Content uploaded by Javier Vidal
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Javier Vidal on Mar 08, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
Ghanges in Spanish
Universities
Improvements and lJnsolved Conflicts
I,Vhite the Spankh system of higher education has taken great stridesforward in the last two
decades, there is sttll roomfor improuement.
by Josó-Ginós Mora and JavierVidal
n the last two decades, Spain has experienced a period of
profound social, political, and economic changes that have
affected the higher education system considerably. These
changes have taken place over a short period of time, creating
a dynamic situation. Although the consequences of most of
these changes have been eKremely positive, some unintend-
ed negative effects have also occurred.
Josó_Ginós Mora is professor, Depart-
ment of Applied Economics, at the Univer-
sity o{ Vatencia. Hrs iield is economics of
education and higher education. He has
served as advisor of the Spanish Council
of Universities for the last 10 years.
JavierVidal is professor, Department of
Education, at the University'of León. Cur-
rently, he is acting as director of the i', ,l
Office for Ouality Assurance.
Legal Framework:
Leaving State Control Behind
The University Reform Acror Ley de Reforma Universitaria
(LRU) established the current structure of higher education in
1983. This act brought about great changes in the legal frame'
work of Spanish universities, whiń until then had been whol-
ly regulated by the central Ministry of Education
(Garcia-Garrido 1992: Mora 1997a). Following are the main
changes the LRU introduced:
. Universities became autonomous entities.
o Direct responsibility for universities was transferred from
the central government to the 17 autonomous regions.
o The establishment of private universities was permitted.
Under the new legal structure, power over the universi-
ties is shared by the following:
Planning for Higher Education
. Central government, which is responsible for general and
legal issues concerning universities and staff, most of
whom are tenured civil servants
. Begional governments, which are responsible for financ-
ing public universities and planning higher education in
the regron
. Universitres, whidr make decisions on internal organization,
program cunicula and syllabi, staff recruitment (restricted
by the general rules for civil servants), the organization of
teaching and research, and internal budgeting
After the LRU, universities were no longer dependent on the
state and became collegial structures in the sense of Clark
(i983). Decision-making power was transferred to collegiate
bodies in which
nonacademic staff
and students
make up a consid-
erable percentage
(roughly one-
third). The Univer-
sity Senate also
has considerable
powel including
the election of the
rector. (Although
the position of
rector is formally
similar to presi-
dents at American
universities, their real power is rather lower.) Boards with
large numbers of members make decisions on faculties and
departments, and elect deans and heads of departments. The
Social Council (based on the pattern of boards of trustees in
Josó_Ginós Mora and JavierMdal
Becoming a Mass Higher Education System
The increase in the number of higher education students in
recent decades has been dramatic (table 1). However, the
increase has slowed in recent years due to the remarkable
reduction in the size of the cohort of youths reaching higher
education age.
The Spanish higher education system has become a
mass system, with increasing proportions of people enrolling
in higher education institutions (table 2). The gross enrollment
quota for the 18-to-23-yearold population is 41 percent, and
the percentage of new entrants in higher education among
the 18-year-old population is 55 percent.
The growth of higher education has been a demand-
driven process. It is hard to find policy documents from either
governments or universities promoting the groMh of the high-
er educątion SVStem' The social demand has been the com-
pelling Bngine of growth. However, governments have poured
resources into the system to compensate for the growth of
students (especially since higher education was a responsibili-
ty of regional governments). Though universities were not
enthusiastic about the fast growth of students, they took
advantage of this growth to obtain greater numbers of staff,
more economic resources, and greater social prominence.
Access to higher education is relatively open to all social
classes. An analysis of the socioeconomic background of
higher education students shows a fair representation of
youths from middle- and upper-class groups (table 3). Youths
from lower socioeconomic groups (unskilled, agricultural, and
industrial workers) also have significant access to higher edu-
cation, though they are still underrepresented (Mora 1997b).
On the other hand, the proportion of women among higher
education students surpasses the proportion of men. ln i970,
the proportion of women enrolled in higher education was
ł
:r.
*
:
łł:
t$
);
taote I
:: Number of Higher
: Education Students
Number of
Year Students
.i: l
il'
1l
1.,
illir r
ll.'
