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Equity in a twenty-first century learning
intensive society: is schooling part of the
solution?
Riel Miller
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between equity and schooling in a
post-industrial society using a scenario of the learning intensive society.
Design/methodology/approach – The method used here, but not elaborated as such, is based on a
‘‘hybrid strategic scenario method’’ that is a technique for building ‘‘futures literacy’’.
Findings – Industrial era schooling may be incompatible with post-industrial heterarchical equity.
Practical implications – By questioning the role of schools in developing the capacities necessary for
post-industrial society this article calls for an examination of emergent alternatives.
Originality/value – Both the method and conclusions are distinctive and may be valuable for strategic
conversations aimed at questioning the assumptions that shape the decisions made today.
Keywords Schools, Post-industrial societies, Learning
Paper type Conceptual paper
This article sketches a scenario of post-industrial society and then poses some
questions about equity and the role of schooling. The story of post-industrial society
presented here is not the only one imaginable nor should it be. But it is one starting
point for reconsidering the potential of the present. The aim of this brief, speculative article is
to question the assumptions that shape current choices and in particular those that underpin
today’s views of equity and schooling.
The article is organized in three parts. The first part offers a brief definition of post-industrial
social equity. The second section presents an overview of one story of a future learning
intensive society (LIS). The third section offers a few concluding observations that link the
idea of post-industrial social equity to schooling.
Post-industrial social equity
There are many potential definitions of social equity in a post-industrial context. The one
adopted here is as follows: post-industrial social equity is when everyone is equally free.
Where freedom is understood in a Senian sense to mean more than just liberty, but the
capacity to use one’s freedom (Sen, 1999). The conditions for the achievement of equity in
the capacity to be free are probably unimaginable on the basis of today’s limited
vocabularies and practices. But for now, as part of a ‘‘rigorous imagining’’ exercise meant to
explore the potential of the present, this article focuses on a non-hierarchical or
‘‘heterarchical’’ definition of equity of freedom.
Conventional, hierarchically defined, equity makes use of external metrics such as level of
income or status of a profession or access to education, etc. This allows for a definition of an
inequitable distribution of incomes or professional status or opportunity, when one person
has a higher or lower income or professional standing or access to education than another.
From a hierarchical perspective there is an almost infinite range of definitions of equity of the
DOI 10.1108/14636680610682003 VOL. 8 NO. 4 2006, pp. 13-22, QEmerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 1463-6689
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Riel Miller is a member of
foresight’s editorial board,
based at XperidoX, Paris,
France.
An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the
International Coloquium
Educacio
´n y Desigualdad
sponsored by El Fondo
Mexicano para la Educacio
´ny
el Desarrollo and published as
a conference collection, in
Spanish, by Siglo XXI, in 2005.
capacity to be free. Different value systems and different metrics will provide different
definitions. For instance some might want to define equity of the capacity to be free in terms
of an equal opportunity to acquire knowledge. Others might want to use outcomes to define
a common denominator of ‘‘liberty’’ from hunger or mortal danger. Regardless, internal or
external, the hierarchical approach selects a particular ‘‘objective’’ standard against which
the degree of equity of a particular case is assessed.
By way of contrast a heterarchical definition of equity is purely self-referential and does not
use a common standard of measurement. There is no inter-subjective judgment or external
point of reference at all. When it comes to social equity there is no ‘‘successful’’ social group
or individual nor any ‘‘failed’’ ones. There are simply different expressions of who you are that
may or may not be similar to others self-expression. In a sense, the idea of equity, in terms of
the position of an individual or group in a specific distribution or set of conditions, does not
even exist. What then does a heterarchical definition of equity of the capacity to be free
mean?
One way of making sense of this conceptualization of equity is to imagine a situation where
people not only have the capacity be free, as an internal subjective point-of-view, but also
that their expression of this freedom externally, in society, is treated as legitimate (as valued)
as anyone else’s. Such a degree of non-judgmental openness, where the social standing
(status) of a handicapped person, a homeless person, a millionaire, a professional designer,
a banker, a professor and a farmer are all equally ‘‘good’’, may seem difficult to imagine.
Particularly since there are many aspects of such ‘‘equality of freedom’’ that from today’s
vantage point seem difficult to achieve – not least assuring that everyone actually has the
requisite (objective and subjective) physical, psychological and cultural capacities. But this
is the point.
