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Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rüstungswunder
Abstract
Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941 by implementing several organizational reforms. We question the received view by showing that there was nothing like a clear-cut discontinuity in both real production and organization of the German armament industry after Speer was appointed armament minister. With respect to organizational reforms, Speer obviously failed to enforce the rationalization measures "type reduction" and "reduction of program changes". Speer can also not be credited with pushing through fixed-price contracts which were the rule already before the year 1942. Revised macroeconomic data indicate that labour productivity displayed a rather u-shaped development during World War II, decreasing between 1939 and 1941 and increasing from 1941 onwards. In our opinion, the initial decrease in productivity was caused by start-up problems resulting from the astonishing growth of both the capital stock and the work force of traditional and newly founded armament firms. The increase in productivity after 1941 then resulted mainly from learning-by doing.
... Todt and Speer (who managed to get the credentials) pushed through a massive rationalization program that managed to bring about an impressive increase in the fi gures for fi nished production of armaments. 15 Speer's production statistics concealed that a considerable part of the increase in armaments production was due to shifting production contracts abroad. The French industry in particular contributed much to the German war effort. ...
... The important role of contracts in the German war economy has already been stressed by Overy (1994), who believes that the considerable increase in both German armament production and productivity after 1941 was triggered primarily by the general transition from cost-plus contracts (CPC) to fixed-price contracts (FPC) in procurement in May 1942. Although various authors have shown that fixed-price contracts were already widely in use at the beginning of World War II in several German armament industries (see Budrass, 1998; Budrass, Scherner and Streb, forthcoming; Rauh-Kühne, 2002; Scherner and Streb, 2006; Tooze, 2006), Overy was still right to emphasize the general preference of Nazi regulators for fixed-price contracts. The main benefit of this contract type was that it motivated firms to decrease their use of the scarce inputs of the German war economy, such as labor and raw materials. ...
This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost-plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed-price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high-risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed-price contracts still in use. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.
The article deals with the history of the clothing industry during the ‘Third Reich’. It discusses the development of the industry and the room for manoeuvre by the example of three companies, Seidensticker, Hugo Boss, and Bierbaum-Proenen. The article makes the point that the Nazi’s economic policy brought about severe restraints for the clothing industry, which seems to be typical for consumer goods industries as a whole during the ‘Third Reich’.
During World War II, Germany occupied much of continental Europe. Although the social and political history of this occupation has been studied extensively, the economics of the unprecedented transfer of resources has received surprisingly little attention. Allies, neutrals, and conquered nations under German hegemony were a vital source of supplies for Hitler's war machine. Without the war material, consumer goods and labor they provided, Germany would not have been able to wage a prolonged multi-front war. All of these countries suffered enormous losses, but each had a distinct experience that depended on Germany's wartime needs, whether they were allied, occupied or neutral, and their place in Nazi racial ideology. Paying for Hitler's War is a comparative economic study which explores these different experiences through case studies of twelve nations spanning the European continent.
During the last two decades, a growing number of historians with a wide variety of research interests have identified the last months of Nazi rule as a distinct period in the regime's history. Several main topics can be identified, among them new outlooks on German society under the circumstances of looming defeat, newer approaches to military history, and research into the Nazi violence pursued until the end. One question lies at the heart of many studies: why did the Germans hold out, why did they keep on fighting, and why did they keep on killing right until the end?
Economic Statistics 1933 – 1945
by Rainer Fremdling
The major part of the paper deals with economic statistics as an instrument for preparing the war and then for warfare itself. Firstly the involvement of the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Reichsamt) is described and analyzed: as soon as 1934, plans emerged in the Office to conduct periodical industrial censuses as means for a statistical information system to meet the demands of a planned or commanded economy for warfare. The comprehensive industrial census of 1936 became the main tool for this purpose. Secondly, the statistical information increasingly provided by compulsary reports of private industrial firms and their organizations are put forward. They became instrumental in steering the German economy. Officially and privately organized economic statistics were finally merged: during the war the Ministry of Economics set up a statistical information system based on the collaboration between the German Statistical Office and the German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung). In 1943, the responsible department of the Ministry of Economics was moved into the Planning Office (Planungsamt) of Speer´s Ministry for Armament. Within this centre of economic command economic statistics became an essential tool for running the German economy during the last years of the war. In a separate part of the paper plans of the Ministry of Economics during the last months of the war are highlighted which aimed at designing an institutional framework for centralizing and centrally steering German empirical economic research and economic statistics after the war. Finally, the use of the NS-statistics after the war is touched upon, e. g. East-Germany setting up its planned economy. A case study deals with a report of the Statistical Office asked by the Ministry of Economics in 1936 to estimate the assets of German Jews.
