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Chinese Foreign Policy under Hu Jintao:The Struggle between Low-Profile Policy and Diplomatic Activism
Abstract
This article explores a controversial issue of Chinese foreign policy: whether the Hu leadership has abandoned Deng Xiaoping's taoguang yanghui policy — hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time — and reoriented Chinese foreign policy towards a more assertive, if not more aggressive, direction. This is controversial because while China in public still insists that it follows the taoguang yanghui policy established by Deng in the early 1990s; Chinese diplomacy has become increasingly active and assertive since Hu came to power, particularly since the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. This article argues that as a rising power, an active foreign policy has become a necessity rather than a luxury for China. This diplomatic activism marks a certain departure from the taoguang yanghui policy, but the Hu leadership is still juggling China's taoguang yanghui policy with its emerging role as a global power. One defining tension in China's foreign policy agenda is to find a balance between expanding China's international influence and taking more international responsibility on the one hand and continuing to play down its pretence of being a global power and avoiding confrontation with the United States on the other.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
This chapter contains a chronological account of the development of EU-China relations from the resumption of relations after the Tiananmen Square unrest to the visit of Xi Jinping in March 2014 as the first Chinese president to pay an official visit to the EU headquarters in Brussels. The chapter documents the first steps toward the setting up of the strategic partnership, which were taken by the EU in an effort to create good commercial and political relations with China and include China into the world community. Further, it describes the near breakdown in the relations following the EU’s criticism of China’s human rights record and its handling of Tibet in 2008–2009, the impact of the eurozone crisis of 2010–2012 on bilateral relations between the EU and China, and the re-set of the relations on a more realistic basis which prevails today. The chapter also gives a short overview of the issue areas in which the EU and China have long-standing, unresolved disputes and contentious relations: the human rights dialogue, the EU’s arms export ban, the recognition of China as a market economy, and the lack of cohesiveness among EU member states regadings the EU's relations to China.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
This chapter analyzes the deep-seated differences in perceptions that the Chinese and Europeans hold in regard to the international system, the aims and principles for international cooperation, and the contending visions of power. It also investigates the difference in terms of actorness of China and the European Union (EU) and how it impacts their outlook on the world, foreign policy behavior, as well as their ability and resources to influence the conduct of international politics. It is argued that the roles played by China and the EU in the evolving international system are important on a global level, not least because of the differences in outlook on global governance, interdependence, and the nature of the evolving global order. In order to fully gauge the ramifications of the EU-China strategic partnership, it is important to consider the differences in their understanding of their respective international roles and identities as global actors.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
This first chapter introduces the main aims of the book. These pertain to analyzing and understanding the significance of the increasing number of strategic partnerships in the world and to explicating the development of the EU-China strategic partnership since its creation in 2003. The authors argue that in order to fully understand the dynamics of the EU-China strategic partnership, the deep-seated conceptual differences which reign between the EU and China must be taken into account. To this end, the following chapters of the book provide in-depth analyses of these differences focusing on external and internal norms, vision of power, worldviews, and modes of international engagement. Furthermore, the authors argue that to understand the social dynamic that has emerged in the EU-China strategic partnership, its significance should be assessed from a three-pronged approach taking the international, bilateral, and individual levels into account.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
In this chapter, the authors explore the meaning of strategic partnerships and their place in the international system on the basis of a number of interrelated dimensions and contending theoretical perspectives. In order to analyze in detail the meaning of strategic partnerships, the authors propose a definition of these partnerships based on their descriptive and conceptual properties which are derived from contending theoretical approaches: the classic realist and the social constructivist. On this basis, the authors devise a three-pronged analytical framework with the purpose of establishing what functions strategic partnerships fulfill for the partnering states and which aims they are associated with. First, the systemic level is considered by asking what functions strategic partnerships have in the international system. Second, the inter-relational level is analyzed by querying why and with what aim states engage in bilateral partnerships. Finally, the intra-relational level is explicated by investigating what functions strategic partnerships have in the construction of the identity of the participating states and the expectations that individual actors (states and international organizations) hold in terms of their reputation and status. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the approaches that the European Union and China have taken vis-à-vis strategic partnerships in general and what can be deduced in terms of foreign policy strategy on the basis of existing strategic partnerships.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
This chapter explores persistent deep conceptual differences between China and the European Union (EU). It is argued that in regard to sovereignty and human rights, China and Europe usually stand at the two opposing ends of a normative spectrum as the Europeans give priority to human rights while the Chinese give preference to sovereignty. This has resulted in contending views on the management of international security crises, military intervention in third countries, the diffusion of norms, and the purpose and outcome of the EU-China dialogue on human rights. However, despite opposing normative standpoints, China and Europe are not bound to perpetual conflict over sovereignty and human rights issues as both are capable of pragmatism as well as dogmatism depending on the issue at stake.
