Next Generation Bioweapons: The Technology of Genetic Engineering Applied to Biowarfare and Bioterrorism


Next Generation Bioweapons: The Technology of Genetic Engineering Applied to Biowarfare and Bioterrorism

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The history of warfare and the history of disease are unquestionably interwoven. Throughout the history of warfare, disease and non-battle injury have accounted for more deaths and loss of combat capability than from actual battle in war itself. The most striking example is the great influenza pandemic during World War I that killed 20 million people or more worldwide in 1918. Although this was a naturally occurring event, what if a country could create a biological agent that could yield the same catastrophic loss of life on the enemy? That, in essence, is the potential effect of applying genetic engineering for biological warfare (BW) or bioterrorism (BT). Today, we face not only natural diseases (including emerging infectious diseases), but also threats of BW or BT, possibly with genetically engineered agents, that may resist known therapies. In simple terms, genetic engineering is the process of human%an intervention to transfer functional genes (DNA) between two biological organisms. In the BW/BT context, it is the manipulation of genes to create new pathogenic characteristics (increased survivability, infectivity, violence, drug resistance, etc). Organisms with altered characteristics are the "new generation" biological weapons.

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... For further discussion we shall take the (well written) parts from the special study on the matter [4]. Although this 16 year old text is little «out of fashion» its originality cannot be overlooked. ...
... Just before the bioweapon was deployed, the two components would be mixed together. The transformation of the host organism back into a pathogen could conceivably take place after a weapon is triggered and during transport/ flight» [4]. ...
... Research for similar gene splicing in humans continues for possible vectors to carry the replacement genes to their targets. As has been done for animals, there is potential for human -vaccination against certain diseases, or as a targeted delivery capability for therapeutic drugs or cytotoxic effects» [4]. ...
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The catastrophic spread of COVID-19 pandemic, uncontrolled by modern medical science, regardless of whether it is artificial or not, clearly shows the limits of human mind and knowledge to resist this and other similar challenges. The purpose of this work is to show the danger of dual-use biotechnologies in the development of fundamentally new approaches to biological damage to humans. The forecasts of the development of biotechnologies, made by the experts of the American organization JASON and other specialists 23 years ago, are analyzed. It is shown in the article, that in general these forecasts and assessments turned out to be true. The technologies that, most probably, can be used for the development of new means of biological destruction are: binary bioweapons – these are two-component systems that are relatively safe to handle but become deadly when the two components come together on deployment; designer genes – where specific unnatural gene sequences are built into viruses or other life forms to incorporate into the genome of the unsuspecting host, which later becomes the victim; gene therapy – today a medical (partial) reality; the technology that allows medicine to repair or replace defective genes in a diseased individual might be subverted to introduce pathogenic sequences into healthy individuals; stealth viruses – viruses that could be fashioned by a researcher to infect the host but remain silent until activated by some physiological or environmental trigger; host-swapping diseases – new zoonotic agents which might be developed specifically for bioweapon purposes by modifying existing pathogens to seek human hosts; designer diseases – where the detailed knowledge of biochemical signaling pathways could conceivably be used to create designer diseases. In addition to those predicted by JASON, another dual�use technology has emerged recently – synthetic biology. It is a very powerful interdisciplinary branch of biology. Specific examples of the use of these technologies to create new means of biological warfare are given in the article. The author believes that it is necessary not only to track new dual-use biotechnologies, but also to improve conventional and scientific methods of monitoring their use
... Indeed, all types of herding and crowding are closely interwoven with infectious diseases. This applies particularly to warfare, where disease has often trumped combat by its death toll [14,15]: from the epidemic "killing the warriors in droves" evoked by Homer to spark the story of his Iliad, to the plague of Athens in 430 BC that extinguished about a quarter of those entrenched in the besieged overcrowded city, and the Spanish flu pandemic, with (far) more than 20 million victims, during the First World War. ...
... On a less optimistic note, such activity has unavoidably been entangled with bioweapon development 5 , (at least) ever since "variolated" sundries, blankets, and handkerchieves were distributed around Fort Pitt in Pennsylvania to decimate the Native Americans, in the 1760's [16]. And although the ensuing "gain-of-function" 6 research has become increasingly unpopular and repeatedly officially banned [21], it has ar-guably never ceased [15]. The late Steven Hawking's worries 7 about disasters more imminent than those predicted by his cosmological theories thus do not seem to have arisen out of thin air, but rather underscore a commonly underestimated eminent political dimension of epidemiology that has resurfaced in recent debates [22][23][24]. ...
