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Choosing analytic measures 1
... Consider a link to systems science as one essential to the design of systems intended to measure performance of Rouse's [1] goal-directed organizations, or enterprises, that necessarily feature the complexity and related concepts central to systems science [2]; Recognize the utility to enterprise measurement of OT&E concepts of critical operational issues (COIs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of performance (MOPs), as defined by Sproles [3][4][5] and others [6][7][8][9][10]; and to Recognize the criticality of MCDA-related concerns such as utility [11][12][13] and measurement theory [14] to the validity and usefulness of results achieved with an enterprise PMS. Figure 1 depicts those three disciplines, select components, and the relationships among all within a methodology the authors were ultimately led to develop and label as Enterprise AID, or simply AID, for enterprise assessment, improvement, and design. Ensuing subsections more fully explain the importance of each discipline to PMS design. ...
... What later portions of this paper will show to have become an AID Phase 1, PMS Design, focused on establishing enterprise-specific performance evaluation structures owes extensively to advocates of three OT&E conventions as mechanisms "not the exclusive domain of just the engineering disciplines....[but] equally applicable to all disciplines and...a manifestation of good management practices" [3]. Table 3 displays the conventions of COIs, MOEs, and MOPs together with definitions advanced by prominent contributors [3][4][5][7][8][9] and tailored for AID purposes by its developers [6,10]. Table 3 also makes plain a link between the OT&E concepts upon which AID depends and the equally significant systems science concept of emergence; and the table's COI description reference to "problems" hints at a feature of AID that has users apply the PMSs they design with it to performance measurement needs expressed as problems they wish resolved or, equivalently, as gains in capability they wish to achieve. ...
... OT&E Discipline-derived Concepts of COIs, MOEs, and MOPs[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10] ...
The Enterprise AID − for assessment, improvement, and design − methodology is a systems science-, operational test and evaluation-, and multicriteria decision analysis-based approach to design and deployment of performance measurement systems (PMSs) tailored to specific enterprises pursuing any or all of enterprise assessment, improvement, or design. Its two phases of design and deployment sprang from designers’ inductively generated and now prototyped response to a gap they recognized between performance measurement capabilities required by contemporary enterprises and those offered by contemporary PMSs. This paper illustrates key concepts underlying AID, while a companion document, The Enterprise AID methodology: Application, draws from a prototyping effort to identify value to be gained by stakeholders from PMSs designed and deployed with methodology application.
... These processes, moreover, contain complex feedforward and feedback loops (or "double-loop learning") that implicitly influence "decision" and "action" and, in turn, inform hypothesis testing of future decisions. 4 For instance, while military theorists often categorize politics as extrinsic to war (i.e. a linear model), the feedback loops which operate from the use of force to politics and from politics to the use of force are intrinsic to war (Roche and Watts;Overy 1981). As a corollary, Boyd argues that C2 systems must embrace (and not diminish) the role of implicit orientation and their attendant feedback loops (Roche and Watts 1991;Overy 1981). ...
... 4 For instance, while military theorists often categorize politics as extrinsic to war (i.e. a linear model), the feedback loops which operate from the use of force to politics and from politics to the use of force are intrinsic to war (Roche and Watts;Overy 1981). As a corollary, Boyd argues that C2 systems must embrace (and not diminish) the role of implicit orientation and their attendant feedback loops (Roche and Watts 1991;Overy 1981). ...
This article argues that artificial intelligence (AI) enabled capabilities cannot effectively or reliably compliment (let alone replace) the role of humans in understanding and apprehending the strategic environment to make predictions and judgments that inform strategic decisions. Furthermore, the rapid diffusion of and growing dependency on AI technology at all levels of warfare will have strategic consequences that counterintuitively increase the importance of human involvement in these tasks. Therefore, restricting the use of AI technology to automate decision-making tasks at a tactical level will do little to contain or control the effects of this synthesis at a strategic level of warfare. The article re-visits John Boyd's observation-orientation-decision-action metaphorical decision-making cycle (or "OODA loop") to advance an epistemological critique of AI-enabled capabilities (especially machine learning approaches) to augment command-and-control decision-making processes. In particular, the article draws insights from Boyd's emphasis on "orientation" as a schema to elucidate the role of human cognition (perception, emotion, and heuristics) in defense planning in a non-linear world characterized by complexity, novelty, and uncertainty. It also engages with the Clausewitzian notion of "military genius"-and its role in "mission command"-human cognition, systems, and evolution theory to consider the strategic implications of automating the OODA loop.
