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Theory as Foundation for Strategic Communication Doctrine

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Civilian and military leaders throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledge the importance of strategic communication for operational forces today. Although strategic communication has been defined in the DoD, much still needs to be done to develop joint doctrine that geographical combatant commands (GCCs) can use for implementing strategic communication in support of operations. This paper examines the development of strategic communication in the 21st century, discusses a framework for analysis and a model for communication which could be used as the foundation for doctrine, and provides recommendations for the future development of strategic communication joint doctrine.
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Theory as Foundation for Strategic Communication Doctrine
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Norberto R. Menendez, MAJ, USA
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14. ABSTRACT
Civilian and military leaders throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledge the importance of strategic
communication for operational forces today. Although strategic communication has been defined in the DoD,
much still needs to be done to develop joint doctrine that geographical combatant commands (GCCs) can use for
implementing strategic communication in support of operations. This paper examines the development of strategic
communication in the 21st century, discusses a framework for analysis and a model for communication which could
be used as the foundation for doctrine, and provides recommendations for the future development of strategic
communication joint doctrine.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Strategic Communication, Theory, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations, framework for
analysis, geographic combatant commands, pragmatic complexity model
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
Theory as Foundation for Strategic Communication Doctrine
by
Norberto R. Menendez
Major, United States Army
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
Signature: _____________________
04 MAY 2009
ii
Contents
Introduction 1
Background 2
Discussion 9
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication 10
Information Operations and Strategic Communication 11
Framework for Analysis 12
Model for Communication 14
Conclusion 15
Recommendations 16
Notes 18
Bibliography 21
iii
Abstract
Civilian and military leaders throughout the Department of Defense (DoD)
acknowledge the importance of strategic communication for operational forces today.
Although strategic communication has been defined in the DoD, much still needs to be done
to develop joint doctrine that geographical combatant commands (GCCs) can use for
implementing strategic communication in support of operations. This paper examines the
development of strategic communication in the 21st century, discusses a framework for
analysis and a model for communication which could be used as the foundation for doctrine,
and provides recommendations for the future development of strategic communication joint
doctrine.
1
INTRODUCTION
To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and
global struggle about ideas…
-- Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 2004
The United States has engaged in a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in
Afghanistan and Iraq for nearly a decade. Consequently, the United States Government
(USG) has recognized the importance of strategic communication in the counterinsurgency
environment and beyond. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States
highlights that “in the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the war of ideas,1
and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states “victory in the long war ultimately
depends on the strategic communication by the United States…”2
Strategic communication has been the topic of several studies in the Department of
Defense (DoD). Scholars are studying its complexities, and geographic combatant command
(GCC) commanders continuously emphasize its importance. In 2007, U.S. Southern
Command’s Admiral James Stavridis paraphrased World War II Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Ernest King: “I don’t know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that
Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.”3 Remarkably, despite the level of
attention given to strategic communication, there is no joint doctrine. This lack of doctrine
has made it very difficult for GCCs to integrate and execute strategic communication within
their areas of responsibility.
Acknowledging that strategic communication joint doctrine is evolving, this paper
argues that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) must work to develop and deliver a sound
doctrinal model. Doctrine must be anchored on public diplomacy theory, and must integrate
2
a communications model useful to GCC staffs while executing the joint operational planning
process.
BACKGROUND
The concept of strategic communication as it is known today can trace its roots to a
document known as the Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and
Dissemination of All Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in
Times of Military Conflict published on May, 2000 (DSB 2000). This report was the result
of a Congressional directive for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The directive tasked
the SECDEF to establish a task force to examine the use of radio and television broadcasting
as a propaganda instrument in times of military conflict, and to review the adequacy of the
capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, to make use of radio and television during operations
in the Balkans.4
DSB 2000 was initially commissioned as a result of the EC-130E (Commando Solo)
aircraft’s inability to adequately disseminate television and radio broadcasts in support of
operations in the Balkans.5 However, the task force quickly determined that the report must
be “addressed in the context of an overall information operations campaign” and expanded
the original intent to include an evaluation of organizational issues associated with PSYOP
within the Department of Defense (DoD), and their relationship with intelligence
organizations. 6 Additionally, the task force addressed modern trends in information
dissemination and media content creation.
