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e Oxford Handbook of
inking and Reasoning
OXFORD LIBRARY OF PSYCHOLOGY
--
Peter E. Nathan
Clinical Psychology
David H. Barlow
Cognitive Neuroscience
Kevin N. Ochsner and Stephen M. Kosslyn
Cognitive Psychology
Daniel Reisberg
Counseling Psychology
Elizabeth M. Altmaier and Jo-Ida C. Hansen
Developmental Psychology
Philip David Zelazo
Health Psychology
Howard S. Friedman
History of Psychology
David B. Baker
Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Steve W. J. Kozlowski
Methods and Measurement
Todd D. Little
Neuropsychology
Kenneth M. Adams
Personality and Social Psychology
Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder
1
e Oxford Handbook
of inking and
Reasoning
Edited by
Keith J. Holyoak
Robert G. Morrison
OXFORD LIBRARY OF PSYCHOLOGY
Editor in Chief .
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
e Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning / edited by Keith J. Holyoak, Robert G. Morrison.
p. cm.
ISBN 978–0–19–973468–9
1. ought and thinking. 2. Reasoning (Psychology) I. Holyoak, Keith James, 1950– II. Morrison,
Robert G., Jr., 1966–
BF441.O94 2012
153.4—dc23
011031592
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
v
SHORT CONTENTS
Oxford Library of Psychology vii
About the Editors ix
Preface xi
Contributors xiii
Contents xvii
Chapters 1–806
Index 807
vii
OXFORD LIBRARY OF PSYCHOLOGY
e Oxford Library of Psychology, a landmark series of handbooks, is published
by Oxford University Press, one of the world’s oldest and most highly respected
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Encompassing a comprehensive set of handbooks, organized hierarchically, the
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Planned as a refl ection of the dynamism of psychology, the Library will grow
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viii
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Befi tting its commitment to accessibility, each handbook includes a compre-
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In summary, the Oxford Library of Psychology will grow organically to provide a
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than 500-year tradition of Oxford University Press for excellence, innovation, and
quality, as exemplifi ed by the Oxford Library of Psychology.
Peter E. Nathan
Editor-in-Chief
Oxford Library of Psychology
ix
ABOUT THE EDITORS
Keith J. Holyoak
Keith J. Holyoak, Ph.D., Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University
of California, Los Angeles, is a leading researcher in human thinking and reason-
ing. He received his B.A. from the University of British Columbia in 1971 and
his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1976. Dr. Holyoak was on the faculty of
the University of Michigan from 1976–1986 and then joined the Department of
Psychology at UCLA. His work combines behavioral studies with both cognitive
neuroscience and computational modeling. Dr. Holyoak has published over 180
scientifi c articles, and is the co-author or editor of numerous books, including
Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery (MIT Press, 1986), Men-
tal Leaps: Analogy in Creative ought (MIT Press, 1995), and the Cambridge
Handbook of inking and Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2005). In a
parallel career as a poet he has published Facing the Moon: Poems of Li Bai and
Du Fu (Oyster River Press, 2007), My Minotaur: Selected Poems 1998–2006 (Dos
Madres Press, 2010), and Foreigner: New English Poems in Chinese Old Style (Dos
Madres Press, 2012).
Robert G. Morrison
Robert G. Morrison, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience
at Loyola University Chicago, uses behavioral, computational, and neuroimag-
ing methods to investigate memory and reasoning throughout the lifespan. After
receiving his B.S. from Wheaton College, Morrison worked both as a scientist
and a conceptual artist. He discovered cognitive science at the interface of these
worlds and studied Cognitive Neuroscience at UCLA, where he received his Ph.D.
in 2004. After co-founding Xunesis (xunesis.org) and completing a National
Institute of Aging post-doctoral fellowship at Northwestern University, Morrison
joined the Department of Psychology and the Neuroscience Institute at Loyola
in 2009. Dr. Morrison has published numerous scientifi c articles and chapters
and has edited the Cambridge Handbook of inking and Reasoning (Cambridge
University Press, 2005). Dr. Morrison’s research has been funded by the National
Institute of Mental Health, the Offi ce of Naval Research, the American Federa-
tion of Aging Research, and the Illinois Department of Public Health. In a paral-
lel career as an artist he has exhibited his painting, sculpture and photography in
galleries and museums throughout the United States.
xi
PREFACE
A few decades ago, when the science of cognition was in its infancy, the early
textbooks on cognition began with perception and attention and ended with
memory. So-called higher-level cognition—the mysterious, complicated realm of
thinking and reasoning—was simply left out. ings changed—any good cogni-
tive text (and there are many) devotes several chapters to topics such as categori-
zation, various types of reasoning, judgment and decision making, and problem
solving. As the new century began, we noticed that unlike fi elds such as percep-
tion or memory, the fi eld of thinking and reasoning lacked a true Handbook—a
book meant to be kept close “at hand” by those involved in the fi eld, particularly
those new to it. In response, we edited the Cambridge Handbook of inking and
Reasoning (2005). Our aim was to bring together top researchers to write chapters
each of which summarized the basic concepts and fi ndings for a major topic,
sketch its history, and give a sense of the directions in which research is currently
heading. e Handbook provided quick overviews for experts in each topic area,
and more important for experts in allied topic areas (as few researchers can keep
up with the scientifi c literature over the full breadth of the fi eld of thinking and
reasoning). Even more crucially, this Handbook was meant to provide an entry
point into the fi eld for the next generation of researchers, by providing a text
for use in classes on thinking and reasoning designed for graduate students and
upper-level undergraduates.
e fi rst Handbook achieved these aims. However, a fast-moving scientifi c
fi eld has a way of quickly rendering the “state of the art” the “state of yesterday.”
