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Life-Course and Generational Politics
... Por un lado, desde una corriente positivista se ha subrayado la importancia de los ciclos de vida y del desarrollo humano, al señalarse que los in-cumplimientos o fracasos en los mismos condicionaban las experiencias de cambio social y el desarrollo histórico. Por otro lado, recuperando los aportes de la escuela romántico-histórica, se han enfatizado los factores culturales e históricos para comprender la estabilidad social y el cambio debido a que estructuran la dependencia de una generación, enlazando a sus miembros y separando a las nuevas generaciones (Braungart y Braungart 1986). ...
... Mientras que desde la primera modalidad se privilegia el curso de la vida, desde la segunda se privilegian las influencias sociohistóricas y las consecuencias de la pertenencia a los grupos de edad. Si bien dichas perspectivas no son excluyentes, se han desarrollado de manera independiente en buena parte del siglo XX (Braungart y Braungart 1986). ...
... La política, estudiada desde el punto de vista del ciclo de la vida, ha dado importantes contribuciones. Considerando que a medida que los individuos crecen experimentan ciertos cambios cualitativos en relación con la fisiología, el funcionamiento cognitivo, los patrones emocionales y las necesidades sociales, se han identificado los caminos característicos del pensamiento y el comportamiento político en las diversas etapas de la vida, lo que ha revelado ciertos patrones en cada etapa y los cambios en el curso de la vida (Braungart y Braungart, 1986). ...
El libro propone un abordaje sociopolítico de Chiapas desde una perspectiva generacional. En ello radica parte de su potencia: en aportar una mirada generacional para comprender los procesos políticos situados en la temporoespacialidad chiapaneca; un punto de vista que no se centra sobre, por o para las juventudes, sino que construye un enfoque de y desde las y los jóvenes. El autor presenta la juventud como un concepto en disputa. Nos recuerda que las juventudes disputan y son disputadas, producen y son producidas. las dimensiones que enfoca este libro tienen anclajes localizados, pero no se reducen a lo local, son singularidades que interpelan cuestiones comunes a otras situaciones. Son estudios producidos desde Chiapas, pero que dialogan con realidades nacionales, regionales y globales. Esto nos invita a identificar los elementos en común que podemos trazar a partir del reconocimiento de las singularidades y diversidades que caracterizan a las juventudes contemporáneas. Pablo Vommaro.
... I will examine each in turn. The life cycle effect states that as people grow older, they will develop more of an attachment to their community, and thus participate in politics more actively compared to when they were younger (Aldrich et al., 2020;Braungart & Braungart, 1986). Through the four major stages in life: childhood, youth, middle age, and older adulthood, patterns can be identified regarding political behavior (Braungart & Braungart, 1986). ...
... The life cycle effect states that as people grow older, they will develop more of an attachment to their community, and thus participate in politics more actively compared to when they were younger (Aldrich et al., 2020;Braungart & Braungart, 1986). Through the four major stages in life: childhood, youth, middle age, and older adulthood, patterns can be identified regarding political behavior (Braungart & Braungart, 1986). In childhood, children are aware of political symbols, but do not understand politics itself very well, and are influenced by their parents' political beliefs. ...
... More complex concepts such as government begin to be understandable during later childhood, as well as partisan loyalty. ISSN 2327-5510 2021 During youth, cognitive changes occur that "set the stage for greater political awareness," (Braungart & Braungart, 1986). People also become critical of society and their elders at this stage, and begin to form their own beliefs in addition to the ones they were raised with. ...
With recent technology and social media, new forms of political activism have become widespread. Young people in particular, have been willing to embrace these new forms of activism. This paper examines new trends in digital activism through qualitative observations of Twitter and Tiktok, and three case studies of young people’s digital activism. In the first case study, Korean pop music (K-pop) fans thwarted police’s attempts to identify protesters by crashing police apps. In the second, they rendered white supremacist hashtags useless, by drowning out the hashtags with their own tweets. Finally, K-pop fans, along with Tiktok users, played a prank which humiliated the Trump reelection campaign. The study expands upon the life cycle effect and generational effects theories of political behavior, and develops a continuum with which to conceptualize and understand the nature of activism. It concludes that digital activism is characteristic of Gen Z, and has real-world impacts. This article pushes back on the notion that digital activism is mere “slacktivism” (low effort token support of a social movement). Instead, it argues that activism evolves along with technology and time, and that digital activism’s real-world impacts can be just as effective as conventional political activism.
... Estos primeros usos del concepto de generación buscaron realizar una agregación de individuos en una clasificación que priorizaba el momento biológico del nacimiento y del desarrollo de las diferentes etapas de sus vidas, dando por sentado un conjunto de etapas sólidas y cronológicamente ordenadas. Es así que se daba por hecho que un conjunto de personas que compartían la edad biológica tendrían en común al menos dos aspectos: el desarrollo de los ciclos de sus vidas y las experiencias históricas que atravesaran (Braungart y Braungart 1986). En una línea similar, Robert Wohl sostuvo que "la comunidad más verdadera a la cual uno puede pertenecer es aquella definida por la edad y la experiencia" (1979,203). ...
... Otras miradas clásicas del término generación pusieron atención en la descendencia familiar como sucesión de generaciones entre padres e hijos, acentuando la influencia del "linaje" de familia. No obstante, se ha sostenido también que la descendencia, además del influjo familiar directo, es el resultado de una multiplicidad de factores tales como el contexto social, el tipo de relación intrafamiliar, entre otros (Braungart y Braungart 1986 Parece que, por primera vez en la historia, los hombres de nuestra época necesitamos saber, con insólita urgencia, qué es una generación y a qué generación pertenecemos. ...
... Estas tensiones y conflictos son los que llevaron a que, durante la década de 1980, se desarrollaran algunos estudios desde la sociología y la psicología que renovaron la mirada respecto a la constitución de las generaciones. Braungart y Braungart (1986) clasificaron los trabajos de esta época en dos grandes enfoques: los del Abordaje del Curso de la Vida (ACV) y los del Abordaje Generacional (AG). Ambos tuvieron por objetivo observar las diferencias políticas de distintos t e m a s grupos etarios en función de advertir cambios y continuidades en extendidos períodos de tiempo. ...
