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Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South
Abstract
Newport Paper 21, "Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South," helps reopen the door to serious analyses of the relationship between Latin American national security issues and American strategic interests. The monograph consists of an introduction and conclusion and three substantive essays analyzing specific issues facing Latin America. The first essay, "Latin America's Lawless Areas and Failed States," builds upon the concepts of failed states and borderless regions to suggest how criminals and perhaps terrorists can find refuge and support in localities outside the control of states. The second essay, "Security Implications of Poor Economic Performance in Latin America," provides a solid introduction to the interconnection of economic behavior and the national security threats facing both Latin American governments and the United States. The final essay, "Chinese Interests in Latin America," speculates on the interest of China in the region, with particular attention to the potential roles played by immigration and Chinese ownership of firms charged with operation of both access ports to the Panama Canal. It is the authors' hope that this work will help reinvigorate sound thinking about U.S. policies toward Latin America and encourage closer cooperation between strategists and scholars in both regions. Such cooperation would provide real benefits to the national security communities and military establishments in the United States and many critical Latin American countries. The work published in this volume represents an important effort by scholars in Argentina and the United States to share assessments of security challenges and options available to governments throughout the Americas. The result is a set of assessments from North and South as researchers in the two countries have grappled to reach shared judgments and policies that make sense at both ends of the hemisphere.
... Bolivia and Peru face the challenge of organized crime in remote coca-and cocaine-producing regions of the country. Countries such as Suriname and Paraguay are used as transhipment routes for the rest of the region (Dreyfus et al., 2003;Cirino, Elizondo, and Wawro, 2004). Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina have reported recent cases of diversion of small arms from military and police stockpiles to insurgent or criminal groups in neighbouring countries. ...
... Despite these obstacles, a report by the Naval War College estimated that Hizballah was able to raise US$10 million a year from the TBA alone. 28 A number of law enforcement actions have provided a glimpse of Hizballah financing generated by Hizballah operatives in the Shi'a diaspora enclaves of South America. ...
The activities of Hizballah in Latin America generally have been viewed by governmental authorities in the region as a security concern primarily because of its importance in bilateral relations with the United States rather than as an internal terrorist threat targeted against their sovereign interests. This article explores Hizballah's network and past activities in South America to assess the nature of Hizballah's strategic aims in the region in support of its global organizational goals. The author argues that the perception of Hizballah as a legitimate political organization by Latin American governments has hampered efforts to effectively apply counterterrorism resources to root out the entrenched Hizballah infrastructure in the region that can potentially carry out directives by the Hizballah leadership or by serving as a proxy of Iran.
Die lateinamerikanischen Subregionen haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren weiter auseinander entwickelt. Während sich die zentralamerikanischen Staaten und mit Einschränkungen auch Mexiko immer stärker auf die USA hin orientieren, gibt es einen südamerikanischen Gegenpol. Dort füllt Brasilien mehr und mehr die Rolle einer regionalen Führungsmacht aus. Unterschiedliche Ausrichtungen zwischen den Subregionen zeigen sich in den Handelsbeziehungen, der Entstehung einander ausschließender subregionaler Organisationen oder der Haltung in wichtigen außenpolitische Fragen, wie etwa beim Irakkonflikt. 1 Der III. Europäisch-lateinamerikanische Gipfel 2 Der Irak-Konflikt war indirekt auch Thema auf dem III. Europäisch-lateinamerikanischen Gipfel, der am 28. Mai 2004 in Guadalajara (Mexiko) nach Rio de Janeiro (1999) und Madrid (2002) bereits zum dritten Mal stattfand. Von den 58 europäischen und lateinamerikanischen Regierungen waren immerhin 33 durch ihre Regierungschefs vertreten. Das Abschlussdokument ist eine Bestandsaufnahme gemeinsamer europäisch-lateinamerikanischer Positionen, deshalb fällt es mit 104 Punkten auch so umfassend aus, und es zeigt einen Korridor für die zukünftige Beziehungen zwischen beiden Regionen auf. Das Gipfeltreffen hatte neben den konkreten Ergebnissen auch einen symbolischen Wert: es handelte sich um das erste gemeinsame Auftreten der erweiterten EU auf einem internationalen Forum, und diese Tagung fand vor der Haustür der USA, aber ohne Beteiligung der USA statt. Es gab zwei zentrale Themen auf dem Gipfel: soziale Kohäsion in Lateinamerika und der Multilateralismus. Dieser umfasste einerseits die regionale