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The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences
Abstract
Unlike other animal species, much of the variation among human groups is cultural: genetically similar people living in similar environments exhibit strikingly different patterns of behavior because they have different, culturally acquired beliefs and values. Such cultural transmission is based on complex, derived psychological mechanisms that are likely to have been shaped by natural selection. It is important to understand the nature of these evolved psychological mechanisms because they determine which beliefs and values spread and persist in human groups. Boyd and Richerson showed that a tendency to acquire the most common behavior exhibited in a society was adaptive in a simple model of evolution in a spatially varying environment, because such a tendency increases the probability of acquiring adaptive beliefs and values. Here, we study the evolution of such “conformist transmission” in a more general model in which environments vary in both time and space. The analysis of this model indicates that conformist transmission is favored under a very broad range of conditions, broader in fact than the range of conditions that favor a substantial reliance on social learning. The analysis also suggests that there is a synergistic relationship between the evolution of imitation and the evolution of conformism. We conclude by examining the role of conformism in explaining the maintenance of cultural differences among groups.
... For dichotomous cultural traits, the definitions of conformity and anticonformity are straightforward: conformity entails that the more popular of the two variants is adopted at a rate greater than its frequency, whereas anticonformity entails that it is adopted at a rate less than its frequency (7). Boyd and Richerson (7) formalized this definition in a mathematical model, which has been widely used in subsequent theoretical research (8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20). The model gives rise to the following population dynamics: Under conformity, the more popular of the two variants increases in frequency until everyone has it. ...
... However, defining conformity in relation to the mean variant in a population is not analogous to the definition of conformity for discrete traits proposed by Boyd and Richerson (7) and used extensively throughout the conformity literature (8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20). For example, consider the cultural trait "proportion of resources shared with others." ...
... In SI Appendix, section 4, we propose a model of anticonformity that differs from Fig. 2. Fig. 2 captures the idea that anticonformists have a higher probability of copying cultural variants seen in some role models (namely, individuals with A B C D "unpopular" cultural variants) relative to the random copying strategy (Fig. 1), as is the case for many studies of discrete and unordered traits (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20). However, this is not the only possible representation of anticonformity. ...
Models of conformity and anticonformity have typically focused on cultural traits with unordered variants, such as baby names, strategies (cooperate/defect), or the presence/absence of an innovation. There have been fewer studies of conformity to cultural traits with ordered variants, such as level of cooperation (low, medium, high) or proportion of time spent on a task (0% to 100%). In these studies of ordered cultural traits, conformity is defined as a preference for the mean trait value in a population even if no members of the population have variants near this mean; e.g., 50% of the population has variant 0 and 50% has variant 1, producing a mean of 0.5. Here, we introduce models of conformity to ordered traits, which can be either discrete or continuous. In these models, conformists prefer to adopt more popular cultural variants even if these variants are far from the population mean. To measure a variant’s “popularity” in cases where no two individuals share precisely the same variant on a continuum, we introduce a metric called k -dispersal; this takes into account a variant’s distance to its k closest neighbors, with more “popular” variants having lower distances to their neighbors. We demonstrate through simulations that conformity to ordered traits need not produce a homogeneous population, as has previously been claimed. Under some combinations of parameter values, conformity sustains substantial trait variation over many generations. Furthermore, anticonformity may produce a high level of polarization.
... The term social learning strategy (SLS) refers to any of a variety of methods by which individuals can choose others to copy [20,21,[24][25][26]. The efficiency of individual and social learning strategies in stable and dynamic environments has been demonstrated through theoretical and empirical studies [17,[27][28][29][30]. For instance in a computer tournament, Rendell et al. [31] noted the success of strategies that rely heavily on social learning over individual learning. ...
... This poses a fundamental challenge for the individual, forcing them to confront a trade-off between performance and exploration cost [11]. To fully examine this issue, we performed an evolutionary analysis on individual learning and two social learning strategies, success-based and conformist [17,21,27,36,37] (see Fig 1). Despite several investigations into these strategies, the effect of environment uncertainty on their performance has remained largely unaddressed, making it hard to connect to the meta-control idea in neuroscience. ...
... While previous research examined individual and social learning strategies in the context of a changing environment [17,[27][28][29][30][31], this study tested a new hypothesis that measurements of environmental uncertainty (formalized by the UDPU) can be used as a means to implement a reliable and cost-efficient learning strategy, regardless of environmental changes. To test this hypothesis, we performed an analysis on individual learning and two social learning strategies, namely success-based and conformist, on volatile and uncertain environments. ...
Social learning, copying other's behavior without actual experience, offers a cost-effective means of knowledge acquisition. However, it raises the fundamental question of which individuals have reliable information: successful individuals versus the majority. The former and the latter are known respectively as success-based and conformist social learning strategies. We show here that while the success-based strategy fully exploits the benign environment of low uncertainly, it fails in uncertain environments. On the other hand, the conformist strategy can effectively mitigate this adverse effect. Based on these findings, we hypothesized that meta-control of individual and social learning strategies provides effective and sample-efficient learning in volatile and uncertain environments. Simulations on a set of environments with various levels of volatility and uncertainty confirmed our hypothesis. The results imply that meta-control of social learning affords agents the leverage to resolve environmental uncertainty with minimal exploration cost, by exploiting others' learning as an external knowledge base.
... Thus, a key question within cultural evolution is how human traditions arise and persist, and the answer will rely on a detailed understanding of the psychological processes that guide human social learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). Henrich and Boyd (1998), provide an example of cultural variation by comparing Amish farmers and more mainstream American culture. As a group, the Amish are well and widely known for their striking differences to the world around them. ...
... As a result, conformist transmission takes whichever variant is the most popular and drives it to ever higher frequencies. Theory shows that, over time, conformist transmission will homogenise groups, and where different groups converge on different behaviours, create between-group variation that can persist indefinitely (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). ...
... The plausibility of conformist transmission underpinning cultural dynamics receives support from theoretical models which show that it is expected to evolve under a wide range of conditions, including static and spatially varying environments (Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Kendal et al., 2009;Wakano & Aoki, 2007). In addition, one distinct attribute of conformism is the ability to conform to a popular behaviour even when the payoffs associated with different behaviours are unclear. ...
The maintenance of cross-cultural variation and arbitrary traditions in human populations is a key question in cultural evolution. Conformist transmission, the tendency to follow the majority, was previously considered central to this phenomenon. However, recent theory indicates that cognitive biases can greatly reduce its ability to maintain traditions. Therefore, we expanded prior models to investigate two other ways that cultural variation can be sustained: payoff-biased transmission and norm reinforcement. Our findings predict that both payoff-biased transmission and reinforcement can enhance conformist transmission's ability to maintain traditions. However, payoff-biased transmission can only sustain cultural variation if it is functionally related to environmental factors. In contrast, norm reinforcement readily generates and maintains arbitrary cultural variation. Furthermore, reinforcement results in path-dependent cultural dynamics, meaning that historical traditions influence current practices, even though group behaviours have changed. We conclude that environmental variation probably plays a role in functional cultural traditions, but arbitrary cultural variation is more plausibly due to the reinforcement of norm compliance.
... Internalising descriptive norms leads to a preference for following the majority. In other words, it results in a form of social learning process, 'conformity', defined as adopting the most prevalent behaviour (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Whiten et al., 2005). Substantial empirical evidence shows that descriptive norms influence cooperation ('conditional cooperation'; e.g. ...
... norm psychology of descriptive norms) was presumably selected to allow us to develop adaptive behaviours beyond cooperation. Mathematical models reveal that conformity is evolutionarily favoured under a wide range of conditions because descriptive norms serve efficiency and accuracy functions, especially in spatially and temporally variable environments (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). Evidence from various species (2-year-old children, Haun et al., 2014;primates, van de Waal et al., 2013;birds, Aplin et al., 2015) supports the idea that conformity can be regarded as a primitive capacity in our psychological mechanism. ...
