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The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the crisis of 1997
Abstract
The Crown Property Bureau is the monarchy's investment arm in Thailand. While the monarchy's political role has been much discussed since the 2006 coup, its economic foundations, activities and role have seldom been studied. To understand these aspects better, this article looks at how the 1997 crisis affected the Crown Property Bureau. The Bureau was particularly vulnerable because of its dependence on the performance of two private companies in which the Bureau was a major shareholder. Both companies, the Siam Commercial Bank and the Siam Cement Group, were in sectors that were hit hard by the crisis. The Bureau survived the crisis by making significant changes in its own management and investment policies, and by promoting similar reforms in two affiliated companies. As a result, the Bureau emerged with an income significantly higher than its peak pre-crisis level.
... Abgeschnitten von dem unmittelbaren Zugriff auf die staatlichen Steuereinnahmen wurde das finanzielle Auskommen des Hauses Chakri durch die Etablierung eines königlichen Schatzamtes gesichert -eine Institution, die das Vermögen der Familie, vor allem deren Grundeigentum verwaltete und zu Aufgabe hatte, durch die Bewirtschaftung dieser Vermögen dem Königshaus ein standesgemäßes Auskommen zu sichern. Dafür wurde eine besondere Rechtsform geschaffen, die das Schatzamt von allen Steuern und Abgaben und von jedweder Rechenschaftspflicht befreit (Ouyyanont 2008). ...
... Ähnlich der japanischen zaibatsu oder koreanischen chaebol bildeten die chinesisch-stämmigen Händlerfamilien Bang-koks Konglomerate, zu deren Kern eine Bank und ein Handelshaus gehörten, und die in unterschiedlichen Industriesparten zu investieren begannen. Das königliche Schatzamt war eines dieser insgesamt fünf Konglomerate, in dessen Zentrum die Thai Farmers Bank und Industrieunternehmen wie Siam Cement stand (Ouyyanont 2008;Suehiro 1989;Phipatseritham u. Yoshihara 1983). ...
... Dieses qualitativ ganz anders konzipierte Projekt zeigt deutliche Auswirkungen in den Ländern der chinesischen Einflusssphäre -wie zum Beispiel in Thailand . (Porphant 2008) . ...
... Ähnlich der japanischen zaibatsu oder koreanischen chaebol bildeten die chinesisch-stämmigen Händlerfamilien Bangkoks Konglomerate, zu deren Kern eine Bank und ein Handelshaus gehörten, und die in unterschiedlichen Industriesparten zu investieren begannen (Suehiro 1989;Krirkkiat/Yoshihara 1983) . Das königliche Schatzamt war eines dieser insgesamt fünf Konglomerate, in dessen Zentrum die Thai Farmers Bank und Industrieunternehmen wie Siam Cement stand (Porphant 2008) . ...
In May 2014, the Thai military staged a coup d’état and ousted the democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. This coup, which marks the climax of the split between the Redshirt and Yellowshirt political camps, is difficult to explain solely in terms of inner Thai power relations. Instead the article argues that the Chinese mega infrastructure project one belt one road needs to be taken into account. This project is another major step in the rise of China – a process, which has often been seen as part of a hegemonic shift towards a new accumulation cycle with China as new center. Against this background, the present upheaval in Thailand is interpreted in a historical perspective and as one example for the kind of conflicts, which accompany the historic shift towards China as a new power center. However, the article also argues that the turn towards an autocratic form of governance can not be attributed to direct Chinese influence. Rather, it is the result of the fierce rivalry between two capitalist fractions and domestic factors.
... Abgeschnitten von dem unmittelbaren Zugriff auf die staatlichen Steuereinnahmen wurde das finanzielle Auskommen des Hauses Chakri durch die Etablierung eines königlichen Schatzamtes gesichert -eine Institution, die das Vermögen der Familie, vor allem deren Grundeigentum verwaltete und zu Aufgabe hatte, durch die Bewirtschaftung dieser Vermögen dem Königshaus ein standesgemäßes Auskommen zu sichern. Dafür wurde eine besondere Rechtsform geschaffen, die das Schatzamt von allen Steuern und Abgaben und von jedweder Rechenschaftspflicht befreit (Ouyyanont 2008). ...
... Ähnlich der japanischen zaibatsu oder koreanischen chaebol bildeten die chinesisch-stämmigen Händlerfamilien Bang-koks Konglomerate, zu deren Kern eine Bank und ein Handelshaus gehörten, und die in unterschiedlichen Industriesparten zu investieren begannen. Das königliche Schatzamt war eines dieser insgesamt fünf Konglomerate, in dessen Zentrum die Thai Farmers Bank und Industrieunternehmen wie Siam Cement stand (Ouyyanont 2008;Suehiro 1989;Phipatseritham u. Yoshihara 1983). ...
... Housing transaction Pyhrr et al. (1999), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004) Debt-equity ratio Pyhrr et al. (1999), Hung et al. (2002), Ouyyanont (2008), Morri and Cristanziani (2009). 22 Construction schedule Edelstein and Tsang (2007) , Liu and Wang (2008), Coulson and McMillen (2008), Khumpaisal et al. (2010), Eskinasi (2012), Elazouni and Abido (2014). ...
