ArticlePDF Available

Violent and peaceful crowd reactions in the Middle East: Cultural experiences and expectations

Article

Violent and peaceful crowd reactions in the Middle East: Cultural experiences and expectations

Abstract and Figures

Collective honor in Middle Eastern crowds may serve as an important basis for both conflict and conflict resolution between security forces and crowd members. To investigate this issue, we extended a social–cognitive model of crowd behavior to account for the role of honor in social identities and relations, and tested the model in two studies. In Study 1, we collected critical incidents representing crowd experiences in the Middle East. The interview data were coded to include security actions that escalate force and those that generate understanding or exhibit restraint. Study 2 used a scenario-based interview procedure to test the hypothesis that Middle Eastern civilians and Americans with no Middle Eastern cultural experience hold differing beliefs and expectations about crowd reactions to security force actions. The results showed that escalation of force against the crowd led to an increase in the level of conflict more often than not, whereas attempting to understand the crowd or exhibiting restraint tended to decrease conflict. Middle Eastern expectations were largely congruent with these findings, whereas American beliefs diverged. The results have implications regarding the cultural and cognitive determinants of crowd behavior, and for the management of crowds by regional governments and in international peacekeeping situations.
Content may be subject to copyright.
Violent and peaceful crowd reactions in the Middle East:
cultural experiences and expectations
Winston R. Sieck
, Jennifer L. Smith, Anna P. Grome, Elizabeth Veinott
and Shane T. Mueller
Applied Research Associates
(Received 8 September 2010; final version received 18 August 2011)
Collective honor in Middle Eastern crowds may serve as an important basis for both
conflict and conflict resolution between security forces and crowd mem bers. To
investigate this issue, we extended a social cognitive model of crowd behavior
to account for the role of honor in social identities and relations, and tested the
model in two studies. In Study 1, we collected critical incidents representing
crowd experiences in the Middle East. The interview data were coded to include
security actions that escalate force and those that generate understanding or
exhibit restraint. Study 2 used a scenario-based interview procedure to test the
hypothesis that Middle Eastern civilians and Americans with no Middle Eastern
cultural experience hold differing beliefs and expectations about crowd reactions
to security force actions. The results showed that escalation of force against the
crowd led to an increase in the level of conflict more often than not, whereas
attempting to understand the crowd or exhibiting restraint tended to decrease
conflict. Middle Eastern expectations were largely congruent with these findings,
whereas American beliefs diverged. The results have implications regarding the
cultural and cognitive determinants of crowd behavior, and for the management
of crowds by regional governments and in international peacekeeping situation s.
Keywords: culture and cog nition; honor; Arab spring; intercultural interaction
In March 2006, a crowd of Kurds gathered in protest near the Halabja Monument. In an
attempt to disperse the crowd, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan guards fired warning shots
into the air from their machine guns. Rather than quelling the demonstration, the
enraged crowd members braved the gun fire to drive the panicked guards away and
attack the monument. They smashed windows and set fires, ultimately destroying the
memorial that commemorated the day that Saddam’s government killed more than
5,000 people by poison gas attacks in 1988. One 17-year old protestor was shot and
killed, and six others were wounded. (Worth, 2006)
Peaceful gatherings can provide an important means for people to feel that they have a
stake in the success of free and open societies that sanction collective action. When
such gatherings turn violent and destructive, they can instead serve to support terrorist
and insurgent agendas. Relatively new or less stable governments, such as in some
Middle Eastern countries, are likely to be especially vulnerable in this regard. The criti-
cal nature of such events leads us to address the question of why violent reactions
ISSN 1943-4472 print/ISSN 1943-4480 online
# 2011 Society for Terrorism Research
DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2011.616668
http://www.informaworld.com
Corresponding author. Email: sieck@globalcognition.org
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
2011, iFirst Article, 1 25
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
sometimes occur in protests and other gatherings, and why others remain relatively
peaceful, even when the political stakes are enormous.
One possible explanation comes from notions that crowd membership drives people
towards irrationality and destructiveness (Le Bon, 1947). The irrationality concept is
perhaps most enticing in its ability to explain crowd violence by ordinary citizens.
According to this view, crowd membership leads to mindlessness and irrationality
caused by de-individuation (loss of self), leading to an increase in destructive ten-
dencies (Le Bon, 1947; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982). Arab crowds have at times
been described in similar terms, including the explicit suggestion that there is little
one can do about it. For example, Patai’s (2002) ethnography on Arabs includes the
following excerpt:
the rank and file supplied the mass of manpower and the outflow of emotionalism which
inundated the capital’s [Baghdad’s] streets whenever a popular uprising occurred. In the
past (prior to the 1958 revolution), though popular uprisings caused damage to life and
property ... they were like the floods of the river Tigris, capable of destruction but
short-lived and quickly exhausted. The ruling Oligarchy well understood the nature of
those outbursts and learned how to cope with them by letting the flood pass swiftly,
and the police often tried merely to channel it and clear the wreckage. (Patai, 2002, p. 171)
Such simple explanations have been largely debunked within the social psychology lit-
erature on crowd behavior, and have been replaced with models that maintain the
rationality of the individuals involved (Couch, 1968). Here, we propose a more
complex explanation of Arab crowd behavior in particular, drawing on a social identity
model of crowd membership, combined with considerations of honor as experienced in
the Middle East (Gregg, 2005; Reicher, 1996).
The Social Identity Model of crowd membership emphasizes the self-concepts of
crowd members, and provides mechanisms for understanding how conceptions of
the self and related outcomes, such as self-efficacy, change through participation in
crowd events (Stott & Drury, 2000). According to the model, social identity is a
mental model of one’s position in a set of social relations along with actions that are
possible and legitimate given such a position. Social identities thus support decision-
making in crowd situations. Core assumptions of the model include that crowd
members retain their rationality, although in-group goals and values do become more
salient to each person. Also, members tend to view their actions as anonymous to
out-groups, but they perceive their acts as being highly visible to the in-group of
fellow crowd members. Hence, they are very much aware of and subject to the appraisal
of their peers. Finally, crowd members experience increased feelings of power or self-
efficacy as members of the collective (Drury & Reicher, 1999).
Social identities are also subject to change as a result of participation in crowd
events (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000). To understand the mechanisms
by which changes come about, elaborations of the model emphasize that crowd events
are characteristically intergroup encounters, and that the various groups can hold dis-
tinct understandings of the crowd members’ social identity (i.e roles within the
event, and society more generally). In particular, Drury and Reicher (2000) proposed
that changes in self-understanding can arise when crowd members hold a different
model of their social identity from that of security forces. For example, Drury and
Reicher documented a case in which English participants in an environmental protest
originally saw themselves as respectable citizens enacting a democratic right and
responsibility to voice their concerns within a neutral state. However, after a severe
W.R. Sieck et al.2
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
crackdown by security forces intended to bring about a quick dispersal of the crowd, the
crowd participants came to see themselves as radicals who stood in opposition to a
biased state. Although these British demonstrators did not react violently, the
changes in self-concept they experienced following the event were associated with con-
sequences such as loss of trust, and an increase in fear of the police. In this case, the
crowd participants’ self-efficacy also presumably decreased as an outcome of the
crowd event. In other cases, successful collective action has been shown to lead to
increases in feelings of power among crowd members (Drury & Reicher, 1999). The
Social Identity Model of crowd behavior was developed based on studies of Western
populations. How does it apply to understanding crowds in the Middle East? Specifi-
cally, what cultural considerations would be expected to influence the form that
social identities take in the Middle East?
In the Middle East and elsewhere, one’s honor or ‘face’ is an important measure of
how one appears to others, and how that image reflects on one’s family (Feghali, 1997).
Honor is considered a predominant value system that spans the Middle East, and one
that is distinct from and sometimes at odds with Islamic values (Gregg, 2005). For
example, Gregg (2005) notes that, ‘Ethnographies from nearly all MENA [Middle
East and North Africa] cultures suggest that the region is characterized by two predo-
minant value systems and their associated interpersonal etiquettes and self-care prac-
tices: that of “honor-and-modesty” and that of Islam’ (p. 90). Although many
subtleties exist,
1
conceptions of honor are generally associated with two primary
aspects, the protection of women belonging to one’s in-group, and the aggressiveness
of men towards other, out-group men. The honor system has been described as having
historical roots in societies surrounding the Mediterranean, with facets of it having
spread across the Middle East, well into south-central Asia, and to a variety of other
locations. For example, although ‘manliness in men’ tends to be discouraged and
even ridiculed in Western-middle class cultures, several researchers have pointed out
that subcultures of honor thrive within them (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965).