By the time the book appeared, new developments that our book had barely
touched on were already generating excitement among researchers. ese new
themes included advances in Bayesian modeling, which helped to understand
the rational foundations of thinking and reasoning, and advances in cognitive
neuroscience, which began to link higher order cognition to its neural and even
genetic substrate . In addition, new topics such as moral reasoning became active.
After a few years, we decided the fi eld of thinking and reasoning was ripe for a
new comprehensive overview. is is it. Our aim is to provide comprehensive and
authoritative reviews of all the core topics of the fi eld of thinking and reasoning,
with many pointers for further reading. Doubtless we still have omissions, but we
have included as much as could realistically fi t in a single volume. Our focus is on
research from cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience,
but we also include work related to developmental, social and clinical psychology,
philosophy, economics, artifi cial intelligence, linguistics, education, law, business,
xii
and medicine. We hope that scholars and students in all these fi elds and others
will fi nd this to be a valuable collection.
We have many to thank for their help in bringing this endeavor to fruition.
e editors at Oxford University Press, Catherine Carlin and more recently Joan
Bossert, were instrumental in initiating and nurturing the project. We fi nd it
fi tting that our new Oxford Handbook of inking and Reasoning should bear
the imprint and indeed the name of this illustrious press, with its long history
reaching back to the origins of scientifi c inquiry and its unparalleled list in the
fi eld of psychology. e entire staff at Oxford, especially Chad Zimmerman,
provided us with close support throughout the arduous process of editing 40
chapters with 76 authors. During this period our own eff orts were supported
by grants from the Offi ce of Naval Research (N000140810126), the Air Force
Offi ce of Scientifi c Research (FA9550-08-1-0489), and the Institute of Educa-
tion Sciences (R305C080015) (KJH); and from the National Institute of Aging
(T32AG020506), the Illinois Department of Public Health Alzheimer’s Disease
Research Fund, American Federation of Aging/Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert
Foundation, and the Loyola University Chicago Deans of Arts and Sciences and
the Graduate School (RGM).
And then there are the authors. (It would seem a bit presumptuous to call them
“our” authors!) People working on tough intellectual problems sometimes experi-
ence a moment of insight (see Chapter 24), a sense that although many laborious
steps may lay ahead, the basic elements of a solution are already in place. Such
fortunate people work on happily, confi dent that ultimate success is assured. In
preparing this Handbook, we also had our moment of “insight.” It came when all
these outstanding researchers had agreed to join our project. Before the fi rst chap-
ter was drafted, we knew the volume was going to be of the highest quality. Along
the way, our distinguished authors graciously served as each other’s reviewers as
we passed drafts around, nurturing each other’s chapters and adding in pointers
from one to another. en the authors all changed hats again and went back to
work revising their own chapters in light of the feedback their peers had provided.
We thank you all for making our own small labors a great pleasure.
Keith J. Holyoak Robert G. Morrison
University of California, Los Angeles Loyola University Chicago
December, 2011
xiii
CONTRIBUTORS
Paolo Ammirante
Department of Psychology
Ryerson University
Toronto, Canada
Jose F. Arocha
Department of Health Studies and
Gerontology
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Peter Bachman
Department of Psychiatry and
Biobehavioral Sciences
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Miriam Bassok
Department of Psychology
University of Washington
Seattle, WA
Mark Beeman
Department of Psychology
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
Marc J. Buehner
School of Psychology
Cardiff University
Cardiff , Wales, UK
Colin F. Camerer
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
Computation and Neural Systems
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, CA
Tyrone D. Cannon
Departments of Psychology, Psychiatry and
Biobehavioral Sciences
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Alan D. Castel
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Nick Chater
Behavioural Science Group
Warwick Business School
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
Patricia W. Cheng
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Susan Wagner Cook
Department of Psychology
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA
Leonidas A. A. Doumas
Department of Psychology
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Manoa, HI
Kevin N. Dunbar
Department of Human Development
and Quantitative Methodology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
School of Psychology
University of Plymouth
Plymouth, UK
Jessica I. Fleck
Department of Psychology
e Richard Stockton College of
New Jersey
Galloway Township, NJ
Brandy N. Frazier
Department of Psychology
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Manoa, HI
Michael C. Friedman
Department of Psychology
University of California,
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
xiv
Susan A. Gelman
Department of Psychology
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI
omas Gilovich
Department of Psychology
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Lila Gleitman
Department of Psychology
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA
Susan Goldin-Meadow
Department of Psychology
University of Chicago
Chicago, IL
Robert L. Goldstone
Department of Psychological and
Brain Sciences
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN
Richard Gonzalez
Department of Psychology
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI
Adam E. Green
Department of Psychology and
Interdisciplinary Program in
Neuroscience
Georgetown University
Washington, DC
Dale W. Griffi n
Sauder School of Business
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
omas L. Griffi ths
Department of Psychology
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA
Ulrike Hahn
School of Psychology
Cardiff University
Cardiff , Wales, UK
Mary Hegarty
Department of Psychology
University of California,
Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, CA