ł]l
\s:,1,r
l:r
l!'l
196M1
197U71
l 198G€1
r 1990-91
I tggz-g8
1998-99
178,000
352000
M9,000
1,140,000
1,5M,000
1,579,000
Source: Consejo de Unirrersidades (sevaral years)
other university systems) was estab-
lished as an external body representing
the wider interests of society in the uni-
versity. Nevertheless, the real influence
of thrs body is cluite linrited, due to a
lack oi tracjrtiorr and an unclear legal def-
inition of rts role l\ccordrng to the crite-
ria used by McDaniel (1996), Spanish
universities have a similar level of auton-
omy to those of the Netherlands and
Sweden, less than Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries but more than most of the Euro-
pean continenlal countries.
Table 2
Rate of Participation in Higher Education
New Entrants/
18-Year-Old Total Students/
18-to-23-Year-Old
Year , Population Population
198H1
1990-91
1997-98
21o/o
39o/o
55o/o
18o/o
29o/o
41%
Source: Mora, Garcfa-Montalvo, and Garcia-Aracil (2000)
16 Winter 2000-2001
just 26 percent, but by 1986 numbers reached 50 percent and
have continued to increase to currently stand at 54 percent of
the higher education population.
lncreasing Resources
Before the LRU, expenditures at public universities were
mere items in the budget of the central government. The LBU
Changes in Spanish Universities: lmprovements and
Unsolved Conflicts
Given this considerable increase, it would be interesting
to analyze the forces that have driven it. lt is quite obvious
that the rise in available resources has been substantial. How-
ever, in our view, the key has been the way in which these
resources have been distributed. Several factors have stimu-
lated and given prestige to the research activity of the teach-
ing staff: competitiveness for funds, independent assessment
of projects, the prestige attached to obtaining the funds, and
represented the beginning of a profound
financial cfrange. Under the current
financial model, regional governments
grant funds to universities as a lump
sum. Universities are free to allocate
these funds internally. However, univer-
sities control neither the main expendi-
ture item (salaries are determined by
central government) nor the main
sources of income (appropriations and
tuition fees) that regional governments
establish.
Table 3
Socioeconońic Background of the You n g Population
{by occupation of the household's main breadwinnerl
ln Population
as aWhole ln Higher
Education
Not only did the financial system 'r
dlange after the LRU, the total amount l
of funds devoted to universities
increased enormously. ln 1997 total
higher education expenditures in Spain l
reached '1.2 percent (OECD 2000).This expenditure is similar
to most European countries but smaller than the U.S. figure
of 2.5 percent. However, the remarkable fact is that the
increase has been substantial in just a fewyears; in 1985, the
total expenditure in higher education was only 0.54 percent oi
the gross domestic product (Mora and Garcia-Aracil 1999).
lncreasing Research ActivĘ
There has been an explosive growth both qualitatively and
quantitatively in the research capacities of Spanish universi-
ties.Two outstanding facts relate to researdt in Spain in gen-
eral, most of which has been carried out at universities. ln
1986 the percentage of the Spanish gross domestic prociuct
invested in research and development was 0.55 This percent-
age rose to 0.91 in 1993, though it has remained stable since
then. ln addition, the Spanish share in worldwide scientific
production rose from 0.9 percent in 1984 to 2.51 percent in
1998 (Oficina de Ciencia yTecnologia 1999). Although there is
room for increase in both of these figures (investment and
outcome), the result to date can certainly be considered a
tremendous success for Spanish universities.
8.07o
2.9%o
32.3o/o
21.4%o
7.9o/o
17.00/o
10.57o
the introduction of a system of evaluation of each researcher.
Another situation that should be analyzed is the extent to
which this development of research activities, along with a
lack of similar incentives for teaching, may be impairing the
effort that universities devote to teaching, which undoubtedly
is the most important function of universities.
The Changing Role of Academics
Before the LRU, tenured academics were members of nation-
al bodies. They changed from one university to another
depending on the vacancies.The internal organization of the
universities was extremely hierarchical. The basic unit was
the chair occupred by a chairman (very rai-ely by a chari'rvonran
at that time) who headed all teaching, research. and (irr fact)
personnel issues. The labor status of the rest of the academ-
ics, whiń was considered to be provisional, WaS consequent_
ly rather poor (Mora 2000).
The LRU strongly changed the situation of academic staff
in the following respects:
. Departments, where several professors work together
and share teaching and research activities, replaced the
former chairs.