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guiding principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and continues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
... See European Community (EC) Edmund, Burke, 107, 129n41 effective multilateralism, 15, 17, 37n14, 76, 77, 84, 85, 140 emerging powers, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 71, 173 EU-China relations. See also China-EU relations EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 60, 65n23, 65n25, 68n62, 141, 159n20 EU-China strategic partnership, 1-10, 20, 23, 30, 31, 41, 47, 54, 61, 90-1, 134, 154, 156, 165-71, 173 EU's policy paper on China, 60 human rights dialogue, 9, 45, 47, 51, 59-61, 82, 83, 116-20, 125, 169 euro, 46, 47, 99 eurozone, 4, 49-51, 53, 141, 154, 157, 167, 169 15,43,44,46,53,58,78,139,146,147 European Community (EC),15,55,66n40,139 European Convention on Human Rights,103 European integration,32,44,48,62,80,84,99,101,102,107,114,138,139 European security strategy,15,32,37n18,39n39,47,64n15,75,139 European states,54,84,98,115 Union,49 European Commission,46,54,67n47,68n60,68n61,78,82,84,85,94n36,95n41,121,130n53,130n59,141,174 European Council,43,51,55,81,114,141,151 European External Action Service,61,140,174 European Parliament,42,45,59,61,69n67,78,103 neighborhood policy,Benita,37n14,174 financial crisis,46,[49][50][51][52]89,120,122,131n67 Financial Stability Forum,120 Finland,44 First and Second Opium Wars,100 Fischer,Joschka,99,126n8 Sudan,55,89,118,119 Swarthmore College,123 Sweden,44,56,66n40,106,110,111 Syria,50,116 Syrian civil war, 53,150 T Taipei,3 Taiwan,48,52,56,64n17,100,122,143,149,155,160n35,168,170 terrorism,85,175 Thatcher,Margaret,102 Tiananmen Square protest,42,44,55,56,155 Tianxia system,34,134 Tibet,48,49,83,125,155. 160n35 76, 77, 81, 99, 100, 146 unilateralism, 78, 85, 86, 91, 100 unipolarity, 5 United Kingdom (UK), 53-5, 115-17, 123 UN Security Council,3,16,24, 116, 150 United States (US), 1, 2, 5, 12-16, 22-3, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36n3, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 64n17, 65n28, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 107, 133, 135-9, 143-5, 147, 149, 155-7, 160n35, 167, 168, 172 V Van Rompuy,Herman,51,65n24,65n26,141,159n19 Vietnam,35 W Wang,Lixing,109,129n37,129n46 Wang,Yi,14,36n7 Washington Consensus,80 Wendt,Alexander,38n31,38n35,39n33,73,75,93n10,93n13 Wen,Jiabao,34,40n50,56,115 Westphalian,99,134,135,138,155 Wissenbach,Uwe,121,131n74 World Expo in Shanghai, 153 world order, 1-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 35, 77, 136, 139-41, 154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173 ...
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the book. The first aim of the study was to actualize a complex understanding of the deeper meaning of strategic partnerships. For this purpose, a three-pronged conceptual framework was devised which analyzes the significance of strategic partnerships on the systemic, bilateral, and individual levels. The second aim was to explicate the complexities of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and China and the evolution of the EU-China strategic partnership. To this end, the authors analyzed the conceptual differences that reign between the EU and China in regard to their perceptions on sovereignty, internal and external norms, soft and hard power, as well as their views on the world and appropriate forms of international engagement. These conceptual differences play an important role in shaping the bilateral engagement between the EU and China explaining the EU’s and China’s contending international roles and milieu-shaping ambitions. To conclude, the authors contend that the EU-China strategic partnership constitutes an important piece of the puzzle as to why the number of strategic partnerships has surged in recent years and the function they have in the emerging world order.
