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The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa
Terrence Lyons a
a Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and Co-Director, Centre for Global Studies George Mason
University,
Online Publication Date: 01 June 2009
To cite this Article Lyons, Terrence(2009)'The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa',Review of
African Political Economy,36:120,167 — 180
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The Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict and the
Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa
Terrence Lyons
The Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute is embedded within a set of domestic
political conflicts in each state, is linked further through proxy conflicts to
instability in Somalia and the Ogaden, and is skewed additionally by the
application of Washington’s global counter-terrorism policies to the
region. Each of these arenas of contention has its own history, issues,
actors and dynamic; however, each is also distorted by processes of conflict
escalation and de-escalation in the other arenas. The intermeshing of
domestic insecurities, interstate antagonisms, and global policies create
regional ‘security complexes’ in which the security of each actor is intrinsi-
cally linked to the others and cannot realistically be considered apart
from one another. Prospects for both the escalation and resolution of the
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict are linked to domestic political processes (such as
increasing authoritarianism), regional dynamics (such as local rivalries
played out in Somalia) and international policies (such as US counter-
terrorism policies).
Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict
In late 2008, tensions on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border were as taut as they have been
since the parties signed the ceasefire that ended their 1998–2000 war. The peace
process launched by the Algiers Agreement has failed, yet there is no clear replace-
ment or even framework for talks in sight. The Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission
(EEBC) closed its doors without having delimited the border on the ground in Novem-
ber 2007; the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) terminated
its mandate in August 2008; Eritrean troops re-occupied the Temporary Security
Zone. Ethiopia remains in control of areas that the EEBC’s demarcation placed on
the Eritrean side of the border, notably the symbolically important town of Badme
and Ethiopian and Eritrean troops are face-to-face along their highly militarised
border. Eritrea is steadfast in its position that the EEBC decision is final and has the
backing of international law. Ethiopia, in turn, clings to the leverage it has by virtue
of the de facto situation on the ground and its strong relationship with the United
States. The stalemate is both durable and costly.
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi, and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), led by President Isaias
Afwerki, cooperated closely to overthrow the brutal Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in
ISSN 0305-6244 Print, 1740-1720 Online/09/020167-14
DOI: 10.1080/03056240903068053
Review of African Political Economy No. 120:167-180
#ROAPE Publications Ltd., 2009
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1991. While the EPRDF joined with other parties to form the Transitional Government
of Ethiopia, the EPLF assumed control of Eritrea and established a provisional govern-
ment. In April 1993, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence in a UN-
monitored referendum. The EPRDF welcomed Eritrean independence and for the
next several years the two states and leaders seemed to be prepared to put past conflicts
behind them and cooperate on a broad range of economic and diplomatic issues.
However, by 1998 relations between the two countries had degenerated. Disputes
between Addis Ababa and Asmara arose over land-locked Ethiopia’s access to
Eritrean ports of Massawa and Asab, questions of how the new Eritrean currency
related to the existing Ethiopian currency, and disagreements over the precise location
of their poorly demarcated border, among other things. The classic imperatives of
state- and nation-building drove both regimes to set forth unconditional goals and
refuse compromise on the vital issues of territoriality, legitimacy and identity.
In May 1998, Eritrean armed forces attacked the disputed border town of Badme, a use
of military force that quickly escalated into full-scale war. The historical links and rival-
ries between the two peoples, ruling parties and leaders made the violence particularly
bitter. Meles and Isaias characterise each other’s behaviour as a betrayal, and both
countries share a political culture that valuesabsolute victory and zero-sum calculations
over compromise and joint gains. This led both to be obdurate and made de-escalation
difficult. The violence generated considerable casualties and huge costs on both sides.
An estimated 70,000 to 100,000 people were killed, 1 million were displaced, and a
generation of development opportunities was squandered.
After a period of military stalemate and unproductive negotiations, Ethiopia launched
a major offensive in May 2000, broke through defences, and forced Eritrea to pull its
troops back to pre-May 1998 positions. Following a June 2000 ceasefire agreement,
the warring parties signed an internationally brokered agreement in Algiers in Decem-
ber 2000. An ad hoc group of states served as Witnesses to the agreements, including
the Organization of African Unity (now Africa Union), Algeria, the European Union,
and the United States.
The Algiers Agreement established a ceasefire, created a 25-kilometre temporary
security zone (TSZ) to be patrolled by UNMEE and the EEBC to delimit the border,
and a claims commission to assess liability for war damages. On the issue of the
border, the agreement followed African practice and confirmed colonial borders.