In the case of crowd situations, in-group/out-group considerations and male aggres-
sion seem the most relevant facets for understanding Middle Eastern crowd members’
social identities. In the typical depiction of such aggression, insult or injury is treated as
an attack on one’s reputation and status, and one must retaliate and re-establish honor
and status through an aggressive response. In line with this generalized portrayal,
researchers have experimentally demonstrated that cultural differences in the propen-
sity towards violence relate to the value of honor (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, &
Schwarz, 1996). Another critical component of honor as related to the Social Identity
Model is the inherent demand to perform with style under the scrutiny of others in the
social context (Gregg, 2005). Recall that the Social Identity Model implies heightened
in-group visibility in crowd situations. Honor can be seen as the assertion and defense
of one’s public image, as reported by Peristiany (1965), ‘nothing is accepted on credit,
the individual is constantly forced to prove and assert himself ... he is constantly “on
show,” he is forever courting the public opinion of his “equals” so that they may pro-
nounce him worthy’ (p. 11). Other research further suggests that, in at least some cul-
tures, honor is not only given by one’s peers, but also projected to them. For instance, a
primary concern for the group’s honor, as shared by its individual members, was found
in a classic ethnographic study of Egyptian Bedouins (Abou Zeid, 1965). This facet of
honor is probably held within the Middle East, more broadly, as Bedouin concepts of
honor and other values are generally regarded as having had a strong regional influence
(Moracco, 1983). Hence, the notion of ‘group honor’ is potentially pertinent to Middle
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 3
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
Eastern social identities in crowds, given that in-group loyalties and goals tend to be
highly elevated according to the Social Identity Model. In these situations, an affront
to any one individual crowd member may be taken as threatening the group’s honor
and demand a collective response.
Abou Zeid’s and other studies also suggest that aggressive action towards outsider
men produces especially large gains in honor when such action is taken against a larger
or more powerful adversary, as indicated in the following quote. ‘Bedouin society
which admires, and in fact encourages, attacks on the camps of strong and powerful
clans considers it a most shameful action to violate the rights of the poor and the
weak’ (Abou Zeid, 1965, p. 246). This impetus to take on larger foes typically
appears to come with a complimentary lack of concern with risks to one’s own physical
well-being, or even life itself. Findings from a study of Algeria’s Kabyle region are sug-
gestive (Bourdieu, 1965): ‘This stake for the Kabyle is worth more than life itself.
[Honor] is also the desire to overcome one’s rival in man-to-man struggle’ (p. 204)
and, ‘[Honor] is above all in the action of defending, cost what it may, a certain
public image of oneself’ (p. 208).
As described above, from the perspective of the social identity model of crowd
behavior, honor may serve as an important cultural contributor to conflict between
security forces and crowd members in the context of Middle Eastern crowd events.
In particular, the degree of in-group visibility afforded by crowd membership pro-
vides an opportunity to prove oneself in the eyes of one’s peers. This may be
especially true to the extent that clear in-group/out-group divisions are created
between crowd members and security forces. At the same time, crowd members
may be expected to take personal responsibility for the group’s honor in the situation.
These considerations of honor further suggest that Middle Eastern crowd members
may be especially likely to oppose an aggressive security force, even at great risk
to their own personal safety. Note that this does not imply irrationality in the Le
Bon sense, but rather suggests that a deeply held shared value, made even more
salient in the crowd context according to the Social Identity Model, can lead to
violent confrontations. In addition to this hypothesis, we also expect that core
elements of the Social Identity Model would generalize to crowds in the Middle
East, including cognitively rational assessments and goal-driven behavior, increased
self-efficacy as a result of successful crowd participation, and the link between social
relations and permissible actions.
Study 1: crowd incidents in the Middle East
The purpose of Study 1 was to test a specific implication of the concept of honor as a
prevalent value that regulates perceptions and decisions in the Middle East. In particu-
lar, we elicited and examined crowd incidents to determine whether security force
actions that were readily construed by crowd members as diminishing honor led to
increases in crowd member resistance, as compared with security force actions that
enhanced or did not affect honor.
In Study 1, we employed critical incident interviews to study the crowd experiences
of populations in the Middle East, eliciting information about the knowledge, goal
structures, and judgment and decision processes underlying observable actions of par-
ticipants in the crowd context (Flanagan, 1954; Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998;
Sieck, McHugh, & Smith, 2006).
W.R. Sieck et al.4
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
Method
Participants
We collected 36 incidents from 25 people in the United States and Lebanon represent-
ing experiences with crowds in the Middle East from multiple perspectives. We con-
ducted interviews with 11 people from the Middle East (54% from Lebanon, 18%
from Egypt, 18% from Palestine and 9% from Jordan) who had participated in demon-
strations there. Middle Eastern crowd participant interviewees were identified by pro-
fessional recruiters who engaged local community centers, social networks and existing
panels. Selection criteria were that interviewees had to have been born and raised in the
Middle East, have participated in at least one demonstration in the region, and be at
least 18 years of age. We also interviewed 14 military personnel who were either
native to the Middle East (36%), or had advanced cultural knowledge of the Middle
East (64%), as well as specific experiences managing crowds in that region. These inter-
viewees were identified via military contacts, and selected based on peer-nomination of
Middle Eastern cultural expertise, and at least one experience managing a crowd in the
region. Interviews were conducted in the summer and autumn of 2005, in English and
Arabic. Most of the Arab participants spoke conversational English, although a trans-
lator was available to facilitate communication of difficult concepts and nuances. Two
of the interviews were conducted entirely through a translator. The level of detail and
key findings were comparable across these interview approaches.
Interview guide
The general structure of the interview guide is described below. The interviews were
semi-structured, organized around an initial account of a specific incident provided
by the interviewee. The interviewers then revisited and inquired further about
various aspects of the incident to gather additional information. The incident account
was generated by the interviewee in response to a specific open-ended question
posed by the interviewers, such as ‘Can you tell us about a time when you were part
of a demonstration or protest of some sort?’ Once the participant had identified a rel-
evant incident, he or she was asked to recount the episode in its entirety without inter-
ruption from the interviewer. The interviewee’s account of the incident provided the
basic structure for the remainder of the interview. Next, the elicitors and participant
constructed a map of the situation to help clarify the positions of crowd members,
the physical context and any constraints, and the unfolding of crowd events. The par-
ticipant was asked for relative times and places of key events and turning points within
the incident. The aims were to elicit the salient events within the incident, including
cognitive events, such as points where understanding changed, or where judgments
or decisions were made.
The interviewers then led the participant back over his or her incident several times,
in order to elicit additional details about key aspects of the account. Examples of probe
questions used to gather more detailed information included:
.
How did you recognize the crowd was changing?
.
What were your concerns at that point?
.
What were you noticing right then?
.
How did you know that?
.
What led you to this decision?
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 5
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
.
What was it about the situation that let you know what was going on?
.
What were you trying to accomplish at that moment?
.
What was your biggest challenge at this point?
Once the actual events had been described sufficiently, the interviewers asked some
additional questions to gain insights into the participants’ understanding of how
things work in the situation. An example question is, ‘What if the security forces
had taken action X? How would things have turned out differently?’
Procedure
Participants were interviewed individually by a pair of trained interviewers. An Arabic
translator was available during all of the interviews with Middle Easterners, and the
translator joined the interview to facilitate communication between the interviewer
and interviewees as necessary. The interviews with crowd participants were audio
recorded; the military participants declined permission to record. The duration of
each interview was approximately 1.52 h. Crowd participants received $75 as com-
pensation for their time, while the crowd controllers did not receive compensation
because of their military status. Data records were created for each interviewee, consist-
ing of either the interviewer’s notes (if interview was not taped) or a transcript of the
interview and a summary of the incident.
Results
The data included a number of incidents depicting specific crowd experiences in the
Middle East, from either the crowd participants’ or security forces’ point of view.
We conducted a thematic analysis to identify patterns of related topics across the
data. We relay general examples of excerpts from these incidents that illustrate specific
themes, and then describe a quantitative analysis of the data. First, as an example of the
‘rational cognition’ theme, a Palestinian man recounts an incident in the street near his
home, illustrating that some crowd members explicitly engage in a rational assessment
of the weapons and level of force being directed towards them:
You become an expert at knowing whether they are using rubber bullets. You would
know because it’s a big size magazine connected to the rifle, and that the noise is different
from a rifle. You hear whether it’s live ammuni tion in the air.
