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How the LPF Fuelled Discontent: Empirical Tests of Explanations of LPF Support
Abstract
In this article, three models to explain the LPF vote are tested; the socio-structural model, the protest vote model, and the policy voting model. Popular explanations of the success of the LPF in 2002 consist of mixtures of the socio-structural and the protest vote model. Votes for the LPF are described as protest votes, mainly from low-educated angry white men, who are sociologically expected to feel mostly attracted to the simple populist message of a charismatic politician. The results from this study show, however, that these explanations are not valid. LPF voters hardly fit the sociological profile proposed in this literature. Moreover, general feelings of discontent towards parties and politicians (political cynicism and lack of political efficacy) did not affect the LPF vote. Instead, the effect was the other way around: preferences for the LPF fuelled political cynicism, and reduced political efficacy. This study provides firm support for the policy voting model. In 2002, LPF voters evaluated the LPF on the basis of its policies, mainly its fierce position on refugees. So, votes for the LPF were based on the same kind of reasoning that voters for other parties make: voters vote for the party they agree with the most on those issues they consider important. In conclusion, implications of these findings are discussed for (1) theories of voters for right-wing populist parties in general, (2) explanations of LPF support in particular, and (3) the strategies employed to treat such parties (accommodation versus the cordon sanitair).Acta Politica (2003) 38, 89106. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500005
... On the basis of cross-sectional data, Van der Brug (2003) provides evidence for his claim that the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn fuelled political discontent by his anti-elite rhetoric. In a more recent study Rooduijn, Van der Brug and De Lange (2016) show that citizens who switch their support to populist parties become more discontented with politics. ...
... The interpretation of this correlation as a causal effect has been criticized. In particular Van der Brug (2003) and Rooduijn et al. (2016) have argued that the effect also runs the other way: the populist message fuels discontent. Rooduijn et al. (2016) refer to this as the 'fuelling discontent logic'. ...
... In this study we investigate whether the pervasiveness of populism threatens liberal democracy by affecting citizens' attitudes in a negative way. To this end we examine the 'fuelling discontent logic', which argues that exposure to populist messages fuels cynicism about politics (Rooduijn et al., 2016;Van der Brug, 2003). After all, according to populist actors-such as populist politicians, parties, and mediaestablished politicians have no idea what ordinary people find important and only focus on their own interests. ...
Many European countries have seen a growth of populism in recent years. Extant research shows that populist parties are increasingly successful, and that populist messages appear more frequently in the media. This raises the question to what extent populist messages affect public opinion. The aim of this study is to assess whether populist messages fuel political cynicism by arguing that an arrogant, selfish and complacent political elite does not listen to what ordinary people find important. Moreover, it assesses whether populist messages affect only those already favourably predisposed towards populist parties, or whether it affects citizens across the board. The results of a survey experiment, conducted in the Netherlands, suggests that individuals who are exposed to populist messages are indeed more cynical afterwards than individuals who are exposed to a very similar, but more ‘neutrally formulated’ message. However, the effects seem to be restricted to supporters of populist parties.
... One explanation is that populism is always only part of the picture next to more ideological reasons for voting for populist parties on the left or the right (e.g. Van der Brug, 2003). Another element is that the people-elite opposition central to the populist logic, when turned against a small elite, allows comparatively well-off groups to consider themselves part of 'the ordinary people' (see part 3). ...
... Moreover, groups identifying as underdogs are not necessarily at the receiving end of societal inequality to start with either. In an article on the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, Van der Brug (2003) calls attention to how this populist radical right party 'fuelled discontent' among voters that did not fit the sociological profile of an objectively subordinate or underprivileged group. Mols and Jetten (2016: 275) even write that populist radical right parties should be seen as 'crafty identity entrepreneurs who are able to turn objective relative gratification into perceived relative deprivation'. ...
This article explores the use of populism by comparatively privileged groups, a specific type of populism we call the ‘populism of the privileged’. Our argument is not merely that ‘populisms of the privileged’ are also forms of populism, but that they warrant a specific label. We first identify intersections between populism and privilege on the levels of populist actors, support for populism and beneficiaries of populism, which we call populism by, with and for the privileged. We then present a discursive conceptualization of ‘populism of the privileged’. Building on this we develop analytical strategies for the study the ‘populism of the privileged’, zooming in on how ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are constructed in such populisms, their sociological directionality, the layeredness of privilege and un(der)privilege, the discursive construction of ‘crisis’ and ‘unmet demands’ and the role of discourses about populism in reproducing the claims of populisms of the privileged.
... Op het individuele niveau suggereert bewijs op basis van recente verkiezingen dat een substantieel deel van het electoraal van partijvoorkeur wisselt tussen verkiezingen. Op basis van gerapporteerd kiesgedrag in de huidige en de vorige verkiezingen schat Swyngedouw (2008) dat 28,5% van de Vlaamse kiezers van partij gewisseld is tussen de federale verkiezingen van 2003van en 2007van . Tussen 2007van -2009van en 2010 wisselde ongeveer vier op de tien Belgische kiezers van partijvoorkeur (Dassonneville en Baudewyns, 2014; Walgrave, Lefevere en Hooghe, 2010). ...
... Schumacher en Rooduijn (2013) vinden bijvoorbeeld dat, naast protestattitudes en evaluaties van partijleiders, beleidsposities, met name de nabijheid van de eigen beleidspositie tot de beleidspositie van een populistische partij, een van de belangrijkste redenen was om te stemmen voor zowel linkse als rechtse populistische partijen bij de verkiezingen van 2006 en 2010 in Nederland. Ook Ivarsflaten (2008) vindt dit voor beleidsposities met betrekking tot immigratie en toont aan dat grieven over immigratie de belangrijkste voorspeller waren voor het succes van zeven rechts-populistische partijen in West-Europa (2002 (zie ook van der Brug 2003;van der Brug en al. 2000van der Brug en al. , 2005. Op basis van deze bevindingen verwachten we dat ideologische overwegingen ook een rol zullen spelen in het stemgedrag bij de verkiezingen van 2019 in België. ...
... Op het individuele niveau suggereert bewijs op basis van recente verkiezingen dat een substantieel deel van het electoraal van partijvoorkeur wisselt tussen verkiezingen. Op basis van gerapporteerd kiesgedrag in de huidige en de vorige verkiezingen schat Swyngedouw (2008) dat 28,5% van de Vlaamse kiezers van partij gewisseld is tussen de federale verkiezingen van 2003van en 2007van . Tussen 2007van -2009van en 2010 wisselde ongeveer vier op de tien Belgische kiezers van partijvoorkeur (Dassonneville en Baudewyns, 2014; Walgrave, Lefevere en Hooghe, 2010). ...
... Schumacher en Rooduijn (2013) vinden bijvoorbeeld dat, naast protestattitudes en evaluaties van partijleiders, beleidsposities, met name de nabijheid van de eigen beleidspositie tot de beleidspositie van een populistische partij, een van de belangrijkste redenen was om te stemmen voor zowel linkse als rechtse populistische partijen bij de verkiezingen van 2006 en 2010 in Nederland. Ook Ivarsflaten (2008) vindt dit voor beleidsposities met betrekking tot immigratie en toont aan dat grieven over immigratie de belangrijkste voorspeller waren voor het succes van zeven rechts-populistische partijen in West-Europa (2002 (zie ook van der Brug 2003;van der Brug en al. 2000van der Brug en al. , 2005. Op basis van deze bevindingen verwachten we dat ideologische overwegingen ook een rol zullen spelen in het stemgedrag bij de verkiezingen van 2019 in België. ...
... Op het individuele niveau suggereert bewijs op basis van recente verkiezingen dat een substantieel deel van het electoraal van partijvoorkeur wisselt tussen verkiezingen. Op basis van gerapporteerd kiesgedrag in de huidige en de vorige verkiezingen schat Swyngedouw (2008) dat 28,5% van de Vlaamse kiezers van partij gewisseld is tussen de federale verkiezingen van 2003van en 2007van . Tussen 2007van -2009van en 2010 wisselde ongeveer vier op de tien Belgische kiezers van partijvoorkeur (Dassonneville en Baudewyns, 2014; Walgrave, Lefevere en Hooghe, 2010). ...