... Referring back to the schematic example of the two cohorts, one will only reap the full benefit of a targeted protection strategy if the population is well mixed. If the vulnerable remain permanently segregated, instead, in close mutual contact rather than dispersed within an already largely immunized population, the risk of devastating outbreaks among them is not diminished as much as it could be ("dry-tinder effect") 15 . Generally speaking, beyond a population's susceptibility distribution, one also needs to address its heterogeneous contact networks, if one wants to fully understand the spreading of an epidemic. ...
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Epidemic disease spreading is conventionally often modelled and analyzed by means of rate and diffusion equations, following the paradigms of well-controlled chemical reactions and diffusive dynamics in a test tube. Yet, serious worries that this suggestive and appealing similarity might be a false friend were already voiced by the pioneers of mathematical epidemiology. A century later, we can draw on cross-fertilizations from network and game theory and the emerging field of eco-evolutionary dynamics to substantiate them. Epidemiological spreading is thereby revealed as a fundamentally heterogeneous and erratic process that shares certain properties with more unwieldy phenomena, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, traffic jams, and stock crashes. They are all characterised by high tail risks that materialize very rarely but fatally. That they arise from bursts of unlikely chains of localized random "superspreader" events, by which micro-scale fluctuations and uncertainties may get heftily magnified, makes their accurate prediction and control intrinsically and notoriously hard. That epidemic disease spreading is moreover closely intertwined with equally heterogeneous genetic drift and information feedback adds new challenges -- and chances.
... The period from 1940 to 1969 can be considered as the golden age of biological warfare research and development. In the last few decades, several incidences of bioterrorism/biological warfare were recorded (Ainscough, 2002). ...
... Anthrax strain 836, Pasechnik's superplague strain, glanders strain, myelin toxin forming Yersinia pestis, tularemia (Schu S-4), and viruses like Ebola, Marburg and influenza are only a few to name them. They also tried their hands at the production of chimeric viruses by introducing genetic elements from Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEEV), Ebola (EBOV), and Marburg (MARV) into native smallpox virus (Ainscough, 2002). ...
... Surprisingly, genetic manipulation procedures were adopted to enhance resistance of the existing etiological agents to high temperature and the available range of therapeutic antibiotics and prophylactic measures, and to make novel immune-suppressive agents that could be easily weaponized when needed. These facts indicate the violation of 1972 BTWC by FSU, as they were continuously engaged in developing designer lethal agents, which they might have integrated into their special war plans (Ainscough, 2002). ...
Biological weapons are highly contagious in nature, designed for warfare scenarios, and cause mass destruction by hammering the economic, environmental, and societal attributes of a country. Rapid advances in genetic engineering and synthetic biology have revolutionized the development of highly lethal and reliable biological agents with enhanced virulence, survivability, and drug resistance. In the current scenario, construction and misuse of next generation synthetic agents is not mere science fiction, but has become a harsh reality. Next generation bioweapons are potential bio-threats to peace, security, and well-being of the targeted country. Thus, effective diagnostic and prophylactic measures need to be developed to mitigate adverse effects caused by the hazardous biological agents. This chapter provides a systematic overview of emergence and synthesis of next generation agents, methods, and challenges associated with detection, protection, and decontamination of the concerned biological agents.
... Biological defenses may have been brought to wider attention given the recent global pandemic, but biological warfare challenges are far from novel. 3 Accordingly, defensive investments into biological programs have been ongoing for many years. Annual fiscal allocation into the chemical and biological defense programs has measured in billons over the past two decades. ...
