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The Crime of Genocide under International Law
Abstract
The article sets out the nature, the history and the general structure of the crime of genocide and provides a comprehensive analytical commentary of the elements of the crime. Against the current trend of the international case law to expand the boundaries of the definition at the risk of the crime's trivialization this article develops a strict construction even if the results may appear politically unattractive. The article starts from the premise that, for all practical purposes, the occurrence of a crime of genocide entails a collective destructive act. This collective act forms the objective point of reference of the required intent to destroy a protected group in whole or in part; the vain hope of an individual to contribute, by way of commission of one of the underlying offences, to the destruction of a group falls short of this concept of a realistic genocidal intent. The article rejects a purely subjective definition of the various categories of protected groups and cautions against the conversion of the crime of genocide into an unspecific crime of massive human rights violations based on discriminatory motive. At the same time, it is submitted that not every campaign of so-called
... De este modo, a pesar de que existe una creciente preocupación por evitar la trivialización del genocidio cuando el elemento contextual arriba mencionado no es considerado parte del mismo, lo cierto es que el legado jurisprudencial del TPIY no ha cerrado formalmente la puerta al denominado genocidio solitario (Schabas, 2006), por improbable que el mismo pueda resultar (Kreß, 2006). ...
... Por su parte, Kreß (2006) considera que los trabajos preparatorios de la Convención contra el Genocidio, el alcance dado a su definición en el juicio de Eichman (1961) (en el que se trató de establecer la existencia de una campaña genocida) y los intentos por probar ante el TPIR un genocidio de ámbito nacional en Ruanda y ante el TPIY una empresa criminal genocida para cometer la masacre de Srebrenica, demuestran la necesidad de categorizar adecuadamente la potencialidad destructiva del genocidio y de no desconocer su calidad de crimen sistemático. En consecuencia, para evitar posibles contradicciones entre el artículo 6 del ECPI y los EC, propone que el elemento contextual sea entendido, no como un elemento objetivo del crimen, sino "como un punto de referencia objetivo para la determinación de una auténtica intención genocida" (Kreß, 2009, p. 299). ...
El presente capítulo explora el legado jurisprudencial del TPIY sobre el contenido del principio nullum crimen sine iure en el derecho internacional consuetudinario (sección 1) y sobre el elemento contextual del crimen de genocidio (sección 2). A continuación, compara este legado con la primera jurisprudencia de la CPI sobre ambas cuestiones (sección 3). Finalmente, en la sección 4 se exponen las principales conclusiones alcanzadas.
... More precisely, it has been maintained that Act of war crimes and Act of crimes against humanity are perpetrated by individuals and not by impersonal forces, and that international law can only be upheld and implemented by punishing those responsible for such horrible crimes. Nevertheless, a convincing argument could be made that the establishment of these tribunals heralds a revolutionary change in international law (Kreß, 2006). ...
The creation of Special Tribunals with authority to prosecute those accused of "grave breaches" and infringements of the law towards humanity was among the most significant breakthroughs in international law. Unquestionably, this is a recent worldwide development that has raised questions about sovereignty and impunity. Since the horrors committed by the Nazis and the Nuremberg trials, war crimes legislation has expanded its definition to include several offenses that are now referred to as "international crimes" and "crimes of genocide." Although it was created to combat the politics of punishment for those who commit these crimes, some member states are unwilling to prosecute people who commit these recognized international crimes. In fact, the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) was drafted due to the jurisprudence established by these Special Tribunals. More precisely, it has been maintained that Act of war crimes and Act of crimes against humanity are perpetrated by individuals and not by impersonal forces, and that international law can only be upheld and implemented by punishing those responsible for such horrible crimes. Nevertheless, a convincing argument could be made that the establishment of these tribunals heralds a revolutionary change in international law. The qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.
... The International Court of Justice (ICJ) contemplated on banning genocide, which was commonplace as late as 1951. Finally in 2006, the ICJ acknowledged that declaring genocide as forbidden corresponded to jus cogens (Kreß, 2006). However, compared to the ICC, the ICJ does not play an important role in preventing genocide crimes as defined in the CPPCG. ...
Genocide is an international crime against humanity under international law. The legal and international framework of genocide is stated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) of 9 December 1948. Likewise, the international community is duty bound to obligate the legal framework of genocide. The Faily Kurdish people were subjected to mass killings, disappearance, chemical weapon attack, homelessness and expatriation, as well as being forced to evacuate their hometowns due to their fight for political, ethnic, economic, and cultural rights since decades ago. Thus far, the international community has not acknowledged such tragic events as genocide under international law. Therefore, this paper examines whether the mass killings of the Faily Kurdish People are an international crime of genocide under international law, whether the International Criminal Court can hear the case, and whether the Iraqi federal government is legally bound to compensate the families of the genocide victims. The paper explores and utilizes secondary source materials to cross-examine arguments and draw conclusions.
... 22 Such understanding, however, denies the term 'national' a distinct meaning, which is contrary to the basic canon of treaty interpretation that each term of the treaty ought to be interpreted to have a distinct meaning. 23 The ordinary meaning of the term 'nation' is 'a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory'. 24 A nation is therefore a distinct entity united by common traits, be it history, culture, traditions, language, ethnicity or race. ...