... Schumacher en Rooduijn (2013) vinden bijvoorbeeld dat, naast protestattitudes en evaluaties van partijleiders, beleidsposities, met name de nabijheid van de eigen beleidspositie tot de beleidspositie van een populistische partij, een van de belangrijkste redenen was om te stemmen voor zowel linkse als rechtse populistische partijen bij de verkiezingen van 2006 en 2010 in Nederland. Ook Ivarsflaten (2008) vindt dit voor beleidsposities met betrekking tot immigratie en toont aan dat grieven over immigratie de belangrijkste voorspeller waren voor het succes van zeven rechts-populistische partijen in West-Europa (2002 (zie ook van der Brug 2003;van der Brug en al. 2000van der Brug en al. , 2005. Op basis van deze bevindingen verwachten we dat ideologische overwegingen ook een rol zullen spelen in het stemgedrag bij de verkiezingen van 2019 in België. ...
... Op het individuele niveau suggereert bewijs op basis van recente verkiezingen dat een substantieel deel van het electoraal van partijvoorkeur wisselt tussen verkiezingen. Op basis van gerapporteerd kiesgedrag in de huidige en de vorige verkiezingen schat Swyngedouw (2008) dat 28,5% van de Vlaamse kiezers van partij gewisseld is tussen de federale verkiezingen van 2003van en 2007van . Tussen 2007van -2009van en 2010 wisselde ongeveer vier op de tien Belgische kiezers van partijvoorkeur (Dassonneville en Baudewyns, 2014; Walgrave, Lefevere en Hooghe, 2010). ...
... Schumacher en Rooduijn (2013) vinden bijvoorbeeld dat, naast protestattitudes en evaluaties van partijleiders, beleidsposities, met name de nabijheid van de eigen beleidspositie tot de beleidspositie van een populistische partij, een van de belangrijkste redenen was om te stemmen voor zowel linkse als rechtse populistische partijen bij de verkiezingen van 2006 en 2010 in Nederland. Ook Ivarsflaten (2008) vindt dit voor beleidsposities met betrekking tot immigratie en toont aan dat grieven over immigratie de belangrijkste voorspeller waren voor het succes van zeven rechts-populistische partijen in West-Europa (2002 (zie ook van der Brug 2003;van der Brug en al. 2000van der Brug en al. , 2005. Op basis van deze bevindingen verwachten we dat ideologische overwegingen ook een rol zullen spelen in het stemgedrag bij de verkiezingen van 2019 in België. ...
... First, the claims are so broadly postulated that they have little explanatory power. Second, there is little empirical basis for these claims: Dutch election research indicates that voters for the party of Pim Fortuyn did not deviate much from the rest of the electorate, either in terms of demographics or in terms of their (supposedly resentful) voting motivations ( van Praag 2001, van der Brug 2003, 2004, Bélanger & Aarts 2006. A third problem is of a more general nature: when using social characteristics (e.g. ...
... Diplomademocracy provides no explanation of why dissatisfaction suddenly erupted in 2002, given that in 1998, under exactly the same government and with almost identical policies, confidence was at an all-time high (Aarts 2005). 8 The only logical conclusion would seem to be that Fortuyn actively fuelled discontent (van der Brug 2003, 2004, Bélanger & Aarts 2006, but that of course contradicts the pluralist conception of reflective representation, where things need to happen first among the electorate, and only then have an impact in the political field. ...
Right-wing populist movements and related political parties are gaining ground in many EU member states. This unique, interdisciplinary book provides an overall picture of the dynamics and development of these parties across Europe and beyond. Combining theory with in-depth case studies, it offers a comparative analysis of the policies and rhetoric of existing and emerging parties including the British BNP, the Hungarian Jobbik and the Danish Folkeparti.
The case studies qualitatively and quantitatively analyse right-wing populist groups in the following countries: Austria, Germany, Britain, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Hungary, Belgium, Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia, with one essay exclusively focused on the US.
This timely and socially relevant collection is essential reading for scholars, students and practitioners wanting to understand the recent rise of populist right wing parties at local, countrywide and regional levels.
... Edwards, 1990;Marcus, 2000;Van Kleef et al., 2015), and negative feelings are thought to make persons more open to changing their predispositions and (political) opinions (Valentino et al., 2008;Brader, 2011;Weber, 2013), as well as to have less optimistic views about others in society (Schwarz, 2011). By consequence, negative emotions are increasingly recognized as predictors of populist support (Demertzis, 2006;Flecker et al., 2007;Magni, 2017;Rico et al., 2017;von Scheve, 2018, 2017), and on the supply side, RPP:s aim to fuel negative emotions among the electorate in an attempt to increase their support (Belanger and Aarts, 2006;Rooduijn et al., 2016;Van der Brug, 2003). ...
... We have argued that life dissatisfaction and attitudes influence RPP vote choice, yet other studies have claimed that populist voters are equally likely to adopt the attitudes that their parties represent (Harteveld et al., 2017;Rooduijn et al., 2016;Van der Brug, 2003). While reciprocal effects may very well exist between attitudes and party support, considering the longstanding theories of issue positions influencing vote choice (Carmines and Stimson, 1980;Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989;Mauerer et al., 2015;Lachat, 2014), we argue that prior attitudes and preferences remain key to understanding vote choice in general and RPP support in particular (e.g. ...
This thesis sheds light on the relationship between subjective wellbeing and political behaviour and attitudes in contemporary European democracies. The profound societal changes of the last half a decade and the unanswered questions about why some citizens engage more politically while others do not, and how persons develop into politically efficacious citizens, as well as why a part of the electorate is attracted to right-wing populist parties and ideas, have paved the way for considering citizen’s subjective wellbeing as a powerful, yet so far overlooked, predictor of political attitudes and behaviour. Through four empirical studies, this research links several dimensions of subjective wellbeing, including its evaluative, emotional, eudemonic and social components, to a sense of political efficacy (Study 1), to political participation (Studies 2 and 3) and to a right-wing populist vote choice (Study 4). The empirical studies reveal how subjective wellbeing is a significant driver of citizen’s political orientations, their participation patterns, as well as their electoral choices, thereby being highly relevant at all stages of the development of the political citizen. The implications of this relationship are profound, both from a scholarly and a policy-making perspective, in order to better understand persisting political inequality in contemporary democracies, to identify the origins of democratic support or instability, as well as to shed light on the development of illiberal political ideas and threats to liberal democracy. In this way, subjective wellbeing emerges as a crucial research agenda for the future of political science.
... These factors have been used to explain the aggregate entry rates and electoral support of new parties, but whether these factors matter for the electoral support for new parties at the micro (voter) level has largely remained underexplored. There have been many studies on why individual voters vote for specific new political parties or party families (Van der Brug 2003;Arzheimer and Carter 2006;Conti and Memoli 2015;Passarelli and Tuorto 2018;Vidal 2018), but these studies cannot be generalized to all new parties as they tend to emphasize the specific political opportunity structure that allows for the development of that specific party. This means that we are missing a crucial link in our understanding of the support for new parties: the micro-level assumptions of the theories of new party support have not yet been tested on new parties in general. ...
... Secondly, the question of causality arises here: do new parties exploit existing dissatisfaction with democracy or do their electoral campaigns increase dissatisfaction (Van der Brug 2003)? Similar questions about causality also come to mind when looking at the measures of issue positions and salience: are these deficits between what voters want and what parties offer created by changing party platforms, changing voter preferences, or both (Spoon and Klüver 2019)? ...
Why do voters vote for new political parties? This article tests the microfoundations of why voters support new parties. We examine three perspectives: that citizens vote for new parties because the established parties stand distant from the citizens’ left-right position; that they vote for new parties because the existing parties ignore the issues that the citizens prioritize; or that they vote for new parties because the citizens are cynical about established parties in general. Based on an analysis of more than three decades of Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys, we conclude that all three factors matter but that ideological distance is by far the strongest predictor.