... Many of these also propose some ideas for resolving some of these challenges, but none provide a comprehensive framework. For a summary of the challenges, see Roche and Watts, 1991;Anderson, 2008;Pfleeger and Cunningham, 2010;and Pfleeger, 2012. For some attempts at proposed frameworks and metrics that cover limited parts of the necessary scope, see Chapin and Akridge, 2005;Howard, Pincus, and Wing, 2005;Jansen, 2009;Pfleeger, 2009;Bau and Mitchell, 2011;Yee, 2013;Cheng et al., 2014;Wang et al., 2014;Hubbard and Seieren, 2016;and Zhang et al., 2016. ...
... 3 Metrics of military power, such as counting the number of divisions of ground forces and numbers of fighter aircraft and bombers, are insufficient for predicting the outcome of a conflict. Many factors, such as how those forces work together, the agility and robustness of their combat support, the stratagems and tactics they pursue, and how well they train, can also be 1 Roche andWatts, 1991, p. 191. 2 Ross, 1977;Langdridge and Butt, 2004. Humans present a range of other biases, many of which are discussed by Kahneman, 2011. ...
... A full system evaluation ultimately requires both types of measures and determining the relation between them. 3 3 The relation between these two types of measures is discussed in [12]. The insight that there are "good applications for crummy MT" [1] is another way of saying that MT engines can score highly on measures of effectiveness while scoring much less well on measures of performance. ...
How can recent advances in automating the evaluation of machine translation (MT) engines be applied to automate the evaluation of more complex embedded MT systems? In this paper, we describe initial evaluation testing of FALCon, an embedded MT system where hard-copy documents are scanned into bit-mapped images, converted into online text files via optical character recognition (OCR) software, and then translated by an MT engine from one natural language into another. Our challenge with the ongoing support of FALCon systems is to evaluate when the replacement of a particular component with a new or upgraded product will yield significant improvements over the baseline system performance. In this paper we address the following questions: (i) how can we automate the baseline end-to-end evaluation of this system? and (ii) what is the relation between the accuracy of the individual components and their end-to-end accuracy, that could be used to model the system performance?
... A key challenge, however, is what we would like to measure and what we can measure are usually not the same thing [29]. Additionally, most endeavors are very situation dependent, ruling out 'one size fits all' sets of measures [37]. It is generally accepted, however, the vertical framework should be used for effectiveness Inputs -any controllable or uncontrollable factor that enters the system Outputs -system transformation of the inputs Effect -system changes resulting from the outputs Outcome -environmental conditions created by system effects Purpose/Impact -reason for system existence or expected system behavior ...
A system can be defined as a set of elements that interacts with its environment, where relationships exist between the elements. Numerous disciplines in the sciences including physical, social, and behavioral, as well as the realms of engineering, business, and economics are concerned with objects, processes, and phenomenon that satisfy this generic, system definition. These fields and others have a need to understand systems within their domain. Key to understanding a system is being able to measure it. This paper presents fundamental concepts and an empirically feasible methodology for system measurement.
• provide a general set of guidelines for determining when clandestine activities may be legitimate and moral.
The test and evaluation of complex socio-technical systems is difficult. This is especially so when those involved in the testing and evaluation of such systems tend to associate closely with the physical sciences. The social or behavioral sciences have developed methods to address such problems and have shown that these methods are capable of providing rigorous results. A discussion of the worth of qualitative data and an overview of the social science methods likely to be appropriate for evaluating complex systems involving humans is provided. A brief overview of an instance where qualitative data analysis methods proved useful in the evaluation of a military command and control system is discussed in order to illustrate the merit of social science methods for T&E
Single systems and systems of systems, alike, demand management approaches focused on performance; but system of systems management can only responsibly address performance if it accounts for characteristics such as the presence of distinct subsystems pursuing possibly disparate purposes, a characteristic by definition of no concern to single system management. By extension then, with to manage in many ways to measure, systems of systems demand performance measurement schemes that accommodate the traits that set them apart from individual systems. Enterprise AID represents a means for measuring and hence managing the current or future performance of systems of systems. Enterprise AID - or simply AID, for assessment, improvement, and design - is a methodology for the design and use of performance measurement systems able to uniformly address problems encountered with extant or envisioned, single system or system of systems type enterprises. This paper describes advantages held by the AID methodology for system of systems performance measurement, and it does so within a context set by appropriate definitions, selected methodology elements, and an application example focused on the selected elements. This paper concludes with a recognition of performance related issues attendant to system of systems improvement or design.