Upon conclusion of the study, the DSB 2000 offered nine recommendations to the
SECDEF. These recommendations can be categorized in three groups: recommendations on
issues associated with PSYOP as an organization, recommendations on issues associated
3
with PSYOP ability to tap into media dissemination systems, and recommendations on
technical aspects of information dissemination and media content creation.7 DSB 2000 is
important to the defining of strategic communication because the recommendations outlined
become the starting point of the next report, the Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Managed Information Dissemination published on October, 2001 (DSB 2001).
Additionally, the term “strategic” is defined in the context of information operations,
meaning that the term is simply used to differentiate between the three categories of PSYOP
(strategic, operational, and tactical).8 Strategic PSYOP is primarily conducted outside the
military arena, can use DoD support, and is conducted to achieve USG objectives.
Operational PSYOP is conducted to support joint forces in a defined operational area, and
tactical PSYOP is conducted to support tactical objectives in a defined tactical area. By
defining strategicthis way, strategic becomes an effect measured by the size of the
audience reached, and the level of objectives supported, a very simplistic characterization
that does not account for the complexities of the information domain.
Acting on the recommendations of DSB 2000, DSB 2001 was co-sponsored by the
DoD, and the Department of State (DoS). In the terms of reference to the Defense Science
Board, the sponsors requested that the Task Force “determine the need and feasibility of a
coordinated information dissemination capability within the USG encompassing tactical,
operational, and strategic information.”9
The DSB 2001 addressed two components of strategic information: first, the
coordination of national level information, and second, the means to disseminate the
message.10 Accordingly, all ten recommendations reflected concepts to improve on these
two components. Recommendations this time can be categorized in two groups,
4
recommendations on systems to improve coordination, and recommendations on purchasing
and/or using hardware/software capabilities to disseminate the message.11
The DSB 2001 highlights information as a strategic resource less understood but no
less important than the other instruments of national power.12 “Strategic” in this document is
used in the context of a level of command. Additionally, every time strategic communication
(with and without an “s”)1 is mentioned in the document, it is referring to a capability able to
reach multiple and diverse audiences, such as the internet or high-power radios; strategic in
the DSB 2001 is a capability as opposed to an effect. For example, the use of the internet to
disseminate information to a target audience that has access to the technology, and the act of
communicating through this medium. Focus is on the technical aspects of the transmission,
instead of the message or the target audience’s reaction to the message.
At this point in the development of strategic communication, GCCs and combatant
command staffs had very little to work with. Many scholars and leaders recognize the
importance of strategic communication, but despite the level of attention given to the matter,
JFCOM has not yet begun to develop doctrine. Staffs looking for a frame of reference would
have found two reports that do not clearly define strategic communication, each used
“strategic” in different contexts, and do not offer a framework from which to begin
developing doctrine.
By 2004, the United States was engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. This situation prompted the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) to request the
Defense Science Board to conduct a study on the transition to and from hostilities.13 As a
result of this request, one of the six panels assembled for the study revisited the topic of the
1 Strategic Communication is the proper term for the topic of this paper. Strategic Communications (with an
“s”) refer to equipment used for communicating at the strategic level of command.
5
DSB 2001 and commenced work on the Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic
Communication published on September, 2004 (DSB 2004).
Using the DSB 2001 as the baseline, the DSB 2004 examined the recommendations
given, and expanded their study to account for the new strategic environment as a result of
the 9/11 attacks. This was done to determine what new Presidential directive or means might
be needed for strategic communication, and how to use open information operations in
support of public diplomacy.14 The DSB 2004 offered seven recommendations which
included new legislation to fund the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Communication to chair the Strategic Communication Committee (SCC); the
creation of two new organizations, the SCC within the National Security Council to
coordinate public diplomacy across the interagency, and the independent non-profit Center
for Strategic Communication to enhance government-private sector collaboration in support
of strategic communication; and several organizational changes to structure aimed at
streamlining interagency coordination and support relationships for more effective public
diplomacy.15 The DSB 2004 also recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have
appropriate strategic communication components.”16 However, the DSB 2004 did not
address how GCCs might integrate strategic communication into operations, nor did it
mention a need for joint strategic communication doctrine to achieve this end.