... Previous research generally shows that both protest attitudes and ideological considerations drive the vote for radical populist parties -albeit, depending on the particular country and party, with varying degrees of importance for both determinants (e.g. Bélanger & Aarts, 2006;Oesch, 2008;Ramiro, 2016;Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013;van der Brug, 2003;van der Brug et al., 2000). How did these determinants play out in the 2019 Belgian elections? ...
... For instance, Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) find that, besides protest attitudes and evaluations of party leaders, policy preferences, particularly the closeness of one's own policy positions to the policy positions of a populist party, was one of the most important reasons to vote for both left-and right-wing populist parties in the 2006 and 2010 Dutch elections. Similarly, Ivarsflaten (2008) shows that grievances over immigration were the single most important predictor for the success of seven right-wing West European populist parties (2002)(2003) (see also van der Brug, 2003;van der Brug et al., 2000van der Brug et al., , 2005. Moreover, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) find that left-wing socio-economic issue positions drive support for left-wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions drive support for right-wing populist parties. ...
This study investigates how protest attitudes and ideological considerations affected the 2019 election results in Belgium, and particularly the vote for the radical right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang (VB) and for the radical left-wing populist party Partij van de Arbeid-Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB). Our results confirm that both protest attitudes and ideological considerations play a role to distinguish radical populist voters from mainstream party voters in general. However, when opposed to their second-best choice, we show that particularly protest attitudes matter. Moreover, in comparing radical right- and left-wing populist voters, the article disentangles the respective weight of these drivers on the two ends of the political spectrum. Being able to portray itself as an alternative to mainstream can give these parties an edge among a certain category of voters, albeit this position is also difficult to hold in the long run.
... Voters turned to the AfD as a means to express distrust in the current political system, their vote was a 'protest-vote' (Schäfer 2017). It is an established finding that challenger parties draw support from politically distrustful voters (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018;Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013;Van der Brug 2003). However, the development of political support after a challenger party gained access to the legislature and represents its voters' interests is less clear. ...
... This study sets out to address this theoretical conundrum. As political trust affects challenger party support (Van der Brug 2003;Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013), endogeneity problems emerge in the study of the link between chanllenger party representation and political trust. Hence a regression discontinuity design (RDD) is employed. ...
In Europe and beyond, parliaments and party systems are subject to fundamental shifts. With the waning importance of established cleavages, challenger parties of diverse backgrounds have emerged. So far, it is unclear whether these changes represent a threat to the fundamental properties of western democracies or a healthy corrective to an increasingly detached political elite. This study is interested in the causal effect of challenger parties’ representation in national parliaments on political trust. Scholars offer conflicting theories of this link: Miller and Listhaug argue that challenger parties function as some kind of pressure valve that - once they gain parliamentary status - channels distrust back into the electoral system. Hooghe and Dassonneville criticise this view and claim that protest voters become more distrusting in the long run, since they subsequently identify with the party (and its policies) they initially voted for only out of protest. This study sets out to address this theoretical conundrum. As political trust affects challenger party support, endogeneity problems emerge in the study of the link between challenger party representation and political trust. Hence a regression discontinuity design is employed.
... Third, the PRR's emergence and success might have consequences at the individual level. Citizens could be affected in the sense that they attach more importance to certain issues, shift their views toward more anti-immigration and authoritarian positions, and change their political behaviour (Andersen and Evans, 2003;Bohman, 2011;Braun, 2011;Dunn and Singh, 2011;Immerzeel, 2015;Ivarsflaten, 2005;Semyonov et al., 2006;Sprague-Jones, 2011;Van der Brug, 2003;Wilkes et al., 2007). PRR groups can make some issues more salient (Bale, 2003;Ivarsflaten, 2005) and trigger politically disengaged people to become actively or passionately involved in politics (Jansen, 2011;Mouffe, 2005). ...
... However, based on a Dutch six-wave panel study (2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013), Rooduijn et al. (2016) find that the popularity of populist parties fuels political discontent, rather than dampens it (cf. Van der Brug, 2003). ...
This article reviews three strands in the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe. It first assesses political opportunity explanations for the fortunes of the PRR. Second, it discusses internal supply-side approaches, referring to leadership, organization and ideological positioning. Third, research on the consequences of the rise of these parties and movements is examined: do they constitute a corrective or threat to democracy? The review concludes with future directions for theorizing and research.
... With the appearance of the 'new right' on the political scene, the conventional association with the 'right' has become more problematic. For instance, the electoral breakthrough of the ethnocentric (and socially liberal) LPF has often been explained as reflecting the public dissatisfaction concerning the issue of immigrants, as well as a political entrepreneur who fueled and channeled the public discontent (e.g., van der Brug, 2003, Zwan, 2004, Bйlanger and Aarts, 2006. The implications for political preferences in the Netherlands are twofold: ethnocentric orientation should be important for explaining preference for the anti-immigrant parties, but also increasingly for other parties as the issue became politically salient. ...
... There is a weak tendency of the more ethnocentric respondents not to participate in elections, especially in 1998 and 2003. This is somewhat surprising in the context of the anti-immigrant mobilization associated with Pym Fortuyn and elections of 2002and 2003. In 1994and 2004, the tendency among the more ethnocentric respondents was also to less strongly identify with political parties. ...
The paper analyzes the political consequences of religiosity, post-materialism and nationalist attitudes. According to modernization and secularization theses, ideological orientations such as religiosity and (ethno)nationalism are supposed to decline in political relevance as modernizations progresses. On the other side, in the era of political de-alignment and re-alignment, political space is supposed to be determined by the 'new politics' ideological dimensions, of which post-materialist orientation is the most familiar. In order to examine the implications of these theoretical perspectives, this paper analyzes the ability of the aforementioned orientations to explain various aspects of political attitudes and behavior, such as the support for democracy, party preference, or ideological identification. The outlined problems are examined using data the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). Several features make the Netherlands an appropriate case to address these problems. These include the sharp trend of secularization, but accompanied by the persisting religious political cleavage. More recent trends of post-materialist and anti-immigrant politics have also been early and vividly expressed in the Netherlands. The main findings show that ideological orientations such as post-materialism, religiosity, and ethnocentrism, continue to be important for explaining various aspects of political attitudes and behavior in the Netherlands. The results also indicate that modernization and 'post-modernization' theories are imperfect explanations for the observed trends.
... Verschillende onderzoekers stellen echter dat de nieuw-linkse bewegingen van de jaren zestig een rechtse contrarevolutie hebben veroorzaakt. Sinds de jaren tachtig ziet men in verschillende westerse landen − zoals België, Denemarken, Frankrijk, Nederland en Oostenrijk − namelijk nieuw-rechtse en autoritaire bewegingen en partijen ontstaan (Elchardus, 1996;De Koster et al., 2008: 722-4;Ignazi, 1992Ignazi, , 2003Van der Waal & Achterberg, 2006), die inmiddels aanzienlijke electorale successen hebben geboekt (Ignazi, 2003;Van der Brug, 2003;Veugelers, 2000). Volgens Ignazi ligt de opkomst van links-libertaire bewegingen in de jaren zestig en zeventig ten grondslag aan dit succes: nieuw-rechtse bewegingen beschouwen de erosie van de sociale orde die is ontstaan door de opkomst van de tegencultuur als problematisch. ...
Internationale waarnemers verbazen zich al tijden over het verhitte integratiedebat dat in Nederland woedt. Ze vragen zich af hoe zoiets mogelijk is in een land dat bekendstaat als baken van seculiere tolerantie. Dit roept de vraag op hoe etnische tolerantie en afwijzing van traditionele christelijke stellingnamen over morele vraagstukken zich tot elkaar verhouden. In dit artikel onderzoeken we daarom of en waarom het aanhangen van een post-Christelijke moraal voor sommigen leidt tot etnische intolerantie, terwijl het voor anderen samengaat met etnische tolerantie.