La conceptualización y aplicación de la noción de “generación” ha sido objeto de múltiples debates en el campo de la teoría social contemporánea. En el presente texto, se presenta el recorrido que tuvo la utilización del concepto en el campo de la teoría social, desde sus primeras aplicaciones hasta los enfoques contemporáneos. A su vez, se da cuenta de las principales impugnaciones actuales a la utilización de esta noción, para sustentar finalmente un posicionamiento propio respecto al debate, que rescata la pertinencia del concepto de generación política para la comprensión de las dinámicas de los movimientos sociales, en función de una perspectiva amplia y comprensiva.
... Sin embargo, la relación entre generaciones no siempre es conflictiva y, de hecho, es posible también hablar de genealogías familiares en las que se enlazan 3 Pérez (2019). 4 Jennings (2002) 5 Braungart y Braungart (1986) 6 Guisado y Baigorri (2013) 7 Wilhelmi (2016). ...
En la movilización contra la incorporación de España a la OTAN en la primera mitad de los años ochenta participaron diferentes partidos, organizaciones y personas comprometidas con el pacifismo y el antimilitarismo. Este artículo, centrado en Canarias, donde hubo un amplio apoyo al No en el referéndum de 1986, propone un nuevo enfoque sobre la historia del pacifismo en España al focalizar la atención en las mujeres y las relaciones entre generaciones. A partir de fuentes archivísticas y testimonios orales, se analizan las tensiones entre diferentes formas de entender el compromiso, la política internacional o el protagonismo de las mujeres y del feminismo en el movimiento pacifista, pero también las herencia e intercambios, los referentes comunes y el aprendizaje mutuo entre tres generaciones de mujeres. Se presta además especial atención a las relaciones con los hombres de diferentes generaciones en el seno del movimiento anti-OTAN, así como a la existencia de redes familiares y genealogías que favorecieron los intercambios intergeneracionales. Este estudio arroja luz sobre el relevo generacional en el feminismo y el pacifismo.
... Thus, the literature records that former activists usually pursue life course patterns that are consistent with their political values and activist history (e.g. being employed in teaching or helping professions, promoting social change in daily life, resisting conventional lifestyles) (Braungart and Braungart, 1986;Fendrich, 1974;Giugni and Grasso, 2016;Whalen and Flacks, 1980). ...
The literature on political disengagement has proliferated since the global upsurge of mobilizations in late 2010. Studies show that disengagement is a highly dynamic process, shaped by the interaction of a multiplicity of factors at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The article reviews the principal factors related to disengagement, revealing their varied impact, the significance of agential factors and the context-specific nature of disengagement. Given the different forms and degrees of disengagement, scholars have begun to challenge strictly defined dichotomies such as engagement/disengagement. The article concludes by noting some blind spots in the literature and providing suggestions for future research.
... In addition to education, a person's age group is another factor that correlates with their social status, experience, cognitive capacity, and knowledge. It has been identified as a core factor that determines people's political attitudes and behaviours (Braungart and Braungart 1986). For instance, people who are born in a certain period are likely to experience similar social events, and therefore are quite likely to share a similar social memory (e.g. ...
Rapid economic growth is often a disruptive social process threatening the social relations and ideologies of incumbent regimes. Yet far from acting defensively, the Chinese Communist Party has lead a major social and economic transformation over forty years, without yet encountering fundamental challenges subverting its rule. A key question for political sociology is thus - how have the logics of China’s governmentality been able to help maintain compliance from the governed while acting so radically to advance the state’s growth priorities? This book explores the issue by analysing the detailed trajectories, rationale, and effects of China’s pension reforms. It uses strong methods, including institutional analysis of resource allocation in the multiple pension schemes and programmes, and quantitative text analysis of the knowledge construction in official discourse along with the reforms. Causal identification estimates the effects of key policy instruments on public opinion about pension responsibility and political trust. Moving beyond the pension issues, the analysis discusses with qualitative evidence why falsified compliance might exist in China’s society and the mechanisms that may lie behind it. Where active counter-conduct (such as resistance) is confined, individuals may choose cognitive rebellion and falsify their public compliance. The Chinese state’s strategy to generate public compliance is hybrid, organic, and dynamic. The state rules society by its customised governance design and constant adjustments. Public compliance is not only acquired through ‘buying off’ the public with governmental performance and transfer benefits, but is also manufactured through achieving cultural changes and new ideological foundations for general legitimation.
... From a sociological perspective, generations emerge from specific historical circumstances (Braungart and Braungart 1986;Escudier 2016;Mannheim 1972). A "generation" is generally a cohort of individuals who are collectively marked by a formative event during their youth (Stoker 2014, 378). ...
This volume contends that young individuals across Europe relate to their country’s history in complex and often ambivalent ways. It pays attention to how both formal education and broader culture communicate ideas about the past, and how young people respond to these ideas. The studies collected in this volume show that such ideas about the past are central to the formation of the group identities of nations, social movements, or religious groups. Young people express received historical narratives in new, potentially subversive, ways. As young people tend to be more mobile and ready to interrogate their own roots than later generations, they selectively privilege certain aspects of their identities and their identification with their family or nation while neglecting others. This collection aims to correct the popular misperception that young people are indifferent towards history and prove instead that historical narratives are constitutive to their individual identities and their sense of belonging to something broader than themselves.
... From a sociological perspective, generations emerge from specific historical circumstances (Braungart and Braungart 1986;Escudier 2016;Mannheim 1972). A "generation" is generally a cohort of individuals who are collectively marked by a formative event during their youth (Stoker 2014, 378). ...
... As a subset of the broader question of "articulation," or how distinct groups are brought together in common cause without losing their distinctiveness (Grossberg 1986), intergenerational movement-making raises particular kinds of issues. These include questions of "life cycle"-that is, how political participation and priorities are shaped by the social roles at different stages of the life course-and of "generation," or the way that particular cohorts are differentially marked by historical processes and events (see Braungart and Braungart 1986). The latter is emphasized in Mannheim's ([1927-28] 1952) classic concept, in which common experiences during youth-often of dramatic historical transformation-fuse an age cohort into a recognizable political generation. ...