Although “Measures of Effectiveness” (MOEs) are referred to in systems engineering documents such as EIA/IS-632, there is no universally accepted meaning for the term. This paper provides an overview of this important topic by suggesting a definition of MOEs. The role of MOEs as the standards for identifying successful solutions is examined. They are shown to be “mission” or “purpose” oriented and not concerned with the internal details of the solutions per se. A clear distinction is drawn between the MOEs as established by the stakeholder and the quantified MOE, or figure of merit, established as a result of the analysis and evaluation of particular solutions. MOEs are seen to be the precursor to, hence the “engines” of, test and evaluation and of criteria. A study of the roles of other forms of “measures” enables a clearer understanding of the role and nature of MOEs to be established. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Syst Eng 3: 50–58, 2000
Should the United States deploy conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) in support of the prompt global strike (PGS) mission? Most important, do the political-military benefits outweigh the risks of CBM deployment? The United States, if it works to mitigate the risk of misperception and an inadvertent nuclear response, should deploy near-term CBMs in support of the PGS mission. The prompt response of CBMs would likely be sufficient to defeat many time-sensitive, soft targets, provided actionable intelligence was available. Near-term CBMs, those options capable of being deployed prior to 2013, would have the required attributes to defeat their targets: payload flexibility, throw weight, and accuracy. More specifically, the U.S. Navy’s Conventional Trident Modification is a cost-effective, near-term PGS option that would mitigate the concerns of CBM opponents. The large-scale use of midterm and long-term CBMs against mobile targets and hard and deeply buried targets, however, will require a wider range of technologies that have yet to mature. Thus, the United States should continue investing in research and development for a broad portfolio of PGS options to cover the emerging target set.
This essay introduces Max Weber's sociology of modern culture to International Relations. Previous treatments of Weber in the discipline have focused on Morgenthau's use of Weberian ideas rather than on the differences between their positions. In appropriating Weber's 'ethic of responsibility' for his theory of power politics, Morgenthau neglected Weber's sociology of 'rationalization' and analysis of the displacement of cultural values in modern policy-making. In Morgenthau's theory foreign policy is judged in terms of consequences for state power, while for Weber policy is judged in terms of consequences for cultural values. This crucial difference in their understanding of the political ethics of realism is anatomized. Using Weber's sociology of modern culture and often misunderstood view of the relation between science and values, the article then traces the repercussions of Morgenthau's influential understanding of realism in strategic policy science.
Daniel L. Byman is a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation.
Matthew C. Waxman is a consultant with the RAND Corporation.
The authors would like to thank Natalie Crawford, Robert Mullins, Jeremy Shapiro, Alan Vick, and anonymous reviewers of International Security for their critiques and suggestions. The authors also invite comments: byman@rand.org, waxman@aya.yale.edu.
1. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1942). Works by other visionaries include H.H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York: Harper, 1941); and William M. Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925). Much of the early debate over how best to use air power took place inside various air forces. For useful overviews of this history, see Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989); and Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths to Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
2. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Air Wars Won't Stay Risk Free, General Says," New York Times, June 18, 1999, p. A8. Gen. Michael J. Dugan, a former U.S. Air Force chief of staff, declared: "For the first time in history—5,000 years of history of man taking organized forces into combat—we saw an independent air operation produce a political result." Quoted in James A. Kitfield, "Another Look at the Air War That Was," Air Force Magazine (October 1999), p. 40.
3. Quoted in John Diamond, "Air Force Strategists Fight Overconfidence Built by Air Victory," European Stars and Stripes, July 4, 1999, p. 1.
4. The lessons drawn by both sides of this debate are outlined in Nick Cook, "War of Extremes," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 7, 1999, pp. 20-23. See also John D. Morrocco, "Kosovo Conflict Highlights Limits of Airpower and Capability Gaps," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 17, 1999, pp. 31-33.
5. Clifford Beal, "Lessons from Kosovo," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 7, 1999, p. 20. One retired U.S. Army general fears that "the strategic relevancy and future of our Army have suffered a grave blow from the Kosovo experience." See Robert F. Wagner, "In Kosovo, the Army's Guns Were Silent and Forgotten," Army Times, July 12, 1999, p. 46. Various assessments of the bombing campaign, including its successes and limits, are summarized in Bradley Graham, "Air vs. Ground: The Fight Is On," Washington Post, June 22, 1999, p. A1; and Tim Butcher and Patrick Bishop, "Nato Admits Air Campaign Failed," Eondon Daily Telegraph, July 22, 1999, p. 1.
6. The leading academic work on the use of air power as a coercive instrument is Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Pape's works "The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 200-214; and "The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 93-114. For the best critique of Pape, see Karl Mueller, "Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 182-228. Other valuable works on the use of air power include Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/February 1994), pp. 109-124; Stuart Peach, ed., Perspectives on Air Power (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1998); Meilinger, Paths to Heaven; and Phillip S. Meilinger, Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995).