... First, voting for populist parties or candidates may be understood as protest voting, and thus as an expression of disaffection with mainstream politics and political institutions (Bélanger and Aarts 2006), in line with the nature of populism as rejecting the entire political elite as corrupt and self-serving (Canovan 1999;Mudde 2004). The second explanation considers voting for populist parties as an expression of voters' policy preferences, which then leads to low political trust as a consequence of populist parties' antiestablishment rhetoric (Brug and Wouter 2003;Der Brug, Wouter, and Tillie 2005). Both explanations may be true at the same time, and there is reason to believe that the link between political trust and populist support is indeed reciprocal (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018;Matthijs, van der Brug, and de Lange 2016). ...
Studies typically find that supporters of populist parties exhibit low political trust. Drawing on research on winner-loser gaps in political support and the consequences of political polarization on attitudes, I re-examine the association between populism and political trust taking into account the supported party’s status in or outside of government, distinguishing between government leaders and junior coalition partners. I analyze data from the European Social Survey Rounds 1–9 from nine Central and Southern European countries that experienced populist parties as government leaders, combined with party characteristics from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization as well as democracy scores from the Varieties of Democracy datasets. Results show that the effect of party status on political trust is stronger among supporters of populist than non-populist parties. Further, I find that supporters of populist governments enjoy greater trust advantages in less democratic contexts.
... Yet, there is reason to believe that the causal direction also flows in the opposite direction (Rooduijn et al., 2016). The benefits of parliamentary representation may expose more voters to the radical right's anti-establishment messages and fuel citizens distrust in liberal democratic institutions (Rooduijn et al., 2016;van der Brug, 2003). In accordance with the above argument, I hypothesize that: ...
A close reading of the literature on radical right parties (RRPs) suggests that these parties erode trust and solidarity in European democracies when they pit ‘the pure people’ against political and legal institutions, elites, and immigrants. I propose the conjecture that RRPs with seats in the national parliament have better conditions for spreading nativist and populist messages that may erode trust and solidarity between a society’s residents, between ethnic groups, and towards its political and legal institutions. To test this research question, I combine nine waves of European Social Survey data from 17 countries and data on national elections spanning the years 1999 to 2020. Two-way fixed effects models estimate that RRPs representation in the national parliament is associated with a reduction in public support for redistribution of ca. 18% of a standard deviation. Additionally, I demonstrate that this inverse relationship runs parallel to growing welfare chauvinistic beliefs and that it is stronger in countries with weak integration policies. Contra theoretical expectations, the radical rights’ political representation has not produced any change in societal levels of anti-immigration attitudes, institutional trust, or social trust. While the findings persist across a wide range of robustness checks and other model specifications, threats to identification in the form of non-parallel pre-trends and unobserved sources of confounding, means that one should be cautious in interpreting the findings in a causal manner.
... Denmark (Thesen, 2018). Specifically, the anti-immigrant rhetoric is used by populist parties to both enhance the mantra of the 'foreigner' that 'takes the job' of the native and stage the narrative of the immigrants as potential threats for the safety of the residents, often by pairing the presence of foreigners to the crime increase (van der Brug, 2003). ...
Recent Italian parliamentary elections have revealed individuals’ growing populist attitudes, expression of widespread political discontent. Place-based policies and national spending programmes might play a role in shaping voters’ behaviour and political consensus. Within this context, we exploit the outset of a novel Italian Strategy, aimed to boost development in peripheral areas to investigate this relationship. Besides, we set a quasi-experimental framework using municipal-level data on Italian national elections in 2013 and 2018, and we apply a semi-parametric matching difference-in-differences. The findings suggest that place-based spending programmes mediate the revealed discontent with different magnitudes depending on geographical heterogeneity and previous expenditure levels.
... Research in the area of political psychology analysed external political efficacy, that is the perception of politicians and the political system not caring about citizens' opinions, as a potential mediating factor between negative economic evaluations and support for populist leaders and movements (Rooduijn., 20, Van Der Brug, & De Lange, 2016). This concept is also clearly related with the more general notion of political discontent (Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018;Van der Brug, 2003) that comes from the weak presence and the inconsistent responsiveness of political institutions, causing frustration and a loss of trust in traditional political parties. ...
Following the rise of populist parties and leaders in the last decade, research has extensively investigated the political and economic factors that have driven some voters towards populism. Less research has been devoted to the individual psychological factors associated with populist attitudes, and to how those can influence political decisions, such as vote choice in an election or referendum. In this study, we analysed data from the 2016 and 2020 ITANES panel surveys, where populist attitudes were measured by a 6-item scale. Findings indicate that populist attitudes were associated with relevant psychosocial factors, such as nationalism, political efficacy, and conspiracist beliefs. Populist attitudes in turn explained part of the variance in vote choice at both referenda, after controlling for reform evaluation and political orientation. Furthermore we found that voters with strong populist attitudes had a tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in the form of the biased evaluation of the foreseeability of the referendum results, making simplified and self-reassuring evaluations aligned with their vote choice. The discussion focuses on how populism as a political phenomenon can be rooted in relevant individual differences in the psychological features of voters.
... It is often cultural changes that are recognized, and thus criticized, by the radical right. There is no doubt about the effect of the negative evaluation of immigration among supporters of the radical right (Coffé et al., 2007;Bowyer, 2008;van der Brug, 2003;Stockemer, 2015;Sørensen, 2016). The idea of ethnopluralism has intensified since 2015 with the start of the European migration crisis. ...
The Identitarian movement, a radical-right movement active in a number of European countries, desires to unite European nationalists in international action. Nevertheless, the theory claims that the latter ideology is based on nativism. This might create internal ideological conflict between nativism versus transnationalism. The article offers a qualitative analysis of how the movement solves the issue of identity framing on the transnational level. This is a question of how the ethno-nationalist message is transformed to the transnational level, and how national needs are translated into transnational ones. The findings show that the Identitarian movement constructs a two-fold identity – a national one and a European one; and operates with three types of identity framing, thereby building a complex picture of a common past, present, and future. All three frames always act to maintain a balance between both identities, and always work with the language of civilization. Such framing, then, might lead to the successful mobilization of international resources and turn ideas into action.
... One line of thought is that populist attitudes are supply-side driven and, as such, much more malleable. Rooduijn et al. (2016), for example, contend that support for populist parties is driven by political discontent, which in turn, is fuelled by the supply-side and particularly by the political message of a populist party (see also Van der Brug, 2003). These observations lead to the idea that at least for some voters', populism may not exist independently from the messages they receive from political actors and, therefore, will not be embedded in broader web of attitudes but can be considered untethered. ...
Scholars who study populism from an ‘ideational approach’ consider populism as a set of ideas based on a moralised anti-establishment thinking and a strong people-centrist view of politics. From this perspective, at a theoretical level, populist attitudes have the following two main contrasts: pluralism and elitism. In this article, we investigate the ideological consistency of the populism-pluralism-elitism set of attitudes among voters. Analysing data from Flanders (N = 1444), we make three main contributions. First, we show that there indeed exists an internally consistent relationship between populism, elitism, and pluralism among voters. Second, we demonstrate that this consistency only holds for the most politically sophisticated citizens. And third, we show that the relationship between populist and elitist attitudes is much more nuanced than often assumed. We show that it is possible to empirically distinguish between ‘expertise elitism’ and ‘anti-populist elitism’, two forms of elitism which relate differently to populist attitudes.
... Voting for populist parties is associated with low political support in the first place, but voting for them could also lead to lower political support as a result (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018b). Rooduijn et al. (2016) develop this argument nicely, showing how people may be attracted to populist or extremist parties through certain issues (such as immigraton or Europe), but are then prone to the cues of such a party, particularly on deriding the establishment (see also van der Brug, 2003). This leads to greater levels of discontent overall, rather than acting as a safety valve for protest voting. ...
Does European integration affect public support for political institutions and, if so, how? This is the broad research question this thesis poses. The central theme of this thesis is whether the long-term constraints entailed by European integration have had an impact on domestic mass politics in the European Union, and specifically on political support. That integration, European or otherwise, leads to the loss of political support has been claimed extensively within the literatures on Europeanisation, globalisation and political support, with little empirical examination. This academic interest has become more relevant as political elites and the public alike call for greater control over national decision-making and a reinvigoration of democratic participation.
