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Oswald, M. E., & Grosjean, S. (2004). Confirmation bias. In R. F. Pohl (Ed.). Cognitive Illusions. A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory. Hove and N.Y.: Psychology Press

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... However, objections have been raised against using this confirmation bias paradigm, mainly on two grounds: (1) it confuses confirmation bias with the positive testing strategy, which can be regarded as a rational choice under some circumstances (Klayman & Ha, 1987;Mercier & Sperber, 2017;Oswald & Grosjean, 2004), and (2) the more profound conceptual question of what should be considered confirmation bias and the overlap with myside bias (Baron, 1995;Cavojov a et al., 2018;Stanovich & Toplak, 2019;Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008b, motivated reasoning (Bardolph & Coulson, 2017;Klaczynski, 2000;Kunda, 1990;Lord et al., 1979), and selective attention (Johnston & Dark, 1986). These objections are similar in that they focus attention on the cognitive component of cognitive bias (i.e. ...
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... Current literature reports the use of two behavioral measures to estimate the degree of confirmation bias: 1) importance of information and 2) information selection (Oswald & Grosjean, 2004). Unfortunately, these subjective measures can be hindered by factors including evidence search strategies, evidence interpretation, socially acceptable outcomes, the participant's belief of what the experimenter wants to hear, and participant memory capacity (Hays, 1983). ...
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