E. Tory Higgins
Departments of Psychology and
Management
Columbia University
New York, NY
Keith J. Holyoak
Department of Psychology
University of California,
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
John E. Hummel
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, IL
P. N. Johnson-Laird
Department of Psychology
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Charles Kemp
Department of Psychology
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
David Klahr
Department of Psychology
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
Barbara J. Knowlton
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Kenneth R. Koedinger
Departments of Human-Computer
Interaction and Psychology
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
Derek J. Koehler
Department of Psychology
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
John Kounios
Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA
Robyn A. LeBoeuf
Marketing Department
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL
xv
Jeff rey Loewenstein
Department of Business Administration
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, IL
Tania Lombrozo
Department of Psychology
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA
Arthur B. Markman
Department of Psychology
University of Texas
Austin, TX
Shannon McGillivray
Department of Psychology
University of California,
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Douglas L. Medin
Department of Psychology
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
Daniel C. Molden
Department of Psychology
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
Robert G. Morrison
Department of Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
Chicago, IL
Jonas Nagel
Department of Psychology
University of Göttingen
Göttingen, Germany
Laura R. Novick
Department of Psychology and
Human Development
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN
Mike Oaksford
Department of Psychological
Sciences
Birkbeck College London
London, UK
John E. Opfer
Department of Psychology
e Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
Anna Papafragou
Department of Psychology
University of Delaware
Newark, DE
Vimla L. Patel
Center for Cognitive Studies
in Medicine and Public Health
New York Academy of Medicine
New York, NY
Derek C. Penn
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Daniel J. Povinelli
Cognitive Evolution Group
University of Louisiana
New Iberia, LA
Tage S. Rai
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Lance J. Rips
Department of Psychology
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
Ido Roll
Carl Wieman Science Education
Initiative
Department of Physics and Astronomy
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Frederick Schauer
School of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
Eldar Shafi r
Department of Psychology and Woodrow
Wilson School of Public Aff airs
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
Robert S. Siegler
Department of Psychology
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
Dean Keith Simonton
Department of Psychology
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA
xvi
Alec Smith
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, CA
Edward E. Smith
Department of Psychology
Columbia University
New York, NY
Steven M. Smith
Department of Psychology
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX
Ji Yun Son
Department of Psychology
California State University, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
Barbara A. Spellman
Department of Psychology and
School of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
Keith E. Stanovich
Department of Human Development and
Applied Psychology
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Andrew T. Stull
Department of Psychology
University of California, Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, CA
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Boston, MA
William Forde ompson
Department of Psychology
Macquarie University
Sydney, Australia
J. Jason van Steenburgh
Department of Psychiatry
e Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Baltimore, MD
Michael R. Waldmann
Department of Psychology
University of Göttingen
Göttingen, Germany
omas B. Ward
Department of Psychology
University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, AL
Alex Wiegmann
Department of Psychology
University of Göttingen
Göttingen, Germany
Jiajie Zhang
Center for Cognitive Informatics
and Decision Making
School of Biomedical Informatics
University of Texas at Houston
Houston, TX
xvii
CONTENTS
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s Guide 1
Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison
Part One • General Approaches to inking and Reasoning
2. Normative Systems: Logic, Probability, and Rational Choice 11
Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford
3. Bayesian Inference 22
omas L. Gri ths, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Charles Kemp
4. Knowledge Representation 36
Arthur B. Markman
5. Computational Models of Higher Cognition 52
Leonidas A. A. Doumas and John E. Hummel
6. Neurocognitive Methods in Higher Cognition 67
Robert G. Morrison and Barbara J. Knowlton
7. Mental Function as Genetic Expression: Emerging Insights From
Cognitive Neurogenetics 90
Adam E. Green and Kevin N. Dunbar
Part Two • Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Reasoning
8. Dual-Process eories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies 115
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
9. Inference in Mental Models 134
P. N. Johnson-Laird
10. Similarity 155
Robert L. Goldstone and Ji Yun Son
11. Concepts and Categories: Memory, Meaning, and Metaphysics 177
Lance J. Rips, Edward E. Smith, and Douglas L. Medin
12. Causal Learning 210
Patricia W. Cheng and Marc J. Buehner
13. Analogy and Relational Reasoning 234
Keith J. Holyoak
14. Explanation and Abductive Inference 260
Tania Lombrozo
15. Rational Argument 277
Ulrike Hahn and Mike Oaksford
Part ree • Judgment and Decision Making
16. Decision Making 301
Robyn A. LeBoeuf and Eldar Sha r
17. Judgmental Heuristics: A Historical Overview 322
Dale W. Gri n, Richard Gonzalez, Derek J. Koehler, and omas Gilovich
18. Cognitive Hierarchies and Emotions in Behavioral Game eory 346
Colin F. Camerer and Alec Smith
19. Moral Judgment 364
Michael R. Waldmann, Jonas Nagel, and Alex Wiegmann
20. Motivated inking 390
Daniel C. Molden and E. Tory Higgins
Part Four • Problem Solving, Intelligence, and Creative inking