Integration, die von beiden Seiten als wesentliche Komponente einer multilateralen Weltordnung angesehen wird. Sie gilt als Baustein und praktische Übung für multilaterale Beziehungen auf globaler Ebene. Sowohl Lateinamerika als auch Europa sind daran interessiert, dass sich auch die USA internationalen Verträgen unterwerfen und in ein gemeinsames Regelwerk einbinden lassen. In der Erklärung des Gipfels wird die Bedeutung der Vereinten Nationen und des Weltsicherheitsrates als zentrale Entscheidungsorgane in den Internationalen Beziehungen und bei der Bewältigung von Herausforderungen wie der Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und des Internationalen Terrorismus hervorgehoben. Dies ist indirekt an eine Absage an den Unilateralismus der USA. Auch in anderen Passagen der Gipfelerklärung grenzen sich die 1 Während von den südamerikanischen Ländern drei (Argentinien, Brasilien und Venezuela) die Intervention total ablehnten, zwei (Chile, Peru) diese bedauerten, drei (Bolivien, Ekuador, Uruguay) eine ambivalente Position bezogen und nur ein Land (Kolumbien) die US-Politik unterstützte, vertraten fünf zentralamerikanische Staaten und die Dominikanische Republik ein pro US-amerikanische Position. Siehe Claudio Fuentes/Francisco Rojas Aravena, El patio trasero. Estados Unidos y América Latina pos-Irak, in: Nueva Sociedad 185, mayo-junio 2003, 64-82 (79). 2 Siehe Susanne Gratius, Europa und Lateinamerika. Zwischen Rückzug und Annäherung SWP. Ergebnisse des Gipfeltreffens in Mexico, SWP-Aktuell 26, Juni 2004; Detlef Nolte, Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft? Der III. Gipfel zwischen der EU und Lateinamerika in Guadalajara, Brennpunkt Lateinamerika 11-2004. Die wichtigsten Dokumente zum Gipfel in Guadalajara und den vorausgegangenen Gipfeltreffen finden sich auf der Homepage der EU-Kommission http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac-guadal/00_index.htm; siehe auch European Commission, The European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategic Partnership, Luxembourg 2004.
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions have increased substantially in number, functions and geographic spread since their inception in 2003. Despite their expansion in numbers and scope, especially in the Western Balkans, few systematic assessments of the contributions that CSDP missions make to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have been undertaken to date. This article addresses that lacuna by assessing the contributions CSDP missions have made in recent years to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Western Balkans. It explores whether CSDP missions in that region: make an intrinsic contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in those countries or merely profit (or take credit) from the initial groundwork laid by United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions; are adequately coordinated within the European Union (EU) and between the EU and other international organisations, including NATO; are sufficiently embedded or effectively linked to other EU instruments, such as the Stability and Association Process to the Western Balkans; and engender adequate elite or public support or ‘ownership’ in these countries.
This article will develop an explanatory theory on terrorist safe havens. Focusing on Islamist Terrorist networks, this article argues that four specific conditions are necessary for the establishment of a safe haven for Islamist terrorist networks: geographic features, weak governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty. At the conclusion of the article, the developed theory is applied to the Tri-Border Area of South America (TBA), where the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, an area overlooked by the 9/11 National Commission Report's list of Islamist terrorists' safe havens.
President George W. Bush signed the Merida Initiative, referred to as "Plan Mexico" by critics, into law on June 30, 2008. The plan contains approximately $1.5 billion in aid to Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean countries to improve regional security by reducing organized crime, drug smuggling, and illegal arms trafficking while strengthening domestic institutions. Critics argue that the plan does not adequately address the demand side of the drug model, will add to the militarization of Mexico, empower corrupt institutions, and reduce the rule of law while failing to address the violence of organized crime. The researcher has identified organized crime, socio-economic disparity, and institutional corruption as the main factors that led Mexican President Calderon to ask for assistance from the United States. Although the Merida Initiative is a comprehensive plan that attempts to solve a number of complex transnational issues that affect both the United States and Mexico, its performance to date, indicates that it is not meeting its objectives. Using problem-solution methodology, the researcher identified additional measures, such as demand-side drug reduction programs, US gun control enforcement, immigration reform, and economic reforms that would improve the chances of achieving long-term stability and security in the region. The success of the Merida Initiative will require a holistic and synergistic approach between a joint, interagency, and coalition team.