Agricultural workers
Unskilled workers
Skilled industrial workers
Service sector workers
Agricultural employers
Professionals and employers
Managers
Source: Mora (1997b)
2.1Yo
1.6Yo
21.2Vo
25.1o/o
5.57o
19.7%
25.1Vo
.!
il'
i
Ir'
lil
łi
il
i
Planning for Higher Education 17
in
The [Jniversity Reform Act established
the current structure of higher education
1983.
regular program. These programs are completely market-ori-
ented. Students pay the full costs of the program, although in
some cases public or private corporations or foundations suq
port these courses. Teachers in these programs receive fees
in addition to their salaries. This parallel market-oriented sector
Professors became members of universities where they
worked instead of members of rational bodies.
Rules for the selection of professors changed, transfer-
ring significant power to the university with the vacancy.
A new structure of professorships and nontenured per-
sonnel was established.
A reasonable increase in academic staff salaries made
academic careers more attractive.
Changing the Cuniculum
The traditional organization of coursework in Spanish universi-
ties was a consequence of the centralized system, which
existed before the LRU. Curricula were fixed, almost identical
in every university, and had a very limited proportion of option-
al courses. Courses were also strongly based on theory, leav-
ing out the practical aspects. The rigidity of this system was
evident. Adaptability to society s needs, to students' curricular
demands, and to the variability of labor market demands
required substantial reform in the curriculum.This process of
reform began several years ago, when basic national criteria
for new curricula were set up. Universities were given exten-
sive freedom to develop detailed curricula based on their own
objectives. The development of new curricula was carried out
in each university in ad hoc committees for each academic
program. The new curricula have a modular structure, courses
are mostly delivered in semesters, the proportion of optional
courses is high, and practical content has been enhanced in
every course.
Universities were also allowed to set up their own pro-
grams, specific to each institution. They do not require any
kind of national validation by the Council of Universities and
are not financed through public funds. However, they are not
officially recognized as a national diploma. Most of these pro.
grams are offered to students who are already graduates in a
Josó-Ginós Mora and JavierMdal
within universities is growing rapidly, and universities are cur-
rently offering more than 2,500 programs of this type (Mora
and Vidal 2000).
Assessment and Accountability: A New
Attitude in Universities
The traditional higher education system, which the state
monopolized and completely regulated, obviously did not con-
cern itself with accountability. HoweveĘ accountability is more
necessary as the system has become more autonomous and,
along with assessment, is developing very rapidly. General-
ized assessment of individuals and institutions began in the
early 1990s. Teaching and research activities of academics are
evaluated on a regular basis. Promotion and some salary
increase depend on those assessments (Mora 2000). ln addi-
tion, after several pilot projects, the Council of Universities
estaUlished the National Program for Assessment of Ouality in
Universities (Mora 1997c; Mora andVidal 1998) with the aim
of introducing a systematic assessment of universities. After
only a few years, Spanish universities have set up new offices
to support assessment and quality assurance programs, and
thousands of people are participating in self-assessment activ-
ities and external visits around the country. Some regional
governments are also involved in these programs, even creat-
ing their own quality agencies. lt is cunently difficult to deter-
mine the impact of these programs on the Spanish higher
education system because the consequences are expected to
be seen only in the long-term. ln any case, quality assurance
is a new but unavoidable topic on the agenda of Spanish uni-
versities.
What ls Still Missing
Experts would consider most of the recent developments in
Spanish higher education to be positive for a sound higher
education system (Dill and Sporn 1996;
Meek et al. 1996). Universities have
become autonomous and are more in
tune to regional needs, their internal
structure has become flexible, the
whole system has become open and
accessible, funds have been poured into
the system as never before, curricula have become modular
and flexible, market forces have started to play a relevant role,
the system has become accountable, and so on.
It is true that the effect of these changes has been
extremely positive for the higher education system. lt would
1a Winter 200C-2001
The services Spanish universities offer
their customers are still poor. Students,
who are the most direct customers,
receive few services apart from lec-
tures, which, in too many cases, take
place in huge classes. The treatment
students receive during their stay at the
not be an overstatement to say that higher education in Spain
is today considerably better than it was two decades ago.
Nevertheless, there are still many aspects that are still miss-
ing in the higher education system.
PoorAttention to the Customer
Changes in Spanish Universities: lmprovements and
Unsolved Conflicts
that are usually neglected in the Spanish education system.
