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Private self-consciousness and the subordinate constructs of self-reflection and insight are key factors in the self-regulatory process underpinning the creation of behavior change, both in clinical practice with clinical populations, and in performance enhancing coaching with nonclinical populations. This paper reports the construction and validation of the Self- Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS) which is designed to be an advance on the Private Self-Consciousnes Scale (PrSCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Previous work has found the PrSCS to comprise two factors, self-reflection and internal state awareness. In a series of studies two separate factor analyses found the SRIS comprised two separate factors labeled Self-Reflection (SRIS-SR) and Insight (SRIS-IN). “Need for self-reflection” and “engagement in self-reflection” loaded on the same factor. Test-retest reliability over a 7-week period was .77 (SRIS-SR) and .78 (SRIS-IN). The PrSCS correlated positively with the SRIS-SR and negatively with the SRIS-IN. The SRIS-SR correlated positively with anxiety and stress, but not with depression and alexithymia. The SRIS-IN was negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, stress and alexithymia, and positively correlated with cognitive flexibility and self-regulation. Individuals who had kept diaries had higher SRIS-SR scores but lower SRISIN scores than did those who had not kept diaries. Implications of these findings for models of self-regulation and goal attainment are discussed.
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University of Sydney, NSW, Australia
Macquarie University, NSW, Australia
Private self-consciousness and the subordinate constructs of self-reflection and insight are
key factors in the self-regulatory process underpinning the creation of behavior change, both
in clinical practice with clinical populations, and in performance enhancing coaching with
nonclinical populations. This paper reports the construction and validation of the Self-
Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS) which is designed to be an advance on the Private Self-
Consciousnes Scale (PrSCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Previous work has found
the PrSCS to comprise two factors, self-reflection and internal state awareness. In a series of
studies two separate factor analyses found the SRIS comprised two separate factors labeled
Self-Reflection (SRIS-SR) and Insight (SRIS-IN). “Need for self-reflection” and “engage-
ment in self-reflection” loaded on the same factor. Test-retest reliability over a 7-week peri-
od was .77 (SRIS-SR) and .78 (SRIS-IN). The PrSCS correlated positively with the SRIS-SR
and negatively with the SRIS-IN. The SRIS-SR correlated positively with anxiety and stress,
but not with depression and alexithymia. The SRIS-IN was negatively correlated with depres-
sion, anxiety, stress and alexithymia, and positively correlated with cognitive flexibility and
self-regulation. Individuals who had kept diaries had higher SRIS-SR scores but lower SRIS-
IN scores than did those who had not kept diaries. Implications of these findings for models
of self-regulation and goal attainment are discussed.
This paper reports on the development and validation of a new measure of pri-
vate self-consciousness: the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS). Self-
Reflection, the inspection and evaluation of one's thoughts, feelings and behav-
ior and insight, the clarity of understanding of one's thoughts, feelings and
behavior, are metacognitive factors central to the process of purposeful, directed
2002, 30(8), 821-836
© Society for Personality Research (Inc.)
Anthony M. Grant, Coaching Psychology Unit, School of Psychology, University of Sydney, New
South Wales, Australia; John Franklin and Peter Langford, Macquarie University, NSW, Australia.
Appreciation is due to anonymous reviewers.
Keywords: self-reflection, insight, private self-consciousness, coaching, psychological mindedness
Please address correspondence and reprint requests to Anthony M. Grant, Coaching Psychology
Unit, School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, NSW 2006. Phone: +612 9351
6792; Fax: +61 2 9351 2603; Email:<>
change (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Purposeful progress through the cycle of self-
regulation towards a specific goal rests on an individual’s being able to monitor
and evaluate his/her progress and use such feedback to improve his/her per-
formance (Figure 1).
The development of reliable measures of self-reflection and insight would pro-
vide researchers and practitioners with the means to assess metacognitive
processes such as psychological mindedness, self-reflection and insight and
enhance our understanding of their roles in purposeful behavior change (Grant,
To date, such measurement has often been conducted using the Private Self-
Consciousness Scale (PrSCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The purpose
of the present studies was to develop a more reliable measure that could be used
to examine levels of self-reflection and insight following a program of sys-
temised change, such as occurs in the coaching process or in clinical practice.
The PrSCS is a 10-item measure assessing individuals' tendency to direct
attention inwards (Fenigstein et al., 1975). There have been a number of psy-
Set a Goal
Develop an
Action Plan
(requires Self-reflection)
(associated with Insight)
Change what's not working
Do more of what works
Figure 1: Generic model of self-regulation and goal attainment showing role of self-reflection
and insight.
chometric problems associated with the PrSCS. For example, although some fac-
tor analytical studies have found support for a uni-dimensional structure (Britt,
1992), it is now generally accepted that the PrSCS is comprised of two sub-
scales; internal state (PrSCS-ISA) and self-reflection (PrSCS-SR).
The database PsycINFO lists over 280 papers related to the PrSCS, yet only 12
of these have discussed the distinction between internal state awareness and self-
reflection and there has been some disagreement as to the specific items that
comprise each subscale (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996; Burnkrant &
Page, 1984; Chang, 1998; Conway & Giannopoulos, 1993; Creed & Funder,
1998; 1999; Kingree & Ruback, 1996; Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987; Piliavin
& Charng, 1988; Ruganci, 1995; Silvia, 1999; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, &
Hickman, 1996).
In addition, it has been argued that the items of the PrSCS-SR do not accu-
rately capture the essence of self-reflection because PrSCS-SR has been found
to correlate positively and significantly with measures of psychopathology. It has
been argued that this kind of psychopathology could be expected from rumina-
tion, rather than from a constructive self-reflection, and that the PrSCS-SR may
be tapping a negative or dysfunctional self-absorption rather than measuring a
constructive self-reflection (Anderson et al., 1996).
In distinguishing rumination from reflection, Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
developed two separate scales. The “reflection” scale attempted to capture a non-
pathological, philosophically orientated process of constructive self-examina-
Although the work of Trapnell and Campbell is an advance in differentiation
between rumination and philosophically oriented reflection, it is not clear that
the philosophical orientation of this scale is necessarily associated with metacog-
nitive factors inherent in the self-monitoring of performance as individuals move
or are coached through the self-regulatory cycle towards goal attainment.
Further, Trapnell and Campbell do not include a measure of internal state aware-
ness (or insight).