Under Article Four of the agreement, the EEBC was charged to ‘delimit and demarcate
the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908)
and applicable international law’ and this determination was final and binding. The
commission explicitly was not empowered to make decisions ex aequo et bono, that
is, on the basis of equity considerations.
Although the ceasefire has held, the other core provisions of the Algiers Agreement
have not been implemented and the overall framework has failed. In April 2002, the
EEBC issued its determination and ruled that the town of Badme was on the Eritrean
side of the border while other, less symbolically important areas claimed by Eritrea
were on the Ethiopian side. The town of Badme was not the underlying cause of the
conflict, but both regimes used it as the marker of whether it had ‘won’ or ‘lost’ the
war, and hence whether the terrible sacrifices each made in the conflict were justified
or in vain. Therefore, the control of this small desolate town became linked directly to
the political fortunes – even survival – of both regimes. Isaias, for example, said that
168 Review of African Political Economy
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‘pulling out of Badme may be likened to insisting that the sun will not rise in the
morning ... it is unthinkable’ (Tronvoll 1999, p. 1048).
Once the border ruling was clear, Ethiopian leaders strongly objected to it and did
everything short of resumption of hostilities to delay compliance. In a September
2003 letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Prime Minister Meles dug in his
heels and characterised the EEBC decision as ‘totally illegal, unjust, and irresponsible’
and called for an ‘alternative mechanism’ to demarcate the boundary.
1
This public
repudiation of the EEBC represented a fundamental challenge to the Algiers peace
process and the principle of a final and binding agreement. Meles later issued a
five-point peace initiative in November 2004 that declared acceptance of the border
ruling in principle while simultaneously calling for peace-building dialogue. More
recently, Addis Ababa has stated its unconditional acceptance of the decision but its
initial rejection gives it little credibility on the issue.
2
Eritrea, frustrated both by Ethiopia and by what it considered international appease-
ment of Addis Ababa, took measures to force the border demarcation issue in October
2005. Eritrea banned UNMEE helicopter flights, which led the UN to withdraw its
forces from nearly half of its deployment sites. In November 2005, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1640, demanding that Eritrea lift its restrictions, Ethiopia
accept the EEBC’s border demarcation decisions, and both states reverse recent troop
mobilisation. The Resolution threatened to impose sanctions against Eritrea if it did
not remove the UNMEE restrictions. Tensions in late 2005 were high and an Inter-
national Crisis Group report argued there were ‘worrying signs that the countdown
to renewed conflict may have begun’ (International Crisis Group 2005, p. i).
The initial US response to the crisis over UNMEE and the non-implementation of Res-
olution 1640 was an improvised unilateral initiative to break the impasse. Washington
sent the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, to the region
where she met with Ethiopian officials, but was denied meetings in Asmara. A
flurry of international meetings ensued: Representatives of the Witnesses to the
Algiers Agreement convened in New York in February 2006, and the EEBC met in
London with officials from Addis Ababa and Asmara in March and May 2006; these
meetings did not break the stalemate. In May 2006 the UN Security Council reduced
the size of UNMEE’s force from 3,300 to 2,300.
After failing to bring Ethiopia and Eritrea together for talks in June 2006, the EEBC
concluded that: ‘The situation is one which is beyond the Commission’s powers to
remedy on the grounds of manifest implacability’ (Plaut 2006). Ethiopia had moved
from adamant refusal to accept the agreement to agreeing ‘in principle’ and then to
accepting without qualification (while asking for further talks). Eritrea refused to
accept the need for additional negotiations and would not meet with UN representa-
tives. As one observer commented, Ethiopia ‘is guilty of throwing a tantrum’ but
Eritrea’s ‘passive-aggressive’ response has not helped (Pratt 2006, p. 339). The EEBC
disbanded in November 2007, leaving the two parties maps with virtual demarcation,
but without boundary pillars on the ground as called for in the Algiers Agreements.
While the underlying conflict was not limited to the border issue, demarcating the
border was a necessary prerequisite for progress on other issues.
Despite these tensions, the stalemate remained stable because neither Asmara nor
Addis Ababa had compelling incentives to break the ceasefire. Because international
law supports its position, Eritrea believes that the international community should
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict 169
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force Ethiopia to comply with the final and binding EEBC decision. Ethiopia feels no
need to alter the status quo since the agreement left it in control of Badme and the
international community has not applied any significant pressure. Both regimes antici-
pate the imminent collapse of the other and believe that time is on its side. Tensions
between the two states have been displaced from the frozen border conflict into
support for each other’s opposition movements and proxy conflicts in Somalia.
When tensions increase, they tend to be displaced into surrogate conflicts rather
than direct military confrontation on the border (Lyons 2006b).