... 17Construction loan interest rateHung et al. (2002),Barlas et al. (2007),Edelstein and Tsang (2007),Deng et al. (2009),Morri and Cristanziani (2009), Park et al. (2010),Eskinasi (2012),Golob et al. (2012),Hwang et al. (2013- 2). 18Taxes and feesHuang and Wang (2005),Vanichvatana (2007),Ouyyanont (2008). 19Land cost and consultant costsKenny (1999),Guthrie (2010),Eskinasi (2012 ). ...
Profits are the highest concern of Chief Executive Officers, especially in real estate companies. In the real estate industry, there are many factors that influence on the profits enhancement. This article aims at exploring the factors that affect the profits of residential real estate companies in Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam. A number of literature both in developed and developing countries, especially in construction and real estate related literature, have been reviewed and 23 items associated with profit enhancement are discovered. They are divided into five key items: urban population, buyers’ capacity, housing supply, housing economics, and housing finance. These key items give basic understanding to the real estate companies to plan for their profit improvement. The items will be confirmed with confirmatory factor analysis in further study.
... Gray 1986Gray , 1991Gray , 1992Gray , 1995Bowie 1997;Chanida, Chaithawat and Thanapol 2004;Connors 2003;Hewison 1997;Ockey 2005;Somsak 2001;Thanapol 2007;Thongchai 2005). And the coup in September 2006 caused a spree of critical texts dealing with this issue (Connors 2008;Giles 2007Giles , 2008Ukrist 2008;Porphant 2008). The Thai publisher Fa Diao Kan (SameSky) in its publications and its website has offered space to critical discussions of the Thai monarchy. ...
... This can be seen as posing a challenge to the Crown Property Bureau. As Porphant Ouyyanont (2008) has revealed, the Bureau is extraordinarily wealthy, worth $28 billion in 2005. The Bureau and other royal enterprises are considered 'special businesses' receiving various forms of state benefit, including considerable tax exemptions. ...
The Thai monarchy today is usually presented as both guardian of tradition and the institution to bring modernity and progress to the Thai people. It is moreover seen as protector of the nation. Scrutinizing that image, this volume reviews the fascinating history of the modern monarchy. It also analyses important cultural, historical, political, religious, and legal forces shaping the popular image of the monarchy and, in particular, of King Bhumibol Adulyadej.In this manner, the book offers valuable insights into the relationships between monarchy, religion and democracy in Thailand – topics that, after the September 2006 coup d’etat, gained renewed national and international interest. By addressing such contentious issues as Thai-style democracy, lese majeste legislation, religious symbolism and politics, monarchical traditions, and the royal sufficiency economy, this volume will be of interest to a broad spectrum of academics, journalists and other interested readers outside academia.
... Given the contemporary nature of events, the shadowy politicking of various capitalist groups, and the oftentimes highly personalised nature of business dealings, this analysis is necessarily preliminary. One point of departure is to recognise significant economic rivalry among domestic capitalist groups, and especially between the Shinawatra business group and, despite some significant linkages, the monarchy's investment arm the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) (also see Hewison, 2008;Porphant, 2008). Tensions were not limited to these two. ...
... Charoen has close ties with the palace and the military, with General Prem serving as honorary chairman of New Imperial Hotel Group owned by Charoen (Chai-Anan, 1997 We now come to the most contentious and difficult capital relation of all: that between Thaksin and the CPB. The CPB was hard-hit by the economic crisis of 1997 (see Porphant, 2008). Paul Handley (2006a: 410) suggested that the crisis wiped out palace income. ...
The 2006 coup d'état was far more than a simple case of military seizure of power. Rather, the 19 September 2006 coup is connected intimately with the monarchy in various respects. The “royalist military” legitimated the coup by using the royalist discourse that was generated by the anti-Thaksin movement and the massive celebrations of the king's 60th year on the throne. Having succeeded in overthrowing prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the coup makers thought they could secure the throne by ensuring loyal succession to the position of Army Commander-in-Chief in the medium term. To enhance military influence the “royal military” are also revitalising a Cold War relic, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). In line with this political regression, it appears that military want to return Thailand to the years of “semi-democracy,” when the military and bureaucracy had significant power over elected politicians.
... This will require new skills and knowledge, which need to be developed through dedicated training programs. 5. Adaptation opportunities are not only affected by the lifecycle of the buildings, but also by the lifecycle of the tenancy contract (land or building), which is owned by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) and the national government (Ouyyanont, 2008;Pimonsathean, 2012). This needs to be taken into consideration and require further study. ...
Urban climate adaptation currently focusses mainly on hazards but often ignores opportunities which arise in both space and time. Opportunistic Adaptation provides a rationalized approach to mainstream measures for climate adaptation into urban renewal cycles. Adaptation opportunities are identified by projecting the lifespans of urban assets into the future to obtain an operational urban adaptation agenda for the future. Upscaling of the adaptation process is done by synchronizing the end-of-lifecycle of a group of assets to develop adaptation clusters that comprise multiple dwellings, infrastructure as well as public spaces. An extensive catalogue of adaptation measures for different scale-levels ensures flexibility in the type of measures that can be integrated. Sequencing the adaptation measures over long periods of time provides insight and flexibility in the long-term protection standards that can be achieved. By applying a design-centered approach, the potentials of obtaining co-benefits in the urban landscape are maximized. Potentials of clustering of nature-based solutions are being considered which ensures to maximize the delivery of ecosystem services. This research aims to assess \the adaptation potential of Bangkok, based on a case study area (Lat Krabang) by mapping the adaptation opportunities and flood vulnerability. The resulting outputs will contribute to the development of a flexible and inclusive FRM strategy.
