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Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords
Abstract
With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992, a process began of dividing the commonly held assets of the Soviet republics between newly independent states. The two most important of these new states, Russia and Ukraine, had much to divide between them. Western observers began to worry that disputes between the two countries over the transfer of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, the final legal status of Crimea, and the possession of the Black Sea Fleet (hereafter denoted as "BSF") and its home port of Sevastopol could escalate into a crisis with violent consequences. Yet after five years of public posturing, stalemate, and stop-&-go diplomatic negotiations, Ukraine and Russia reached an agreement, signed by Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on May 28, 1997. While it was expected that Russian President Boris Yeltsin would sign the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, few senior Ukrainian officials believed that a separate BSF agreement could be reached. It was also surprising that Moscow had accepted conditions similar to those it had rejected in October, 1996.
Rakstā apskatīta Krievijas Federācijas militārā invāzija Krimā 2014. gada pavasarī un tā analizēta no starptautisko tiesību viedokļa, izmantojot normatīvo aktu analīzes metodi. Pētījuma rezultātā tiek atzīts, ka Krievijas Federācijas aktivitātes Krimā ir vērtējamas kā kara noziegums. The article provides overview of the military invasion of the Russian Federation in Crimea during the spring of 2014, analysing it from the point of view of the international law. The method of analysis of legal acts has been allpied. The provided conclusions prove that the activities of the Russian Federation in Crimea can be defined as a war crime.
This article analyses Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis in the context of Moscow’s foreign policy historical development, underlining patterns of continuity and change in its policies towards the CIS. It argues that Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine results from a combination of two trends, reinforcing a Russian interventionist agenda: perceived threats to Russia’s interests in the near abroad and a radicalised and conservative national spectrum shaping foreign policy decisions. The combination of domestic and external factors driving Russia’s agenda in the near abroad raises important challenges for Russian society and its leaders as it does for its neighbours and partners.
This paper discusses the macroeconomic challenges and opportunities facing Sudan and South Sudan following their mutual separation in July 2011. It was written as part of the framework for informing the Sudan and South Sudan parties in negotiations following the secession of the South. Mutual viability was a key issue. While events have moved on since then, some of the language of the original paper has been preserved. The paper argues that close economic cooperation borne out of the realization of economic interdependence, and geographical and cultural proximity should be a central feature of economic policy for both countries. Institutions to ensure this, including correspondent commercial banks and trading houses, will need to be created. Externally, Sudan and, especially the newly independent South Sudan, will need to make choices about the trading blocs to join, as well as the speed of convergence to the regional trading norms. The paper concludes that Sudan-South Sudan macroeconomic cooperation could be an important agency of restraint on domestic policy makers and prevent policies from swinging too much to the vagaries of political pressure.
Key Words: Sudan, South Sudan, Macroeconomic Cooperation
Zambia Social Science Review, Vol 3, No 1 (2012/2014)
The 27-31 May 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine, and the accompanying resolution of the status of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, has redefined the relationship between the two states. The accords finally give substance to Russia's rhetorical recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity, and mark a shift away from pressure towards cooperation as a way of persuading Ukraine that its future lies in closer integration with Russia. The accords also seem to vindicate Ukraine's policy of building up relations with NATO and the West. While there is still opposition to the Russia-Ukraine deal in both countries, and an enduring desire by powerful Russian interests to dominate Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet accords provide a basis for hope that Russian-Ukrainian relations will continue to improve.