The provision of theoretical training and scholarly knowledge-
probably the easiest to supply_łoes not seem to be the most
adequate for the present labor market. The reason is that grad-
uates from Spanish universities lack some of the basic tools
that are necessary to begin their working lives easily. Although
universities cannot be made responsible for the high rates of
unemployment among the youth of Spain, the type of training
provided by them does not appear to be the best.
A Single Model of UniversitY
The LRU opted for a common model of university. Hardly any
elements were introduced to promote diversity and competi-
tiveness among and within institutions. Although the possibili-
ty of differentiation was not excluded, practice over the last
few years has led to a degree of inter- and intrainstitutional
homogeneity that is higher than is desirable. The power of the
state over universities, exerted through regulations and coor-
dination mectranisms adopted by the Ministry of Education,
has created a situation in which universities, though legally
autonomous, are seriously restrained from exercising differen-
tiation and competitiveness. And several universities have not
sought diversity and competitiveness and have shown their
fear of differentiation.
As a consequence of this uniformity, Spanish universities
do not compete for students. ln other words, they do not
compete for the financial resources that students may bring.
This is not necessary because the university access mecha-
nism and the student allocation system to the various pro-
grams guarantee that the programs are filled, no matter how
little demand there is from students or the labor market.
The clear cansequence of all these factors-the lack of
true differentiation among Spanish universities, the lack of
internal diversity, the great teacfring staff homogeneiĘ-is
that the degree of competitiveness among universities,
departments, and teaching staff is very small. lt would be nec-
essary to create some kind of stimulating competitiveness to
encourage active dynamics that help to improve the quality of
university institutions and their personnel (Clark '1997).
Before the LRU, the internal organization
of the universities was extremelY
hierarchical.
institution is not exactly friendly. This makes the connection
between students and their university very tenuous and hin-
ders the setting up of later links through alumni associations.
Connections between universities and enterprises, the
second major customers of universities as employers of their
graduates and as bodies requiring their services, are still tenu-
ous. Active participation of employers in universities is also
limited. Even services, which have sharply increased, repre-
sent less than 5 percent of the budget for all Spanish universi-
ties. The more dynamic universities are lust starting to develop
the concept of the entrepreneurial university (Clark 1998)'
This lac* of services may be partly explained by the tradi-
tional shortage of resources' HoweveĘ it would seem that the
change from a state-controlled university to an autonomous
university has not always brought about the expected change
in the mentality of both the institution and the academics.
There seems to remain the well-established bureaucratic spir-
it so typical of civil servants.
One of the consequences of the poor attention paid to
students is that the number of dropouts and the number of
students who lag behind are very high at Spanish universities.
Three-year degrees and five-year degrees have an estimated
average duration of 5 and 7'l years, respectively, and dropout
rates are around 40 percent (Mora and Garcia-Aracil 1999).
This situation is also affected by the fact that registration fees
are very low for students, sirrce most tuition costs are
financed by the state, and by the fact that youth employment
perspectives are very discouraging.
ln addition, a university system that provides little individ-
ual attention to students due to overcrowded classes gener-
ates graduates who lack necessary skills and training. There
are certain basic aspects of university training-such as read-
ing, writing, critical thinking, and problem-solving capability-
Planning for Higher Education 19
An Obsolete Status forAcademic Staff
Spanish universities were a typical case of the Napoleonic
model, where universities were a part of the state and aca-
demics were civil servants belonging to national bodies. The
LRU changed the model, transforming universities into
autonomous institutions, but it did not dlange the status of
the academics. Academics, at least those in stable positions,
are still civil servants and members of national bodies. There
is a deep contradiction between the status of academics and
the university autonomy. For instance, candidates for tenured
positions at one university are selected by a committee of
members of the national body of professors, whiń is com_
posed of members from other (perhaps competitor) universi-
ties. ln other words, the selection of personnel at one
autonomous and independent university depends on deci-
sions undertaken by members of other universities, some.
thing radically contradictory.
There is another relevant consequence of keeping the
status of civil servant for academics. Salaries and working
conditions of academics are fixed at a national level for all the
members of the national body of professors (with differences
by categories). Commitment to work, higher productivity, or
better results cannot be negotiated and compensated at the
individual level because membership in a national body
implies the same rules for all members. How is it possible to
compensate the different levels of peńormance? ln the case
of Spain, the solution the LRU adopted was to allow "market,,
Josó_Ginós Mora and JavierVidal
ln this situation, academics have sometimes deeprooted
feelings that they belong to a generic civil servant body that
lacks a clear awareness of their duties toward the enterprise
for which they work and its customers. This feeling would
drange if academic staff members were given a different sta-
tus and other recruitment procedures were used. This problem
is not easy or quick to solve, but it should be addressed soon.