Troubled Transitions, Regional Instability
The stalled Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process is intertwined with troubled political tran-
sitions and growing authoritarianism in both Addis Ababa and Asmara. Following the
signing of the Algiers Agreement, and in part as a consequence of the war, the ruling
parties in both states faced serious internal opposition. In both cases, the respective
leaders effectively crushed challengers and arrested or expelled dissidents. In the
ensuing years, neither has established the foundation for peaceful political compe-
tition and both rely upon force to stay in power. Eritrea and Ethiopia both have
grown increasingly authoritarian since the ceasefire in 2000. The border issue and
threats to the homeland have been used to justify restrictions on political activity,
and the lack of democratic accountability in turn has allowed both regimes to maintain
highly militarised and destructive policies. If the border issue is removed, then there
might be new opportunities to promote political reform in both states.
Eritrea
Political change and the most basic respect for political and civil rights are desperately
needed in Eritrea. In March 2001, shortly after the Algiers Agreement was signed, a
group of 15 senior Eritrean officials signed a letter that criticised President Isaias
and called for greater democracy. The letter was leaked and 11 of those who signed
it, and many other supporters, were arrested in September 2001 and have been held
without charge since then. Three were abroad at the time, including former Minister
of Defence Mesfin Hagos, who has helped organise the Eritrean Democratic Party
(EDP), an opposition group operating from exile.
The September 2001 crack-down was followed by the closing of private press, the
arrests of students and others who offered critical voices, and the indefinite postpone-
ment of elections. The Eritrean Government became highly repressive and isolationist,
arresting two Eritreans working for the US embassy in 2001, throwing out the United
States Agency for International Development in 2005, and expelling nearly all inter-
national humanitarian organisations by 2006. International human rights groups,
monitors of religious persecution, and media watchdogs all place Eritrea among the
most repressive regimes in the world.
3
Today, a very small leadership circle dominates
all aspects of political, economic and social life. While the government is obviously
fragile, it is less clear what might replace it. Past experience in both Eritrea and
Ethiopia suggests that what appears to be a cohesive hierarchy from the outside is
held together by accommodation. If the dominant institutions and leaders stumble,
acquiescence can transform into violent dissent quickly (Reid 2005).
The Eritrean diaspora plays a critical role in supporting the current regime. Approxi-
mately one-quarter of the Eritrean population lives outside Eritrea, and Asmara is
170 Review of African Political Economy
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highly dependent on diaspora remittances. Given the history of the costly, prolonged
war of national liberation and the legitimacy earned by the EPLF in leading this
struggle, the diaspora has been reluctant to criticise Isaias. The 1998 – 2000 war mobi-
lised the diaspora to increase their support in order to counter what was perceived to
be another threat to their liberated homeland. However, during the last few years,
diaspora support and the essential remittances have declined (Styan 2007).
Eritrean opposition movements have been plagued by factionalism, weakened by the
vagaries of diaspora politics, and have had their commitment to national interests
questioned by their association with Ethiopia. In January 2002, the EDP was born in
exile, led by the former Minister of Defence, Mesfin Hagos, and some of the dissidents
purged from the ruling party in September 2001. However, this party remained rooted
in the diaspora and distant from developments within Eritrea. In February 2005 an
opposition grouping called the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) was formed in
Khartoum (Plaut 2005). The EDA held a series of meetings in Addis Ababa (February
2007, May 2008) to overcome its fractious nature, but its close association with the
Ethiopian regime leads many to regard it as a tool of the neighbouring enemy.
However, the current authoritarian order in Eritrea can be sustained only at tremen-
dous cost, and it inherently creates opposition and anger, even if underground and
silent for now. Given the pervasive political repression, many Eritreans have with-
drawn from political life. Resentment is reportedly high, particularly among families
with children in military camps on the harsh border year after year (Gettleman 2007).
The October 2007 attempted assassination of Simon Gebredingil, a senior internal
security service official, raised additional questions about the coherence of the
ruling party. Isaias has made Ethiopia’s refusal to honour the Algiers Agreement
and international collusion in that betrayal the principal theme of his public speeches
for several years. If the border demarcation process can commence, as Asmara has
demanded, Isaias will get a short-term boost in his popularity, but will inevitably
face difficult internal political issues in the longer term.
Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the ruling EPRDF party went through its own challenges following
the signing of the Algiers Agreement, as the Central Committee of the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (historically Meles’ support base) split into two rival
factions. With his base in the Tigray heartland at risk, Meles took advantage of his
central position within the broader EPRDF coalition to outmanoeuvre his rivals,
sack and arrest a number of senior officials, and successfully weather the storm.