Defining social equity in this way is an attempt at ‘‘cognitive estrangement’’ – or breaking
from current assumptions. A heterarchical definition of post-industrial social equity does not
correspond to either the practices or lived constraints of today’s society. One might even
argue that it does not even relate to what people expect or desire. Again, that is the point.
This definition simply poses the question, is it possible to imagine a society where such a
definition might be functional? Which leads to the next section’s overview of what a
post-industrial learning intensive society might be like and then, in the concluding section,
consideration of what relationship schooling might have to a society that operates on the
basis of heterarchical equity of freedom.
Imagining a post-industrial learning intensive society
The scenario of the learning intensive society presented here summarizes a number of
different and ongoing projects (Miller, 2001, 2003a, b, 2006; Miller and Bentley, 2003). It is
not a predictive scenario, nor even one that may be considered desirable. Rather it is a
snapshot of a possible future aimed at helping reassess the assumptions made about the
present. It is not about setting goals for train tracks it is about making new destinations
thinkable. And thereby, potentially altering the decisions people make today.
A ‘‘possibility space’ ’ depiction of the learning intensive society
Figure 1 presents, in highly reduced form, some of the key dimensions of a learning intensive
society. Each of the possibility spaces focuses on a key variable (T) – respectively in the
technological (Tt), economic (Te ), social (Ts ) and governance (Tg) domains. Tt,
‘‘technological dynamism,’’ tracks the extent to which a new technology (or set of
technologies) might become pervasive. Te, ‘‘economic dynamism,’ ’ tracks potential
changes in the basic conditions of production and consumption. Ts, ‘‘social dynamism,’’
picks up possible developments in the nature of social identity – the ‘‘who am I?’’ question.
And Tg, ‘‘governance dynamism,’’ attempts to capture ways in which decision-making
capacity might plausibly shift over time.
In all of these possibility spaces the arrow of change goes from the lower-right (mass-era) to
upper-left (learning society). Such movement corresponds to a transition scale
transformation, where transition scale is equivalent to the kinds of changes in the conduct
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of daily life that characterized the shift from agricultural to industrial society. Once again, this
is not meant to suggest that such movement, and the decisive breaks with the practices of
the industrial era that would be required, are probable. Rather, the aim is to tell a
multi-dimensional story about what the learning society might be like.
Technological dynamism (Tt) is, in part, a function of new technologies that have the capacity
to become pervasive tools. These are the tools that mark an era, that enter into a wide range of
activities and, eventually, play a part in enabling changes to what and how people live. In turn,
pervasiveness is partially a function of the ease (E) and range (R)ofusestowhicha
technology can be put. There is a difference between a widely diffused technology, like
refrigeration, and a pervasive technology, like printing, electricity. The latter is not only a
directly used output but also an input with a wide range of direct and indirect uses. However,
pervasive tools must also undergo a diffusion process and diffusion is not always rapid or
linear. Technologies that eventually become pervasive, moving from lower left to upper right in
Figure 1a, enter into everyday life and mark an era. But technology is not destiny. A technology
only becomes pervasive on the basis of widespread and usually disruptive societal change.
The potentially pervasive technologies of the learning society, like ubiquitous computing,
Figure 1 Possibility space diagrams of transition scale changes in key technological,
economic, social and governance variables
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nano- or bio-tech, will only reach that status on the basis of economic, social and governance
changes (see next three possibility spaces, Figures 1b, c, d).
Tt ¼fðE;RÞ
BE¼ease of use. This variable tries to capture one of the key hallmarks of a maturing tool.
Information technology, for instance, is still a long way from reaching the ease-of-use
standards set by such sophisticated technologies as cars and electricity. Although the
number of computers or internet connections or web pages published may be growing
rapidly and even add up to large absolute numbers, most IT remains difficult to use for the
vast majority.
BR¼range of uses. The range of uses for a technology is a key indicator of its potential to
become pervasive. IT, as one of the key enablers of twenty-first century transitions is
beginning to move down this path as semiconductors are starting to become essential for
a wide range of items and activities. However, for the most part IT is in the replacement or
extrapolation of existing activities phase and is only beginning to alter the underlying
ways of producing, consuming and conducting everyday affairs.
Economic dynamism (Te) is largely a function of changes in the way production and
consumption is organized. In turn, two of the primary attributes of the way production and
consumption are organized revolve around the extent to which these activities are
unpredictable (U) and open to free initiative (I). One way of depicting the shift from the
industrial to learning eras is to consider the extent to which production and consumption
activities are predictable and free. Figure 1b illustrates this shift as the distinction between
supply and demand collapses into the joint production/consumption of an economy where
everyday creativity is primary. But what fuels this creative urge? Potentially, the search for
identity that is central to social dynamism (see the next social possibility space depicted in
Figure 1c).