The PrSCS-SR confounds motive to self-reflect with the actual direction of
attention towards the self (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). This is an important con-
ceptual issue as a motive to perform a specific act and the execution of that act
are logically independent. It may be that this fundamental conceptual confound
is another reason that the PrSCS-SR scale has performed inconsistently in past
research. This paper is the first to examine the relationship between these two
The PrSCS-ISA correlates negatively with anxiety and depression (Watson et
al., 1996). As insight is related to internal state awareness, scores on the insight
scale of the SRIS (SRIS-IN) should be negatively correlated with depression,
anxiety and stress. Predictions about the relationship between the self-reflection
scale of the SRIS (SRIS-SR) and psychopathology are not so clear. If the SRIS-
SR avoids tapping the rumination associated with the PrSCS-SR, then the SRIS-
SR should not correlate with measures of psychopathology. Because it was not
known a priori if the SRIS-SR would – in fact – avoid tapping a ruminative style
of self-reflection, no specific predictions were made.
Internal state awareness and the related construct of insight are associated with
the ability to identify and express feelings. Alexithymic individuals have a lim-
ited capacity to identify and express feelings (Loiselle & Dawson, 1988). Thus
the SRIS-IN should be negatively correlated with measures of alexithymia.
The processes of self-reflection and insight are logically independent. One
may spend considerable time in self-reflection without gaining insight. Thus no
specific predictions were made about the correlation between self-reflection and
Goal attainment and self-regulatory processes demand cognitive flexibility.
Cognitive flexibility refers to an individual's: a) awareness that there are options
and alternative courses of action available in any given situation, b) willingness
to be flexible and adapt to the situation, and c) self-efficacy in being flexible
(Martin & Rubin, 1995). Thus it was hypothesized that there would be a positive
correlation between both the self-reflection and insight scales of the SRIS and
cognitive flexibility.
As reflection and insight are central to the self-regulatory process (see Figure
1), both scales of the SRIS should correlate positively with measures of self-reg-
ulation, and individuals who regularly monitor their thoughts, feelings and
behaviors should have higher levels of insight and self-reflection. As journal or
diary-keeping requires the self-monitoring of thoughts, feelings and behavior,
responses of individuals who kept journals or diaries were compared with those
who did not keep journals.
This paper reports three studies. The first study reported on an initial factor
analysis of the SRIS. The second examined test-retest reliability. The third exam-
ined convergent validity of the SRIS. This final study also compared the respons-
es of individuals who kept journals with those of individuals who did not, and
included a second factor analysis of the SRIS.
The aim of Study One was to develop the SRIS through factor analysis.
Three doctoral level psychologists constructed items which they considered
likely to load on the proposed scales. The scales were “insight” (10 items), and
the two scales assumed to comprise “self-reflection”: “need for self-reflection”
(10 items) and “engagement in self-reflection” (10 items).
Participants and Procedure Two hundred and sixty undergraduate psychology
students participated for course credit (127 women and 117 men 16 partici-
pants did not indicate their gender; mean age = 20.58 years). Questionnaires
Study 1 Study 3
Factor Analysis Factor Analysis
Factor Loadings Factor Loadings
12 12
Item α = .91 α = .87 α = .71 α = .82
Engagement in self-reflection
I don't often think about my thoughts (R) .68 -.01 .32 -.07
I rarely spend time in self-reflection (R) .78 -.02 .61 -.12
I frequently examine my feelings .86 -.07 .85 -.09
I don't really think about why I behave in the way that I do (R) .72 .10 .57 -.02
I frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts .72 .01 .77 .04
I often think about the way I feel about things .72 -.08 .72 -.02
Need for self-reflection
I am not really interested in analyzing my behaviour (R) .71 .02 .63 -.05
It is important for me to evaluate the things that I do .75 .00 .76 -.01
I am very interested in examining what I think about .77 .01 .70 -.03
It is important to me to try to understand what my feelings mean .79 -.04 .78 -.14
I have a definite need to understand the way that my mind works .73 -.03 .72 -.17
It is important to me to be able to understand how my thoughts arise .72 -.02 .80 -.14
I am usually aware of my thoughts -.13 .67 -.43 -.23
I'm often confused about the way that I really feel about things (R) -.06 .79 -.18 .80
I usually have a very clear idea about why I've behaved in a certain way .21 .66 .27 .60
I'm often aware that I'm having a feeling, but I often don't quite know
what it is (R) -.01 .66 -.13 .76
My behavior often puzzles me (R) -.16 .78 -.17 .76
Thinking about my thoughts makes me more confused (R) .05 .65 -.03 .73
Often I find it difficult to make sense of the way I feel about things (R) -.06 .80 -.12 .87
I usually know why I feel the way I do .07 .78 -.27 .63
Factor Intercorrelations
Factor 1 1.00 -.03 1.00 -.31**
were completed in small group settings using a six-point scale (1 = strongly dis-
agree, 6 = strongly agree).
Responses were subjected to a principal components analysis with varimax
rotation to determine the optimal factor solution. Inspection of the scree plot
found five rather than the expected two factors. Subsequently, items which
showed minimal factor loading or loading on more than one factor were sys-
tematically eliminated.
A second principal components analysis with varimax rotation found a final
two-factor scale consisting of a total of 20 items (see Table 1). These two factors
accounted for 56% of the total variance. Six items from the engagement in self-
reflection subscale and six items from the need for self-reflection subscale
loaded on the same factor. This factor was labeled Self-Reflection (SRIS-SR).
Eight items from the insight subscale (SRIS-IN) loaded on the same factor.
Coefficient alpha for the self-reflection scale was .91, and .87 for the insight
There was a nonsignificant correlation of r = - .03 between the SRIS-SR and
the SRIS-IN. There was no significant difference between male and female
scores for either the SRIS-SR, (F (1, 243) = .68, ns) or the SRIS-IN (F (1, 243)
= .09, ns).
The final factorial solution revealed two factors which were labeled Insight
and Self-Reflection. Both scales had good internal consistency and performed
better in this respect than the PrSCS-SR and the PrSCS-ISA, given that
Anderson et al. (1996) reported Cronbach alphas of .63 (PrSCS-SR) and .56
(PrSCS-ISA). In accord with previous work (Creed & Funder, 1998) there were
no differences between male and female scores.
The finding that the SRIS-SR and SRIS-IN were not correlated (r = -.03)
appears to run counter to the generic model of self-regulation (Figure 1), which
predicts a positive correlation between self-reflection and insight. Previous work
has found that the relationship between SR and ISA is ambiguous (e.g.,
Burnkrant & Page, 1984) and this issue is further explored in Study 3.
