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Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures

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Abstract

This paper presents an approach to elicitation and correction of intuitive forecasts, which attempts to retain the valid component of intuitive judgments while correcting some biases to which they are prone. This approach is applied to two tasks that experts are often required to perform in the context of forecasting and in the service of decision making: the prediction of values and the assessment of confidence intervals. The analysis of these judgments reveals two major biases: non-regressiveness of predictions and overconfidence. Both biases are traced to people's tendency to give insufficient weight to certain types of information, e.g., the base-rate frequency of outcomes and their predictability. The corrective procedures described in this paper are designed to elicit from experts relevant information which they would normally neglect, and to help them integrate this information with their intuitive impressions in a manner that respects basic principles of statistical prediction.

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... Estas falacias fueron descubiertas por Tversky y Kahneman (1971). Para más estudios véase: Kahneman, D. y Tversky, A. (1979). lntuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. ...
... quiere obtener más información sobre estos elementos mentales distorsionadores le remito a:Kahnemann, D. (2015). Pensar rápido, pensar despacio,Kahneman, D. y Tversky, A. (1979). lntuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. ...
Thesis
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¿Qué consecuencias morales y epistemológicas tendría la aplicación de los resultados obtenidos en las últimas investigaciones de Kahneman en nuestra comprensión de la raison d’être de la evaluación académica? Las implicaciones filosóficas de su obra redefinen los fundamentos de las “calificaciones académicas” y nos invitan a reflexionar sobre nuestras propias inconsistencias, sobre nuestra responsabilidad y sobre nuestra vida. Este pequeño escrito puede formularse como una búsqueda del significado de la evaluación: su por qué y su cómo. Kahneman establece que se da una falta de intersubjetividad en cuestiones como las calificaciones académicas, los diagnósticos o las sentencias. Piensa que esto se debe a ciertos factores cognitivos que distorsionan nuestros juicios y afectan a nuestras decisiones. Si en un conjunto de profesores de una misma materia existe una falta de acuerdo en torno a la calificación de una prueba de evaluación idéntica, entonces, ¿cómo podemos justificar la validez y fiabilidad de la evaluación? En este trabajo nos aproximaremos a este problema, relativo a las calificaciones académicas, desde varias disciplinas, como la psicología y la filosofía, tomando en cuenta ejemplos proporcionados por diversas áreas, como la computación, la filosofía de la mente y la inteligencia artificial. What moral and epistemological consequences would the application of the results obtained in Kahneman’s latest research have on our understanding of the raison d’être of academic evaluation? The philosophical implications of his work redefine the foundations of ‘academic grading’ and invite us to reflect on our own inconsistencies, our responsibility, and our lives. This brief writing can be framed as a quest for the meaning of academic grading: its reason and its manner. Kahneman posits that there is a lack of intersubjectivity in matters such as academic grading, diagnoses, or judgments. He believes this is due to certain cognitive factors that distort our judgments and affect our decisions. If there is a lack of agreement among a group of teachers in the same subject regarding the grading of an identical evaluation test, then how can we justify the validity and reliability of such assessments? In this work, we will approach this problem, concerning academic grading, from disciplines such as psychology and philosophy, considering examples provided by diverse areas including computing, philosophy of mind, and artificial intelligence.
... We focus on IBIS's ability to predict future purchasing, comparing it with a measure of purchase intent. Purchase intent captures only a subset of respondents' beliefs (Zaller 1992) and is subject to a range of biases and inaccuracies (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979;Morwitz et al. 2007;Roese and Vohs 2012). Given these limitations, new measures that improve the prediction of brand-relevant behavior would be a useful contribution, especially a measure like IBIS that should broadly tap closeness and emotional appeal without requiring respondents to introspect on motivation. ...
... Purchase intent measures are a snapshot of attitudes, expressed at a given moment in the context of a survey, and thus reflect only a subset of potentially relevant beliefs (Zaller 1992). Moreover, various biases, such as the planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), distort predictions of behavior in consistent ways. Linking individual respondents' attitudes and behaviors to group-level financial outcomes rarely yields the granularity needed to understand processes at the individual level. ...
Article
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Predicting future consumer behavior is a core objective of marketing research. However, it is an elusive target, typically measured by highly imperfect proxies. Here, we test a measure adapted from self-expansion theory, Inclusion of Brand in Self (IBIS), that uses a single item to assess the degree to which a brand is incorporated into a consumer’s sense of self. In three studies, we demonstrate that IBIS significantly predicts future consumption and purchase. IBIS was at least as strong a predictor as purchase intent, sometimes even outperforming it. IBIS shows promise as an efficient and pragmatically useful predictor of future purchase.