Limitations on Students
Spanish students face severe limitations in pursuing a universi-
ty education. As we have stated, university "customers" are
guaranteed irrespective of the quality of the university or the
suitability of its academic programs. Furthermore, even though
universities may make an effort to improve their quality, it is
difficult for students to respond to them due to cultural and
economic factors. The strongest economic reasons are that
part-iltne employment is not compatible with studying and,
especially, there is not a good system of student scholarships.
The present system of scholarships for Spanish students
is insufficient and unfair. The funds allocated to scholarships,
their amount, and their distribution system are absolutely
inadequate. The global endowment of scholarships for Span-
ish students is still comparatively low, in spite of having tripled
in constant currency since 1985 (Mora and Garcia-Aracil
1999). For instance, the United States, which has a university
population roughly 10 times larger than that of Spain, invests
in aid programs, scholarships, and loans for students 60 times
more than Spain. ln the Scandinavian
countries, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands, more than 60 percent of
students obtain financial aid, and the
average aid they receive is several
times higher than Spanish students
receive (Daniel, Schwarz, and Teichler
1999). This poor system of aid for students not only affects
the equity but also the efficiency, the mobility, and the qualiĘ
of universities.
Excessive Power of Academics
The LRU transferred decision making in universities to colle-
giate bodies. Boards with large numbers of members make
decisions for each university and department, and they elect
the rector, deans, and heads of departments.The Spanish
higher education system moved from the state, in the well
known scl'reme of Clark (1983), to a position that is rather
close to an academic oligarchy. Although market forces are
{
'*
ł
r
ł
i
{
ł
This mix between the civil servant and
market activities of Spanish academics has
contradictory consequences.
activities of academics in addition to their "civil servant', activi-
ties. Academics are allowed to assume extra activities, such
as continuing education courses (sometimes at another uni-
versity), contracting for applied research activities or consul-
tancy, and organizinq any other activity more or less related to
the pro{ession. There are rules establishing some limits for
these activities, but they are not too restrictive. This mix
between the civil servant and market activities of Spanlsh aca-
demics has contradictory consequences. lt has been a stimu-
lus for most active academics to promote many and diverse
entrepreneurial activities that are satisfying social demands
that institutions by themselves are not able to provide. at least
with enough flexibility.
20 Winter 2000-2001
gaining influence in Spanish higher education, the system is
still too far from the market (Mora 1997a).
The democratic development of Spanish universities at
the beginning of the 1980s was necessary to shake off old
bureaucratic structures and reduce direct interference from
the state. Nevertheless, in this new
scheme, academics act in many cases
as a guild that is more concerned with
how to defend its own interests than
with serving the community and its stu-
Changes in Spanish Univercities: lmprovements and
Unsolved Conflicts
These problems raise several questions:What are the
limits of university autonomyT What should be the role of gov-
ernments steering higher educationT What should be the role
of academics in governing and managing universities? Public
debate on these questions is just starting in Spain, and experts
agree that finding a correct answer to these questions is nec-
essary in addressing the problems of Spanish universities.
Nevertheless, this debate is extremely complicated and mixed
with political and sociological factors. lt comes as no surprise
that there is tension as Neave (1997 p. 9) envisioned:
lFlrom 1983 onwards reform in Spanish higher edu-
cation has successively tackled issues whiń, else-
where in Western Europe, were spaced out, and
dealt with, over a quarter century. . . . I am suggest-
ing that the move from reform iustified in the name
of participant democracy to the rigours of competi-
tion and economic efficiency is likely to be a source
of considerable tension, and not only in academia.
There are several reasons that explain the current con-
flict. University autonomy is a hot political issue everywhere'
but especially in Spain. For too many years, Spanish universi-
ties suffered the interference of a dictatorial regime. Political
democracy and university autonomy are considered synony-
mous in suń a way that autonomy is guaranteed by the con-
stitution. Consequently, academics are extremely reluctant to
admit any possible interference from anywhere outside the
institution, especially in the participation of the community in
university boards. Despite the fact that these iears have a his-
torical justification, they are unacceptable in a democratic soci-
ety. lf the community is the owner of public universities, and
the university's mission is to serve the community, how may
academics deny the right of this community to participate
actively in governing universities?