An important and original finding of this study is that “need for self-reflec-
tion”and “engagement in self-reflection” loaded on the same factor. There has
been considerable inconsistency in the research into private self-consciousness
using the PrSCS, and it has been generally thought that these inconsistencies are
due to the use of the PrSCS as a unidirectional measure when in all probability
it is bidimensional. A less discussed issue with the PrSCS is the confounding of
the motive or need for self-reflection with the actual engagement in self-reflec-
tive acts. Clearly these are logically separate factors. However, the present study
has found that they appear to be inextricably connected.
In Study 2 test-retest reliability was evaluated over a seven-week period.
Participants and Procedure Twenty-eight undergraduate psychology students
participated for course credit (22 women and 6 men, mean age = 22.25 years).
Questionnaires were completed in small group settings.
The test-retest correlation over seven weeks for the SRIS-SR was .77 (p <
.001), and was .78 (p < .001) for the SRIS-IN. Both scales compared favorably
with the PrSCS given that Fenigstein et al. (1975) reported a test-retest correla-
tion over a two-week interval of .79.
To examine congruent validity, responses to the SRIS were correlated with
responses to established, related measures. These measures were the 20-item
SRIS-SR 1.00 - - 49.00 11.88
SRIS-IN -.31*** 1.00 25.57 3.95
DEP .15 -.21* 9.92 10.18
ANX .32*** -.31*** 9.12 8.24
STRESS .21* -.35*** 16.17 10.94
TAS-20 -.09 -.39*** 46.48 11.88
PrSCS .59*** -.26** 37.06 5.36
CFS .10 .26** 53.35 6.90
SCS .02 .23* 132.82 31.81
Note: SRIS-SR = Self-reflection scale; SRIS-IN = Insight scale; DEP = DASS-21 depression scale;
ANX = DASS-21 anxiety scale: STRESS = DASS-21 stress scale; TAS-20 = Twenty-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale; PrSCS = Private Self-consciousness Scale; CFS = Cognitive Flexibility Scale;
SCS = Self-control Schedule.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
version of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), the
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (Martin & Rubin, 1995) and the Self-Control
Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980). Study 3 also examined the differences between
individuals who currently kept diaries and those who did not, and incorporated a
second factor analysis of the SRIS.
Participants and Procedure One hundred and twenty-one undergraduate psy-
chology students participated for course credit (99 women and 22 men, mean age
= 23.23 years).
Participants completed the questionnaires in small group settings. In addition
to the measures detailed above, participants responded “yes” or “no” to the fol-
lowing question; "Do you currently keep a journal or diary on a regular basis in
which you write about your thoughts and feelings?" Participants were informed
that this question did not refer to keeping a time management or appointment-
tracking diary.
Pearson correlations between the measures mentioned above are presented in
Table 2. There was a negative correlation between the SRIS-SR and the SRIS-
IN. This is in contrast to the first study which found no relationship between
these two scales.
There was a positive correlation between the PrSCS and the SRIS-SR, and a
negative correlation between the PrSCS and the SRIS-IN. This finding further
Did Not Keep Diary Kept Diary Statistical significance
(n = 84) (n = 37) of difference score
Mean SD Mean SD F (1,119) p
SRIS-SR 48.11 5.91 51.03 5.93 6.26 .01
SRIS-IN 27.07 3.89 25.43 3.89 4.56 .03
DEP 10.02 10.46 9.68 9.63 0.03 .86
ANX 8.26 8.15 11.08 8.21 3.06 .08*
STRESS 15.71 10.51 17.19 11.94 0.46 .50
CFS 53.15 6.48 53.78 7.86 0.21 .65
SCS 132.31 31.85 134.00 32.10 0.07 .79
Note: SRIS-SR = Self-reflection scale; SRIS-IN = Insight scale; ANX = DASS-21 anxiety scale:
STRESS = DASS-21 stress scale; DEP = DASS-21 depression scale; CFS = Cognitive Flexibility
Scale; SCS = Self-control Schedule.
* significant with a one-tailed test.
supports the need for a measure of private self-consciousness that differentiates
between self-reflection and insight.
Scores on the SRIS-IN negatively correlated with measures of depression,
anxiety and stress, and with alexithymia, and positively correlated with measures
of cognitive flexibility and self-regulation. These findings provide support for
the convergent validity of the SRIS-IN.
Scores on SRIS-SR did not correlate with measures of cognitive flexibility or
self-regulation. There were positive correlations between the SRIS-SR and
measures of anxiety and stress, but there was no relationship between SRIS-SR
and depression and alexithymia.
Individuals who did not keep diaries had lower scores on the SRIS-SR than did
those who had kept diaries (Table 3). However, diary keeping was not associat-
ed with higher levels of insight; scores on the SRIS-IN were lower for those who
had kept diaries. There were no differences for self-regulation, depression, or
stress, nor for cognitive flexibility. However, using a one-tailed test there was a
significant difference between groups for anxiety, with journal-keepers being
significantly more anxious than individuals who did not keep journals.
There was a nonsignificant correlation between the SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR (r
= -.08, p = .63) for participants who kept diaries and a significant negative cor-
relation for participants who did not keep diaries (r = -.37, p = .001).
A principal components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. Two
factors were specified. The emerging two factors accounted for 51% of the vari-
ance. Results are presented in Table 1.
These studies evaluate the validity of the SRIS, and explore the structure of
private self-consciousness and its relation to self-regulation. These studies pro-
vide support for the validity of the SRIS as a measure of self-reflection and
insight, and indicate that the SRIS is an advance on the PrSCS. Several findings
support this conclusion.
Firstly, in accord with some previous work with the PrSCS (e.g., Burnkrant &
Page, 1984) SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR loaded on different factors. A second factor
analysis confirmed this factorial structure. Further, the SRIS has more items than
the PrSCS, makes explicit reference to all three domains of human experience
(i.e., thoughts, feelings and behavior), and the internal and test-retest reliabilities
of the SRIS-IN and the SRIS-SR were better than those for the PrSCS.
The SRIS-IN demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity. It neg-
atively correlated with measures of depression, anxiety, stress and alexithymia,
and correlated positively with cognitive flexibility and self-regulation. The
SRIS-SR, which was designed to measure a constructive style of self-reflection,
was not related to depression. However, positive correlations between the SRIS-
SR and measures of anxiety were found. Based on previous arguments (e.g.,
Creed & Funder, 1998) this may indicate that the SRIS-SR may be tapping a dys-
functional rumination or self-focused style of self-reflection.