21. Problem Solving 413
Miriam Bassok and Laura R. Novick
22. On the Distinction Between Rationality and Intelligence: Implications
for Understanding Individual Diff erences in Reasoning 433
Keith E. Stanovich
23. Cognition and the Creation of Ideas 456
Steve M. Smith and omas B. Ward
24. Insight 475
J. Jason van Steenburgh, Jessica I. Fleck, Mark Beeman, and John Kounios
25. Genius 492
Dean Keith Simonton
Part Five • Ontogeny, Phylogeny, Language, and Culture
26. Development of inking in Children 513
Susan A. Gelman and Brandy N. Frazier
27. e Human Enigma 529
Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli
28. New Perspectives on Language and ought 543
Lila Gleitman and Anna Papafragou
29. inking in Societies and Cultures 569
Tage S. Rai
Part Six • Modes of inking
30. Development of Quantitative inking 585
John E. Opfer and Robert S. Siegler
31. Visuospatial inking 606
Mary Hegarty and Andrew T. Stull
32. Gesture in ought 631
Susan Goldin-Meadow and Susan Wagner Cook
33. Impact of Aging on inking 650
Shannon McGillivray, Michael C. Friedman, and Alan D. Castel
xix
34. e Cognitive Neuroscience of ought Disorder in Schizophrenia 673
Peter Bachman and Tyrone D. Cannon
Part Seven • inking in Practice
35. Scientifi c inking and Reasoning 701
Kevin N. Dunbar and David Klahr
36. Legal Reasoning 719
Barbara A. Spellman and Frederick Schauer
37. Medical Reasoning and inking 736
Vimla L. Patel, Jose F. Arocha, and Jiajie Zhang
38. inking in Business 755
Je rey Loewenstein
39. Musical ought 774
William Forde ompson and Paolo Ammirante
40. Learning to ink: Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Transfer 789
Kenneth R. Koedinger and Ido Roll
Index 807
1
Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison
1 inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s
Guide
“Cogito, ergo sum,” the French philosopher René
Descartes famously declared, “I think, therefore I
am.” Every fully functioning human adult shares a
sense that the ability to think, to reason, is a part of
one’s fundamental identity. A person may be struck
blind or deaf yet still recognize his or her core cog-
nitive capacities as intact. Even loss of language, the
gift often claimed as the sine qua non of Homo sapi-
ens, does not take away a person’s essential human-
ness. Perhaps thinking, not language, lies closest to
both the core of our individual identity and to what
is special about our species (see Penn & Povinelli,
Chapter 27; Gleitman & Papafragou, Chapter 28).
A person who loses language but can still make
intelligent decisions, as demonstrated by actions, is
viewed as mentally competent. In contrast, the kinds
of brain damage that rob an individual of the capac-
ity to think and reason are considered the harshest
blows that can be struck against a sense of person-
hood (see Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6).
Cogito, ergo sum.
What Is inking?
We can start to answer this question by look-
ing at the various ways the word thinking is used
in everyday language. “I think that water is neces-
sary for life” and “Keith and Bob think George was
a fascist” both express beliefs (of varying degrees
of apparent plausibility)—explicit claims of what
someone takes to be a truth about the world. “Ann
is sure to think of a solution” carries us into the
realm of problem solving, the mental construction
of an action plan to achieve a goal. e complaint,
“Why didn’t you think before you went ahead with
your half-baked scheme?” emphasizes that thinking
can be a kind of foresight, a way of “seeing” the pos-
sible future.1 “What do you think about it?” calls
for a judgment, an assessment of the desirability of
an option. “Genocide is evil” takes judgment into
the moral domain. And then there’s “Albert is lost
in thought,” where thinking becomes some sort
of mental meadow through which a person might
meander on a rainy afternoon, oblivious to the
world outside.
Rips and Conrad (1989) elicited judgments from
college students about how various mentalistic terms
relate to one another. Using statistical techniques,
the investigators were able to summarize these rela-
tionships in two diagrams, shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1A is a hierarchy of kinds, or categories.
Roughly, people think planning is a kind of decid-
ing, which is a kind of reasoning, which is a kind of
conceptualizing, which is a kind of thinking. People
also think (that verb again!) that thinking is part
of conceptualizing, which is part of remembering,
which is part of reasoning, and so on (Fig. 1.1B).
e kinds ordering and the parts ordering are quite
similar; most strikingly, thinking is the most general
term in both orderings—the grand superordinate of
mental activities, which permeates all the others.
Cogito, ergo sum.
It is not easy to make the move from the free
fl ow of everyday speech to scientifi c defi nitions of
mental terms, but let us nonetheless off er a pre-
liminary defi nition of thinking to suggest what this
book is about:
inking is the systematic transformation of mental
representations of knowledge to characterize actual or
possible states of the world, often in service of goals.
Obviously our defi nition introduces a plethora
of terms with meanings that beg to be unpacked,
but at which we can only hint. A mental represen-
tation of knowledge is an internal description that
CHAPTER
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FINALS, 01/12/12, NEWGEN
2
can be manipulated to form other descriptions
(see Markman, Chapter 4). To count as thinking,
the manipulations must be systematic transforma-
tions that may be described computationally (see
Doumas & Hummel, Chapter 5), governed by
certain constraints. Whether a logical deduction
(see Evans, Chapter 8) or a creative leap (see Smith
& Ward, Chapter 23), what we mean by thinking
is more than unconstrained associations (with the
caveat that thinking may indeed be disordered; see
Bachman & Cannon, Chapter 34). e internal
representations created by thinking describe states of
some external world (a world that may include the
thinker as an object of self-refl ection; see Gelman
& Frazier, Chapter 26); that world might be our
everyday one or perhaps some imaginary construc-
tion obeying the “laws” of magical realism. And
often (not always—the daydreamer, and indeed the
night dreamer, is also a thinker), thinking is directed
toward achieving some desired state of aff airs, some
goal that motivates the thinker to do mental work
(see Molden & Higgins, Chapter 20).