... Most of those social groups that felt they benefited to some extent from TRT policies were willing to look the other way, but neoliberals in the Democrat Party and royalists who felt increasingly challenged by Thaksin's accumulation of greater wealth and power grew restive, particularly as they saw their possibilities for success at the polls recede under a series of increasingly large TRT victories. 67 If these had been the only forces at work, the situation would have been volatile enough. However, yet another complicating factor, directly related to U.S. imperial ventures, also came to into play. ...
... Not only power and prestige are at stake. In terms of economic interest, the royal family's Crown Property Bureau (CPB) is one of the largest business conglomerates in Thailand, with assets worth some uS$41 billion in 2005(hewison 2012Ouyyanont 2008). CPB is an opaque organization: exempt from taxes, protected by the palace, and lacking transparency and public accountability. ...
Thailand fits the pattern of pernicious polarized politics identified in this volume, where a previously excluded group successfully gains political power through the ballot box, governs unilaterally to pursue radical reforms, and produces a backlash from the traditional power elites. In Thailand, elite conflict has been a major part of the story, but this article argues that political polarization there cannot be merely understood as “elite-driven”: conflict among the elites and the masses, and the interaction between them, produced polarized and unstable politics. Violent struggle is caused by class structure and regional, urban-rural disparities; elite struggle activates the existing social cleavages; and ideological framing deepens the polarization. While the Yellow Shirts and traditional elites want to restore and uphold the “Thai-style democracy” with royal nationalism, the Red Shirts espouse the “populist democracy” of strong elected government with popular nationalism and egalitarian social order. © 2019 by The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
... The work ofPorphant (2008) has been influential in opening up discussion on royal wealth.The Monarchy and Thai-style Democracy 671 ...
Although many people date critical commentary on the Thai monarchy to Paul Handley's explosive biography The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej, this article demonstrates the existence of a consistently critical body of work, in the English language, that emerged contemporaneously with the king's growing stature from the 1980s. It also considers the conditions that have led to wider and more vocal criticisms since the coup of 2006. The primary focus is an exploration of new contributions to this critical commentary by the authors of the edited collection Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand. It identifies tensions across the chapters, including different emphases on liberalism and conservatism, and on the symbolic functioning of the monarchy.
... The king's personality attributes are shaped by the royalist account in ways that render him as ''great and gifted,'' with the resulting glorification becoming ''a powerful force in promoting the monarchy'' (Hewison, 2008: 196). As such, donations to the king and royal foundations set up by members of his family have become a means to acquire status, particularly for big businesses, as they show a link between the donor and the king; indeed, a large number of royal development projects are funded by the middle and upper classes of Thai society (Jory, 2001;Porphant, 2008;Thak, 2007). The investment branches of the monarchy based on land, banking and infrastructural development have also augmented some of the royal development projects. ...
A sociological reading of Thailand's monarchistic legacy is employed to identify cultural themes and practices of nation construction. It is demonstrated how, after the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, royalist networks of Thailand's first constitutional king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, reinforced the staying power of his rule and the institution of constitutional monarchy with primordial themes. The themes functioned to sacralise the nation as rooted in a glorious past as well as legitimise the king's place and continued relevance in Thai politics. Within this context, primordial simulacra derived from the Siamese empire, Buddhism and rekindled royal ceremonies from antiquity were reassembled for nationalistic purposes. As a result, the sacralising of the Thai nation has rendered the king a sacred nationalist, a type of nationalist that synchronises the real and ethereal to construct nation, a process that elevated the country's traditional authority system to respond to the undesirable consequences of twentieth century modernisation.
... Even though Thailand's constitution accurately places the monarchy as the symbolic head of the state and " above " normal politics, in fact it appears that the king has actively engaged in politics through a loose alliance of his proxies – the judiciary, the army, the bureaucracy, and especially, the president of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanond (McCargo 2005; Winichakul 2008). Additionally, the palace also has a dominant role in the economic sector owing to its ownership of a large part of properties in the real estate section (Ouyyanont 2008). Thus, this network monarchy 2 has been a significant political force typically operating to seek an expansion of its political influence (McCargo 2005, 516). ...
This article offers a sociological perspective to investigate the structure and mechanism of the Red Shirts' blood-sacrificing rituals. It argues that the blood-sacrificing rituals functioned to challenge the legitimacy of Thailand's socio-political order – one that is directed by the network monarchy. The article suggests that (1) these rituals served to embody the different fragments within Red Shirts' umbrella, as well as to translate them into a powerful symbolic collective action, and (2) these rituals derived their powerful imaginare by embodying a two-part ideology – one that used the language of 'democracy' and 'justice' proposing an alternative political ideology and the other that used the language of 'blood' and 'sacrifice' drawn upon the sacred cultural habitus to marshal the politics of identification to further strengthen their demand. This article concludes that through their demand for full-fledged citizenship, the Red Shirts' blood-sacrificing rituals can be best understood as a vehicle of change posing a serious anti-structural force to an existing socio-political order. "This is a peaceful way to fight. We are asking for neither bloodshed, nor violence. If there is any bloodshed, let it be the blood of 'Phrai', of those without privilege like the Red Shirts, who is bleeding for democracy. Abhisit has to dissolve the parliament. Let them know that even our life, we can sacrifice for democracy." – Nattawut Saikur, Red Shirts' co-leader (Phu Chad Kan [Manager] 16th March 2010, 4)
The role of elite coalitions, violence and social orders in the development process has recently resurfaced in economic literature. In this article, we mobilize some of the literature on elite coalition, elite circulation and institutional change and provide a framework for understanding institutional change as the result of major misalignment between rent-seeking and rank-keeping. We also analyse how lock-in systems implemented by the elite in place provoke political instability.