These studies have presented a number of original findings, some of which are
somewhat counterintuitive. These findings suggest that the relationship between
self-reflection, insight, self-regulation and goal attainment may be more com-
plex than originally thought.
The first study found an orthogonal relationship between SRIS-IN and SRIS-
SR. Drawing on the generic model of self-regulation presented in Figure 1, it
could be predicted that self-reflection should be positively correlated with levels
of insight.
Thus the orthogonal relationship between insight and self-reflection observed
in Study 1 is somewhat counterintuitive. This finding may be explained by the
notion that engagement in self-reflection does not necessary mean that one has
developed, or will develop, clarity of insight.
However, in contrast to the first study, Study 3 found that there was a signifi-
cant negative correlation between SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR for the total sample,
but also found that the relationship between SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR varied
between participants who kept journals and those who did not. This finding may
throw some light on inconsistencies evident in past research.
Past research on the PrSCS has found the relationship between self-reflection
and insight to be somewhat inconsistent. Creed and Funder (1998) found a sig-
nificant positive correlation between the PrSCS-ISA and the PrSCS-SR, where
Kingree and Ruback (1996) found an orthogonal relationship. Such inconsisten-
cies have tended to be explained by reference to the psychometric shortcomings
of the PrSCS. However, the improved psychometrics of the SRIS in terms of
number of items, internal constancy and test-retest reliability, reduce the chances
of such inconsistencies stemming purely from poor psychometrics.
Some of the factors that influence the relationship between self-reflection and
insight may include the extent to which an individual actually consciously
engages in acts of self-reflection, the psychological mechanisms and behaviors
that they use in the process of self-reflection, and the reason that they engage in
Individuals can engage in self-reflection in a number of different ways. For
some people self-reflection may be akin to an automatic appraisal process,
requiring little or no overt effort (Ekman, 1992). For others, self-reflection may
require conscious application of effort, and there is some evidence that individ-
uals prone to anxiety tend to utilise a conscious and purposeful approach to self-
reflection (Mansell, 2000).
To examine the effect of conscious and purposeful self-reflection or self-mon-
itoring on levels of insight and self-reflection, the responses of individuals who
kept a journal or diary in which they wrote about their thoughts and feelings
were compared with those who did not keep a journal or diary.
A correlational analysis found the correlations between the SRIS-IN and
SRIS-SR differed for journal-keepers and those who did not keep journals. For
journal-keepers there was a nonsignificant correlation between the SRIS-IN and
SRIS-SR (r = -.08, p = .63), and there was a significant negative correlation for
participants who did not keep diaries (r = -.37, p = .001).
This suggests that one confounding factor in previous research investigating
the relationship between self-reflection and insight may be the extent to which
participants engage in acts of conscious and purposeful self-reflection.
With regard to the differences for group means, contrary to predictions, diary
or journal-keeping was not associated with increased levels of insight; partici-
pants who did not keep diaries in fact had higher scores on the SRIS-IN. As
expected, individuals who had kept journals had significantly higher scores on
the SRIS-SR scale, a finding which provides further and unique support for the
validity of the SRIS-SR scale.
There are a number of possible explanations for the unexpected findings. For
those who did not keep journals, it could be that these individuals (who had high-
er levels of insight than did journal-keepers) did not engage in the kind of con-
scious and purposeful self-reflection measured by the SRIS-SR. For such indi-
viduals the self-reflection process and the experience of insight may be auto-
matic rather than deliberate.
For individuals who did keep journals, it could be that these individuals were
not explicitly keeping them in order to increase their levels of insight. Indeed,
Burt (1994) found that diary-keeping was often used as a means of providing an
outlet for expressing thoughts, feelings, and emotions - a strategy for discharg-
ing unpleasant emotions, rather than an explicit means of gaining insight. Thus,
it may be that participants who kept a journal were in some way stuck in a
process of self-focused self-reflection and self-examination.
The idea that journal-keeping participants in the present study were in some
way stuck in a process of self-focused self-reflection has some support also from
past work on the Transtheoretical Model of Change (Prochaska & DiClemente,
1984). Individuals who have difficulty in making changes tend to spend more
time thinking about their emotional reactions and ruminating on their problems
than actually focusing on solutions and attempting to change their behavior.
Indeed, Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, and Berg (1999) found that dysphoric
self-reflection is characterized by a focus on the negative emotional aspects of
personal problems rather than on a constructive problem-solving approach.
Thus, such individuals may well lack the skills or resources to move from self-
reflection through to action and insight (Grimley & Lee, 1997).
The findings that journal-keeping is not associated with increased insight and
self-regulation, and that there is not a positive correlation between the SRIS-SR
and SRIS-IN scales, appear to run counter to the self-regulatory model present-
ed in Figure 1. Thus, this model may need some revision.
This discussion suggests that there are different kinds of self-reflection
involved in the self-regulatory cycle and goal attainment. In relation to coping
with stress, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguish between a problem-focused
and an emotion-focused coping style. Adapting the approach of Lazarus and
Folkman for use in the present study, we can speculate that there are at least two
types of self-reflection.
One type may be a productive problem-solving or solution-focused approach
in which individuals constructively reflect on how best to reach their goals. The
other type may be a self-focused approach in which individuals attempt to under-
stand, contain or dissipate their negative emotional, cognitive and behavioral
reactions, rather than focusing on moving towards goal attainment.
This notion differentiates between problem-solving self-reflection (PS-SR)
and self-focused self-reflection (SF-SR). The term self-focused self-reflection is
used here in preference to the term emotion-focused, because this type of self-
reflection involves a focus on more than just emotions - it includes reflection on
cognitions and also on behavior.
Of course, individuals are likely to use both styles of self-reflection to some
extent, although showing a preference for one style over the other. The conjoint
use of problem- and self-focused coping style is commonplace. For example, in
an analysis of 1,332 episodes of coping with a wide range of life issues, Folkman
and Lazarus (1980) found that in 98% of the episodes both problem- and emo-
tion-focused coping styles were used.
According to this revised conceptualization, individuals who engage in SF-SR
are less likely to progress through the cycle of self-regulation towards goal
attainment. Such individuals would be more engaged in SF-SR than in PS-SR.
One would thus expect that SF-SR would be associated with difficulties in reach-
ing goals.
