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Entering the Risk Society: A Contested Terrain for Immigration Enforcement
... When broken down by political party, 67% of Republicans and 40% of Democrats say they are very concerned about extremism in the name of Islam around the world [45]. This negative sentiment is seen today in the line of questioning after terrorist acts typically discerning if Bthe attacker was a terrorist^followed by Bif the alleged terrorist was a Muslim immigrant, refugee, or asylum seeker.^Because of negative perceptions of Muslims and the associated harsher policies around immigration and crime, there also seems to be a lack of recognition of and support for Muslim immigrant crime victims [41]. ...
The media plays a crucial role in highlighting the important facts the public should know by selecting, broadcasting, and emphasizing what events the public should classify and comprehend as important and what the public should assess as a threat (Slone Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(4): 508-522, 2000, Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira The International Journal of Press/Politics 13(1): 52-74, 2008). This paper explores the notion that the media reinforces a false synonym between Muslims and terrorism. I begin with a description of news framing bias and how this bias impacts the portrayal of terrorism and Muslims through politically and emotionally charged discourse. Then, through a content analysis of local and national news articles, I examine selected terrorist events in France and Turkey, analyzing the U.S media’s portrayal of these events to uncover what elements journalists select, emphasize, and deemphasize in countries with predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim populations. This analysis is useful in uncovering the mechanisms allowing U.S perception of perceived threat to rise in tandem with U.S national security’s placement on the current policy agenda, while the actual risks posed by terrorism and Muslim populations are marginal in comparison and continue to decline (Powell Communication Studies 62(1): 90-112, 2011). The findings suggest that news media framing utilizes biased, negative imagery, portraying the events in these countries in a way that reinforces current prejudices against Muslims, even when Muslims are themselves the victims. This unequal reporting increases viewership while simultaneously allowing current perceptions about terrorism and Muslims to continue.
... In addition, anti-immigrant sentiment can also result into internal fears among immigrants, including fears for deportation, which may prevent them from seeking help when victimized [35,41,47]. As such, not only is there less sympathy for the role of immigrants as victims of crime [39,41], the role of antiimmigrant sentiment in further marginalizing immigrant communities may, in fact, increase their vulnerability to human trafficking. ...
Prior research shows that anti-immigration sentiment affects public opinion about criminal justice problems and solutions. However, we know little about how these sentiments affect public opinion about human trafficking. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the role of anti-immigration sentiment in shaping public support for anti-trafficking efforts in the United States. Specifically, this research examines the effect of anti-immigration sentiment on the public’s understanding about vulnerabilities for human trafficking among migrant populations and corresponding support for policies directed at the protection of migrant trafficked persons. This is particularly important because public policies that safeguard migrant trafficked persons have been among the most difficult to pass despite strong support for the governmental prioritization of anti-trafficking efforts overall. Utilizing public opinion data from an original, nationally representative survey experiment of 2000 Americans, this study finds that anti-immigration sentiment (1) is associated with greater recognition of the vulnerability of immigrants to human trafficking victimization; (2) does not impact public support for a general governmental prioritization of human trafficking policies; yet (3) creates less public support for victim services for non-citizen trafficked persons; and (4) stems from differences in political views impacting support for services for immigrant victims. These findings contribute to an understanding of the role of anti-immigration sentiment in public opinion about crime and have implications for policies aimed at improving the identification of and outcomes for migrant trafficked persons.
... Immigration is increasingly framed as a security issue because immigrants are presumed to bring risks of terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration (Barker, 2012;Bosworth and Guild, 2008;Provine and Doty, 2011;Van der Woude et al., 2014), a development also referred to as 'crimmigration' (Stumpf, 2006(Stumpf, , 2011Van der Woude et al., 2014). Schengen member states have thus been searching for ways to balance economic benefits and border security measures, by trying to distinguish bona fide travellers from dangerous criminal immigrants (Aas, 2011;Koulish, 2013). Because the legal possibilities for physical border control using walls and border guards to tackle this issue are limited owing to the Schengen Border Code, a solution to this issue is often sought in information technology. ...