... Furthermore, peaceful coexistence becomes a foundation of China's concept of 'peaceful rise' and 'peaceful development' which were seriously discussed by Chinese leadership in the early 2000s. Some scholars state that the term 'peaceful rise' was introduced at Boao Forum in 2003 in Zeng Beijan's speech entitled The New Road of China's Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia (Zhao, 2010;Guoli, 2008). Some analysts claim that the term rise may lead to the perception that China is a threat (Zhao, 2010;Guoli, 2008). ...
... Some scholars state that the term 'peaceful rise' was introduced at Boao Forum in 2003 in Zeng Beijan's speech entitled The New Road of China's Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia (Zhao, 2010;Guoli, 2008). Some analysts claim that the term rise may lead to the perception that China is a threat (Zhao, 2010;Guoli, 2008). Therefore, Hu Jintao changed the term 'rise' to 'Peaceful development' in his speech at Boao Conference in April 2004 . ...
... China's concept of cooperative security in the Sri Lankan context covers Sri Lanka's internal stability and regional stability in the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions. According to Zhao (2010), a prominent Chinese academician, "the backbone of China's South Asia policy has been to maintain and promote regional peace and stability." The Chinese side is committed to supporting Sri Lanka in defeating terrorism and safeguarding its sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. ...
The article engages in a critical reading of the political pattern of Sino-Sri Lankan bilateral engagement. China offers an alternate global order for Sri Lanka by underscoring political discourses like “harmonious world” and “building a community with a shared destiny or future for mankind.” Through these discourses, China attempts to present a “fair and equitable” international system to small states such as Sri Lanka to mobilize them against the universalization of the liberal order. This is part of China's goal to challenge the universalization of liberal values to indicate the Chinese economic and political model as aspirational for developing countries. However, it culminates as the “hegemony of harmony,” as China dictates the terms to protect its national interests, dissimulating cultural relativism and exceptionalism as the foundation of the Chinese-led global order. This article employs historical and descriptive analysis to explain the political nature of Sino-Sri Lankan engagement, elucidating China's specific strategies to harmonize Sri Lanka.
... Given the widespread perception that "authoritarianism is becoming more formidable" 31 , this article aims to contribute to our understanding of authoritarian states and their foreign policy behaviour. Such an approach could also shed light on recent events and the future trajectory of Chinese foreign policy which has entered a state of change since the second Hu administration 32 , and especially as taoguang yanhui has been increasingly replaced by fenfa youwei ("striving for achievement") after Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in late 2012. ...
By treating militarism and personalism as institutional constraints on foreign policy, this article examines the role and influence of these constraints on the foreign policies of Russia and China. By looking at empirical evidence the authors argue that domestic institutional constraints in each country have exhibited distinctly different patterns throughout the last twenty years, and this can to some extent explain the difference in their respective foreign policies. However, institutional personalism in China has recently become more similar to that of Russia. The authors argue that current Russian foreign policy bears some elements of similarity suggesting future developments in Chinese foreign policy.
... Some analysts credited him with making the decisive break from Deng Xiaoping's previous emphasis on 'taoguang yanghui' or keeping a low profile in global politics towards a new era of 'striving for achievements' (Zheng and Tok, 2007). Others point to initiatives under his successor (and Xi's predecessor) Hu Jintao instead as signs of start of a new era (Zhao, 2010). The emphasis on China's pre-revolutionary and ancient past as a source of Chinese wisdom that is often associated with Xi (and repeated by him) was also something that Hu pioneered (Kallio, 2016: 18). ...
Have China’s international relations changed fundamentally under Xi Jinping? Or is it rather a matter of heading in the same direction as before, but with a considerable increase in pace accompanied by a greater confidence in outlining where this journey is taking China (and as a consequence, the world as well)? This introduction outlines some of the collective conclusions of the special issue as a whole, and in explaining the rationale for constructing it, pays tribute to John Peterson’s contribution and support.
... Fravel and Medeiros (2003, p. 22) have argued that under Xiaoping's strategic view, 'peace and development were the two major themes of today's world…Beijing has embarked on a new road to economic modernization and reoriented its foreign policy to heighten the diplomatic relations'. Under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese foreign policy had stood for 'a low profile, do something and concentrating on establishing a favourable external climate for domestic economic growth (Chang, 1991;Suisheng, 2010;Xu & Du, 2015). However, given the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-SARS (2003) in China and its inability to handle the same had significantly dented its global image. ...