This framework is then applied to Thailand, which has experienced political instability in the past decades. The rapid empowerment of an ascending elite provoked a major misalignment between its growing economic power and the legitimacy of the established political order, i.e. a major contradiction between a rent-seeking and a rank-keeping conception of the legitimacy of elites.
This article examines the legacy of King Rama IX, its impact on the business sector in Thailand, and the collective memories of the business elite after the king passed away in late 2016. It shows that capitalists were selective when it came to their remembrance of Rama IX. They tended to remember the king’s charitable projects to which magnates could donate money and goods. Following in the king’s footsteps, they even established their own philanthropic foundations and pledged that these organisations would work in tandem with royal charities for the benefit of the poor. These social activities among the capitalists show the rise of philanthrocapitalism in Thailand. Although philanthrocapitalism can temporarily alleviate the suffering of the poor, it comes at a price: the undemocratic and unaccountable regime of the wealthy oligarchs, the reduction in social welfare, the increasing power of the market, and the growing inequality between the rich and the poor. Despite the death of Rama IX, philanthrocapitalism remains a popular practice that bonds the monarchy and capitalists under the new reign. The bond between them, however, has been put to the test by social dissent and mass protests against the monarchy.
This volume showcases the diversity of climate change politics and practices across Southeast Asia.
Through a series of country-level case studies and regional perspectives, the authors in this volume explore the complexities and contested nature of climate governance in what can be considered as one of the most dynamic and multi-faceted regions of the world. They reflect upon the tensions between authoritarian and democratic climate change governance, the multiple roles of civil society and non-state interventions, and the conflicts between state planning and market-driven climate change governance. Shedding light on climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in Southeast Asia, this book presents the various formal and informal institutions of climate change governance, their relevant actors, procedures, and policies. Empirical findings from a diverse set of environments are merged into a cross-country comparison that allows for elaborating on similar patterns whilst at the same time highlighting the distinct features of climate change governance in Southeast Asia.
Drawing on case studies from all Southeast Asian countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam, this book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and practitioners dealing with climate change and environmental governance.
บ่อยครั้งที่การพัฒนาเมืองโดยการลงทุนบนที่ดินได้นำมาสู่การเปลี่ยนแปลงทางกายภาพของเมืองและสภาพแวดล้อมภายใต้วัฏจักรนี้ชุมชนเมืองมักเป็นหนึ่งในพื้นที่ซึ่งได้รับผลกระทบจากการพัฒนา อย่างไรก็ตาม การศึกษาเพื่อทำความเข้าใจชุมชนเมือง โดยเฉพาะชุมชนที่อยู่ในย่านใจกลางเมือง (Central Business District) นั้น มักถูกมองข้ามบ่อยครั้งเมื่อการลงทุนเพื่อการพัฒนาที่ดินมักถูกให้น้ำหนักมากกว่า บทความนี้ต้องการสร้างความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับชุมชนเมืองโดยศึกษาในกรณีศึกษาชุมชนบนที่ดินของสำนักงานทรัพย์สินส่วนพระมหากษัตริย์ 6 ชุมชน โดยวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อต้องการสะท้อนภาพชุมชนเมืองที่มีความสัมพันธ์ภายในชุมชนที่หลากหลาย ภายใต้คุณสมบัติ 3 ลักษณะ ได้แก่ 1) ลักษณะทางกายภาพ2) ลักษณะทางสังคม-เศรษฐกิจของครัวเรือน และ 3) ความคาดหวังต่อการพัฒนา โดยผลลัพธ์จากการศึกษาพบคุณลักษณะที่สำคัญ คือ เมืองประกอบด้วยโครงสร้างทางสังคมเหลื่อมทับกันอยู่ 2 ลักษณะ ได้แก่ 1) ความสัมพันธ์ทางสังคมแบบชุมชนดั้งเดิมและชุมชนที่มีการปรับปรุง และ 2) ปัจจัยที่ส่งผลต่อความต้องการในการปรับปรุงทางกายภาพของชุมชนและที่อยู่อาศัย ผลการศึกษา พบว่า ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างเงื่อนไขทางกายภาพและประโยชน์ทางเศรษฐกิจที่ผูกติดกันอย่างแนบแน่นในปัจจุบัน ทำให้การพัฒนาเปลี่ยนแปลงลักษณะทางกายภาพของชุมชนทำได้ยาก ในท้ายสุดงานวิจัยได้สะท้อนให้เห็นว่าความไม่เป็นเอกภาพและความสลับซับซ้อนในชุมชน และอาจส่งผลต่อความไม่ชอบธรรมของชุมชนในการยืนหยัดอาศัยในพื้นที่ โดยชุมชนจำต้องเร่งสร้างพื้นที่เจรจาต่อรองกับเจ้าของที่ดินโดยเร็วเพื่อประโยชน์ร่วมกัน
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze an unusual legal development concerning brand protection in Thailand. The case study elucidates many key concepts in brand management and the political economy of Thailand.