7. A collection of military publications on joint operations can be found at http://www.dtic.mil/jcs.
8. In this respect, contemporary theory resembles that of air power pioneers, such as Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and William (Billy) Mitchell. Their modern-day heirs, such as John Warden, Harlan Ullman, and James Wade, also focus on air power's exclusive contributions, and have been properly criticized for making excessive...
Effectiveness measures provide decision makers feedback on the impact of deliberate actions and affect critical issues such as allocation of scarce resources, as well as whether to maintain or change existing strategy. Currently, however, there is no formal foundation for formulating effectiveness measures. This research presents a new framework for effectiveness measurement from both a theoretical and practical view. First, accepted effects-based principles, as well as fundamental measurement concepts are combined into a general, domain independent, effectiveness measurement methodology. This is accomplished by defining effectiveness measurement as the difference, or conceptual distance from a given system state to some reference system state (e.g. desired end-state). Then, by developing system attribute measures such that they yield a system state-space that can be characterized as a metric space, differences in system states relative to the reference state can be gauged over time, yielding a generalized, axiomatic definition of effectiveness measurement. The effectiveness measurement framework is then extended to mitigate the influence of measurement error and uncertainty by employing Kalman filtering techniques. Finally, the pragmatic nature of the approach is illustrated by measuring the effectiveness of a notional, security force response strategy in a scenario involving a terrorist attack on a United States Air Force base.
Effects-Based Operations depend on two things: smart operational objectives that accomplish the desired political goals, and feedback on the progress toward achieving those objectives. As an operational-level commander, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) needs operational-level feedback, and today s Joint and Air Force guidance covering that feedback is insufficient for the need. Therefore, fixing the assessment problem requires going back to first principles about the feedback requirements of the air commander at the operational level of war. Col John Boyd s theory of war emphasizes the dominance of time in warfighting decision-making and his Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop is an appropriate foundation for determining the way air component assessment should be done. The JFACC needs the assessment function to improve the speed and accuracy of his OODA loop by providing feedback on friendly efforts, the interaction of those efforts with the enemy and the environment, and the effects on enemy behavior. Joint and Air Force publications should be revised accordingly to guide the organization, training, and equipping of Joint Aerospace Operations Centers in preparing for the demanding task of assessing air operations.
This paper proposes an end-to-end process analysis template with replicable measures to evaluate the filtering performance of a Scan-OCR-MT system. Preliminary results 1 across three language-specific FALCon 2 systems show that, with one exception, the derived measures consistently yield the same performance ranking: Haitian Creole at the low end, Arabic in the middle, and Spanish at the high end.
Although Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are an important element of the Systems Engineering process, they have yet to gain acceptance from practitioners. This is caused not only by the confusion surrounding their definition but also the perceived difficulty in formulating appropriate MOEs. This paper builds on previously published papers that address the issue of the definition of MOEs and the distinction to be drawn with Measures of Performance. Following a brief review of this existing work, a process for formulating MOEs is suggested and explained. This is supplemented by several examples from everyday life and from historical references. The examples build on the issues raised in the discussion of the process and provide practical examples to reinforce what has been previously discussed. © 2002 Commonwealth of Australia. Exclusive worldwide publication rights in the article have been transferred to Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 5, 253–263, 2002
It is 1994 and the United States Army is in the process of preparing itself for the 21st century. As part of that preparation, the Army must determine how it will organize its combat forces for future war. The Army has had experience with reorganization in the past. An examination of these past experiences is relevant to current efforts at reorganization. The monograph begins with a historical examination of the triangular concept that was the foundation for the Army's reorganization and force design on the eve of World WAR II. Then the monograph examines the pentomic concept which developed during the early years of the Cold War and was the operational concept for the Army until 1961. The historical sketches provide a foundation for analysis using a three part methodology. The methodology considers the strategic requirements that shape the nation's needs for its army, the operational concept that determines how the Army will fight and the system processes that influence the size, shape and complexion of the force. The monograph continues with a discussion of Clausewitz' understanding of the nature of war in relation to the Army's view of military theory and doctrine. It concludes with an examination of the Army's current situation, identifying several problems the Army must carefully consider. First, strategic requirements that ought to help determine the shape of the force are, themselves, unclear. Second, the Army's definition and understanding of war, a central part of its operational concept, has become increasingly more complex. Third, the Army's force structure, the reality of the force, is a function of Congressional willingness to provide money for the Army's budget. Finally, this study of past experiences provides a framework from which force planners can approach the increasingly complex problem of future war and force design.