Te ¼fðU;IÞ
BU¼degree of unpredictability in consumption choices and production outputs. To a
certain extent this variable can be measured quite simply by the variety of items being
produced. As more distinctive goods and services become available predictability falls.
But the shift to a learning society implies a more radical or non-linear break, one that goes
beyond a greater heterogeneity of outputs, to a situation where demand and supply
merge into a joint activity. This would seem to pose a fundamental challenge to the
Taylorist division of conception and execution in production and to the mass-era passivity
of the consumer. Unique creation entails, by definition, direct involvement by the
consumer. Of course there is an open question as to how ‘‘unique’’ outputs might really
become. Not everyone will want or need to be a genius inventor or artist. The increase in
heterogeneity and unpredictability is linked to the extent to which people refine their own
tastes in order to personalize the objects, services and activities they ‘‘prosume’’. An
increase in the overall level of this ‘‘banal or everyday creativity’’ moves Uupwards.
BI¼freedom of initiative. Industrial era consumers were free to choose what was on the
shelf or in the catalogue while workers did what they were told or they were free to quit or
be fired. Learning era freedoms are different. Unique outputs depend on much greater
initiative and autonomy on the part of workers and consumers – even the merger of these
two categories. Everyday creativity is the predominant economic activity and this means
that the economy is dominated by efforts to refine taste and skill. This is not the same as
the technocratic challenge of the industrial era, where access to ever more exclusive, and
specific knowledge defines value and hierarchy. It is a creative task, where learning who
you are and what you want to be, becomes central throughout all the steps and stages of
the production/consumption process.
Social dynamism (Ts) is, in part, a function of the structures and processes that shape lived
identity – both the individual and collective aspects of how we think about and express who
we are. How our identity is constructed is, in turn, deeply influenced by the nature of the
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prevailing social affiliations (A) and the extent/capacity of individual/collective
decision-making (D). Previous transition scale changes certainly altered the ways in which
people looked at their social affiliations and the life-choices they faced. Figure 1c depicts a
shift from industrial era structures of affiliation and choice patterns to the more diverse and
fluid ones of a learning society. Once again, this is only meant to suggest one possible
configuration for a learning society. One where the social dynamism arising from the
perpetual construction of heterogeneous identities powers the ‘‘banal creativity’’ of unique
production. But what makes this lifelong evolution of identity doable/sustainable? Possibly a
significant increase in the underlying capacity to handle the economic and social decision
making loads implied by this kind of learning society (see the next governance possibility
space depicted in Figure 1d).
Ts ¼fðA;DÞ
BA¼diversity of social affiliation. There are many ways of defining and measuring social
affiliation. The key attribute that this variable needs to capture is the extent to which
self-identity (even if it is articulated as a common or community attribute) is connected to
distinctive institutions or communities. Scale and persistence of the institution probably
does matter, but even more important is the strength or predominance of top-down
referents like national or religious constructs. This variable captures the extent to which
identity is self-constructed and continuously evolving. One hypothesis is that, on the one
hand, identities constructed on the basis of small and heterogeneous points of reference
are more open to change, while on the other hand, identities that depend on a few
monolithic points of reference, in particular those that were dominant during the industrial
era, are less open to change. A learning society is linked to both greater heterogeneity of
the points of reference used to construct identity and the extent to which identity evolves
(scale, rate and duration) because these kinds of changes are deeply dependent on
continuous learning.
BD¼significance=intensity of decision making. This variable is perhaps easier to track,
since a few key choices like change in family status, change in profession, number of
relocations, number of bio-tech implants installed, or range of expressed identities, can
be assessed on the basis of survey data that is, for the most part, already collected. In
addition it is possible to observe changes in the range and frequency of less ‘‘life
transforming’’ but still choice intensive items such as what we eat, wear, etc. Increases in
this index signal a continuous need to make decisions, of large and small import, and
hence to learn.