The new wave of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, and the intensification of the armed conflict accompanied by grave breaches of international humanitarian law, has received significant scholarly attention. Many academic interventions have examined the developments in Ukraine through the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Some, however, have applied a genocide lens to make sense of reported numerous and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This article contributes to the latter stream of scholarship by contextualizing the arguments for the existence of genocidal intent behind the seemingly unrelated crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation all over Ukraine. The authors pay particular attention to the language and pseudo-historical references used by Russia’s leaders as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine and argue that these statements and expressions indicate the existence of genocidal intent. This article also reflects on the issue of the systematic destruction of cultural heritage of Ukraine as further evidence of the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation understood as a protected national group under the Genocide Convention, at least in part. Finally, the authors analyse the genocidal acts that have apparently been committed, including killings; the causing of serious bodily or mental harm; the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the deliberate infliction of conditions of life aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the destruction of the Ukrainian nation by Russia has been pursued through commission of these prohibited acts. Their nature and large-scale character serve as further evidence of genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
... ENDNOTES 1 We deliberately use the term in the plural as the construction of the "Australian Aboriginal" or "Indigenous Australians" as a singular is itself a work of the colonising imagination which failed to recognise the plurality of First Nations that already had deep roots across the Australian continent when the British first made their outlandish claims of possession-by-arrival. Although the act of genocide was not defined as a crime international law until the passage of the UN Convention on Genocide (Kress, 2006), and Australia ratified the Convention in 1949, enabling legislation in Australia was controversially delayed until 2002 (Scott, 2004), meaning that retrospective application of the term to policies, acts, and events in Australia's colonial (and more recent) past remains contested (see eg. Barta, 2008aBarta, , 2008bBehrendt, 2001;Fredericks, Maynor, White, English, & Ehrich, 2014;Kerruish, 1998;Maynard, 2017;Reynolds, 2001;Tatz, 2017). Many First Nations peoples faced genocidal intent and genocidal action as their existence and resistance challenged the fanciful British claim that they simultaneously did not exist and were too primitive to be recognised as self-governing nations. ...
Macquarie University takes its name from a man known simultaneously as the founding father of Australia, its greatest colonial administrator, a key inspiration for Australia’s egalitarian ethos, the military strategist who authorised the Appin Massacre, and committed civiliser of the uncivilised native peoples of Sydney who established the first institutions aimed at educating Aboriginal children by separating from their families, culture, and language. This article explores Macquarie’s ambiguous legacy and considers how it is mobilised to promote the university. It discusses how the university community might engage with the “Macquarie legacy” and take responsibility for its implications for Macquarie University. Decolonising this particular university must involve much more than simple renaming—although even that would be far from simple. Transformation of the institution into a partner with Dharug and other Indigenous groups must involve uncomfortable and ultimately transformational reflection and action on the purposes, processes, and outcomes of education, on the nature and purposes of partnership, and more generally on the nature of decolonising transformations.
... The following footnote to the crime of genocide by causing substantial bodily or mental injury is found in this document named "Elements of Crimes": "Acts of torture, rape, sexual violence, or cruel or humiliating treatment may be included, but are not necessarily limited to." 49 The absolute prohibition of torture has been widely acknowledged as an element of customary international law and is thus binding on all nations, not only those who have signed the Convention. Those who become signatories to anti-torture treaties. ...
This research paper is aimed at genocide educators and students all over the world. It isn't just about recounting the genocide's history; that has already been done. Instead, this paper focuses on four genocide-related conceptual areas, posing two common questions: how do these concerns become relevant to understanding the genocide, and how does knowing the genocide reveal these themes? Ethnicity, outside influences, gender difficulties, and environmental issues are just a few of the topics discussed. None of these problems are unique to genocide; thus, "distancing" genocide to a faraway, "exotic" location can be dangerous. This research work also aims to clarify the concept of the Gregory model on genocide and the genocide convention. The Psychology of Terrorism and torture-related clauses on genocide are also available to the reader.
... 772-865;Shelton et al 2005, pp. 395-397;Kress 2015;May 2010;Schabas 2009;Boot 2002, pp. 401-454;Schabas 2016, pp. ...
This chapter deals with comparing the protective scope of crimes under international law (genocide, war crimes and aggression) with protected legal interests of crimes against humanity. The aim here is try to reveal the problematic areas in that scope, and analyze whether and how the conceptual theory of humanness offered in Chap. 4 could be instrumental – or not – in clarifying those problematic elements. In that vein, the chapter first looks at the basic differences between crimes against humanity and other core crimes as those inevitably affect their respective protective scopes. It then moves on to reviewing the exact protected values of each group of core crimes: genocide (three dimensions of interests), war crimes (considerations of humaneness and other values) and the crime of aggression (peace, security and well-being of the world), and to how the proposed conceptual view of humanness helps in clarifying, or otherwise, the protective scopes of crimes under international law.
The 1948 Genocide Convention is a vital legal tool in the international campaign against impunity. Its provisions, including its enigmatic definition of the crime and its pledge both to punish and to prevent the 'crime of crimes', have now been considered in important judgments by the International Court of Justice, the international criminal tribunals and domestic courts. Since the second edition appeared in 2009, there have been important new judgments as well as attempts to apply the concept of genocide to a range of conflicts. Attention is given to the concept of protected groups, to problems of criminal prosecution and to issues of international judicial cooperation, such as extradition. The duty to prevent genocide and its relationship with the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect' are also explored.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is fundamentally transforming human interactions, key processes and systems that underpin modern society, from decision-making mechanisms to information flows, economic structures, and international relations. While its potential is comprehensive, AI introduces significant risks, such as reduced human autonomy, algorithmic bias, data privacy threats, and challenges in accountability for algorithmic harm. Emerging technologies, such as embodied AI and large language models, exacerbate these risks, affecting human-machine interactions and raising concerns about environmental sustainability and human rights across the AI value chain.