Efforts to measure progress in the US War on Terror are frustrated by a complex strategic situation and a shadowy network of enemies. The “Long War,” as the conflict is referred to by many public officials, is likely to remain costly in human and financial terms. Some have suggested that the war will continue for a generation, giving the US ample reason to make sure it is optimally prepared for a long fight. One opportunity to examine the health and endurance of the US war effort lies in the concept of military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is the process by which a military converts its available national resources into fighting power. Contributions from multi-disciplinary researchers, like historians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, provide a foundation for conceptualizing effectiveness in an intellectual sense. Effectiveness is derived from the application of necessary strategic resources (means) in the right proportions (ways) to achieve specific goals (ends). Designing a methodology to assess a nation’s military effectiveness in a Long War requires a sophisticated understanding of the three central features of the conflict: protractedness, irregular warfare, and ideological motivation. The Military Effectiveness Model is built around these traits and analyzes effectiveness across four levels of military activity: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. By focusing exclusively on three requirements necessary for victory – endurance, legitimacy, and deterrence – one is able to render judgment about very specific aspects of effectiveness in a Long War. The Military Effectiveness Model must be validated against historical experience. The French experience in the Algerian War from 1954-1962 provides an insightful case study that invites useful comparisons to the current US situation. In Algeria, success at the tactical and operational levels could never compensate for strategic incoherence and a lack of political support. The war in Algeria accelerated erosion of the French military’s effectiveness, leaving the military weak and ill-prepared for future conflicts. The US military finds itself in a precarious position with regard to military effectiveness and is exhibiting many of the same symptoms as the French Army in Algeria. While popular support for military operations is in decline, requirements for funding and manpower are increasing. Questions of legitimacy and strategic incoherence continue to undermine the war effort. US military effectiveness will continue to erode for the foreseeable future until balance is restored to the process.
Thesis (M.S.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 1992. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 175-178). AD-A253 059. Photocopy. s
This report is adapted from a conference paper submitted for presentation at the November 2000 Systems Engineering and Test & Evaluation Conference (SETE 2000) in Brisbane, Australia. The report points out that while systems engineering (SE) is concerned with problems ranging from the highly abstract to the highly practical, Test and Evaluation (T&E) tends to concentrate on the practical problems. The behavioural sciences offer an opportunity for T &E practitioners to use subjective as well as qualitative data and analysis techniques for the more complex socio-technical systems. The application of such techniques to the evaluation of components of the Australian Army Battlefield Command Support System is discussed as a minor case study. Systems Engineering theory acknowledges the impact and influence that the human element has on the effectiveness of systems. The T&E community needs to acquire the skills to assess this impact. A T&E community with a broader level of expertise will be better able to evaluate new acquisitions of military equipment. The test and evaluation of complex socio-technical systems is difficult. This is especially so when the test and evaluation (T & E) community involved tends to associate itself closely with the physical sciences. The behavioural sciences have developed methods to address such problems and have shown that these methods are capable of providing rigorous results. A discussion of the worth of qualitative data and an overview of the behavioural science methods likely to be appropriate for evaluating complex systems involving humans is provided. A minor case study illustrating the application of qualitative data analysis methods to the evaluation of the Australian Army's Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS) is discussed in order to illustrate the merit of behavioural science methods for T&E. CITD
First-order difference equations arise in many contexts in the biological, economic and social sciences. Such equations, even though simple and deterministic, can exhibit a surprising array of dynamical behaviour, from stable points, to a bifurcating hiearchy of stable cycles, to apparently random fluctuations. There are consequently many fascinating problems, some concerned with delicate mathematical aspects of the fine structure of the trajectories, and some concerned with the practical implications and applications. This is an interpretive review of them.
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Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers.
This report presents a logical and transparent methodology for evaluating strategic offensive forces on the basis of first-strike stability, which the authors define as a condition that exists when neither superpower perceives the other as motivated by the strategic force posture to launch the first nuclear strike in a crisis. The methodology underlines that (1) first-strike stability under current conditions is relatively robust, (2) postures of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces become increasingly important under an arms reduction regime if the current level of first-strike stability is desired, (3) enlarging U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons inventories does not necessarily erode first-strike stability, (4) the superpowers should realize the importance of both sides generating forces early in a crisis to render these forces nontargetable.
Joshua M. Epstein is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Visiting Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He is currently writing a book on the European conventional balance and conventional arms control.
While the author bears sole responsibility for all views expressed here, he is grateful to John D. Steinbruner, Bruce G. Blair, Ethan Gutmann, and Shimon Avish for their contributions.
1. Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988).
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 16-17. See also p. 15 and p. 19 n. 33.
3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), p. 55 (emphasis mine). Hereafter, references to this article appear in parentheses in the text.
4. I made two points about the rule and one about static methods in general.
5. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance," p. 155. I do not deny that there may exist units of account in which a 3:1 rule might work. I doubt it, but nowhere do I deny it. I do deny that any such units have yet been identified.