Based on a revision of output and labor productivity series of the German armament industry during the World War II we show that the so-called German armament miracle was only a statistical construct produced by the manipulation of Albert Speer and his statisticians. In particular, we find no structural break in the year 1942 when Speer became armament minister. In a period of continuous expansion, only the year 1941 stands out, when both domestic armament production and labor productivity decreased. We suggest that this temporary slump was caused by the short-term effects of outsourcing activities and capital deepening.
This review of recent scholarship on the German occupation of France during the Second World War discusses four subjects: the role of the German military authorities, anti-Jewish policy, economic policy, and relations between occupiers and occupied. The review argues that recent scholarship on the German occupation offers a potential complement to the scholarship on Vichy, which has been dominated by a focus on the French. There is, however, a danger of simply replacing a focus on the French with one on the Germans. The review points to the need for more exploration of the intertwined experiences of occupiers and occupied. This intertwining was evident in the economic and industrial realms and perhaps even more so in the social realm, in which significant numbers of French and Germans interacted with one another on a regular basis.
Cet article passe en revue plusieurs études récentes sur l'histoire de l'occupation allemande de la France pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Il traite de quatre sujets en particulier: le rôle des autorités militaires allemandes; la politique antisémite; la politique économique; et les rapports entre les occupés et les occupants. L'argument de l'article est que les études récentes sur l'occupation offrent un éventuel complément aux études sur Vichy, qui sont marquées par une concentration sur les Français. En même temps, il est à craindre que les études récentes remplacent tout simplement une concentration sur les Français par une autre sur les Allemands. L'article avance la nécessité d'examiner les rapports entrecroisés des occupés et des occupants. Cet entrecroisement était évident dans les domaines de l'économie et de l'industrie et peut-être davantage dans celui du social—un domaine dans lequel un grand nombre de Français et Allemands ont dû s'affronter au quotidien.
Neue Wege zur Erforschung der Wirtschaftsgeschichte Europas unter nationalsozialistischer Hegemonie
Wenn die europäische Dimension der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in das Blickfeld der historischen Forschung rückt, handelt es sich insgesamt eher um eine neuere Entwicklung. Die Standardwerke zur Geschichte des " Dritten Reichs " kamen bis Anfang der 1990er-Jahre noch häufig ohne die Thematisierung der na-tionalsozialistischen Hegemonie über Europa und seine Wirtschaft aus. Dieses Manko gilt umso mehr für die Wirtschaftsgeschichte, die sich auf die von den National sozialisten errichtete Kriegswirtschaft innerhalb des Deutschen Reichs konzentrierte.
According to estimates made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after World War II, German industrial labour productivity grew significantly during the war, especially in 1940 and 1941. These estimates are based on the assumption that the intermediate input – sale ratios in the different industrial sectors remained constant over time. However, after the beginning of the war, German armament producers started to outsource the manufacturing of intermediate goods to other companies, especially to firms in occupied Europe. In order to trace the impact of such outsourcing, German imports are re-estimated on the basis of information given about payment flows because the official German import data are highly distorted, suggesting that German net imports during the war were almost insignificant. Instead, this re-estimation shows that Germany imported a huge amount of goods from occupied countries, especially intermediate inputs for the armament production. Consequently, Germany"s industrial labour productivity grew much less than assumed by the study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
Reconstructing the complex supplier network of the famous JU 88 air armament programme, this article shows that outsourcing activities increased considerably in wartime Germany. The resulting inter-firm division of labour did not lead only to a quite effective protection of the German aircraft production against Allied air raids but also contributed to enormous labour productivity growth in most stages of the production process. Even though aircraft production was prohibited in post-war Germany, this supplier network survived and became the backbone of the most spectacular symbol of West Germany's economic rebirth: the automobile industry.
In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm-level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning-by-doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.