Our defi nition thus includes quite a few stipula-
tions, but notice also what is left out. We do not
claim that thinking necessarily requires a human
or even a sentient being. Nonetheless, our focus
in this book is on thinking by hominids with elec-
trochemically powered brains constrained by their
genes. inking often seems to be a conscious
activity, of which the thinker is aware (cogito, ergo
sum); but consciousness is a thorny philosophi-
cal puzzle, and some mental activities seem pretty
much like thinking except for being implicit rather
than explicit (see Evans, Chapter 8). Finally, we do
not claim that thinking is inherently rational, or
optimal, or desirable, or even smart (see Stanovich,
Chapter 22). A thorough history of human think-
ing will include quite a few chapters on stupidity;
but at its pinnacle, thinking can be sheer genius (see
Simonton, Chapter 25).
e study of thinking includes several interre-
lated subfi elds, which refl ect slightly diff erent per-
spectives on thinking. Reasoning, which has a long
tradition that springs from philosophy and logic,
places emphasis on the process of drawing infer-
ences (conclusions) from some initial information
(premises). In standard logic, an inference is deduc-
tive if the truth of the premises guarantees the truth
of the conclusion by virtue of the argument form.
If the truth of the premises renders the truth of the
conclusion more credible, but does not bestow cer-
tainty, the inference is called inductive.2 Judgment
and decision making involve assessment of the value
of an option or the probability that it will yield a
certain payoff (judgment), coupled with choice
among alternatives (decision making). Problem
solving involves the construction of a course of
action that can achieve a goal.
Although these distinct perspectives on thinking
are useful in organizing the fi eld (and this volume),
these aspects of thinking overlap in every conceiv-
able way. To solve a problem, one is likely to reason
about the consequences of possible actions and to
make decisions to select among alternative actions.
A Kinds Orderings
inking inking
Conceptualizing Conceptualizing
Reading
Reading
Deciding
Deciding
Planning
Planning
Remembering
Remembering
Reasoning
Reasoning
B Parts Orderings
Fig. 1.1 People’s conceptions of the relationships among terms for mental activities. (A) Ordering of “kinds.” (B) Ordering of “parts.”
(Adapted from Rips & Conrad, 1989, with permission.)
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A logic problem, as the name implies, is a problem
to be solved (with the goal of deriving or evaluating
a possible conclusion). Making a decision is often a
problem that requires reasoning. And so on. ese
subdivisions of the fi eld, like our preliminary defi -
nition of thinking, should be treated as guideposts,
not destinations.
A Capsule History
inking and reasoning, long the academic
province of philosophy, have over the past century
emerged as core topics of empirical investigation and
theoretical analysis in the modern fi elds known as
cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cogni-
tive neuroscience. Before psychology was founded,
the 18th-century philosophers Immanuel Kant (in
Germany) and David Hume (in Scotland) laid the
foundations for all subsequent work on the origins
of causal knowledge, perhaps the most central prob-
lem in the study of thinking (see Cheng & Buehner,
Chapter 12). And if we were to choose one phrase to
set the stage for modern views of thinking, it would
be an observation of the British philosopher omas
Hobbes, who in 1651 in his treatise Leviathan pro-
posed “Reasoning is but reckoning.” Reckoning is an
odd term today, but in the 17th century it meant
“computation,” as in arithmetic calculations.3
It was not until the 20th century that the psy-
chology of thinking became a scientifi c endeavor.
e fi rst half of the century gave rise to many
important pioneers who in very diff erent ways laid
the foundations for the emergence of the modern
fi eld of thinking and reasoning. Foremost were the
Gestalt psychologists of Germany, who provided
deep insights into the nature of problem solving
(see Bassok & Novick, Chapter 21; van Steenburgh
et al., Chapter 24). Most notable of the Gestaltists
were Karl Duncker and Max Wertheimer, students
of human problem solving, and Wolfgang Köhler, a
keen observer of problem solving by great apes.
e pioneers of the early 20th century also
include Sigmund Freud, whose complex and ever-
controversial legacy includes the notions that forms
of thought can be unconscious, and that “cold”
cognition is tangled up with “hot” emotion (see
Molden & Higgins, Chapter 20). As the founder of
clinical psychology, Freud’s legacy also includes the
ongoing integration of research on “normal” think-
ing with studies of thought disorders, such as schizo-
phrenia (see Bachman & Cannon, Chapter 34).
Other early pioneers in the early and mid-century
contributed to various fi elds of study that are now
embraced within thinking and reasoning. Cognitive
development (see Gelman & Frazier, Chapter 26)
continues to be infl uenced by the early theories
developed by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget and
the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. In the United
States, Charles Spearman was a leader in the system-
atic study of individual diff erences in intelligence (see
Stanovich, Chapter 22). In the middle of the cen-
tury, the Russian neurologist Alexander Luria made
immense contributions to our understanding of how
thinking depends on specifi c areas of the brain, antici-
pating the modern fi eld of cognitive neuroscience (see
Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6). Around the same
time in the United States, Herbert Simon argued that
the traditional rational model of economic theory
should be replaced with a framework that accounted
for a variety of human resource constraints, such as
bounded attention and memory capacity and limited
time (see LeBoeuf & Shafi r, Chapter 16). is was
one of the contributions that in 1978 earned Simon
the Nobel Prize in Economics.
