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The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945-1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology

Article

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945-1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology

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Abstract

This article examines the founding, social origins, and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria from 1945 to 1958. The organization was influenced ideologically by the original Egyptian Brotherhood, but its founding was essentially an independent move. Unlike its Egyptian counterpart during this period, the Syrian Brotherhood was a participant in parliamentary politics. Its discourse was reflective of this fact, and in public it emphasized the universal nature of its message and eschewed sectarianism in Syria's divided society. An examination of internal documents, however, reveals that the organization was concerned with protecting Syria's Sunni Muslim majority. While in Egypt the Ikhwan developed in opposition to the establishment 'ulama', which were seen as being unresponsive to the needs of Muslims in a modern society, in Syria the 'ulama' played a leading role in the organization.

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... Logo em 1947, a Irmandade Muçulmana Síria participou das eleições parlamentares e em 1949 das eleições para a assembleia constituinte. Diante das ambições de galgar ao poder através de eleições, a Irmandade precisava contar com os votos de cristãos e judeus (e outros grupos) (TEITELBAUM, 2011;WEISMANN, 2010 Breuilly (1993) argumenta que uma das consequências do espaço político introduzido pela modernidade é a exigência de que elementos culturais se articulem de maneira a fazer sentido politicamente. Isto é, "a menos (e até) que essas ideias se 'fixem', por se tornarem parte de um movimento político que tem que negociar com governos e granjear apoio na sociedade, elas tendem a ser vagas e descontínuas" (BREUILLY, 2000, p. 170). ...
... e as ações e a administração de sua irmã. Isso porque a Irmandade na Síria não foi apenas uma ramificação da matriz, mas foi a união de inúmeros grupos religiosos já existentes no Levante. Esses grupos, anteriormente autônomos, foram unificados por integrantes que haviam visitado o Egito, onde entraram em contato com a ideologia da Hassan al-Banna.(TEITELBAUM, 2011). Portanto, pode-se dizer que a ideologia da Irmandade Muçulmana desempenhou um papel mais aglutinador do que realmente criador.Ao contrário da organização egípcia, que contava com amplo apoio popular, a vertente síria era apenas um partido, entre vários, e nunca conseguiu estabelecer uma rede difundida na sociedade. Os integrantes da Ir ...
... Nesse caso, a ramificação síria adotou um discurso menos sectário e relativamente mais inclusivo que entendia o Islã como uma civilização no seio da qual diversas tradições e comunidades coexistiram. Em consonância com a tradição intelectual do Levante no início do século XX, a Irmandade Muçulmana Síria manifestava uma postura arabista mais forte que aquela expressada pelos seus colegas egípcios(TEITELBAUM, 2011). ...
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... Electoral laws in 1947 and in 1949 further guaranteed proportional representation for minorities, 21 which, following the same manner, witnessed the SMB cooperating with Christian and/or Jewish candidates in both elections. 22 The SMB valued its parliamentary representation, 23 even though it remained modest with three members elected in 1947, and three members elected in 1949. 24 After the 1947 elections, Al-Siba`i wrote to Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: 'This marks the rst time of cial representatives of the Islamic idea were elected to parliament in any Islamic or Arab state'. ...
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book review of: The muslim brotherhood – evolution of an islamist movement Carrie Rosefsky Wickham Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2013 Inside the brotherhood Hazem Kandil London, Polity Press, 2015, ISBN The muslim brotherhood in contemporary egypt – democracy redefined or confined? Mariz Tadros London and New York, Routledge, 2012 Counting islam ‒ religion, class and elections in egypt Tarek Masoud Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014
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Tlas, it should be remembered, is known for his hyperbole
  • Mustafa Tlas
  • Mir
  • Hayati
Mustafa Tlas, Mir'at Hayati [Moments of My Life], Vol. 1 (Damascus: Dar Tlas, 1991), pp. 76, 138-139, 141. Tlas, it should be remembered, is known for his hyperbole. See also Muhammad 'Umran, Tajribatifi al-Thawra [My Experiences in the Revolution] (N.P: 1970), p. 165.