In another example, a Lebanese woman recounts her participation in a demonstration in
Beirut to increase teachers’ salaries. The protestors again act quite rationally, leaving
peacefully after determining that their goals have been met:
About a half an hour after the cameras left is when the crowd started to disperse. After the
cameras left we thought our story was now going to get out and so everybody went home.
We didn’t really know whether the teachers ended up getting a pay raise, but we did see
the demonstration on TV. There, the government said they would have meetings with the
teachers. We felt that we got our message out by watching people say things about the
message, and we were happy with ourselves; feeling that we did something good.
The example shows how the participants assessed that their goals were met, so that they
knew when to stop the demonstration. It also illustrates the psychological effects,
W.R. Sieck et al.6
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
including an increased self-efficacy that accompanied and persisted beyond the crowd
members’ decision to end the event. The following incident from Lebanon provides an
example of a theme concerning the link between social relations and actions. It also
shows de-escalation following a potential flash point when the security force exhibits
heroic levels of restraint:
A Shia crowd had blocked off the roads to the airport near Beirut. They used tires that
were set on fire, and cement blocks and barrels full of concrete to close off the two roads
leading to the airport. The overall area was quite large, and the number of crowd
members was around 500. Civilian cars that were coming up to the airport stopped
and created a big traffic jam. The Lebanese Army officer and his troops were sent to
clear the road. When the security forces arrived, the crowd became more violent.
Members of the crowd are waving sticks around, and throwing many stones. Then some-
thing happens. A member of Hezbollah within the crowd throws a grenade at the secur-
ity forces. Fifteen members of the security team were hurt. The soldiers expected the
stones, but not a grenade. It was an immediate challenge for the officer to keep his
men calm and not fire at the crowd. They took positions and held their ground, but
he convinced his men not to shoot. The rules of engagement said they could not
shoot unarmed civilians. But the grenade meant that the crowd could be treated as
armed, and the security forces cou ld shoot. Both sides realized this. It changed the
tone of the crowd from strongly aggressive to being less certain. It calmed them
down. After the grenade, other members in the crowd seemed shocked and they
moved back on their own. They knew the security forces had the right to fire. When
the crowd advanced again, the security force moved forward slowly and called out to
the crowd members to negotiate. There was a lot of talking, but then the situation
ended without further violence.
This incident illustrates a co-shifting of permissible actions and evaluations according
to fluctuating social identities in the context of the situation. In light of the Social Iden-
tity Model, we suggest that crowd members make decisions with reference to tacitly
held sets of actions, with acceptability depending on social context. The informal
rules of action considered legitimate by different subgroups can shift throughout the
crowd event. Sub-groups try to assess each other’s informal action rules, and they
modify their own behavior based on that assessment. The action rules within the
crowd can cycle back and forth to higher and lower levels of escalation. As another
example of social relation/action links in the Middle Eastern cultural context, consider
the following example described by an Arab-American Marine who was part of a team
that had intercepted some bank robbers in Baghdad in 2003:
The Iraqis were standing there quietly watching the events; they seemed curious ... then
some of the men began saying, ‘Haram’ meaning ‘shame’ or ‘it’s too bad.’ This started
spreading throughout the crowd. The crowd told the security force officer that he needed
to go see the old man. He understood what the problem was as soon as he walked down
the sidewalk to the old man. The bank robbers, cuffed and laying on the concrete side-
walk, were not comfortable. One of these men was in his late 50s or 60s he was a
gray hair. He was a little frail. The crowd could clearly see that he was in pain. Then
crowd began complaining about the way that the old man was being treated. The elder
was in obvious discomfort. They told the security force officer that he should let the
old man go. Crowd members started shouting, ‘Let him go.’ The crowd started to
become more agitated and angrier. The security force officer treated the elder with
respect, and decided to let him go. He helped the elder stand up, brushed off his
clothes, and cut off the elder’s flexicuffs. He then picked the elder’s belongings up off
the ground and put them back into his pocket. He walked the elder to the edge of the
crowd and said, ‘You’re free to go, Uncle.’ The elder was very grateful. He kissed the
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 7
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
security force officer on his cheeks and shook hands with him. The crowd immediately
applauded.
The above example also reveals that even ‘curious’ bystanders, who are sometimes dis-
missed as nonplayers, serve a function in the crowd. Crowds of bystanders have a moni-
toring function, observing the events and determining whether people are enacting
culturally appropriate social positions, or whether social relations are out of sync
with cultural norms, such as dishonorable treatment of elders.
Consistent with considerations of honor in social identities, the findings suggested
that Middle Easterners tend to exhibit a relatively high degree of risk-tolerance for
physical harm in crowd situations, as shown in the following incident involving a Leba-
nese demonstrator:
They’re bombing the roads to keep people from going back and forth to the palace to
protest. We would hide when the bombing started, and when they stopped, we would
go back down. It was like this. We were crazy then. We were young, but it was really
everybody who would do this, young people, old people; it was everybody. Just after
bombarding, we were few, but after some hours, it was normal size again. Our people
are like this; they are crazy. Not just for the demonstrations, but for other things too.
For example, several times we went to the beach, and they started to bombard us.
Okay, home ... we go home, and when everything is calm, we go back.
This example demonstrates a shared tolerance for risk that far outstrips the comfort
levels of most Americans. Similarly, extremely high risk tolerance and commitment
in protestors was reported by a Lebanese Army officer who was appointed to security
detail during protests against Syria following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic
Hariri:
The demonstrators included men, women, and children from all religious groups. The
people were angry, and wanted to vent their anger in public. They were not dangerous
he did not see any sticks, arms, stone throwing, or anything. He had arranged his sol-
diers behind concertina wire, with an officer on a pile of stones with a bullhorn. The
officer was in charge of talking to the crowd. His job was to calm them down, and
repeat that they were not allowed to come in. The crowd reaction was shouting
slogans, walk ing over the concertina wire, and pushing the soldiers. He saw women
and children walking over two layers of concertina wire. He saw that as an indication
of the strength of their determination. He felt that attempting to block them completely
at that point would end in disaster, so he let a few enter the area, a little at a time.
In another example, a security team did not operate with such restraint, and it did lead to
disaster. The following incident occurred in Iraq, 2004, involving a deadly violent reac-
tion to aggression by a security team:
A protest was planned to occur in Hit, led by a former sheik. The plan was to gather people
in Baghdadi and then march to Hit. They were protesting to have the roads to Fallujah
opened. The roads were closed at the time to prevent weapons smuggling. The crowd
of about 2000 people began the marc h. Some insurgents, or civilians dressed as insur-
gents, joined the crowd. They wore RPGs and hoods, but later the investigators found
out that the RPGs were fake. The crowd was peaceful at first. The police walked with
them. There were four ‘insurgents’ in the front. A sheik was leading the march and
there were sheiks dispersed throughout the crowd who were trying to keep things peace-
ful. An oil man and his security contractors left the base in three cars around this time,
coincidentally. They drove down the road, saw the crowd, apparently panicked and did
a herringbone on the road. The cars turn around to leave, but no one noticed that the
W.R. Sieck et al.8
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
lead car was stuck in a ditch with three of the security contractors. One of the contractors
got out of the car and shot one of the lead ‘insurgents.’ At that point, the crowd erup ted.
The crowd killed the contractor and wounded another one (they thought they had killed
him). They let the third member of the security team (an Iraqi) leave. The mob tore the car
apart.
Another common theme that emerged from the interviews related to the connection
between social identity and honor was the use of language to highlight in-group/out-
group differences between the crowd members and security forces. This kind of commu-
nicative act reflected attempts to influence the models of social identity and correspond-
ing relevant actions held by sub-groups. Unfriendly crowd leaders attempted to
engender hostile emotional reactions among their fellows by proposing images of
polar opposition between security forces and the crowds. In the following example of
crowd member attempts to polarize, the security forces explicitly tried to focus on com-
monalities, and were able to provide some concrete demonstrations to back them up:
The protestors would call out arguments that created a distance between themselves and
the security forces. For example, the crowd members argued that they were Muslims, and
the security forces were Christians. They also brought Israel into the picture, suggesting
that the security forces were working on behalf of the Israelis. The security forces
attempted to talk to the crowd in ways that would calm them down and find commonalities
between them. They would say things like, ‘Calm down,’ ‘we are not the enemy,’ ‘we ’re
just doing our jobs here have to clear the area. They also had some Muslims in their
ranks who stepped forward to directly counter the argument about religion . By pointing
out the commonalities, they were able to defuse the situation.