Governance dynamism (Tg) is closely linked to the evolution of decision-making capacities
throughout society (from the political to individual levels). Changes in the quantity and
quality of decisions that a society is capable of taking, including the decisions made in
implementation, are characteristic of periods of societal transition. Although it is difficult to
assess this type of trend, particularly since the arrow of time makes it almost impossible to
experiment with alternative choices, it seems reasonable to assume (all other things being
equal) that better decisions result when there is better information (Y) and greater
accumulation of pertinent experience (L). Governance dynamism, or the evolution of
decision-making capacities, is central to developing and sustaining the kind of
multi-dimensional and interdependent changes that characterize transition scale
transformation. In the case of the transition to a learning society, improvements in
governance capacities both inspire and depend, on technological, economic and social
dynamism. Indeed, moving individual and collective decision making capacities towards the
upper right of Figure 1d could be the determining factor in the shift from an industrial to a
learning society. It is the link between possible and probable.
Tg ¼fðY;LÞ
BY¼extent of transparency and access. Quality and accessibility are crucial attributes of
information. Quality has a wide range of dimensions that are meant to be summarized
here by the term transparency. Information is transparent when its meaning is clear and
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the content trustworthy. Clarity and trust depend fundamentally on standards or norms,
whether explicit or implicit. Language is perhaps the most obvious example, since a
common language works because there is a clear shared meaning that people trust.
Common rules or standards, the conventions that are law or just everyday practice, make
comprehension and sharing possible. The shift that needs to be tracked for the transition
to the learning society has to do with the development of standards across a much
greater and more heterogeneous range of activities. This is the opposite of
standardization that aims to reduce complexity. An example of a complexity enabling
standard, one that is minimal and strict but allows for tremendous diversity, is the
internet’s basic communication standard TCP/IP. Another example is shared values like
tolerance or the ideals enshrined in the ‘‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’’. These
standards are similarly effective mechanisms for creating viable communities where a
common convention fosters immense diversity. Transparency is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for access since there are attributes of information acquisition that can
be very costly and inhibiting. Technology, like the net, plays an important role and still has
a very long way to go before becoming genuinely user-friendly and comprehensive.
Central to access are developments in the fields of intellectual property rights, payment
systems, privacy and searching. Here again, like with transparency there is an absolutely
key role for standards.
BL¼degree of experimentation and learning. This variable, which is close to the notion of
‘‘human capital’’, is notoriously difficult to assess. Particularly since there is such a strong
temptation to use industrial-era proxies like years of schooling or literacy tests scores. In
part shifts in this field can be tracked by using the same approach as variable Dthat tries
to capture the range, duration and rate of decisions taken. However, in the same way that
the development of many industrial-era variables had to await the widespread recognition
of key economic and social phenomena, this variable is the one most contingent on
actually moving into a learning society. In practice, initiatives from across a wide range of
fields are making progress towards more transparency for ‘‘what people know how to do’ ’
(Miller, 1996).
Taking all four transformative variables together produces the eight dimensional space
depicted in Figure 2. This radar chart shows that the movement from industrial to learning
societies entails a shift from the inner to the outer circle. Figure 2 also points to the
inter-dependency of these different variables. This, in turn, helps to identify the leverage
points for making strategic changes – the cross-roads of choice and potential.
Overview of ‘‘before and after’ ’ of transition to a learning intensive society
Table I summarizes the contrast, or the transition scale, of the changes between the
industrial and learning societies. Table I helps to pose the question: is the current period one
of transition or consolidation? Certainly there are a range of negative indicators that suggest
the current period is one of transition, such as growing polarization (as lagging and leading
edges get farther apart), decay of ruling conventions (as institutional authority and
boundaries weaken), crises of identity (as old faiths mount last-ditch resistance), etc. There
are also a number of positive indicators that many parts of the world are entering periods
when transition scale change might be possible, such as the recognition in a wide range of
fields that the potential for radical innovation is significant and that old, new, denser and
more spontaneous networks are all becoming more sustainable.
Of course this does not imply that defensive innovations or simply victory by entrenched
interests will not prevail. Nor do initial signs that transition scale change may be possible
imply that it, or any specific scenario like the twenty-first century transition to a learning
intensive society sketched above, is desirable. Furthermore, there would seem to be strong
grounds for arguing that even if this particular scenario of a learning intensive society is
possible the synergy conditions for transition scale change are too severe. The learning
intensive society may be possible but improbable.
