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The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: Probing the Myths
... In 2009 a plan of action was formed to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime and the initial steps were taken to strengthen multilateral economic cooperation. Today, the SCO promotes stability and peace among its members through cooperating on issues of security, cultural understanding and international trade (Hansen, 2008). 1 Although member countries are geographically close to each other they are significantly diverse in their history, technological capability, methods of corporate governance, language, national interests, culture, politics and levels of wealth and their mandate remains primarily to eliminate the " three evils " of " religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism " (Yuan, 2010), especially in the former Soviet member countries (Aris, 2009b). With the positive strength and influence of Russia and China, the SCO has the potential to grow as an international market for business, security and further integration and become a regional force in central Asia. ...
... From 2005, the SCO policy has indirectly limited the USA's entry into many parts of central Asia mainly affecting their access to the regions rich energy resources (Germanovich, 2008). Through this action the SCO are challenging the influence the USA has in this region and in recent years their actions have generally decreased or eliminated their members' dependence on 'western' countries (Bakshi, 2002; Hansen, 2008; Matveeva and Giustozzi, 2008). This strategy remains likely to continue. ...
Facing a collection of challenges, how can the Shanghai cooperation organisation (SCO) use technology to help improve cohesion, cope with enlargement, manage relations better with external parties, develop resources, advance economic cooperation between members, improve their speed of decision making and upgrade their quality of decision implementation. This review suggests potential solutions to resolve difficulties and consolidate the SCO's status through the use of improved communication mechanisms, surveillance devices and computer software, inter alia, to assist in the enhancement of communications, improve the security of stakeholders, develop a legally binding framework, promote economic confidence, increase financial inputs, encourage stronger joint-leadership from its two largest partners and manage enlargement.
... From both its words and actions it has become clear that it aims to become the most important international organization in the Asian region (Hansen, 2008). China has played a formative role in the establishment and development of this non-western Asian-centred organization, which is in line with its overall positive attitude towards institutions in the 21 st century. ...
China’s ever growing importance in world affairs and politics has not gone by unnoticed. However, conventional IR theories fail to explain how the emerging superpower has been expanding its role in regional institutions. The rather novel theory of scholar Kai He of institutional realism will be applied to China’s involvement in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). His theory combines traditional neorealism with elements of the neoliberal interdependence theory in an attempt to provide a holistic approach to the PRC’s foreign policy decisions.
Today, South Asia witnesses significant changes ranging from growing partnerships and unfolding opportunities to perceptible uncertainties, and China's robust engagement with the region needs to be seen and understood through a fresh lens of strategic pragmatism and developmental reciprocity. This collection of essays, by both established and up-and-coming scholars from the countries involved, provides an excellent study of multiple aspects of the relationship and reflects diverse perspectives and complementary insights. The study, balancing sober thoughts and meaningful policy recommendations with sanguine expectations, also proves a worthwhile attempt to move beyond the conventional geopolitical approach.' Zhang Li, Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies, 'The profile of China-South Asia interactions is increasing day by day due to the Belt and Road Initiative, investments in infrastructure for connectivity, trade and tourism, but also due to the spread of terrorism and other non-traditional security challenges. This volume, which has gathered a number of scholars' perspectives unravelling these interactions , is comprehensive in its coverage of subjects and themes and provision of diversified opinions. Several contributors to the volume have reflected on the historical and contemporary interactions, asymmetries, balance of power, cooperation, competition or even elements of conflict emerging in the region and provide relevant studies.' Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Chinese Studies, 'This edited volume is a well-timed and powerful collection of seventeen chapters from eminent scholars across the world, each taking a close and dispassionate look at China's role in regional and global politics. It provides an international context against which China's foreign policy behaviour and strategic thinking can be carefully compared and critically examined. In this analytically sophisticated and empirically rich volume, the authors have brilliantly offered systematic, graceful and trenchant analyses of the critical factors that shape and influence China's external relations. As such, it makes an enlightening addition
Organizacija dogovora o kolektivnoj bezbednosti (ODKB) predstavlja važnu regionalnu bezbednosnu organizaciju, pre svega onu odbrambeno vojnog tipa, koja deluje na turbulentnom postsovjetskom prostoru. Kao takva, ODKB teži saradnji sa drugim srodnim regionalnim organizacijama koje deluju na ovom prostoru. U radu se posmatra odnos ODKB sa NATOM i ŠOS-om (Šangajskom organizacijom za saradnju), njihove međusobne razlike, interesi, vidovi saradnje i/ili njihov izostanak kao i razlozi za to. U radu se daje sumarna ocena ovih odnosa i njihova moguća perspektiva u budućnosti.