... These projects demonstrated improved adaptability and alignment by enabling direct communication among stakeholders and leveraging collaborative history. This approach represents a paradigm shift from traditional reliance on hierarchical coordination [26], [16], emphasizing instead a networked, participatory model of supplier integration that enhances responsiveness to project dynamics. ...
... Unrealistic timeline [26], [19] Overconfidence Bias ...
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Innovation projects play a crucial role in maintaining competitive advantage but often experience high failure rates. This study examines how behavioral biases influence supplier resource management in failed innovation projects. Using Resource Orchestration Theory as a lens, we analyze six failed projects, each involving two suppliers, to explore how cognitive biases disrupt critical resource management activities, including structuring, bundling, and leveraging. Key biases, such as overconfidence, optimism, and strategic misrepresentation, were found to skew decision-making, prioritizing technical competencies over relational history during supplier selection. This misalignment impaired supplier interactions and knowledge-sharing practices, ultimately contributing to project failure. The findings offer a novel perspective on how cognitive biases undermine resource orchestration and highlight the importance of incorporating collaborative history into supplier selection frameworks. Addressing these biases can significantly improve decision-making processes and enhance the success of innovation projects.
... Without self-regulation of the ego, collaborator input is perceived as relinquishing control (Sarasvathy, 2001). Therefore, to evaluate the efficacy of experiential learning, educators should examine how students become self-aware and self-regulate against the harmful effects of stress and ego, concurrently avoiding errors in judgment, such as confirmation bias and the escalation of commitment when confronting disconfirming evidence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977, 1979. Based on the mindset triad, we envisage a firstand second-person core of a tailored experiential pedagogy, where critical reflection on action is central to most forms of assessments. ...
... As shown, metacognition enables students to challenge their own assumptions, catch and attend to cognitive traps in decision-making such as 'confirmation bias' and 'sunk cost fallacy' (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977, 1979, which ultimately leads to sound decision-making under the error-inducing challenges of entrepreneurial journeys (Baron, 1998). For instance, in Case 1, the student states: 'when I dealt with the customers' frustrations, I realized that we should not only look at positive things that confirm our idea'. ...
Article
Despite the recent recognition of experiential learning as an effective pedagogy for cultivating entrepreneurial mindsets, it still lacks a robust and tailored conceptual foundation primed for adoption in entrepreneurship education (EE). Addressing this deficit, this research integrates action learning and design learning to propose Action Design Learning (ADL) as a bespoke and adaptable framework for experiential learning in EE. ADL fosters entrepreneurial mindsets by placing first- and second-person learning at the core of pedagogy, using emergent entrepreneurial artifacts as focusing devices. Through longitudinal insider action research, the framework is abductively evaluated across two cases in Irish universities, culminating in a functional adaptation primed for adoption. The study reveals that ADL provides a robust conceptual foundation that educators can readily apply in designing and delivering high-impact curricula that foster metacognitive abilities deemed foundational to an entrepreneurial mindset. Consequently, this study contributes to the experiential learning discourse by offering a theoretically grounded pedagogy that overcomes skepticism about the efficacy of this approach in promoting high-impact EE.
... Sunk cost fallacy impairs a firm's reevaluation strategy wherein managers continue to invest in a foreign market beyond the point of viability to justify resources already expended even when the indicators suggest additional investments are unlikely to yield a favorable outcome. It causes managers to ignore diminishing returns for resources that could be optimally deployed elsewhere (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977). Instead of considering future benefits and the likely costs, decisions are based on accumulated investments. ...
... Confirmation bias leads decision makers to view ownership and control not in terms of the likely implications but as a means to support existing beliefs (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977). It is driven by selective information where the evidence sought and prioritized is conditioned by expected outcomes instead of a proper understanding of the pertinent knowledge, resources, and risks (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007). ...
