Content uploaded by Gerald Gendron
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gerald Gendron on Jul 27, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
NEXT-GENERATION STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION:
BUILDING INFLUENCE
THROUGH ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING
Lieutenant Colonel Gerald R. Gendron, Jr., USAF
Major Herminio Blas-Irizarry, USA
Mr. Jesse W. Boggs, Department of the Navy
Joint Forces Staff College
Joint and Combined Warfighting School
Class 09-03
1 June 2009
The original version of this paper was written to satisfy writing requirements of the Joint Forces
Staff College (JFSC). The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the official policy of
the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE
01 JUN 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED
00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Next-Generation Strategic Communication: Building Influence Through
Online Social Networking
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Joint Forces Staff College,Joint and Combined Warfighting
Scholl,Norfolk,VA,23511
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
Same as
Report (SAR)
18. NUMBER
OF PAGES
18
19a. NAME OF
RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT
unclassified b. ABSTRACT
unclassified c. THIS PAGE
unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Introduction
The value of a social network is defined not only by who's on it, but by who's excluded.
—Paul Saffo, The Economist (October 18, 2007)
Social networks existed long before MySpace and Facebook hit the headlines.
Sociologists and researchers have used the term social networks for over a century to describe
complex sets of relationships between members of social systems at all levels. At its core, a
social network—whether face-to-face or web-based—is a map of relevant ties among
participants in the network. Within this social network map, individuals in a particular network
may exhibit varying degrees of interconnectedness—ranging from tightly connected cliques to
those with few connections within a single network—but nonetheless, they act as gateways to
other networks. Online social networks have become technologically-driven extensions of the
relationships, interactions, and alliances that people establish as part of their everyday lives.
However, the Department of Defense (DoD) and other interagency partners underutilize online
social networking to advance the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication. Government departments and agencies should increase their influence through
social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogging to support U.S. national strategy as it
relates to strategic communication and countering messages sent by violent extremist
organizations.
2
Strategic Communication
Although the United States invented modern public relations, we are unable to
communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for as a society and
culture, about freedom and democracy, and about our goals and aspirations. This
capability is and will be crucial not only for the Long War, but also for the consistency of
our message on crucial security issues to our allies, adversaries, and the world.
—U.S. National Defense Strategy (June 2008)
United States public diplomacy and strategic communication are intended to synchronize
and coordinate messages, themes, and programs throughout the Department of State (DoS),
DoD, and other government agencies to advance U.S. foreign policy and achieve national
security objectives. In 2004, a Defense Science Board task force concluded, “U.S. strategic
communication must be transformed.” The report points out, “Strategic communication is a vital
component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of
purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and
homeland security.”1
Before developing and proposing a plan to improve U.S. national strategic
communication, one first needs an understanding of who is responsible for strategic
communication. In 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive Number
77 (NSDD-77), which highlights how public diplomacy relates to national security. He
established a Special Planning Group under the National Security Council composed of the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Director of
the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Assistant to the President for
Communications. These are the departments and agencies charged with organizing, planning,
and coordinating strategic communication.2 Since the release of NSDD-77, several Presidential
3
directives on information and public diplomacy have been issued. NSDD-130 (1984) recognized
improvements in international information programs, but encouraged exploration of new
technologies. It warned officials to maintain appropriate capabilities during war and peace and
increase their assessments of foreign opinion to U.S. information.3 Presidential Decision
Directive Number 68 (1999) ordered the creation of an International Public Information Group
made up of top officials from the interagency and chaired by the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs at DoS. This group was formed as a result of military missions in
Kosovo and Haiti where it was demonstrated that no single U.S. agency had the authority to
coordinate efforts. The group was ordered to “assist efforts in defeating adversaries.”4 No
additional, unclassified strategy was implemented until the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. It serves as an action plan for strategic
communication, addressing resource needs, stating objectives, and listing priorities. Most
notably, the strategy outlines a structure for interagency coordination and it defines three
strategic audiences, including Key Influencers as “those whose views can have a ripple effect
throughout society.”5
United States Government Strategic Communication Programs
The International Broadcasting Committee (IBC) was established by NSDD-77. It is
chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and is
responsible for coordinating U.S. Government-sponsored, non-military, international
broadcasting.6 NSDD-45 (1982) is still in effect and gives the authority for international
broadcasting via programming on Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Marti, and other
stations.7 In addition to these broadcasts, the DoD has directed all Combatant Commands to
develop, operate, and maintain websites in the targeted languages specific to their respective
4
areas of responsibility. Using conceptual approaches approved by the government, U.S. Special
Operations Command supports this directive with websites tailored to both promote U.S. policy
goals and counter the messages of political and religious extremists.8 Among the diplomatic
corps, strategic communication emanating from U.S. embassies is managed by their Public
Affairs Sections, which produce magazines and newspapers, manage official Internet portals, and
regularly conduct press conferences to disseminate messages tailored to their specific countries.