In response to far-reaching societal impacts of AI, policymakers are increasingly adopting a human rights lens for AI governance. However, the regulatory landscape remains fragmented and characterized by Western led initiatives as well as inconsistent enforcement. To address these limitations, a unified and binding international framework is urgently needed.
The proposed Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights (drafted as the "Munich Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights") is an initiative toward such a framework. Developed with contributions from over 50 global experts, it proposes an international convention to align AI governance with human rights principles. This whitepaper explores the underlying rationale behind the convention, emphasizing its alignment with the norms and principles articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. It examines the relevance of safeguards against AI's misuse in facilitating human rights violations, with particular focus on protecting underrepresented or marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples, and addressing collective rights. It furthermore points to the necessity to codify rights that empower individuals to opt out, be forgotten, seek explanations, and access remedies to maintain adequate human rights standards in the context of AI.
The urgency to act arises from the escalating impact of AI and the rapid pace of political and technological advancements. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is particularly well poised to play a leading role in initiating global discussions on a binding convention for AI governance, grounded in human rights principles. Drawing on its established mandate to uphold human rights globally, the UNHRC has a record of successfully embedding human rights principles into international frameworks, as demonstrated by its endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Through dedicated action around promoting a convention on AI and human rights, the UNHRC can foster international consensus and proactively shape the future of AI in a manner that prioritizes the values and principles enshrined in the key documents of international human rights law.
This chapter addresses the legal implications of defining genocide as an endangerment crime in relation to the actus reus. It begins by reinterpreting the ICC's approach in the Al Bashir case, demonstrating how the court effectively positioned the contextual element as an objective threshold for the crime's consummation, aligning it more with the material elements of genocide rather than its subjective components. The chapter then examines how the collective context of perpetration shapes the structure of the crime and its application to various genocidal acts, including killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's destruction. Through this analysis, the chapter explores the relationship between individual harm and collective endangerment within the frameworks of result-based and conduct-based genocidal acts. It also addresses the argument that while some genocidal acts are inherently collective, others may be perpetrated by a lone actor. The chapter concludes with a discussion of substantiality and its implications within the legal framework of genocide.
This chapter focuses on the legal value underlying the prohibition of genocide. It examines how different legal traditions, particularly the harm principle in common law and the Rechtsgut theory in civil law, converge in safeguarding fundamental values in the realm of criminal law. Building on the doctrine and analyses of domestic law, it articulates a trans-subjective approach vis-à-vis the protected legal value of the law on genocide, reconciling the subjective and objective elements of the existing theories. In this constellation, the protected group serves as the critical link between intent (mens rea) and action (actus reus). The analysis is extended to the classification of national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups, arguing for a nuanced understanding that reflects the complex interplay between group identity, legal definitions, and the collective right to exist. Ultimately, the chapter underscores the importance of balancing the subjective and objective aspects of genocide to maintain the integrity of international criminal law.
This chapter addresses one of the most complex aspects of genocide—the crime’s mens rea, which sets it apart from both common law offenses and other core international crimes. After reviewing how genocidal intent has been interpreted in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the chapter explores the realistic components of genocide’s general and special intent. The discussion includes an analysis of the existing theories of genocidal intent, focusing on both the purpose-based and knowledge-based approaches. Common misunderstandings, such as the assumption that the knowledge-based approach is a recent or innovative concept, are clarified. Additionally, the chapter examines the fundamental premises of the knowledge-based theory, emphasizing the role of taxonomy or hierarchy among different types of offenders in the commission of genocide. Through this examination, the chapter seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the mens rea that underpins the crime of genocide and its unique legal significance.
This chapter seeks to bridge the gap between the social and legal interpretations of genocide by exploring the complex processes that define and transform targeted groups through mechanisms of stigmatization, othering, and dehumanization. It critically examines how legal frameworks, particularly those rooted in the Genocide Convention, often compartmentalize the phenomenon of genocide into rigid judicial constructs that may overlook the broader sociological realities. The chapter argues for a more integrative approach that considers the continuum of genocide, from initial targeting and othering to the ultimate destruction of the group, and underscores the importance of understanding the dynamic and trans-subjective nature of group identity in the context of genocide. By engaging with both legal and non-legal perspectives, the chapter highlights the challenges and necessities of aligning legal norms with the social realities of genocidal processes to ensure both justice and the protection of vulnerable groups
This chapter addresses the legal challenges posed by introducing the contextual element in the structure of the crime of genocide through the Elements of Crimes (EOC) and examines the relationship between the collective context of perpetration and the structure of the crime of genocide. Genocide is analyzed as an endangerment crime, exploring the various nuances that the structure of endangerment acquires when incorporated into inchoate genocidal offenses, specifically focusing on direct and public incitement and conspiracy as outlined in Article III(b)–(c) of the Genocide Convention. These inchoate offenses are chosen as the starting point due to their role in the preventive function of the Convention. They identify the existential risks that the law seeks to address and suppress criminal conduct that threatens the protected legal interest, even when such conduct falls short of genocide proper. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how these offenses reflect the broader preventive logic of the Genocide Convention and the challenges of aligning the legal framework with the realities of perpetrations, namely the collective and contextual nature of genocide.