After the September 11 attacks, Honduras committed to support the GWOT, but priorities in national objectives other than terrorism have kept the Honduran government from developing a strategy and the necessary counterterrorism infrastructure to combat this emerging threat. This research examines current threats in Latin America and Honduras in particular. It also suggests a developmental strategy to enhance the country's capabilities to combat terrorism by the employment of instruments of national power in a multidimensional way capable to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts. This study uses a brief analysis based on the concepts of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability in order to identify the risk that the proposed strategy could incur. The study concludes by proposing a series of recommendations that should minimize risk and make this strategy feasible for supporting the GWOT.
With hundreds of millions of dollars of financial support, ease of movement into the United States because of false passports and visas provided by corrupt South American government officials, and a sympathetic population filled with anti-American sentiment, the Islamic terrorist threat is very real in South America and should be a major security concern for the United States. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) receives most of the attention from U.S. political and military leaders due to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and recent developments in Iran, the many threats in South America, to include Islamic terrorists, narco-terrorists, corrupt government officials, and the growing relationships among the three, is reason enough to elevate U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) from its current level of importance to one demanding the highest attention. In order to combat the growth of Islamic terrorism in South America, the United States must disrupt the conditions such as corruption, lawlessness, prevalence of drugs, and anti-Americanism that allow this terrorism to thrive.
Much of recent international relations literature argues conflicts to achieve or to frustrate regional dominance will become more virulent in the future. In this context we examine different approaches in international relations theory regarding the role and importance which they attribute to regional powers. We discuss diverse concepts of power and theoretical approaches that address the topics of power relations and power hierarchies in international politics. Marking differences as well as common grounds with the more traditional concept of "middle powers", we sketch an analytical concept of regional powers adequate for contemporary international relations research. The paper concludes with reflections on the relationship between regional powers and regional integration and a short discussion of the analytical value of the concept of cooperative hegemony for the study of regional powers.
The Iguaza Falls, a once popular international tourist destination in the northeast corner of Argentina, is one of most beautiful places in South America. Located in the Tri Border Area (TBA), which is comprised of Puerto Iguazu, Argentina, Foz de Iguazu, Brazil, and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, it is populated with between 12,000 to 40,000 Arabs and their descendants, as well as 30,000 Asians. The area is a lawless zone that is home to Islamic terrorists of Syrian and Lebanese descent and their sympathizers. Together they work in an informal economy of fund-raising, narcotics trafficking, smuggling (human and commercial), money laundering, document and currency fraud, and the manufacture/movement of pirated goods. The porous borders of the region enable terrorist operatives of Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda and their splinter groups to pass through the TBA, easily conducting criminal activities to support worldwide terrorism. The United States needs to do more to counter this threat in the Western Hemisphere. Even with terror groups on the run after three years of intense pressure since 9/11, Hezbollah, operates freely, especially in money laundering and the drug trade, in this South American safe-haven. Because of the full-time engagement of the United States in the Middle East, the threat has operated without the required level of attention of the United States for too long. A serious emphasis on the TBA is necessary for American security because of the region’s proximity to the United States. The diplomatic, informational, military, economic, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME) Plus Model provides a useful framework to analyze the issues in the TBA. The paper will identify what has worked in the past, and explain how certain conditions have created an environment in which terrorist groups operate in the region, and how their activities pose a threat to hemispheric security. It also and provides a robust checklist of recommendations to help both the Department of State and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) remedy the problems. Ultimately, it will address how cooperation among the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay can be improved to combat transnational terrorism in the TBA in a post 9/11 security environment. Using the DIME Plus Model in an engaged strategy gives America the tools to assist the TBA nations in their own efforts to work toward a future of success in the TBA. Mustering all the elements of U.S. power will strengthen the rule of law in the region and spawn economic development. U.S. projection of its national power tailored to the particular needs of each of the three countries of the TBA is the best way to resolve the persistent issues. A U.S strategy using the DIME Plus Model will build strong partnerships. Given its comprehensive structure and flexible implementation, it provides the most appropriate approach for this time. If America is to be secure, a fundamental change in the security situation in the TBA is essential.
Much of recent international relations literature argues conflicts to achieve or to frustrate regional dominance will become more virulent in the future. In this context we examine different approaches in international relations theory regarding the role and importance which they attribute to regional powers. We discuss diverse theoretical approaches that address the topics of power relations and power hierarchies in international politics. Marking differences as well as common grounds with the more traditional concept of “middle powers”, we sketch an analytical concept of regional powers adequate for contemporary international relations research. The paper concludes with reflections on the relationship between regional powers and regional integration and a short discussion of the analytical value of the concept of cooperative hegemony for the study of regional powers.