Under these circumstances. the debate on governrng and
managing universities is often vehement. Nevertheless, the
idea that new forms of governance must be introduced is
spreading, and the need for a stronger external participation in
universities is gaining popularity. The problem is to find a way
of making this participation as independent as possible of par-
tisan powers and of short-term fashions. ln the search for a
better balance of power between academics and the commu-
ri
łl
f1
!,
Those "right" policies have generated
some "wrong" effects.
dents. As McDaniel (1997) pointed out, the move from direct
state intervention to institutional autonomy should be accom-
panied by other meńanisms, such as competitiveness (for
students, staff, funds, and reputation), diversification of
resources, and increasing client power and social responsibili-
ty of institutions. These trends have not been followed
enough in Spanish universities for several reasons:
. The lack of tradition of serving the community. Coming
from a bureaucratic model, universities and staff (mostly
civil servants) consider themselves more as belonging to
a branch of the public administration than to an institution
for serving the community.
o The lack of social control over universities. Although the
LRU established the Social Council to bring external
points of view it has little influence due to the legal defi-
nition of its role.
. The lack of governmental policies on higher education.
As soon as the LRU granted direct responsibility for uni-
versities to regional governments, the main concern of
the central government was to transfer this responsibility.
HoweveĘ regional governments' With few exceptions,
have not been able to define policies on higher educa-
tion, establish goals for public institutions, or require uni-
versities to achieve some oblectives.
ln addition to governing universities, the main responsibil-
ity for managing institutions lies with academics. Although
some institutions hire professional managers for some mana-
gerial positions, they are always in dependent positions, while
nrost of the decision-nraking power lies with academics that
are temporarily occupying a managerial post. There is no evi-
dence that academics have enough knowledge or training to
act as managers. On the contrary, in general they have no
experience in the management of any type of big organiza-
tion. The result is far from a model of good practice. There is a
general feeling in Spanish higher education that the manage-
ment structure of universities must change to make them
more professional and efficient.
Planning for Higher Education 21
nity, discussions among experts are centered on two areas:
how to enhance the role of the Social Council and how to set
up a new way of electing the rector. lt is likely that iust these
two changes might bring about other desirable improvements
in the rest of the system. Many experts recommend that the
Social Council should be both formally and factually the body
in charge of universities and the body responsible for the
appointment of rectors, who should be selected according to
their managerial abilities. A new type of rector should also
introduce new managerial styles in running universities, abol_
ishing most of the power that academics currently have.
These solutions, of which more and more people today are in
favor, are not original. Six years after the establishment of the
LRU, the Spanish government asked an international team of
experts to assess the reform. This team elaborated in a report
(ISCED 1989) that presents an extraordinary insight into the
potential dangers of the reform. They proposed (at a time
when dangers were only "potential") the same changes that
we are proposing 10 years later.
Conclusion
Higher education in Spain has developed dramatically over the
last two decades. Generally speaking, most of the policies
implemented in Spain during this period have been adequate
and have produced remarkable improvements in the higher
education system. Nevertheless, not everything is running
smoothly. For example, those "right', policies have generated
some "wrong" effects. And some crucial issues were never
tackled and are still waiting for reforms. Generally, all the neg_
ative aspects of Spanish higher education have something in
common: they are related to the almost exclusive influence of
academics in the definition of the role of the higher education
system and in the implementation of the policies defined
mostly by themselves. This excessive influence is a conse-
quence of the limited influence of other agents and the lac* of
a more resolute introduction of market forces into the higher
education system. These two problems have not stimulated
universities to greater responsiveness to social needs. On the
contrary, universities have taken advantage of the fragmenta-
tion of regronal governments and lack of competition to
increase their privileges. To provide a better service to society
Spanish universities must face a new dlallenge: to make the
whole system more oriented to social demands and to reduce
the influence of academics. r$t
Josó-Ginós Mora and JavierMdal
References
Clark, B. B. 1983. The Higher Education System: Academic Organiza_
tion in Cross-Nationa! Perspective. Berkeley: University of Cali_
fornia Press.
Clark, B. R. '1997 Diversification, Competitive Autonomy. and lnstitu_
tional lnitiative in Higher Education Systems. ln Wandel im ter_
tióren Bildungs-sektoł edited by M. Herbst et al. VDF
Hochschulverlag AG an der ETH Z0rich.