If this were the case then it can be hypothesized that as individuals systemati-
cally work towards the attainment of a specific goal which they had previously
been unable to attain (and this lack of attainment was due in part to being over-
ly engaged in SF-SR), their levels of insight would increase whilst their levels of
self-focused self-reflection would decrease. The present study could not test this
hypothesis, but such a study would provide useful insights into the metacogni-
tive factors involved in purposeful behavioral change such as that which occurs
in clinical or coaching practice.
There are a number of other limitations in the present series of studies. These
studies employed a relatively small and homogeneous sample drawn from an
undergraduate student population. Thus it is not clear to what extent these find-
ings will generalize across age and educational status. Future research should
seek to extend these findings with other populations. Further, the journal-keep-
ing participants were self-selected. Thus it is not clear whether the observed dif-
ferences in levels of self-reflection and insight are specifically related to journal-
keeping, or to some other factors.
It is of interest, however, that Accardo, Aboyoun, Alford and Cannon (1996)
found there were no significant differences in scores on personality inventories
between those who kept diaries and those who did not. Future research should
investigate these issues and also seek to extend the SRIS and develop scales
which further differentiate between SF-SR and PS-SR.
This paper documents the development and validation of a new measure of pri-
vate self-consciousness, the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale. The data present-
ed in this paper indicate that the SRIS is a valid and reliable measure of self-
reflection and insight which represents an advance on the much used, but oft crit-
icized PrSCS. This paper has presented a revised model of self-regulation and
goal attainment which distinguishes between SF-SR and PS-SR and has noted
that further development of PS-SR scales is needed.
This paper also presents data that begin to shed some light on the complex
relationship between self-reflection, insight, self-regulation and goal attainment.
Past research using the PrSCS has often found ambiguous and often contradic-
tory relationships between self-reflection and insight. The findings of this paper
suggest that these ambiguities may be due to the influence of factors such as
individuals’ skills in self-evaluation and the extent to which they actually engage
in conscious rather than automatic self-reflection through processes such as jour-
The development of this new measure of private self-consciousness provides
researchers with a new instrument with which to investigate and measure the
processes of self-reflection and insight, and in this way to further develop our
understanding of the sociocognitive and metacognitive processes central to pur-
poseful individual change.
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... Although the existing instruments claim to measure self-reflection or RP, they were developed for a variety of different purposes. For instance, some scales target the assessment of reflective learning process (Phan, 2009;Sobral, 2001), whereas others emphasised the level of involvement in RP (Aukes et al., 2007;Grant et al., 2002;Priddis & Rogers, 2018). Based on current research, it would be difficult for a professional or academic to know which tools designed to measure reflection are appropriate. ...
... Cohort Study SRIS (Not applicable, cited Grant's, 2002 study) The study examined the putting into practice reflection learnt from a short course. Two models were generated with the use of the SRIS and Commitment to Change (CTC) statements. ...
... The SRIS (Grant et al., 2002) was developed to examine levels of self-reflection and insight. The authors assert that self-reflection is a metacognitive factor that contributes to a purposeful and directed change, hence they developed the SRIS to inform individuals' performance by monitoring their reflective thinking and insight. ...
Reflective Practice (RP) is considered a crucial component of personal and professional learning. RP is regarded as a way that professionals learn from experience to understand and enhance their practice by responding appropriately to self-reflection. Despite playing a crucial role in healthcare settings, there is little agreement on how to assess RP. This study aims to systematically review self-rating instruments that assess RP in healthcare professionals. Peer review articles assessing RP in healthcare professionals using a self-rating instrument, published in English between 1998 and 2018 from PubMed, CINAHL, and PsychInfo databases, were considered for inclusion. Eighteen papers were appraised, the strengths and weaknesses of the measures were discussed in accordance with an adapted critical appraisal checklist. In general, all self-report instruments included in this review were potentially generalisable to healthcare professionals or health science programmes with some adaptation. Given the limited evidence for other measurement scales, the Reflective Questionnaire and Self-Reflection and Insight Scale are recommended for measuring RP within healthcare settings. Future research developing a standardised tool for the review of mixed-method, heterogeneous, questionnaire studies is strongly recommended. ARTICLE HISTORY
... Insight. The Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002) is a self-report measure of "selfreflection, the inspection and evaluation of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior, and insight, the clarity of understanding of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior" (p. 821). ...
... Items are rated on a Likert-type scale from 1 ϭ strongly disagree to 6 ϭ strongly agree, and a higher score indicates a higher level of insight. The SRIS-IN subscale has been shown to be positively associated with cognitive flexibility and self-control, both of which arise from awareness of one's cognition, emotion, and action (Grant et al., 2002). Positive association with the SRIS-IN subscale is thought to provide evidence of convergent validity for the COMPO self-understanding subscale. ...
Most measures of psychotherapy outcome focus on symptomatic change. However, clients often report other changes through therapy, such as increased self-acceptance. This study reports on the development and validation of the Complementary Measure of Psychotherapy Outcome (COMPO) that assesses different areas of psychological functioning deemed important by clients and therapists. Items were written based on a literature review of client-reported change and feedback from experienced therapists. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the initial 42-item COMPO administered to 264 psychotherapy clients. Iterative item reduction resulted in the final 12-item, four-factor solution, with factors named self-acceptance, self-knowledge, relationship quality, and consideration of others. This factor structure, along with a bifactor model that contains a general factor and the four domain-specific factors, was replicated on a sample of 571 adults in the community. The 12-item COMPO exhibits convergent validity with measures of self-esteem, insight, social support, and empathy; demonstrates 2-week test-retest reliability; and predicts life satisfaction. The 12-item COMPO was further administered to 28 clients in short-term psychodynamic therapy for depression. Except for consideration of others, COMPO subscales and total scale scores improved from pre- to posttherapy. Posttherapy COMPO scores were also higher among clients who experienced clinically significant change compared to those who did not. The COMPO was negatively associated with depressive symptoms and impairments in functioning across the three samples. The brevity of the COMPO makes it a convenient tool to supplement symptom-based measures for a more comprehensive assessment of outcome in psychotherapy.
... Each participant completed an oral consent process approved by Rocky Mountain University of Health Profession's Institutional Review Board. Theoretical sampling was used to select individuals based on results from instruments measuring selfreflection behavior (Grant et al., 2002) and EBP implementation (Melnyk et al. 2008). Eighteen participants were initially selected based on results from the Self-Reflection Insight Scale -Self Reflection subscale (SRIS) (Grant et al., 2002). ...