The next serious domestic challenge to the EPRDF took place in the 2005 parliamen-
tary elections. These elections presented the Ethiopian people with a remarkable
opportunity to express their political views by participating in a poll that for the
first time in history offered them a meaningful choice. In contrast to earlier elections
in 1995 and 2000, opposition parties did not boycott the poll, but instead competed vig-
orously across the most populous regions. Live televised debates on matters of public
policy, opposition party access to state-owned media, and massive peaceful rallies in
the final week of campaigning made it clear that these elections would represent a
decisive moment in Ethiopia’s political development. The Ethiopian people seized
this opportunity with great hope and turned out in overwhelming numbers to
express their choices.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict 171
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However, a very chaotic vote counting process generated controversy and violent
protests. According to official results, the EPRDF and allied parties won 367 (67 per
cent) parliamentary seats, while the opposition took 172 seats (31 per cent), with 109
going to the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). The chief of the European
Union election monitoring group concluded that the process ‘did not live up to inter-
national standards and to the aspirations of Ethiopians for democracy’ and many
rejected the results as fraudulent (European Union Election Observation Mission
Ethiopia 2005). Despite increasing its share of seats in the parliament from 12 to 172,
important leaders within the opposition refused to accept this outcome, claiming
they had irrefutable evidence that massive fraud had taken place. When the new par-
liament met in October 2005, some opposition leaders took their seats, but others, par-
ticularly leading members of the CUD, boycotted the assembly. Violence erupted in
the first week of November and most top CUD officials were arrested. Ethiopian pro-
secutors formally charged some 131 opposition politicians, journalists and civil society
leaders with crimes, including genocide and treason. A number of leading Ethiopians
in the diaspora, including reporters working for the Voice of America as well as oppo-
sition party fund-raisers and managers of critical websites, were also indicted. By
bringing these charges against its leading critics, the EPRDF effectively criminalised
dissent and sent an unmistakable message that effective opposition would not be
tolerated. The opening of 2005 had closed (Lyons 2006a).
While the opposition both inside and outside parliament has been marginalised, the
EPRDF still faced fundamental challenges relating to two large constituencies that
are essential for any Ethiopian regime to govern successfully. First, the EPRDF’s
Oromo wing, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, has failed and remains
in power through intimidation and ever more pervasive systems to monitor the popu-
lation (Human Rights Watch 2005). Second, the May 2005 elections saw an almost
complete sweep by the CUD in Addis Ababa and the other main cities.
According to a 2007 poll conducted by Gallup, only 17 per cent of Ethiopians had
confidence in the honesty of their elections, suggesting that the outcome of the 2005
election is regarded as legitimate by a very small number of Ethiopians (Rheault
2008). In July 2007, most of the major opposition political leaders arrested following
the electoral crisis of 2005 were pardoned after they signed documents admitting
responsibility for the violence. However, the damage had already been done and
the CUD fractured into several bickering factions.
Despite the weakness of the opposition, the April 2008 local elections suggest that the
EPRDF plans to restrict political and civil liberties further. The opposition only
managed to register some 16,000 candidates for the nearly 4 million posts up for
election (Deibert 2008). Even parties that participate in the national parliament
found it impossible to identify candidates or to campaign, particularly in the Oromo
region. In addition to restricting political space, the ruling party deepened its
control over the smallest, sub-community level of administration, the kebelle councils.
While kebelles are quite small, some of the councils have up to 300 members. As a
result, some 4 million Ethiopians in a country of 75 million are now part of an
EPRDF-controlled council.
Civil society, already silenced by arrests in 2005, faced further restrictions. A ‘Charities
and Societies Proclamation’ under consideration in 2008 restricts organisations
engaged in human rights activities – an ‘assault on civil society’ according
to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 2008).
172 Review of African Political Economy
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The EPRDF reacted to the 2005 electoral scare by tightening restrictions and by dee-
pening its penetration to the most local levels of administration.
The 2008 humanitarian emergency is another source of pressure on Meles Zenawi’s
government. In July 2008, the United Nations estimated that 10 million people –
some 12 per cent of the population – were in need of food assistance (Benequista
2008). There are many reasons for the humanitarian emergency of 2008: poor rains;
high food and fuel prices; multiple inter-linked conflicts; animal disease; and
general inflation. Overall inflation reached 40 per cent in May 2008, driven in part
by a surge in money growth and public sector borrowing since 2005 (IMF 2008).
Food prices have also risen rapidly. An increasing number of Ethiopians are depen-
dent upon the market to meet their basic needs, and inflation has left the very poor
unable to turn to the market to feed their families. The EPRDF has not faced the
types of food riots sparked by high prices that have occurred in many countries as a
result of the global good crisis. However, Ethiopian cities – centres of political opposi-
tion – are growing rapidly. It is likely that the government will face increased
pressures from urban dwellers for relief.