6. Firepower is relatively straightforward; the other two are not.
7. Surprise, we are told, comes in four varieties, but we only have to "bonus" for two. See Mearsheimer, "Assessing," p. 64 n. 24. For yet another unspecified adjustment instruction, see ibid., p. 58 n. 10.
8. Although Mearsheimer does not say so, one might get the mistaken impression that he has addressed the question of units by mentioning armored division equivalents (ADEs) (although he also mentions "the division equivalent firepower [DEF] . . .; firepower scores . . .; and simple comparisons of manpower and weaponry") (p. 64). First, if Mearsheimer means to suggest that he has verified the general historical validity of the 3:1 rule when forces are scored in ADEs, he has presented no evidence to that effect: He does not provide ADE scores for World War I, Korea, or the Middle East, to take cases where he claims the rule obtains. (It is not even clear how one would apply the Army's ADE scoring manual to the earlier cases.) Second, ADEs do not measure "combat power," as Mearsheimer defines that term, because neither surprise nor troop quality is reflected in ADEs. Mearsheimer fails to note that surprise is not reflected, but admits that "the ADE does not capture differences in the quality of troops." Strangely, he continues "but this does not significantly distort analyses of the European balance because the fighting skills of the troops in NATO and Warsaw Pact armies are roughly equal." See p. 63 (emphasis mine). This remark is strange for two reasons. First, to establish the general historical validity of the 3:1 rule (our present topic), today's balance in Europe is irrelevant. To verify the rule, one looks to the historical sample of wars. No war between NATO and the Pact has yet occurred; hence, the contemporary balance is by definition not part of that historical sample of wars by which one would verify the rule. To say that ADEs are useful in assessing the current balance does not establish in what units the (historical) 3:1 rule is being asserted. Second, even in Europe today, Mearsheimer's claim that NATO and Pact fighting skills are "roughly equal" stands in sharp contrast to his previous arguments to the contrary. See especially his disparaging remarks on Soviet troop skill in Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly," pp. 32-36. Moreover, troops were certainly not of comparable skill in many historical cases of interest, as Mearsheimer himself observes in the historical appendix to his article. So, the issue of surprise aside, the use of ADEs over the historical sample would "significantly distort" one's analyses. What to do? Again, Mearsheimer says that "ADE scores must be adjusted. . . ." And how are they to be adjusted? Mearsheimer gives no clue (p. 64). Finally, there are 1974...
Joshua M. Epstein is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Visiting Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He is currently writing a book on the European conventional balance and conventional arms control.
While the author bears sole responsibility for all views expressed here, he is grateful to Paul B. Stares, Bruce G. Blair, and Melissa Healy for their suggestions.
1. See Col. T.N. Dupuy (ret.), Numbers, Predictions, and War (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1985), pp. 14-15, 234-239. Kursk refers to the first week, German XLVIII Panzer Corps sector before Soviet reinforcement.
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 16-17. See also Karsten Voigt, rapporteur, "Draft Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Conventional Defence in Europe" (Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, May 1984), p. 8.
3. Col. T.N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory in Combat (New York: Paragon Publishers, 1987), p. 98.
4. Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE): Progress Report, August 1986, Requirements and Resources Directorate, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, p. 3-20.
5. Ibid., p. 3-22.
6. Beyond that, Mearsheimer's reasoning is incomplete and seems to conflict with arguments he uses in attacking maneuver advocates in "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front." First, assuming each of NATO's eight corps sectors to be a possible axis, Mearsheimer rebuts assertions that in multi-pronged attacks the Soviets could amass 1974 Armored Division Equivalent (ADE) ratios of 4:1 on four axes, or 5:1 on three, without conceding to NATO a greater-than 3:1 ratio on the remaining axes. But, it is easy—using Mearsheimer's numbers —to construct alternative Pact attacks that (a) deny NATO an advantage exceeding 3:1 on non-breakthrough axes while (b) amassing a 7:1 ratio on two breakthrough sectors, as follows. Like Mearsheimer, assume NATO deploys 4 of its 32 ADEs on each of 8 possible attack axes. Opposite six of these eight, place 1 1/3 Pact ADEs; this denies NATO a ratio exceeding 3:1 and uses up 6 x 1 1/3 = 8 of the Pact's 64 ADEs, leaving 56 to concentrate on the remaining two NATO corps sectors. This is enough for 28 on each, for a ratio of 7:1 in the Pact's favor (or 5:1 on one and 9:1 on the other, or 4:1 on one and 10:1 on the other, and so forth). Mearsheimer correctly observes that, in such cases, "because there would be limited room on the front to accommodate them," some of these (say 28) ADEs "would have to be located behind the attacking forces, where they would have little impact on the initial battles." But the issue is whether, in successive attacks, those 28 ADEs can ultimately wear down NATO's defending forces and achieve a breakthrough. Mearsheimer simply states without evidence that "certainly, the forces in each NATO corps sector should be capable of blunting the initial Soviet attack and providing adequate time for NATO to shift forces from other corps sectors and its operational reserves to threatened points along the line." But, how much force will be necessary to reinforce and how much time is available? Even interpreting the unsubstantiated 3:1 rule as a casualty-exchange ratio, NATO's 4 ADEs could take 3 x 4 = 12 Pact ADEs to the grave on each of the two breakthrough axes, leaving 28 - 12 = 16 Pact ADEs to threaten each of those axes. Assuming the 3:1 rule works for reinforcing and hence non-entrenched defenses (that it doesn't work for such so-called encounter battles is core to Mearsheimer's attack on the maneuver advocates), NATO would need 16 ÷ 3 = 5 1/3 ADEs on each sector, or 10 2/3 ADEs in toto. Maybe this much force can be stripped out of neighboring sectors, supplemented by other reserves, and delivered to the appropriate place in time. But Mearsheimer hardly demonstrates the "certainty" he claims. Indeed, how much time...