It is widely accepted that military regimes break down faster than any other form of autocracy. To account for this instability, scholars have claimed that military professionalism, particularly the concern for maintaining hierarchy and cohesion, will lead the military to seek extrication sooner rather than later. Others have argued that under-institutionalization results from the limited goals set by moderator-type military interventions. However, none of these accounts help us understand the substantial variation in the duration and stability of the South American military juntas of the 1960s through the 1980s that were established by highly professionalized militaries, pursuing long-term foundational goals. Building on the new institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism, this chapter shows that the ‘standard model’ of the South American military junta that continues to inform today’s thinking about the characteristic weaknesses of military rule, achieved different levels of institutionalization across the region. More institutionalized regimes like the Brazilian or Chilean junta were better equipped to deal with the challenges of authoritarian power-sharing and control and therefore lasted significantly longer than less institutionalized regimes like the Argentinean or Peruvian junta. We argue, however, that the current literature on authoritarian institutions has difficulties accounting for this variation because it suffers from excessive voluntarism. Comparing the cases of Chile and Peru, we show instead that the institutional ‘choices’ of military rulers are not as free, that they are, in fact, constrained by historical legacies like the founding conditions of military professionalism and the military’s prior relation to party politics.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a comprehensive regional organization, created and driven by China, Russia, and the four Central Asian states for their own national interests and priorities. Despite national differences, the SCO member states have found enough common ground in maintaining and expanding the organization, which has emerged as the primary regional organization in Central Asia. While SCO has taken an anti-U.S. tone at times, it is largely focused on internal challenges. SCO is fundamentally a state-centric regionalist response to non-traditional security challenges, with both advantages (leveraging each other to deal with domestic opposition) and weaknesses (interstate cooperation will only delay the real solution of the problems).
While a pure security organization to start with, SCO has expanded into the economic cooperation arena. China has been most eager in pushing economic cooperation because of its growing economic power and demands for natural resources. While being wary of China intruding into its traditional sphere of influence, the Russians became more accepting of economic cooperation projects in light of the color revolutions and then the Global Recession. The Central Asian states are largely interested in economic cooperation because of their desire for modernization, which is an important reason for their interest in SCO.
SCO has turned to economic cooperation to solidify their ongoing security cooperation. It has indeed contributed to regional stability, although it is more a case of “authoritarian stability.” As the two largest powers, China and Russian have so far accommodated each other strategically to ensure the stability in this region. They have shown little interest in interfering in each other’s domestic affairs. As China and Russia become more involved in international organizations, one should expect more of that coming, particularly when they are founders of new organizations.
International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2013, pp. 285-399 (115 pp. + iii). [Scopus - Q1] <https://www.dropbox.com/s/6947ysyf1dfwovm/IJCS-V4N3-RegularIssue-combinedtext-221113-with-finalcover.pdf>
Established in 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is still struggling to define a clear and commonly accepted identity for itself. As the member states hold very different views of the future CIS, they pull the organization in different directions, giving it a somewhat fuzzy character. While the Russian-led core is seeking closer integration, possibly even a transfer of decision-making to the supranational level, another group of states is insisting that the CIS should remain a loose and non-binding forum for cooperation. As a reflection of this reality, the CIS space is home to a number of other organizations which all take their members from the CIS circle. These organizations deliver what the CIS as a whole—because of its lowest common denominator policy—cannot do. The host of acronyms offer something to most member states, but they also cause the CIS space to be highly fragmented. Russia, in particular, has worked to bring all the different parts of the CIS closer together under its own leadership, but has remained largely unsuccessful. With its most recent initiative, a Eurasian Economic Union to be established by 2015, Russia is making a new effort to achieve what has failed so far. Little suggests that it will have any greater success now than before, and it therefore seems likely that the CIS will remain in the future also a complex organizational setting and a difficult challenge for Russia to handle.