Issues Affecting United States Government Strategic Communication Strategy
In spite of official guidance laid out by the U.S. Government requiring the coordination
of strategic communication, The current National Defense Strategy identifies “a weakness across
the U.S. Government, and that a coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning
and implementation of strategic communications.”9 Lack of coordination can hinder the use of
innovative media (i.e., online social networks, mobile technology, chat rooms, and blogs) to
disseminate official messages. As such, the U.S. Government risks failure in reaching its target
audiences around the world by this underutilization of commonly-used communication networks.
Online Social Networks
Social dynamics for creating identity and meaning are especially germane to the Internet,
which is an incredibly powerful vehicle for creating grand narratives and constructing
community. —David Bollier, People/Networks/Power
An online social network is a web-based or mobile service that allows individuals to
construct a public or semi-public profile among various domains, develop a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and manage their list of connections and those made by
others within the system. While the term online social network site is used to describe this
5
phenomenon, the term social networking sites also appears in public discourse, and the two terms
are often used interchangeably. Currently, popular online platforms include Facebook, Twitter,
and MySpace. On many of the large online social networks, participants are not necessarily
networking or looking to meet new people; instead, they are primarily communicating with
people who are already a part of their extended social network.
Recent Successful Online Social Network Events
Though a relatively new phenomenon, many successful strategic uses of online social
networks have been documented. In February 2008, over six million people in 185 cities around
the world marched against the Colombian narco-terrorist group, the Armed Revolutionary Forces
of Colombia (FARC), for kidnapping hostages and holding them for years in hidden jungle
camps. The inspiration for the march originally came from a campaign started online by a group
of students on the social network site Facebook, where they called their protest "Million Voices
against the FARC." The catalyst the students used to build the protest group were videos,
messages, and documents posted on Facebook proving that while FARC hostages were still
alive, they were being held in the harshest of conditions. This message appealed to millions of
people worldwide who demanded the immediate release of all hostages through a massive
popular outcry. The march was then actively covered by mainstream media around the world,
specifically El Tiempo, Colombia’s major national daily newspaper, The New York Times, CNN,
Fox News, and the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC). Due to the international momentum
gained by this demonstration, the FARC was forced to release additional hostages and was
subsequently put on the defensive in their revolutionary media campaign.10 The protests
succeeded in Colombia, and it all began from strong popular support through the online
organizing group.
6
In another use of online social networking, President Barack Obama used Facebook,
Twitter, and MySpace to bring his campaign to millions of new followers in the United States
through their computers and cell phones.11 This innovative method of campaigning allowed the
then presidential candidate Obama and his campaign team to influence young and undecided
voters who frequently visit these online social sites. By September 2008, President Obama’s
Facebook page boasted 6,267,981 supporters.12 Recognizing the potential of this new frontier,
Republican Party presidential candidate Senator John McCain and his campaign team also
created a Facebook site, eventually reaching 625,000 supporters by the end of the national
presidential campaign.13 Not only were both presidential candidates’ campaign messages
delivered to new followers through Facebook, but social networking also allowed them to collect
millions of dollars of individual contributions for their political campaigns.
Violent Extremist Organizations and Social Networks
The nearly limitless potential for strategic communication on the Internet has not gone
unnoticed by terrorist organizations. No matter their political orientation, Islamists, nationalists,
separatists, racists, and anarchists all find online social networks alluring. Today, most active
terrorist organizations maintain websites, with many maintaining more than one using several
different languages. Typically, these sites provide a history of the organization and its activities;
a detailed review of its social and political background; accounts of its notable exploits;
biographies of its leaders, founders, and heroes; information on its political and ideological aims;
fierce criticism of its enemies; and up-to-date news. Despite the ever-present vocabulary of “the
armed struggle” and “resistance,” most sites do not feature a detailed description of violent
activities. Even if they expound at length on the moral and legal basis of the legitimacy of the
use of violence, most sites refrain from referring specifically to the terrorists’ violent actions and
7
their fatal consequences. This reticence is presumably inspired by propagandist and image-
building considerations.14
Online social networks are often used to recruit and mobilize supporters to play a more
active role in the support of terrorist activities or causes. In addition to seeking converts by using
the full continuum of website technologies like audio and digital video to enhance the
presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who
browse their websites. Users who seem most interested in the organization’s cause, or are well
suited to carry out its work, are then contacted. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet
technology to roam online social networks, chat rooms, and blogs looking for receptive members
of the public—particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards and user nets (chat rooms
and blogs) are increasingly used as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits.