... Theoretical sampling was used to select individuals based on results from instruments measuring selfreflection behavior (Grant et al., 2002) and EBP implementation (Melnyk et al. 2008). Eighteen participants were initially selected based on results from the Self-Reflection Insight Scale -Self Reflection subscale (SRIS) (Grant et al., 2002). Scores on the SRIS ranged from 35 to 72. ...
The purpose of this study was to explore how reflective practice is experienced by occupational therapists. Thirty participants were purposefully sampled to explore reflective practice experiences using a critical reflection inquiry model as a theoretical framework. Grounded theory using a constant comparative analysis method was used to analyze interview data. Three categories emerged: triggers to reflection, depth of reflection, and actions taken. The frequency of statements compared across survey groups showed that participants with high reflection behaviors made more critical reflections, used steps of the EBP cycle, and took actions to correct practice. Results inform practice in three ways: (1) practitioner experiences were analyzed through the complete reflective practice construct, (2) findings indicated that greater depth of reflective thinking promotes EBP use and actions taken to correct practice, and (3) narrative content analysis was found to be a credible method of assessing reflection within practice narratives , suggesting it as useful for education and promoting continuing competency.
... The 20-item Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS) [78] assessed participants' tendency toward self-reflection (eg, "I frequently examine my feelings") and self-understanding or insight (eg, "I usually know why I feel the way I do"). Items are rated on a 6-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree) and yield subscales for self-reflection and insight, with higher scores indicating greater self-reflection or insight. ...
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Background A growing number of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) suggest psychological benefits associated with meditation training delivered via mobile health. However, research in this area has primarily focused on mindfulness, only one of many meditative techniques. Objective This study aims to evaluate the efficacy of 2 versions of a self-guided, smartphone-based meditation app—the Healthy Minds Program (HMP)—which includes training in mindfulness (Awareness), along with practices designed to cultivate positive relationships (Connection) or insight into the nature of the self (Insight). Methods A three-arm, fully remote RCT compared 8 weeks of one of 2 HMP conditions (Awareness+Connection and Awareness+Insight) with a waitlist control. Adults (≥18 years) without extensive previous meditation experience were eligible. The primary outcome was psychological distress (depression, anxiety, and stress). Secondary outcomes were social connection, empathy, compassion, self-reflection, insight, rumination, defusion, and mindfulness. Measures were completed at pretest, midtreatment, and posttest between October 2019 and April 2020. Longitudinal data were analyzed using intention-to-treat principles with maximum likelihood. Results A total of 343 participants were randomized and 186 (54.2%) completed at least one posttest assessment. The majority (166/228, 72.8%) of those assigned to HMP conditions downloaded the app. The 2 HMP conditions did not differ from one another in terms of changes in any outcome. Relative to the waitlist control, the HMP conditions showed larger improvements in distress, social connectedness, mindfulness, and measures theoretically linked to insight training (d=–0.28 to 0.41; Ps≤.02), despite modest exposure to connection- and insight-related practice. The results were robust to some assumptions about nonrandom patterns of missing data. Improvements in distress were associated with days of use. Candidate mediators (social connection, insight, rumination, defusion, and mindfulness) and moderators (baseline rumination, defusion, and empathy) of changes in distress were identified. Conclusions This study provides initial evidence of efficacy for the HMP app in reducing distress and improving outcomes related to well-being, including social connectedness. Future studies should attempt to increase study retention and user engagement. Trial Registration NCT04139005;
... Daily confirmed COVID-19 deaths were obtained from daily morning reports by each city's health department. Employees rated perceived COVID-19-triggered mortality salience with two items adapted from Grant, Franklin, and Langford (2002) (e.g., "Today, I frequently examined my feelings about COVID-19 related deaths"). Employees rated state anxiety with three items from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988; e.g., "nervous", 1 ϭ not at all to 7 ϭ very much); job engagement with a nine-item scale from Schaufeli, Bakker, and Salanova (2006) (e.g., "Today, I felt strong and vigorous at my job"); prosocial behavior with three items from Rodell (2013) (e.g., "Today, I gave my time to help a volunteer group"); and perceived servant leadership with a 7-item scale from Liden et al. (2015; e.g., "My supervisor makes my career development a priority"). ...
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a disruptive event devastating to the workplace and the global community. Drawing on terror management theory, we develop and test a model that explains how COVID-19-triggered mortality salience influences employees' state anxiety and their responses at and outside work. We conducted an experience sampling method study using employees from an information technology firm in China when COVID-19 was surging there and two experiments using employees from a variety of industries in the United States when it became a new epicenter of the global outbreak. Results from 3 studies largely supported our theoretical hypotheses. Specifically, our research showed that mortality salience concerning COVID-19 was positively related to employees' state anxiety (general anxiety in Study 1 and Study 2 and death-specific anxiety in Study 3). Our studies also found that servant leadership is particularly crucial in guiding employees with state anxiety associated with COVID-19 mortality salience to be engaged in their jobs and to contribute more to the broader community. Our findings offer timely, valuable implications for theory and practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
... Teilen davon abgedeckt (ausführlich in Appendix 1):i. Self-reflection and insight scale(Grant et al., 2002): Deckt die Gewahrseinsebene für innere Zustände und Prozesse ab. ...
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In this article, we elaborate a first definition of a sustainability-oriented 'time shaping competency'.
... Nevertheless, the findings we report here are consistent with what we presented previously in Campbell et al. (2018) and lend support to the premise that engineering students can develop their capacity for reflection through arts-and humanities-based activities. We are finding measurable and significant increases in the self-reported abilities of engineering students to engage in reflective thinking as operationalized by: a. Insight which is "the clarity of understanding of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior" (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). In this case, we report statistical significance of p < 0.02 with a modest effect size of d > 0.3 b. ...