Article
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In this practitioner-focused study, we discuss how cognitive biases impair foreign market entry decisions. Focusing on three factors that are central to the evaluation of foreign markets: cost, control, and uncertainty, we explain how decision-making biases undermine their assessment and the ways in which the biases can be mitigated. Specifically, overconfidence bias and the sunk cost fallacy negatively affect the estimation of entry costs which can be mitigated by a strong governance structure and independent reviews; anchoring and confirmation biases undermine the assessment of an appropriate level of control requiring the use of systematic decision frameworks and decision extension tools; and representativeness and availability biases limit the comprehension of environmental uncertainty suggesting mitigation strategies such as the challenging of internal assumptions and devil’s advocacy. By explicating how managerial biases turn into flawed assessments of foreign markets, our study uncovers the mechanisms that explain and potentially remedy cognitive pitfalls during internationalization.
... Effect. An emotion bias that causes individuals to overvalue something they are close to, regardless of its objective value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;Thaler, 1980). For example, Basketball scouts who get to know a player more closely, follow their development over time, meet his parents, and have forged a bond with them may overvalue the player and become blind to their flaws (Johnston et al., 2022). ...
... There is a tendency to make insufficient allowance for regression toward the mean when predicting from an imperfectly reliable predictor (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, NBA front office personnel tend to make extreme decisions that are not justified by supporting evidence (Massey & Thaler, 2013). ...
Article
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Every year, professional basketball franchises convene for an entry draft to select the next generation of talent for their respective teams. This article describes an experiential exercise that places students in the role of team executives of a fictionalized professional basketball franchise. Students are tasked with evaluating a group of draft-eligible athletes and making the optimal selection for their team, considering a wide array of skills, abilities, and attributes. The Basketball Draft Night Exercise is informed by extensive research on sport entry drafts spanning several decades and sheds light on the systematic errors, fallacies, and decision-making biases that arise when making talent selections under uncertainty. Furthermore, this exercise illuminates the potential pitfalls and cognitive errors committed by experts when assessing and selecting talent under uncertainty.
... 35,36 Work-life balance is threatened by our tendency to overestimate benefits and underestimate costs of future tasks, including the time required to complete these tasks, a systematic bias that Kahneman and Tversky refer to as the planning fallacy. 37 Predictions of work-life balance may be particularly bias-prone when those making the predictions are unfamiliar with the situation in which they will perform the future task-and our typical response to this uncertainty is to inflate our perceived ability and diminish the risk that the future situation will be unfavourable (optimism bias). 38 Failure to appreciate the impact that changing from a training environment to independent practice may have on future clinical performance and assuming a continued learning trajectory are a hazard to future clinical performance, 34 as is attributing our clinical skills to inherent ability rather than the result of sustained deliberate practice, [39][40][41] and the belief that the knowledge and clinical skills that we have acquired will not decay over time. ...
... Similarly, a review of the types of cognitive biases that can affect initial decisions might attenuate the impact of attribute substitution and other cognitive biases on decision-making. 26,37,38 Interventions can also be planned regarding decisions related to work-life balance and personal learning strategies at transition points in training, including during the transitionto-discipline and transition-to-practice phases of residency training. 45 This type of intervention is the norm in undergraduate training but becomes less prevalent during later stages of training and beyond. ...
Article
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Background For medical training to be deemed successful, in addition to gaining the skills required to make appropriate clinical decisions, trainees must learn how to make good personal decisions. These decisions may affect satisfaction with career choice, work–life balance, and their ability to maintain/improve clinical performance over time—outcomes that can impact future wellness. Here, the authors introduce a decision‐making framework with the goal of improving our understanding of personal decisions. Methods Stemming from the business world, the Cynefin framework describes five decision‐making domains: clear , complicated , complex , chaotic , and confusion , and a key inference of this framework is that decision‐making can be improved by first identifying the decision‐making domain. Personal decisions are largely complex—so applying linear decision‐making strategies is unlikely to help in this domain. Results The available data suggest that the outcomes of personal decisions are suboptimal, and the authors propose three mechanisms to explain these findings: (1) Complex decision is susceptible to attribute substitution where we subconsciously trade these decisions for easier decisions; (2) predictions are prone to cognitive biases, such as assuming our situation will remain constant (linear projection fallacy), believing that accomplishing a goal will deliver lasting happiness (arrival bias), or overestimating benefits and underestimating costs of future tasks (planning fallacy); and (3) complex decisions have an inherently higher failure rate than complicated decisions because they are the result of an ongoing, dynamic person‐by‐situation interaction and, as such, have more time to fail and more ways to do so. Discussion Based upon their view that personal decisions are complex, the authors propose strategies to improve satisfaction with personal decisions, including increasing awareness of biases that may impact personal decisions. Recognising that the outcome of personal decisions can change over time, they also suggest additional interventions to manage these decisions, such as different forms of mentoring.