Health diplomacy has remained an important part of foreign policy of major countries to expand their geopolitical influence across the world. Given the outbreak of COVID-19, the inadequate healthcare systems even of the developed countries have been exposed. Although China was blamed for the origination of COVID-19, concomitantly, the same country had exploited the global health emergency by putting its global health diplomacy in practice as a soft power tool to expand its geopolitical influence in term of hegemony, vis-→-vis the USA. Whereas, on the contrary, the USA and European Union (EU) have been critically entrapped in the pandemic and remained at crossroads, how to deal with the same locally and globally. In these contrasting roles and reciprocation, the main argument of the article is that China had made the best use of its health diplomacy to expand its geopolitical influence, while the USA and EU did not rise to the occasion; rather, their roles and reciprocation have remained delayed and inert. In this backdrop, the main focus of this article is to examine how China used its global health diplomacy as a soft power tool? Second, would China become hegemon in the present scenario vis-→-vis the USA?
... 21 This rationale was also evident in Hu's "harmonious world" rhetoric in which harmony signified "the importance of the coexistence of diversified civilizations" and "consultation among all of the countries involved, rather than unilateralism driven by hegemonic ambitions." 22 Here, then, China's "peaceful development" and international stability were conceived of as mutually reinforcing. Finally, under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has appeared to cast off strategic reassurance in favor of a more confident posture encapsulated in the rhetoric of the "China dream" (Zhongguo meng). ...
... However, as observed by Professor Suisheng Zhao, those guid- ing principles may lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but nevertheless provide the Chinese leaders with more options; choose one path over another, or modify one principle in relation to another. 75 Thus, Professor Adaora Osondu of Abafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria argues, even though the noninterference principle remains unchanged, China no longer applies it consistently in its relations with Africa and con- tinues: "China's insisting (switching on) or non-insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest." 76 For example, China would insist on a UN authorization and the consent of the affected state as prerequisites for its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and so be able to show flexibility on the sovereignty principle in the Darfur Crisis. ...
The intra-European row that broke out in the build-up to the war in Iraq brought home the fragility of the European foreign policy regime. Existing and future member states publicly demonstrated their diverging positions regarding the appropriate stance to take in relation to the United States. For outside observers, this seemed to prove the futility of seeking to establish a common foreign and security policy among the member states of the EU, which continue placing national priorities before shared European objectives. From this perspective, the EU would forever remain a political dwarf despite its status as an economic giant.
... To explain its membership in the WTO and it being a signatory to the FSB, for instance, China may invoke the principles of mutual benefit and multilateralism as alternatives to the principle of non-interference. As observed by Zhao (2010), those guiding principles may naturally lead to inconsistencies, overlap, and competition, but they provide the Chinese leaders with more options; they could simply choose one path over another or modify one principle according to another. ...
China’s insistence on the non-interference principle has been increasingly inconsistent. While China’s concern with sovereignty, regime security, and legitimacy, as well as its developing country identity, have pushed it to continue its insistence on the principle of non-interference, China’s further adaptation to the international system, increasing engagement in international institutions, and new identity as a responsible power have led China to drag its feet on the same principle. To reconcile these competing forces, China has to make concessions, namely, setting preconditions to legitimize intervention, designing a sovereignty-first solution, and/or complementing the non-interference principle with alternative principles. China’s application of the non-interference principle has thus been made contingent. It is more inflexible at one end of a spectrum and more flexible at the other end, with China’s foreign policies shifting back and forth between them.