In another example, an Egyptian interviewee described a time when his family visited
Cairo, and was caught up in massive, violent demonstrations in 1981. Here, monitoring
and arguments by fellow crowd members about appropriate social roles and positions
did not have any apparent calming effect:
They took to the streets and they expressed their anger and dissatisfaction with the gov-
ernment for the prices going up. We parked our car and followed behind the main crowd.
There were a lot of people, and many were watching from the sides. We were not fam-
iliar with the area. It was like a scene that nobody would miss. You go and it’s exciting.
They were throwing rocks and what not, as they walked down the street. We saw a lot of
cars damaged. Hundreds of cars. See they attacked every car that had like a police officer
in it or someone in uniform. My mom and my sister were very, very upset with the
crowd and what they did. They said, ‘These people could be our children so why are
you doing this?’ If you have a message you have to say or do it peacefully not
through violent demonstrations. I didn’t talk. Some others were saying things like,
‘yes, it’s about time,’ things like that. Others of them would say, ‘no, no, no this is
wrong! Why do they do this?’ It was kind of like a debate between the crowd, I
mean between the onlookers if you will. Some supported what was going on, and
some argued against it.
Quantitative analysis and results
In addition to the qualitative thematic analysis described above, we conducted a quan-
titative analysis to test more directly the specific hypothesis concerning opposition to
aggression. Specifically, we hypothesize that, in cases where Middle Eastern crowd
members construe security force actions as affronts to their honor, they are likely to
sanction resistance against even a heavily armed security force. On the other hand, if
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 9
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
the members of the security force act in ways that preserve the honor of crowd
members, crowd tensions are more likely to be defused.
In order to conduct the quantitative analysis, the 36 crowd incidents were coded for
causal linkages between change points in the crowd and various precipitating events.
Segments of the incidents were coded as causal linkages if they met the following
two criteria. First, the causal linkage had to consist of two parts, a situational event
or cue (e.g. crowd member threw a rock, security forces arrived on the scene, etc.) fol-
lowed by a resulting change point in crowd behavior or crowd demeanor (e.g. crowd
members grew angrier, crowd members drew closer to the security forces, crowd
became louder). Second, the causal relationship between the two parts had to be appar-
ent either by proximity in the incident (the events obviously followed each other
sequentially in the narrative) or by the presence of transitional phrases (e.g. because,
so, then, as a result). In all, 136 triggers and 157 crowd changes were identified.
Specific triggers could not be identified for 21 of the crowd changes. The data were
then further reduced to include only the security force triggering events, coded as
those that would be construed by crowd members as challenges to honor by escalation
of force, and those that would be construed as preserving honor by generating under-
standing or exhibiting restraint. Also, crowd change points were classified in terms of
whether they signified an increase or decrease in the overall level of conflict. The orig-
inal coding was conducted by two raters who worked collaboratively and decided codes
by consensus. Another rater coded the final events independently to assess reliability.
The percentage agreement between for security forces triggers was 94%, and agreement
was 96% for crowd reactions.
A cross-tabulation of these results is displayed in Table 1. As can be seen, escalation
of force against the crowd led to an increase in the level of conflict more often than not
(62%), whereas attempting to understand the crowd or exhibiting restraint was much
less likely to lead to an increase in conflict (29%). The association between the kind
of security force actions and crowd change points was statistically significant,
x
2
(1)
¼ 8.57, p ¼ 0.003.
Summary
In Study 1, we elicited experiences involving crowds in the Middle East, and analyzed
themes across the incidents. Interpretations of the data were guided by a version of the
Social Identity Model, extended to account for considerations of honor. We found
support for core model assumptions, such as rational, goal-driven crowd member
decisions, increased self-efficacy following crowd participation, and specific links
between culturally defined social relations and actions. Elements of honor as reflected
in the social identities were found as well. We further examined the concept of honor as
providing an important basis for potential conflict, as well as conflict resolution
between security forces and crowd members that may be pertinent to understanding
Table 1. Crowd change points by security force actions.
Increased conflict Decreased conflict
Force escalation 16 10
Understanding, restraint 9 22
W.R. Sieck et al.10
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
crowd violence in the Middle East. The findings suggest that violent crowd reactions
are especially likely to occur when crowd members construe security force actions as
affronts to their honor. However, if the members of the security force act in ways
that preserve the honor of crowd members, crowd tensions are more likely to be
defused.
The results from Study 1 provided encouraging support for assumptions of a version
of the Social Identity Model that takes into account considerations of honor. Yet, the
extent to which honor factors into Middle Eastern crowd member decisions remains
somewhat ambiguous, given that the study was conducted with a single culture. A
more controlled, cross-cultural comparison would be helpful in further delineating
the effects of honor. Study 2 provides such a comparison by drawing on the implication
from Study 1 that crowd member action depends on how the relevant social identities
are construed.
Study 2: expected crowd reactions in the Middle East
The purpose of Study 2 was to determine whether and in what ways Middle Eastern
civilians and US military personnel arrive at different understandings of Middle
Eastern crowd behavior. The general idea follows from a conception of culture as a
shared symbolic meaning system, which implies that an important aim of cultural
research is to understand the point of view of members of the culture (Rohner, 1984;
Sieck, 2011). In the present case of crowds in the Middle East, the idea is to understand
the causal maps people use to interpret specific situations and formulate expectations
about how events will unfold. In particular, if Middle Easterners have a greater ten-
dency to frame social events in terms of honor and respect than the Americans, then
they would be more likely to form expectations that Arab crowd participants would
respond positively to signs of respect on the one hand, and also that they would be
more likely to anticipate a hostile backlash by crowd members in response to escalation
by members of the security forces.
In order to conduct the study, we adapted an approach that has been employed by
cognitive anthropologists and cognitive psychologists to study causal beliefs in a
variety of settings, such as those related to disease onset and treatment, and influences
of rainforest plants and animals on each other, among others (Atran, Medin, & Ross,
2005; Garro, 2000). For example, in a study examining the cultural knowledge and
understandings relating to diabetes causation in a Native American community, partici-
pants were asked to describe possible causes, effects and ways of dealing with diabetes
(Garro, 2000). In Study 2, we used a similar approach, but with an emphasis on under-
standing how people with different cultural backgrounds interpret social situations,
including their expected reactions to various kinds of behavior. Specifically, we exam-
ined causal beliefs concerning crowd reactions to various possible security force
actions, as well as more general beliefs concerning appropriate roles and goals of secur-
ity forces in specific crowd situations in the Middle East. Participants read a brief vign-
ette describing a crowd event (based on an actual incident collected in Study 1). After
reading the scenario, the participants were interviewed to elicit their beliefs about the
roles of each group, and expectations about security force actions and crowd
member behavior. Interview topics included their perceptions of the purpose of the
crowd, security force actions and goals, crowd member actions and goals, and
actions that would calm or inflame the crowd. A questionnaire was also administered
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 11
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
in which participants indicated their expectations regarding crowd member responses to
various security force actions.
Method
Participants
Thirty people participated in Study 2. There were two categories of participants: US
soldiers who participated in a training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training
Center in Ft Polk, LA, USA (n ¼ 14); and Middle Eastern ex-patriot civilians living
in Dearborn, MI, USA (n ¼ 16). The Middle Eastern civilians were identified by pro-
fessional recruiters who engaged local community centers, social networks and existing
panels. Selection criteria were that interviewees had to have been born and raised in the
Middle East, have participated in at least one demonstration in the region and be at least
18 years of age. Most of these participants were from Iraq (62%) and Lebanon (30%),
with the remainder from Syria and Saudi Arabia. The soldiers in Study 2 were identified
through their participation in the training exercise, and unlike the military participants
in Study 1, did not have extensive field experience or special Middle Eastern cultural
knowledge. Study 2 data collection was conducted in the summer of 2007.
Interview guide
Structured scenario-based interviews were conducted for Study 2. At the beginning of each
interview, participants read a brief scenario describing a crowd event that occurred in the
Middle East, and then they were asked specific questions about their expectations for secur-
ity force and crowd member actions and goals. Two different scenarios were used in this
study, ‘Tires on Fire’ and ‘Bank Robbery’ (see below). Both of these scenarios were
based on real-world incidents collected in Study 1, and they were tailored to be appropriate
for the relevant participant population. The US military versions are shown below:
Tires on fire
You are the commander of a peacekeeping force in a large city of a Middle Eastern
country. You’ve just gotten word that there is a protest taking place several blocks
from where you are. When you arrive on the scene, you see that there are approximately
20 men in the street burning a pile of tires. Most of the men are relatively young in their
mid-20s to mid-30s. They are yelling and throwing more tires on the fire. You can’t make
out what they are yelling, but they appear angry. There are hundreds of other people lining
the streets watching men and women of all ages, and children. Some are yelling, some
are cheering, and some are just observing and talking with those around them. You also
notice there are several people observing from the balconies of their homes overlooking
the street. They appear more curious than frightened.