This report examines the development of the Soviet Army's operational art against the Germans during World War-2. It examines the reconstruction and reorganization of the Soviet military forces after Hitler's invasion, the development and coordination of military tactics on the various fronts and the deployment of forces for defense or a Hack in several battles.
As with all military thought, a wide variety of political, historical, and economic factors guided the development of air doctrines in the period between the First and Second World Wars. Yet standing above all other influences was a revulsion against the mud and despair of the trenches. Thus, it is not surprising that an Italian senior officer, Giulio Douhet, would argue that airpower could prevent the repetition of a war that had cost Italy more than 400,000 dead. In terms of the first formulations of air doctrine, Douhet's thought did not prove particularly influential. In Britain, the development of doctrine, both within and outside of the Royal Air Force (RAF), already was well advanced by the end of the First World War. Douhet may have exercised more influence on American doctrine, since various translated extracts of his work found their way into the library and schools of the American Air Service as early as 1922. But the formulation of a precision bombing doctrine in the United States raises the question of how deeply his writings influenced early Army Air Corps pioneers.
The extent to which physical systems are predictable is considered with
emphasis on techniques for predicting the chaotic behavior of systems
with random components. Analytical techniques for describing dynamical
systems are reviewed, noting the necessity of finding closed-form
solutions to follow the evolution of simple systems over time. Attention
is given to attractors and repeated returns to attractors after cycles
through a sequence of states, e.g., a pendulum. Chaotic attractors
feature small random elements that diverge rapidly, but whose motions
stretch and fold to remain finite, thereby generating fractals. The
state of the chaotic system is a small region of state space that can be
determined to an accuracy allowed by instrumental noise. Experimentation
w hich has supported the concept of chaotic systems is described.
In the pre-war period, the German economy produced both ‘butter’ and ‘guns’ — much more of the former and much less of the latter than has been commonly assumed. By 1937, civilian consumption, investment in consumer goods industries, and government non-war expenditures equalled or exceeded previous peak levels. There is no question, therefore, of a rearmament programme so large that it prevented a substantial recovery of civilian production.
Does God Play Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos recommended by Rene te Boekhorst, but very basic...
Enthoven then ran the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) -which was renamed PA&E (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in 1973 -from 1961 to 1969. The 'whiz kid' ethos of OSA, as distilled by a former member of the organization, was that 'Other people had adjectives, we had arithmetic'. (Ibid
- Morrison
Morrison, '"Whiz Kids" Rebound?' National Journal, 11 Nov. 1989, p.2741). Enthoven then ran the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) -which was renamed PA&E (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in 1973 -from 1961 to 1969. The 'whiz kid' ethos of OSA, as distilled by a former member of the organization, was that 'Other people had adjectives, we had arithmetic'. (Ibid., p.2740).
Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding of a New Intellectual Vision', Rethinking Patterns of Knowledge
- Alan D Beyerchen
Alan D. Beyerchen, 'Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding of a New Intellectual Vision', Rethinking Patterns of Knowledge, ed. Richard Bjornson and Marilyn Waldman, Papers in Comparative Studies (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1989), No.6, p.30.
Downloaded byQueen's University Libraries
- Huntington
Huntington, p.91. Downloaded by ["Queen's University Libraries, Kingston"] at 19:41 28 December 2014
German fighter monthly production peaked at 3,375 aircraft in Sept The Effects of Strategic Bombing
- Galbraith
- Lifegalbraith
- Klein
Galbraith, A Life in Our Times, p.205. German fighter monthly production peaked at 3,375 aircraft in Sept. 1944 (Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, Table 102, p.277).