E-Mail: j-streb@uni-hohenheim.de 103 Dieses Forschungsdesideratum wurde in der Literatur insbesondere hervorgehoben durch Gregor: Stern und Hakenkreuz (wie Anm. 100), S. 12; Bernhard Lorentz: Industrieelite und Wirtschaftspolitik 1928-1950: Heinrich Dr?ger und das Dr?gerwerk
- Dr. Jochen Streb
Dr. Jochen Streb, Universit?t Hohenheim, Institut Kulturwissenschaften, Speisenmeisterei, 70593 Stuttgart,
E-Mail: j-streb@uni-hohenheim.de
103 Dieses Forschungsdesideratum wurde in der Literatur insbesondere hervorgehoben durch Gregor:
Stern und Hakenkreuz (wie Anm. 100), S. 12; Bernhard Lorentz: Industrieelite und Wirtschaftspolitik
1928-1950: Heinrich Dr?ger und das Dr?gerwerk. Paderborn 2001, S. 238; Overy: War and Economy
(wie Anm. 10), S. 367-369.
War and Economy (wie Anm. 10), S. 362. 12.6.1937, Bl. 31. F?r Beispiele derartiger Festpreisvertr?ge vgl Jahresab schlusspr?fung 1938 bei der ?Weser
- Vgl
- Overy
Vgl. Overy: War and Economy (wie Anm. 10), S. 362.
12.6.1937, Bl. 31. F?r Beispiele derartiger Festpreisvertr?ge vgl. z. B. BArch R 8135/5271, Jahresab
schlusspr?fung 1938 bei der ?Weser" Flugzeugbau GmbH, S. 17.
Demystifying (wie Anm. 3), S. 20. This content downloaded from 134 07:49:20 UTC All use subject to http
- Vgl
- Budra
99 Vgl. Budra?/Scherner/Streb: Demystifying (wie Anm. 3), S. 20.
This content downloaded from 134.155.201.171 on Tue, 31 May 2016 07:49:20 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Das Ende eines Mythos? 195
Ausfertigung; f?r den Luftfahrtindex (ab Januar 1940) vgl. Universit?t Hohenheim, Nachlass Wagenf?hr, Ordner 1, HA Planstatistik Index der deutschen R?stungsendfertigung Gruppen index Flugzeuge, Geheime Reichssache, 6 Ausfertigungen; f?r den Waffenindex (ab Januar 1941) vgl 44; f?r den Panzerindex
- Ausfertigungen
Ausfertigungen, 3. Ausfertigung; f?r den Luftfahrtindex (ab Januar 1940) vgl. Universit?t Hohenheim,
Nachlass Wagenf?hr, Ordner 1, HA Planstatistik Index der deutschen R?stungsendfertigung Gruppen
index Flugzeuge, Geheime Reichssache, 6 Ausfertigungen; f?r den Waffenindex (ab Januar 1941) vgl.
BArch R 3/3005, Bl. 44; f?r den Panzerindex (ab September 1939) vgl. BArch R 3/3005, Bl. 57.
Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Maschi nenfabrik Donauw?rth GmbH
- Z B Vgl
- R Barch
Vgl. z. B. BArch R 2301/5551, Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Maschi
nenfabrik Donauw?rth GmbH 1939/40, Bl. 207; Bericht Zeidelhack ?ber das Gesch?ftsjahr 1939/40,
Bl. 326.
Jonas Scherner: Industrial Investment in Nazi Germany: The Forgotten Wartime Boom
- Quelle
Quelle: Jonas Scherner: Industrial Investment in Nazi Germany: The Forgotten Wartime Boom. Un
ver?ffentlichtes Manuskript.
Der Manager der Kriegswirtschaft: Hans Kehrl: Ein Unternehmer in der Po litik des ?Dritten Reiches" (Schriften der Bibliothek f?r Zeitgeschichte, N.F. 9) Essen 1999, S. 134. Ludwig weist darauf hin, dass die Angaben im R?stungsindex generell f?r das Jahr 1944 ?berh?ht waren
- Vgl
- M Rolf-Dieter
- Ller
Vgl. Rolf-Dieter M?ller: Der Manager der Kriegswirtschaft: Hans Kehrl: Ein Unternehmer in der Po
litik des ?Dritten Reiches" (Schriften der Bibliothek f?r Zeitgeschichte, N.F. 9). Essen 1999, S. 134.