After 17 years in power, the EPRDF is in decline. The 2005 elections demonstrated high
levels of opposition, but failed to usher in an orderly transition based on peaceful mul-
tiparty competition. The 2008 elections suggest that the EPRDF intends to retain power
by further restricting opportunities for peaceful political competition and reducing
space for independent civil society to operate. In the lead up to the critical national
elections in 2010, the electoral process has been largely discredited by many in the
international community, and more importantly by most Ethiopians. While repression
and limitations on opposition have silenced political speech for the moment, it leaves
the regime fragile and without the support of key constituencies.
War by Proxy
The border stalemate and the underlying problems of authoritarian political processes
and fragile governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea are intrinsically linked to conflicts in
the Horn of Africa and global policies focused on the region. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea
have demonstrated the capacity and willingness to use proxy forces to undermine the
other. Armed Ethiopian insurgent groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic
Front (EPPF) have received support from Asmara. Eritrea also has close relationships
with Sudanese groups in Darfur and in particular with factions operating in eastern
Sudan (Young 2006). By the same token, Ethiopia has supported Eritrean opposition
movements.
In addition to supporting each other’s insurgents and opposition movements, both
Ethiopia and Eritrea compete against each other by supporting rival parties in
neighbouring states. Addis Ababa is the major supporter of Abdullahi Yusuf and the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Consistent with a deeply ingrained
pattern of giving support to the enemy of one’s enemy, Eritrea has provided assistance to
the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC, now re-grouped as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation
of Somalia based in Asmara) and Ethiopian opposition groups based in Somalia such
as the ONLF and OLF, hoping to tie Ethiopian forces down in the East. While UN
reports in late 2006 suggested thousands of Eritrean troops were in Somalia, very few
were captured in the subsequent intervention by Ethiopia, suggesting that this
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number was substantially wide of its mark (Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1676; Tomlinson 2006).
This proxy conflict in Somalia escalated dramatically in December 2006. Key leaders
within the UIC such as Hassan Dahir Aweys, former leader of the anti-Ethiopian
al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, sought to provoke Ethiopia into war in late 2006 by making irreden-
tist claims on the Ogaden. However, these threats were rhetorical rather than real since
the UIC lacked the means to force Ethiopia out of the region. From the perspective of Addis
Ababa,the dangers emanating from the UIC and the urgency for acting were due to threats
from Eritrea and internal Ethiopian insurgent groups such as the OLF and ONLF. These
regional and domestic adversaries had increased their military presence in areas con-
trolled by the UIC. To Ethiopia, the potential that these threats would increase over
time – rather than the ideology of the Islamic Courts, their irredentist claims, or their
ties to al-Qaeda – compelled a response. Ethiopia acted pre-emptively by providing the
military might to drive the UIC out of Mogadishu, to end the safe havens offered
Ethiopia’s enemies, and to bring the TFG to power in the Somali capital.
After a rapid and surprising advance the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops, ousted
the UIC and its affiliated militias that had controlled Mogadishu since June 2006. The
TFG continued to rely upon Ethiopian military support to retain power and struggled
to bring in key constituencies, most notably the powerful Hawiye clan leaders
entrenched in Mogadishu as well as many of the moderate leaders within the
diverse Islamic Courts movement. Many Somalis regard Ethiopian troops as foreign
occupiers, and the extreme levels of violence have alienated important constituencies
(Human Rights Watch 2007). Hopes that an effective Africa Union or United Nations
force would be deployed to allow Ethiopian troops to withdraw never materialised
(and were never realistic). Eritrea has continued to support factions of the Islamic
Courts and helped create the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in
Asmara in September 2007.
In part, as a consequence of the escalation of conflict within Somalia, violence within
the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia (the Ogaden) exploded in 2007. The ONLF, part
of the original transitional government in Ethiopia, attacked an oil exploration camp
in April 2007, killing civilians as well as Chinese workers. The Ethiopian Government
responded with a fierce counter-insurgency campaign that depopulated large swathes
of the region, disrupted markets, and resulted in a humanitarian emergency. Human
rights monitoring groups report extremely high levels of abuse in the region.
The ONLF is seen by Addis Ababa as a particular threat for two reasons. First, it is
perceived as part of a network of threats that link Eritrea, the Islamic Courts in
Somalia, and the OLF with the ONLF. Firm control of the region is necessary to
prevent this set of enemies from using the Ogaden as the weak frontier across
which to attack the regime. Second, commercial interests in international oil and gas
exploration in the region have risen lately. Ethiopia has signed deals with a number
of international companies to explore for oil and gas in the Ogaden. The ONLF directly
threatens the EPRDF’s interest in protecting these contracts when it warns against
pursuing exploration of ‘our people’s natural resources’.