... This finding partially supports the argument that punishment and conformity played complementary roles in the evolution of prosociality (Henrich & Boyd, 1998, 2001Andresguzman et al., 2007). However, it does not align with the prediction that two micro mechanisms would work and evolve together in social dilemmas, either culturally (Henrich & Boyd, 2001) or genetically (Andresguzman et al., 2007). ...
People willingly follow norms and values, often incurring material costs. This behaviour supposedly stems from evolved norm psychology, contributing to large-scale cooperation among humans. It has been argued that cooperation is influenced by two types of norms: injunctive and descriptive. This study theoretically explores the socialisation of humans under these norms. Our agent-based model simulates scenarios where diverse agents with heterogeneous norm psychologies engage in collective action to maximise their utility functions that capture three motives: gaining material payoff, following injunctive and descriptive norms. Multilevel selective pressure drives the evolution of norm psychology that affects the utility function. Further, we develop a model with exapted conformity, assuming selective advantage for descriptive norm psychology. We show that norm psychology can evolve via cultural group selection. We then identify two normative conditions that favour the evolution of norm psychology, and therefore cooperation: injunctive norms promoting punitive behaviour and descriptive norms. Furthermore, we delineate different characteristics of cooperative societies under these two conditions and explore the potential for a macro transition between them. Together, our results validate the emergence of large-scale cooperative societies through social norms and suggest complementary roles that conformity and punishment play in human prosociality.
... Status motives also increase people's inclinations to get close to and associate with those who have high status. In particular, deferring to and performing favors for high-status individuals facilitates avoidance of physical conflict in a dominance context and increases the odds of learning from and modeling the behavior of high-status individuals in a prestige context (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). ...
... Humans are a group-oriented species (Lancaster, 1975). Living in groups, including forming coalitions and getting along with other group members, shielded ancestral humans against threats (e.g., resource competition, diseases, predators, and enemies) and harsh conditions (e.g., starvation and extreme weather) and offered benefits EVOLUTIONARY MISMATCH AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE such as sharing of knowledge, resources, and caretaking responsibilities (Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Hill & Hurtado, 1989). Therefore, humans evolved an affiliation system that functions to build and maintain relations with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). ...
In recent years, the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and psychology has garnered unprecedented attention, particularly following the advent of generative AI tools in 2022. These tools, capable of producing human-like text, images, and even deepening our understanding of cognitive processes, have not only captured the public imagination but also sparked new concerns and debates within the psychological community. While AI has been a subject of research for decades, the emergence of its generative capabilities has truly thrust AI into the spotlight. This article explores how these advancements are reshaping our understanding of human cognition and behavior, as well as their potential implications for psychological practice and research. Through a critical examination of current AI technologies and their psychological impacts, we aimed to bridge the gap between technological innovation and the intricate workings of the human mind.
... It often makes sense to follow a majority, especially if we have little or incomplete information because we assume that others are broadly rational, and have good reasons for their behaviors and preferences, and they may have based their decisions on information or evidence we do not have access to (e.g., Morgan et al., 2012). A body of theoretical work has suggested that conforming to a majority is one of several contextually successful social learning strategies that people engage in (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Hoppitt & Laland, 2013;Kendal et al., 2018;Rendell et al., 2011;Whalen et al., 2018). ...
... Many cultural traits, including language and social conventions, are learned at an early age. Formal models suggest that a conformity bias may lead to the stability of such traits over time (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Henrich & Boyd, 1998), and recent work has demonstrated a U-shaped trend in a bias toward the majority across nine countries, with both younger children and adolescents showing a greater frequency of majoritycopying behavior (Sibilsky et al., 2022). If children demonstrate a conformity bias at an early age, it may allow them to quickly learn in-group norms but may allow neutrally beneficial or even detrimental behaviors to persist in the population. ...
We investigate how 3- to 5-year-old U.S. and Canadian children (N = 189) and U.S. adults (N = 241) balance the number of endorsements for a given option with the quality of the informants’ source of information when deciding which of two boxes contains the better option. When choosing between two different boxes endorsed by groups of equal sizes, both children (Experiments 1–3) and adults (Experiment 6) tend to choose boxes endorsed by informants with visual access to the boxes over informants with hearsay. However, children’s choices were biased toward the larger group when the size of the group conflicted with the quality of the source of the groups’ information (Experiments 4 and 5), while adults more often chose the option endorsed by the group with the higher quality information (Experiment 6). Children were more likely to conform to a majority opinion when compared with both adults and to a normative computational model that endorses a group proportional to the number of independent, direct observations made by that group’s informants. These findings suggest that, while adults balance the size of a majority with the quality of the informants’ information source, preschoolers can evaluate when groups differ in the source of their information but may assume that the presence of a majority endorsing an option is inherently informative over and above the information source group members’ testimony relied on.
... Our results above rely on the assumption that social learning is unbiased; that is, individuals choose their targets at random. Other social learning strategies like conformist and pay-off-biased transmission have been suggested to reduce noise and improve the efficacy of transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Kendal et al., 2018;McElreath et al., 2008McElreath et al., , 2013Muthukrishna et al., 2016;Whiten, 2019). Here we investigate whether these strategies provide similar benefits in diverse societies, and whether parochialism provides any additional benefit. ...
... Our model structure is inspired by prior models of the evolution of social learning in spatially varying environments, in which different spatial locations have different locally adaptive traits. Such models have shown that when migration between patches increases, selection on unbiased social learning is weakened (Aoki & Feldman, 2014;Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Henrich & Boyd, 1998;McElreath et al., 2013). Overcoming this limitation has been a key focus of the literature on conformist-or consensus-biased social learning. ...
Humans often learn preferentially from ingroup members who share a social identity affiliation, while ignoring or rejecting information when it comes from someone perceived to be from an outgroup. This sort of bias has well-known negative consequences – exacerbating cultural divides, polarization, and conflict – while reducing the information available to learners. Why does it persist? Using evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that similarity-biased social learning (also called parochial social learning) is adaptive when (1) individual learning is error-prone and (2) sufficient diversity inhibits the efficacy of social learning that ignores identity signals, as long as (3) those signals are sufficiently reliable indicators of adaptive behaviour. We further show that our results are robust to considerations of other social learning strategies, focusing on conformist and pay-off-biased transmission. We conclude by discussing the consequences of our analyses for understanding diversity in the modern world.
... One of the biggest drivers of social cooperation in cultural evolution is inter-group competition, which is a selection pressure that enhances mechanisms that lead people to cooperate with one another and make sacrifices on behalf of their social group. Cultural evolutionary theory argues that such mechanisms operate best when people strive to be most similar to one another through conformity mechanisms, thereby increasing their self-identification with the group (Henrich and Boyd, 1998;Mesoudi and Lycett, 2009). Conformity essentially homogenizes human behavior. ...
... Conformity is a process of "acting like" others around us. It is defined as copying the most prevalent behavior in a population (Henrich and Boyd, 1998;Mesoudi and Lycett, 2009). In conformity, we emulate other people, from their manners of behaving to the products that they consume (e.g., clothing, music, cars). ...
Role playing is a central, but underappreciated, process in human evolution. It is a feature not only of the theatrical arts, but of everyday social interactions. While some role playing is limited to enacting various personas of the self (e.g., wife, accountant, mother), others involve an impersonation of people. The most basic form of impersonation is proto-acting, which refers to a transient engagement in character portrayal, such as when we quote a friend during a conversation. During proto-acting, we “act as” some other person. However, there are other means of acting in a similar manner to another person in which we do not impersonate them, but merely emulate their behavior. This might happen when we learn a motor skill from a teacher or conform to the consumer choices of the masses. This follower-based process of “acting like” is a critically important mechanism in cultural evolution since it leads to social conformity and the homogenization of group behavior. I argue that the evolutionary transition from “acting like” (emulation) to “acting as” (impersonation) occurred via the emergence of pantomime and its narrative depiction of the actions of other people. This was probably the first step toward impersonating someone, leading initially to proto-acting and later to theatrical performance in human cultures. Overall, the study of human evolution needs to give greater consideration to role playing and its diverse manifestations in life and art.