Ludwig weist darauf hin, dass die Angaben im R?stungsindex generell f?r das Jahr 1944 ?berh?ht
waren; Ludwig: Technik und Ingenieure (wie Anm. 31), S. 422.
Bei der Sprengchemie GmbH handelte es sich keineswegs um einen unbedeutenden R?stungsproduzenten -das in das Unternehmen investierte Kapital betrug bereits am 31
- Vgl
- R Barch
Vgl. BArch R 2301/5533, S. 16. Bei der Sprengchemie GmbH handelte es sich keineswegs um einen
unbedeutenden R?stungsproduzenten -das in das Unternehmen investierte Kapital betrug bereits am
31.3.1939 78,3 Mill. RM; vgl. BArch R 2301/5533, Bl. 1.
Kriegswirtschaft (wie Anm. 9), S. 564. 5.1939-1
- Vgl
- Eichholtz
Vgl. Eichholtz: Kriegswirtschaft (wie Anm. 9), S. 564.
5.1939-1.1940
30
31.140
2.1940-5.1940
50
29.200
Das Deutsche Preisrecht (wie Anm. 73), S. 181; Streb/Streb: Optimale Beschaffungs vertr?ge (wie Anm
- Vgl
- Flottmann
Vgl. Flottmann: Das Deutsche Preisrecht (wie Anm. 73), S. 181; Streb/Streb: Optimale Beschaffungs
vertr?ge (wie Anm. 17), S. 282 ff.
Ministry of Arms: Economic Institutions and Industrial Production in the German War Economy
- Albert Speer
- The Nazi
Albert Speer and the Nazi Ministry of Arms: Economic Institutions and Industrial Production in the
German War Economy. East Brunswick 1981, Tab 6.12, S. 195; Tab. 6.13, S. 206 f.
Aktenvermerk ?ber eine Besprechung vom 17
- R Barch
BArch R 2301/5499, Aktenvermerk ?ber eine Besprechung vom 17.12.1940, Bl. 46 f.
Gesch?ftsbericht der Brandenburger Eisenwerke GmbH f?r das Gesch?ftsjahr
- R Barch
BArch R 2301/5568, Gesch?ftsbericht der Brandenburger Eisenwerke GmbH f?r das Gesch?ftsjahr
1941/42, Bl. 120.
) vgl. Universit?t Hohenheim, Nachlass Wagenf?hr, Ordner 1, HA Planstatistik Index der deutschen R?stungsendfertigung Gruppenindex Marine
- Marineindex
Marineindex (ab September 1939) vgl. Universit?t Hohenheim, Nachlass Wagenf?hr, Ordner 1, HA
Planstatistik Index der deutschen R?stungsendfertigung Gruppenindex Marine, Geheime Reichssache, 6
Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Verwertchemie 513; Aufsichtsratsprotokoll der Verwertchemie, 16.5.1942, Bl. 398; f?r die Brandenburger Eisenwerke GmbH vgl. BArch R 2301
?r die Verwertchemie vgl. BArch R 2301/5561, Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG
?ber die Verwertchemie 1940/41, Bl. 513; Aufsichtsratsprotokoll der Verwertchemie, 16.5.1942, Bl.
398; f?r die Brandenburger Eisenwerke GmbH vgl. BArch R 2301/5561, Bericht der Deutschen Revi
sions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Brandenburger Eisenwerke GmbH 1940/41, Bl. 184.
Stichprobe f?r eine ganze Reihe weiterer Beispiele best?tigt eindeutig diesen Befund. Vgl Jonas Scherner: Die Logik der Industriepolitik im Dritten Reich. Die Investitionen in die Autarkie-und R?stungsindustrie und ihre staatliche F?rderung. Habilitationsschrift, Universit?t Mannheim
Eine gro?e Stichprobe f?r eine ganze Reihe weiterer Beispiele best?tigt eindeutig diesen Befund. Vgl.
Jonas Scherner: Die Logik der Industriepolitik im Dritten Reich. Die Investitionen in die Autarkie-und
R?stungsindustrie und ihre staatliche F?rderung. Habilitationsschrift, Universit?t Mannheim 2006,
S. 41-45, 358-361.
Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Havelwerke GmbH
- Z B Vgl
- R Barch
Vgl. z. B. BArch R 2301/5556, Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Havelwerke
GmbH 1938/39, Bl. 130.