This chapter critically examines the prevailing understanding of grouphood within the context of genocide law, highlighting the challenges and shortcomings of current interpretations. A thorough critique of the increasingly popular perpetrator-based subjectivity in constructing the four groups, particularly among legal scholars, is offered. By revisiting the concept of grouphood from historical, teleological, and victimological perspectives, the chapter aims to illuminate its original conceptualization by the drafters, its interpretation by international lawyers at the time, and its evolution in State practice prior to the 1990s. Through a contextual analysis of the first significant international criminal trial on genocide, the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu at the ICTR, core criticisms of the so-called ‘objective’ interpretation of the four groups are reassessed, the ‘permanent and stable’ formula is reconstructed, and the notion of involuntariness in defining protected grouphood is explored.
This chapter proposes a new interpretation of genocidal intent, focusing on the relationship between desire, knowledge, and intent within the crime of genocide. The analysis focuses particularly on the interplay between motives and intent on the collective and individual levels by reinterpreting the qualifier ‘as such’. To support this new understanding, the chapter makes use of historical and contemporary legal debates, the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, key judgments from international tribunals, and basic concepts from the philosophy of desire. It then challenges the conventional views on the inscrutability of motives in genocide, arguing for a more inclusive understanding that incorporates both desire-based and knowledge-based understandings of intent. The discussion also addresses the implications of this interpretation for different levels of perpetrators, from high-level masterminds to low-level foot soldiers. This chapter concludes by considering the potential impact of this approach on the prosecution and understanding of genocide.
In the previous chapter, I explored the status of groups as right-holders and the philosophical understanding of collective rights. I also briefly addressed the challenges related to criminal law and third-party beneficiaries. In this chapter, I will expand on these concepts to examine the major criticisms directed at the Convention and develop an alternative interpretation based on acoustic separation, selective transmission, and the dichotomy between conduct/primary and decision/secondary rules. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of early jurisprudence on genocide to test my hypothesis and critically assess contemporary approaches to the dynamic interpretation of the concept of genocide.
The harrowing Cambodian genocide unfolded between 1975-1979 while the Khmer Rouge regime was in power. It's in human history with ramifications for international law. The trials against the perpetrators of genocide or to be precise the auto-genocide were 30 years too late. This article examines the genocide in Cambodia from the standpoint of international law. It also revolves around the exploration of the legal ramifications of the widespread crimes that resulted in the deaths of almost 1.7 million Cambodians. In doing so, it provides insights into international law in general and Cambodia's catastrophe. The article also addresses the nature of international law from the perspective of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian genocide has made a tremendous contribution to how the author and many like-minded persons view international law and it is the author's humble attempt to reflect on the nature of international law through the lens of the Cambodian genocide.
Immediately after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, as the escalation grew into a war, then the war into a genocide, Israel and its Zionist allies invoked queer Palestinians to vindicate the genocide in Gaza using a largescale pinkwashing campaign. Being an Israeli colonial practice that queer Palestinians have constantly reframed in service of the wider Palestinian struggle against occupation and apartheid, pinkwashing pre- and post-October 7 has been largely akin. Considering the severity of the Zionist colonial violence since October 7, however, the queer Palestinian response to Israeli pinkwashing reemerged with the added merit of challenging the failures of genocide discourse in both international law and academia. This article presents a media analysis of (1) Israel’s actions to pinkwash genocide; (2) the pro-Palestine anti-pinkwashing (pinkwatching) organizing that emerged from the anti-genocide transnational movement, and finally; (3) I contextualize the two to argue that, besides the irremovable link between Palestinian queer liberation and collective Palestinian decolonization, it is beneficial for international law and genocide studies to integrate queer perspectives/analyses in documenting, analyzing, and explaining the failures to prevent Israel’s genocide and protect the Palestinians.
The literature on hate speech in international criminal law is extensive and vast, written by venerated scholars in juridical sciences and humanities. Unfortunately, the existing literature on the prosecution on hate speech in international criminal law touches on specific and narrow angles: for the most part, academic writing on hate speech has focused on persecution as a crime against humanity; hate speech as a mode of participation in the commission of crimes against humanity; and hate speech as direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Built on international legal instruments and the jurisprudence of criminal tribunals, such literature, even though narrow, have advanced legal scholarship thereon. However, they also bring out some of the overlooked aspects related to hate speech. To identify and analyse the substantive challenges in prosecuting hate speech in international law, a hypothetical scenario is designed, setting the context for the discussion in the remaining chapters as the scenario unfolds some of the complexities in dealing with hate speech that results in mass atrocities. The hypothetical scenario captures and reflects the role of the media in Nazi Germany and pre-August 1994 Rwanda, both of which documented some of the worst mass atrocities ever committed within a state.
Debates on the genocidal nature of Russian atrocities in Ukraine have uncovered various grey zones of the law on genocide. While most contemporary commentaries have focused on the essence and scope of the crime’s central element – the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part – little analysis has been dedicated to defining and understanding the alleged object of the destruction, i.e., protected groups themselves. Even beyond the Ukrainian context, this problem is endemic to contemporary doctrine and jurisprudence, providing a rather cursory or even contradictory analysis of the notions of protected groups seemingly without recourse to other fields studying human identities, such as anthropology. This article aims to address this lacuna by exploring the dichotomy between national and ethnic groups under the Genocide Convention through Soviet and Russian identity narratives. The article summarises the state of contemporary law and jurisprudence relevant to the definition of the protected groups, as well as associated gaps and inconsistencies. It further addresses challenging issues of the groups’ definition and delimitation through the lenses of modern anthropology, where the law is silent. The article stresses the importance of multidisciplinary and contextualised application of the legal concepts under the law of genocide in light of the meaning ascribed to them by other fields of study focusing on group identities and inter-group dynamics. Finally, the article applies relevant findings to the context of Soviet and further Russian narratives on the Ukrainian identities, illustrating the dichotomy between national and ethnic groups.