In June 2008 the TFG and one faction of the ARS signed a UN-brokered ceasefire agree-
ment in Djibouti, but this had little effect on the violence in southern Somalia. The
Shabaab militias and the more militant faction of the ARS based in Asmara rejected
the agreement and continued to target TFG and Ethiopian officials. In August, splits
174 Review of African Political Economy
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within the TFG became more public as the President and the Prime Minister fought
over the sacking of the mayor of Mogadishu. In addition, humanitarian workers
were targeted for assassination, making it extremely dangerous to continue to
provide food to the millions in need. There are few signs that the Djibouti agreement
will succeed in bringing stability where so many earlier agreements have failed.
Furthermore, there are indications that conflict is increasing in the Puntland and
Somaliland to the north.
As is the case with domestic politics in both Asmara and Addis Ababa, conflict in
Somalia has its own dynamics and is not predominantly a sideshow in the Ethiopia-
Eritrea rivalry. Ending the Ethiopia-Eritrea proxy war is not sufficient to resolve the
challenges of stability within Somalia. However, the larger regional insecurities are
complicated and made more difficult to settle by the support by Asmara and Addis
Ababa for various factions, motivated in part by the dynamics of their proxy war.
International Policy and the US Global ‘War on Terrorism’
Periodic humanitarian emergencies, the need to end the 1998 – 2000 border war
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the political crisis following the 2005 elections in
Ethiopia, and the links between the Horn and terrorism in the Middle East have all
generated periodic interest in the United States and the international community.
However, what has been lacking is sustained attention and coherent diplomatic strat-
egies that recognise the links among domestic, bilateral and regional dynamics. The
United States, Organization of African Unity/Africa Union, and the UN played critical
roles in the Algiers talks and worked together closely to coordinate policy, prevent
alternative processes from developing, and apply concentrated pressure on both
parties to accept the agreement. However, after this high level involvement to get
the agreement signed, the international community paid little attention to the chal-
lenges of implementation. UNMEE was deployed along the border, the ceasefire
held, and the EEBC proceeded with its hearings and made its demarcation decision
in 2002. Little was done to push Ethiopia to accept demarcation or to advance the
larger tasks of addressing the underlying causes of the conflict and building a frame-
work for normal regional relations and more democratic domestic regimes.
The international community’s response to the 2005 election crisis illustrates the limits
to external leverage over a regime such as the EPRDF. In the immediate aftermath of
the post-election violence and crackdown, major donors responded with both clear
statements criticising the government and with the suspension of significant levels
of assistance. In November 2005, for example, the United States and the European
Union issued a joint statement calling for release of all ‘political detainees’, thereby
challenging the government’s contention that the leaders had been arrested on crim-
inal grounds. The Development Assistance Group (DAG) for Ethiopia, which includes
the United States and other major bilateral and multilateral donors, also adopted a
tough posture and stated:
These disturbances weaken the environment for aid effectiveness and poverty reduction ... As
a result of the situation, the DAG is collectively reviewing development cooperation modalities
to Ethiopia.
In December 2005, international donors put US$375 million in budget support on hold,
sending another clear message that business as usual would not be possible in the
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context of this political crisis. In January 2006, a US Department of State press release
stated that, ‘Steps that appear to criminalise dissent impede progress on democratisa-
tion’. These statements and concrete actions represented the most significant pressure
on the EPRDF since 1991.
4
However, the ruling party remained unmoved. Addis Ababa repeatedly stated that the
elections were free and fair, the response of security forces to demonstrations appro-
priate, and that charges against opposition politicians, journalists and civil society
leaders were based on solid evidence and long-standing Ethiopian law. Over the
course of the next year, the international community softened its criticisms and
shifted its focus to other issues. Washington in particular became increasingly con-
cerned about threats from radical Islamic groups operating in the Horn and looked
to Addis Ababa for cooperation and intelligence. Ethiopian intransigence and US con-
cerns about terrorism in Somalia led diplomats to accept a status quo they concluded
would not change and to get on with other business.
The United States has played a particularly important role with regard to conflicts in
the Horn of Africa. Washington had close ties to both Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afwerki
who were characterised by the Clinton administration as part of a ‘new generation of
African leaders’. These links led the United States to play a major part in the Algiers
talks. Asmara and Addis Ababa both criticised Washington for its attempts to remain
neutral during the process. Ethiopia and Eritrea were both included in Washington’s
initial conception of a global alliance against terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 Sep-
tember attacks and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld visited both Asmara
and Addis Ababa in December 2002. However, the US-Eritrean relationship quickly
soured and Washington developed a very close strategic partnership on counter-
terrorism with Ethiopia.