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the 19th-century-type territorial empire identity that present China inherited from the Maoist period. Due to regime continuity, Deng’s reforms did not put an end to China’s perceived vulnerability to external threats. Events ranging from the fall of communism in Eastern Europe to the American intervention in Iraq convinced the leadership in Beijing of the need to preserve and strengthen China’s military instruments, which could be done only through the maintenance of the territorial empire. To avoid a Sino-American clash in the Pacific, President Xi’s construction of a new, Chinese-led international order took the form of a projection of normative power targeting the Global South. But the US ‘pivot to Asia’ convinced him of the critical importance of the protective role played by the hard power-based territorial empire, whose expansion and actorness he intensified. Its concentration of sovereignty and territoriality is well illustrated by the over-securitization process associated with President Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security and China’s involvement in various territorial disputes. Subchapter 3.4 concludes the chapter by scrutinizing the geostrategic dimension of the confrontation between China the territorial empire and the increasingly coherent and effective ‘networked security architecture’ created by the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
This book argues that China’s Belt and Road Initiative should be seen more as a geopolitical project and less as a global economic project, with China aiming to bring about a new Chinese-led international order. It contends that China’s international approach has two personas – an aggressive one, focusing on a nineteenth century-style territorial empire, which is applied to Taiwan and the seas adjacent to China; and a new-style persona, based on relationship building with the political elites of countries in the Global South, relying on large scale infrastructure projects to help secure the elites in power, a process often leading to lower democratic participation and weaker governance structures. It also shows how this relationship building with elites leads to an acceptance of Chinese norms and to changes in states’ geopolitical preferences and foreign policies to align them with China’s geopolitical interests, with states thereby joining China’s emerging international order. Overall, the book emphasizes that this new-style, non-territorial “empire” building based on relationships is a major new development in international relations, not fully recognized and accounted for by international relations experts and theorists.
O presente artigo visa analisar a política externa da República Popular da China (RPC) sob Xi Jinping no que concerne à sua atuação na Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). Assim, busca-se analisar se a atuação da China no sistema onusiano pode ser caracterizada como agressiva, revisionista ou assertiva, e em que medida sua política externa se diferencia das administrações anteriores. Em termos metodológicos, utilizar-se-á o método qualitativo e descritivo. Argumenta-se que a política externa de Xi Jinping se diferencia em grau e em intensidade das administrações anteriores, caracterizando-se por maior assertividade, ativismo e proatividade, especialmente na avaliação de sua atuação dentro das Nações Unidas.
CPEC being a mega project of the recent era not only in South Asia but throughout the world. CPEC is going to take place between Pakistan and China by bringing enormous economic betterment and lifestyle changes for the people living in Pakistan. Both countries, China and Pakistan are agreed to build one road one belt which is commonly known as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with the intentions to bring peace and prosperity as well as to enhance business activities by promoting trade with each other and with rest of the world, which will directly affect on economic growth. Being a mega economic project for both countries it will bring prosperity and economic stability. It will enhance Pakistan’s infrastructure (road, railway and telecommunication), overcome energy crises, develop trade, modernize and develop agriculture and manufacturing industry and mutual connectivity between people of both countries which is a very important factor for trade. China being the strongest economy of the present day will support the new economically arising country (Pakistan). China will pull Pakistan from the crises by applying modern technology and high financial support, which every country faces during the difficult time of raising its economy. This study helps to overlook and analyze the benefits of CPEC for the people of Pakistan. Keywords: China Pakistan Economic Corridor, One Belt One Road, Gwadar, Socio-Economic Development
Political slogans are understudied in political communication and this conceptual paper aims at broadening the understanding of political slogans as it investigates how governments use political slogans in the context of international political communication. Drawing on the slogan literature in business, marketing and advertising, the paper outlines major characteristics and develops a taxonomy of political slogans. It then uses political slogans utilised by the Chinese government to communicate with foreign audiences to discuss advantages and disadvantages of political slogans as a communicative device for governments. It is argued that the specific characteristics of political slogans make them the prime instrument for government communication, but at the same time the same characteristics make them the most vulnerable instrument as well.
Since the beginning of the policies of ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang) in the late 1970s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not only shown impressive rates of economic growth and multiplied its stakes in the global economy,l it has also gradually intensified its involvement in international politics. From the early days of the post-Maoist period onwards the number of international organizations of which China is a member has increased continuously.2 Since the mid-1990s Beijing has been engaged in far-reaching military reforms,3 and Chinese diplomacy has progressively moved away from the low-profile tradition of the Deng Xiaoping era towards greater activism, including conscious efforts to develop China’s ‘soft power’.4 In the new millennium, Beijing has effectively reached out to countries in virtually all regions of the world.5 The PRC has thus considerably expanded its presence in regional (and not only Asian) and global affairs, especially in the course of the past decade. This has important geopolitical consequences, as it upsets existing political balances and patterns of influence. China’s ‘new assertiveness’ in territorial disputes with its neighbors can be read in this logic,6 but also its growing influence in Latin America,7 long considered the backyard of the United States (US), or the ‘pivot’ towards Asia in the latter’s security policy.8
After more than two decades of reform, China and Russia have developed new hybrid forms of national capitalism and authoritarianism. Besides the domestic socioeconomic and political challenges, both countries have international ambitions. To be sure, China and Russia share a common denominator in the realm of foreign policy: to manage and, if possible, decrease the impact of US influence upon international affairs. But, putting this commonality aside, the two countries have different goals and conditions, and have adopted different foreign policy strategies to deal with the post-Cold War world order. Russia, seeing its current international standing in decline and being reduced to a mere energy supplier to the world market, is seeking to replay the end of the Cold War and to revive its great power ambitions. China has moved away from its former heavy reliance on bilateral relationships to working within numerous multilateral frameworks. Though this development has been welcomed in the international community, China’s more assertive behaviour in the maritime sphere has raised concerns about the implications for regional stability of China’s growing power. At the same time, China has not given up on its insistence on respect for sovereignty, nor has China’s leadership officially been swayed from the argument that, as a developing country, it must focus on raising the living standards of its own people before taking on more international responsibility.