In the DSB 2004 the term “strategic communication” is used for the first time in the
context of its current definition. Unfortunately, the DSB 2004 does not define strategic
communication, but the term is used this time to describe a process to “understand,”
6
“engage,” “advice,” and “influence” global audiences.17 Throughout the document, strategic
communication is used analogously with public diplomacy.18
The next document to address strategic communication is the Quadrennial Defense
Review Report 2006 (QDR). The QDR addressed strategic communication as an
assessment and a process to support strategic objectives, and as a grouping of capabilities
that are used to deliver the message.19 The QDR does not attempt to define strategic
communication, but does mention a need for strategic communication programs, plans, and
policies to support GCCs.20
As a result of the QDR, the QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication
was published on October 2006 (QDRERSC). This is the first time the term “strategic
communication” is defined within the USG. Strategic communication was defined as
focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create,
strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to the advance national interests and objectives
through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions
synchronized with other elements of national power.21
In addition to the definition above, the QDRERSC established the goal of
“developing a culture that recognizes the value of communication and integrates
communication considerations into policy development, operational planning, execution, and
assessment to advance national interests.”22 Three objectives were crafted in support of this
goal. The objectives provided additional guidance in the establishment of doctrine, the
establishment of responsibilities and relationships, and resourcing of equipment.23
Although the QDRERSC recognized the need to establish doctrine to better integrate
strategic communication into operational planning, today, joint forces still lack doctrine from
7
which to plan. The most valuable aspect of the QDRERSC to GCCs is that it allocated funds
to develop operational concepts on how to best employ the Joint Public Affairs Support
Element (JPASE), DoD PSYOP capabilities, and combat camera organizations in support of
strategic communication. Additionally, the QDRERSC called for the development of
operational concepts on how to best employ cross-cultural communication and language
expertise; regionally focused activities to collect, analyze, and fuse open-source information;
Theater Security Cooperation Strategies and Implementation Plans; and Defense Support of
Public Diplomacy programs.24 The weakness of these operational concepts is that they
lacked doctrinal foundation when employed in the context of strategic communication.
The QDRERSC literally defined strategic communication for the DoD, and this
definition is congruent with the process to “understand,” “engage,” “advise,” and “influence”
established in DSB 2004. For the first time, GCC staffs had a definition to use for planning,
but there is still much to be done in the development of joint doctrine.
Recognizing the continuously changing global environment, the DoD requested the
Defense Science Board to conduct a summer study in 2007 on Challenges of Military
Operations in Support of U.S. Interests which was published on December, 2008. Within the
context of this larger study, the Task Force on Strategic Communication reconvened to
review and asses the recommendations and progress made since the completion of the earlier
studies on strategic communication. Their latest report on this topic is the Report of the
Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication published on January, 2008 (DSB
2008). This time, strategic communication was defined as “a sustained and coherent set of
activities that include understanding, advising, engaging, influencing, and measuring. These
activities are elements in a continuous, dynamic, and interactive process that begins with
8
choices among strategic priorities and deep comprehension of attitudes and cultures.25 This
is a much better definition for the GCCs because it succinctly articulates that strategic
communication is a continuous process that is interactive and requires measuring, something
missing from the QDRERSC definition. As defined by the QDRERSC, there is no mention
of the need for long term engagement or the complex nature of communicating with a foreign
audience.
The DSB 2008 offered seven recommendations to the SECDEF. Reflecting the
recommendation from the DSB 2004, the DSB 2008 focused on ways to improve
organizations, develop tools and technologies to support strategic communication, and
leverage programs for the enhancement of strategic communication.26 The DSB 2008 also
described strategic communication as an “instrument of statecraft that depends on shared
knowledge and adaptive networks.”27
The evolution of strategic communication over the past decade has been very
incongruent. Initially, the DSB 2000 used the term strategic in the context of an information
operation with strategic effects. Later, the DSB 2001 made use of the term strategic
information (used together) making reference to a level of coordination (national level of
government), and a method of dissemination. Strategic communication, first used in the
DoD in 2004, referred to a process. The QDR in turn referred to strategic communication as
a process that requires assessment, and the capabilities needed to deliver the message.