This article employs ethnography and history to consider the role of distinct age co-horts, or generations, in the emergence of powerful movements against neoliberaliza-tion in twenty-first-century Costa Rica, articulated around the defense of the "social state" and through a decentralized, horizontal organization practice. Utilizing Nancy Fraser's concept of the "triple movement," we argue that attention to the politics of emancipation and of age cohorts or generations enriches our understanding of movements for social protection by drawing attention to the roles of life cycle and the formation of generations in reactions to marketization; the changing historical definition of what is deemed worth protecting from the market; and the importance of "eman-cipation," both as a motive of political participation and as an organizational commitment that facilitates the articulation of intergenerational movements. [Costa Rica, Central America, Latin America, political generations, youth activism, social movements against neoliberalism, Free Trade Agreements (DR-CAFTA), Polanyi's double movement] R e s u m e n Este artículo emplea la etnografía y la historia para analizar el rol que distintas co-hortes etarias o generaciones han tenido en el surgimiento de poderosos movimien-tos contra la neoliberalización en Costa Rica a comienzos del siglo XXI, articulados en torno a la defensa del "Estado social" y a través de la práctica organizativa horizontal
... Generational identity is fundamentally rooted in cultural shifts resulting from social, economic, and political events. Studies have demonstrated that ideological differences between generational cohorts are attributed more to the unique experiences of a particular cohort than it can to age itself (Braungart and Braungart 1986). Due to the changing nature of society's socioeconomic conditions over time, people from different generations emphasize different political values (Inglehart 1990). ...
en Contemporary American politics is marked by an unusually substantial generation gap. This has important implications for the future of American politics as an overwhelmingly white and conservative generation, the Silent Generation, is being replaced in the electorate by much more diverse and liberal generations: the Millennial Generation and Generation Z. To project potential partisan changes in the American electorate with generational replacement, simulations were calculated estimating what the electorate may look like, using the 2016 presidential election as a baseline. Hypothesizing the same generational dynamics of vote choice and turnout for 2020 that existed in 2016, with generational replacement alone the national plurality of 2.1 percent for the Democratic candidate increases to 4.8 percent if Generation Z votes the same as Millennials. For elections beyond 2020, the potential partisan swing toward the Democrats based on generational replacement become even much more considerable. By 2032, Millennials and Generation Z combined are projected to consist of almost one‐half of the entire electorate. Even if Generation Z is not distinct from the rest of the electorate politically, given how strongly Democratic the Millennials are, the simulated gain for the Democrats in 2032 is 5 percent; and, if Generation Z becomes as Democratic leaning as Millennials are, the simulated swing toward the Democrats is greater than 7 percent.
Related Articles
Cormack, Lindsey. 2019. “Leveraging Peer‐to‐Peer Connections to Increase Voter Participation in Local Elections.” Politics & Policy 47 (2): 248‐266. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12297
Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2019. “Socialization, Rationality, and Age: Generational Gaps and the Attitudes toward the Chechen War in Russia.” Politics & Policy 47 (5): 931‐955. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12323
Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. “Is the Turnout Function in Democracies and Nondemocracies Alike or Different?” Politics & Policy 44 (5): 889‐915. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12174
Abstract
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Reemplazo generacional y el Transformación inminente del electorado estadounidense
La política estadounidense contemporánea está marcada por una brecha generacional inusualmente sustancial. Esto tiene implicaciones importantes para el futuro de la política estadounidense como una generación abrumadoramente blanca y conservadora, la Generación Silenciosa, está siendo reemplazada en el electorado por generaciones mucho más diversas y liberales, la Generación Milenaria y la Generación Z. Para proyectar posibles cambios partidistas en el Electorado estadounidense con reemplazo de generación, las simulaciones se calcularon estimando cómo se vería el electorado, utilizando las elecciones presidenciales de 2016 como referencia. Con la hipótesis de la misma dinámica generacional de elección y participación electoral para 2020 que existía en 2016, solo con el reemplazo generacional, la pluralidad nacional del 2.1% para el candidato demócrata aumenta al 4.8% si la Generación Z vota igual que los Millennials. Para las elecciones posteriores a 2020, el potencial giro partidista hacia los demócratas basado en el reemplazo generacional se vuelve aún más considerable. Para 2032, se proyecta que los Millennials y la Generación Z combinados constituyan casi la mitad de todo el electorado. Incluso si la Generación Z no es distinta del resto del electorado políticamente, dada la fuerza demócrata de los Millennials, la ganancia simulada para los demócratas en 2032 es del 5%. Y si la Generación Z se vuelve tan demócrata como los Millennials, el giro simulado hacia los Demócratas es mayor al 7%.
Abstract
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美国选民中的世代更替与即将发生的转变
当代美国政治的一个特征是（存在）异常巨大的代沟。这对美国政治的未来具有重要意义，因为数量庞大的白人兼保守派一代（即沉默的一代）正在全体选民中被更加多样化和自由派的世代（即千禧一代和Z时代）所取代。为预测世代更替给美国选民带来的潜在的党派变化，本文以2016年总统大选作为基准，计算了相关模拟，预测选民可能的组成部分。将与2016年相同的、因世代而产生的投票选择和投票率动态，用于假设2020年的总统大选，得出的结果显示，仅世代更替这一点就能让全国为民主党候选人的投票数量（2.1%）增加至4.8%，如果Z世代与千禧一代的投票选择一样的话。至于2020年之后的选举，因基于世代更替而产生的、对民主党的潜在党派倾向甚至会变得更为可观。2032年，千禧一代和Z世代的合并总数预计将基本占据全体选民的一半。即使Z世代在政治上与其余选民的投票选择一样，鉴于千禧一代对民主党的强烈支持，模拟得出的民主党选票为5%。并且，如果Z世代变得与千禧一代一样亲民主党，模拟得出的民主党选票则高于7%。
... Una generación política es el producto de un proceso histórico, no de la mera secuencia de cohortes de edad y se hace observable a una escala concreta del campo político haciendo aparecer clivajes específicos o actores colectivos como partidos políticos y/o movimientos sociales (Heberlé, 1951;Sirinelli, 1989). Según el modelo dinámico de Richard y Margaret Braungart (1986), una generación política es el producto de la interacción de tres "efectos": el efecto ciclo de vida a nivel individual, donde cobran relevancia los líderes juveniles potenciales y sus características psicosociales que los predisponen a la acción. Por otro lado el efecto cohorte, que está determinado por las formas de socialización política comunes y la conexidad entre los grupos que comparten características similares como los militantes de un partido, los estudiantes, los trabajadores de un determinado sector, etc. ...