Design/methodology/approach
A case study approach is adopted, in which a chronology of key events surrounding a supreme court decision are developed. An analysis of the causes and consequences of the verdict is presented drawing on inputs from legal and business experts.
Findings
The decision at the center of this case is ground breaking. Unlike conventional infringement decisions that are based on tangible designs of products, this case established protection of a brand image based on advertisements aired on television. It is argued that the decision went too far in the protection of trade dress and may potentially limit freedom and creativity for future marketing campaigns.
Practical implications
Intellectual property protection in developing economies such as in Thailand can be complicated by a lack of clear laws and the political and social influence of the parties involved.
Originality/value
The case provides the first analysis of a potentially consequential supreme court decision with links to the unique context of the political economy of Thailand.
State–business relations are considered the key to explaining long-term economic growth. However, the fact that there is neither an ideal nor convergent model of such relations requires us to explore political arrangements that underpin them. This article proposes a modified social conflict approach to state–business relations that incorporates into the analysis the role of intra-elite contestation, marginalised groups, and different kinds of leading economic actor, with a case study of Thailand. It argues that, from 1980 to 1997, Thailand’s economic development occurred within the context of multifaceted conflicts and power fragmentation. Banking oligopolies played a leading role in resource allocation that took Thailand to a path of high growth, high inequality and low technological capabilities. Social conflict in the post-1997 era has shifted towards power consolidation, centring on the tussle between the traditional elite and elected politicians. Thaksin’s growth regime (2001–2006) was state-led in character, with profound populist–redistributive impacts. Two military coups in 2006 and 2014 did not change this consolidated structure. The junta replaced Thaksin at the top of the pecking order and rearranged the inner–outer circles of its own clientelistic networks. This evolution of social conflict has rendered Thailand’s economic development increasingly opposing to the notion of inclusive growth.
Almost two decades after the initial victory of Thai Rak Thai, scholars still debate the forces behind Thaksin's rise to power. I revisit these debates and argue for a more explicit analysis of dynamics over time. I distinguish analytically between the founding moment of TRT's first victory and the subsequent reproduction of its dominance. I argue that TRT's financial muscle was a sufficient condition for its 2001 victory, that institutions merely contributed to the scale of its victory, and that its platform was not decisive. Once in power, however, institutions were instrumental in allowing TRT to complete its term, but more important for its long-term dominance was the rapid implementation of its campaign promises, which created a mass constituency that in turn made Thaksin-linked parties resilient at the polls despite institutional reforms designed to weaken their electoral performance.
This chapter reviews the key aspects related to governance in Thailand, addressing the upgrading of informal settlements at the national level from a community-driven perspective. It presents the findings of research undertaken on two pioneer case studies under the Baan Mankong Programme. More specifically, the chapter examines the on-site upgrading governance, policies, and planning approaches that contribute to the development of economic, social, and physical improvements in informal settlements. It also evaluates to what extent the informal dwellers have seen improvements in their living conditions as a result of the implementation of the Baan Mankong Programme. The article elaborates on the contributions to the positive development of the low-income communities that can be extracted from the experience in Thailand and suggests valuable lessons for other cities going through similar processes, pointing out some challenges for the future development of on-site upgrading policies.
This article attempts to illuminate Duncan McCargo's influential yet ambiguous concept of ‘network monarchy’ — the source of political power wielded by Thailand's royalist establishment. Drawing on Thai-language primary sources, especially cremation volumes, I argue, first, that many individuals who have made up various institutional components of the network monarchy come from a constellation of traditional royalist families that have intermarried with each other. Contrary to what McCargo suggests, these people are not just bound by their devotion to the monarchy alone, but also by their families’ pervasive intermarriage ties forged over many decades. These ties have given the network monarchy additional resilience, even though not all its members toe the ideological line all the time. My second argument concerns the temporal context in which the network monarchy has come into being. Although McCargo makes it seem that the late King Bhumibol developed the network monarchy — his personal patronage network — as a political tool from scratch in the post-1973 period, it has actually grown, in part, out of the pre-existing elite family networks. I develop these twin arguments by using the case of one royalist prime minister — Anand Panyarachun — as a focal point of analysis.
This article provides an account of the upper echelons of Thailand’s capitalist class. Based on an analysis of the Forbes data on Thailand’s wealthiest for the period 2006–2019, it analyses the 30 families and groups that have dominated these rankings over this period. The article compares how the growth of this group’s wealth has outpaced other measures of how Thailand’s economy has grown over this period. The article also compares this Forbes-ranked group with the upper reaches of the Thai capitalist class in 1980, assessing wealth and investment between the most important capitalist groups in 1980 and those in the Forbes rankings for 2006–2019. It finds considerable consistency within this category, in both periods and over time.
The history of democracy is typically a history of struggle against monarchs and other such autocrats. The elevation of one person over others by virtue of blood and birth has come to be seen as anachronistic; yet some monarchies have managed to survive to this day. This paper analyses two examples of the uneasy coalition between popular sovereignty and royal leadership that is constitutional monarchy. Whereas Juan Carlos of Spain has been described as having steered Spain away from dictatorship, Bhumibol of Thailand has come under scrutiny for allegedly lacking a principled approach to democracy. I argue that structural as much as personal factors influenced the ways in which the two monarchies were legitimised – one by positively responding to the modern aspirations of the king's subjects, giving him a “forward legitimacy,” the other by revitalising the king's traditional charisma and opting for “backward legitimacy.”