Bank robbery
You are on patrol through the streets of a small city in a Middle Eastern country. You’ve
just received word via radio that there’s a bank robbery taking place a few blocks from
your current location. When you arrive on the scene, you enter the bank and find a
group of people including some middle-aged men and women, and an elderly man, in
the process of a robbery. Upon showing your weapons, the robbers surrender, and you
begin to remove the men from the bank one-by-one, flexicuff them, and place them on
the sidewalk face-down. With each robber you bring out, you notice a crowd of onlookers
growing outside the bank. At first the crowd appears relatively small, quiet, and curious.
Yet it becomes larger and more vocal as you continue to bring out the robbers ...
W.R. Sieck et al.12
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
particularly when you bring out the women and the elderly man. By the time you’ve
brought out all the prisoners, there are several crowd membe rs flailing their arms and
yelling. But you can’t make out what they’re sayin g.
After reading a scenario, participants were asked questions about their perceptions of
the security force actions and goals, crowd member actions and goals, and actions
that would calm or inflame the crowd. The purpose of these questions was to elicit
the participants’ expectations about the causal linkages between security force
actions and crowd member behavior. The interview guides varied slightly for military
and civilian interviews. Once the scenario-based interviews were completed, partici-
pants responded to a questionnaire about causal linkages. The structured interview
guide was constructed by reviewing the incidents from Study 1 to identify specific
security force actions and crowd member responses. This initial list of security force
actions was reduced to the following 12 actions:
.
negotiate with crowd leaders;
.
entertain crowd members;
.
remove helmets and armor;
.
speak some amount of arabic;
.
answers their questions;
.
stand by and monitor the crowd;
.
yell at the crowd members;
.
fire a warning shot;
.
strike a member of the crowd with a blunt weapon;
.
push the crowd members back;
.
create a barrier or a blockade;
.
remove certain crowd members from the scene.
Five types of crowd member responses were also included:
.
crowd dispersal or advancement;
.
changes in the level of crowd member violent actions;
.
changes in the level of crowd member agitation;
.
changes in crowd member attitudes towards the United States;
.
changes in the level of destruction.
Each security force action was paired once with each crowd member response. For each
pair, the participant was asked whether the crowd member behavior or attitude will
increase, decrease or stay the same. Two example questions are:
.
If US security forces strike a member of the crowd with a blunt weapon, are the
other crowd members more likely to
(a) increase their level of violence;
(b) decrease their level of violence;
(c) maintain the same level of violence.
.
If US security forces speak some Arabic to the crowd members, are they more
likely to
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 13
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
(a) have favorable attitudes towards the United States;
(b) have unfavorable attitudes towards the United States;
(c) have neutral attitudes towards the United States.
Procedure
The US military participants were interviewed during a break in a training exercise
being held at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft Polk, LA, USA. The Middle
Eastern civilian participants were interviewed individually in a focus group facility
in Dearborn, MI, USA. The structured interviews lasted for approximately 1 hour.
Analysis and results
Scenario interview
We concentrated analysis on security force goals and actions, and crowd responses to
those actions to identify differences between US security forces and Middle Eastern
crowd participants. We focused on these areas as they were most relevant to our
hypotheses concerning the effects of the value of honor on causal beliefs. Also, note
that the first category pertains to simple first-order beliefs, whereas the second category
explicitly addresses beliefs about a particular causal relationship (i.e. actions
inflammation). We analyzed the interviews in several phases, moving from a very
qualitative examination of the data that preserved the individual structure of each par-
ticipant’s utterances to an increasingly quantitative characterization of the data. The
phases of analysis were as follows:
1. We reviewed each interview in depth and created a graphical representation of
each interviewee’s causal belief structures in a format that preserved their own
language and ideas.
2. We abstracted a common set of categories to capture the ideas across individuals.
We used the complete set of categories to develop a single graphical framework
to represent the causal belief structures.
3. Each of the interviews was coded in terms of the common categories using the
graphical framework to represent their causal beliefs.
The descriptions of security force goals and actions were especially rich and complex,
and we wanted to ensure adequate inter-rater reliability. Hence, we employed multidi-
mensional scaling methods to the set of descriptions so as to reduce the complexity in a
meaningful way for the quantitative analyses. In particular, we first reduced each rel-
evant statement to a several-word phrase (e.g. stop people from getting hurt). Many
of these naturally mapped onto the same descriptors (e.g. stop tire burning, end tire
burning in a safe way), but others differed from one another to a greater or lesser
extent. Doing this produced a total of 46 unique phrases to categorize. We then
wrote each phrase on a separate slip of paper, and gave the slips to four independent
raters with familiarity with the topic area. Raters were instructed to sort these slips
into categories of descriptors that had the same or highly similar meanings. Based on
these groupings, we computed a similarity matrix for the descriptors that described
how many raters placed each pair of descriptors in the same category. We then per-
formed a hierarchical clustering analysis to determine whether or not the two
W.R. Sieck et al.14
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
descriptors tended to be placed in the same category across raters. The final set of cat-
egories resulting from this analysis is presented in Table 2.
US security force (US SF) and Middle Eastern crowd participants (ME CP) differed
in their expectation of security force goals in some interesting ways (see Figure 1). For
US security forces, 25% of their expected goals and actions focused on controlling the
situation and securing the safety of the US security forces. They would accomplish
these goals by keeping the crowd at a distance or dispersing them, and enlisting the
help of the local police so the security force can leave the scene. Next, US security
force goals and actions had to do with crowd emotion (15%) and keeping the
crowds calm. In contrast, Middle Eastern crowd participants expected the security
force to focus on crowd safety (20%), and increasing understanding of why the
crowd was forming (14%).
In addition to the differences in goals, we also found differences in causal beliefs
about the actions that might backfire and unintentionally inflame the crowd. Figure 2
clearly shows that US security forces and Middle Eastern crowd participants have
different ideas regarding actions that can unintentionally inflame a crowd. US security
forces are worried about communicating with the crowd in a way that would inflame
them (56%), such as drawing attention by using an interpreter to ask questions, not
answering a question or comment, or having a translator make a command. In contrast,
Middle Eastern crowd participants were most worried about escalation of physical force
Table 2. Categories of security force goals/actions resulting from multidimensional scaling
methods analysis.
Category
number Category name Specific security force goals/actions
1 Remove instigators Stop tire burning; end tire burning in a safe way;
protect bank; deal with robbers; remove robbers
2 Increase understanding
of situation
Talk to families; understand why gathering;
understand culture
3 Secure si tuations/forces Secure location; control situation; control own
forces; keep crowd at a distance; punish them;
security of forces; leave the scene; do not get
separated; get Iraqi police involved; disperse
crowd
4 Improve long-term
attitudes
Peace in area; prevent negative attitudes; do not
increase anti-United States attitudes; help
population; maintain credibility
5 Protect safety of crowd Safety; keep onlookers safe; protect wome n and
children; keep everyone safe; stop people from
getting hurt
6 Manage crowd emotion Keep crowd calm; calm crowd; do not get crowd
angry
7 Diffuse tension Minimize threat; reduce destruction; no hostility;
diffuse tension; maintain peace
8 Reduce vio lence Reduce violence; decrease violence; quell violence;
prevent violence
9 Prevent escalation Prevent joining; keep mob from forming; prevent
escalation; no escalation; avoid escalation; prevent
riot
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 15
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
inflaming the crowd (52%), such as hitting innocent people, pushing crowd members or
firing a warning shot.
Questionnaire
In order to analyze expectations based on the questionnaire responses, we first calcu-
lated (for each participant) the proportion of times the participant reported an expected
Figure 1. US Security Force (US SF) and Middle Eastern crowd participant (ME CP) expec-
tations about security force goals.
Figure 2. US Security Force (US SF) and Middle Eastern crowd participant (ME CP) expec-
tations about security force actions that unintentionally inflame crowds.
W.R. Sieck et al.16
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
increase or decrease in conflict, given that security personnel engaged in force escala-
tion behaviors or behaviors signifying understanding and restraint. We then used t-tests
to compare each of these subject-level measures between the Middle Easterners and
Americans. Middle Eastern participants were more likely, on average, to expect
decreases in conflict following behaviors signifying understanding or restraint than
the American participants, t(28) ¼ 2.54, p , 0.05 (M
1
¼ 0.56; M
2
¼ 0.38, respect-
ively). No other effects were significant. In particular, expectations for increases in con-
flict following force escalation did not differ significantly, with both groups tending to
expect such increases (M
1
¼ 0.54; M
2
¼ 0.60, respectively).