У статті розглянуто особливості правової оцінки злочину геноциду на національному та міжнародному рівнях в контексті агресії Російської Федерації проти України. На основі аналізу наукових позицій та міжнародної судової практики аргументовано позицію щодо більшої тяжкості злочину геноциду в порівнянні з іншими міжнародним злочинами. У контексті висунення обвинувачення високопосадовцям Російської Федерації за злочини, вчинені в Україні, визначено небезпеку підміни обвинувачення в геноциді та збройній агресії обвинуваченням у воєнних злочинах. Доведена необхідність забезпечення повноти, правильності та узгодженості перекладів міжнародних угод, пов’язаних з криміналізацією міжнародних злочинів, зокрема й злочину геноциду. Визначена необхідність розробки узгодженої та ефективної стратегії доведення злочину геноциду в контексті агресії Російської Федерації проти України.
Etnik temizlik politik bir kavram olarak 1980’lerde karşılaşılan belirli örneklerle sık duyulur hale gelmiştir. Yugoslavya Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti’nin dağılma sürecine girmesiyle federe devletlerin ülkeleri ve nüfusları ile bunların dağılmadan sonraki politik pozisyonları gerilime sebep olmuştur. Yeni devletlerin doğuşu bağlamında etnik temizlik belirli bir ülkedeki insan topluluğunu homojen hale getirme olarak genel hatlarıyla ifade edilmiştir. Kavramın nihaî amacı çerçevesinde tanımlandığı ve bu amaca yönelen fiillerin uygulamada belirlilik kazandığı söylenebilir. 1990’larda kurulan ad hoc uluslararası mahkemeler etnik temizliğin uluslararası hukuktaki yerini tayin etmeye, onu tanımlamaya çalışmışlar ve bunu uluslararası hukukun, özellikle soykırım gibi, mevcut kavramlarıyla kıyaslamak suretiyle yapmışlardır. Mahkemelerin, akademisyenlerin ve uluslararası örgütlerin girişimleri olsa da etnik temizliğin henüz üzerinde uzlaşılmış bir tanımı bulunmamaktadır. Bu çalışmada ilk olarak genel hatlarıyla etnik temizliğin niteliği değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. 1980’lerde Bulgaristan hükümeti tarafından Türk ve Müslüman nüfusa yönelik yürütülen ayrımcı politikalar nihayetinde Türkiye’ye göçü getirmiştir. Bu çalışmada ikinci olarak söz konusu hükümet fiillerinin etnik temizlik teşkil edip etmediği ele alınmaya çalışılacaktır.
The Armenian genocide, a tragic chapter in human history, unfolded amidst the turmoil of the First World War within the Ottoman Empire. This research article explores the intersection of this historical event with contemporary doctrines of international criminal law. This article hypothesises that applying modern international criminal law frameworks to the Armenian genocide can strengthen the claims of the victimised community and contribute to the pursuit of historical justice. By examining legal principles of genocide prevention and punishment within the context of historical evidence, this research seeks to provide a juridical perspective on the Armenian genocide, aiming to elucidate its legal implications and reinforce the quest for accountability and recognition.
This work comprehensively analyzes the legal definition of genocide. In so doing, it details the material and mental conditions that can lead to an individual's punishment for the commission of the crime of genocide. Further, it addresses some of the difficulties that have arisen when interpreting and applying the legal rule. To this end, this work starts by presenting the basic structure of the crime of genocide, and also the goals of its legal prohibition. It then concentrates on the material element (actus reus) of genocide, placing emphasis on two difficulties; namely, the notion of the group, and how to identify the four protected groups. In addition, the conduct prohibited by the Convention is detailed. This work then focuses on the mental element (mens rea) of the crime, examining each term from the Convention's formulation separately in order to better assess the concept of specific intent. This work then considers the meaning of article 30 from the ICC Statute. Ultimately, this work details the conventional definition of genocide and reveals some of the main interpretative challenges associated with it.
1948 tarihli Soykırımı Önleme ve Cezalandırma Sözleşmesi, soykırım suçunun tanımını yaparak yasaklamıştır. Devletin Soykırım Sözleşmesindeki sorumluluğu, iç hukukunda Sözleşmeye uygun düzenleme yaparak soykırımı uluslararası suç olarak tanıması ve faillerin yargılanması konusunda gerekli iş birliğini yapmasıdır. Bu anlamda Soykırım Sözleşmesi taraf devletler arasında devlet başkanları dahil suçluların yargılanması ve iadesi konusunda adli iş birliğini tesis etmektedir. Soykırımın alelade cinayetler serisi olmaması, organize ve sistematik yok etme faaliyetlerini ve güçlü bir niyetlilik gerektirmesi, emir-komuta zinciri, itaat-otorite-yaptırım, ikna edici propaganda ve söylem teknikleri, etkili şiddet araçlarına gereksinim duyması nedenleriyle suçun Devlet katılımı olmadan gerçekleşmeyeceği fikrini doğurmaktadır. Bu nedenle Devletin sorumluluğu konusu soykırım suçları için farklı yorumlara neden olabilmektedir. Ancak gerek Sözleşmenin hazırlanış sürecinde gerek Uluslararası Hukuk Komisyonu’nun Devletin Sorumluluğunu belirleme çalışmalarında ve ilgili Raporlarında gerekse de literatürdeki yaygın görüşte Devletlerin Sözleşmede anılan yükümlülüklerini aşan bir yaklaşım söz konusu değildir. Tüzel kişiliklerin cezai sorumluluğu olmadığı hususu açıktır. Çalışmanın amacı Uluslararası Adalet Divanının Devlet sorumluluğuna ilişkin bir kararının yarattığı çelişkiyi ilgili hukuk metinlerini analiz ederek tartışmaktır. Hukuki analiz ve mukayese yöntemleri kullanılmıştır.