The article gives a basic insight into the different currents that are part of an alternative development paradigm in Thailand. While a global trend of alternatives as reflected in the post-development critique gained momentum in the 1990s, its agents in Thailand have a much longer history. Taking up the critique of post-development approaches as remaining at a discursive level, rather than actually effecting progressive material social change, this article traces the strategic alliances, junctures and disjunctures among alternative development proponents in the north-eastern province of Yasothon. Only a couple of months after the historic financial crisis hit Thailand, and just after the ‘Sufficiency Economy Philosophy’ – an alternative development paradigm framed by the King – was roughly outlined in December 1997, a small rural community of five villages in the north-eastern district of Kud Chum, with a history of political dissent, started to implement a community currency network. This article suggests that the reactions and dynamics, which the implementation triggered, as well as preceding and subsequent processes of co-optation and collaboration, are very telling in terms of the overall workings of Sufficiency Economy as a political programme. The events tell a story of top-down co-optation, bottom-up strategic alliances, as well as a plethora of other interests and aims on the ground.
The mainstream agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped to aid capital accumulation by domestic and transnational hegemonic forces, and is currently sustained through hegemonic agri-food production-distribution, governance structures and ideational order. However, sustainable agriculture and land reform movements have to certain extents managed to offer alternatives. This book adopts a neo-Marxist and Gramscian approach to studying the political economy of the agricultural and food system in Thailand (1990-2014). The author argues that hegemonic forces have many measures to co-opt dissent into hegemonic structures, and that counter-hegemony should be seen as an ongoing process over a long period of time where predominantly counter-hegemonic forces, constrained by political economic structural conditions, may at times retain some hegemonic elements. Contrary to what some academic studies suggest, the author argues that localist-inspired social movements in Thailand are not insular and anti-globalisation. Instead, they are selective in fostering collaborations and globalisation based on values such as sustainability, fairness and partnership. Providing new perspectives on polarised politics in Thailand, particularly how cross-class alliances can further or frustrate counter-hegemonic movements, the book points to the importance of analysing social movements in relation to established political authority. It will be of interest to academics in the field of Politics and International Relations, Sociology, Development Studies and Asian Studies.
Since 2005, Thailand has been in crisis, with unprecedented political instability and the worst political violence seen in the country in decades. In the aftermath of a military coup in 2006, Thailand's press freedom ranking plunged, while arrests for lèse-majesté have skyrocketed to levels unknown in the modern world. Truth on Trial in Thailand traces the 110-year trajectory of defamation-based laws in Thailand. The most prominent of these is lèse-majesté, but defamation aspects also appear in laws on sedition and treason, the press and cinema, anti-communism, contempt of court, insulting of religion, as well as libel. This book makes the case that despite the appearance of growing democratization, authoritarian structures and urges still drive politics in Thailand; the long-term effects of defamation law adjudication has skewed the way that Thai society approaches and perceives "truth." Employing the work of Habermas, Foucault, Agamben, and Schmitt to construct an alternative framework to understand Thai history, Streckfuss contends that Thai history has become "suspended" since 1958, and repeatedly declining to face the truth of history has set the stage for an endless state of crisis. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of South East Asian politics, Asian history, and media and communication.
Thailand's democratic development has always been linked with the rise of the middle class. This social class, according to this discourse, has brought about the 1973 student revolution and the 1992 Bangkok uprising. However, the 2006 military coup that overthrew the popular Thaksin government has also witnessed a substantial middle class support, which has developed and consolidated itself into a right-wing monarchist Yellow Shirt movement. This article attempts to argue that the seed of this democratic reversal has already been sown in its vision of "Thai style democracy" (TSD) enshrining the dominance of the monarchy and its ideal of clean politics. The present phase of endemic crisis in Thailand was ignited by the attempt to remove the populist Thaksin from power, who was seen as athreat by the monarchy. Perceiving in Thaksin as offering a new democratic deal, the grassroots Red Shirts have stirred support trying to transcend the confines of TSD.
This chapter presents a geographical-historical analysis with several summary observations about uneven development and “actually existing globalization” in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). It argues that capital bounds the Mekong—the ADB discursively constructs the borders of the region, thereby naturalizing processes of capital accumulation enabled by the infrastructure it has helped build. Along this infrastructure move various kinds of capitalists and workers, bounding into, through, and beyond the GMS, producing a broader East Asian regional economy marked by uneven development and competitive displacement. The two forms of bounding produce a process of regionalization more salient at the scale of East Asia as a whole than at the scale of the GMS—a process of regionalization that can also be taken as an instance of “actually existing globalization.”
This article reviews Andrew MacGregor Marshall’s A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century, a book on how Thailand’s political challenges relate to the Thai monarchy. The review draws comparisons between the excitement surrounding the publication of the acclaimed book The King Never Smiles in 2006 and the recent reaction to the publication of A Kingdom in Crisis. It argues that the book is an important contribution because it informs a wide audience about the damaging political role of the monarchy, but it repeatedly ignores an already existing corpus of literature that deals critically with Thailand’s monarchy. Moreover, its focus on the succession as the key factor in the ongoing political crisis is unnecessarily narrow and should have been complemented by an analysis of structural forces as drivers of change.
Background The European Commission (EC) published a Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in 2003. FLEGT aims not simply to reduce illegal deforestation, but in promoting good forest governance, aims to contribute to poverty eradi-cation and sustainable management of natural resources.