Conference Paper
Can the arts and humanities provide key perspectives for engineers in developing awareness of and interest in the environmental and sociotechnical impacts of engineering? How might essential habits and skills necessary for engineers to meaningfully address these impacts be learned using the arts and humanities? We are exploring such questions under a grant from the National Science Foundation to develop and assess a curriculum that explores methods of fostering reflective habits and skills in graduate students through activities involving the arts and humanities. Largely informed by the theories of John Dewey, Elliot Eisner, and Donald Schön, our experimental curriculum includes such activities as autobiographical writing with an accompanying art creation, reading about and discussing ethical dilemmas, practicing visual thinking strategies (VTS), writing weekly reflective essays, reading and discussing fiction with strong environmental justice themes, and even collaborating on art projects with graduate students in the School of Art. Incorporating aspects of the arts and humanities to complement engineering thought and action is a critical component of our work, which we describe as developing reflective engineers through artful methods. In this paper, we present findings from two instantiations of a newly designed graduate course in civil/environmental engineering that integrates the arts and humanities. The objective of our course is to develop engineers who are more reflective than traditionally trained engineers and are thereby better able to: (a) understand and address the complexities of modern real-world challenges, (b) make better ethical decisions, and (c) serve the public not only with technical engineering skills but with mindfulness of and sensitivity to the complex social, cultural, and environmental contexts their work. Thus far, results have been encouraging from both our surveys (reported here) and our analyses of student interviews and writing samples (reported elsewhere). For example, aggregate results from the pre/post Likert-type surveys (n = 19) showed statistically significant increases in Insight, which is a metacognitive factor central to the process of purposeful & directed change (p < 0.02, d > 0.3) and in Contextual Competence, which is an engineering-specific measure of contextual understand (p < 0.001, d > 0.8). We also observed potentially significant increases in Reflective Skepticism (p < 0.1, d > 0.3), which is a measure of reflection regarding the tendency to learn from one’s past experiences and be questioning of evidence, and in Interdisciplinary Skills (p < 0.3, d > 0.3). These self-reported survey results, despite the small number of participants, suggest clear potential that engineering students can develop their capacity for reflection through arts- and humanities-based activities.
... Reflection denote conscious thoughts about TESSERA sequences, but they are not conceptualized as a component of TESSERA sequences themselves because they can refer to several TESSERA components (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Reflection on an experience can encompass remembering, evaluating and actively restructuring the memory of the situation, PROCESSES OF PERSONALITY CHANGE 19 the behavior, associated expectancies, as well as own or others' reactions (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002;Mayer, 2004;Staudinger, 2001;Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, reflective processes should play a crucial role in the development of explicit, but not implicit selfconcepts (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). ...
This study examined daily life processes and their contribution to long-term continuity and change in explicit and implicit representations of Big 5 traits. The TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) served as theoretical background to derive predictions on 3 linked research questions (RQ) regarding (a) trait-state associations (RQ1); (b) antecedents and consequences of personality states (RQ2); as well as (c) processes of personality development (RQ3). We assessed Big 5 traits using self-ratings (i.e., BFI-44) and implicit association tests 4 times across 2 years in a sample of 382 younger (Mage = 21.57 years) and older (Mage = 67.76 years) adults. We also assessed momentary processes in multiple waves of daily diaries (total M = 43.9 days) focusing on people's most memorable daily experience. As predicted in RQ1, all self-rated traits, and implicit associations of self with conscientiousness, agreeableness, or emotional stability predicted subsequent trait-relevant situations and states. Regarding RQ2 across all trait domains, momentary processes could be generalized as sequences of Triggering situations, Expectancies, States and State Expressions, and ReActions (i.e., TESSERA sequences). With respect to RQ3, states were associated with long-term changes in self-rated conscientiousness and agreeableness, and self-rated and implicitly measured extraversion. Our findings further support the assumption that momentary experiences in daily life can contribute to long-term Big 5 changes, and extend previous research by examining implicit self-concepts and changes therein. The findings highlight the role of triggering situations, expectancies, reactions, and reflection in personality development in addition to trait-relevant states. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
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Einleitung. Die Wirksamkeit von internetbasierten Interventionen zur Behandlung psychischer Störungen kann als belegt angesehen werden. Jedoch ist noch weitgehend unklar, welche Faktoren ihre Effektivität beeinflussen. In dieser Arbeit wurde die zugehörige Wissensbasis daher dargestellt und erweitert. Dabei wurde der Einfluss der Programmdauer und des Einsatzes von Chat-Beratung auf die Wirksamkeit untersucht. Zudem wurde geprüft, welchen Effektivitätsvorteil Beratungsprogramme gegenüber einfacher E Mail-Beratung haben. Daneben wurden verschiedene potenzielle Wirkprädiktoren ausgewertet. Methoden. Es wurden drei Online-Studien an zwei internetbasierten Beratungsprogrammen durchgeführt. Studie 1 ist eine zweifaktorielle Experimentalstudie, in der das Vorhandensein chatbasierter Beratung und die Dauer der Intervention systematisch variiert wurden. Studie 2 ist eine randomisiert-kontrollierte Untersuchung, in der Teilnehmende entweder einem Beratungsprogramm, E-Mail-Beratung oder einer Wartegruppe zugewiesen wurden. Studie 3 ist eine Sekundäranalyse der Daten aus Studie 1. In ihr wurde untersucht, welche Merkmale eine erfolgreiche Programmnutzung vorhersagen. Die Ergebnisse der drei Studien wurden in den aktuellen Forschungsstand integriert. Zuvor wurde eine theoriegeleitete Systematik zur Darstellung der Evidenz entwickelt. Ergebnisse. Wirkfaktoren internetgestützter Interventionen können den folgenden Ebenen zugeordnet werden: den Nutzenden, der Umwelt, der Intervention und interaktionsspezifischen Merkmalen. Die Studien der Dissertation beziehen sich primär auf die Ebene der Intervention und auf die der Nutzenden. An Studie 1 und ihrer Sekundäranalyse Studie 3 nahmen n=534 Personen teil. Studie 2 verzeichnete n=167 Teilnehmende. In Studie 1 zeigten sich weder im Faktor „chatbasierte Beratung“ (p ≥ .63) noch im Faktor „Programmdauer“ (p ≥ .20) signifikante Effektunterschiede. In Studie 2 erreichte das Beratungsprogramm im Vergleich zur Wartegruppe in allen Indikatoren mittlere bis starke Effekte (d ≥ 0,55; p ≤ .023). E-Mail-Beratung erzielte dagegen nur in einem Merkmal signifikante Effekte (d = 0,74; p = .022). Zwischen dem Programm und der E-Mail-Beratung zeigten sich jedoch keine signifikanten Differenzen (p ≥ .25). In Studie 3 wurde das Programmziel „Konsumabstinenz“ (p < .001) als der wichtigste Erfolgsprädiktor identifiziert. Diskussion. Die Wirksamkeit mehrwöchiger Beratungsinterventionen lässt sich womöglich nur begrenzt durch eine höhere Betreuungsintensität steigern. Die tendenzielle Überlegenheit von Beratungsprogrammen gegenüber einfacher E-Mail-Beratung ist vermutlich darin begründet, dass mithilfe ihrer multimodularen Struktur Interventionstechniken besser umgesetzt werden können. Aufseiten der Nutzenden verweisen die Ergebnisse auf die Wichtigkeit individueller Verhaltensziele. Wirkfaktoren internetgestützter Interventionen sollten verstärkt und systematischer erforscht werden.