In recent years immigration control has seen an increase in the implementation of risk assessment technology. According to proponents, such technologies would lead to more objective decision-making compared with the discretionary decisions made by street-level bureaucrats. However, because empirical research on risk assessment technology is limited, it is not quite clear how risk assessment technology in migration control impacts the decision-making process and to what extent it does make the decision-making process more objective. This article aims to shine a light on this issue by making use of a case study of Amigo-boras, a smart camera system used by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNM) for migration control purposes. Qualitative data show that Dutch immigration officers are still able to exercise discretion in the execution of their tasks, placing doubt on claims to objectivity. This finding is confirmed in quantitative data based on a US case study. Although quantitative data on the decision-making process would be able to show if these doubts were justified, the RNM has no such data on the outcomes and selection process using Amigo-boras. This information gap raises new issues regarding the objectivity of the selection process and the individual accountability of RNM officers.
... A more accurately calibrated risk assessment tool would likely lead to less individuals in bricks-and-mortar detention, and more individuals in alternatives to detention ("ATD"). 327 As noted above, similar immigration detention levels as to criminal justice ratios would be easily 30 to 40 percent lower, perhaps more. 328 Mandatory detention laws currently frustrate this scenario, 329 but better calibration would still have some effect. ...
In early 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) deployed nationwide a new automated risk assessment tool to help determine whether to detain or release noncitizens pending their deportation proceedings. Adapted from similar evidence-based criminal justice reforms that have reduced pretrial detention, ICE’s initiative now represents the largest pre-hearing risk assessment experiment in U.S. history — potentially impacting over 400,000 individuals per year. However, to date little information has been released regarding the risk assessment algorithm, processes, and outcomes.
This article provides the first comprehensive examination of ICE’s risk assessment initiative, based on public access to ICE methodology and outcomes as a result of Freedom of Information Act requests. This article argues that immigration risk assessment in its current form will not reduce current over-detention trends. The unique aspects of immigration enforcement, laws, and the impacted population will likely frustrate accurate calibration of the risk tool, and effective implementation of even a calibrated tool — in turn frustrating constructive impact of ICE’s risk assessment initiative on over-detention. Consequently, the immigration risk assessment may only add a scientific veneer to enforcement that remains institutionally predisposed towards detention and control.
Additionally, this article argues that even if more accurate, evidence-based immigration detention were achieved under a future risk assessment regime, it would nonetheless likely be accompanied by several disadvantages. Particularly, risk assessment could facilitate a transition from mass detention to mass supervision of an even wider net of supervisees, by justifying lesser deprivations of liberty such as electronic supervision.
The so called refugee crisis in 2015 coincided with the Polish parliamentary electoral campaign. The effect of it was – for the first time in Poland – the introduction of migration policy to the political agenda of the right-wing and populist political parties on a massive scale. They presented migration as an issue of security – both national and cultural, direct and symbolic. The new government, acting since the end of 2015, included immigration and asylum issues into their political programme as a key element of national security. Their discourse about refugees is usually based on the differentiation: us and them. And “them” are pictured as evil, dangerous, Muslim terrorists. The new government and its authoritarian style of governing has introduced a number of initiatives designed to deprive individuals of immigrant rights (like in the new so-called Antiterrorist Act from the mid of 2016, based on which every foreign citizen could be put under surveillance without any court control) or to stop refugee influx on the Polish territory in any way – directly from their country of origin (new amendments to asylum law are trying to introduce border and accelerated procedures) or under the UE resettlement and relocation programme (Poland is one of 3 EU Member States – along Hungary and Austria – that hasn’t relocated anyone). In this paper I will present in more detail the legal changes described above, their consequences and the so-called rationalities presented by the government.
A condição jurídica de “Irregular” dos imigrantes na entrada e na permanência, em determinado país, é uma decisão de cada um dos Estados, que escolhem entre criminalizar e proibir esses comportamentos ou os integrar e “regularizar”, permitindo o seu acesso a (alguns) direitos dos nacionais. Nos últimos anos vários Estados dos EUA enveredaram por uma política pública de “crimigração” fazendo convergir a lei criminal com a lei de imigração com o objetivo de punir e expulsar os imigrantes “construídos” como irregulares. Na Europa também têm sido implementadas recentemente políticas, direito e práticas “crimigratórias” transplantadas dos EUA. No entanto, países como Portugal acolhem moderadamente essa tendência, continuando a optar preferencialmente pela inclusão e por uma legislação de “regularização permanente” dos imigrantes.
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