In 1943, the British psychologist Kenneth Craik
sketched the fundamental notion that a mental rep-
resentation provides a kind of model of the world
that can be “run” to make predictions (much like
an engineer might use a physical scale model of a
bridge to anticipate the eff ects of stress on the actual
bridge intended to span a river).4 In the 1960s and
1970s, modern work on the psychology of reason-
ing began in Britain with the contributions of Peter
Wason and his collaborator Philip Johnson-Laird
(see Evans, Chapter 8; Johnson-Laird, Chapter 9).
e modern conception of thinking as computa-
tion became prominent in the 1970s. In their classic
treatment of human problem solving, Allen Newell
and Herbert Simon (1972) showed that the com-
putational analysis of thinking (anticipated by Alan
Turing, the father of computer science) could yield
important empirical and theoretical results. Like a
program running on a digital computer, a person
thinking through a problem can be viewed as taking
an input that represents initial conditions and a
goal, and applying a sequence of operations to
reduce the diff erence between the initial conditions
and the goal. e work of Newell and Simon estab-
lished computer simulation as a standard method
for analyzing human thinking (see Doumas &
Hummel, Chapter 5). It also highlighted the poten-
tial of production systems, which were subsequently
developed extensively as cognitive models by John
Anderson and his colleagues (see Koedinger & Roll,
Chapter 40).
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4
e 1970s saw a wide range of major develop-
ments that continue to shape the fi eld. Eleanor
Rosch, building on earlier work by Jerome Bruner
(Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956), addressed
the fundamental question of why people have the
categories they do, and not other logically possible
groupings of objects (see Rips, Smith, & Medin,
Chapter 11). Rosch argued that natural categories
often have fuzzy boundaries (a whale is an odd
mammal), but nonetheless have clear central ten-
dencies, or prototypes (people by and large agree
that a bear makes a fi ne mammal). e psychology
of human judgment was reshaped by the insights of
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who identi-
fi ed simple cognitive strategies, or heuristics, that
people use to make judgments of frequency and
probability. Often quick and accurate, these strat-
egies can in some circumstances lead to nonnor-
mative judgments. After Tversky’s death in 1996,
this line of work was continued by Kahneman,
who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics
in 2002. e current view of judgment that has
emerged from 30 years of research is summarized
by Griffi n et al. (Chapter 17; also see LeBoeuf &
Shafi r, Chapter 16). Goldstone and Son (Chapter
10) review Tversky’s infl uential theory of similarity
judgments.
In 1982 David Marr, a young vision scientist,
laid out a vision of how the science of mind should
proceed. Marr distinguished three levels of analysis,
which he termed the levels of computation, represen-
tation and algorithm, and implementation. Each level,
according to Marr, addresses diff erent questions,
which he illustrated with the example of a physi-
cal device, the cash register. At Marr’s most abstract
level, computation (not to be confused with com-
putation of an algorithm on a computer), the basic
questions are “What is the goal that the cognitive
process is meant to accomplish?” and “What is the
logic of the mapping from the input to the output
that distinguishes this mapping from other input-
output mappings?” A cash register, viewed at this
level, is used to achieve the goal of calculating how
much is owed for a purchase. is task maps precisely
onto the axioms of addition (e.g., the amount owed
shouldn’t vary with the order in which items are pre-
sented to the sales clerk, a constraint that precisely
matches the commutativity property of addition).
It follows that without knowing anything else about
the workings of a particular cash register, we can be
sure that (if it is working properly) it will be doing
addition (not division).
e level of representation and algorithm, as the
name implies, deals with the questions, “What is
the representation of the input and output?” and
“What is the algorithm for transforming the former
into the latter?” Within a cash register, addition
might be performed using numbers in either deci-
mal or binary code, starting with either the leftmost
or rightmost digit. Finally, the level of implementa-
tion addresses the question, “How are the represen-
tation and algorithm realized physically?” e cash
register could be implemented as an electronic cal-
culator, or a mechanical adding machine, or even a
mental abacus in the mind of the clerk.
In his book, Marr stressed the importance of the
computational level of analysis, arguing that it could
be seriously misleading to focus prematurely on the
more concrete levels of analysis for a cognitive task
without understanding the goal or nature of the
mental computation.5 Sadly, Marr died of leukemia
before his book was published, so we do not know
how his thinking about levels of analysis might have
evolved. In very diff erent ways, Marr’s conception of
a computational level of analysis is refl ected in sev-
eral chapters in this book (see especially Chater &
Oaksford, Chapter 2; Griffi ths, Tenenbaum, &
Kemp, Chapter 3; Cheng & Buehner, Chapter 12;
and Hahn & Oaksford, Chapter 15).
In the most recent quarter century many other
springs of research have fed into the river of thinking
and reasoning, including relational reasoning (see
Holyoak, Chapter 13), neural network models (see
Doumas & Hummel, Chapter 5), cognitive neu-
roscience (see Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6),
and cognitive neurogenetics (Green & Dunbar,
Chapter 7). e chapters of this Handbook collec-
tively paint a picture of the state of the fi eld in the
early years of the new millennium.
Overview of the Handbook
is volume brings together the contributions
of many of the leading researchers in thinking and
reasoning to create the most comprehensive over-
view of research on thinking and reasoning that has
ever been available. Each chapter includes a bit of
historical perspective on the topic and ends with
some thoughts about where the fi eld seems to be
heading. e book is organized into seven sections.
Part I: General Approaches to
inking and Reasoning
e seven chapters in Part I address foundational
issues. Chapter 2 by Chater and Oaksford lays out
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, 5
the major normative theories (logic, probability,
and rational choice) that have been used as stan-
dards against which human thinking and reason-
ing are often compared. In Chapter 3, Griffi ths,
Tenenbaum, and Kemp provide an overview of
the Bayesian framework for probabilistic infer-
ence, which has been reinvigorated in recent years.