... To understand cultural change and the emerging characteristics of cultures, researchers have modelled how cultural information is moulded as it flows from senders to receivers, yielding insights into topics such as social learning [1], cumulative cultural evolution [2][3][4][5], the spread of innovations [6], the ebb and flow of fashions [7][8][9][10], the influence of different modes of transmission [11][12][13][14], cultural adaptation [11,15,16], and the relationship between cultural and genetic evolution (sometimes called geneculture coevolution [11,[17][18][19][20][21]). Most models of cultural transmission focus on how receivers process information obtained from senders. For example, receivers may prefer information that conforms to the majority, evokes strong emotions, or proves useful [2,19,22]. Considerable attention has been paid to how biases [12,19,22,23] or cognitive processes [24][25][26][27] in the receiver, often assumed to be innate, can drive cultural evolution in specific directions. ...
... For example, receivers may prefer information that conforms to the majority, evokes strong emotions, or proves useful [2,19,22]. Considerable attention has been paid to how biases [12,19,22,23] or cognitive processes [24][25][26][27] in the receiver, often assumed to be innate, can drive cultural evolution in specific directions. ...
We introduce a mathematical model of cultural evolution to study cultural traits that shape how individuals exchange information. Current theory focuses on traits that influence the reception of information (receiver traits), such as evaluating whether information represents the majority or stems from a trusted source. Our model shifts the focus from the receiver to the sender of cultural information and emphasizes the role of sender traits, such as communicability or persuasiveness. Here, we show that sender traits are probably a stronger driving force in cultural evolution than receiver traits. While receiver traits evolve to curb cultural transmission, sender traits can amplify it and fuel the self-organization of systems of mutually supporting cultural traits, including traits that cannot be maintained on their own. Such systems can reach arbitrary complexity, potentially explaining uniquely human practical and mental skills, goals, knowledge and creativity, independent of innate factors. Our model incorporates social and individual learning throughout the lifespan, thus connecting cultural evolutionary theory with developmental psychology. This approach provides fresh insights into the trait-individual duality, that is, how cultural transmission of single traits is influenced by individuals, who are each represented as an acquired system of cultural traits.
... Consequently, individuals update their action by copying the most successful action (i.e. the action with the highest game payoff). However, both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that during decision-making process humans not only pay attention to the most successful strategy but also to the most common strategy [77,78]. The importance of conformist transmission in human social learning processes has also been addressed in the literature [45,77,79]. ...
... However, both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that during decision-making process humans not only pay attention to the most successful strategy but also to the most common strategy [77,78]. The importance of conformist transmission in human social learning processes has also been addressed in the literature [45,77,79]. In our model, we incorporated conformist transmission into the social learning process by assuming that a normal player updates its action by imitating the most common action with probability α, and imitates the most successful action with probability 1 − α. ...
Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders—who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs—and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their ‘sticky effect’—an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a ‘copying the majority’ strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human–machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.
... Information within a group often spreads from a single source and therefore the trustworthiness of the original source is the key factor for whether information is accepted and less so the evidence and arguments for its content (Sperber et al., 2010). Furthermore, the members of a community are biased to adopt the majority opinion (Henrich and Boyd, 1998). As a consequence, epistemic authorities like religious leaders may get inflated reputations and people can no longer question what they say without rejecting the authority itself (Sperber et al., 2010). ...
The Gricean model of communication assumes that cooperation is a precondition for successful communication but humans often use language non-cooperatively. How do language users calibrate cooperation when deciphering communicated content? The current work probes the role of belief alignment for statements uttered by politicians, comparing Donald Trump and Kamala Harris among Republican and Democrat voter groups. The results show that communicated content is more likely to be endorsed when beliefs align between voter group and speaker. This suggests that we may arrive at different conclusions from the same statement, depending on who the speaker is and how much trust we grant them.
... Emellett azonban kiemelt figyelmet kapnak a stratégia gyakoriságán alapúló dinamikák is, amelyek a konformitás jelenségéhez köthetők. A konformitás jegyében az egyének képesek elfogadni olyan stratégiákat, amik a saját interakciós tartományukon belül a leggyakoribbak, függetlenül a várható kifizetéstől (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). ...
A fenntarthatóságra való átállás nehézsége az egyéni és a társadalmi érdekek közötti konfliktusokból fakad. A zöldberuházások költségesek, ezért a vállalkozások nem preferálják ezeket a beruházásokat, míg a társadalom számára az lenne kedvező, ha minél több ilyen beruházás valósulna meg. A dilemma feloldásához szükséges az ösztönzők megváltoztatása, hogy ezáltal a gazdasági szereplők magatartása is megváltozzon. Nem véletlen, hogy az átállás főként támogatások révén megy végbe. A gazdaságpolitika szempontjából ez a helyzet felfogható egy sokszereplős fogolydilemma játékként, ahol a kooperáció jelenti a fenntartható magatartást és cél a magas kooperációs arány kialakítása. A tanulmányban a különböző társadalmi attitűdök és a kooperatív magatartás jutalmazásának dinamikus kölcsönhatását vizsgálom a kooperáció alakításában. Feltételezem, hogy az egyének attitűdje lehet individualista, a klasszikus fogolydilemma játék magatartástípusa, valamint a többségi stratégiát követő konformista. Az attitűdök időbeli változását replikátor dinamika vezérli, tehát az az attitűd terjeszkedik a társadalomban hosszabb távon, amelyik sikeresebbnek bizonyul. A tanulmány központi kérdése, hogy hogyan befolyásolja az együttműködést egy támogatási rendszer bevezetése. A támogatásnak egyértelmű pozitív hatása van a kooperációra rövid távon, míg a támogatás visszavonását követően (hosszú távon), kontraproduktivitás tapasztalható. Ez az eredmény a társadalmi attitűd dinamikájának és a támogatások kifizetésekre gyakorolt hatásának kölcsönhatásából következik, mivel a támogatás implicit módon az önérdekkövető magatartás elterjedését ösztönzi.
... This focus gives economics a different starting point from the one implicit in neoclassical economics. Homo sapiens differ from other animals in terms of the extraordinary flexibility of our functional groupings (e.g., Bavel & Packer 2021;Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Melis et al., 2006). This is based on the distinctive human flexibility in several domains. ...
This article introduces the core themes of the multilevel economic paradigm. This paradigm extends Darwin’s evolutionary framework of thought (concerned with living things) to economics, in contrast to the neoclassical paradigm, which is modeled after Newtonian mechanics (applicable primarily to inanimate objects). The central theme of the multilevel paradigm is functional organization, which refers to the way in which economic agents (individuals and groups) and systems are structured to achieve economic objectives. The multilevel paradigm recognizes that people are engaged in multiple levels of functional organization, and thus, agency is distributed between individuals and groups. These levels are flexible through time and across domains (economic, political, social, and environmental), so that the economy is understood as embedded in the polity, society, and the natural world. Flexible levels of functional organization are both a cause of and response to radical uncertainty. This flexibility of functional organization implies multilevel economic decision-making and multilevel flourishing.
... commonly used workhorse to that effect [47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63][64], with randomly assigned as well as player-specific conformity. As noted previously, this entails the adoption of the strategy that is most common within the interaction range of the player, regardless of the expected payoff [65]. By adopting the most common strategy, conformists coordinate their behavior in a way that minimizes individual risk and ensures that their payoff will not be much lower than average. ...
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.