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Introduction Emerging biological threats represent a serious challenge for force health protection (FHP). Against a novel biological threat, medical countermeasures are the first line of defense. However, as exposed by global pandemic conditions, there are significant complications when administering medical countermeasures against novel threats. One such limitation involved the lack of any guiding structure to discuss and deliberate upon the relative value of employing different countermeasures either alone or in tandem. For example, both personal protective equipment and prophylactic medication can provide some protection, but how are individual protections weighed against operational capabilities and FHP initiatives? The goal of this review is to provide a hierarchical organizing structure to the different medical countermeasures available in response to emerging biological threats. Materials and Methods This review used no explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria for its literature review. References are provided for illustrative purposes to represent different components of the medical hierarchy. Discussion The hierarchy presented here is organized around a resource-durability structure that functions as a push–pull mechanism. Specifically, lower levels of the hierarchy require more resources to sustain FHP conditions while also providing less durable protection. These countermeasures require continual reapplication, and so resources become conceived as much in time and effort to apply as in exhaustible supplies. Higher-order countermeasures require less resources investment as a single application can provide weeks, months, or years of protection. Moreover, higher-order protections are less likely to interfere with military operational capabilities, which further support their classification as superior countermeasures to sustain FHP. The five levels of the hierarchy are presented here as follows, organized from lowest to highest value as a medical countermeasure: (1) Sanitization, (2) personal protective equipment, (3) prophylaxis, (4) vaccines, and (5) optimized immune system. Rationale and descriptions identify how each higher-order countermeasure is superior to its lower-order counterparts while noting that optimizing FHP will likely require employing multiple countermeasures at different levels. The discussion concludes with an overview as to how different countermeasures were employed to various degrees during a novel global pandemic. Conclusions and Future Uses Identifying medical countermeasures is important to optimizing FHP. Different countermeasures have different advantages, and the hierarchy distinguishes between inferior and superior countermeasures through the push–pull style mechanism of resource-durability assessment. Future deployment and development should focus on superior countermeasures to maximize medical protections and operational readiness while understanding the relative value and complications inherent with different countermeasures.
... The real problem with biotechnology subsists in this aspect of genetic engineering, which calls for more questions than answers. Ainscough (2002) describes genetic engineering as giving birth to biowarfare and bioterrorism, while Carus (2017) gives a short history (from prehistory to the twenty-first century) of what he calls biological warfare. ...
Whilst using modern communication technology has immensely aided in connecting people, communities and nations as well as facilitating smooth global interactions, however, its abuse can also have far-reaching repercussions. For instance, there have been escalating reports of cyberbullying, cyber terrorism and numerous forms of cybercrimes, especially in the economic sector. Some extremist ethnic, religious and social groups have also manipulated the cyberspace to pursue their own selfish agendas. Conversely, technology has become a formidable tool in connecting families and friends as well as assisting in conducting business transactions at a much faster and convenient pace. Tapping into the rights-based theory and the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu, our chapter underscores how communication technology can either enhance or infringe upon human relations in our contemporary times. The first part reflects on how technology can positively contribute towards cementing human relationships. The second part discusses how the abuse of technology can impact negatively on the human rights and dignity of others. The concluding section proffers how the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu can foster principles that will help us to become responsible citizens of the world and enhance our capacity to make the best use of technology.
... According to biological warfare experts, natural or genetically engineered virus with novel characteristics, higher transmissibility, adaptability, communicability, ethnic specificity, higher morbidity and mortality rate, difficult to detect or diagnose and treat, with no known vaccine would be an ideal bioweapon. "Tailoring" classical pathogenic virus could achieve all these goals [45,46]. The history of virus based bioweapon is quite old and dates back to the age of World War-I. ...
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SARS-CoV-2 has created a global disaster by infecting millions of people and causing thousands of deaths across hundreds of countries. Currently, the infection is in its exponential phase in several countries and there is no sign of immediate relief from this deadly virus. At the same time, some "conspiracy theories" have arisen on the origin of this virus due to the lack of a "definite origin". To understand if this controversy is also reflected in scientific publications, here, we reviewed the key articles published at initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (January 01, 2020 to April 30, 2020) related to the zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2 and the articles opposing the "conspiracy theories". We also provide an overview on the current knowledge on SARS-CoV-2 Spike as well as the Coronavirus research domain. Furthermore, a few important points related to the "conspiracy theories" such as "laboratory engineering" or "bioweapon" aspects of SARS-CoV-2 are also reviewed. In this article, we have only considered the peer-reviewed publications that are indexed in PubMed and other official publications, and we have directly quoted the authors' statements from their respective articles to avoid any controversy.
... In 1997, a team of accomplished scientists within a group known as the JASON f group met to discuss the future of biological warfare. 10 They identified six emerging biological threats that needed to be monitored by military planners and strategists: (1) g Binary biological weapons are organisms or biological products that are non-lethal when separated and only become lethal upon mixing the separate components together. ...