Building on the literatures on political support, Europeanisation and globalisation, the thesis tests the theoretical claim that European integration has had a negative impact on political support. Using a number of advanced quantitative methods which combines data from individual and aggregate level public opinion, political parties and countries, the thesis provides a rigorous empirical examination of how the purported ’politics of constraint’ shapes public opinion and the linkages between elites and their publics within the EU.
The four empirical chapters provide a rebuttal to the ’constraint’ hypothesis.
On the contrary, the linkages between domestic institutional changes, such as integration, and political attitudes are highly mediated by their domestic contexts. The chapters show that whilst there is some evidence of a negative effect in the nine longest-serving countries, this is heavily mediated by economic conditions. However, there is clear evidence of a growing ’support gap’: that integration is embedding a domestic cleavage between those with high and those with low education. The thesis also shows that this does not operate in a clear way through direct perceptions of constraint or through integration’s impact on public-elite congruence. On the contrary, integration has no identifiable impact on the congruence between parties, parliaments and governments on one hand and mass public opinion on the other; and, if anything, perceived constraint boosts political support. A key conclusion of the thesis therefore is that more fundamental determinants are at the domestic level, and that the core determinants of political support are how our institutions perform in producing policy. Whilst processes like integration are independently important, it is how they are refracted through domestic politics that leads to change amongst the public.<br/
... The Netherlands saw only one formal coalition government between radicalright and centre-right and one minority government supported by the radicalright PVV. In 2002 the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) brought unprecedented volatility and polarisation into Dutch politics (Bischof and Wagner 2019;Van der Brug 2003). Only formed about three months preceding the election, the party gained wide attraction due to its charismatic leader, a strong media presence and its distinctive anti-immigration stance (Koopmans and Muis 2009). ...
Recent advances in the application of supervised learning have shown how the method can be employed to measure polarization by assessing classifiers' accuracy. Building on these contributions, I propose a reconceptualisation to enable extended utilization of this approach. Focusing on predicted probabilites as a measure of rhetorical similarity, I validate supervised learning for the measurement of accommodation to radical right parties through established parties and politicians in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. Results indicate that the method produces valid estimates of parties' and speakers' rhetorical similarities to respective radical-right parties and outperforms existing similarity measures and scaling methods. I discuss possible further applications and limitations.
... Despite its repudiation of politics as the process for resolving conflict, populism is 'not without politics or apolitical' and 'is driven to engagement with politics but in a way that is at odds with that politics' (Taggart 2018: 81). While the success of anti-establishment appeals depends on populist actors' ability to convince their supporters that they are not part of the entrenched power structure (Barr 2009: 32;Mel endez and Rovira Kaltwasser 2019), political attitudes are also relevant for the populist party vote (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;Van der Brug 2003;Van der Brug et al. 2000). However, populist political participation has been almost exclusively interpreted in terms of electoral participation (cf. ...
The article focuses on a neglected aspect of populist mobilisation, i.e. non-electoral participation (NEP), and elaborates on the extent to which populist party voters engage politically outside the polling station. The study addresses the question that populist parties and movements of the left and right originate from distinctive political experiences, and drive different forms of engagement with politics. The hypotheses are tested on NEP, based on populist party vote, social values and issue preferences relying on a unique cross-national survey. The findings significantly broaden our understanding of populist mobilisation and refine a number of notions related to the different logics of participation of the left and right. While challenging common understandings of populism as inherently distrustful and apathetic, and protest as an exclusive practice of the left, the study critically places NEP at the heart of populism in general, and populist right politics in particular.
... Dutch citizens mainly voted for Fortuyn because of his proposed policies. Contrary to popular belief, a panel survey showed that political cynicism and a decreasing sense of political efficacy were actually a result of support for Fortuyn, rather than a cause (van der Brug 2003). The gap left by the disappearance of Fortuyn's party was quickly filled by Wilders' PVV, which has won a substantial share of parliamentary seats since 2006. ...
... Still, the party won 17% in the 2002 election, which was unprecedented for a new party. The question to what extent voters of Fortuyn voted for the party because of specific issues or because of political trust is a matter of lively debate (Van der Brug 2003;Bélanger and Aarts 2006). Since then, most independent local parties in the Netherlands employ populist rhetoric (Boogers, Lucardie, and Voerman 2007). ...
This paper examines why the support of independent local parties has grown substantially in the Netherlands. These are parties that run in municipal council elections, but do not run in elections at higher levels, specifically the national level. Such parties saw their support double in the Netherlands between 1986 and 2010. Parties of this type have also grown in other Western European states. This paper examines two possible explanations: declining political trust on the level of voters and, on the supply side, the rise of parties that are not rooted at the local level. The evidence shows that the rise of independent local parties reflects the rise of national political parties that do not run in many municipal elections. This article examines the case of the Netherlands, pooling five surveys from the 1986–2010 period.
... Although external political efficacy has a stronger notion of the people than political trust, the people are not necessarily defined as homogeneous or pure. External political efficacy, thus, taps into more general feelings of political discontent (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018;Rooduijn et al., 2016;Van der Brug, 2003), related to the lack of responsiveness of the political institutions. Thereby, it does not relate specifically to the idea that the people are ultimately sovereign, as is highlighted in the definition of populism. ...
Substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining why voters support populist parties. Recently, a new concept has been introduced to gauge populism among voters and to explain voting for populist parties: populist attitudes. However, some researchers regard populist attitudes as simply another measurement of existing and established concepts such as political trust and external political efficacy. Using data from the Netherlands (2018), this article addresses the relationship between these concepts, both theoretically and empirically. This article examines whether political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes tap into different latent dimensions. Using a confirmatory factor analysis, we show that populist attitudes are not old wine in new bottles and that they tap into different underlying attitudes than political trust and external political efficacy. Furthermore, we show that the three measures are not only different constructs but also relate differently to populist voting preferences.
... It showed that LPF-voters were not a specific social category ('deprived social groups' or 'losers of modernisation'). What LPF-voters had in common, was not their social background but their antipathy against further migration and against multiculturalism in the Netherlands (Van der Brug 2003;Wansink 2004: 193-199 parliamentary status) because she misled Dutch authorities when she originally applied for asylum by giving a false name. As the Dutch parliament refused to accept this treatment of one of its members, the cabinet lost its parliamentary support. ...
... There is a general consensus in the literature that those who belong to lower social classes (that is: unskilled manual labourers, people with lower levels of education, the unemployed) can be counted among the prominent losers of social transformations (Lubbers 2001, Van der Brug 2003. A common argument connects the increasing support of right-wing extremism to such lower strata of society, especially during crisis (Golder 2016). ...
... Finally, voters who support populist parties because they are politically dissatisfied might Government and Opposition 5 become even more dissatisfied as populist parties further fuel the discontent of their supporters (e.g. Bartels 2002;Van der Brug 2003;Rooduijn et al. 2016). For all these reasons, we expect that the most dissatisfied will also be the most loyal populist party voters: ...
Scholars of electoral behaviour regularly link political dissatisfaction to two types of behaviour: voting for populist parties and unstable voting behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that the electorates of populist parties are generally assumed to be rather volatile. In this article, we argue that this is not necessarily the case – in particular in a context of increasingly strong and viable populist parties. We make use of data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to show that voters for populist parties are neither more nor less volatile than voters for mainstream parties. Political dissatisfaction among voters for populist parties even increases the likelihood of stable voting for populist parties. The supply of populist parties further conditions the stability of the populist vote, as voters in systems with established populist parties are more likely to vote stably for populist parties. Finally, we find that in a context of strong and stable populist parties, the effect of political satisfaction on vote switching is somewhat reduced.
... Pas vanaf het moment dat Fortuyn landelijk bekendheid kreeg begon dit vertrouwen gestaag te dalen. Dit wijst erop dat hij niet alleen inspeelde op bestaande onvrede, maar die onvrede voor een deel ook zelf aanwakkerde (Van der Brug 2003). Samen met Wouter van der Brug en Sarah de Lange (Rooduijn et al. 2016) laat ik zien dat dit ook geldt voor Wilders. ...