In 2006 Washington and Addis Ababa both opposed the Islamic Courts in Somalia, but
for different reasons. Washington had concerns regarding links to al-Qaeda and other
alleged extremist groups, and claimed that certain ‘high value’ targets (notably indi-
viduals Washington linked to the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam) were in Mogadishu. The United States provided support for something
called ‘The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism’, but this
assortment of warlords soon came into conflict with elements of the Islamic Courts
and was quickly pushed out of Mogadishu. From June to December 2006, Washington
publicly supported the Khartoum talks between the TFG and the UIC.
However, in late November 2006 John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the United
Nations, circulated a draft resolution authorising Ethiopia to send troops into
Somalia in support of the TFG. The final resolution (UN Resolution 1725) authorised
non-neighbouring states to intervene, but the message from the United States was
clear from the first draft: Washington had no objections to Ethiopia intervening in
Somalia (International Crisis Group 2006). In December 2006, Assistant Secretary
Frazer ratcheted up the rhetoric and characterised the Islamist leadership as ‘extremist
to the core’ and ‘controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals’ (Gollust 2006). While many
have seen the subsequent intervention by Ethiopia into Somalia as an example of the
United States ‘subcontracting’ the war on terror to a regional ally, Addis Ababa prob-
ably would have acted with or without Washington’s tacit approval. However, the
United States promoted the impression that it was working hand-in-hand with Ethiopia
when the United States military command used its aircraft and high tech capacities to
target what Washington regarded as al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia (Menkhaus 2007).
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The close relationship between Washington and Addis Ababa associates the United
States with the EPRDF regime in ways that distort other US policies. Washington’s
calls for democratisation and human rights in Ethiopia, for example, are not convin-
cing when high-level officials simultaneously praise the regime’s cooperation in the
‘global war on terrorism’. The two states have different interests in the Horn of
Africa. Addis Ababa and Washington share concerns regarding extremist Islamic
groups in Somalia, for example, but for different reasons. Ethiopia worries about the
assistance these groups provide to the regime’s enemies in Eritrea and among
Oromo and Somali insurgent groups, while the United States is concerned with
links to al-Qaeda. The challenges relating to growing authoritarianism, escalating
tensions along the border with Eritrea, and the quagmire in Somalia are complicated
further by the overlay of Washington’s global war on terrorism. Washington feels it
needs a close relationship with Ethiopia in order to pursue its strategic interests in
the Horn of Africa. However, this relationship comes at a price. As with other
pivotal states in difficult regions such as Pakistan and Egypt, these sometimes
awkward bedfellows receive US support for security reasons but then pursue their
own, sometimes brutal, agendas regardless of pressure from Washington.
While relations between Washington and Addis Ababa strengthened in 2006–2008,
relations between Washington and Asmara plummeted to new lows. Eritrea was
characterised by State Department officials as a state that ‘openly abuses its population
and serves as a destabilising force in the region’.
5
In August, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, suggested that Washington was ‘looking
into’ whether Eritrea should be added to the state sponsor of terrorist list.
6
This des-
ignation triggers certain economic sanctions, but would be largely symbolic in the
case of Eritrea where Washington already has cut most non-humanitarian economic
ties. Whether the actual sanctions would have any effect of not, the designation
would be profoundly offensive to Eritrea. Asmara regards itself as the first country
to engage in the war against al-Qaeda sponsored terrorism when it fought the Eritrean
Islamic Jihad in the early 1990s and therefore deeply resents Washington’s lectures on
the subject.
While Eritrea is characterised as ‘playing a very negative role,’ its support for the OLF,
ONLF and the broad UIC has not been defined by Washington as support of terror-
ism.
7
During US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s December 2007 trip to Addis
Ababa, she emphasised her humanitarian rather than counter-terrorism concerns in
the Ogaden, and publicly urged Ethiopian leaders to pay more attention to humanitar-
ian issues.