This article examines Yunnan’s relations with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries grouped in the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) GMS Program. While locating the analysis in the context of paradiplomacy, this article makes two claims. First, it argues that—unlike subnational governments in federal states—Yunnanese authorities do not use domestic opportunity structures to develop the province’s international agency. Instead, they pursue paradiplomacy as a subnational state-building project, designed to extract economic assistance from the central state. Second, it asserts that—unlike other Westphalian states—the Chinese government has recognized the benefits of paradiplomacy as a way to enhance the structural competitiveness of its borderland provinces in the regional economy. In doing so, it has proactively deployed provincial authorities in the multilevel governance of the GMS Program. At the same time, the central government has remained at the center of Yunnan’s external relations through providing funding and preferential policies for Yunnan’s internal and external economic projects and defining the parameters of Yunnan’s cooperation with the GMS countries and the ADB.
This article examines why and how China upgraded its engagement with the European Union (EU) in the years between 2001 and 2004, with reference to pre-existing foreign policy traditions and practices in reform-era China. It argues that most of the observed changes can be explained with reference to two dynamics. First, the changing international environment, mostly with regard to the roles of the United States and the EU, challenged the established approach to foreign policy inherited from Deng Xiaoping, China’s pre-eminent leadership figure from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. In this sense, the shift towards the EU was part of wider efforts to solve this dilemma. Second, differences in how various groups in the Chinese foreign policy establishment understood and implemented Deng’s guidelines and their respective influence in policy-making can help to grasp some of the more specific developments in Chinese policy towards the EU in the early 2000s. To supplement this main claim, the article also critically evaluates the changes less well explained by these two dynamics and proposes additional explanations.
China’s ascendance attracts concern, even though Beijing claims to be a responsible great power and tries to demonstrate its ‘great power style’ in economic diplomacy. This article therefore discusses the following questions: to what extent does the current notion and practice of Chinese ‘great power style’ in economic diplomacy comply with, or differ from, the criteria of benign hegemony; and what are the major constraining factors? Conceptually, China’s ‘great power style’ is rooted in ancient Chinese political philosophy and institution, but it highly resembles the Western notion of benign hegemony. Empirically, China has started to provide more public goods in trade, finance and aid, and it seeks voting powers at international institutions. However, it is still far from being a benign hegemon because of its level of development, domestic political constraints, and tension between political and economic interests.
China in recent years has been asked by other major powers to take a greater share in international responsibility in response to the rise in China's national capability. Negative perceptions about how China is dodging its international responsibility exist not only among policy makers around the world, but have spread to worldwide mass publics, especially across the American people. In this article, we apply the dataset from the ‘Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey' (AACS) to investigate what the American public think of China's international responsibility and which factors explain the varying evaluations from different theoretical perspectives. The results indicate that Americans' negative evaluations of China's international responsibility are associated with poor ratings regarding China's fulfillment of its domestic obligations and apprehension regarding China's potential threat, but has little to do with China's international behavior. To reduce these negative evaluations, China needs to improve its human rights conditions, give people more political rights, and convince the American public of the benevolence of its ascending power. In addition, persistent efforts toward soft-power construction are also very important since Americans who are interested in Chinese culture or knowledge tend not to think that China is dodging its international responsibility.