Finally, the QDRERSC and the DSB 2008 referred to strategic communication as a process
and a dialogue.
As strategic communication evolved, joint doctrine defined it as “focused United
States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create,
9
strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies,
and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and
products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power.28 This is only
slightly modified from the definition of the QDRERSC, and there is no indication that the
definition will change in the near future, despite further research and studies on the topic by
the Defense Science Board and others.
Joint Publication 3-13 goes on to list primary supporting capabilities of strategic
communication as Public Affairs (PA), Defense Support of Public Diplomacy (DSPD), and
Information Operations (IO) capabilities.29 However, this is where current doctrine
culminates. Joint doctrine emphasizes the importance of synchronizing PA, DSPD, and IO in
support of strategic communication, but does not go on to develop how these relationships
should be established, or what framework planners should use. Strategic communication, as
defined today, evolved from a series of lessons learned and best practices captured by the
Defense Science Board studies and the QDR. The challenge with this approach is that there
is no baseline from which to adapt. The lack of theory in the development of strategic
communication doctrine delivers to planners a system that is continuing to change in a
pragmatic way, instead of providing a common point of departure for analysis and thought.
DISCUSSION
As strategic communication doctrine emerges, the lack of scholarly research in the
field of public diplomacy and strategic communication must be accounted for. 30 As
discussed in the previous section, strategic communication has been used to describe the
means of delivering a message (technical aspects), the effects of the message (strategic
consequence), and the coordination of the message (process). Since joint doctrine has
10
defined strategic communication as a process, and future definitions will likely define
strategic communication as a process also, developing joint doctrine must address the
interrelationship between the desired objective (ends), the message and the intended audience
(ways), and the delivery mechanism (means). This relationship should be addressed within a
framework for analysis, and a model for communication that will allow GCC staffs to
integrate strategic communication into operational joint commands in order to make them
more effective.
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
DoD defines public diplomacy as “those overt international public information
activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to
understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening
dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.31
In short, public diplomacy is global dialogue. It is “the means by which states,
association of states, and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build
and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and
values.”32 By law, this is a function of the Department of State (DoS).33 But the need for the
DoD and DoS to collaborate in the field is well documented throughout all the Defense
Science Board studies, and in the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication.34
“Public diplomacy differs from education, journalism, advertising, branding, and
public relations, however, it imports methods and discourse norms from civil society, and it
depends on deep and diverse relationships with civil society to succeed.”35 Public
diplomacy, as strategic communication, is about dialogue with key audiences, and the U.S.
11
National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication does not differentiate
between public diplomacy and strategic communication, making use of the terms
analogously.36 If public diplomacy and strategic communication are inherently defined the
same way, then the theoretical framework needed for strategic communication doctrine will
be found in the developing field of public diplomacy.
Information Operations and Strategic Communication
Doctrinally, IO is a function that seeks to integrate “electronic warfare (EW),
computer network operations (CNO), operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations
(PSYOP), and military deception (MILDEC) and related capabilities to disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”37 IO
may target cognitive, informational and/or physical dimensions of the information
environment.38
With the understanding that current joint doctrine defines strategic communication as
a process and IO as an integrating function, differentiating between the two becomes easier.
Strategic communication seeks to target “key audiences” (friendly, neutral, and adversarial),
to “understand and engage.” IO seeks to target adversarial human and automated decision
making to disrupt, corrupt, or usurp. Strategic communication works in the cognitive
dimension. IO works in the cognitive, informational, and physical dimensions. DoD
supports strategic communication with DSPD, PA and IO (specifically PSYOP). IO
integrates EW, CNO, OPSEC, MILDEC, and PSYOP; has five supporting capabilities,
information assurance, physical security, physical attack, combat camera, and
counterintelligence; and has three related capabilities, PA, PSYOP, and DSPD.