Like all other crimes, genocide has some common elements such as an actus reus and a corresponding mens rea. Moreover, another subjective element is also present in all crimes of genocide which is the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a […] group as such.” This is also referred to as “genocidal intent” and it indicates that the criminal liability of genocide does not merely rely on the completed result of the committed act but depends on the intention of the perpetrator to achieve. However, the threshold of this intention is not as high as the mens rea narrated in Article 30 of the ICC Statute. In addition, there is no requirement for the existence of any special extent of this intention. Indeed, Dolus eventualis is adequate to perform the actus reus as well as to establish the particular “intent to destroy […].” The theoretical criterion of The Draft Elements of Crimes is both inadmissible and unadvisable for limiting the criminal liability of genocide or the authority of the Court for trying such crimes Keywords: Genocide, Genocidal Intent, ICC Statute, Mens Rea, Holocaust Abstrak. Seperti semua kejahatan lainnya, genosida memiliki beberapa elemen umum seperti actus reus dan mens rea yang sesuai. Selain itu, unsur subyektif lainnya juga hadir dalam semua kejahatan genosida yaitu “niat untuk menghancurkan, seluruhnya atau sebagian, suatu […] kelompok itu sendiri.” Ini juga disebut sebagai “niat genosida” dan ini menunjukkan bahwa pertanggungjawaban pidana genosida tidak hanya bergantung pada hasil akhir dari tindakan yang dilakukan tetapi tergantung pada niat pelaku untuk mencapainya. Namun ambang batas niat ini tidak setinggi mens rea yang diriwayatkan dalam Pasal 30 Statuta ICC. Selain itu, tidak ada persyaratan untuk adanya tingkat khusus dari niat ini. Memang, Dolus eventualis cukup untuk melakukan actus reus serta untuk menetapkan niat untuk menghancurkan [...]” tertentu. Kriteria teoretis dari Rancangan Elemen Kejahatan tidak dapat diterima dan tidak disarankan untuk membatasi pertanggungjawaban pidana genosida atau otoritas Pengadilan untuk mengadili kejahatan semacam itu Kata kunci: Genosida, Niat Genosida, Statuta ICC, Mens Rea, Holocaust
This is the Ukrainian-language version of the article previously published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice (Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Volodymyr Venher, Understanding Russia’s Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 21, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 233–264, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad018) by Oxford University Press. The translation is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0. Abstract from an English edition. The new wave of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, and the intensification of the armed conflict accompanied by grave breaches of international humanitarian law, has received significant scholarly attention. Many academic interventions have examined the developments in Ukraine through the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Some, however, have applied a genocide lens to make sense of reported numerous and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This article contributes to the latter stream of scholarship by contextualizing the arguments for the existence of genocidal intent behind the seemingly unrelated crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation all over Ukraine. The authors pay particular attention to the language and pseudo-historical references used by Russia’s leaders as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine and argue that these statements and expressions indicate the existence of genocidal intent. This article also reflects on the issue of the systematic destruction of cultural heritage of Ukraine as further evidence of the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation understood as a protected national group under the Genocide Convention, at least in part. Finally, the authors analyse the genocidal acts that have apparently been committed, including killings; the causing of serious bodily or mental harm; the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the deliberate infliction of conditions of life aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the destruction of the Ukrainian nation by Russia has been pursued through commission of these prohibited acts. Their nature and large-scale character serve as further evidence of genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
En el presente trabajo se analiza la pertinencia de catalogar los asesinatos masivos de izquierdistas durante la Guerra Civil Española como delito de genocidio, conforme a legislación internacional. Se presta atención a la influencia de los elementos raciales y religiosos en la configuración de la represión franquista, y se ofrece una serie de evidencias que permiten calificar la violencia protagonizada por el bando nacional como un crimen de genocidio. Se destaca que los republicanos no sólo eran considerados por el bando sublevado como rivales, en una dimensión política, sino también como enemigos en una dimensión racial y religiosa. Estos eran percibidos como un grupo de personas que habían desarrollado ciertos tipos de las patologías peligrosas que derivaban de su personalidad perversa y que habían desarrollado ideas opuestas a los ideales del catolicismo español.