Este artículo analiza el factor generacional en las movilizaciones de Chile en el año 2011. Sostenemos que a partir del movimiento de estudiantes universitarios emergen nuevos actores políticos con un proyecto rupturista y con conciencia de generación política.
... Así, partimos del supuesto que la expresión de dicha 'actividad social', se cristaliza con mayor claridad para la actividad política, en un tipo específico de generación que es la 'generación política' (Braungart y Braungart 1986), concepto utilizado en el estudio específico de generaciones militantes y de activistas. Este concepto se diferencia del concepto de cohorte, que queda referido a un grupo de personas "nacidas en el mismo intervalo de tiempo y que envejecen juntas" (Ryder 1965: 844), reservando el concepto de generación para aquel conjunto de personas que no solamente comparten ser miembros de una cohorte, sino que también desarrollan una conciencia como grupo "con una serie distintiva de actitudes y comportamientos que marcan un contrapunto con aquellos de otros grupos en la sociedad" (Braungart y Braungart 1986: 213). ...
In this article we address the relationship between women and politics in three cycles of the recent Argentina, comprised between the 70s and early XXI century, according to trace lines of continuity and rupture, in a relationship that has been conflicting, as several studies have suggested (Amorós 1994; Ríos Tobar 2008). The temporary demarcation we use to operationalize our proposal recognizes three major groups: political generations of 1970, 1980 and 2000. To this end, we will work with reference cases for each period, chosen as models showing the most representative types of militancy for each political generation: the political-military activism to the decade of `70, militancy in the trade union movement and human rights organizations in the `80, and participation in the new unemployed organizations that emerged during the crisis of neoliberalism, in the late twentieth century. Our paper identifies continuities in gender claims, according to consider the historical accumulation that the women's movement has been expressing, while notice innovative breaks in reference to the treatment of gender issues in contemporary social movements.
... But some studies have given it more attention. There are two ways in which age can influence political behavior (Braungart and Braungart 1986). First, age tells us about life-cycle development (young, middle-aged, and old). ...
The Michigan model, named after the institution where it was first articulated, has been used to explain voting behavior in North American and Western European democracies. In Latin American Elections, experts on Latin America join with experts on electoral studies to evaluate the model’s applicability in this region. Analyzing data from the AmericasBarometer, a scientific public opinion survey carried out in 18 Latin American nations from 2008 to 2012, the authors find that, like democratic voters elsewhere, Latin Americans respond to long-term forces, such as social class, political party ties, and political ideology while also paying attention to short-term issues, such as the economy, crime, corruption. Of course, Latin Americans differ from other Americans, and among themselves. Voters who have experienced left-wing populism may favor government curbs on freedom of expression, for example, while voters enduring high levels of economic deprivation or instability tend to vote against the party in power. The authors thus conclude that, to a surprising extent, the Michigan model offers a powerful explanatory model for voting behavior in Latin America. © 2017 by Richard Nadeau, Éric Bélanger, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Mathieu Turgeon, and François Gélineau. All rights reserved.
... First, transitions in the life-course transform the duty as well as the right to provide or receive care. In this sense, care is a life stage-specific practice which cannot be analyzed from an individual perspective, but connects individuals within and across generations (Braungart and Braungart 1986). Second, care contributes to the construction of life stages in a double sense, namely, the normative expectation of receiving care and the duty (or ability) to provide care. ...
... Our interests hinge on theories of political socialization, however, and the impact of formative experiences on the development and crystallization of redistribution preferences. There are certainly diverging views as to whether political attitudes and preferences are stable over one's life span, but the importance of the impressionable or formative years between childhood and adulthood is generally accepted (see e.g., Braungart and Braungart 1986;Sears and Funk 1999;Highton and Wolfinger 2001;Plutzer 2002;Bartels and Jackman 2014). Young citizens, it is believed, are not yet set in their political ways and are subsequently more easily influenced by external factors (Jennings 1989;Alwin and Krosnick 1991;Sears and Valentino 1977). ...
Research on the impact of the macro economy on individual-level preferences for redistribution has produced varying results. This paper presents a new theory on the presence of an expansive welfare state during one's formative years as a source of heterogeneity in the effect that macroeconomic conditions have on individuals' preferences for redistributive policy. We test this theory using cohort analysis via the British Social Attitudes surveys (1983-2010), with generations coming of age between the end of World War I and today. Findings confirm that cohorts that were socialized before and after the introduction of the welfare state react differently to economic crises: the former become less supportive of redistribution, while the latter become more supportive. Our research sheds light on the long-term shifts of support for the welfare state due to generational replacement.
India is in the throes of a massive demographic turn. People born and brought up after 1986 constitute the bulk of the population. Studies elsewhere show that generational replacement transforms societies and can play a key role in changing the political attitudes and behaviour of the electorate. Over the last few general elections the Indian National Congress has witnessed a steady decline in support, while the Bharatiya Janata Party has seen a surge in support. This article examines whether the decline of the Congress party is linked to a demographic shift that is taking place. The study demonstrates that generations as socio-historical space helps us nuance party-choice explanations.
Despite the prevalence of generational labels like Boomers, Gen X, Millennials, and Gen Z in popular discourse, most studies of generationalism have been restricted to content analyses of generational rhetoric. This study investigates the prevalence of negative generationalism, or negative affective sentiment towards perceived generational out‐groups within the US public and considers how it may be linked with partisan political identities. Using a nationally representative survey of 1232 Americans, this research examines the association between generational self‐identity and partisan identity using feeling thermometer scores for four generational groups (Boomers, Gen Xers, Millennials, and Gen Z) and the two major political parties (Democrats and Republicans). I also report the findings of an experimental manipulation testing the extent to which generational priming exacerbates affective partisan polarization. The results reveal strong evidence of positive affect towards one's generational in‐group, but a less consistent pattern of negative generationalism. Neither the correlational nor the experimental outcomes support a strong and consistent link between generationalism and partisanship, though Republicans feel significantly warmer towards Baby Boomers and colder towards Gen Z than independents. Despite the largely null findings concerning partisanship, this study reveals that these generational labels do appear to bear some degree of social meaning as social identities for people, pointing to new directions for future sociological research on generationalism.