... Whereas the study of human sociality traditionally focuses on (group-level) behavioural variation (Enfield & Levinson, 2006;McGrew, 1998;Mesoudi et al., 2006;Sperber, 1996), this focus is only marginally applied to studies of sociality in non-human animals (henceforth 'animals'), where typically single populations are chosen to represent the entire species (Kaufhold & van Leeuwen, 2019;Lott, 1984;Strier, 2017;van de Waal, 2018). To gain more insight into the intricacies of animal behaviour and cognition, studies on (the range of) group-specific sociality are needed (Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Kendal et al., 2018;Schradin, 2013;Silk et al., 2009). For instance, only by comparing different groups of the same species may we be able to pinpoint whether culture has an influence on the respective species' phenotypic expressions (Liebal & Haun, 2018;Nielsen & Haun, 2015). ...
Humans show remarkable differences in social behaviour between families, groups, communities and cultures, whereas such group-level within-species variation in socio-behavioural propensities is typically overlooked in other species. Studies on intraspecific variation in animal social structures are needed to inform an evolutionary account of human sociality. Here, we study multiple independent bonobo populations ( n = 6) in zoological settings to investigate if and how bonobos ( n = 70) show group-specific signatures in sociality. By applying tailored Bayesian statistical methods, we find that beyond individual and dyadic variation, the groups substantially differ from each other in core dimensions of great ape sociality: social proximity, grooming and play. Moreover, the groups’ network structures are distinct regarding cohesiveness and clustering, with some groups forming cohesive wholes, while others showcasing high levels of sub-grouping. Overall, while there is consistent evidence of differences in sociality between the groups, the patterns of cohesiveness and clustering are not consistent across the networks. This suggests that rather than groups having different levels of sociality, different patterns of sociality exist in each group. These findings warrant caution with characterising bonobos’ behavioural phenotype at the species level, and identify an essential source of variation that needs to be integrated in phylogenetic analyses.
... Similarly, a study of 172 Native American societies found that many practices, such as political or kinship systems, are better predicted by cultural history than by local ecological conditions 74 . The stability of human culture may be due to psychological biases such as conformist transmission 75 . However, although evidence for conformist transmission has been documented 76,77 , recent theory suggests that it cannot reliably stabilize traditions [78][79][80][81] . ...
... Peer effects can be theoretically explained through several mechanisms, one of which is conformity to social norms [27]. As inherently social beings, humans tend to avoid deviating from social norms. ...
Toxicity is a widespread phenomenon in competitive online video games. In addition to its direct undesirable effects, there is a concern that toxicity can spread to others, amplifying the harm caused by a single player's misbehavior. In this study, we estimate whether and to what extent a player's toxic speech spreads, causing their teammates to behave similarly. To this end, we analyze proprietary data from the free-to-play first-person action game Call of Duty: Warzone. We formulate and implement an instrumental variable identification strategy that leverages the network of interactions among players across matches. Our analysis reveals that all else equal, all of a player's teammates engaging in toxic speech increases their probability of engaging in similar behavior by 26.1 to 30.3 times the average player's likelihood of engaging in toxic speech. These findings confirm the viral nature of toxicity, especially toxic speech, in competitive online video games.
... None of these additional factors undermine our general conclusions that strategic refinement generates complex technology, which in turn favors conformity and blind copying, observations strikingly evocative of human societies [5,6,[20][21][22][23]37,[40][41][42]45]. ...
Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to humans. To understand why, we organized a computer tournament in which programmed entries specified when to learn new knowledge and when to refine (i.e. improve) existing knowledge. The tournament revealed a ‘refinement paradox’: refined behavior afforded higher payoffs as individuals converged on a small number of successful behavioral variants, but refining did not generally pay. Paradoxically, entries that refined only in certain conditions did best during behavioral improvement, while simple copying entries thrived when refinement levels were high. Cumulative cultural evolution may be rare in part because sophisticated strategies for improving knowledge and technology are initially advantageous, yet complex culture, once achieved, favors conformity, blind imitation and hyper-credulity.
... Evolutionary anthropologists and psychologists (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 1998;Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002) have reported that conformity is an adaptive behavior in the information-seeking situations with high uncertainty. In particular, they have argued that conformity is the fundamental psychological mechanism not only for acquiring correct information (micro level) but also for building culture (macro level). ...
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether conformist bias can be observed in information-seeking situations. We replicated the experiment conducted by Fujikawa et al. (2024), in which conformist bias was observed, using a between-participants design. In Experiments 1 (N = 116) and 2 (N = 157), participants responded to “yes/no” questions in which the answer was objectively and not objectively fixed as correct or incorrect. After being shown one of four patterns of others’ responses (9, 6, 3, or 0 others answering “yes”), participants answered the same questions. The results of both Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 showed a conformist bias for the questions with objectively fixed answers, but not for the questions with non-objectively fixed answers. The differences between the results of Fujikawa et al. (2024) and our results were discussed.
... However, while benefit maximization accurately depicts competitive processes among rational individuals, human behavior also tends to mimic the majority consistently, 35,36 a concept not clarified by a payoff-driven approach. Empirical evidence supports the significant role of conformity, 31 particularly in human societies, 32,37,38 influencing areas, such as moral judgment, 39,40 voting, 41 psychological research, 42,43 charitable giving, 44 and cooperative gaming. 38,45,46 Research on the evolution of conformity in games often focuses on signed networks 47 and public goods games. ...
Human games are inherently diverse, involving more than mere identity interactions. The diversity of game tasks offers a more authentic explanation in the exploration of social dilemmas. Human behavior is also influenced by conformity, and prosociality is a crucial factor in addressing social dilemmas. This study proposes a generalized prisoner’s dilemma model of task diversity that incorporates a conformity-driven interaction. Simulation findings indicate that the diversity of multi-tasks and the path dependence contribute to the flourishing of cooperation in games. Conformity-driven interactions also promote cooperation. However, this promotion effect does not increase linearly, and only appropriate task sizes and suitable proportions of conformity-driven interactions yield optimal results. From a broader group perspective, the interplay of network adaptation, task size, and conformity-driven interaction can form a structure of attractors or repellents.
... [q-bio.PE] 18 Jul 2024 is adopted at a rate greater than its frequency, whereas anti-conformity entails that it is adopted at a rate less than its frequency [7]. Boyd and Richerson [7] formalized this definition in a mathematical model, which has been widely used in subsequent theoretical research [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18]. The model gives rise to the following population dynamics: under conformity, the more popular of the two variants increases in frequency until everyone has it [7]. ...
Models of conformity and anti-conformity have typically focused on cultural traits with nominal (unordered) variants, such as baby names, strategies (cooperate/defect), or the presence/absence of an innovation. There have been fewer studies of conformity to "ordinal" cultural traits with ordered variants, such as level of cooperation (low to high) or fraction of time spent on a task (0 to 1). In these latter studies, conformity is conceptualized as a preference for the mean trait value in a population even if no members of the population have variants near this mean; e.g., 50% of the population has variant 0 and 50% has variant 1, producing a mean of 0.5. Here, we introduce models of conformity to ordinal traits, which can be either discrete or continuous and linear (with minimum and maximum values) or circular (without boundaries). In these models, conformists prefer to adopt more popular cultural variants, even if these variants are far from the population mean. To measure a variant's "popularity" in cases where no two individuals share precisely the same variant on a continuum, we introduce a metric called k-dispersal; this takes into account a variant's distance to its k closest neighbors, with more "popular" variants having lower distances to their neighbors. We demonstrate through simulations that conformity to ordinal traits need not produce a homogeneous population, as has previously been claimed. Under some combinations of parameter values, conformity sustains substantial trait variation over many generations. Anti-conformist transmission may produce high levels of polarization.