In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the immediate focus of the organization was to combat the so-called ‘three evils’—ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism—the SCO's long-term viability and effectiveness in promoting regional stability and economic development depend on how member states build up common identity and cooperate on issues of mutual concern. This article looks at China's role in initiating the Shanghai-5/SCO structure within the broader framework of Beijing's foreign and security policy interests and priorities in Central Asia and seeks to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles to its efforts in achieving key objectives for this new regional organization: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; and promotion of economic prosperity. In addition, the article will also examine the extent to which Beijing has used the opportunity to exercise leadership and whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using the SCO as a vehicle.
"Islamist radicalism in Central Asia... is in large part a response to authoritarianism. Where governments tolerate some degree of political opposition-either in parliaments or in the press-society's enthusiasm for Islamist goals is limited."
The raw material base of the titanium industries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is assessed, with a focus on the geology and mineralogy of producing and prospective deposits and prevailing end-use patterns in CIS and the world as a whole. Upon the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine was the only supplier of titanium ore for the titanium industries of the FSU, which are located in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Efforts of Russia and Kazakhstan to explore and develop their own titanium ore deposits are described, as are the uses of different titanium raw materials (e.g., ilmenite, rutile) in titanium metal and pigment production. FSU producers, now significant participants in world titanium markets, are expected to continue exports of titanium metal because of depressed domestic demand and still relatively low (but growing) levels of titanium consumption in pigment production.
Trade volume between Central Asia and China has tripled since 2002. This study, which is based on Chinese sources, explains
the reasons for this expansion in trade. Even if numerous obstacles remain, Government development policy in China’s western
regions has induced trade growth between Xinjiang and Central Asia. Trade flows mainly consist of three blocks: economic activities
of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, commerce conducted by traders of the coastal province of Zhejiang, based
in Xinjiang, and petty trade notably between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang.
Russia is still the largest nation in the world, yet its power and influence on the international stage has markedly decreased compared with that of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is not seeking to win the geopolitical struggle and to achieve the ideological goal of reshaping the world in its own way. Like any large country, it has national interests of its own, which may or may not coin-cide with the interests of other countries and blocs. As a large state with its own interests, Russia is not interested in a world where one force dominates; therefore it is seeking a multipolar world. At the same time, as a state that is not powerful enough to counter negative trends in global development on its own, it needs support from allies and sympathizers. The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was prompted by the desire of some states, sharing Russia's views on trends in global development, to pool their efforts in the search for common approaches to find solutions to international and regional problems, and to develop regional economic and cultural cooperation. The SCO, which is not any-one's enemy, has become an association aimed at finding posi-tive solutions to specific problems in the interests of its member states. This is the essence of the so-called "Shanghai spirit" Alexander Lukin is the Director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. which permeates the principles of international relations pro-posed by the organization for the international community. The declaration of the anniversary SCO summit (the SCO celebrat-ed its fifth anniversary in June 2006) said: "The SCO owes its smooth growth to its consistent adherence to the 'Shanghai spir-it' based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consulta-tions, respect for the diversity of cultures and aspiration toward common development. This spirit is the underlying philosophy and the most important code of conduct of the SCO. It enrich-es the theory and practice of contemporary international rela-tions and embodies the shared aspiration of the international community for implementing democracy in international rela-tions. The 'Shanghai spirit' is therefore of critical importance to the international community's pursuit of a new and non-con-frontational model of international relations, a model that calls for discarding the Cold War mentality and transcending ideo-logical differences." Attempts to transform the SCO into an anti-Western or anti-American bloc are doomed to failure as that would run counter to the vital interests of member states interested in cooperation with the West in many areas. At the same time, while actively working to ensure the interests of its own members in the first place, the SCO may meet – and already does – with misunderstanding and even hostility on the part of those who see the world as unipolar, while presenting their own interests as universal. Nevertheless, the SCO's activities do not rule out or belittle cooperation mechanisms already built by its member states with other organizations or states beyond the SCO. The SCO wants to create additional spheres for cooperation, which did not exist earlier or are impossible outside its framework. The SCO's future will depend on how broad these spheres are and whether it succeeds in making its additional cooperation mechanisms attractive to the peoples of its member states, so that they become interested in the SCO's strengthening and develop-ment. Today we can speak of three elements of such addition-al cooperation.