As described earlier, Study 2 was motivated in part by a conception of culture as
comprising shared meanings. From this perspective, it is useful to consider analyses
that can inform us directly about various clusters of shared meaning that exist within
the data, enabling us to examine ‘cultures’ directly, rather than relying on demographics
as a proxy for culture. Hence, we employed a statistical technique called ‘finite mixture
modeling’ to further analyze the questionnaire data (McLachlan & Peel, 2000). Finite
mixture modeling is an approach that permits direct segmentation of cultural groups
based on clusters of consensus (Mueller & Veinott, 2008; Sieck & Mueller, 2009;
Sieck, Rasmussen, & Smart, 2010). Mixture models have been applied in many scien-
tific fields. In cultural modeling applications, the distinct segments resulting from the
analysis represent cultural groups, i.e. groups defined by the similarity of their ideas,
and hence the technique has sometimes been referred to as ‘cultural mixture modeling’
in this application area.
Cultural mixture modeling begins by defining a statistical likelihood model (i.e. a
generative model) by which we assume data and errors arise. It then asks the question,
‘How many groups of people with shared beliefs generated the observed data’. Along
with the ability to test whether a consensus exists among a set of respondents, the pro-
cedure can also determine if multiple shared beliefs exist, and identify the different
groups or clusters of respondents.
We investigated two distinct models for this analysis: a binomial model and a strong
agreement model. The binomial model used one parameter to account for each
response, which was the place value of a binomial distribution with N ¼ 2. The
strong consensus model simply assumed that the ‘correct’ response was given with p
¼ 12
a
, and each of the incorrect responses was given with p ¼
a
. By applying cul-
tural mixture modeling, the binomial response model determined that there was a con-
sensus among the different groups of respondents (2BIC ¼ 5588). For all numbers of
groups investigated, the solution defaulted to a single group containing 30 respondents
and the remaining groups were empty. This was achieved because the binomial
response model is quite forgiving and able to account for fairly wide variability
among respondents. We applied the strong consensus model with three values of
a
.
In contrast, the strong consensus model found no consensus in any of the conditions,
with the number of obtained groups varying from 10 (for
a
¼ 0.01, 2BIC ¼ 6373)
to 5 (for
a
¼ 0.05; 2BIC ¼ 4901) to 3 (for
a
¼ 0.1, 2BIC ¼ 4331). Across the
set of models, the smallest BIC value was obtained for the weakest strong consensus
model (
a
¼ 0.1) for three groups (see Figure 3). Each group represents a set of consen-
sus beliefs that is distinct from the other two groups. Hence, we refer to these emergent
groups from the analysis as cultural groups.
Table 3 shows how the US security force and Middle Eastern civilian populations
are distributed among the three cultural groups. Table 3 implies that there is a partial
consensus in causal beliefs about security force interactions with crowds that includes
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 17
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
both US security force and Middle Eastern crowd members (about 50% of the members
of each population). The remaining members of the populations appear to form two
‘splinter’ groups that are formed primarily of Middle Eastern or US participants, and
that hold ideas that diverge from the overall consensus.
With the cultural groups identified, the next step in the analysis was to characterize
the consensual beliefs for each group, and to examine the differences between them. A
summary of the strong consensual beliefs for each group is presented in Table 4. As
shown, the members of the ‘mixed consensus’ group believe that striking crowd
members will most likely result in increased violence, destruction and agitation
(VDA), whereas communication in various forms is likely to decrease VDA or increase
positive attitudes towards the United States. The primary difference between the
‘Middle Eastern splinter’ group is the inclusion of a slightly broader set of escalated
force actions as likely to increase VDA, and the shared belief that more of the forms
of communication will lead to a reduction in VDA. More strikingly different is the
‘US splinter’ group, who share beliefs that communicating with the crowd in various
ways is unlikely to have beneficial effects, either in reducing VDA or in generating
positive attitudes towards the United States. In general, this group appears to hold
fairly pessimistic beliefs about successfully managing crowds; they tend to see
actions as increasing VDA, decreasing positive attitudes or having no effect on the
situation.
Summary
The purpose of Study 2 was to identify differences between American security force
members and Middle Eastern crowd participants with respect to how they interpret
Figure 3. Fit and number of groups from cultural mixture modeling.
Table 3. Distribution of country of origin across three groups.
US security force Middle Eastern civilian
A8 7
B3 6
C5 1
W.R. Sieck et al.18
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
Table 4. Strong consensual beliefs for each cultural group.
Group
Dominant
population
Increase violence/
destruction/agitation
(V/D/A)
Decrease
V/D/A
No effect on
V/D/A
Increase positive
attitude towards
United States
Decrease positive
attitude towards
United States
No effect
on attitudes
A Mixed Strike Answer
questions
Remove CM Speak
Arabic
Negotiate
Warning shots
B Middle
Eastern
Strike
Yell
Remove CM
Speak
Arabic
Negotiate
Answer
questions
Entertain
Remove
helmet
Stand by
C US Remove helmet
Push
Yell
Barriers
Warning
shots
Entertain
Negotiate
Warning
shots
Barriers
Yell
Push
Strike
Speak
Arabic
Answer
questions
Note: CM - crowd member
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 19
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
crowd situations. The scenario interview portion of Study 2 indicated several differ-
ences in beliefs about security force goals, and security force actions that would
inflame the situation. Specifically, the Americans tended to believe that security
force goals should be to control the situation and disperse the crowd, whereas the
Middle Eastern crowd participants expected that primary security force goals should
be to keep the crowd safe. Also, the Americans tended to expect that communication
with the crowd would be most likely to lead to unintentional violent responses,
whereas the Middle Easterners tended to expect that force escalation would be the
most likely unintentional cause of hostile crowd responses. In Study 2, we also used
mixture modeling to quantitatively assess American and Middle Eastern causal
beliefs as reported in a questionnaire. Consistent with the scenario interviews, the
results revealed important differences in how American security force and Middle
Eastern crowd members understand crowd situations. A primary point of divergence
is in US and Middle Eastern understanding of the effects of communicating with the
crowd. In particular, there was a consensus among Middle Easterners that US security
force communication with crowd members is beneficial, whereas the Americans tended
not to expect useful effects from attempts to communicate with Middle Eastern crowd
members.
Discussion
In this paper, we examined the Social Identity Model of crowd behavior, as compared
with notions of de-individuation and ‘mindless violence’, and showed that it can be use-
fully extended to apply to Middle Eastern crowds (Reicher, 1996). In the past, it has
only been applied in cases where all actors originate from a single Western culture.
Here, we elaborated the model to account for the role of honor in social identities
and relations, and examined the correspondence between key assumptions of the elabo-
rated model and experiences from Middle Eastern crowds.
The Social Identity Model assumes that crowd participants are rational decision-
makers focused on shared goals who consider actions as possible and legitimate
based in large part on their perceived position in a set of social relations. Honor rep-
resents a shared value that accompanies tangible goals, and tends to weigh heavily in
those decision processes. At the group level, accomplishment of crowd goals leads
to increased self-efficacy among crowd members that is closely associated with gains
in group honor. At the individual level, honor involves the assertion of one’s public
image, and that image becomes highly accentuated among the in-group of fellow
crowd members. Hence, crowd membership affords an important opportunity to
prove oneself and accrue honor, particularly in cases involving social relations that
are construed as hostile between in-group crowd members and security forces.
Further, the degree of honor gained increases with the extent of risk to physical
safety, such as by crowd members aggressively confronting heavily armed security
who take an adversarial position. Finally, rational assessment combined with the
value of honor implies that direct displays of respect towards crowd members can
reduce tension and prevent violence. In such situations, crowd members are provided
with the opportunity to gain honor without having to trade-off risk.
Study 1 drew on actual experiences of crowd members in the Middle East to test
assumptions of the elaborated model. The results showed that Middle Eastern crowd
members made rational assessments, exhibited goal-directed behavior and were
willing to accept considerable risk to achieve goals shared by the crowd. Experiences
W.R. Sieck et al.20
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
also indicated increased self-efficacy after accomplishing crowd goals. The results
revealed important linkages between peoples’ dynamic models of social relations
and ensuing permissible actions in the crowd context. For example, we found that
Middle East crowd members and security forces actively discussed and debated the
nature of their social positions and relations, and relied on the resulting construals to
define appropriate actions. Finally, quantitative coding of crowd reactions to security
force actions showed that escalation of force against crowds led to an increase in the
level of conflict more often than not, whereas attempts to understand and communicate
with crowds or exhibit restraint tended to decrease conflict.