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Recent developments in biochemistry, genetics, and molecular biology have made it possible to engineer living organisms. Although these developments offer effective and efficient means with which to cure disease, increase food production, and improve quality of life for many people, they can also be used by state and non-state actors to develop engineered biological weapons. The virtuous circle of bioinformatics, engineering principles, and fundamental biological science also serves as a vicious cycle by lowering the skill-level necessary to produce weapons. The threat of bioengineered agents is all the more clear as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the enormous impact that a single biological agent, even a naturally occurring one, can have on society. It is likely that terrorist organizations are monitoring these developments closely and that the probability of a biological attack with an engineered agent is steadily increasing.
... By combining contemporary fi ndings, approach based on biological systems, one can facilitate the development of agents that will attack biological systems (cardiovascular, immune, neurological, gastrointestinal) and processes, leading to the death, incapacitation or neurological damage (Block, 1999;Cannonset al., 2006;Gottschalk & Preiser, 2005;Ghandi, 2011;Petro, Plasse & McNulty, 2003). In an attempt to draw attention to a wide range of dangers that we may face in the future, an independent group of scientists, JASON, suggested the classifi cation of advanced biological weapons in 1997 ("from trivial modifi cation of existing pathogens to completely synthesized illness and life forms"): binary biological weapons, designed genes and life forms, gene therapy as a weapon, stealth viruses, host-swapping diseases and designed diseases (Block, 1999;Ainscough, 2002). Other authors predict the possibility of using food as a weapon -"edible weapons", "insect fi ghters" or even ethnic biological weapons (Th e Sunshine Project, 2004;Petroet al., 2003;Cannonset al., 2006). ...
Conference Paper
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Bioterrorism is the use of biological weapons during the perpetration of terrorist attacks. Biological weapons are weaponized biological agents, various microorganisms and products of their metabolism, whether isolated from nature, cultivated and genetically modifi ed in laboratories or even artifi cially created (new generation of and advanced biowarfare). Biological agents could be easily transmitted among targeted population (people, animals and plants) and may cause high morbidity and mortality rates, major public health impact, public panic and social disruption. If we add mass migrations and globalization processes to this equation, multiplied with media coverage of possible bioterrorist attacks, the result could be terrifying. Defence mechanism in the case of bioterrorism relies on timely detection of biological weapons usage, intelligence data and state agencies response. Detection of biological agents is very diffi cult, due to their nature and lack of resources needed to use necessary detection technologies. Th e intelligence services will not always get information about planned attacks on time; such information could be obtained immediately prior to the attack. Preparedness of state agencies to respond to a bioterrorist attack is also questionable: timely and adequate diagnosis, decontamination, treatment and prophylaxis require organized, planned and knowledge-based actions, as well as material and human resources. Even if someone would argue that bioterrorism is not a real and ongoing threat to security in Serbia, we think that the right time for the preparation and realization of preventive measures and strategies would be right NOW. If we wait for bioterrorism to become ongoing threat, that will be an early intervention, not prevention. Th e main purpose of this paper is to, by reviewing referent literature, bring focus to the ever growing threat of bioterrorism and to urge the scientifi c community to prevent it in Serbia. In this paper we will present the ways in which bioterrorism can threaten human security in economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security domain. Prevention based on protection, such as development of national strategies for response in case of attacks with biological weapons and methods for their detection, and empowerment of the general public, in the form of information and education on the measures of protection in the case of an attack with biological weapons, will be presented as well. Keywords: bioterrorism, human security, prevention, protection, empowerment, Serbia
... Massive increases in biodefense funding spurred a number of ambitious research projects to mitigate the risks of a bioterror attack through medical countermeasures. In a high-profile case, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease director Anthony Fauci said in October 2002 that the additional $1.5 billion in funding attributed to his agency would allow it to produce a vaccine and two drugs for some twelve bioweapons diseases within just 10 years [7]-a tall task considering a single drug costs more than $1 billion to bring to market [37]. The U.S. also signed many contracts with private companies hoping to produce new vaccines and drugs, including a sizable contract with VaxGen for a next-generation anthrax vaccine as part of Project Bio Shield. ...