Isloriua voyennogo iskusstva [History of Military Arts] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), Ch. II, section 3; Colonel David M. Glantz, The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Soviet Operational Art
- B V Panov
- V N Kiselev
- I I Kartavtsev
B. V. Panov, V. N. Kiselev, I. I. Kartavtsev, et al., Isloriua voyennogo iskusstva [History of Military Arts] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), Ch. II, section 3; Colonel David M. Glantz, The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Soviet Operational Art: 1941-1945, Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, April 1987 draft, p.78.
The Effects of Strategic Bombing, p.ii. 48. In his 1981 autobiography, Galbraith went so far as to opine that by the end of 1945 it was possible that he 'knew more about the drained and shattered economies of Germany and Japan than anyone alive
- Galbraith
- Klein
Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, p.ii. 48. In his 1981 autobiography, Galbraith went so far as to opine that by the end of 1945 it was possible that he 'knew more about the drained and shattered economies of Germany and Japan than anyone alive' (John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p.240).
Daylight Precision Bombing' in IMPACT: The Army Air Forces' Confidential Picture History of World War II It is our sense that the full contribution of US long-range escort fighters to the Luftwaffe's loss of daytime air superiority over central Germany in the spring of
- James H Doolittle
- Beirne Lay
- Jr
James H. Doolittle with Beirne Lay, Jr., 'Daylight Precision Bombing' in IMPACT: The Army Air Forces' Confidential Picture History of World War II (New York, NY: James Parton, 1980), Vol.6, p.xv. It is our sense that the full contribution of US long-range escort fighters to the Luftwaffe's loss of daytime air superiority over central Germany in the spring of 1944 remains one of the least appreciated aspects of the CBO.
The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.259. Perera, however, has emphasized that all the COA's assumptions concerning capabilities were provided by the Eighth Air Force (Interview of Guido R. Perera
- Hansell
Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.259. Perera, however, has emphasized that all the COA's assumptions concerning capabilities were provided by the Eighth Air Force (Interview of Guido R. Perera, conducted by Thomas A. Fabyanic and David MacIsaac, Boston, MA., 10 June 1987, tape 1, side 2).
The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory
- Joshua M Epstein
Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), pp.21-31.
Voices from the Central Blue', p.636. Noble Frankland, together with Sir Charles Webster, authored The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany
- Macisaac
MacIsaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue', p.636. Noble Frankland, together with Sir Charles Webster, authored The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945, the official history of the British Bomber Command during World War II.
On Relating Non-Technical Elements to Systems Studies', Selected Papers on National Security
- James R Schlesinger
James R. Schlesinger, 'On Relating Non-Technical Elements to Systems Studies', Selected Papers on National Security 1964-1968 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation paper P-5284, Sept. 1974), p.77.
The US-Decline or Renewal?' Foreign Affairs
- P Samuel
- Huntington
Samuel P. Huntington, 'The US-Decline or Renewal?' Foreign Affairs, Winter 1988/89, p.90.
The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler The primary reason 89
- Hansell Jr
Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, pp.259, 261-2, 267-8, 286-97. The primary reason 89. Interview of Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., conducted by Thomas A.
The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics
- John J Mearsheimer
John J. Mearsheimer, 'The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', International Security, Spring 1989, p.55.
A War the US Can Win -Decisively', Chicago TribuneThe Experts in Retreat: After-the-Fact Explanations for the Gloomy Predictions
- John J Mearsheimer
John J. Mearsheimer, 'A War the US Can Win -Decisively', Chicago Tribune, 15 January 1991, p.13. 126b. See Joel Achenbach, 'The Experts in Retreat: After-the-Fact Explanations for the Gloomy Predictions', Washington Post, 28 February 1991, p.D12.
The suggestion that strategic bombing may have perversely aided German war production crops up even in the USSBS volume for which Galbraith was the principal author (see, in particular The Effects of Strategic Bombing
- Galbraith
- Galbraith
- Klein
Galbraith, A Life in Our Times, p.215. The suggestion that strategic bombing may have perversely aided German war production crops up even in the USSBS volume for which Galbraith was the principal author (see, in particular, Galbraith, Klein, et al., The Effects of Strategic Bombing, pp.26, 38, 157).
Problems of Estimating Military Power
- Andrew W Marshall
- Aug
The Military Applications of Modeling
- John A Battilega
- Judith K Grange
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy
- Kenneth Galbraith
- J Klein
- H Burton
A Life in Our Times: Memoirs, 240Boston
- John Galbraith
- Kenneth
Selected Papers on National Security
- Sept
The Effects of Strategic Bombing139144
- Klein Galbraith
Leaves from My Book of Life Washington and War Years, ix–x
- Guido R Perera