Large, highly diversified business groups are a prominent feature of the industrial landscape of most emerging economies.
Their competitiveness has been the topic of much debate in the international business literature. This paper intervenes in
this debate by utilising data from Thailand and demonstrating that whereas business groups create value by filling institutional
voids, the political context of a country and the investment of powerful actors in particular groups can cause great variance
across business groups’ performance.
This article examines the racialization of urban space in early twentieth-century Bangkok. After a general strike in 1910, the Siamese monarchy represented itself in urban space as the leaders of a sovereign nation with a racial Other in its midst. Rather than create a separate, walled enclave to contain this population, the monarchy drew on a material and rhetorical campaign to develop two interdependent cities with distinct racial identities. One city was a national capital under the authority of the absolute monarchy. The other was a thriving port city populated mostly by "Chinese" migrants and governed by extraterritorial law. Juxtaposing the built environment against its discursive representations, this article argues that the monarchy sought to endow the dual city of Bangkok and its inhabitants with racial characteristics to clarify national belonging, control the political power of the region's migrant population, and cultivate support for royal urban investments.
Duncan McCargo's influential model of 'network monarchy' enables us to understand how King Bhumibol Adulyadej has mobilized his nationwide patronage network to shape contemporary Thai politics. This model, however, focuses mainly on the conflicts between reform-minded virtuous leaders
(represented by Bhumibol) and unprincipled, self-serving politicians, and pays insufficient empirical attention to the porous boundaries between the two. The author makes up for this weakness by unravelling the historical process through which Bhumibol has developed a symbiotic, if ambiguous,
relationship with Banharn Silpa-archa, regarded as the epitome of unscrupulous rural-based politicians. The author shows that the two have used each other for their respective political purposes. In an effort to protect and advance his personal and dynastic interests, Bhumibol has found it
necessary and expedient to rely on Banharn as a valuable political ally. Banharn, for his part, has relied on the king and his proxies to legitimate and consolidate his authority at the local level. By casting light on this interdependence between the two seemingly contrasting types of leader,
the paper contributes to a further elaboration of McCargo's model and, more generally, to a deeper understanding of the complexity of Thailand's patronage politics.
The anti-government demonstrations that occurred in Thailand around Bangkok’s Ratchaprasong intersection in April and May 2010 drew attention to the broader significance of the protest site. In the wake of the bloody crackdown on the protests and of unprecedented arson attacks against shopping malls on 19 May, some people turned to the past in search of explanations of the shocking events. As a result, for the first time since its disappearance in the early 1980s, Wang Phetchabun, the former palace of Prince Chudadhuj Dharadilok, returned to the public memory. The palace had occupied the land adjoining Ratchaprasong intersection since the reign of King Rama VI until it was replaced by a shopping mall. Rumours spread about a royal curse, and about uprooted guardian spirits whose duty to protect the heritage of Wang Phetchabun dooms to failure commercial enterprises at the former palace site and punishes ignorance of its history with physical harm. The collective memory of the palace lends itself well to interpretations based on Halbwachs’ theory of social morphology which relates to the connection between society and architecture.
This article examines the desacralisation of royal charisma in contemporary Thailand. Over the past few years an underground discourse has emerged among critics of royal ideology and supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that directly confronts the power of the monarchy. The images, metaphors and linguistic devices used in the process are difficult to study because they rarely appear in public. This article focuses on an unprecedented demonstration of rage against the monarchy on September 19, 2010, when red-shirted demonstrators painted anti-royal graffiti on a construction hoarding at Ratchaprasong intersection in downtown Bangkok. In analysing the Thai political crisis as a battle of different charismatic groups, the article will present the September 19 event as the first open strike against the sacred charisma of the Thai monarchy. This charisma has hitherto been protected by royalists from all walks of life who were “working towards the monarchy.” With their attacks on the monarchy the red-shirts were challenging a legitimacy-conferring system which had benefited wide sections of the Bangkok populace in the past. At the same time, a competing charismatic movement has emerged around Thaksin, who himself has to take into account the charisma he conferred upon his followers.
After the 1997 Asian markets crash, the theory of the “sufficiency economy” altered the discourse of development in Thailand. Emphasizing Buddhist notions of moderation and “enough” sufficiency recast development as a means to temper socio-economic volatility by reforming consumer affect. Sufficiency theory pinned the nation's economic upheaval on excessive desires, attempting to intervene in these impulses through projects rooted in personal moderation and communality. In this article, I explore the relationship between politics, citizenship, and sufficiency. Through ethnographic analysis of cases from urban squatter settlements taking part in state-driven participatory urban planning policies, I argue that sufficiency has become central to debates over citizenship in contemporary Thailand. Urban planners use sufficiency to attempt to produce what they term “personal development” and to attempt to defuse political claims by training the poor to moderate their demands by learning “enough.” I also show how residents of squatter communities use the language and practices of sufficiency to make political claims and to demonstrate their legitimacy as citizens with rights to the city. In doing so, I demonstrate how notions of sustainable development tied to moderation extend and potentially interrupt social inequalities.