... Specifically, consistent with a literature in political psychology on the persuasive impact of an "inside" view (Freling et al., 2020;Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), we theorize that prior experience with governance failure influences how citizens respond to subsequent efforts at correction. For individuals who can recall and recognize from experience the failure as substantively similar-and therefore suggestive of unsolved underlying problems-the impact is likely to be particularly consequential. ...
Article
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In a substantial literature on political trust in normal times, we know little about the impact on trust of crises or subsequent government efforts at correction. We investigate these impacts by analyzing a pair of similar governance failures in China, a strong single-party authoritarian state with high levels of political trust and sophisticated tools to manage negative information about its performance. We theorize that how citizens update beliefs about government trustworthiness depends on prior experience: firsthand knowledge and anecdotal evidence supply powerful “insider” information that citizens bring to their processing of news. We leverage occurrence of two exogenous shocks—a vaccine crisis and a subsequent government correction—with administration of a face-to-face, nationally representative survey in 2018. We find: (1) the 2018 crisis reduced trust, regardless of prior experience; and (2) the subsequent correction did not increase trust for “insiders,” residing in cities exposed to a similar crisis and correction in 2016, but did increase trust for other citizens. We show that governance failure is not a singular event concluded with crisis weathered and trust rebuilt through corrective efforts. Instead, it introduces a persistent constraint on the persuasiveness of government claims of trustworthiness. Past governance failures persist in social perceptions and are reactivated by similar failures, with attention to one failure elevated in the long term for citizens familiar with it from experience.
... To realize its global optimality, one thus needs to commit to a plan determined at the initial time of planning throughout the planning horizon, disallowing re-evaluations 3 no matter what happens in the future. Such commitment is against human nature; empirical evidence reveals that without relying on commitment devices [8], humans tend to reassess their plans at some future times and states, making them prone to future deviations for the lack of self-control [32,7]. Consistent planning is robust 4 under future re-evaluations and thus is the more rational choice in the event that commitment devices are unavailable or not useful. ...
Article
Time inconsistency (TIC) often arises in multiperiod decision-making through the encoding of more realistic human preferences as objectives; TIC describes a situation in which a plan, consisting of current and future actions, that is optimal today may no longer be optimal in the future. The sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) solution is well-known to resolve such TIC, backed by evidence from behavioral economics and stochastic control literature. Motivated by TIC proliferation and SPE desirability in handling TIC, this paper establishes a subgame perfect equilibrium reinforcement learning (SPERL) framework to search for an SPE solution for TIC problems. We propose a new class of algorithms, called extended backward policy iteration (EBPI), that solves SPERL and concurrently addresses two algorithmic challenges in TIC-RL: the nonexistence of natural recursive relationships between value functions at different time points and the questionable applicability of standard policy iteration algorithms due to unprovable policy improvement theorems. To demonstrate the practical usage of EBPI as a training framework, we adopt standard RL sample-based methods and derive two EBPI-based training algorithms. We examine our derived training frameworks on a mean-variance portfolio selection problem and evaluate some performance metrics including convergence and model identifiability.
... Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions, offering key insights and policy recommendations based on the findings. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory is foundational in understanding the behavioral aspects of investor decision-making, particularly by highlighting how investors exhibit asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses. This theory emphasizes that individuals are more sensitive to losses than to equivalent gains, challenging the classical expected utility theory. ...
... Variations in extreme trust levels will result in variations in how information is interpreted and assessed, which will lead to variations in the solutions that are produced, [32]. The majority of psychology research concludes that overconfident behavior Decision makers are more likely to make erroneous forecasts than logical, well-informed ones when they are encouraged by their nature to make such judgments. ...
Article
High overconfidence (a high degree of calculation error) among investors can lead to an overestimation of the price of securities, which can lead to unintentional purchases at a higher price or sales at a price below the underlying value, which can result in transaction losses. The purpose of this study is to examine the connection between overconfidence and the precision of stock price forecasts in the Sharia capital market of Indonesia. This study approach observes investors' reactions in an experimental laboratory setting after they are provided with important information. Based on self-confidence, the research design was split into three classification groups. Markets that get negative news and markets without information are the two categories of treatment. Based on the conducted experiments, the research findings demonstrated that in all experimental market sessions, investors with high overconfidence tended to overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge and information, resulting in higher average predictions and price errors than investors with low overconfidence. This data implies that investors with a high degree of confidence are susceptible to self-deception. The study's findings also demonstrate that, in contrast to investors with low overconfidence, those with strong overconfidence do not necessarily experience losses, even though their average prediction error or price is larger.