Using the data of Chinese General Social Survey from 2010 to 2018, this study measured the modernity of Chinese peasants from four dimensions: equality and autonomy, positive attitude, general confidence, and open-mindedness. Hierarchical age–period–cohort models were introduced to assess the effect of age, period, and cohort on modernity and to further explore the heterogeneities in the effect of education and off-farm work experience on modernity among various birth cohorts. Age effects consistently show significance, with the level of individual modernity decreasing as age increases. However, the rate of decline gradually slows down. Period effects are generally significant and contribute to the advancement of modernity. Cohort effects are significant in most cohorts. The modernity of peasants born between 1941 and 1960 show a consistent decline, reaching its lowest point in the cohort 1961–1970 and then increasing steadily among those born after 1970. Possible explanations were proposed from the perspective of changes in the land property system and household registration system in China. We also found that the positive effect of education is stronger for younger cohorts, whereas the positive effect of off-farm experience is stronger for older cohorts. This study enriches Inkeles’s research on individual modernization and reveals the transformation process of traditional peasants in developing countries.
Generation X often receives less attention in generational analysis due to its perceived lack of distinctiveness compared to preceding and succeeding generations in the contemporary United States. Politically, there is little justification for distinguishing Generation X as it is commonly defined, yet it harbors significant political divergence between its older and younger cohorts. In terms of partisanship, ideology, and public policy preferences, Generation X is markedly divided, essentially comprising two distinct political generations. Generation X can thus be viewed as the in‐between generation representing the political dividing line between young and old. The dividing point is the birth year of 1973. Due to the considerable differences in the political climate during their formative years, those Gen Xers born before 1973 lean considerably more conservative and Republican than those born in 1973 and afterward.
Related Articles
Fisher, Patrick. 2020. “Generational Replacement and the Impending Transformation of the American Electorate.” Politics & Policy 48(1): 38–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12340 .
Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2019. “Socialization, Rationality, and Age: Generational Gaps and the Attitudes toward the Chechen War in Russia.” Politics & Policy 47(5): 931–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12323 .
Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. “Is the Turnout Function in Democracies and Nondemocracies Alike or Different?” Politics & Policy 44(5): 889–915. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12174 .
Dieser Handbuchartikel analysiert das Verhältnis zwischen generationalen und kohortenanalytischen Ansätzen in der Sozialstrukturanalyse unter Einbeziehung qualitativer und quantitativer Methoden. Ausgehend von Karl Mannheims Konzept des „Generationenzusammenhangs“ wird eine Synthese von biografieorientierten und kohortenanalytischen Perspektiven vorgenommen. Es erfolgt eine theoretische Einordnung der beiden Konzepte Generation und Kohorte, gefolgt von einer methodischen Erörterung zur Herausforderung der Auflösung der Verschränkung von Lebenszeit, Gesellschaftszeit und historischer Zeit. In Form von Beispielanalysen werden sowohl die generationale Identität in biografischen Erzählungen als auch der Wandel der politischen Beteiligung im Zeitverlauf aufgezeigt. Ergänzend werden mit quantitativen Kohortenanalysen von Zeitreihendaten das Wahlverhalten, politisches Interesse und Parteipräferenzen über Geburtskohorten hinweg analysiert, um kohorten- bzw. generationengetragene Muster zu identifizieren. Der Artikel schließt mit der Empfehlung eines Mixed-Methods-Ansatzes, um ein umfassendes Verständnis für das Zusammenspiel von qualitativen und quantitativen Erkenntnissen zum jeweiligen Forschungsgegenstand zu gewinnen.
Pese al papel central del populismo en la política y la democracia de América Latina, es muy poco lo que sabemos sobre los rasgos y motivaciones individuales de quienes apoyan al populismo en dicha región. El giro a la izquierda que caracterizó a la etapa contemporánea del populismo latinoamericano, junto al contexto de desigualdad y subdesarrollo de varios de los países gobernados por líderes populistas, ha llevado a buena parte de la literatura a analizar la movilización populista desde una perspectiva económica y de clase. ¿Hasta qué punto el perfil del electorado populista latinoamericano responde a este llamado? Para dar respuesta a esta pregunta analizamos las características socioeconómicas y demográficas de los votantes de seis líderes populistas de izquierda de este período: Evo Morales, de Bolivia; Marco Enríquez-Ominami, de Chile; Rafael Correa, de Ecuador; Andrés Manuel López Obrador, de México; Ollanta Humala, de Perú; y Nicolás Maduro, de Venezuela. Los resultados demuestran que, si bien la insatisfacción por las desigualdades materiales importa, los votantes de la izquierda populista latinoamericana no son necesariamente masas desprovistas y manipulables, sino que responden a una identidad mucho más compleja.
In the 2020-2021 pro-democracy protests in Thailand, an unprecedented number of high school students participated on all levels: from organizing rallies to small symbolic actions. To better understand this phenomenon, we engaged 691 Thai students from diverse backgrounds to write a letter to a recipient on the other side of the political divide. Participants were asked to reflect upon their hopes and fears for Thailand's political future and explain why their civic engagement is personally, socially, and politically important. Utilizing the ladder of youth participation and other succeeding frameworks in the field, we explored the students' perception of their political participation in three facets: aspirations of young people, their justification for their participation, and responses from the adults in their lives. We find that while the students have clear and well-articulated reasons for their participation, they are hindered and resisted by their parents or teachers who disagree with their political views.
We asked whether and how generations vary in their perceptions on moral matters ranging from their justifications of crime and questions concerning bodily autonomy. In our exploratory study using data from the World Values Survey, we found that Generations Y and Z are more likely than their older counterparts to justify crimes, such as cheating on taxes or stealing property, and to favor greater bodily autonomy in issues such as suicide and abortion. They also rank lower the importance of God and national pride. Implications are offered for employers who wish to motivate and incentivize a multi-generational workforce.