8
In 2008 Washington urged talks between the UIC and the TFG and between
the Ethiopian Government and the OLF and ONLF. While Addis Ababa regularly
labels both movements as ‘terrorist,’ Washington has not. The State Department did
not place Eritrea on the state sponsor of terrorism list, but did designate it ‘not an
active partner on counter-terrorism programs’ (US Department of State 2008). As
relations with the United States have become hostile, Eritrea has actively constructed
an alternative set of relations. Asmara re-established diplomatic relations with
Khartoum and sought to improve its relationship with Yemen and Djibouti in 2007
in order to undermine the Sanaa Pact that linked Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan in an
effort to contain Eritrea. However, in June 2008 a border skirmish between Eritrea
and Djibouti resulted in several casualties and Yemen began to complain that
Eritrea was seizing Yemeni fishing boats and arresting their crews. In January 2003
Eritrea attempted to join the Arab League as an observer, although the Charter of
the Arab League does not allow for an observer member and Eritrea’s request
remains pending. There are reports of close links between Libya and Eritrea. In 2006
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict 177
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Eritrean press recounted meetings with Iranian officials and others who shared
Asmara’s hostility to the United States (Reuters 2006).
The Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict and the failed Algiers peace process are part of a
regional security complex that links the border issue with conflicts at the domestic,
regional and international levels. International policies toward Eritrea and Ethiopia
are part of this system of relationships and conflicts. The impasse over implementation
of the Algiers Agreements distorts US policy toward counter-terrorism in the region,
for example, because Asmara emphasises the border issue in its dealings with
Washington while the United States focuses on counter-terrorism. By the same
token, the strategic partnership with Ethiopia, motivated by key US interests in
counter-terrorism, links Washington to Addis Ababa’s recalcitrance in the implemen-
tation of the Algiers Agreement as well as its policies in Somalia and the restrictions on
domestic political and civil rights. By prioritising the ‘war on terror ’ the United States
provides a ready rationale for regimes in the region to label and target their political
opponents as terrorists. As Washington and other actors have sought to shape devel-
opments in the Horn of Africa, the primacy of local dynamics and the limits to external
leverage over matters of fundamental importance to regional actors is apparent.
Actors in the region respond to the incentives created at the global level to characterise
their pursuit of their regionally focused interests in terms that elicit international
support. However, in the end local dynamics rooted in protracted conflicts and
authoritarian political systems dominate developments on the ground.
Terrence Lyons is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution and Co-Director, Centre for Global Studies George Mason University,
email: tlyons1@gmu.edu
Endnotes
1. Letter dated 7 October 2003 from the President of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
to the Secretary-General, reprinted in ‘Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and
Eritrea’, 19 December 2003, S/2003/1186.
2. Ethiopia stated in a June 2007 letter to the Security Council, for example, that ‘Ethiopia has
accepted the Commission’s delimitation decision of 13 April 2002 without precondition’.
Letter dated 8 June 2007 from the Charge
´d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 June 2007,
S/2007/350.
3. The Committee to Protect Journalists labelled Eritrea ‘one of the world’s worst jailers of jour-
nalists’. Reporters Without Borders ranked Eritrea 166 out of 168 counties in its 2006 Worldwide
Press Freedom Index, Freedom House ranked the state as ‘not free’ in its 2007 report. The US
Department of State’s ‘International Religious Freedom Report 2007’ says that the Eritrean Gov-
ernment ‘continued to harass, arrest, and detain members of independent evangelical groups,
Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a reform movement within the Eritrean Orthodox
Church’.
4. US Department of State statement, ‘Ethiopian Political Violence’, 7 November 2005; Statement
by the Development Assistance Group, Addis Ababa, 11 November 2005; US Department of
State, press statement, ‘Political Dissent and Due Process in Ethiopia’, 6 January 2006.
5. James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, ‘US Policy in the Horn of Africa’,
address to the 4th International Conference on Ethiopian Development Studies, Kalamazoo,
Michigan, 4 August 2007. The statement goes on to characterise President Isaias as ‘increasingly
tyrannical and megalomaniacal’ and states that: ‘The Eritrean Government has fabricated a
national mythology by demonising neighbouring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering
178 Review of African Political Economy
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complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channelling Eritrean patriotism
into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without
public opposition.’
6. Jendayi Frazer, Briefing on US-Eritrea Relations, 17 August 2007, Washington DC.
7. ‘Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer Interview with VOA’, 22 November 2007. James
Knight, Director, Officefor East Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State charac-
terised Eritrea as pursuing ‘expensive and dangerous adventurism’ that encourages ‘unending
violence’. See ‘US Policy in the Horn of Africa’, remarks from the Conference ‘Working
toward a Lasting Peace in the Ogaden’, University of San Diego, California, 7 December 2007.
8. Rice said in an Ethiopian TV interview: ‘We’ve worked very, very diligently to try and help
relief agencies, non-governmental agencies to be able to deal with the humanitarian situation
there and we need the cooperation of the Ethiopian Government.’ Secretary Condoleeza Rice,
interview with Tefera Ghedamu of Ethiopia TV, 5 December 2007.
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