... This does not take into account negative wider impacts, like environmental and social costs, which are often substantial for large infrastructure projects, and which, if included, would reduce the aggregate effect of wider impacts.2 The planning fallacy was originally formulated byKahneman and Tversky (1979) andBuehler et al. (1994) to apply to estimates of completion times and schedules. The concept was later expanded byLovallo and Kahneman (2003),Flyvbjerg (2008), andFlyvbjerg and Sunstein (2017) to also include the costs and benefits of decisions. ...
Preprint
This paper asks and answers the question of whether Kahneman's planning fallacy or Hirschman's Hiding Hand best explain performance in capital investment projects. I agree with my critics that the Hiding Hand exists, i.e., sometimes benefit overruns outweigh cost overruns in project planning and delivery. Specifically, I show this happens in one fifth of projects, based on the best and largest dataset that exists. But that was not the main question I set out to answer. My main question was whether the Hiding Hand is "typical," as claimed by Hirschman. I show this is not the case, with 80 percent of projects not displaying Hiding Hand behavior. Finally, I agree it would be important to better understand the circumstances where the Hiding Hand actually works. However, if you want to understand how projects "typically" work, as Hirschman said he did, then the theories of the planning fallacy, optimism bias, and strategic misrepresentation - according to which cost overruns and benefit shortfalls are the norm - will serve you significantly better than the principle of the Hiding Hand. The latter will lead you astray, because it is a special case instead of a typical one.
... Assumptions about e.g., user training, testing and operations equipment being covered and planned outside the scope of the project should be verified in the preparation phase, not discovered in the execution phase, causing inflation in the scope of work and cost. If no suitable reference class (Flyvbjerg, 2007;Kahneman and Tversky, 1977) for software project scope inflation is available, industrial averages can be used instead for validating the adequacy of contingency allocation. ...
Article
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Information technology (IT) projects often fail. Postmortem analysis is not general practice in IT project management. This is a missed opportunity for IT project management because postmortem analysis is a proven source of practice improvements and preventive actions in other domains. In this paper, the root causes of failure of a major IT project are identified by postmortem analysis, a well-established method for investigating accidents and failure ex post facto to improve practice and performance. The root causes of failure identified are: a) inadequate planning, b) novelty of a technology to the organisation, and c) inappropriate software development method and process. The postmortem offers insights into risks and challenges that IT projects still face today. Significantly, the postmortem analysis shows how a different approach to project planning could have prevented the failure and termination of the project. This paper also demonstrates how systematic IT project postmortem analysis can be conducted based on leading theory of process tracing and causal modelling in combination with the literature on IT project failure. The demonstration of this approach to IT project postmortems is new and original.
... The use of failure factors from the literature, which by definition are "managerially controllable" (Schmidt, 2023), and the choice of a compatible definition of root causes as causes that "management has control to fix" (Paradies & Busch, 1988) focus the analysis on areas that are realistic to address by practice changes. The focus on areas of activity that are under management control is a strength, but clearly also a limitation, because it excludes other kinds of explanations, for example psychological (Flyvbjerg, 2007;Kahneman & Tversky, 1977), political (Flyvbjerg, 2007), and explanations involving causal powers that emerge on social structures (Elder-Vass, 2011). ...
... Studying biases in "real-world" decision making (as opposed to lab settings) is a growing, yet underdeveloped, field (Toplak et al. 2017). In this paper, we return to one of the first real-world settings studied by Kahneman and Tversky (1977), namely project investment decisions. Kahneman and Tversky's early work was foundational for how to think about projects. ...
Preprint
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The paper explores "uniqueness bias," a behavioral bias defined as the tendency of planners and managers to see their decisions as singular. For the first time, uniqueness bias is correlated with forecasting accuracy and performance in real-world project investment decisions. We problematize the conventional framing of projects as unique and hypothesize that it leads to poor project performance. We test the thesis for a sample of 219 projects and find that perceived uniqueness is indeed highly statistically significantly associated with underperformance. Finally, we identify how decision makers can mitigate uniqueness bias in their projects through what Daniel Kahneman aptly called "decision hygiene," specifically reference class forecasting, premortems, similarity-based forecasting, and noise audits. 3
... The foundation of many current asset pricing models, such as CAPM and APT, relies on Utility theory principles. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted experiments that presented evidence contradicting Utility theory. Their research highlighted phenomena such as the Certainty Effect, Reflection, Isolation effect, and others, which challenge the traditional utility theory. ...