Vaccine uptake variation across demographic groups remains a public health barrier to overcome the coronavirus pandemic despite substantial evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines against severe illness and death. Generational cohorts differ in their experience with historical and public health events, which may contribute to variation in beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines. Nationally representative longitudinal data (December 20, 2020 to July 23, 2021) from the Understanding America Study (UAS) COVID-19 tracking survey (N = 7279) and multilevel logistic regression were used to investigate whether generational cohorts differ in COVID-19 vaccine beliefs. Regression models adjusted for wave, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, political affiliation, and trusted source of information about COVID-19. Birth-year cutoffs define the generational cohorts: Silent (1945 and earlier), Boomer (1946–1964), Gen X (1965–1980), Millennial (1981–1996), and Gen Z (1997–2012). Compared to Boomers, Silents had a lower likelihood of believing that COVID-19 vaccines have many known harmful side effects (OR = 0.52, 95%CI = 0.35–0.74) and that they may lead to illness and death (OR = 0.53, 95%CI = 0.37–0.77). Compared to Boomers, Silents had a higher likelihood of believing that the vaccines provide important benefits to society (OR = 2.27, 95%CI = 1.34–3.86) and that they are useful and effective (OR = 1.97, 95%CI = 1.17–3.30). Results for Gen Z are similar to those reported for Silents. Beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines markedly differ across generations. This is consistent with the idea of generational imprinting—the idea that some beliefs may be resistant to change through adulthood. Policy strategies other than vaccine education may be needed to overcome this pandemic and future public health challenges.
There are conflicting theoretical expectations regarding students' protest behaviour in contemporary autocracies. On the one hand, in line with a resource model of political participation, university students are more likely to protest than their peers without higher education. On the other hand, university students in autocracies might refrain from high-risk activism in exchange for their own financial well-being and career advancement. To address this debate, the article leverages data on anti-corruption protests organized by the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in March 2017. Results show that anti-corruption protests were larger in Russian cities with a larger university student population. Next, employing individual-level data from the fifth wave of the European Values Survey, multinomial logistic regression analysis demonstrates that university students participated in demonstrations at a higher rate than non-students of the same age. More broadly, these findings yield insights into subnational variation in mass mobilization in a repressive political regime.
This article builds on the theoretical debate over age, period, and cohort effects (APC) and explores how these factors might affect Taiwan's partisan stability. We conducted a two-level multinomial logit random effects model using survey data from 1991 to 2020 to disentangle the APC effects. Our findings challenge Converse's core assumption that partisanship strengthens with age. As a new democracy, Taiwan's party affiliations remain fluid, and we do find evidence of period effects, particularly associated with cross-Strait crises that favor the DPP. However, generational replacement is the most significant factor driving party identity changes in Taiwan. With generational replacement, the Kuomintang is burdened by the image of a century-old party. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had previously fared better among young cohorts but has recently lost its support from millennials. The youngest generation increasingly refuses to associate with the traditional political parties. It seems reasonable to expect that the new generational forces will restructure the Blue–Green cleavage and expand the ideological diversity of Taiwan's party system.
TikTok, a short video platform featuring content between 15 and 60 seconds long, has become a popular and rapidly growing social media application around the world. As a platform catering for light entertainment, TikTok champions virality and encourages memetic remixes. Meme videos, mostly featuring lip-syncs, dance routines, and skits, have become one of the defining features of the platform. These seemingly trivial videos have been utilised by young TikTokers to advocate for various causes. This paper uses #OkBoomer memes as a case study to examine the political culture of young people and Gen Z in particular. By analysing how intergenerational politics has been ‘memefied’, this study delineates how Gen Z imagines and expresses a generational sentiment towards ‘Boomers’ as the imagined other. They do so through short video cultures and practices on TikTok, drawing upon the networked experiences of their peers. Specifically, the paper considers the key controversial issues, meme forms and meme functions across the #OkBoomer memes on TikTok, and its eventual mainstreaming in society.
The uprisings that erupted unexpectedly in the Middle East between 2010 and 2011 propelled the region’s youth to the forefront of the political and media spheres. According to some scholars, we are witnessing a re-politicisation of Middle Eastern youth, a marked contrast to their ‘depoliticisation’ and ‘apathy’ as a group in recent years. Yet, although the youth (incidentally, the majority of the population in the region) have unquestionably participated in popular protests, student unions seem not to have played a role thus far. From a macro-level perspective, the marginal role of student associations may seem natural; whilst nationalist and revolutionary leaders encouraged students to actively participate in politics ‘for the sake of the nation’ until the 1960s, both revolutionary and conservative regimes progressively sought to ‘depoliticize’ them. This turned higher education into a privileged ‘sandbox’ for testing methods of repression which would then be extended to all segments of society. However, while scholars should consider the political context of a given society, namely, the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes of most Middle Eastern countries, we must ask: what can meso- and micro-level analysis reveal about the complex and multi-layered phenomena of collective demobilization and individual disengagement? This special issue offers some responses to that central question, analysing different case studies within higher education, from Turkey and Egypt to Morocco and Mexico, over the last forty years.
Prior scholarship finds that participation in means-tested welfare programs, including cash assistance and food stamps, deters political participation among groups that are already politically and socioeconomically marginalized. We revisit these findings within a contemporary context using nationally representative data, along with fixed-effects models that adjust for time-stable unobserved and time-varying observed characteristics. In contrast to prior research, we find little evidence that cash assistance is related to participation. However, food stamps—a benefits program that has undergone substantial changes in recent years—is positively associated with being registered to vote. Moreover, food stamps has countervailing associations with voting—e.g., marginalizing and incorporating—that depend on a person’s attention to politics. Together, these findings revise our understanding of how welfare influences political inequalities and advances policy feedback scholarship by identifying heterogeneity by political attentiveness as a focus of future inquiry.