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Concluding observations: schools, equity and the learning intensive society
Is a learning intensive society more compatible with the post-industrial, non-hierarchical idea
of equity? Are schools, understood as the classroom model of compulsory schooling,
compatible with the learning intensive society? What kind of learning system might be
effective at enabling a learning intensive society and the equity of freedom that might be one
Figure 2 Synergy conditions for transition scale change: technological, economic, social
and governance dynamism
Table I Before and after twenty-first century transition
Industrial era Learning intensive society
Wealth Physical/financial Human capital
Rules Simple property rights Complex property rights
Governance Ex-ante allocation of power Real-time allocation of power
Values Adoption of the universal declaration
of human rights
Implementation of the universal declaration
of human rights
Economy Mass production Production for self/community
Home Life organized for work Work organized for life
Authority Hierarchy Networked autonomy
Identity Imposed identity Self-generated identity
Freedom Liberation from constraints As a capacity to do
things
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of the attributes of such a society? These are speculative questions built upon an already
speculative edifice. Only tentative, partial and inherently speculative answers are possible.
For a variety of reasons I would argue that the learning intensive society is more compatible
with the attainment or functioning of systems of social equity based on equal freedom. In part
this is for purely definitional reasons since the specification of the LIS scenario is largely
constructed around the freedom to choose and the capacity to do so in terms of networking,
production/consumption, identity and decision making. Another line of argument that favors
the notion that the learning intensive society would both encourage and function more
effectively with equality of freedom rests on our current understanding of network dynamics.
Equality of freedom is an attribute of certain networks, like the network enabled by language.
From today’s perspective it is difficult to untangle the extent to which social inequality hinders
the equality of freedom which a language that is open to everyone might provide. Similarly,
the internet, with its principle of ‘‘end-to-end’’ such that the network is just a neutral carrier of
digital code, offers a common foundation for diversity. Not that everyone has the same
access to or command of the tools at their end of the network. Just as not everyone has the
same command of a language. Still, for a learning intensive society to function economically,
socially and in terms of governance, it seems likely that there will need to be a greater
preponderance of highly dynamic neutral carrier networks.
This is a stringent, highly social requirement and it runs counter to the perception, rooted in
one of the central dualisms of industrial society (individual versus collective), that the
learning intensive society is ‘‘individualist’ ’. In the LIS, at least according to this scenario, the
individual is not free of social obligations and constraints. On the contrary the importance of
spontaneity, interdependence, and diversity for the functioning of the economic and social
systems puts an immense priority on adherence to certain basic standards – the languages
that make it easy to join, use, invent, and leave networks continuously. This follows from the
rule that as the networks we use and create become more dense they must also become
easier to enter, exit, create and abandon. Otherwise we would quickly reach the limits of our
ability to network effectively[1].
The combination of network density and spontaneity puts a high premium on transparency –
accurate, timely, accessible, intelligible, trustworthy information. In the past not only were
there fewer, less fluid networks, but the methods for ensuring transparency depended on
simplification and top-down authority. The LIS will need to generate transparency on the fly,
covering a much broader and deeper realm of information. One of the factors that could
make this more practical is heterarchical social relations – meaning everyone’s subjective
position is of equal worth, equal value. This cuts the transaction cost of trying to determine, in
a highly heterogeneous context, who’s who in terms of a social pecking order. What it does
not solve is the way in which transparency will be established – which is one of the crucial
‘‘vouch for’’ roles played by signals associated with social status in hierarchical industrial
society.
Another mechanism for establishing the transparency required by industrial society is the
school. After all, the pre-industrial systems of identification that could answer the questions:
who are you and can you be trusted, no longer worked in the anonymous factory and city.
How can an employer or a neighbor be sure that a stranger (an unknown ‘‘outside the
family’’) understands the codes of conduct and communication needed to function in
industrial society? Mass compulsory schooling is one effective way to inculcate the common
codes of behavior such as punctuality, obedience to authority that is neither paternal nor
noble, and coexistence amongst strangers. Schooling also turns out to be fairly good way to
signal social status since it does little to alter the capacity of parents to pass their social
privileges on to their children. ‘‘Vouch for’’ information is mostly preserved and perpetuated.
Schools, as it turns out, are poor vehicles for redressing hierarchical inequity (one of the
reasons for the success of schools in hierarchical society).