In early June 2005 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) foreign ministers' meeting, India, Pakistan, and Iran were recommended for SCO "observer" status. Final SCO approval for the three countries was granted a month later at the SCO heads of state meeting held July 5-6, 2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan. This is a major step which accommodates each of the SCO member states' interests and position of the SCO to further support a multi-polar world. This paper seeks to specifically address what is driving India's and Pakistan's interest in joining the SCO? In order to answer this question, one must have an understanding of the SCO and its members. The SCO is comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. During the SCO's evolution, other countries in the region including Mongolia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and more recently the post-Taliban Afghan government, have expressed interest, to varying degrees, in participating in this emerging regional forum. The SCO is an emerging regional organization in Central Asia, but during its short history it has largely remained an enigma. It has been characterized as a security organization, a regional forum, and an anti-terrorism coalition. Another common characterization of the SCO is as a Russian and Chinese led alliance created to counter U.S. hegemony. These explanations of the SCO have their shortfalls and provide little insight of the primary motivations and interests driving the SCO's evolution. While analysis of this larger question is important, this paper seeks to examine the possibilities and implications of either India, Pakistan or both joining the SCO as full-fledged members. In order to answer this paper's research question, it is also important to understand the current geopolitical and geoeconomic relations between Central and South Asia.
In the post-Soviet 1990s, the three key players in the geopolitical space around Central Asia Russia, China and the United States achieved a provisional equilibrium. Russia maintained its traditional dominance in its former southern provinces. China, as it developed its economic relations with the Central Asian countries, gradually increased its own political influence, while seeking to avoid confrontation with Moscow. The United States, despite its preoccupation with other areas of greater strategic significance, kept a wary eye on the region. After 11 September, this alignment of power has changed: the United States is now the region's main economic donor and security manager. The Bush administration needs to think clearly about the advantages and disadvantages of US dominance in Central Asia. The American presence in Central Asia threatens to offend Russian nationalistic sensibilities and make Putin's pro-US policy domestically very difficult. The optimal US approach to Central Asia is to establish leadership there in partnership with Russia. It is not in the American interest to corner Putin and deny him the opportunity to continue his policy of integrating Russia with the West.
This study analyses the establishment and development of the GUUAM cooperation and offers an assessment of the future implications of this regional grouping for the CIS military alliance. It presents three key arguments. First, that the GUUAM members have bandwagoned with western states at the system level and balanced against Russia at the regional level. Second, that there is a dialectical relationship between these two policies, with one getting added momentum from the other. And finally, that on this background we should expect to see increased future balancing by the GUUAM states — and possibly by other CIS members as well — causing a further undermining of the CIS military cooperation.
In the late 1980s regional integration emerged as one of the most important developments in world politics. It is not a new phenomenon, however, and this book presents the first analysis of integration across time, and across regions. Walter Mattli examines projects in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, but also in Latin America, North America and Asia since the 1950s. Using the tools of political economy, he considers why some integration schemes have succeeded while many others have failed; what forces drive the process of integration; and under what circumstances outside countries seek to join. Unlike traditional political science approaches, the book stresses the importance of market forces in determining the outcome of integration; but unlike purely economic analyses, it also highlights the impact of institutional factors. The book will provide students of political science, economics, and European studies with a new framework for the study of international cooperation.