Study 2 compared reactions with crowd scenarios cross-culturally to test the
hypothesis that Middle Easterners tend to interpret crowd events in a manner consistent
with honor considerations. The results showed that American soldiers and Middle
Eastern civilians hold differing beliefs and expectations about social roles and crowd
reactions to security force actions. The American soldiers reported that the aim of secur-
ity forces would be to establish control over the situation, a stance that does not reflect
sensitivity to honor and that would probably lead to acts that tend to diminish it. Middle
Eastern civilians instead expected security forces to focus on crowd safety, which
would not clash with honor considerations. In addition, Middle Eastern crowd partici-
pants felt that security force communication with crowd members would reduce vio-
lence and aggression. In contrast, the American soldiers felt that attempting to
communicate with the crowd could unintentionally inflame them, and was unlikely
to reduce violence and destruction. However, both groups did tend to expect some
level of violent responses to force escalation. Overall, the Middle Eastern civilian
expectations were congruent with considerations of honor, as well as with the patterns
of actual experience reported in Study 1. American expectations diverged in ways
suggesting interpretations based on a different frame of reference.
The results from Study 2 also have implications for the conduct of crowd manage-
ment in peacekeeping and stability operations. As a number of authors have suggested,
an important objective in such cases is to gain the support of the populace, as well as to
ensure that civilians feel like they have a stake in the success of free, stable govern-
ments (Kilcullen, 2009). Crowd participation can provide an opportunity for civilians
to develop a collective sense of efficacy, as well as confidence in authorities who
support their efforts to be heard. Providing appropriate support is nontrivial,
however, and includes special challenges when security forces represent international
coalitions. Specifically, an implication of the present research is that crowd member
action depends on how the relevant social identities are construed by themselves as
well as by security forces. Knowing this can be especially difficult if the crowd
members and security personnel come from different cultural backgrounds, such as
in international peacekeeping situations. In order to understand the behavior of
crowd members, one must first be able to see the situation as the crowd members do
(Sieck, Grome, Smith, & Rababy, 2010). The difficulty is that a person’s construal
of a social situation and resulting expectations depend on culture-specific beliefs and
knowledge. The identification of potential differences in interpretations that could
lead to conflicts in intensive intercultural crowd situations, such as described in
Study 2, provides a basis for educating international security forces on how to more
effectively support public collective action.
For such applications to be truly effective, a better understanding is required of the
extent to which the key pattern of effects should be expected to generalize. Results from
Study 2 suggest that the pattern would not be culturally universal. For example, it may
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 21
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
be that groups of protestors in the West tend to be more ideologically driven than
honor-focused, as well as guided by more well-defined and rehearsed action scripts
that are less sensitive to honor affronts or appeasements. If so, we would expect to
find that crowd reactions depend less on security force actions in Western countries
than in the Middle East. Clearly, such speculation requires empirical testing. Another
question related to the generality issue that deserves further exploration pertains to
other contextual factors that moderate crowd reactions to security force actions,
whether in the Middle East or other regions. In Study 1, for example, there were
cases where escalation of force reduced conflict and vice versa. Do such cases
simply attest to an inherent level of unpredictability in human behavior, or are other
aspects of the context at work, as well? A related issue is that there are likely to be
differences regarding the role of honor in crowd behavior depending on the local cul-
tures or segments of society that exist within broader regional cultures. In order to
understand locations where honor may or may not play a significant role, it is useful
to consider a recent theory concerning the origins of cultures of honor (Henry,
2009). Henry investigated status as a key mediator linking cultures of honor to
herding subsistence patterns, which have been previously associated with honor
(Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Specifically, Henry found that herding societies tend to be
associated with relatively large and fluctuating status disparities, as well as the low-
status members of an area being especially at risk of stigma. Low-status people in
such areas thus become especially vigilant in psychological self-protection as a way
of compensating for their low status, and are especially willing to react violently to
threats to their self-esteem. If this account is essentially correct, we expect the level
of status disparity in geographic areas to indicate the likely importance of local cultures
of honor, and the extent of honor-effects on crowd behavior to vary with the local
degree of status disparity. Again, this presents an area for further investigation and
empirical testing.
Perhaps the most important findings of the current study are the results indicating
that direct displays of respect can reduce conflict in Middle Eastern crowd situations.
According to the theory, such displays enable rational crowd members to accrue
honor while avoiding risks associated with violent confrontation. The idea that interper-
sonal violence might be defused by imparting intangible values of respect, worth and
dignity has been explored in broader contexts (Henry, 2009; Kelman, 2007). In addition
to the supporting incidents and other findings reported here, it is also useful to consider
contemporary events that point towards the same conclusion. The popular uprisings
that have been spreading across the Middle East during the writing of this article
yield many illustrations of reduced tensions following signs of mutual respect, as
well as violent confrontation in response to attempted suppression (Fahim & Stack,
2011; Kulish & Mekhennet, 2011). The Egyptian protests, for example, are remarkable
in remaining fairly peaceful, relative to the sheer size, magnitude of the goals, and
intensity of commitment displayed to those goals on all sides.
2
The findings of the
current study indicate that respectful, affirming gestures between protestors and sol-
diers, such as giving flowers, sharing water and taking pictures, were extremely impor-
tant in fostering (relatively) peaceful protests. Such small moments occurred several
times in between fighting early on, even before the largest affirmation on the part of
the military, in their declaration that the protestors had a right to peaceful, free
expression (Kirkpatrick, 2011).
In the Egyptian case, the protests ultimately resulted in regime change and the
detainment of the former leader, Mr Mubarak, giving some other governments in the
W.R. Sieck et al.22
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
region considerable incentive to violently repress the popular uprisings they are facing
(Slackman & El-Naggar, 2011). At the moment, it remains unclear as to how such
tactics will play out in individual countries. The studies reported here suggest the
value of an alternative approach for the long term, however. The current findings
have served to validate the application and elaboration of the Social Identity Model
of crowd behavior to Middle Eastern populations. The model implies that successful
crowd participation gives rise to an increased sense of self-efficacy that persists
beyond the specific event. Supporting the right to organize and participate in peaceful
demonstrations and protests, along with ensuring that security members proactively
treat crowd members with respect, is thereby expected to reduce the chance and mag-
nitude of violence over the long term, as well as in the immediate moment. Such a strat-
egy increases stability by enabling more frequent, lower-intensity collective actions to
provide some measured level of reform to moderate governments, rather than resisting
the public voice until rare, yet devastating, revolutionary strife ensues with far more
drastic consequences.
Acknowledgments
This research was sponsored by the US Air Force Research Laboratory under contract FA8650-
05-C-6549. The studies reported here were approved by an Independent Review Board. The
authors would like to thank Mohit Gohr, Rob Hutton, Helen Altman Klein, David Rababy
(and his family), Louise Rasmussen and Tom Theaux for assistance with the research, as well
as Małgorzata Kossowska, Justin Sinclair, Daniel Antonius and two anonymous referees for
their feedback on an earlier version of the article.
Notes
1. A study of Afghan values attests to some of the complexities inherent in the concept and in
its associated effects on decision-making (Sieck, Javidan, Osland, & Rasmussen, 2011).
Although honor was found to be a fundamental Afghan value with widespread importance,
there were subtle differences in interpretation of honor between groups within Afghanistan.
Furthermore, honor was sometimes ‘trumpe d’ by other values in spec ific contexts,
especially by the second most important reported value of status. The se mantic relationships
between honor and other values were found to be quite complex.
2. The many political intricacies influencing these demonstrations are beyond the scope of the
current paper.
Notes on contributors
Winston R. Sieck is founder and president of Global Cognition, a research and training devel-
opment orga nization located in Yellow Springs, OH, USA. His areas of specialization include
culture and cognition, metacognition, cross-cultural competence and cognitive skills/expertise.
He received his PhD in cognitive psychology from the University of Michigan, and MA in stat-
istics from the same university.
Jennifer L. Smith is a doctoral candidate in the Applied Social Psychology Program at Loyola
University Chicago, and holds an MA from the same program. She received a BA in Psychology
from Kenyon College, Gambier, OH, USA. Her research focuses on self-regulatory processes,
including strategies used to defend the self against threatening information.
Anna P. Grome is a cognitive scientist at Applied Research Associates. She conducts applied
research in the areas of multinational teamwork, cross-cultural collaboration, performance
improvement and organizational change. Ms Grome has significant experience collecting data
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 23
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
from a variety of populations using Cognitive Task Analysis interviews. She received her MS in
industrial and organizational psychology from Wright State University.