The need to implement the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes was justified in Germany by the inability of domestic law to adequately reflect the core wrong of these crimes. To perform the same analysis for the then omitted crime of aggression, this chapter starts with identifying the core wrong of the crime as defined under Article 8bis of the ICC Statute. It does so by determining the “protected legal interests” of the crime before specifying the “type of attack” from which these interests are protected. This chapter breaks with the traditional view that perceives aggression as a crime that primarily protects State interests. It emphasizes the importance of the protection of international peace for the classification as a “crime under international law”. It argues that the crime of aggression can better address the unease resulting from the “humanization of international law” if conceptualized as a crime that also protects individual interests. It presents three possibilities to explain this human protective core of aggression. The chapter ultimately turns to the “type of attack”. It illuminates the limited protection of the identified protected interests from the use of armed force “by a State” which amounts to a “manifest violation” of the ius ad bellum and by persons who belong to the “leadership circle” of a State. The findings serve as a frame of reference for assessing in Chap. 4 the extent to which domestic criminal offenses can capture the core wrong of the crime of aggression.KeywordsCore wrongInternational element of “crimes under international law”Protected legal interestsType of attackState sovereigntyInternational peaceProhibition of the use of forceIndividual interestsCollective interests
Personale Rechtsgutslehre
Humanization of international lawManifest violation of the UN CharterTriggering the application of international humanitarian lawExclusion of non-State actor violenceLeadership crimeRevisionists and the philosophy of war
Soykırım suçunun uluslararası hukukta kabul edilen tanımı çerçevesinde, ulusal, etnik, ırksal veya dini bir grubu “tamamen veya kısmen yok etme kastı” şeklinde ortaya çıkan suçun manevi unsuru (mens rea), diğer unsurlardan bir adım öne çıkmaktadır. Zira manevi unsur, soykırım suçunun adam öldürme suçundan veya insanlığa karşı suçlar altında incelenebilecek diğer suçlardan ayrılmasını sağlayan öğesidir. Bu öneminden dolayıdır ki; öğretide soykırım suçu “mens rea suçu” olarak da anılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, manevi unsurun somut olayda ispat edilmesi, failin suç işlediği sırada taşıdığı amacın, diğer bir deyişle zihinsel durumunun, ortaya konulmasını gerektirdiğinden çoğu zaman son derece güçtür. Buna ek olarak, niteliği gereği belli bir organizasyon ve belli bir yapılanma dahilinde, her seviyeden failin katılımını gerektiren soykırım suçu açısından, ilgili failin taşıması gereken grubu yok etme kastının içerik ve yoğunluğu da, bu fail için kabul edilecek standart bakımından manevi unsurun yorumlanmasını gerektirmekte olup, uygulama ve öğretide bu konuda çeşitli yaklaşımlar ortaya konulmuştur. Bu çalışmada, soykırım suçunun şüphesiz en ayırıcı özelliği olan manevi unsura ve bu unsurun yorumlanmasına dair yaklaşımlara daha yakından bakılmıştır.
The lessons of the history of past genocidal incidents expose that the educated and the leaders, collectively called ‘intellectuals’, have often been a distinct target by the perpetrators. Bengali intellectuals were also targeted and killed by the Pakistani military and its local collaborators during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. As the Bangladesh genocide, committed by the Pakistani military and its local collaborators, is still internationally overlooked, the issue of killing the Bengali intellectuals during such genocide has not obtained much attention. This study identifies the killing of the intellectuals as one of the genocidal policies employed by the Pakistani military and its local collaborators during the war. The massacre of the Bengali intellectuals in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is examined in this article from the perspective of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The authors have critically analyzed the killing of the Bengali intellectuals in light of the definition of ‘genocide’ and the travaux preparatoires of the Convention to explore whether it forms a genocidal policy.
Este artículo discute en qué medida la definición jurídica internacional del genocidio protege la identidad cultural de los pueblos étnicos, como interés autónomo, independientemente de la vida de sus miembros. Se defiende la tesis de que la identidad cultural constituye un objeto de protección con relativa autonomía. Si bien es posible interpretar ampliamente el término destruir, los medios para lograr la destrucción son limitados, pues necesariamente se deben subsumir en los actos de genocidio enunciados en el artículo II de la Convención para la Prevención y Sanción del Delito de Genocidio. Sin embargo, se advierte que estos actos no se dan siempre en condiciones análogas, ya que los efectos de la violencia dependen del contexto en el que esta se ejerce y de las características del grupo atacado. Para sustentar esta reflexión, el artículo conecta el análisis normativo de la jurisprudencia relevante y los trabajos preparatorios de la Convención con el estudio empírico del caso del pueblo nasa; así, se busca ilustrar algunos daños que la identidad cultural de los pueblos indígenas puede sufrir en conflictos armados. El artículo llama la atención sobre la importancia de la interpretación contextualizada de este crimen.
Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court incorporates the provisions of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. While genocide has given rise to an abundance of international jurisprudence, in particular before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it has only been a matter to incidental debates within the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court when issuing arrest warrants. If the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court remains to come, particularly in the consistent interpretation of the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, genocide is articulated in three components. A contextual element that remains to be confirmed and, if need be, circumscribed; an intentional element that jurisprudence now distinguishes by analysing two facets, one general and the other special; and a material element that appears to be fixed but that could accommodate new forms of underlying criminality.KeywordsDestructionContextual element
Actus reus
KillingSerious bodily or mental harmConditions for physical destructionMeasures to prevent birthsForcible transfer of children
Mens rea
Intent to destroyProtected group
Bu çalışmanın konusu, Ruanda Soykırımı’nın uluslararası hukuktaki soykırım suçu kapsamında değerlendirilmesi olarak belirlenmiştir. Söz konusu değerlendirme, soykırım suçunun uluslararası hukuktaki tanımında yer alan unsurların, Ruanda Soykırımı’nda ne şekilde somutlaştığını ortaya koymak suretiyle yapılmıştır. Tutsi etnik grubunu hedef alan Ruanda Soykırımı, yakın tarihin en çarpıcı ve yıkıcı şiddet olaylarından biridir. Soykırım olayları sırasında, çoğunluğu Tutsi grubuna mensup olan pek çok kişi katledildiği gibi, fiziksel şiddet, işkence ve tecavüz gibi, suç tanımında belirtilen diğer ihlâllerin örnekleri de fazlaca yaşanmıştır. Bu kapsamda Ruanda Soykırımı, soykırım suçunun çerçevesinin çizilebilmesi bakımından çok çeşitli örnek olayları ihtiva etmektedir. Bu suça ilişkin hukuki çerçevenin doğru şekilde çizilmesi, gerekli hukuki mekanizmaların işletilebilmesi ve suçluların en ağır şekilde cezalandırılabilmesi için önemli bir başlangıç noktasıdır. Diğer yandan, insanlığın temel değerlerini derinden zedeleyen bu en ağır suç ile etkin şekilde mücadele edilebilmesi için, konunun yalnızca uluslararası hukuk perspektifinden ele alınması yeterli olmayıp, disiplinler arası bir yaklaşım şarttır.