Article
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The literature on overconfidence has witnessed prolific growth since the beginning of the century. This context underscores the necessity to comprehend and categorize an increasingly diverse body of overconfidence research within the financial domain. This study reviews existing literature on financial overconfidence from its inception to the present with a detailed review of 132 articles from 84 journals by examining theories, context, and methods (TCM) used in overconfidence research. Our review unpacks significant themes (i.e. determinants of overconfidence, overconfidence and risk-taking, overconfidence measures and type of investors, overconfidence in a volatile market, overconfidence, and personal financial behavior). We propose a pertinent research framework to investigate the less investigated aspects of financial overconfidence and suggest future research direction.
... The most common problem is overconfidence, which leads to an illusion of competence (Moore et al., 2015;Feld et al., 2017). It accompanies Experts do not quite correctly determine the confidence interval of their own estimates (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, 1977), overestimate or underestimate what can be achieved over a certain period of time (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979;Sharot et al., 2012), create scenarios based on the development of the present in the future, and at the same time focus on optimistic scenarios (Newby -Clark et al., 2000). They persist in this misconception even in the face of negative feedback (Buehler et al., 1994). ...
Article
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Foresight projects are expected to provide realistic scenarios for different future scenarios, which provides a better information base for relevant strategies. However, these expectations often turn out to be at least difficult to fulfill due to the uncertainty of the external environment and cognitive biases. Therefore, the idea of assessing each stage of Foresight is gaining relevance, which is of particular importance in the energy sector, which affects a variety of areas of life. This article analyzes the results of the Egyptian energy foresight study, Egypt LEAPS, in terms of process efficiency and forecast accuracy as well as the factors that influenced it, including cognitive biases. The authors conclude that for each stage of foresight, a thorough analysis of weaknesses and shortcomings is necessary. Therefore, from the very beginning, the foresight process should include reliable mechanisms for assessing results and a readiness for constant iterations. Consistent process adjustments that rely on new ways of dealing with complexity and uncertainty in dealing with the future help build trust among participants and consistently reduce the level of erroneous assumptions.
... The evidence-based management theory and the planning fallacy provide theoretical explanations for cost planning causes in projects. Cost planning is often based on experience and intuition (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Also, limited access to relevant and high-quality cost data is challenging (Reay et al., 2009). ...
Conference Paper
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Large public procurement projects often face systematic cost deviations. Research aims to analyze these cost deviations to identify the underlying causes and develop appropriate solutions. Furthermore, existing research tends to examine theories in a cursory manner to enhance comprehension of cost deviations, leading to a fragmented understanding of the underlying reasons and remedies for systematic cost deviations. This study adopts a theorizing approach, incorporating organizational buying behavior, prospect theory, and evidence-based management theory, to offer a unified understanding of cost deviations, their underlying causes, and solutions. This study contributes to the elaboration of existing theoretical constructs and relationships, while emphasizing for cost planners and decision-makers the importance of cost information for reliable procurement decisions.
... It may mean that one should incorporate rules pertaining to manufactured vehicles of all kinds in an ES that will be used to evaluate aircraft designs. Tis is related to reference class forecasting [24] and the reference class problem. For one, rules concerning specifcs can easily multiply the number of rules and input variables (see Section 3.2). ...
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The more “manufacturable” a product is, the “easier” it is to manufacture. For two different product designs targeting the same role, one may be more manufacturable than the other. Evaluating manufacturability requires experts in the processes of manufacturing, “manufacturing process engineers” (MPEs). Human experts are expensive to train and employ, while a well-designed expert system (ES) could be quicker, more reliable, and provide higher performance and superior accuracy. In this work, a group of MPEs (“Team A”) externalized a portion of their expertise into a rule-based expert system in cooperation with a group of ES knowledge engineers and developers. We produced a large ES with 113 total rules and 94 variables. The ES comprises a crisp ES which constructs a Fuzzy ES, thus producing a two-stage ES. Team A then used the ES and a derivation of it (the “MAKE A”) to conduct assessments of the manufacturability of several “notional” designs, providing a sanity check of the rule-base. A provisional assessment used a first draft of the rule-base, and MAKE A, and was of notional wing designs. The primary assessment, using an updated rule-base and MAKE A, was of notional rotor blade designs. We describe the process by which this ES was made and the assessments that were conducted and conclude with insights gained from constructing the ES. These insights can be summarized as follows: build a bridge between expert and user, move from general features to specific features, do not make the user do a lot of work, and only ask the user for objective observations. We add the product of our work to the growing library of tools and methodologies at the disposal of the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC). The primary findings of the present work are (1) an ES that satisfied the experts, according to their expressed performance expectations, and (2) the insights gained on how such a system might best be constructed.