On the basis of the 2013 Chinese Social Survey (CSS) data, this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the influence of social, economic and cultural factors on the national identity of the population, with a focus on the differences between the younger and the older generation. Our findings show that the sense of national identity of the younger generation is weaker than that of the older generation, and this is even more marked among the tertiary-educated younger generation. The sense of national identity of the older generation is more influenced by social structural factors, especially by their position in the social hierarchy, while that of the younger generation is more affected by cultural and economic factors. In addition, we find that in China, the sense of national identity of the privileged stratum is stronger than that of the middle and base-level strata. These findings, which run counter to Huntington and Inglehart’s view of “the weakening of elite national identity,” may be due to the different roles of the state in globalization and economic growth.
Text rozvíjí diskurzivně-pragmatický koncept Mannheimovy teorie generace, především jeho myšlenku generace jako skutečnosti, která zdůrazňuje kolektivní kognitivní pozadí neboli horizont generace. Autor rovněž rozebírá vznik tohoto kognitivního pozadí v závislosti na souběžném výskytu různých časových hledisek, jako jsou biografický, historický a generační čas. K vysvětlení diskurzivních praktik generací jsou představeny koncepty „historického času“ (Robinson), „historické sémanitky“ (Luhmann) a „kulturních okruhů“. Autor tak nabízí chápání „problému generace“, které lze využít k empirickému zkoumání tohoto tématu za pomoci interpretativních a rekonstruktivních výzkumných metod.
The uprisings that erupted unexpectedly in the Middle East between 2010 and 2011 propelled this region’s youth to the forefront of the political and media scene. To some scholars, we are witnessing a re-politicisation of the Middle Eastern youth, which stands in marked contrast to their "depoliticisation" and "apathy" of recent years. Yet, although the participation of the youth "by the way the ’majority’ of the population in the region" to popular protests is an undeniable fact, student unions seem to be out of the picture so far. From a macro-level perspective, the marginal role of student associations may appear "natural". Whilst nationalist and revolutionary leaders encouraged students to actively participate in politics "for the sake of the nation" until the 1960s, revolutionary as well as conservative regimes progressively sought to "depoliticize" them. In that respect, the university field became a privileged site of experimentation of methods of repression which would then be expanded to be used in all sectors of society. However, though scholars must take into consideration the political context of a given society "authoritarian or semi-authoritarian in most of Middle Eastern countries", what the meso and micro levels of analysis reveal us about the complex and multi-layered phenomena of collective demobilization and individual disengagement? This special issue offers some responses to that central question while analyzing different case studies within the university milieu from Turkey to Egypt, Morocco, and Mexico over the last forty years.
The literature presents conflicting expectations about the effect of globalization on democracy. One view expects globalization to enhance democracy, a second argues that globalization obstructs democracy; a third argues that it does not necessarily affect democracy. In this paper, we consider the threshold effect approach to reconcile these different results. We study the role of demography in the determination of the relationship between globalization and democracy. Based on a panel of 97 countries for the period 1993–2013, we use a threshold panel model (Hansen 1999) as well as a dynamic threshold panel model (Kremer et al. 2013) to estimate the effect of globalization on democracy, taking into account the demographic structure of the country. We find evidence of a threshold effect of demographic characteristics on the relationship between globalization and democracy and prove that the impact of globalization on democracy is regime specific. Our results show a positive impact of globalization associated with “early demographic transition regime” and a negative impact for countries with “late demographic transition regime.” Our results remain robust to alternative measure of democracy.
To date, comparatively little empirical research has been done on Generation Z globally, and the studies that do exist, while informative, have arrived at different, often loosely tied, conclusions. Seeing as how Generation Z is in the process of joining the professional workforce, it is important for decision makers to understand this generation’s value differences and cultural orientation in order to mitigate intergenerational conflicts and ensure a productive workforce going forward. China, meanwhile, is a rising superpower, and its Generation Z will have a significant impact globally. With the generational mix at work changing to accommodate this new generation, this paper presents a critique of current empirical research on this topic in a cross-cultural context and offers recommendations regarding future research directions as these relate to generational shift in China and other non-Western contexts. It is only by better understanding Generation Z that organizations can develop strategies and policies that will ensure a productive, profitable and collaborative environment in the future, one that better takes into account this newest generation’s needs and outlook.
This article studies post-2000 Chinese feminist activism from a generational perspective. It operationalises three notions of generation- generation as an age cohort, generation as a historical cohort, and "political generation"-to shed light on the question of generation and generational change in post-socialist Chinese feminism. The study shows how the younger generation of women have come to the forefront of feminist protest in China and how the historical conditions they live in have shaped their feminist outlook. In parallel, it examines how a "political generation" emerges when feminists of different ages are drawn together by a shared political awakening and collaborate across age.
The government of Kazakhstan has invested heavily in educating an independently thinking generation of young people, one that is qualitatively different from the generations that came before. Yet, what constitutes “independent thinking”? Is it the expression of views that differ from prior generations? Is it the expression of views that challenge government policy? An analysis of the political and economic attitudes of the “Nazarbayev generation,” aged 18–29, reveals that young people indeed interpret the world in distinct ways. Data show that, when compared to older Kazakhstanis, they are more passive and trusting in (certain) state institutions, less in favor of questioning government decisions, and less likely to be troubled by nepotism and family rule.
Since the 2008 crisis, youth unemployment in Southern Europe has hindered a return to social and economic stability: in Spain, the young and unemployed are sometimes referred to as a ‘lost generation’. This article investigates how rampant youth unemployment in Spain has darkened expectations for the country’s future inside the European Union (EU) as well as altered views of the past. Using interviews with jobless young people, the article argues that the severity and duration of the 2008 crisis has prompted historical revisionism. Age cohorts often organise around pivotal events and the article shows how young people have questioned the success of democratisation (1980s) and European integration (1990s), causing a growing rift with their parents’ generation. Finally, it explores generational conflict in Spain through three interconnected experiences of unemployment: returning to live with parents, urban to rural migration for a lower cost of living, and emigration to Northern Europe for employment.
Context: The health professions education (HPE) literature abounds with recommendations for how educators should adapt practices to the needs of generations of learners, using these insights as a means to bridge inherent differences between learners and educators. Yet the evidence supporting these applications of generational theory in HPE have not been critically examined; if unsubstantiated, these approaches may perpetuate biases towards learners they are intended to support.