... Cultural evolution of political rhetoric in China. According to extensive research on cultural transmission biases, humans have a tendency to preferentially adopt certain cultural variants based on specific contexts and content cues (Henrich and McElreath, 2003), such as the preference to conform to the majority (Henrich and Boyd, 1998), to learn from the more prestigious individuals (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001), to adopt the cultural practices with higher payoffs (Vale et al. 2017), or a combination of different learning mechanisms (Hong, 2022b;Laland, 2004). If we treat various rhetorical strategies as different "culture variants", then individuals may exhibit context and/or content-dependent biases in selecting what rhetorical strategies to use. ...
The study of rhetoric has a long history in the Western intellectual tradition. However, only minimal efforts have been made to rigorously examine the cultural evolution of various rhetorical strategies in argumentation over time. In this study, we harness the power of fully digitized Chinese dynastic history to systematically analyze how different rhetorical strategies were used to persuade superiors throughout the past two millennia. By leveraging existing literature on Chinese rhetoric and argumentation styles, as well as engaging in extensive consultation with historians of ancient China, we identify and classify rhetorical strategies into distinct categories. We then examine their recorded success in persuasion and any temporal changes in frequency. Our findings point to a cumulative payoff-biased cultural evolution where later dynasties tend to demonstrate higher recorded persuasion success, with the notable exception of the Ming dynasty. Additionally, we detect a temporal decline in the frequency of rhetorical strategies associated with persuasion failures, such as analogy and the use of auspicious/inauspicious signs.
... Contemporary cultural evolutionary research is expansive, incorporating processes of cultural selection, mutation/innovation, drift and migration (Mesoudi 2011), niche construction (Odling-Smee and others 2003)whereby individuals modify the environments they live in, affecting the selection pressures they are subject to, and thereby creating feedback in the evolutionary process -and other non-genetic inheritance channels (Jablonka and Lamb 2005), cognitive and symbolic evolution (Sperber 1996) and cyclical processes of change (Turchin and Nefedov 2009). The field draws on population-genetic and epidemiological diffusion models (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981;Boyd and Richerson 1985) to examine change in the frequencies of cultural traits over time; models and experiments of social learning and cognition to understand how individual characteristics give rise to population level distributions of cultural traits (Henrich and Boyd 1998;Henrich and others 2005); and macro-evolutionary and phylogenetic studies of societies and languages Jordan and others 2009;Mace and Pagel 1994) to make explicit the path-dependent histories of culture as well as identifying sources of shared ancestry. Cultural evolution is now a thriving multidisciplinary arena for experimental, observational and quantitative work at multiple levels of analysis. ...
Human evolutionary demography is an emerging field blending natural science with social science. This edited volume provides a much-needed, interdisciplinary introduction to the field and highlights cutting-edge research for interested readers and researchers in demography, the evolutionary behavioural sciences, biology, and related disciplines.
By bridging the boundaries between social and biological sciences, the volume stresses the importance of a unified understanding of both in order to grasp past and current demographic patterns. Demographic traits, and traits related to demographic outcomes, including fertility and mortality rates, marriage, parental care, menopause, and cooperative behavior are subject to evolutionary processes. Bringing an understanding of evolution into demography therefore incorporates valuable insights into this field; just as knowledge of demography is key to understanding evolutionary processes. By asking questions about old patterns from a new perspective, the volume—composed of contributions from established and early-career academics—demonstrates that a combination of social science research and evolutionary theory offers holistic understandings and approaches that benefit both fields.
Human Evolutionary Demography introduces an emerging field in an accessible style. It is suitable for graduate courses in demography, as well as upper-level undergraduates. Its range of research is sure to be of interest to academics working on demographic topics (anthropologists, sociologists, demographers), natural scientists working on evolutionary processes, and disciplines which cross-cut natural and social science, such as evolutionary psychology, human behavioral ecology, cultural evolution, and evolutionary medicine. As an accessible introduction, it should interest readers whether or not they are currently familiar with human evolutionary demography.
... In cultural evolution theory, this process of selection is mediated by a series of "transmission biases" that influence people's preferences for some variants over others Richerson, 1985, 2005;Laland, 2004;Mesoudi, 2011), for example the bias to favor those products that are used by highly-esteemed individuals in a domain (Gil-White and Henrich, 2001). Conformity is perhaps the strongest force of cultural selection, such that people develop a preference for certain products because they are preferred by the majority of people (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;Sternberg and Lubart, 1995;Boyd and Henrich, 1998;Mesoudi and Lycett, 2009;Legare and Nielsen, 2015). The type of transmission bias that is perhaps most directly related to aesthetic appeal is the "content bias" (Rendell et al., 2011), in which people select objects based on their intrinsic features, including their aesthetic properties (among others). ...
Within cognitive psychology, there are separate experimental fields devoted to the study of creativity, on the one hand, and aesthetics, on the other, with virtually no cross-talk between them. In this article, I propose a means of uniting creativity and aesthetics via a consideration of the mechanisms of cultural evolution. I call this the creativity/aesthetics cycle. The basic tenet of the model is that creativity and aesthetics mediate, respectively, the processes of variation (production) and selection (perception or consumption) in evolutionary models of culture. By means of this cycle, creators produce works that they hope will be evaluated positively by consumers, where such appraisals ultimately feed back to influence the subsequent decision-making processes of creators. I discuss the implications of this model for the fields of creativity and aesthetics.
... While the Darwinian metaphor should not be taken too literally, since strictly speaking the cultural evolution of odds in games of chance may not be adaptive in the biological fitness sense, the process could be viewed as payoff-biased transmission (Kendal et al., 2009), with payoff approximated as monetary profits. It is possible that the gambling houses' decisions were influenced by other transmission biases, such as the conformist bias (Henrich & Boyd, 1998), in which gambling houses would preferentially copy the odds setup used by the majority of other houses; prestige-bias (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), wherein the odds from more reputable gambling houses would be selectively imitated; or a combination of multiple learning biases (Hong, 2022a). Gambling houses may also have adopted simple heuristics such as "set the payoff multiplier to be a little less than the number of options" in the flower lottery, and it is difficult to know with certainty from the available historical record. ...
Chance-based gambling has been a recurrent cultural activity throughout history and across many diverse human societies. In this paper, I combine quantitative and qualitative data and present a cultural evolutionary framework to explain why the odds in games of chance in premodern China appeared “designed” to ensure a moderate yet favorable house advantage. This is especially intriguing since extensive research in the history of probability has shown that, prior to the development of probability theory, people had very limited understanding of the nature of random events and were generally disinclined to think mathematically about the frequency of their occurrence. I argue that games of chance in the context of gambling may have culturally evolved into their documented forms via a process of selective imitation and retention, and neither the customers nor the gambling houses understood the probability calculus involved in these games.
... The cultural selection model distinguishes between context biases and content biases. Context biases motivate novices to preferentially copy certain individuals-for example, to adopt the variant used by older, more knowledgeable, skilled, or successful individuals (prestige bias; e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985), or to adopt the variant used by the greatest number of individuals (conformist bias; e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 1998). Other context biases motivate novices to choose social learning over independent learning under certain conditions-for example, when the novice is uncertain or when asocial learning would be costly (Kendal et al., 2018). ...
For most of human evolution, accumulated cultural knowledge has been stored in memory and transmitted orally. This presents a daunting information management problem: how to store and transmit this knowledge in a portable format that resists corruption. One solution--widespread among foragers--is to encode knowledge in narrative. However, this strategy depends on accurate performance of the story. Significantly, some forager cultures have rules regulating myth performance, although the extent of this phenomenon is unknown. We hypothesize that these rules subserve high-fidelity transmission across generations. Accordingly, we predicted that, across forager cultures, myth-telling rules will mandate: (P1) transmission by the most proficient storytellers (P2) under low-distraction conditions with (P3) multiple individuals and (P4) multiple generations present, and the application of measures that (P5) prevent, identify, and/or correct errors, (P6) maintain audience attention, (P7) discourage rule violations and/or (P8) incentivize rule compliance. To test these predictions, we searched the forager ethnographic record for descriptions of myth performance and coded them for prescriptions/proscriptions regarding narrator age, performance context, audience composition, narrative delivery, and audience comportment, as well as sanctions associated with rule transgression or compliance. Results indicate that rules regulating myth performance are widespread across forager cultures and are characterized by features that reduce the likelihood of copy errors. These findings help elucidate the role that anthropogenic ratchets played in the emergence of cumulative culture.
The Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty is a comprehensive reference work exploring recent changes and future trends in the principles that govern institutional investors and fiduciaries. A wide range of contributors offer new perspectives on the dynamics that drive the current emphasis on short-term investment returns. Moreover, they analyze the forces at work in markets around the world which are bringing into sharper focus the systemic effects that investment practices have on the long-term stability of the economy and the interests of beneficiaries in financial, social and environmental sustainability. This volume provides a global and multi-faceted commentary on the evolving standards governing institutional investment, offering guidance for students, researchers and policy-makers interested in finance, governance and other aspects of the contemporary investment world. It also provides investment, business, financial media and legal professionals with the tools they need to better understand and respond to the new financial market challenges of the twenty-first century.
The Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty is a comprehensive reference work exploring recent changes and future trends in the principles that govern institutional investors and fiduciaries. A wide range of contributors offer new perspectives on the dynamics that drive the current emphasis on short-term investment returns. Moreover, they analyze the forces at work in markets around the world which are bringing into sharper focus the systemic effects that investment practices have on the long-term stability of the economy and the interests of beneficiaries in financial, social and environmental sustainability. This volume provides a global and multi-faceted commentary on the evolving standards governing institutional investment, offering guidance for students, researchers and policy-makers interested in finance, governance and other aspects of the contemporary investment world. It also provides investment, business, financial media and legal professionals with the tools they need to better understand and respond to the new financial market challenges of the twenty-first century.
As one of the prerequisites for maladaptive cultural evolution, oblique transmission has drawn attention. However, even though maladaptive cultural evolution could occur if children choose oblique transmission frequently, can oblique transmission be selected by children in the course of genetic evolution? In addressing the question above, in this study, we conducted agent-based simulations focusing on the evolution of “oblique transmission bias,” the tendency of children to choose oblique transmission when they can choose between oblique and vertical transmission. At first, we analyzed how the oblique transmission bias evolves by comparing models with two cultural traits versus five traits, manipulating the probability of environmental changes and the strength of natural selection, respectively. As a result, the oblique transmission rate evolved under limited conditions. Second, we conducted simulations under the setting of the oblique transmission rates as exogenous variables; maladaptive cultural evolution did not occur because of oblique transmission when oblique transmission bias is as strong as one evolved in the previous simulation. In addition, we show that if maladaptive culture is more likely to be imitated by children, maladaptive cultural evolution occurs.
Social etiquette, dress codes and culture-specific architectural features are undoubtedly stylistic conventions. Literature from anthropology, sociology and ecological psychology suggests a coordinative function of such conventions, without, however, offering a theoretical analysis of this function. The best-known philosophical theory of conventions—by David Lewis—does offer a theoretical analysis of the coordinative function of conventions, but stylistic conventions typically fall outside the purview of this theory. The present paper suggests a remedy for this situation by putting to use the notion of ‘correlation devices’, developed as an addition to the Lewisian framework. I argue that stylistic conventions function as markers for social categories without which these categories become cognitively intractable. Given that social categories are a precondition for complex coordinated role-divisions, and given that such role-divisions are a major part of the explanation for our evolutionary success, I argue that it is likely that the psychological proclivities that make us susceptible to stylistic conventions can be explained as the result of group-level selection pressures.
Outcomes in the cultural arena are due to many factors but are there general rules that can suggest what makes some cultural traits successful and others not? Research in cultural evolution theory distinguishes factors related to social influence (such as copying from the majority, or from certain individuals) from factors related to individual, nonsocially influenced, propensities such as evolved cognitive predispositions, or physical, biological, and environmental constraints. Here, we show, using analytical and individual-based models, that individual preferences, even when weak, determine the equilibrium point of cultural dynamics when acting together with nondirectional social influence in three out of four cases we study. The results have implications regarding the importance of keeping into account individual-level, nonsocial, factors, when studying cultural evolution, as well as regarding the interpretation of cross-cultural regularities, that must be expected, but can be product of weak directional forces, intensified by social influence.
Children and adults alike rely on others to learn about the world, but also need to be able to determine the strength of both their own evidence as well as the evidence that other people provide, particularly when different sources of information disagree. For example, if two informants agree on a belief but share the same evidence, their testimony is statistically dependent on each other, and may be weaker evidence for that belief than two informants who draw on different pieces of evidence to support that belief. Across three experiments (total N = 492), we examine how 4- and 5-year-old children evaluate statistical dependency on a task where they must determine which of two jars that toys were drawn from. A majority of informants, whose testimony could draw from the same evidence or different evidence, always endorsed one jar. Then, children were presented with a dissenting informant or their own personal data that was consistent with the other jar. Children showed no sensitivity to statistical dependency, choosing the majority with equal probability regardless of the independence of their testimony, but also systematically overweighted their own personal data, endorsing the jar consistent with their own evidence more often than would be predicted by an optimal Bayesian model. In contrast, children made choices consistent with this model on a similar task in which the data was presented to children without testimony. Our findings suggest that young children treat majorities as broadly informative, but that the challenges of inferring others’ experiences may lead them to rely on concrete, visible evidence when it is available.
The principle of respecting patient autonomy underpins the concept and practice of informed consent. Yet current approaches to consent often ignore the ways in which the exercise of autonomy is deeply epistemically dependent.
In this paper, we draw on philosophical descriptions of autonomy ‘scaffolding’ and apply them to informed consent in medicine. We examine how this relates to other models of the doctor–patient relationship and other theories (eg, the notion of relational autonomy). A focus on scaffolding autonomy reframes the justification for existing ways of supporting decisions. In other cases, it suggests a need to rethink how, when and where professionals obtain consent. It may highlight the benefit of technology for supporting decisions.
Finally, we consider the implications for some high-stakes decisions where autonomy is thought to be critical, for example, termination of pregnancy. We argue that such decisions should not be free from all sources of influence—rather they should be protected from undesired influence.
Cultural evolution applies evolutionary concepts and tools to explain the change of culture over time. Despite advances in both theoretical and empirical methods, the connections between cultural evolutionary theory and evidence are often vague, limiting progress. Theoretical models influence empirical research but rarely guide data collection and analysis in logical and transparent ways. Theoretical models themselves are often too abstract to apply to specific empirical contexts and guide statistical inference. To help bridge this gap, we outline a quality-assurance computational workflow that starts from generative models of empirical phenomena and logically connects statistical estimates to both theory and real-world explanatory goals. We emphasize and demonstrate validation of the workflow using synthetic data. Using the interplay between conformity, migration, and cultural diversity as a case study, we present coded and repeatable examples of directed acyclic graphs, tailored agent-based simulations, a probabilistic transmission model for longitudinal data, and an approximate Bayesian computation model for cross-sectional data. We discuss the assumptions, opportunities, and pitfalls of different approaches to generative modeling and show how each can be used to improve data analysis depending on the structure of available data and the depth of theoretical understanding. Throughout, we highlight the significance of ethnography and of collecting basic cultural and demographic information about study populations and call for more emphasis on logical and theory-driven workflows as part of science reform.
In a novel large-scale experiment, we study how adults in two societies, Shanghai (China) and Norway, make real distributive decisions involving children. We find that acceptance of inequality between children increases with the age of the children, is affected by the source of inequality and the cost of redistribution, and is lower than acceptance of inequality between adults. We document a large cross-societal difference in inequality acceptance: adults in Shanghai implement twice as much inequality between children compared with adults in Norway. Finally, we show that the willingness to accept inequality between children is predictive of attitudes to child policies.