Thailand's on-going political crisis began with agitation against the Thaksin Shinawatra-led government, saw a military coup and a spate of street-based protest and violence. Drawing on Marx and Weber and using the categories of class, status and party, it is argued that Thailand has reached a political turning point. Subaltern challenges to the hierarchical institutions of military, monarchy and bureaucracy appear to have resulted in political patterns of the past being set on a new trajectory. The social forces that congregate around old ideas associated with status honour – hierarchy, social closure and inequality, ‘Thai-style democracy’ and privilege – are challenged by those championing equality, access, voting and populism. While the balance of forces would suggest that an historical turning point has been achieved, reaction and unexpected outcomes remain possible.
This article examines the inter-related factors that underpin the fragility of Thailand's democracy. Uneven economic development, the high levels of income inequality, and unequal access to power and resources are significant drivers of Thailand's ongoing political conflict. Social divides across classes and regions, and populist exploitation of the rural poor's sense of alienation from the traditional ruling elites, provide a volatile backdrop to national politics. In addition, Thailand's unstable political history and the weakness of liberal institutions present risks to its democracy. The army, the revered monarch and the judiciary comprise elites whose periodic interventions in politics and reservations about electoral democracy further render the Thai polity fragile. Thailand's political situation represents a ‘slow-burning’ crisis of democracy: a long-term historical confrontation developing slowly, with the fundamental issues unresolved. It is undergoing a period of social turmoil fuelled by a power struggle between competing material interests and by an ideational contest to determine the country's constitutive political rules. This can be conceptualised as a struggle for control of Thailand's future between a heterogeneous populist-capitalist movement of illiberal democracy and conservative forces of undemocratic liberalism.
This paper analyzes past and present efforts of government agencies, civil society organizations and the private sector to improve the housing conditions of some one million urban poor who live in informal settlements in Bangkok, Thailand. It gives special attention to the current programme, Baan Mankong that supports community-based organizations in informal settlements to build city-wide networks that enable the communities to negotiate better deals with landowners for the lease or purchase of land, and to assist in the improvement of housing and infrastructure. It finds that the programme, while effective, also has some limitations and concludes that Thailand needs a national housing policy that promotes adequate housing for all.
Twice elected prime minister of Thailand at the head of his Thai Rak Thai Party, telecommunications magnate Thaksin Shinwatra was controversial in office. Since his government was overthrown by a September 2006 military coup backed by the palace, conservatives, and a broad coalition of opponents, Thaksin has remained at the centre of Thailand's continuing political turmoil. This paper examines his political legacy, both in its positive and negative forms, through a focus on the nature of political parties and electoral policies in Thailand; the role of business interests in politics; the impact of Thaksin's politics on political activism and mobilisation; populism, social welfare, and the reaction of the middle class to welfare politics; Thaksin's confrontation with the elite and the monarchy; and the developing judicialisation of politics.
For all the attention paid to the economic, social, and moral dimensions of prostitution in Thailand, no scholar has thus far conducted an empirical study of the relationship between the vice and political change in the countryside, where most sex workers come from. Using the case of Phayao Province in northern Thailand, I attempt to redress this lacuna. I show how rampant prostitution, the most acute social issue in Phayao, has ushered in the rise to power of one virtuous woman from an ethnic minority family—Ladawan Wongsriwong. Located on the economic and social margins of Thailand, many village families in Phayao traditionally relied on prostitution for income, causing a massive influx of young girls into the lucrative sex industry in Bangkok and abroad. In the 1990s, however, AIDS started taking a heavy toll on Phayao's small population. Against this backdrop, Ladawan emerged as a prominent female leader in the male-dominant rural society of Phayao by conducting an extensive issue-oriented campaign against prostitution. This case questions much of the literature on rural politics and female leadership in democratizing Southeast Asia that underestimates the importance of social issues.
The setting the early years of the Ministry of Finance 1885-96 - its establishment and collapse the creation of an effective Ministry of Finance 1896-1902 the effective Ministry in operation - financial stringency 1902-06 the Ministry disunited and revived 1906-10 assessment and perspectives.
Samnak ngan sapsin suan phra mahakasat khong wai kaen thae'' [The Crown Property Bureau Keeps its Core
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Doktor Chirayu Isarangkun na Ayuthaya boet yutthasat mai so. no. ngo. sapsin'' [Dr Chirayu Isarangkun na Ayuthaya Introduces New Strategies for the Crown Property Bureau], Kan ngoen thanakan [Money and Banking
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The Banker Who Saved the King
- R Horn
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Royal Rehab: Thailand's Crown Property Bureau Gets a Corporate Makeover
- E Ellis
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Bot bat khong krom phrakhlang khang thi to me karn longtun tang setthakit nai adit pho. So. 2433-2475'' [The Role of Privy Purse in Economic Investment in the Past, 1900-32], Warasan Thammasat
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Absolute Dreams: Thai Government Under Rama VI
- S Greene
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Kan chatkan sapsin suan phra mahakasat
- Thewaratmaneekul Sakuna
Kho naenam kieow kap rang phon ngan wichai ‘Samnak ngan sapsin suan phra mahakasat kap botbat kan longthun thang thurakit' khong ro. so. do. ro. porphant ouyyanont’”.[Comments on the draft research report on ‘The Crown Property Bureau and Business Investment’ by Assoc
- Property Crown
- Bureau
Kan jat ongkan: korani suksa samnakngan sapsin suan phra mahakasat
- Sukosol Siriporn
Phra khlang khang thi kap kan longthun thurakit nai prathet po
- Wattanasiri Chollada
Big Business Groups, Family Business and Multinational Corporations in Thailand
- Akira Suehiro