What is the political impact of the populist radical right (PRR)? In this essay, I assess to what extent PRR parties have influenced other parties, policies, people and polity. On the one hand, PRR parties have affected the positions of mainstream parties vis-à-vis the issue of immigration and thereby also actual policy making. Moreover, PRR parties have fueled political discontent among voters. On the other hand, PRR parties have not made mainstream parties more populist, and their direct impact on policy making has (so far) been limited. I argue that one of the most important consequence of the upsurge of PRR parties is that they challenge the system of liberal democracy. Moreover, I discuss how mainstream parties and academics should deal with this challenge. Mainstream parties must accept PRR parties as full participants in the public debate, but they should oppose all ideas that are incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy. We academics have a role to play, too. The system of liberal democracy is a necessary condition for the existence of an open and pluralist society in which science can flourish, academics can do their work, and we can all live in freedom. Academics have the moral obligation to protect that system.
... The question is also important for society more generally, as these parties are frequently linked to political violence and cynicism (e.g. Jesse, 2001;Van der Brug, 2003). Yet, categorically refusing any cooperation with AIPs is often considered undemocratic because it restricts the free and fair competition for political power and support-a necessary condition for democracy (e.g. ...
The success of anti-immigration parties (AIPs) in many European democracies poses a strategic problem for established actors: Immediate policy impact of AIPs can be averted by ostracizing them (i.e. refusing any cooperation), but this strategy may sway public opinion further in their favor. A comparative review shows large variation in the electoral trajectories of ostracized parties. We therefore propose a model of the context conditions that shape the repercussions of ostracism in public opinion. Under conditions that suggest substantial policy impact of an AIP were it to join a coalition government, ostracism should decrease the party’s electoral support. Vice versa, if context suggests strong “signaling” potential of an AIP if in opposition, ostracism should increase its support. To avoid apparent endogeneity of political context and party competition, the model is tested with a survey-embedded experiment on a representative sample from the Netherlands. Results confirm that ostracism is a double-edged strategy.
What caused Dutch citizens to vote ‘no’ in the 2005 and 2016 referendums? How do these referendum outcomes compare to voting patterns in European Union (EU) member states more generally? How are national-level referendums related to European integration? In a comparative analysis, we explore such questions based on information and data on two Dutch referendums, exploring the driving forces of voter opposition in light of more general theories of EU-related voting. We find that perceived threats to identity and culture mattered in the ‘Dutch double no’, while economic cost-benefit calculations and the actual contents of the votes played a less dominant role.
What caused Dutch citizens to vote 'no' in the 2005 and 2016 referendums? How do these referendum outcomes compare to voting patterns in European Union (EU) member states more generally? How are national-level referendums related to European integration? In a comparative analysis, we explore such questions based on information and data on two Dutch referendums, exploring the driving forces of voter opposition in light of more general theories of EU-related voting. We find that perceived threats to identity and culture mattered in the 'Dutch double no', while economic cost-benefit calculations and the actual contents of the votes played a less dominant role.
A politikai közvélemény-kutatások egyik leggyakoribb célja egy-egy választás várható eredményének előrejelzése. Ebben hol többé, hol kevésbé sikeresek a kutatók. Mindenképpen szükséges ezért végig gondolni, mire is van szükség a választói viselkedés megértéséhez, felméréséhez, mi befolyásolhatja azt, hogy valaki szavaz-e és ha igen, hogyan. Ennek a megismerésnek az igénye egyidős bármiféle szavazás intézményével. Az idők során számtalan elmélet és vizsgálat próbálta feltárni ezt. Jelen tanulmányban azokat az elméleteket tekintjük át, amelyek az egyént közvetlenül érő, nem politikai rendszerbeli hatásokat vizsgálták. Azt a feladatot vállaltuk, hogy feltérképezzük az elmúlt száz év választói magatartás elméleteit, hét fő terület alapján: a gyermekkori-fiatalkori szocializáció, a társadalmi környezet, a gazdasági megfontolás, az állampolgári kötelesség, beleszólás, a média, a személyes félelmek és a közvéleménykutatások. Kiindulópontként és elméleti összegzésként kezeljük jelen írást, amely nem arra szolgál, hogy tökéletes magyarázatot adjon a választók viselkedésére. Hanem arra, hogy átgondolandó kérdéseket tegyen fel azzal kapcsolatban, hogy mit érdemes vizsgálni mélyebben ahhoz, hogy megértsük a választók döntéseit.
In this article, we explore the consequences of the increasing presence of both left- and right-wing populist parties in government, critically reflecting on the recent scholarship on the topic, underlining promising venues for future research and outlining a conceptual framework which constitutes the background of this special issue entitled ‘Populism in Power and its Consequences’. Our main contribution is empirical, since – by reflecting on the various articles hosted in the special issue – we assess the impact of populist parties in government on politics, polities and various policy domains. We also provide an account of potential moderating factors of the influence of populists in government, focus on different ideological underpinnings of types of populisms (left-wing and right-wing) and discuss their relevance. We conclude by identifying four possible scenarios for European populist parties in governments: radicalization, compromise and moderation, splintering, or loss.
This article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual‐level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party‐voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesize that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Time‐series analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
This study examined if and for whom prosecution of politicians for hate speech undermines support for the legal system and democracy. Three research designs were combined to investigate the case of Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who was convicted for hate speech against minorities in 2016. First, an experiment showed that observing a guilty verdict decreased support among 'assimilationists' who oppose the multicultural society. This deterioration of support was found among the entire group of assimilationists, regardless of whether they voted for Wilders. Secondly, a quasi-experiment demonstrated that assimila-tionists who were interviewed after Wilders' conviction indicated less support than those who were interviewed before the verdict and compared to a pre-test. Thirdly, a nine-year panel study suggested that these effects accumulate into long-term discontent. This case therefore demonstrates that hate speech prosecution can damage the democratic system it is intended to defend.
One common feature of the Italian political space over the past half century has been the presence of distrust in political parties and the presence of anti-system parties on both the left and the right. Discontent with existing elites and the political system has taken many forms, including referendums altering the electoral system. Both the character of the main parties and the rules by which they are elected have been reformed 4 times since the 1980s. However, as the elections of 2013 and 2018 and the referendum of 2016 demonstrate, Italians still have a high amount of resentment towards party elites and the operation of the system. Using data from Italian National Election Studies, this paper traces the development of this party resentment with a focus on three questions: 1) How has resentment towards party representiveness changed with the electoral and party reforms 2) Who was likely to hold this resentment 3) What was the party affiliation of those most resentful, or did they abstain? Results stress that socio-demographic differences had little effect on understanding the source of party resentment; distrust in parties correlates well with distrust in parliament and political administration. General social distrust did not translate into a distrust for parties. We conclude that discontent can be separated into a political dimension associated with current governance and one of a more systemic nature.
Political policies affect the lives of citizens to a great extent. Yet, citizens in modern representative democracies are not allowed to vote in favour of one or the other policy. Policies come as a package deal: if a voter gives preference to a certain politician of a certain party, it is implicitly assumed that the voter supports the policies of this party with respect to the entire spectrum of policy domains. In an empirical study, we show that Flemish respondents know which level of government is responsible for a set of nine different policies, that they have different party preferences for each policy domain, and that they let some (high-impact) policies determine their overall party preference. We conclude that citizens don't want the package deals that the system forces them to accept. Because all-round politicians exist just as little as super citizens, an alternative approach to referenda for increasing public participation therefore, may be the developing of a multiple voter turnout system by organising separate elections for separate policy fields.
Despite a long tradition linking individual differences in personality to a variety of different political outlooks and philosophies, little attention has been devoted to the potential relationship between personality and populist attitudes. Drawing on survey data from more than 2,500 Canadians of voting age, this article provides a first look at the relationship between personality (general and dark traits) and populist attitudes. Even when controlling for a variety of factors like age, sex, income, education, labour market situation, and a number of others, the results reveal a consistent role for personality. In terms of general personality, the results reveal a significant relationship between populist attitudes and three traits: honesty-humility, emotionality, and conscientiousness. As for the dark traits, narcissism is significantly and negatively related to populist sentiment.