Does self‐governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the Middle Ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of a prominent noble dynasty. As a result, some Swiss municipalities became self‐governing, whereas the others remained under feudalism for another 600 years. Evidence from a behavioral experiment, the World Values Survey and the Swiss Household Panel consistently show that individuals from historically self‐governing municipalities exhibit stronger norms of cooperation today. Referenda data on voter‐turnout allow me to trace these effects on individually costly and socially beneficial actions for over 150 years. Furthermore, norms of cooperation map into prosocial behaviors like charitable giving and environmental protection. Uniquely, Switzerland tracks every family's place of origin in registration data, which I use to demonstrate persistence from cultural transmission in a context of historically low migration.
Although acculturation psychology is extensively studied in the social sciences, research progress has slowed due to overused methodologies and theories and emerging challenges to core conceptual tenets. Here, we seek to stimulate scientific inquiry into acculturation by integrating underutilized cultural evolutionary perspectives. We propose that cultural evolutionary mechanisms, such as (anti)conformity, prestige bias, payoff bias, and vertical transmission are instrumental in understanding when, why, and how minority- and majority-group members acculturate. The direction and potency of these mechanisms are proposed to be modulated by a combination of contextual and individual factors, resulting in acculturation strategies that at the population level form “cultural evolutionary equilibria.” These equilibria in turn have consequences for the long-term, population-level dynamics of cultural evolution. We outline how our integration of perspectives can allow researchers to model the dynamics of large-scale cultural change, increasing our understanding of the complex challenges faced by today’s diverse societies.
Public Abstract
Acculturation describes the cultural and psychological changes resulting from intercultural contact. Here, we use concepts from “cultural evolution” to better understand the processes of acculturation. Cultural evolution researchers view cultural change as an evolutionary process, allowing them to borrow tools and methods from biology. Cultural evolutionary mechanisms such as conformity (copying the numerical majority), anti-conformity (copying the numerical minority), prestige bias (copying famous individuals), payoff bias (copying successful people), and vertical cultural transmission (copying your parents) can cause people to adopt elements from other cultures and/or conserve their cultural heritage. We explore how these transmission mechanisms might create distinct acculturation strategies, shaping cultural change and diversity over the long-term. This theoretical integration can pave the way for a more sophisticated understanding of the pervasive cultural shifts occurring in many ethnically diverse societies, notably by identifying conditions that empower minority-group members, often marginalized, to significantly influence the majority group and society.
The goal of this article was to reveal the perspectives of the intergenerational transmission measurement for Russian survey research based on the analysis of the English-language scientific publications. Intergenerational values transmission measurement is a crucial tool for the investigation of social dynamics. In addition to this, it could be applied for anti-stigmatization of the people, who belong to different generations and affect agist public prejudices. However, this tool is not yet widely used in Russian social research practice. In this article to shed the light on intergenerational transmission of values promise for the Russian quantitative research on families, I analyze the validity and reliability issues that typically emerge in foreign studies. The analysis is based on criteria of research quality suggested by E.Drost. As a literature review methodology is used narrative literature review approach. My analysis demonstrates that the pivotal threats for the intergenerational transmission of values research lie in the survey setting; the choice of the scales for values measurement; the size, and composition of the sample; the number of times, and periodicity the values measurement. The construct validity and reliability issues seem to be the most manageable and treatable. At the same time, the serious threat come from the validity of statistical conclusions and external, internal validity. These problems reduction is an acute methodological challenge that could hinder the methodology wide application on Russian-speaking samples. The paper could be of interest to family, childhood, and aging students.
Humans learn in ways that are influenced by others. As a result, cultural items of many types are elaborated over time in ways that build on the achievements of previous generations. Culture therefore shows a pattern of descent with modification reminiscent of Darwinian evolution. This raises the question of whether cultural selection-a mechanism akin to natural selection, albeit working when learned items are passed from demonstrators to observers-can explain how various practices are refined over time. This Element argues that cultural selection is not necessary for the explanation of cultural adaptation; it shows how to build hybrid explanations that draw on aspects of cultural selection and cultural attraction theory; it shows how cultural reproduction makes problems for highly formalised approaches to cultural selection; and it uses a case-study to demonstrate the importance of human agency for cumulative cultural adaptation.
The Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty is a comprehensive reference work exploring recent changes and future trends in the principles that govern institutional investors and fiduciaries. A wide range of contributors offer new perspectives on the dynamics that drive the current emphasis on short-term investment returns. Moreover, they analyze the forces at work in markets around the world which are bringing into sharper focus the systemic effects that investment practices have on the long-term stability of the economy and the interests of beneficiaries in financial, social and environmental sustainability. This volume provides a global and multi-faceted commentary on the evolving standards governing institutional investment, offering guidance for students, researchers and policy-makers interested in finance, governance and other aspects of the contemporary investment world. It also provides investment, business, financial media and legal professionals with the tools they need to better understand and respond to the new financial market challenges of the twenty-first century.
The Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty is a comprehensive reference work exploring recent changes and future trends in the principles that govern institutional investors and fiduciaries. A wide range of contributors offer new perspectives on the dynamics that drive the current emphasis on short-term investment returns. Moreover, they analyze the forces at work in markets around the world which are bringing into sharper focus the systemic effects that investment practices have on the long-term stability of the economy and the interests of beneficiaries in financial, social and environmental sustainability. This volume provides a global and multi-faceted commentary on the evolving standards governing institutional investment, offering guidance for students, researchers and policy-makers interested in finance, governance and other aspects of the contemporary investment world. It also provides investment, business, financial media and legal professionals with the tools they need to better understand and respond to the new financial market challenges of the twenty-first century.
The Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty is a comprehensive reference work exploring recent changes and future trends in the principles that govern institutional investors and fiduciaries. A wide range of contributors offer new perspectives on the dynamics that drive the current emphasis on short-term investment returns. Moreover, they analyze the forces at work in markets around the world which are bringing into sharper focus the systemic effects that investment practices have on the long-term stability of the economy and the interests of beneficiaries in financial, social and environmental sustainability. This volume provides a global and multi-faceted commentary on the evolving standards governing institutional investment, offering guidance for students, researchers and policy-makers interested in finance, governance and other aspects of the contemporary investment world. It also provides investment, business, financial media and legal professionals with the tools they need to better understand and respond to the new financial market challenges of the twenty-first century.
What is the nature of human thought? A long dominant view holds that the mind is a general problem-solving device that approaches all questions in much the same way. Chomsky's theory of language, which revolutionised linguistics, challenged this claim, contending that children are primed to acquire some skills, like language, in a manner largely independent of their ability to solve other sorts of apparently similar mental problems. In recent years researchers in anthropology, psychology, linguistic and neuroscience have examined whether other mental skills are similarly independent. Many have concluded that much of human thought is 'domain-specific'. Thus, the mind is better viewed as a collection of cognitive abilities specialised to handle specific tasks than a general problem solver. This volume introduces a general audience to a domain-specificity perspective, by compiling a collection of essays exploring how several of these cognitive abilities are organised.
This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning – in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking (reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution.
Seasonal variance in the diet of Ache hunter-gatherers is examined. Fluctuation in the number of calories of honey consumed daily contributed most to the differences in total calories consumed daily during different seasons of the year. Meat, the most important resource in the diet, provided the greatest number of calories daily, and varied little across seasons. The vegetable component of the diet is characterized by low variance in absolute numbers of calories, but high variance in species composition. The mean number of calories consumed daily per capita is high (3827 calories) compared to that reported for other hunter-gathers. Differences in energy expenditure and consumption among modern hunter-gatherers is discussed.
The chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes, Pongidae) among all other living species, is our closest relation, with whom we last shared a common ancestor less than five million years ago. These African apes make and use a rich and varied kit of tools. Of the primates, and even of the other Great Apes, they are the only consistent and habitual tool-users. Chimpanzees meet the criteria of working definitions of culture as originally devised for human beings in socio-cultural anthropology. They show sex differences in using tools to obtain and to process a variety of plant and animal foods. The technological gap between chimpanzees and human societies living by foraging (hunter-gatherers) is surprisingly narrow, at least for food-getting. Different communities of chimpanzees have different tool-kits, and not all of this regional and local variation can be explained by the varied physical and biotic environments in which they live. Some differences are likely customs based on non-functionally derived and symbolically encoded traditions. Chimpanzees serve as heuristic, referential models for the reconstruction of cultural evolution in apes and humans from an ancestral hominoid. However, chimpanzees are not humans, and key differences exist between them, though many of these apparent contrasts remain to be explored empirically and theoretically.
Hunting has been considered a behavior of importance in the physical and social evolution of humans. Achè hunters are efficient predators. This chapter presents the models derived from the optimal foraging theory to account for the total set of species hunted, using different technologies. The comparison of Achè hunting to other hunter-gatherers shows a wide range of variation. The difference in hunting behavior between the Achè and the !Kung is the difference in the game species. The !Kung hunt large game animals, which single men stalk and shoot with poison arrows. The present study tests the hypotheses concerning the applicability of optimal foraging models to hunter-gatherer subsistence behavior. The Achè demonstrates that in the appropriate ecological setting humans are efficient predators and get good returns hunting with simple technology. The tropical forests of this part of lowland South America are well endowed with game that is easily killed by human hunters.
The Ache, whose life history the authors recounts, are a small indigenous population of hunters and gatherers living in the neotropical rainforest of eastern Paraguay. This is part exemplary ethnography of the Ache and in larger part uses this population to make a signal contribution to human evolutionary ecology.
This paper aims to describe and explain aspects of food sharing among Ache hunter-gatherers of eastern Paraguay. Food sharing has been widely held to be a fundamental feature of the hunting and gathering way of life and has been hypothesized to have played a major role in the evolution of language, intelligence, and the sexual division of labor. The very general question that guided the research is: What factors are responsible for the evolution of food sharing among adult conspecifics, and how can we account for the variation among groups in the extent to which food is shared? Five alternative hypotheses concerning the evolution of adult-adult food sharing are reviewed and analyzed in terms of the competing predictions they generate. These hypotheses invoke (1) kin selection, (2) tolerated theft, (3) temporal reciprocity, (4) cooperative acquisition of food resources, and (5) conservation of resources. For meat and honey, the resources the Ache share most, the data conform to the predictions of the tolerated-theft and temporal-reciprocity hypotheses, with some qualifications. Long-term differences in productivity between foragers suggest that reciprocity is not completely balanced. The implications of these results for a general theory of food sharing are discussed.
Over the past 25 years, Boyd and Richerson have become well-known across a wide range of disciplines for their path-breaking work on evolution and culture. This work collects twenty of the influential but relatively inaccessible published articels that form the backbone of this research. It could not be more timely given the growing influence of evolutionary psychology. The papers – which were published in a diverse set of journals and which are not easily available – a conceptually linked and form a cohesive, unified evolutionary account of human culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior: unlike other organism, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Taking off from these two assumptions, Boyd and Richerson’s novel idea is that culture is a pool of information, stored in the brains of a population, that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Among their conclusions: culture can account for both our astounding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. Interest in Boyd and Richerson’s work spans anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science, and has influenced work on animal behavior, economics and game theory, memes, and even archaeology.
controversies have focused on the thesis that perceptual and linguistic decoding processes are modular, much more than on the alleged nonmodularity of thought / defend the view that thought processes might be modular too / articulate a modular view of human thought with the naturalistic view of human culture that [the author has] been developing under the label "epidemiology of representations" / show how, contrary to the received view, organisms endowed with truly modular minds might engender truly diverse cultures (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Existing models suggest that reciprocity is unlikely to evolve in large groups as a result of natural selection. In these models, reciprocators punish noncooperation by with-holding future cooperation, and thus also penalize other cooperators in the group. Here, we analyze a model in which the response is some form of punishment that is directed solely at noncooperators. We refer to such alternative forms of punishment as retribution. We show that cooperation enforced by retribution can lead to the evolution of cooperation in two qualitatively different ways. (1) If benefits of cooperation to an individual are greater than the costs to a single individual of coercing the other n − 1 individuals to cooperate, then strategies which cooperate and punish noncooperators, strategies which cooperate only if punished, and, sometimes, strategies which cooperate but do not punish will coexist in the long run. (2) If the costs of being punished are large enough, moralistic strategies which cooperate, punish noncooperators, and punish those who do not punish noncooperators can be evolutionarily stable. We also show, however, that moralistic strategies can cause any individually costly behavior to be evolutionarily stable, whether or not it creates a group benefit.
This article summarizes 5 years of research on resource choice and foraging strategy among Ache foragers in eastern Paraguay. Successes and failures of simple models from optimal foraging theory (OFT) are discussed and revisions are suggested in order to bring the models in line with empirical evidence from the Ache. The following conclusions emerge: (1) Energetic returns from various alternative resources and foraging strategies is probably the best single predictor of foraging patterns. (2) Nutrient constraints should be added only when they significantly improve the predictive power of the model. Importance of meat versus vegetable resources may be one important modification based on nutrients that enhances the ability of OFT models to account for empirical reality in human foragers. (3) Men's and women's abilities and foraging patterns differ enough that they should be treated separately in all OFT analyses. (4) Opportunity costs associated with resources that are processed when foraging is not possible may be sufficiently low to predict that high processing time resources will be included in the optimal diet even when their associated return rates (including processing) are lower than mean foraging returns. (5) When food sharing is extensive and foraging bands include several adult males and females, foragers may not need to modify foraging strategies in other ways in order to reduce the risk of not eating on some days.
How do biological, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors combine to change societies over the long run? Boyd and Richerson explore how genetic and cultural factors interact, under the influence of evolutionary forces, to produce the diversity we see in human cultures. Using methods developed by population biologists, they propose a theory of cultural evolution that is an original and fair-minded alternative to the sociobiology debate.
Kinship Relations in the Machiguenga
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Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979. Barth, F. Introduction Boston: Little Brown & Com-pany
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MacQuarry, K. Dissipative Energy Structures. Dissertation, California State University Chimpanzee Material Culture: Implications for Human Evolution Science and Civilization in China
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Neotropical hunting among the Ache of eastern Paraguay. In Adaptive Re-sponses of Native Amazonians
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Cultural learning The psychological foundations of culture. In The Adapted Mind: Evolution-ary Psychology and the Generation of Culture
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Ache Life History: The Ecology and Demography of a Foraging People. Haw-thorne, NY: Aldine DeGruyter Cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with ostracism
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Hill, K., and Hurtado, M. Ache Life History: The Ecology and Demography of a Foraging People. Haw-thorne, NY: Aldine DeGruyter, 1996. Hirshleifer, D., and Rasmussen, E. Cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with ostracism. John E. Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA Business Economics Working Paper #86– 10, 1988.
Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare Origins of domain specificity: the evolution of functional organization
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Boyd, R., and Richerson, P.J. Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare. Proceedings of the British Academy 88:77–93, 1996. Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. Origins of domain specificity: the evolution of functional organization. In Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (Eds.). New York: Cambridge Press, 1994, pp. 85–116.
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Alexander, R. Darwinism and Human Affairs. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979.
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Lumsden, C., and Wilson, E.O. Genes, Mind and Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
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Foraging decisions among Ache hunter-gatherers
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Cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with ostracism. John E. Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA Business Economics Working Paper #86-10
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