Chapter 4 by Markman provides an overview of
diff erent conceptions of mental representation,
and Chapter 5 by Doumas and Hummel surveys
approaches to building computational models
of thinking and reasoning. en in Chapter 6,
Morrison and Knowlton provide an introduction to
the methods and fi ndings of cognitive neuroscience
as they bear on higher cognition, and in Chapter
7 Green and Dunbar discuss the emerging links
between thinking and cognitive neurogenetics.
Part II: Inductive, Deductive,
and Abductive Reasoning
Chapters 8–15 deal with core topics of reasoning.
In Chapter 8, Evans reviews dual-process theories of
reasoning, with emphasis on the psychology of deduc-
tive reasoning, the form of thinking with the closest
ties to logic. In Chapter 9, Johnson-Laird describes
the work that he and others have done using the
framework of mental models to deal with various rea-
soning tasks, both deductive and inductive. Chapter
10 by Goldstone and Son reviews work on the core
concept of similarity—how people assess the degree
to which objects or events are alike. Chapter 11 by
Rips, Smith, and Medin considers research on cat-
egories, and how concepts are organized in semantic
memory. In Chapter 12, Cheng and Buehner discuss
causal learning, a basic type of induction concerning
how humans and other creatures acquire knowledge
about causal relations, which are critical for predict-
ing the consequences of actions and events. en,
in Chapter 13, Holyoak reviews the literature on
reasoning by analogy and similar forms of relational
reasoning. In Chapter 14, Lombrozo explores the
multifaceted topic of explanation, which is closely
related to abductive reasoning (often called “infer-
ence to the best explanation”). en, in Chapter 15,
Hahn and Oaksford apply the Bayesian framework
to understand how people interpret informal argu-
ments, including types of arguments that have classi-
cally been viewed as logical fallacies.
Part III: Judgment and Decision Making
In Chapters 16–20 we turn to topics related to
judgment and decision making. In Chapter 16,
LeBoeuf and Shafi r set the stage with a general review
of work on decision making. en, in Chapter 17,
Griffi n, Gonzalez, Koehler and Gilovich review the
fascinating literature on heuristics and biases that
infl uence judgment. In Chapter 18, Camerer and
Smith discuss behavioral game theory, an approach
rooted in economics that has been applied in many
other disciplines. ey also touch upon recent work
on neuroeconomics, the study of the neural substrate
of decision making. In Chapter 19, Waldmann,
Nagel, and Wiegmann review a growing literature
on moral reasoning and decision making. en, in
Chapter 20, Molden and Higgins review research
revealing the ways in which human motivation and
emotion infl uence judgment.
Part IV: Problem Solving, Intelligence,
and Creative inking
e fi ve chapters that comprise this section deal
with problem solving and the many forms of indi-
vidual diff erences observed in human thinking. In
Chapter 21, Bassok and Novick provide a general
overview of the fi eld of human problem solving. In
Chapter 22, Stanovich analyzes diff erent conceptions
of rationality and discusses individual diff erences in
both rational thought and intelligence. Problem
solving has close connections to the topic of creativ-
ity, the focus of Chapter 23 by Smith and Ward. In
Chapter 24, van Steenburgh, Fleck, Beeman, and
Kounios review research that takes a cognitive neu-
roscience approach to understanding the basis for
insight in problem solving. Finally, in Chapter 25
Simonton reviews what is known about the thinking
processes of those who function at the extreme of
individual diff erences commonly termed “genius.”
Part V: Ontogeny, Phylogeny,
Language, and Culture
Our understanding of thinking and reasoning
would be gravely limited if we restricted investigation
to young adult English speakers. Chapters 26–29
deal with the multifaceted ways in which aspects
of thinking vary across the human life span, across
species, across speakers of diff erent languages, and
its connections to larger human groups. In Chapter
26, Gelman and Frazier provide an overview of
the development of thinking and reasoning over
the course of childhood. In Chapter 27, Penn and
Povinelli consider the fundamental question of what
makes human thinking special when compared to the
mental functioning of nonhuman animals. One of the
most controversial topics in the fi eld is the relationship
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6
between thinking and the language spoken by the
thinker. In Chapter 28, Gleitman and Papafragou
off er a fresh perspective on the hypotheses and evi-
dence concerning the connections between language
and thought. Finally, in Chapter 29, Rai discusses the
ways in which human thinking can be viewed as dis-
tributed across social and cultural groups.
Part VI: Modes of inking
ere are many modes of thinking, distinguished
by broad variations in representations and processes.
Chapters 30–34 consider a number of these. In
Chapter 30, Opfer and Siegler discuss mathemati-
cal thinking, a special form of thinking found in
rudimentary form in nonhuman animals and which
undergoes complex developmental changes over the
course of childhood. In Chapter 31, Hegarty and Stull
review work on the role of visuospatial representations
in thinking; and in Chapter 32, Goldin-Meadow and
Cook discuss the ways in which spontaneous gestures
refl ect and guide thinking processes. In Chapter
33, McGillivray, Friedman, and Castel describe the
changes in thinking and reasoning brought on by the
aging process. In Chapter 34, Bachman and Cannon
review research and theory concerning brain disor-
ders, notably schizophrenia, that produce striking
disruptions of normal thought processes.