As their transition to market economies continue, China and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia have rediscovered their complementary economic and political interests in increasing trade and investments, especially between Xinjiang Province and independent Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan. However, a number of obstacles remain, including payments arrangements, customs procedures, and transportation facilities. Prospects for trade in oil and gas, consumer goods, and agricultural materials are bright in the long run, however. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
The Origins of Alliances
- S On
- Walt
On balancing, see S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, chapter 2.
Regime Insecurity and International Co-operation', p. 83. 14. British Petroleum [BP], Statistical Review of World Energy
- Fravel
Fravel, 'Regime Insecurity and International Co-operation', p. 83. 14. British Petroleum [BP], Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, pp. 8 and 11; http:// www.bp.com.
The centre was established in 2004 only
- Rfe Rl
RFE/RL, 3 September 2003 and China Daily, 16 January 2004. The centre was established in 2004 only.
Putin and Russian Foreign Policy Putin's Russia
- D Herspring
- P Rutland
D. Herspring & P. Rutland, 'Putin and Russian Foreign Policy', in D. Herspring (ed.), Putin's Russia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, pp. 229–242.
US Energy Information Agency
- E Factiva
E.g. Factiva, 11 June 2006, 22 August 2006 and 1 September 2006. 33. US Energy Information Agency [EIA], Country Analysis Brief China (2006): 3, http:// www.eia.doe.gov. 34. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, pp. 8 and 11.
Country Analysis Brief China
- Rfe Rl
EIA, Country Analysis Brief China, 9 and RFE/RL, 22 March and 10 April 2006.
Is SCO New Warsaw Pact or Modern-Day Holy Alliance?
- A Krickovic
A. Krickovic, 'Is SCO New Warsaw Pact or Modern-Day Holy Alliance?', RFE/RL Endnote, 22 August 2007. This figure does not include the 2002 Chinese-Kyrgyz exercise.
232 THE SHANGHAI CO-OPERATION ORGANISATION Downloaded by [Duke University Libraries
- E G Rfe
E.g. RFE/RL, 12 December 2005. 232 THE SHANGHAI CO-OPERATION ORGANISATION Downloaded by [Duke University Libraries] at 21:03 28 May 2012
Why Shanghai is Not Warsaw
- Bruce Pannier
Bruce Pannier, " Why Shanghai is Not Warsaw ", RFE/RL Commentary and Analysis, 22
Armii ShOS nuzhny NATO
- See
- Haas
See, e.g, Marcel de Haas, "Armii ShOS nuzhny NATO", Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 22 February 2008; available at <nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-03-21>.
SCO Fails to Back Russia Over Georgia
" SCO Fails to Back Russia Over Georgia ", RFE/RL, 28 August 2008.
- Freedom House
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008 (2008); available at <www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fi w08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf>.
Our Military Exercises are a Threat for Terrorists, but not for the West' -Nikolai Bordyuzha
- Yuri Plutenko
Yuri Plutenko, ""'Our Military Exercises are a Threat for Terrorists, but not for the
West' -Nikolai Bordyuzha", Moscow News, 24 April 2008; available at <www.mnweekly.
ru/politics/20080424/55325469.html>.
The Role of the Russian Power Structures in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: What the Future Holds
- Dmitri Trenin
August 2008, and Dmitri Trenin, "The Role of the Russian Power Structures in Domestic
Politics and Foreign Policy: What the Future Holds", in Jan Leijonhielm and Fredrik Westerlund, eds. Russian Power Structures -Present and Future Roles in Russian Politics (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2007), pp. 175-176.
According to Jane's, 2008 defence spending stood at USD 65,6 bn in China and USD 42 bn in Russia; in Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, special issues China and Northeast Asia
According to Jane's, 2008 defence spending stood at USD 65,6 bn in China and USD
42 bn in Russia; in Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, special issues China and Northeast Asia, 29 September 2008, and Russia and the CIS, 12 August 2008.