... 2003). In an attempt to draw attention to a wide range of dangers that we may face in the future, an independent group of scientists, JASON, suggested the classifi cation of advanced biological weapons in 1997 ("from trivial modifi cation of existing pathogens to completely synthesized illness and life forms"): binary biological weapons, designed genes and life forms, gene therapy as a weapon, stealth viruses, host-swapping diseases and designed diseases (Block, 1999;Ainscough, 2002). Other authors predict the possibility of using food as a weapon -"edible weapons", "insect fi ghters" or even ethnic biological weapons (Th e Sunshine Project, 2004;Petroet al., 2003;Cannonset al., 2006). ...
Conference Paper
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Infective agents are considered as one of the leading security risks due to possible consequences that can entail immense impacts at medical, political, economic, socio-psychological and military level as evidenced by great outbreaks that changed human history in the past (plague, cholera, smallpox, influenza) as well as consequences of SARS, Ebola and HIV in the recent times. The potential misuse of infective agents for bioterrorism is also an important security threat. Actual great migrations we are faced with present the risk for the emergence of new, re-emergence of old diseases and raising the incidence of existing infective disorders in the European continent that is the subject of this paper. The preparation of the national resources for the adequate response and prevention is also discussed as well as specific national and international regulations, reccomendations and experience. Key words: infective agents, migrations, outbreaks, bioterrorism
... In asymmetric warfare, biological weapons are seen as a "great equalizer. 114 To Ainscough's conclusion we can add that pairing genetic weapons with MAVs and DNA detectors may be precise enough to argue that these are not terror weapons at all, hence increasing the potential for future use. This potential may be reinforced by considering whether self-defense doctrines permit the envisioned threat system. ...
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Introduction Vaccine technology has improved substantially since the first smallpox vaccine, developed more than 200 years ago. As technology improves, vaccines can be produced more safely and reliably for many different pathogens. A recent breakthrough saw the first full deployment of mRNA vaccines to fight a pandemic. Despite the technological and logistical feat of developing a viable vaccine in an abbreviated time frame, there have been many questions about this new approach to vaccine development. The current review will provide descriptions about different types of vaccines as well as answers to some common questions about mRNA vaccines. The purpose is to provide military medical professionals with the information needed to better convey the importance and function of these new vaccines to service members. Materials and Methods There were no explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria for articles describing mRNA vaccine technology. References included here were intended to illustrate important principles or empirical evidence in demonstrating the safety, efficacy, and function of mRNA vaccines. Discussion The review describes three different types of vaccines: whole-pathogen, subunit, and nucleic acid. Each vaccine type has different implications for the development and production of a vaccine line. For example, whole-pathogen and subunit vaccines often require growing significant amounts of the vaccine sample in laboratory before the material can be incorporated into the vaccine. Nucleic acid vaccines instead provide cells the opportunity to produce key proteins without needing to reproduce the virus and attenuate it in a laboratory setting. This approach has a notable advantage of speed in moving from genome sequencing to vaccine production, but it also creates some potential confusion. The discussion covers three questions with regard to this confusion. First, was the vaccine developed too quickly? Speed here is a byproduct of the new technology and unprecedented government interdepartmental cooperation. No steps were skipped in development or production. Second, does the vaccine modify DNA? No, the mRNA vaccines never enter the cell nucleus and therefore cannot modify DNA. The discussion clarifies how mRNA enters cells and produces the key proteins required to stimulate an immune system response. Third, how long will immunity last? Because mRNA vaccines are new, long-term immunity cannot be projected without significant further study. Still, the discussion does cover issues in determining vaccine efficacy in clinical laboratory trials versus field effectiveness in the real world. Conclusions and Future Uses These mRNA vaccines are the newest and most sophisticated defensive tool military medicine has against emerging biological threats. Evolving dangers, such as synthetic biology and engineered pathogens, further enhance the importance of having defensive countermeasures that can be rapidly deployed in response. Current evidence suggests high safety and effectiveness for a biological countermeasure, decades in the making, and military medical personnel should feel confident using and recommending this technology to ensure force health protection.