12
The nuances and differences between strategic communication and IO are significant
to the development of joint doctrine as strategic communication is often confused as
“strategic” IO (in contrast to operational or tactical IO). Developing doctrine must articulate
the difference between the two. This is critical to having the ability to define target
audiences for strategic communication and IO at operational joint force headquarters.
Framework for Analysis
In a field where theory is still under development, leading scholars often cite Dr.
Mark Leonard’s public diplomacy variables as a potential foundation of public diplomacy
theory.39 One of these scholars, Dr. Eytan Gilboa, integrates the variables into a single
framework.40 This framework could serve as a foundation for doctrine in this emerging field
of academic study.
Dr. Leonard’s variables distinguish between three dimensions of public diplomacy:
news management, medium range campaigns on high value policies,41 and relationship
building.42 The three dimensions engage within three spheres: political/military, economic,
and social/cultural.43 The framework offers two types of public diplomacy engagement:
cooperation and competition.44 Finally, Dr. Leonard distinguishes between five public
diplomacy instruments which can help deliver the message: Non-Governmental Organization
(NGO) diplomacy, Diaspora diplomacy, political party diplomacy, brand diplomacy, and
business diplomacy.45
Dr. Gilboa takes these variables and connects them into a single framework following
a “structured focused comparison.”46 Within the framework, the three dimensions of public
diplomacy are characterized by the time in which they seek to achieve their objective and the
purpose. News management can be measured in hours or days and is reactive in nature,
13
medium range campaigns on high value policies can be measured in weeks or months and is
proactive in nature, and relationship building can be measured in years and emphasizes long
term relationship building. GCC staffs tend to focus most of their effort on the news
management dimension, and refer to this as strategic communication.47 This is a very narrow
way to define the operational challenge of strategic communication, and neglects the
importance of working across all three dimensions of strategic communication to achieve
stated objectives. Additionally, all three dimensions are applied within all three spheres,48
and engagement within all three spheres, along the range of all three dimensions, can be
cooperative or competitive.49
The five diplomacy instruments identified by Dr. Leonard build on the Walter
Lippmann premise that most people don’t choose between true and false messengers, they
choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy messengers.50 Following this logic, Dr.
Leonard suggests that NGOs, Diaspora, political party, brand, and business diplomacy are
instruments that provide trustworthy messengers to numerous audiences through the use of
already established relationships and name recognition. This is another area where the lack
of doctrine hinders GCC planners’ ability to align messages with messengers. The
messenger is just as important as the message; planners must understand that the messenger
must be handpicked to communicate to an audience, and that the messenger communicating
with a single audience might not be effective across all three dimensions of strategic
communication.
Developing doctrine on a theoretical model like the one suggested by Dr. Gilboa,
based on the variables outlined by Dr. Leonard, will allow GCC planners to better understand
the complex information environment and develop better processes to support their
14
respective organizations. Having already established that public diplomacy and strategic
communication are analogous terms, this framework could serve as a solid foundation from
which to develop operational joint doctrine.
Model for Communication
In addition to a framework for analysis, the development of strategic communication
doctrine must consider a model for communication. A framework allows GCC planners to
understand the parameters within which they have to work; the model for communication
allows the GCC planners to understand how the message should be communicated to the
“target audience.”
Whether PA or PSYOP, much of the argument on how they support strategic
communication revolves around the “tailoring” of the message to engage a specific audience,
and who might be most capable of accomplishing the task.51 Current doctrine for PA and
PSYOP, emphasize the crafting of the message, and the capacity to deliver the message.
This method of communicating is based on the message influence model of communications,
a long standing model frequently used in advertising and public relations. 52
The message influence model assumes that communication is the transfer of meaning
from person to person and the message sent is the one that counts.53 However, this model
does not account for the meaning listeners give the message based on factors like
“autobiography, history, local context, culture, language, power relations, and immediate
personal needs.”54 Given the large amount of research and writing on this topic since the
turn of the century, message influence modeling has not worked well in the complex
information environment of the post 9/11 world. Operational joint commands have identified
15
this shortcoming, and continuously assess how the message is being received by the intended
audiences.55
Strategic communication must transition to a more modern model for communication
than one that puts most of the effort on the crafting of the message as PA and PSYOP
practitioners might suggest. An alternative is the Pragmatic Complexity Model (PCOM).