Next-Generation Strategic Communication
Allied governments need to have the will to use public diplomacy as a political
instrument. —Stefanie Babst, “Reinventing NATO’s Public Diplomacy”
Having explored strategic communication and recent examples of social networking, one
can analyze the problem space as it relates to the U.S. national strategy.
Implications for Strategic Communication Planning
Strategic communication planning for the whole of the U.S. Government is undoubtedly
a daunting endeavor. From the military planning perspective, the three fundamental building
blocks of strategic communication planning focus on: the delivery vehicle, timing, and tempo.15
Additionally, strategic communication must be synchronized with other U.S. agencies.16 From
8
the national policy planning perspective, adapting to the “new reality” of information
transformation poses a significant problem for traditionally-minded governments.17 As a NATO
research paper by Stefanie Babst notes, “The successful application of soft power does not come
for free but requires careful strategic planning.”18
A changing understanding of hierarchical structures and communities is also an important
planning consideration. The structure of nation states, government agencies and corporations are
typically hierarchical in nature. Contrast that with the “communities of shared interest emerging
on the Internet,” 19 which typically manifest themselves as online social networks. The modern
media environment vividly shows how important “personalization, customization, and
interaction for, by and with audiences” has become. Some corporate enterprises quickly realized
the traditional relationship between the organization and the audience had been usurped by this
modern media environment.20 For example, CatholicMatch.com—a ten-year old social
networking site—identified three characteristics of success within the new reality: (1) grouping
people by interest area, (2) making communication easy and edifying, and (3) providing a sense
of community. The organization adopted this understanding into its planning and continues to
generate strong traffic to this day. 21 In this age of information, effective strategic communication
planning will occur within organizations which understand that identity and meaning now result
from membership in social communities.22
Social Networking is the “New Reality”
Online and mobile media technologies are the new tools for governments, corporations,
civic organizers, political candidates, and ordinary citizens “to reach out to others and galvanize
community action on a wide range of issues.”23 The elements of a successful civic engagement
using online and mobile media span the gamut from recruiting new members to encouraging
9
existing members to take action—all the while becoming a source of reliable and trusted
information on an issue.24 In the commercial sector, the key to strategic communication—
influencing audiences in order to gain market share—is establishing and promoting the corporate
brand. Likewise with governments, online and mobile platforms afford similar opportunities for
them to introduce their brand to a global audience and reach an audience much larger than their
traditional communities of interest. With respect to the U.S. Government, its representation in
the digital sphere has been through websites featuring multiple modes of media (video, text, and
photos), but still representing a one-way, non-dynamic approach. The digital age is one powered
by blogs, chat rooms, and social networking platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.25
Given the myriad of challenges facing the U.S. Government and its finite supply of
resources, it is reasonable to ask whether this media trend really matters. How popular is social
networking and should the U.S. Government expend resources to utilize this capability for
strategic communication? The statistics and trends are remarkable. Quantcast is a company
which collects real-time metrics on digital media. It ranks one million web sites based on the
level of monthly U.S. traffic volume. Table 1 shows that social networking sites accounted for
four of the top ten sites. Facebook has monthly traffic of over 87 million monthly users. Twitter
ranked 28th (leaping from 46th one month earlier) with over 23million monthly users. How did
traditional news sources and government websites compare? Table 2 shows that the highest-
ranked traditional news source (CNN.com) was commensurate with Twitter, but most traditional
information sites fell below the social networking sites.
Besides the traffic volume, the growth among social networking sites is phenomenal.
Facebook nearly doubled its traffic in the four months ending in April 2009, while Twitter
experienced nearly 2,000-percent growth during the same period (and nearly doubled in just one
10
month). One can only speculate how large these networks will grow and how quickly they will
get there. Comparatively, growth among traditional news sites has shown no growth or has
shown a decrease in their constituencies. As if growth were not enough, social networking sites
are also consistent, as social network users are both loyal and persistent: 66 percent of Facebook
users were categorized as either addicts or regulars and account for 97 percent of its traffic28; 28
percent of Twitter users were categorized as addicts or regulars and account for 76 percent of
visits.29 This level of dedication merits the consideration of using social networks, as well as
identifying potential networks to build and grow through key influencers.