The geographical patterns of the Italian electoral discontent have been strengthened by the European elections of 2019. The growing populist sentiments have been fuelled by the political programs focusing on national-popular issues, which have pushed the escalation of the right-wing sovereign/nationalist political parties. While the literature has stressed that long-term socioeconomic structural decline is among the main reasons feeding the rise of the European distrust, little is yet known about the micro-scale populist voting patterns in Italy. Through a parametric approach with linear models, the main determinants of discontent, at municipal level, are revealed and, specifically, it results that (un)employment, long-term cultural change and immigration are the main drivers of the right-wing populism intensity growth in the European elections of 2014 and 2019.
In 2017, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) and the Freedom Party both won seats in the Dutch parliament. Both of these parties are radical right-wing populist parties. It does not happen often that two radical right-wing populist parties gain seats in the same election. The question is to what extent these two radical right-wing populist parties have been able to carve out different niches for themselves. This paper examines the competition between these two parties looking at three surveys spanning between 2017 and 2019, when FvD became the largest party in the Dutch Senate. The paper finds that there are social-economic differences between the two electorates in terms of economic policy preferences and education level. The electorate of the FvD is also more libertarian where it comes to moral issues than PVV voters are. The paper concludes that despite not having the manifesto of a neo-liberal populist party, in electoral terms FvD is the functional equivalent of one.
The aim of this paper is to map and contrast recent developments in attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Austria and Hungary. The context of the paper is that the economic and the so-called 'refugee' crisis and its social and political consequences have fundamentally affected European attitudes towards solidarity. Such times of crisis are often seen as providing ample opportunities for the populist radical right to prosper. Nevertheless, the above developments do not necessarily mean a weakening of solidarity as its forms may change and its meanings become contested. Based on a comparison of Austrian and Hungarian results of the ESS round 8 (2016) the article - with the help of k-means cluster and multinomial logistic regression analyses - examines what solidarity positions can be observed and contrasted and how they may be linked step-by-step to 1) objective socio-demographic variables, 2) subjective perceptions at the micro-level (like social trust, well-being, and feelings of insecurity), 3) subjective perceptions at the macro-level (like institutional and political trust, attachment to country and the EU), moreover 4) to different values and attitudes like xenophobia, homophobia, conformism or statism on the one hand, and, 5) to political orientations and voting intentions on the other. © 2019 Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics.
Cambridge Core - Political Sociology - Cultural Backlash - by Pippa Norris
Deze bundel bevat stukken die over een langere periode zijn gemaakt ter voorbereiding van het Continu Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven (cob), dat het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau sinds begin 2008 in opdracht van de Voorlichtingsraad uitvoert voor het kabinet.
De publicatie bestaat uit drie delen. Deel 1 doet verslag van de pilot van het cob van eind 2007, die bestond uit een internetenquête, interviews en groepsgesprekken en enkele internetvarianten van kwalitatief onderzoek. Deel 2 bevat secundaire analyses van materiaal van een voorloper van het cob, de Rijksbrede Belevingsmonitor. Peter Tammes behandelt de persoonlijke en maatschappelijke problemen en politieke prioriteiten en hun achtergronden, en in een volgend hoofdstuk de determinanten van vertrouwen in de regering. De nadruk ligt op de inhoudelijke bevindingen. Van meer methodologische aard is deel 3, waarin Will Tiemeijer ingaat op de positie van beleidsgericht opinieonderzoek in een representatieve democratie en op de theorie en praktijk van kwalitatief opinieonderzoek bij de overheid. De auteur is zeer kritisch over het nut en de wenselijkheid van dergelijk onderzoek en is juist vanwege zijn scepsis uitgenodigd om mee te denken over ons onderzoek. In het eerste hoofdstuk worden zijn overwegingen, de bevindingen van de Belevingsmonitor en
de ervaringen met de pilot vooral gebruikt voor de uitwerking en verantwoording van het cob. Verwacht mag echter worden dat de analyses en beschouwingen in deze bundel ook interessant en nuttig zullen zijn voor anderen, met name opinieonderzoekers,
ommunicatiefunctionarissen en andere gebruikers van
opinieonderzoek bij en rond de overheden.
Populist parties have been successful in many Central Eastern and Western European countries. Although populist parties differ from each other in many respects, they also share a common message, namely that the 'bad' elite is no longer, or not acting in the interests of the 'good' ordinary people. In this chapter we examine the characteristics and subtypes of populism (e.g. agrarian populism, conservative or neo-liberal populism, national populism and social populism), providing a comprehensive overview of contemporary populist parties in Europe. We also study possible explanations for the electoral successes of these parties and explore the relationship between the agrarian, the rural and the populist. We conclude that although agrarian populism is no longer a widespread phenomenon in Central Eastern and Western Europe, most populist parties have a clearly defined stance on agrarian issues and attract considerable electoral support from the countryside.
Research on the supply side of politics demonstrates that populism acts as a common denominator even though populist parties possess very different ideological positions. However, it is uncertain whether this translates to the demand side: Do voters support left and right-wing populist parties for similar reasons? Using the Netherlands as our case study, we investigate the common demand side characteristics of supporters of populist radical right and populist radical left parties. The paper concludes that populist attitudes (i.e. a people-centered notion of political representation) unify supporters of both populist radical left and populist radical right parties. Supporters of both parties also demonstrate lower levels of political trust (than voters for other parties): this is particularly the case for PVV supporters. Beyond these similarities we find that the PVV and the SP attract very different supporters. PVV supporters demonstrate low immigrant tolerance, while SP voters support more income equality.
This study traces the evolution of right-wing extremism, conceptualized as latent electoral support for extreme right-wing parties (i.e., vote intention), in six Western European countries (i.e., Belgium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, and Italy) between 1984 and 1993. Employing a pooled time-series cross-sectional research design, the author examines the relative strength of three popular explanations of contemporary right-wing extremism: the impact of economic conditions (unemployment and inflation), social developments (immigration), and political trends (public's dissatisfaction with the political regime). Evidence is presented in support of the last two explanations. Rising levels of immigration and public dissatisfaction with the political regime significantly facilitate right-wing extremism. Contrary to the initial hypothesis however, results suggest that a declining national economy (unemployment in particular) diminishes the electoral appeal of extreme right-wing parties.
In this article we address the question whether or not the votes for anti-immigrant parties can be considered as protest votes. We define protest votes by the motives underlying electoral choices, building on earlier research done by Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). That research showed that ideological proximity and party size are the best predictors of party preference. On this basis we designed a typology of motives for party choice and how these motives would manifest themselves empirically. Analyzing the 1994 elections for the European Parliament for seven political systems we show that anti-immigrant parties attract no more protest votes than other parties do, with only one exception: the Dutch Centrumdemocraten. Voting for anti-immigrant parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties. In addition, (negative) attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties. Social cleavages and attitudes towards European unification are of minor importance as determinants of preferences for anti-immigrant parties. The overall conclusion is that a rational choice model of electoral behavior has strong explanatory power for party preferences in general, but also for the support for anti-immigrant parties in particular.
This article looks to build a motivation profile for extreme right voters of the Vlaams Blok in the 1995 general election. Voters' subjective motivations are studied using an open-ended question from the Belgian–Flemish public broadcaster (VRT) exit-poll. After a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using open as opposed to closed questions, the different motives are classified on a functional basis according to existing theoretical voting behaviour models. HICLAS, a hierarchical classes analysis method for binary objects (parties) by features (motives) data, is used to create a subjective cognitive and affective map of the extreme right Vlaams Blok (VB) voters. The research strategy reveals the existence of motives to support the VB that have previously been mentioned only rarely (if at all). The results also lead us to re-evaluate the relative importance of the different motivations for vote choice (e.g. Flemish nationalism and communitarian issues, crime and law and order, political scandals, …). Furthermore, the results make it clear that traditional social groups do not see the VB as the party representing their interests. The reasons why voters support the VB are to a large extent different from the reasons that the VB leadership claims that they support it; the VB vote is not solely a question of economic self-interest or fear (of crime and migrants). This has important consequences for solutions designed to “manage” these issues, given the rejections of party politics and the anti-political attitude of the extreme right voter.