This communication model recognizes that the “message received is the one that really
counts, a fact that GCC commanders and staffs have already learned on their own based on
emerging lessons learned from the field.56 The PCOM does not assume that there is a
listener “out there” waiting to be impacted by a message. Instead, the messenger and the
listener are locked in a relationship of simultaneous, mutual interdependence. The listener is
influenced by the messenger’s behavior as well as the listener’s expectations, interpretations,
and attributions with respect to the messenger.57
As joint strategic communication doctrine continues to develop, it must address the
complexities of the 21st century information environment by including a communication
model that will allow GCC planners to develop plans for communicating the message. The
pragmatic complexity model will allow GCC planners to better understand communication
modeling and provide them the tools to develop better messaging strategies.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Secretary of Defense Dr. Robert Gates, on his April 17, 2009 address to the
Naval War College, mentioned that the now defunct U.S. Information Agency had a
tremendous impact on the winning the cold war. Dr. Gates was alluding to the importance of
strategic communication in winning the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the need to have
16
the capability to communicate messages and information that would create an environment
favorable to the U.S. and its allies.
To achieve this end, the military must enable success within the unique
communication environment by creating doctrine that establishes the foundation for analysis
function, and communication. These elements of the strategic communication doctrine
would reflect an understanding of what strategic communication is, and how it should be
employed at the joint operational level.
As this doctrine is written, it should be firmly anchored on theory, as opposed to
temporal lessons learned which are specific to a particular environment at a particular point
of time. Doctrine based on the framework for analysis and communication model could
serve as sound foundation for the continued discussion among scholars and practitioners in a
field that the USG has recognized as “critical to achieving all U.S. strategic objectives.”58
RECOMMENDATIONS
Through the Defense Science Board studies, in addition to the QDRERSC initiatives,
significant progress has been made in the development of strategic communication.
However, much remains to be done in the development of joint doctrine for operational
commanders. If strategic communication is in fact going to be priority effort within the
DoD, JFCOM must draft and deliver joint doctrine to GCC commanders and staffs soon. To
this end, this research paper recommends four points of action.
First, that the DoD adopt the DSB 2008 definition of strategic communication. This
definition offers the most accurate and comprehensive articulation of what strategic
communication is today. In contrast to the most current definition found in joint doctrine, the
DSB 2008 definition best describes the long term implications of strategic communication
17
along with the need to understand the target audience along with measuring the effectiveness
of the messages the USG is attempting to communicate.
Second, that the development of strategic communication doctrine be founded on
public diplomacy theory. Given that strategic communication is a relatively new concept for
the DoD, doctrine writers must look outside the DoD for theoretic basis from which to write
the doctrine. If the USG defines strategic communication and public diplomacy to be
analogous, then it is in the realm of public diplomacy that the academic foundation for
strategic communication doctrine will be found.
Third, that joint doctrine adopt the framework for analysis presented by Dr. Gilboa.
This framework will allow GCC planners to better understand the complex information
environment and help develop better processes to support their respective organizations.
Finally, that joint doctrine adopt the pragmatic complexity model of communication.
As joint strategic communication doctrine continues to develop, it must address the
complexities of the 21st century information environment by including a communication
model that will allow GCC planners to develop plans for communicating the message. The
pragmatic complexity model will allow GCC planners to better understand communication
modeling and provide them the tools to develop better messaging strategies.
18
NOTES
1 U.S. President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: 2006), 9.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, (Washington, DC: 2006), 91-2.
3 James G. Starvidis, “Strategic Communication and National Security”, Joint Forces Quarterly, (3rd Quarter,
2007): 4.
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All
Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in Times of Military Conflict,
(Washington, DC: May, 2000), 6.
5 Ibid, 28.
6 Ibid, 6-7.
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All
Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in Times of Military Conflict,
(Washington, DC: May, 2000), 52-4.
8 At the time of the DSB 2000, PSYOP had four categories. The fourth category not discussed is
inconsequential to defining strategic, and JP 3-53 published on September 2003 removes it from PSYOP
doctrine.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination,
(Washington, DC: October, 2001), Annex I.