Key Influencers Bolster Social Networking Reach
Creating identity and meaning through online networks requires an understanding of the
organizing principles of social networks. Four basic principles guide social network
development: they make it easy for people to pursue shared goals, they are efficient and fast-
paced, they shift power to decentralized smart mobs, and they “tend to be dominated by a few in
influential hubs.” 30 A significant implication of these principles is identifying “key nodes of
influence in global networks, so that you can try to engage them constructively.”31 During the
Cold War, the United States and its allies made use of existing intellectual movements against
Table 1 – Top 10 U.S. Websites based on Traffic26 Table 2 – Ranking of Traditional Information Sites27
Rank Site Monthly Traffic Volume Rank Site Monthly Traffic Volume
1 google.com 141M+ U.S. monthly people 27 cnn.com 23M+ U.S. monthly people
2 yahoo.com 122M+ U.S. monthly people 61 nytimes.com 11M+ U.S. monthly people
3 live.com 114M+ U.S. monthly people 67 people.com 11M+ U.S. monthly people
4 msn.com 100M+ U.S. monthly people 82 foxnews.com 9M+ U.S. monthly people
5 facebook.com 87M+ U.S. monthly people 309 army.mil 3M+ U.S. monthly people
6 youtube.com 82M+ U.S. monthly people 434 state.gov 2M+ U.S. monthly people
7 Microsoft.com 80M+ U.S. monthly people 635 navy.mil 2M+ U.S. monthly people
8 Wikipedia.org 73M+ U.S. monthly people 703 whitehouse.gov 2M+ U.S. monthly people
9 myspace.com 64M+ U.S. monthly people 1062 af.mil 1M+ U.S. monthly people
10 ebay.com 60M+ U.S. monthly people 141,072 bbc.com 8K+ U.S. monthly people
11
Communism by providing “money and organization to turn individual efforts into a coherent
campaign.” 32 They used these movements to build influence while maintaining a distance
between themselves and the messengers to increase the likelihood of success. This history is
useful because three commonalities exist between the Cold War and today: (1) we are in a new
and confusing geopolitical environment with a significant security threat, (2) new, large U.S.
Government agencies were created to combat the issue, and (3) we are in an ideological
struggle33—a war of ideas.
Consider this modern-day example of key influencers and social networks. Hollywood
actor George Clooney travels to troubled areas of the globe to make statements about local
situations. He frequents the Dafur region of Sudan, Africa to highlight local conflict. Mr.
Clooney also serves the United Nations (UN) in an official capacity as a Messenger of Peace.
This example spawns a practical question worthy of U.S. Government consideration: Which
information source has greater influence over the world community, George Clooney doing a
spot on Entertainment Tonight or a UN official posting an update at www.un.org? Both the Cold
War and this contemporary example demonstrate the power wielded by key influencers within
social communities to propagate messages while distancing those messages from the origin and
reducing the perception of propaganda. A notable difference since the Cold War is that online
and mobile platforms have redefined cultural values, identities, and loyalties and their influence
on politics, economics, and culture. In essence, they “represent something of a slow-motion,
geopolitical tsunami.” These fast-growing platforms “are not simply conduits of information;
they constitute a wholly new sort of global nervous system. They enable new sorts of virtual
social communities to rise and flourish and facilitate unmediated flows of transnational
communication.”34
12
Implications for Strategic Communication Assessment
Assessment is crucial to effective use of the digital domain for strategic communication.
Current literature invariably highlights assessment as an essential activity, but typically does not
address the potential for broader assessment methods to bolster social networking platforms.
Assessment techniques most commonly found in the literature include measures of objectives,
effectiveness, and performance;35 and underlying motives of public trends and attitudes.36
However, a RAND report on building networks indicates the United States must build expertise
and capacity to execute a broader strategy, specifically pointing out the need for “mechanisms
for monitoring, refining, and overseeing programs” that “include a feedback loop to allow for
inputs and corrections from those partners who have been found to be most trustworthy.” A key
finding states, “The U.S. Government and its allies need, but thus far have failed, to develop
clear criteria for partnerships with authentic moderates.”37
Assessment of U.S. strategic communication requires an understanding of the social
significance of the new media available, paying particular attention to the social physics of these
online social communities.38 The U.S. Joint Forces Command publication entitled Commander’s
Handbook for Strategic Communication recognizes the need for analysis of the cognitive
dimensions permeating social, political, economic, and information networks. These represent
complex adaptive systems and are much more difficult to understand than a closed-loop
system.39 This cognitive dimension is a very different domain for military members to assess and
also varies greatly by locality. Outside expertise may be necessary to address this challenge, to
include sociologists, local marketing experts, linguists, members of embassies, and the
Department of State.40
13
The Way Ahead
A war can only really be fought against an enemy who shows himself. By infiltrating your
opponents’ ranks, working from within to bring them down, you give them nothing to
react against—the ultimate advantage. From within, you also learn their weaknesses and
open up possibilities of sowing internal dissension.
—Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
The U.S. Government must build its influence through online social networks as a pillar
of strategic communication strategy. Today’s world is dominated by electronic media, and online
social networks have effectively been used to disseminate messages to the masses as well as to
further political agendas. Effectively using these popular social outlets is imperative if the United
States is to gain a foothold and build sufficient influence within a virtual frontier where violent
extremist organizations have thrived. This strategy must be well-coordinated and synchronized
through a whole of government approach.
Secondly, the U.S. Government must engage with moderate key influencers in desired
social networks to disseminate messages stimulating discussion around key U.S. Government
themes and messages. Drawing on its own history, the U.S. Government must increasingly
spread its message through these key influencers—now via online social networks—to build
influence in support of U.S. national strategy.
Finally, the U.S. Government must broaden its assessment of strategic communication
beyond merely determining if activities are having their desired effects. A comprehensive
assessment program requires analysis of social networking activities to understand trends within
the online community and to identify key influencers. This may require expertise from
disciplines currently not involved in strategic communication assessments.
14
While implementing these recommendations poses challenges, the advantages of working
within the modern domain of social networking outweigh the disadvantages. Social networks can
make networking and engagement with worldwide audiences more powerful, simple, and
relevant; identify key influencers to assist in disseminating messages and building influence;
provide mechanisms for combating negative publicity; and assess world audience sentiment
towards U.S. Government policies and diplomacy efforts. The U.S. Government can benefit
greatly by adopting progressive new approaches with online social networks and the indirect,
intimate influence they propagate.
Although online social networks afford many benefits, these networks and their key
influencers do not represent the total solution to improving strategic communication. Additional
study and attention must be directed to strategies for organizing and resourcing the U.S.
Government’s efforts. For instance, additional direction and leadership will likely be needed to
cultivate a conceptual framework to fuse together complementary programs under a coherent
agenda for influence. It is time for the U.S. Government to embrace online social networking to
operationalize public diplomacy programs for use in the war of ideas.
1OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseForAcquisition,Technology,andLogistics,ReportoftheDefenseScienceBoard
TaskForceonStrategicCommunication,Washington,DC,September2004,1‐2.
2TheWhiteHouse,“ManagementofPublicDiplomacyRelativetoNationalSecurity(NSDD‐77),”
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd‐077.htm(accessedMay28,2009).
3TheWhiteHouse,“U.S.InternationalInformationPolicy(NSDD‐130),”http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd‐130.htm
(accessedMay31,2009).
4TheWhiteHouse,“U.S.InternationalInformationPolicy(PDD‐68),”http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd‐68.htm
(accessedMay31,2009).
5U.S.DepartmentofState,U.S.NationalStrategyforPublicDiplomacyandStrategicCommunication,Preparedbythe
StrategicCommunicationandPublicDiplomacyPolicyCoordinatingCommittee,Washington,DC,June2007,4.
6TheWhiteHouse,“ManagementofPublicDiplomacyRelativetoNationalSecurity(NSDD‐77),”
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd‐077.htm(accessedMay28,2009).
7TheWhiteHouse,“UnitedStatesInternationalBroadcasting(NSDD‐45),”http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd‐
045.htm(accessedMay28,2009).
8U.S.DepartmentofDefense,“PolicyforCombatantCommand(COCOM)RegionalWebsitesTailoredtoForeignAudiences,”
memorandumdatedAugust3,2007.
9U.S.DepartmentofDefense,NationalDefenseStrategy,Washington,DC,June2008,19.
15
10ElTiempo,“UnMillondeVocesMarchanenContradelasFARC,”http://www.eltiempo.com,(accessedApril21,2009).
11TheWashingtonPost,“YoungVotersFindVoiceonFacebook,”http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐
dyn/content/article/2007/02/16/AR2007021602084.html(accessedApril21,2009).
12Facebook,“BarackObama,”Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/barackobama(accessedApril22,2009).
13Facebook,“JohnMcCain,”Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/johnmccain(accessedApril22,2009).