Social change and multicultural society in Western Europe against diversity - new right ideology in the new Europe individualism and xenophobia - radical right-wing populism in a comparative perspective the social basis of radical right-wing populism political conflict in the postmodern age.
L'A. presente les differentes theories avancees pour expliquer la croissance du vote Front National (FN) en France. Elle classe ces theories en quatre groupes. Le premier groupe, « L'effet Le Pen », souligne l'importance de la personnalite et du caractere demagogique du leader du FN en faisant egalement l'examen de la psychologique de l'electorat FN (tendances autoritaires heterophobes et xenophobes). Le second groupe d'explications s'appuie sur des facteurs economiques : l'immigration, notamment nord-africaine et musulmanne, declencherait le vote FN chez les individus vivant a proximite de communautes ayant des systemes de valeurs et des modes de vie differents. Cette theorie est demontree par la carte geographique du vote FN qui coincide avec la presence locale d'etrangers. D'autres theoriciens mettent davantage l'accent sur le changement economique et social et ses consequences negatives. La troisieme categorie d'explications met l'accent sur les facteurs culturels. Des historiens comme Pierre Milza ont souligne le rapport ideologique entre le vote FN et le renouveau periodique d'un « temperamment de protestation », d'un populisme national ; d'autres parlent de « contre-revolution » comme d'un aspect de la reaction neo-conservatiste de la societe contre les valeurs permissives et hedonistes des annees 60, par rapport aux preoccupations de securite des annees 70 et a la crise d'identite des elites suite a la globalisation de la culture et du marche dans les annees 80, a la construction de l'Europe et a la chute du communisme. La derniere categorie d'explications met l'accent sur les facteurs politiques qui ont favorise le vote FN : les craintes et les deceptions generees par la prise de pouvoir de la gauche, l'incapacite des elus a solutionner le chomage et leur manque de credibilite croissante suite a une longue serie d'affaires et de scandales, les lois d'amnestie et la desorientation gene
In their 1994 study of electoral preferences for anti-immigrant parties, Van der Brug et al. (2000) concluded that most voters consider anti-immigrant parties to be normal parties. In this replication using 1999 data, the main conclusions of the 1994 study are confirmed for FPÖ, Alleanza Nazionale, Dansk Folkeparti and Vlaams Blok. Preferences for these parties are largely determined by the same variables that determine preferences for other parties. Votes for these parties should not be interpreted as protest votes. Things turned out to be different for the Lega Nord, the Centrumdemocraten, the Fremskridtspartiet, the French Front national, the Republikaner and the Wallonian Front National. The motivations to vote for any of the latter parties turn out to be substantially different in 1999 than they were in 1994. In 1999, these parties attracted more protest votes, or rather they lost their ideological and pragmatic votes. This article ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our theoretical understanding of electoral support for these parties, as well as for the ongoing political debate about the appropriate strategy to fight them.
In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.
In this article we set out to improve our knowledge onvoting for extreme right-wing parties, i.e. the Republikaner, by taking into account social,political and contextual characteristics. We test fourtheories that provide explanations as to why certainsocial categories are more likely to vote for the Republikaner. The hypotheses are tested withmultilevel analyses, with data from a national sample(N = 4688). Multinomial analyses provide additionalinformation on how theoretically derived politicalattitudes effect voting behaviour.
National and other election studies suffer from a number of problems that can be addressed if electoral researchers focus first and foremost on the ‘core business’ of election studies — measurement of the dependent variable in all its aspects — and allow other concerns (generally associated with measuring independent variables) to be ‘hived off’ to special-purpose surveys specific to particular sub-fields of electoral studies. These additional surveys can later be linked to the core election study for analysis purposes. This paper spells out the manner in which such linkages can be implemented, and enumerates a variety of advantages to be gained from splitting up in this way the business of studying voter attitudes and behavior. It elaborates how measurement of the dependent variable, traditionally a straightforward question about party choice, can be improved, and indicates the advantages thereof for improving our understanding of the voter's calculus, and for comparative electoral research.
Inzicht in onvrede: visies op maatschappelijk onbehagen aan het begin van de 21e eeuw
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Beker, M. (2003) Inzicht in onvrede: visies op maatschappelijk onbehagen aan het begin van de 21e
eeuw, Amsterdam: SISWO.
Herover het speelveld op Pim Fortuyn', NRC Handelsblad
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Vrijzinigen, ongelovigen en protest
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Derks, A. and Deschouwer, K. (1998) 'Vrijzinigen, ongelovigen en protest', in M. Swyngedouw,
J. Billiet, A. Carton and R. Beerten (eds.) Kiezen is verliezen. Onderzoek naar de politieke
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Pim Fortuyn is bedreiging VVD
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The gender gap in support for the new right: the case of Canada
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Enige wenken voor democratische vernieuwing
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The challenge of populist parties: perspectives based on the Austrian experience
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Luther, K.R. (2003) 'The challenge of populist parties: perspectives based on the Austrian
experience', Conference on Populisms in North America, South America, and Europe:
Comparative and Historical, January 2003, Bogliasco, Italy.
Mobilization and Policing of Protest in Western Europe and Hungary
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P. Timora´nszky (ed.) Mobilization and Policing of Protest in Western Europe and Hungary.
(Special issue of U´j Rende´szeti Tanulma´nyok.)
Le vote Le Pen. L'e´lectorat du Front national', Notes de la fondation Saint-Simon
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Martin, P. (1996) 'Le vote Le Pen. L'e´lectorat du Front national', Notes de la fondation Saint-Simon, October/November 1996. Paris.
Achterblijvers en sociale stijgers: twee kanten van sociale onvrede
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Meijer, C. (2003) 'Achterblijvers en sociale stijgers: twee kanten van sociale onvrede', Facta,
February 2003: 14-17.
The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream
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the Extreme Right', in P. Hainsworth (ed.) The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins
to the Mainstream, London and New York: Pinter, pp. 144-171.
Het onbehagen kan weer ondergronds
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Oosterbaan, W. (2002) 'Het onbehagen kan weer ondergronds', NRC Handelsblad, 1 November
2002: 28.
Van oude en nieuwe klassen, of de deftigheid in het gedrang
- H J Schoo
Schoo, H.J. (2003) 'Van oude en nieuwe klassen, of de deftigheid in het gedrang', in A. Rouvoet,
H.J Schoo, B. Tromp and P. Schnabel (eds.) Haagse tegenstrijdigheden, een jaar verder,
Amsterdam University Press/Salome, pp. 15-28.
De (on)redelijke kiezer. Onderzoek naar de politieke opvattingen van Vlamingen. Verkiezingen van 21 mei
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Swyngedouw, M., Billiet, J., Carton, A. and Beerten, R. (1998) De (on)redelijke kiezer. Onderzoek
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Fortuyn gaf politiek terug aan burger', NRC Handelsblad
- G Van Den Brink
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2002: 6.
Boos, machteloos en onverschillig', NRC Handelsblad
- G Van Den Brink
Van den Brink, G. (2002b) 'Boos, machteloos en onverschillig', NRC Handelsblad, 19 July
2002: 26.
What explains success of anti-immigrant parties? A Political Science Approach
- W Van Der Brug
- M Fennema
- J Tillie
Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2001) 'What explains success of anti-immigrant
parties? A Political Science Approach', General Conference of the ECPR, 6-8 September 2001,
University of Kent, Canterbury.
De LPF-kiezer: rechts, cynisch of modaal?', Jaarboek Nederlandse Politieke Partijen
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Van Praag, Ph. (2003) 'De LPF-kiezer: rechts, cynisch of modaal?', Jaarboek Nederlandse Politieke
Partijen 2003, forthcoming.