10 Ibid, 16.
11 Ibid, 5-7.
12 Ibid, 7.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: September, 2004), Appendix A.
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: September, 2004), 14.
15 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: September, 2004), 6-9.
16 Idid, 83.
17 Ibid, 11.
18 Interview with Bruce Gregory, April 8, 2009.
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: February, 2006), 92.
20 Ibid.
21 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: September, 2006), 3.
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: September, 2006), 3.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 7.
25 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: January, 2008), 11.
26 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: January, 2008), XIV-XX.
27 Ibid, 13.
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: 26 December 2006),
I-10.
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006), I-
10.
30 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 73.
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006),
GL-11.
19
32 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,” Small Wars
Journal (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25,
2009).
33 The United States Code, Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 38 - Department of State, Sec
2732, "Public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department of State," Statute C, "Objectives".
http://uscode.house.gov/uscode- (Accessed March 24, 2009).
34 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
(Washington, DC: June, 2007).
35 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,” Small Wars
Journal (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25,
2009).
36 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,” Small Wars
Journal (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25,
2009).
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006),
GL-9.
38 Information Environment is defined as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect,
process, disseminate, or act on information. JP 3-13.
39 Dr. Leonard’s work is cited by Dr. Bruce Gregory, Dr. Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Eytan Gilboa, all leading
scholars in the field of public diplomacy.
40 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 72.
41 “Medium range campaigns on high value policies” is the term used by Dr. Bruce Gregory in his work titled
“Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience” to describe medium range public
diplomacy. Dr. Leonard’s second dimension of public diplomacy is “strategic communication”, however, his
definition is not the same as the U.S. DoD definition and for the purpose of this research paper, the use of this
term will create unnecessary confusion.
42 Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 8-21.
43 Ibid, 10.
44 Ibid, 22-30.
45 Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 54-71.
46 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 72.
47 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices
2007-2008 (Suffolk, VA: March 10, 2009).
48 Spheres carry different weights at different times, and in different context. When communicating with some
countries, political/military messages will outweigh economic and social/cultural. For other countries,
economic, or social/cultural messages will outweigh political/military. Yet for other countries, there is a need
to provide equal weigh to any combination of two spheres, or to all three of them at the same time.
49 Cooperative public diplomacy engagement is characterized by the common ground a group of nations may
have to engage with a country in which they wish to establish a relationship. This is the case of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan. The NATO leadership in Afghanistan conducts
diplomacy to achieve an objective that is common to all the member nations. Competitive public diplomacy
engagement is characterized by nations conducting public diplomacy through bilateral or multilateral
agreements that serve to further the interests of a particular nation. Interests are typically political influence,
military cooperation, trade, and investment to name a few.
50 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997).
51 Ibid.
52 Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall, Jr, Weapons of Mass Persuasion (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2008), 156.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices
2007-2008 (Suffolk, VA: March 10, 2009), 13.
20
56 Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall, Jr, Weapons of Mass Persuasion (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2008), 156.
57 Ibid, 160.
58 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication,
(Washington, DC: January, 2008), 3-9.
21
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... or international; 4. for the performance (or not) of specific actions by a competitor or opponent. [7] These goals are part of a DoD perspective that does not provide conclusive answers, but attempts to stimulate informed discussions and experiments to discover a set of common shared capabilities with regard to StratCom. This conception provides only a possible approach to how joint forces should address strategic communication, thus being defined as an exchange of meaning in support of national interest, in which influencing is the fundamental challenge, with the different forms that it takes and for which effective integration of all available means is needed. ...
... Moreover, this doctrine would lead to an understanding of strategic communication and how it should be used at the joint operational level. [7] In NATO terminology, StratCom is an integrative concept, whose purpose is to coordinate and synchronize all communication activities or relevant from a communication point of view (special events, exercises, operations, etc.) carried out by the Alliance and allies with the purpose of shaping the informational environment in support of the fulfillment of its own political and military objectives. According to NATO ACO Strategic Communications Directive [8], StratCom actually includes all the activities and capabilities of information-handling structures: public diplomacy, military and civil information and communication, information operations and psychological operations. ...
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