14GabrielWeimann,“www.terror.net:HowModernTerrorismUsestheInternet,”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeaceSpecial
Report,(March2004):4.
15USJointForcesCommandJointWarfightingCenter,Commander’sHandbookforStrategicCommunication,Preparedbythe
DoctrineandEducationGroup.Suffolk,VA,September2008,IV‐10.
16U.S.DepartmentofDefenseJointStaff,JointPublication5‐0:JointOperationalPlanning,Washington,DC,2006,II‐2.
17StefanieBabst,“ReinventingNATO’sPublicDiplomacy,”NATOResearchPaper77,(November2008):2.
18Babst,6.
19DavidBollier,People/Networks/Power:CommunicationsTechnologiesandtheNewInternationalPolitics,(Washington,DC:
TheAspenInstitute,2004),33.
20Babst,1‐2.
21MeganMiller,“Catholic2.0,”FamilyFoundations,May/June2009,18.
22Bollier,33.
23J.D.Lasica,CivicEngagementontheMove:Howmobilemediacanservethepublicgood,(Washington,DC:TheAspen
Institute,2008),29.
24Lasica,36.
25Babst,7.
26Quantcast,“QuantcastUSSiteRankingforsites1to100,”Quantcast,http://www.quantcast.com/top‐sites‐1(accessed
May14,2009).
27Ibid.
28Quantcast,“facebook.com–QuantcastAudienceProfile,”Quantcast,http://www.quantcast.com/facebook(accessedMay
14,2009).
29Quantcast,“twitter.com–QuantcastAudienceProfile,”Quantcast,http://www.quantcast.com/twitter(accessedMay14,
2009).
30Bollier,36‐38.
31Ibid.
32AngelRabascaetal.,BuildingModerateMuslimNetworks,(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2007),xiv‐xv.
33Ibid.
34Bollier,1.
35Commander’sHandbookforStrategicCommunication,IV‐13‐14.
36Babst,7.
37Rabasca,xiii,xxi.
38Bollier,35.
39Commander’sHandbookforStrategicCommunication,IV‐3.
40Ibid.,xiii.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Babst, Stefanie, “Reinventing NATO’s Public Diplomacy,” NATO Research Paper 77.
November 2008.
Bollier, David, People/Networks/Power: Communications Technologies and the New
International Politics. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2004.
El Tiempo, “Un Millon de Voces Marchan en Contra de las FARC,” http://www.eltiempo.com,
(accessed April 21 2009).
Facebook, “Barack Obama,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/barackobama (accessed
April 22, 2009).
Facebook, “John McCain,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/johnmccain (accessed April
22, 2009).
Lasica, J.D., Civic Engagement on the Move: How mobile media can serve the public good.
Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2008.
Miller, Megan, “Catholic 2.0,” Family Foundations, May/June 2009.
Quantcast, “facebook.com – Quantcast Audience Profile,” Quantcast,
http://www.quantcast.com/facebook (accessed May 14, 2009).
Quantcast, “Quantcast US Site Ranking for sites 1 to 100,” Quantcast,
http://www.quantcast.com/top-sites-1 (accessed May 14, 2009).
Quantcast, “twitter.com – Quantcast Audience Profile,” Quantcast,
http://www.quantcast.com/twitter (accessed May 14, 2009).
Rabasca, Angel, et al., Building Moderate Muslim Networks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2007.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning, Prepared by the
Joint Staff. Washington, DC, 2006.
U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, Washington, DC, June 2008.
U.S. Department of Defense, “Policy for Combatant Command (COCOM) Regional Websites
Tailored to Foreign Audiences,” memorandum dated August 3, 2007
U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic
Communication, Prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Washington, DC, September 2004.
U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication,Prepared by the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy
Coordinating Committee, Washington, DC, June 2007.
U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for Strategic
Communication, Prepared by the Doctrine and Education Group. Suffolk, VA, September
2008.
The Washington Post, “Young Voters Find Voice on Facebook,”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/16/AR2007021602084.html (accessed April 21, 2009).
Weimann, Gabriel, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States
Institute of Peace Special Report. March 2004.
The White House, “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security (NSDD-
77),” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm (accessed May 28, 2009).
The White House, “United States International Broadcasting (NSDD-45),”
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-045.htm (accessed May 28, 2009).
The White House, “U.S. International Information Policy (NSDD-130),”
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-130.htm (accessed May 31, 2009).
The White House, “U.S. International Information Policy (PDD-68),”
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm (accessed May 31, 2009).