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In the fourth industrial revolution, where almost the entire world is connected through the internet, mental health plays a great role. The National Center for Health Statistics noted a suicide-rate increase of some 35 percent between 1999 and 2018, with the rate growing approximately 2 percent a year since 2006. Suicide is now the tenth-leading cause of death in the United States. Depression increases suicide risk—about 60 percent of people who die by suicide have had a mood disorder. The Health Care Cost Institute’s 2018 report disclosed that per-person spending on mental health admissions increased 33 percent between 2014 and 2018, while outpatient spending on psychiatry grew 43 percent. Between 2007 and 2017, the percentage of medical claims associated with behavioral health (both mental illnesses and addictions) more than doubled. According to WHO, currently there are 970 million worldwide suffering from mental health disease worldwide and it is predicted to grow and will be the main cause of disease by 2029. Cyberspace, driven by information systems and the Internet, is changing our world in unprecedented ways by facilitating economic development and creating innovative ways for people to communicate, engage, negotiate, and collaborate with one another. There is almost no aspect of human endeavour that has not been domesticated in the realm of cyberspace. Personal and societal changes are brought on by cyberspace. The number of human events that have shifted from actual, face-to-face meetings to interactions facilitated by remote, distant connectivity has increased dramatically, changing human behaviour, goals, governance, parenting, and so on. The wellbeing of cyberspace, like public health, has an effect on about every area of contemporary culture. Businesses, governments, and societies would be unable to survive if critical elements of the cyberspace system are compromised or lost (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010). Failures in cyberspace health may have a huge impact on a nation’s strength. In this paper, we discuss: 1) What is cyberspace, cyberspace mental health and why is it so important? 2) Addressing the societal landscape 3) Understanding our mind, brain and body 4) How can we harness science and technology for humanity? 5) Call for action – framework for a healthy cyberspace mental landscape
Bioethics refers to ethical issues arising from the creation and maintenance of the health of all living things. Technology embraces the concept of techniques to derive a product, and the required knowledge of its use, application and process in developing products (Lovell 1998; Bozeman 2000), while the techniques, skills, and knowledge required to create and maintain the health of all living things, is termed biotechnology. United Nations (UNCTAD 2002, 3), define biotechnology as “technologies that use biological matter or processes to generate new and useful products”. Such techniques range from genetic modification, hybridization, interbreeding and manipulation of individual genes in humans, animals, plants and microorganisms. For Batalion (2000), the central problem of biotechnology lies in the overall attempt to control living nature on an erroneous mechanistic view. I think the problem is instead ethical and geographically discriminative, since certain parts of the world, like Africa, are affected more negatively by the impacts of biotechnology on life than in other parts of the world. The hypothesis is that the relationship between technology and organic life, by the use of biotechnology, has great ethical implications for developing countries, like sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, we investigate African ethical perspective on bioethics and biotechnology.
ASHINGTON, Sept. 27 — The Office of Homeland Security announced by President Bush after the Sept. 11 attacks will be elevated to a new White House agency with powers to match those of the National Security Council, the White House chief of staff said tonight. The new Homeland Security Council will be run by Gov. Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania. It will include the attorney general, the secretaries of defense, treasury, health and human services and agriculture, as well as the directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. "If you take a look at what Condi Rice does so effectively, you'll get an idea what Governor Ridge will be doing just as effectively," said the chief of staff, Andrew H. Card Jr., referring to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser. The National Security Council was created in 1947 at the dawn of the cold war. It was designed to coordinate national defense, diplomacy and intelligence at the highest levels for the president. Similarly, the new council, which will have 100 staff members, comparable in size to the national security staff, is intended to help coordinate counterterrorism and prevent a repeat of the Sept. 11 attack on the United States. Defense officials said the administration had also decided to create a military homeland defense command. And the White House's longtime terrorism czar will now concentrate solely on the threat of attacks on computer systems, officials said. In a speech to a joint meeting of Congress on Sept. 15, President Bush announced that Governor Ridge, a longtime friend and political ally, would run a new White House Office of Homeland Security. But he gave only a broad hint of how that office might work. Empowered by its proximity to the president rather than actual legal authority, the office is intended to "coordinate activities, to make sure that anybody who wants to harm America will have a hard time doing so," President Bush said today.
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CambridgeThe Anthrax Terror
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Jonathan B. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 4-5; and Jim A. Davis, “The Anthrax Terror,” Aerospace Power Journal, Vol XIV, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 17.
Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology,” in The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, eds
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  • Thomas M Gorman
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Stephen M. Block, “Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology,” in The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, eds. Sidney Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 58; see also, Robert G. Webster, William J. Bean, Owen T. Gorman, Thomas M. Chambers, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka, “Evolution and Ecology of Influenza A Viruses,” Microbiological Reviews, March 1992, 152-179.