Clark, B. R. 1998. Creating Entrepreneurial lJniversities: Organizational
Pathways of Transformation. Oxford: pergamon press.
Conse.jo de Universidades. SeveralYears. Anuario de Estadistica Uni-
versitaria. Madrid: Consejo de Universidades.
Daniel, H. D., S. Schwarz, and U. Teichler. 1999. Study Costs, Student
t[TT.ilTir:blic Policv in Europe. European Journatof Educa'
Dill, D., and B. Sporn. 1995. Emerging Patterns of Sociat Demand and
University Reform:Through a Glass Darkly. Oxford: pergamon
Press.
Garcfa-Ganido, J. L. 1992. Spain. ln Encyclopedia of Higher Education,
vol. 1, edited by B. R Clark and G. Neave. Oxford: furgamon
Press.
ISCED. 1989. The Spanish University Reform: An Assessment Report.
Madrid: Consejo de Universidades.
McDaniel, O.C. 1996.The Paradigms of Governance in Higher Educa-
tion Systems. Higher Education folicy gl2l: 137-Sg.
1997 Les Etablissements d'Enseignement Superieur fuu-
vent-ils se Passer de I'lntervention de l'Etat? Gestion de I'En_
se ig n e m e n t S u
pe ri e u r g(21 : 1 2Ug.
Meek, V 1., L. Goedegebuure, O. Kivinen, and R. Rinne. 1996. Ihe
Mod<ers and Mod<ed: Comparative perspectives on Differentia-
tion, Convergence and Diversity in Higher Education. Oxtord:
furgamon Press.
Mora, J. G. 1997a. MarketTrends in Spanish Higher Education. Higher
Ed u catio n Pot icy 1Ol3 l4): 1 87*98.
1997b. Equity in Spanish Higher Education. Higher Education
33(3): 233-49.
-.
1997c. Ouality Assessment in Spain: An On-Going process.
Higher Education Management 9(l): Sg-70.
-.
2000 Adapting to Change:The Academic profession in Spain.
ln Academic Staff in Europe: Changing Contexts and Con-
drtrbns, edited by J. Enders. Westport: Greenwood publishers.
Winter 2000-2001
Mora, J. G., and A. Garcia-Aracil. 1999. Private Costs of Higher Educa-
tion in Spain. European Journal of Education34(21 95-110'
Mora, J. G., J. Garcia-Montalvo, and A. Garcia-Aracil' 2000' Higher
Education and Graduate Employment in Spain' European Journal
of Ed ucation 35(21 : 229-37 .
Mora, J. G., and J. Vidal. 2000. Lifelong Learning in Spanish Universi-
ties:The Market lnside a Public System' European Journal of
E d u catio n 35(3\: 317 -27.
.-. 1998. lntroducing OualityAssurance in Spanish University' ln
Ouality Assurance in Higher Education, New Directions for lnstitu-
tional Researń, edited by G. Gaither. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass'
The same practices and conventional wisdom that brought us
today's success witt ttkely get us into trouble regardless of the
number of experts that ńronicle suń "new ideas" for suc-
cess. lf we assume that YesterdaYś-'-or even today's_suc-
cesses will continue to serve us well, it isn't likelY that we will
thrive in the future.
Kaufman, R. 2000.Thriving and Not Just Surviving: New
Directions for Tomorrow's Peńormance-l mprovement Man-
agers. Educational Teńnology 4o(4l: 23.
Changes in Spanish Universities: tmprovements and
Unsolved Conflicts
Neave, G. 1997 The Rise of the Evaluative State: The State of the Art'
Paper presented at Fetos presentes Y futuros de la Universi-
dad Consejo de Universidades and lVlE, Valencia'
OECD. 2oOO. Education at a Glance' Paris: OECD'
Oficina de Ciencia yTecnologia. 1999' lndicadores del Sistema
Espańot de Ciencia yTecnologia' Retrieved September 29' 2000'
from the World Wide Web: www'cicyt es/publicalndica99'pdf'
We're on a train that's accelerating out the station and we're
discussing how to get the best seat in the dining car before
the other guy gets it. But nobody's talking about where the
train is going.
Winston, G., and D. Zimmermann. 2000. Where ls Aggressive
Price Competition Taking H igher Educa tion? Cha n g e 3214\ : 12'
23
Planning for Higher Education