Part VII: inking in Practice
In cultures ancient and modern, thinking is put to
particular uses in special cultural practices. Chapters
35–40 focus on thinking in particular practices. In
Chapter 35, Dunbar and Klahr discuss thinking and
reasoning as manifested in the practice of science.
In Chapter 36, Spellman and Schauer review diff er-
ent conceptions of legal reasoning. In Chapter 37,
Patel, Arocha, and Zhang discuss reasoning in a
fi eld—medicine—in which accurate diagnosis and
treatment is literally an everyday matter of life and
death. Lowenstein discusses reasoning as it relates to
business in Chapter 38. inking is also involved in
many aspects of music, including composition; this
topic is covered by ompson and Ammirante in
Chapter 39. Finally, Chapter 40 by Koedinger and
Roll concludes the volume by considering one of
the major challenges for education—fi nding ways
to teach people to think more eff ectively.
Examples of Chapter Assignments for a
Variety of Courses
e present volume off ers a comprehensive treat-
ment of higher cognition. As such, it serves as an
excellent source for courses on thinking and rea-
soning, both at the graduate level and for advanced
undergraduates. While instructors for semester-
length graduate courses in thinking and reasoning
may opt to assign the entire volume as a textbook,
there are a number of other possibilities (including
using chapters from this volume as introductions for
various topics and then supplementing with read-
ings from the primary literature). Here are a few
examples of possible chapter groupings, tailored to a
variety of possible course off erings.
Introduction to inking and Reasoning
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s
Guide
2. Normative Systems: Logic, Probability,
and Rational Choice
3. Bayesian Inference
4. Knowledge Representation
8. Dual-Process eories of Reasoning:
Facts and Fallacies
9. Inference in Mental Models
10. Similarity
11. Concepts and Categories: Memory,
Meaning, and Metaphysics
12. Causal Learning and Inference
13. Analogy and Relational Reasoning
14. Explanation and Abductive Inference
15. Rational Argument
16. Decision Making
17. Judgment Heuristics
21. Problem Solving
22. On the Distinction Between Rationality
and Intelligence: Implications for
Understanding Individual Diff erences in
Reasoning
23. Cognition and the Creation of Ideas
Development of inking
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s Guide
4. Knowledge Representation
10. Similarity
11. Concepts and Categories: Memory,
Meaning, and Metaphysics
13. Analogy and Relational Reasoning
14. Explanation and Abductive Inference
26. Development of inking in Children
27. e Human Enigma
28. Language and ought
30. Mathematical Cognition
31. Visuospatial inking
32. Gesture in ought
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, 7
33. Impact of Aging on inking
40. Learning to ink: Cognitive
Mechanisms of Knowledge Transfer
Modeling Human ought
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s
Guide
3. Bayesian Inference
4. Knowledge Representation
5. Computational Modeling of Higher
Cognition
6. Neural Substrate of inking
9. Inference in Mental Models
10. Similarity
11. Concepts and Categories: Memory,
Meaning, and Metaphysics
12. Causal Learning and Inference
13. Analogy and Relational Reasoning
15. Rational Argument
18. Cognitive Hierarchies and Emotions in
Behavioral Game eory
40. Learning to ink: Cognitive Methods of
Knowledge Transfer
Applied ought
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s Guide
35. Scientifi c inking and Reasoning
36. Legal Reasoning
37. inking and Reasoning in Medicine
38. inking in Business
39. Musical ought
40. Learning to ink: Cognitive Methods of
Knowledge Transfer
Diff erences in ought
1. inking and Reasoning: A Reader’s
Guide
19. Moral Judgment
20. Motivated inking
23. Cognition and the Creation of Ideas
24. Insight
25. Genius
26. Development of inking in Children
27. e Human Enigma
28. Language and ought
29. inking in Society and Culture
32. Gesture in ought
33. Impact of Aging on inking
34. e Cognitive Neuroscience of ought
Disorder in Schizophrenia
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported by grants from the
Offi ce of Naval Research (N000140810186) and the Institute of
Education Sciences (R305C080015) (KJH); and by the National
Institute of Aging (T32AG020506), the Illinois Department
of Public Health Alzheimer’s Disease Research Fund, and the
Loyola University Chicago Deans of Arts and Sciences and the
Graduate School (RGM).
Notes
1. Notice the linguistic connection between “thinking” and
“seeing,” thought and perception, which was emphasized by the
Gestalt psychologists of the early 20th century.
2. e distinction between deduction and induction blurs in
the study of the psychology of thinking, as we will see in Part II
of this volume.
3. ere are echoes of the old meaning of reckon in such
phrases as “reckon the cost.” As a further aside, the term “dead
reckoning,” a procedure for calculating the position of a ship
or aircraft, derives from “deductive reasoning.” And in an old
Western movie, a hero in a tough spot might venture, “I reckon
we can hold out till sun-up,” illustrating how calculation has
crossed over to become a metaphor for mental judgment.
4. See Johnson-Laird, Chapter 9, for a current view of think-
ing and reasoning that owes much to Craik’s seminal ideas.
5. Indeed, Marr criticized Newell and Simon’s approach to
problem solving for paying insuffi cient attention to the compu-
tational level in this sense.
References
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., & Austin, G. A. (1956). A study of
thinking. New York: Wiley.
Craik, K. (1943) e nature of explanation. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes, T. (1651/1968). Leviathan. London: Penguin Books.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving.
Englewood Cliff s, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rips, L. J., & Conrad, F. G. (1989). Folk psychology of mental
activities. Psychological Review, 96, 187–207.
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