Schooling also perpetuates another pre-existing hierarchical system that is arguably even
more deeply opposed to the logic of heterarchical equity of freedom in a LIS: the denigration
of self-generated knowledge. In this regard schools are largely in a dependent or
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subservient position, receiving its hierarchy of knowledge from the ‘‘senior’’ university
‘‘citadel’’ or peak of knowledge. Regardless of where the pinnacle of authority is located, the
exigencies of imposing and reproducing this hierarchy through schooling plays a key role in
severing a young person’s connection to their own knowledge. Typically these early
encounters with the superiority of external knowledge establishes a clear power relationship
where the child’s own knowledge is not adequate for success at school. This reward system,
layered on the imperatives of punctuality and mass obedience, necessary organizational
requirements if one teacher is to ‘‘manage’’ many students, is an effective way to reproduce
the highly differentiated hierarchies of industrial society.
But is not such ranking, be it of students or information, highly useful – even essential – for
making judgments? For instance the fact that student performance has been ranked helps to
conduct effective screening of say doctors so as to be more certain they possess key
‘‘desirable’’ attributes. Similarly a hierarchical distinguishing of knowledge as scientific or
non-scientific can make the difference between life and death, blind superstition and
informed judgments. Hierarchy as a way of ranking information is essential. It is information
about information – a key component of transparency. The difficulty is that in a LIS much of
this transparency must rest on more neutral sources, ones that respect and empower a
greater diversity of ‘‘truths’’. Establishing and discovering the governance principles of the
facilitators of transparency (institutions, rules, culture) appropriate to a LIS is probably the
biggest unanswered challenge to understanding the functioning of such a society.
However, the question in this short, speculative article is slightly narrower: is universal
compulsory classroom schooling part of the problem or solution when it comes to both the
general functioning of a LIS and more specifically heterarchical equity of freedom? I think
that the answer to the comparative static version of this question is clear. That is, if we take
today’s school and drop it more or less intact into a future LIS it is incompatible. The industrial
era school resolutely preserves a system for signaling both what is legitimate information
and ‘‘what people know’ ’ that excludes in order to sustain a hierarchy of unequal power and
status. This is incompatible with heterarchical equity of freedom.
However, the comparative statics view that simply contrasts an institution as it functions
today with how it might function, unchanged in its own organization and logic, in some
imaginary scenario, is too limited. Such an analysis is helpful for understanding the current
relationship of that institution or power group to the changes entailed for the functioning of a
possible LIS. But institutions and communities change. And, as they change they play a role,
sometimes as positive catalyst, sometimes as a negative one, in the evolutionary processes
of transformation. Could the industrial school, by its very incompatibility and rearguard
efforts to preserve its former centrality, spur the changes involved in creating a LIS? Does the
school have the potential to evolve into one of the key institutions of the LIS, like it was for
industrial society, or will it gradually fade to the margins? Could a transformative path see the
school abandon its cognitive role, inefficient in the coercive circumstances of the classroom,
to address the challenge of overcoming network aggregation effects (‘‘the power law’’) when
it comes to creating the transparency (validation of what people know) necessary for much
greater dynamism of birth, death, entry and exit of knowledge/learning networks?
These remain open questions. Ones that merit being posed if we want the decisions we take
today to create a different future.
Note
1. The term network density as used here combines in one variable both the number of networks that
people are connected to and the number of connections within each particular network. In practice
there are clearly trade-offs – as people join or create more networks the density of existing networks
may fall. However in highly diversified and inter-dependent social systems there are many different
types of networks. In many cases people are able to maintain their affiliation to one network, like the
nation or profession, while setting up other, new and less dense networks. However, the hypothesis
discussed here is that even these new, less dense networks may be both more numerous and more
dense than before.
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References
Miller, R. (1996), Measuring What People Know: Human Capital Accounting for the Knowledge
Economy, OECD, Paris, available at: www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/9196031E.PDF
Miller, R. (2001), Long-run Prospects: Policy Challenges for a World in Transition, OECD, Paris, available
at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/42/1903212.pdf
Miller, R. (2003a), ‘‘Getting the questions right: challenges for twenty-first century policy makers’’,
Optimum Online: The Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 33 No. 3, available at:
www.optimumonline.ca/article.phtml?id=183
Miller, R. (2003b), Where Schools Might Fit in a Future Learning Society, IARTV, Victoria.
Miller, R. (2006), ‘‘Futures literacy: a hybrid strategic scenario method’’, Futures: A Journal of Policy,
Planning and Futures Studies, in press.
Miller, R. and Bentley, T. (2003), Unique Creation, National College for School Leadership, Nottingham.
Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom, Routledge, London.
Further reading
Arrow, K., Bowles, S. and Durlauf, S. (Eds) (2000), Meritocracy and Economic Inequality, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Corresponding author
Riel Miller can be contacted at: rielm@yahoo.com
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