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Hardiness has been identified as a key personal characteristic that may moderate the ill-effects of stress on health and performance. However, little is known about how hardiness might be developed, particularly in sport coaches. To systematically address this gap, we present two linked studies. First, interviews were conducted with pre-determined high-hardy, elite coaches (n = 13) to explore how they had developed their hardy dispositions through the associated attitudinal sub-components of control, commitment, and challenge. Utilizing thematic analysis, we identified that hardiness was developed through experiential learning, external support, and the use of specific coping mechanisms. Key to all of these themes was the concept of reflective practice, which was thought to facilitate more meaningful learning from the participants’ experiences and, subsequently, enhance the self-awareness and insight required to augment hardiness and its sub-components. To investigate further the potential relationship between coaches’ reflective practices and their level of hardiness, we conducted a follow-up study. Specifically, a sample of 402 sports coaches completed the Dispositional Resilience Scale-15, the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, and the Questionnaire for Reflective Thinking. Using latent profile analysis (LPA), we clustered participants into groups based on their reflective profiles (e.g., type of engagement, level of reflective thinking). We then examined differences in hardiness between the five latent sub-groups using multinomial regression. Findings revealed that the sub-group of highly engaged, intentionally critical reflective thinkers reported significantly higher levels of all three hardiness sub-components than all other sub-groups; these effect sizes were typically moderate-to-large in magnitude (standardized mean differences = −1.50 to −0.10). Conversely, the profile of highly disengaged, non-reflective, habitual actors reported the lowest level of all three dimensions. Collectively, our findings offer novel insights into the potential factors that may influence a coaches’ level of hardiness. We provide particular support for the importance of reflective practice as a meta-cognitive strategy that helps coaches to develop hardy dispositions through augmenting its attitudinal sub-components. Consequently, our research makes a significant contribution by providing a comprehensive insight into how we might better train and support coaches to demonstrate the adaptive qualities required to thrive in demanding situations.
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Addressing shortcomings of the self-report Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), two studies were conducted to reconstruct the item domain of the scale. The first study resulted in the development of a new twenty-item version of the scale—the TAS-20. The TAS-20 demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and a three-factor structure theoretically congruent with the alexithymia construct. The stability and replicability of this three-factor structure were demonstrated in the second study with both clinical and nonclinical populations by the use of confirmatory factor analysis.
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A distinction between ruminative and reflective types of private self-attentiveness is introduced and evaluated with respect to L. R. Goldberg's (1982) list of 1,710 English trait adjectives (Study 1), the five-factor model of personality (FFM) and A. Fenigstein, M. F. Scheier, and A. Buss's(1975) Self-Consciousness Scales (Study 2), and previously reported correlates and effects of private self-consciousness (PrSC; Studies 3 and 4). Results suggest that the PrSC scale confounds two unrelated motivationally distinct disposition-rumination and reflection-and that this confounding may account for the "self-absorption paradox" implicit in PrSC research findings: Higher PrSC sources are associated with more accurate and extensive self-knowledge yet higher levels of psychological distress. The potential of the FFM to provide a comprehensive Framework for conceptualizing self-attentive dispositions, and to order and integrate research findings within this domain, is discussed.
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Psychological mindedness (PM) has long been considered to be an important mediator of therapy outcome. However, to date, definitions of PM have been typified by linguistic imprecision and lack of conceptual clarity. Further, most definitions and measures of PM have approached the task from a psychodynamic perspective, thus limiting the use of this construct by clinicians and researchers from other theoretical perspectives. In this paper, previous definitions and self-report measures are reviewed and a new definition proposed. It is argued that PM is best conceptualised as a form of metacognition: a predisposition to engage in metacognitive acts of inquiry into how and why people behave, think, and feel in the way that they do. A new model, based on this definition, suggests that PM may be assessed by measuring individuals' metacognitive processes of self-reflection and insight, circumventing many of the problems associated with previous self-report measures of PM. Research into individual differences in propensity for PM, self-reflection, and insight may well provide the clinician with additional tools with which to facilitate purposeful, directed change in both clinical and nonclinical populations.
Directed diary keeping is an important method of gathering data for various therapeutic and research purposes. Little information, however, has been collected on spontaneously kept diaries. A questionnaire relating to personal diary keeping and five personality inventories were administered to 101 undergraduates. Analysis suggested that women keep diaries more often and at an earlier age than men. Also, information regarding diary content and reasons for starting and stopping a diary are discussed. Surprisingly, scores on personality inventories were not significantly different for respondents who had kept a diary than scores for those who had not.
The Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) private and public self-consciousness scales were administered to two samples of blood donors as part of longitudinal research on commitment to donation: 658 U.S. voluntary donors who were contacted by mail and 256 Polish donors, some paid, some volunteer, who were interviewed. A principal axis factor analysis of the U.S. data extracted essentially the same three-factor solution obtained by Burnkrant and Page (1984) and by Lennox, Welch, Wolfe, Zimmerman, and Dixon (1987), rather than the expected two factors obtained originally by Fenigstein et al. and by Scheier and Carver (1985) in a recent replication. The same two subfactors of the original private self-consciousness scale were found in the Polish data. These two subscales correlate in opposite directions with a measure of identity seeking in both data sets, and with self-esteem in the Polish data. Further conceptual and psychometric work to clarify the importance of this factorial structure is suggested.
The aim of the study was to analyze the psychometric properties of public and private subscales of the self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–527, 1975) on a sample of Turkish University students. Two pilot studies were carried out to explore the efficacy of the translated version. Then, in the main study, the final reliability and construct validity analysis were carried out on a sample of 253 students from various departments of Middle East Technical University. Results confirmed both the two factor structure of the private self-consciousness scale which had been reported by Bunkrant and Page (Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 629–637, 1984), and Piliavin and Chamg (Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14, 587–595, 1988) and the psychometric properties of the public self-consciousness scale which had been reported in the original study (Fenigstein et al., 1975). The Turkish version of each subscale is seemingly applicable on Turkish populations.