Erich Flottmann: Das Deutsche Preisrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung der Grunds?tze der Preispolitik und des Preisrechts
Nur f?r die Anlaufzeit eines neuen R?stungsguts seien Selbstkostenvertr?ge abgeschlossen worden.
Vgl. Guido Fischer: Einheits-und Gruppenpreise. Leipzig 1943, S. 20; Erich Flottmann: Das Deutsche
Preisrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung der Grunds?tze der Preispolitik und des Preisrechts. Stuttgart
1943, S. 172.
BArch R 2301/5570, Bericht des OKH vom 26.7.1943 f?r das Gesch?ftsjahr 1941/42 bei der Eibia GmbH f?r chemische Produkte
- Z B Vgl
Vgl. z. B. BArch R 2301/5570, Bericht des OKH vom 26.7.1943 f?r das Gesch?ftsjahr 1941/42 bei der
Eibia GmbH f?r chemische Produkte, Bl. 50.
BArch R 2301/5557, Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Havelwerk GmbH 1940/41, Bl. 32
- Z B Vgl
Vgl. z. B. BArch R 2301/5557, Bericht der Deutschen Revisions-und Treuhand AG ?ber die Havelwerk
GmbH 1940/41, Bl. 32; Bericht des OKH vom 27.2.1942, Bl. 29.
The Evolution of the Pricing Policy for Public Orders during the Third Reich
- Wolfgang Vgl
- Bopp
Vgl. Wolfgang Bopp: The Evolution of the Pricing Policy for Public Orders during the Third Reich, in:
Christoph Buchheim/Redvers Garside (Hg.): After the Slump. Industry and Politics in 1930's Britain
and Germany. Frankfurt a. M. 2000, S. 159 f.
United States Strategie Bombing Survey (Hg
- Vgl
Vgl. United States Strategie Bombing Survey (Hg.): The Effects of Strategie Bombing (wie Anm. 36),
S. 213, Appendix Tab. 11 (Zahlen jeweils f?r den 31. Mai des betreffenden Jahres).
Armen Alchian: Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production
- Vgl
Vgl. Armen Alchian: Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production, in: Econometrica 31(1963),
S. 679-693;
S. 23, 178; f?r die Besch?ftigten in der R?stungsindustrie vgl. United States Strategie Bombing Survey (Hg.): The Effects of Strategie Bombing (wie Anm. 36), S. 213 f., Appendix Tab. 11 (Zahlen jeweils f?r den 30
- Eigene Berechnungen
Eigene Berechnungen. Quellen: F?r den R?stungsindex (Basis 1943=100) vgl. Wagenf?hr: Die deutsche
Industrie (wie Anm. 9), S. 23, 178; f?r die Besch?ftigten in der R?stungsindustrie vgl. United States
Strategie Bombing Survey (Hg.): The Effects of Strategie Bombing (wie Anm. 36), S. 213 f., Appendix
Tab. 11 (Zahlen jeweils f?r den 30. Juni des betreffenden Jahres; 1944 zuz?glich der Angabe f?r den
31. Dezember).
Einflu? des Ausfalls der besetzten Gebiete auf den Verlauf der R?stungsfertigung; f?r den Wert der R?stungsproduktion vgl
- Betr
Betr. Einflu? des Ausfalls der besetzten Gebiete auf den Verlauf der R?stungsfertigung; f?r den Wert
der R?stungsproduktion vgl. Wagenf?hr: Die deutsche Industrie (wie Anm. 9), S. 114. Nach diesen
Daten ergibt sich ein Anteil von 7 %.
S. 12; Bernhard Lorentz: Industrieelite und Wirtschaftspolitik 1928-1950: Heinrich Dr?ger und das Dr?gerwerk
Dieses Forschungsdesideratum wurde in der Literatur insbesondere hervorgehoben durch Gregor:
Stern und Hakenkreuz (wie Anm. 100), S. 12; Bernhard Lorentz: Industrieelite und Wirtschaftspolitik
1928-1950: Heinrich Dr?ger und das Dr?gerwerk. Paderborn 2001, S. 238; Overy: War and Economy
(wie Anm. 10), S. 367-369.