The definition of crimes under international law in the strict sense, or core crimes—the crime of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—is more or less indicated in customary international law. Especially, the crime of genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as war crimes are defined in multilateral conventions that are recognized as reflecting universally established customary international law. Nonetheless, since the major applicable law of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is its own statute whereas ad hoc international criminal tribunals basically apply customary international law, problematic legal situations arise where the definition of crimes slightly differs among various international judicial forums.
O artigo busca apresentar a transferência forçada de pessoas realizada por meio de processos aparentemente lícitos de adoções, como mecanismo de genocídio. Para tanto, o artigo irá além do mero texto legal do Estatuto de Roma, para se verificar casos históricos e situações que, mesmo com a aparência de programas oficiais de adoção, nada mais eram do que genocídios disfarçados de programas em favor de crianças. Apesar de a adoção ser um dos institutos mais nobres do direito, datando de tempos antigos, houve momentos e locais históricos nos quais a adoção forçada serviu para políticas estatais de higienização social, com efeitos que perduram.
“National group” is one of four victim groups that is explicitly protected by international criminal law from genocide. At the core of any genocide lies an element of identity. Yet, the fixed group categories that the law provides for seemingly do not conform to the fluidity of group identities. Is the law at all able to account for identity fault lines? By recourse to research on identity construction and otherness, this article argues that the interpretation of the law of genocide can benefit, structurally and legally, from insight into the forces at work before a genocide erupts. In recognizing the perpetrator’s definitional power over the victim group, the courts should increasingly focus their investigation into the mind of the génocidaires and their perception of the national victim group. In addition to discussing the dynamics of intergroup conflicts leading up to a genocide, this article also looks at the jurisprudence of criminal courts on the issues of nationality, national groups, and national identity for the crime of genocide.
Raphael Lemkin, the man who founded the term ‘genocide,’ did so with a view to protecting not only physical beings from systematically imposed extinction, but also protecting their cultures from the same fate. However, in the wake of the atrocities and bloodshed of WWII, cultural genocide was omitted from the 1948 Genocide Convention, and as a result, does not constitute an international crime. This omission has left a lacuna in international law which threatens minority groups. Not a threat of loss of life but rather loss of the culture that distinguishes them and identifies them as a minority. Powerful States with indifferent attitudes towards their international obligations face no significantly harsher punishment for cultural genocide than they do for other human rights transgressions. Consequently, cultural genocide continues as minority cultures are rendered extinct at the hands of States. The Case Study of this article investigates the present-day example of the Uyghur minority in China and analyzes whether this modern cultural genocide can pave the way for the recognition of cultural genocide as an international crime or whether the Uyghur culture will become a cautionary tale for minorities in the future.
This article examines the feasibility of bringing an application to the International Court of Justice, under the terms of Article IX of the Genocide Convention or Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. It concludes that such an application would be legally feasible and political desirable and that the failure of any state thus far to institute proceedings before the Court is an indefensible abdication of international responsibility.
According to the author, the Audiencia Nacional violated the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege, in
that it applied to the offences attributed to the accused Spanish rules on crimes against humanity which were not in force
at the time of the events in question. She holds the view that while the court was correct to classify the acts in question
as crimes against humanity, it was wrong to affirm the broad notion of genocide which had been relied upon by the investigating
judge in order to initiate proceedings, because, at that stage, the Spanish provision on crimes against humanity was not yet
in force. The author also argues that while it may be permissible for international criminal courts to apply a loose notion
of the nullum crimen principle, this is not permissible for the domestic courts of a state, such as Spain, where the Constitution
lays down a strict notion of the principle of legality and requires that criminal provisions exist before the facts occur,
and that they must be written, specific and detailed.
This article deals with the legal and moral imperatives arising out of the Kapo trials, which took place in Israel between 1951 and 1964. Section 2 considers substantive aspects of the Israeli Nazi and
Nazi Collaborators Law (adopted in 1950), as well as the moral quagmire embedded within this Law. Section 3 explores the dialogue
that these trials advanced (and the dialogue that they failed to advance) in Israeli society. Section 4 offers some reflection
on the reasons why these trials have been expunged from Israel's collective memory. The authors also attempt to shed some
light on the impact that this deliberate collective forgetting has had on the construction of Israel's national identity and
examine the central role that judicial institutions have played in reconstructing the past and providing meaning for the Kapo trials as a nation-building mechanism.
The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has properly focused on the special intent (dolus
specialis) to destroy a group as the distinguishing characteristic of genocide and differentiated it from result-oriented
crimes. Although the ICTR has crowned genocide as ‘the crime of crimes’, it has simultaneously dethroned it by holding that
it attracts the same sentence as other humanitarian law violations. Nonetheless, ICTR jurisprudence attaches considerable
importance to characterizing the destruction of the Tutsi as genocide as distinct from crimes against humanity. Because the
Tutsi cannot be readily distinguished as one of the protected groups under the Genocide Convention, Trial Chambers have gone
to great lengths to characterize them as an ‘ethnic’ group in order to justify the label of genocide.