Much of recent international relations literature argues conflicts to achieve or to frustrate regional dominance will become more virulent in the future. In this context we examine different approaches in international relations theory regarding the role and importance which they attribute to regional powers. We discuss diverse concepts of power and theoretical approaches that address the topics of power relations and power hierarchies in international politics. Marking differences as well as common grounds with the more traditional concept of "middle powers", we sketch an analytical concept of regional powers adequate for contemporary international relations research. The paper concludes with reflections on the relationship between regional powers and regional integration and a short discussion of the analytical value of the concept of cooperative hegemony for the study of regional powers.
This paper investigates the impact of international migration on technical efficiency, resource allocation and income from agricultural production of family farming in Albania. The results suggest that migration is used by rural households as a pathway out of agriculture: migration is negatively associated with both labour and non-labour input allocation in agriculture, while no significant differences can be detected in terms of farm technical efficiency or agricultural income. Whether the rapid demographic changes in rural areas triggered by massive migration, possibly combined with propitious land and rural development policies, will ultimately produce the conditions for a more viable, high-return agriculture attracting larger investments remains to be seen.
Only a handful of the world's nation‐states can be categorized as failed or collapsed. Several dozen more, however, are serious candidates. What does it take to drive a failing state into collapse? Here is what to watch to determine who is in danger of failing next.
What changes more often the fashion designs coming from Paris and Milan or the economic policy designs Washington and Wall Street prescribe for countries that are less developed or that are emerging from decades of communism? While this comparison may seem frivolous, a review of the ideas that have guided thinking and action about economic reforms in this decade shows that they are as faddish as skirt lengths and tie widths. The difference, of course, is that economic policy fashions affect the way millions of people live and define their children's chances of a better future. Ideas about what makes a country prosperous have always been fickle. This decade has been no different in terms of the variety and volatility of the policy prescriptions that became dominant among academics, policy makers and the better-informed segments of the world's population. The 1990s, however, have been different in one significant respect: during this decade the world has been under the impression that there was a clear and robust consensus about what a poor country should do to become more prosperous. This misimpression clearly owes a lot to the surprising popularity of the term 'Washington consensus' the name that economist John Williamson gave in 1989 to a list of 10 policy recommendations for countries willing to reform their economies.' The general ideas derived from the Washington Consensus had a huge influence on the economic reforms of many countries. Yet the way these countries interpreted such ideas varied substantially and their actual implementation even more so. Moreover, the original 10 policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus reigned unchallenged for only a short time. Changes in the international economic and political environment and new domestic realities in the reforming countries created problems the Consensus did not envision or encompass, thus forcing the search for new answers. The newfound answers often complemented the recommendations originally offered by the Washington Consensus, but some also ran counter to them. The wildly gyrating ideas about controls on foreign capital or about exchange rate regimes that have been offered at different times are good examples of the lack of consensus or indeed the confusion that prevailed among the experts. Moreover, throughout the decade, both the general media and expert commentators often characterised the reforms implemented in countries as different as MoisesNaim is the Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy, 1779MassachusettsAvenue, Washington, DC20036, USA.
this paper I highlight the role of three sets of critical contributing factors. First, we must begin with the trauma of the 1980s. The deep recession that most of the countries of the region experienced in the aftermath of the debt crisis is reminiscent in some ways of the Great Depression in the United States during the 1930s. While the Great Depression resulted in a steeper fall in incomes, the recovery was more rapid as well. In the United States, the hardships caused by the Great Depression, and especially the losses suffered by the middle classes, stimulated a set of government programs--collectively known as the New Deal--which greatly expanded the role of the government, established social safety nets, and provided social insurance. In Latin America, the upshot of the debt crisis was a series of reforms that actually served to weaken institutions of social insurance. Employment generally became less secure, and publicly provided safety nets were weakened. Second, as Latin America entered the 1990s it found itself in a world of high macroeconomic volatility, driven in large part by erratic capital flows--or at least magnified by them. The spread of international financial markets and the region's enthusiastic embrace of them left macroeconomic policy dependent on (and often hostage to) the fancies of short-term investors. Key instruments such as fiscal policy and the exchange rate became overwhelmed by the need to manage capital flows and could no longer be targeted on domestic stability. Macroeconomic policy became increasingly divorced from the real economy. This has exacerbated the volatility of economic outcomes both over time and across households. 4 Third, a key shortcoming in Latin America is that social and political institutions have not been adequately...
Declaration on Security in the Americas
- Organization
Organization of American States, Declaration on Security in the Americas (Mexico City, Mexico: Special Conference on Security, Oc-tober 27–28, 2003), p. 4.