... Two examples are optimism bias, where the possibility of random or uncontrollable events is ignored, and anchoring, the tendency to base estimates on information that is only apparently relevant. Together these biases contribute to the planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;Buehler et al., 1994;Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) observe that these biases are likely to be greater for initiatives that a company has never attempted before, such as implementing new manufacturing technologies or entering new markets. ...
... draws on behavioral economic theories of decision-making under uncertainty developed byKahneman and Tversky[16],[17] and Lovallo and Kahneman[18], suggesting psychological (i.e., optimism bias) and political (i.e.,strategic misrepresentation) explanations are the root causes of cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects. The Planning Fallacy assumes that estimators will "underestimate costs, completions, and risks of planned actions" and, at the same time, "overestimate the benefits of the same actions" and may intentionally manipulate figures and lie to ensure projects are undertaken [15 p.7]. ...
Article
Collaborative procurement methods such as alliancing and its variants are becoming increasingly popular in delivering large-scale transport infrastructure projects. The systematic design of the Project Alliance Agreement (PAA) provides the basis for stimulating collaborative behaviors to be enacted, which contributes to ensuring best-for-project decision-making and outcomes are delivered. However, despite the nascent adoption of alliancing, knowledge is absent on effectively delivering transport infrastructure projects on time and within budget. Thus, this article focuses on alliances and addresses the following question: How can alliances produce reliable target outturn costs (TOC) for transport infrastructure projects? To answer this question, we draw on the experiences of senior executives involved in formulating a TOC (including the target adjustment event) in rail infrastructure projects. We find the PAA shapes and guides collaborative behaviors, enabling alliance team members to jointly consider the context and complexity of projects and thus develop realistic and reliable estimates of their TOC. The insights we obtained from the senior executives provide insights into the decision-making processes of alliances, enabling a better understanding of how large-scale rail infrastructure projects' cost and time performance can be improved.
... The focus on managerially controllable factors (Rockart, 1979;Bullen and Rockart, 1981;Pinto and Slevin, 1987;Pinto and Mantel, 1990;Paradies and Busch, 1988;Atkins, 2001), and the corresponding selection of literature that identifies multiple such factors excludes important literature, including papers by Flyvbjerg Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002;Flyvbjerg, 2007Flyvbjerg, , 2009bFlyvbjerg, , 2014Budzier, 2011b, 2011a), Love, Ika, Pinto, Jugdev, and Zwikael (Love et al., 2022;Ika et al., 2022;Ika and Pinto, 2022a;Pinto et al., 2022). Flyvbjerg identifies multiple reasons for inadequate project planning and preparation: a) technical explanations, including imperfect forecasting techniques, inadequate data, honest mistakes, and lack of experience (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p49), b) psychological explanations: The planning fallacy and optimism bias (Flyvbjerg, 2007;Kahneman and Tversky, 1977), and c) political-economic explanations, including overestimating benefits and underestimating costs in order to have projects accepted, driven both by project owners and contractors (Flyvbjerg, 2007). The analysis in this paper supports Flyvbjerg's focus on the front-end of projects since most failure factors identified represent causes of failure that originate at the front-end of IT projects. ...
Article
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This paper shows how causes and mechanisms behind past information technology (IT) project failures can be used for systematic risk mitigation in new IT projects. This is significant because successful IT projects are needed to realise the benefit potential of digitalisation, whereas failed IT projects overspend resources and underdeliver benefits. In this paper we a) identify factors and causes that lead to IT project failure, b) analyse the consistency over time of the identified factors and causes, c) expose mechanisms of failure by analysing failure factors, causes, and common features of IT projects, and d) show how this knowledge can be used in IT project risk evaluations. The paper uses hermeneutic literature review, statistical analysis of failure factors in the literature, content analysis of the reviewed literature, and process tracing.
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