Methods: This paper critically reviews generational theory in the HPE literature, with particular focus on recent recommendations regarding ‘millennial’ learners. We used Google Scholar, MEDLINE, EBSCO, JSTOR, and PsycINFO to search for articles pertaining to the origins and uses of generational theory within and outside of the health professions. This synthesis is presented as a preliminary understanding of how ideas of generational theory arose and permeated the HPE literature, exploring potential downstream effects of generational theory on educational practices.
Results: Translation of generational theory into the HPE literature generally follows the types of recommendations that have been advanced other literatures, with broad generalizations about generational cohorts drawn from limited data. Outside of HPE, this application of generational theory has been criticized as a form of stereotyping that ignores the internal differences and diversity inherent in any large group of people. Accordingly, problematizing the needs of generations such as ‘millennial’ learners in the HPE literature may perpetuate narrow or privileged assumptions by teachers.
Conclusion: Generational archetypes such as ‘millennial learners’ are myths that perpetuate unfounded generalizations about cohorts, reinforce power differentials between age groups, and minimize the unique needs of individuals. To individualize and strengthen teaching practices in HPE, we recommend adopting ‘generational humility’ as a means to more purposefully explore the dynamic social, cultural, and historical influences that shape individuals within each generation of learners.
Analyses of the political and economic attitudes of the “Nazarbayev generation” (aged 18-29) reveal the ways that young Kazakhstanis are distinct from older generations. Young people are more accepting of material inequality and less likely to make demands on the welfare state in favor of the poor and unemployed. They are also less likely to be troubled by nepotism and family rule. When compared to those who were socialized prior to the consolidation of presidential power, the Nazarbayev generation more closely reflects the values that underlie Kazakhstan’s personalist regime and the practices and policies associated with it.
This paper examines the internal dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood. It uses a sociological approach that focuses on the interactions between different generational sections within the movement. Generation, however, is conceived through different currents of intellectual thought and not strictly by age. This is justified by an examination of the views and opinions of the Muslim Brotherhood's youngest generation in the wake of the January 25, 2011 revolution, which are diverse. The positions of this group are explored across a number of issues: the organizational structure, the decision-making process, the culture of obedience, proselytizing (daawa) and politics, political party life, and reform. It relies on focused or semi-structured interviews with current and former members of the movement as well as selected biographies, Facebook groups, and video recordings made and published by the movement's members. The sample of members taken into account for the study was based on two criteria. The first is the position occupied by a Muslim Brotherhood member and the experience they have in or outside the movement. The second is their position in the revolutionary-conservative binary, or the degree to which he/she accepts or rejects the discourse of the movement and its leadership. The latter factor indicates diversity among Muslim Brotherhood youth in terms of vision, cultural makeup, and political experience.
Indonesia's Islamic organizations sustain the country's thriving civil society, democracy, and reputation for tolerance amid diversity. Yet scholars poorly understand how these organizations envision the accommodation of religious difference. What does tolerance mean to the world's largest Islamic organizations? What are the implications for democracy in Indonesia and the broader Muslim world? Jeremy Menchik argues that answering these questions requires decoupling tolerance from liberalism and investigating the historical and political conditions that engender democratic values. Drawing on archival documents, ethnographic observation, comparative political theory, and an original survey, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia demonstrates that Indonesia's Muslim leaders favor a democracy in which individual rights and group-differentiated rights converge within a system of legal pluralism, a vision at odds with American-style secular government but common in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. Challenges the assumption that liberal modes of tolerance are necessary for making democracy work Instead of asking whether Islam is compatible with democracy, it investigates the more important question: what kind of democracy do Muslims want? Draws on twenty-four months of field research in Indonesia, including archival research, ethnographic observation and an original survey.
The article seeks to give an overview of the ways in which the various human sciences —particularly philosophy and political sociology— have interpreted contemporary generational conflict since the 1920s and 1930s, while describing the evolution and the growing complexity of forms of protest as they relate to gradual acquisition of historical and political consciousness by juvenile cohorts. It examines various archetypes exemplifying such modes of conflictive political participation: student rioting, party militancy, paramilitary activism and the new alternative social movements.
This article reports on the preliminary findings from a national UK study of the life histories of 28 Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) educators who led schools across a 47-year period (1968–2015). BAME head teachers were grouped by generations (i.e. pioneer, experienced, and novice) and questioned about the critical life experiences that influenced their path to leadership, the intersection of their professional and social identities, and their metaphors for leadership. Participants claimed leadership metaphors which included the head teacher as parent, ambassador, moral steward, role model, and community advocate. Pioneer Black and South Asian headteachers narrated more collectivist identities as community leaders and race equality activists, while current BAME headteachers appear more individually focused on raising attainment for students who have been marginalized. A life history approach across generations emphasizes the influence of changing attitudes toward race and the shifting policy context on professional identities.
The study of political activism has neglected people’s personal and social relationships to time. Age, life course and generation have become increasing important experiences for understanding political participation and political outcomes (e.g. Brexit), and current policies of austerity across the world are affecting people of all ages. At a time when social science is struggling to understand the rapid and unexpected changes to the current political landscape, the essay argues that the study of political activism can be enriched by engaging with the temporal dimensions of people’s everyday social experiences because it enables the discovery of political activism in mundane activities as well as in banal spaces. The authors suggest that a values-based approach that focuses on people’s relationships of concern would be a suitable way to surface contemporary political sites and experiences of activism across the life course and for different generations.
There has been considerable debate over the extent and role of young people's political participation. Whether considering popular hand-wringing over concerns about declines in young people's institutional political participation or dismissals of young people's use of online activism, many frame youth engagement through a “youth deficit” model that assumes that adults need to politically socialize young people. However, others argue that young people are politically active and actively involved in their own political socialization, which is evident when examining youth participation in protest, participatory politics, and other forms of noninstitutionalized political participation. Moreover, social movement scholars have long documented the importance of youth to major social movements. In this article, we bring far flung literatures about youth activism together to review work on campus activism; young people's political socialization, their involvement in social movement organizations, their choice of tactics; and the context in which youth activism takes place. This context includes the growth of movement societies, the rise of fan activism, and pervasive Internet use. We argue that social movement scholars have already created important concepts (e.g., biographical availability) and questions (e.g., biographical consequences of activism) from studying young people and urge additional future research.
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