Although there is clear dissatisfaction in China with the nature of the current global order, it is hard to find a clear and coherent Chinese vision of what an alternative world might look like. This is partly a result of conflicting understandings within the country of the benefits and drawbacks of taking a more proactive global role and perhaps undertaking more leadership functions. But it is also a consequence of how elites frame Chinese interests and demands in different ways for different audiences. Furthermore, the existing order has in fact served China quite well in its transition towards becoming a global power. So while at times China appears to be the main driver for reform and change, at other times (or to other people) the emphasis is on China as a responsible stakeholder in the existing system. How others receive and interpret these conflicting signals is likely to be influenced by the way China exercises, rather than talks about, its growing power— perhaps most notably in terms of its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas and its role as a regional power.
China’s emerging standing in the world demands a major rethinking of its diplomatic strategies. Given its population size, geographical scale, economic power and military presence, China is poised to play a larger political role in the twenty-first century, and is thus perceived by the international community to have greater capacities, capabilities and responsibilities. At the same time, environmental stresses caused by China’s energy and resources demands have become increasingly evident in recent years, urging China to cultivate delicate diplomatic relations with its neighbors and strategic partners. Tensions have been seen in areas such as transboundary air pollution, cross-border water resources management and resources exploitation, and more recently in global issues such as climate change. As the Chinese leadership begins to embrace the identity of a responsible developing country, it is becoming apparent that while unabated resources demands and environmental deterioration may pose a great threat to environmental security, a shared sense of urgency could foster enhanced cooperation. For China to move beyond existing and probable diplomatic tensions, a greater attention to domestic and regional environmental security will no doubt be necessary. This article explores such interrelations among domestic, regional and global environmental securities and China’s diplomacy, and suggests possible means by which China could contribute to strengthening global environmental security.
The acceptance and promotion of partnerships among major countries reflect an attempt on the part of China to re-define its position in the new international strategic pattern. They also reveal a strategic idea offered by China in the post-Cold War era in which it is emerging as a major power. The key questions are as follows. (a) What are the contents of such partnerships among major powers? (b) What are the differences between this partnership model among major powers and the Chinese foreign policy of independence and peace in the 1980s? (c) What are the motivations behind China's promotion of this model of partnerships among major powers? (d) Does the new model of partnerships among the major powers provide an important innovation in the management of relations among the major powers in the coming century? This article attempts to answer these questions so as to better understand China's international strategic behaviour patterns in the post-Cold War era, the inner logic of partnership relationships, and the trends of China's international strategy in the coming century.
This article examines the sources of Chinese foreign policy in a particularly important case—recent policy toward North Korea. It surveys that policy in several areas: the economic backdrop, leading the six party talks, permissive support for United Nations Security Council measures, signals—some rhetorical, others more tangible—warning against future transgressions, and some coercive measures that impose costs on North Korea today. In sum, it finds Beijing has wielded a number of coercive tools aimed a North Korea, while avoiding excesses that might lead to spirals on the peninsula or regionally. Defensive realism best explains this policy, both in the aggregate and in detail in many cases. Offensive realism, strategic culture, and bureaucratic politics approaches do a particularly poor job of explaining outcomes in what shozuld be for each of them a relatively easy case. This has important implications for understanding the sources of Chinese foreign policy in other areas. Further, on North Korea policy, while it is important for American policy makers to recognize that Beijing is not working fundamentally at cross-purposes to Washington's own goals, it is also important to recognize that Beijing has mixed motives.
A harmonious world will benefit the whole world including China and the United States. Building a harmonious world calls for good relations between all countries, especially favorable Sino–US relations. Even though China and the US have different perceptions with respect to building a harmonious world, the two countries need to cooperate for that to happen. The constructive partnership between China and the US provides a solid foundation for cooperation between them. For further cooperation, both should work towards building strategic mutual trust and increasing mutual understanding.
This paper is designed to review China's efforts to adapt to the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States and to analyze the underlying factors that have shaped such efforts. It attempts to make three points: (1) the adaptation process has been an eventful and difficult one; (2) China's gradual appreciation of the new international reality, the daunting domestic challenges China faces, and China's growing awareness of the implications of its rise for its developmental prospects have helped shape its efforts of adaptation; and (3) in the foreseeable future, if the US does not treat China as an enemy and if the two countries can effectively manage the Taiwan problem, China is likely to continue its efforts to accommodate and cooperate with the US.