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Divergent Interests and Different Success Rates: France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in EU Legislative Negotiations

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Abstract

In this paper, we evaluate the relative success rates of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in the area of European Union legislative decision-making. We present a research design that encompasses data on the policy profiles of these four EU member states for 70 European legal acts that were recently negotiated. We find that, among the four countries, the policy outcome on the European level is most closely related to the British position. Moreover, the results show that the preferences of the UK and Germany are more closely related to each other than the preferences of France and Germany. We detect a ‘north versus south’ coalition pattern rather than the existence of a ‘Franco-German axis’.French Politics (2004) 2, 81–95. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200049

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... Studies (Beyers and Dierickx 1998;Elgström et al. 2001;Kaeding and Selck 2005) have demonstrated either a north-south divide among the EU Members States (Elgström et al. 2001;Kaeding and Selck 2005) or a roughly matching "centre-periphery" pattern (Beyers and Dierickx 1998). In addition, Selck and Kaeding (2004) investigated the Franco-German partnership and found evidence for the historical Franco-German partnership having lost its momentum, giving way to a "north-south" pattern. ...
... The continuing existence of the Franco-German partnership (Wood, 1995;Pedersen, 1998;Selck and Kaeding, 2004) can only be proven halfway. We could see the two countries cooperating systematically with each other but we did not find evidence for them being central for other Member States' cooperation networks. ...
... In contrast, the emphasis on intergovernmental decision-making and focus on careful MS representation served to underscore the centrality of national representation within the Council, the primary decision-making body during the first decades of the EU's history. Analyses of the Council underscored the limited role of ideology in shaping coalitions between member states, highlighting instead inter-state power dynamics and MS interests (variously defined) (Selck & Kaeding, 2004). While there have been some more recent analyses that note the potential role of ideology in shaping coalitions within the Council (Hagemann & Hoyland, 2008), these analyses continue to treat MS representations as unitary, tending toward understandings of ideological representation in the form of broad coalitions of the centre-left or centre-right based on some measure of the ideological identity of the government. ...
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... (e.g.Bailer 2006: 368, Selck andKaeding 2004). ...
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... Only Denmark's score is somewhat worse with a coefficient of 0.31. Selck and Kaeding (2004) employ a different subset of the DEU data set. They analyse France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom regarding their policy success on the European level. ...
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... The continuing existence of the Franco-German partnership (Wood, 1995; Pedersen, 1998; Selck and Kaeding, 2004) can only be proven halfway. We could see the two countries cooperating systematically with each other but we did not find evidence for them being central for other Member States' cooperation networks. ...
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... The road to the Schengen free travel area starting in the 17 Cf. Selck and Kaeding (2004). The authors conclude on the basis of issue distances between France and Germany that the 'historical important Franco-German axis, if it ever existed in the real EU policymaking, seems to have lost momentum' (Selck and Kaeding, 2004, p. 92). ...
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... The DEU data has been made publicly available for replication at the Netherlands national social science data archive, the Steinmetz Archive (http://www2.niwi.knaw.nl). For a similar analysis that focuses on France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, see Selck and Kaeding (2004). proposals that had been introduced earlier and were still pending on that date. ...
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Sandholtz and Zysman (Chapter 18) argued that supranational actors played a major role in relaunching Europe. Neofunctionalism was suddenly back in style among many students of the European Community, who now saw spillover everywhere. Realists, who assume that nation states operating in an anarchic (or near-anarchic) world are still the most important international actors, eventually reacted to the emphasis on supranational institutions and processes with their own explanation of recent events in Europe.
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