Elizabeth Veinott is a cognitive scientist at ARA. Her research areas include trust, influence
across cultures, communication, social interaction, group cohesiveness, social media and
decision-making. She received her PhD in cognitive psychology from the University of Michi-
gan, and an MS in industrial/organizational psychology from San Francisco State University.
Shane T. Mueller is a professor of psychology at Michigan Technical University. He investi-
gates human cognitive, perceptual, and memory systems using empirical, computational, math-
ematical and statistical techniques. He developed cultural mixture modeling, a method to
identify cultural consensus and multiple cultures of belief within a population. He received
his PhD in cognitive psychology from the University of Michigan.
References
Abou Zeid, A. (1965). Honour and shame among the Bedouins of Egypt. In J.G. Peristiany
(Ed.), Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (pp. 244 259). London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Atran, S., Medin, D.L., & Ross, N.O. (2005). The cultural mind: Environmental decision
making and cultural modeling within and across populations. Psychological Review,
112(4), 744 776.
Bourdieu, P. (1965). The sentiment of honour in Kabyle society. In J. Peristiany (Ed.), Honour
and Shame: The Values of Mediterranea n Society (pp. 193241). London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
Cohen, D., Nisbett, R., Bowdle, B., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the Southern
culture of honor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 945 960.
Couch, C.J. (1968). Collective behavior: An examination of some stereotypes. Social Problems,
15(3), 310 322.
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (1999). The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment:
Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations, 2, 381 402.
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2000). Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of
new social identities. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 579604.
Fahim, K., & Stack, L. (2011, January 27). Protesters in Egypt defy ban as government cracks
down. The New York Times, p. A10.
Feghali, E. (1997). Arab cultural communication patterns. International Journal of Intercultural
Relations, 21(3), 345378.
Flanagan, J.C. (1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 327358.
Garro, L.C. (2000). Remembering what one knows and the construction of the past: A compari-
son of cultural consensus theory and cultural schema theory. Ethos, 28(3), 275319.
Gregg, G.S. (2005). The Middle East: A Cultural Psychology. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Henry, P.J. (2009). Low-status compensation: A theory for understanding the role of status in
cultures of honor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(3), 451466.
Hoffman, R.R., Crandall, B.W., & Shadbolt, N.R. (1998). Use of the critical decision method to
elicit expert knowledge: A case study in cognitive task analysis methodology. Human
Factors, 40(2), 254276.
Kelman, H.C. (2007). The IsraeliPalestinian peace process and its vicissitudes: Insights from
attitude theory. American Psychologist, 62, 287303.
Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.
Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press.
Kirkpatrick, D.D. (2011, February 1). Mubarak’s grip on power is shaken. The New York Times,
p. A1.
Kulish, N., & Mekhennet, S. (2011, January 29). In Alexandria, protesters rout the police, for
now. The New York Times, p. A12.
Le Bon, G. (1947). The crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. London: Ernest Benn.
McLachlan, G.J., & Peel, D. (2000). Finite Mixture Models
. New York: Wiley.
W.R. Sieck et al.24
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
Moracco, J. (1983). Some correlates of the Arab character. Psychology: A Journal of Human
Behavior, 20, 4754.
Mueller, S.T., & Veinott, E.S. (2008). Cultural mixture modeling: Identifying cultural consen-
sus (and disagreement) using finite mixture modeling. Paper presented at the Cognitive
Science Society, Washington, DC.
Nisbett, R., & Cohen, D. (1996). Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Patai, R. (2002). The Arab Mind. Long Island: Hatherleigh Press.
Peristiany, J.G. (Ed.). (1965). Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R.W. (1982). Effects of publ ic and private self-awareness on dein-
dividuation and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 104 113.
Reicher, S. (1996). Social identity and social change: Rethinking the context of social psychol-
ogy. In P. Robinson (Ed.), Social Identity: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel. London:
Butterworth.
Rohner, R.P. (1984). Toward a conception of culture for cross-cultural psychology. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15(2), 111138.
Sieck, W.R. (2011). A cultural models approach for investigating the cognitive basis of terror-
ism. Journal of Terrorism Research, 2(1), 315.
Sieck, W. R., Grome, A.P., Smith, J., & Rababy, D.A. (2010). Expert cultural sensemaking in the
management of Middle Eastern crowds. In K.L. Mosier & U.M. Fischer (Eds.), Informed by
Knowledge: Expert Performance in Complex Situations. Abingdon: Taylor and Francis.
Sieck, W.R., & Mueller, S.T. (2009). Cultural variations in collaborative decision making:
Driven by beliefs or social norms? Proceedings of the International Workshop on
Intercultural Collaboration (pp. 111 118), Palo Alto, CA.
Sieck, W.R., Javidan, M., Osland, J., & Rasmussen, L.J. (2011). Honor and integrity in Afghan
decision making. Manuscript in preparation.
Sieck, W.R., McHugh, A.P., & Smith, J.L. (2006). Use of cognitive field research methods to
investigate cultural groups. In R. Sun & N. Miyake (Eds.), Proceedings of the 28th
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 21642168). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Sieck, W.R., Rasmussen, L.J., & Smart, P. (2010). Cultural network analysis: A cognitive
approach to cultural modeling. In D. Verma (Ed.), Network Science for Military
Coalition Operations: Information Extraction and Interaction (pp. 237 255). Hershey,
PA: IGI Global.
Slackman, M., & El-Naggar, M. (2011, April 28). Embattled Arab leaders decide it’s better to
fight than quit. The New York Times, p. A11.
Stott, C., & Drury, J. (2000). Crowds, context and identity: Dynamic categorization processes in
the ‘poll tax riot’. Human Relations, 53(2), 247 273.
Worth, R.F. (2006). Kurds destroy shrine in rage at leadership. The New York Times. p. A1.
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 25
Downloaded by [Winston Sieck] at 22:06 19 October 2011
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
Terrorists attempt to communicate specific aspects of their ideological frameworks to shape the common perspective of their intended audiences. For the approach to be successful, the ideas they are promoting must fit within the cultural meaning systems shared across the population they are addressing. Knowing what messages will effectively persuade their constituents is likely intuitive for terrorists operating within their own cultural environment, but not necessarily for researchers who come from distinct cultural backgrounds. A method is thus described for studying in detail the common perspective that members of a culture bring to a situation. The method results in models of the culture that provide a basis for outsiders to begin to frame events from the cultural-insider point of view. The cultural models can then be used as an aid to anticipate how messages will be interpreted and evaluated by terrorists and their audiences.
Article
Full-text available
Reicher has recently developed the social identity model of crowd behaviour based on self-categorization theory (SCT). This model begins to tackle the thorny theoretical problems posed by the dynamic nature of crowd action (Reicher, 1996b). The present paper describes an ethnographic study of a crowd event in which there were changes in the inter-group relationships over time. It is suggested that the laboratory evidence in support of SCT is complemented by ethnographic research of this type. By exploring situations in which definitions of context and/or categories are not purposefully manipulated, we can demonstrate the explanatory power of a dynamic and interactive approach to social categorization.
Article
Full-text available
The concept "culture" in cross-cultural psychology remains largely unexamined theoretically, and is often undifferentiated from other core behavioral science concepts such as "social system" and "society." As a result, the theoretical usefulness and research value of these constructs have been diminished seriously. In order to provide the beginnings of a theory of "culture" for heuristic use in cross-cultural psychology, an attempt is made in this article first, to differentiate conceptually, and second, to interrelate the packaged variables of "culture," "social system," and "society." The intent of this article is to promote the framework for shared understanding about culture and its relation to the other core concepts discussed here, and hence to initiate a dialogue within cross-cultural psychology about the utility of the conceptualization.
Article
Full-text available
Recent accounts of collective action highlight the importance of psychological empowerment, but conceptualize it simply as a precondition for such action. By contrast, the social identity model (Reicher, 1996, 1997; Stott, 1996) suggests that empowerment is a product as well as a precondition of collective action. However, existing research on the social identity model has merely inferred the emergence of feelings of power rather than shown it empirically. This paper describes a study of a town hall anti-poll tax demonstration, using interviews, written accounts, newspaper accounts, and video evidence. The principal source consisted of interviews with 29 protesters which were subjected to thematic analysis to identify (i) whether and to what extent empowerment took place in the crowd; (ii) features of the intergroup relationship responsible for any such empowerment; and (iii) any normative limits to empowered behavior. The analysis suggests that feelings of power increased among crowd members due to the more inclusive categorization among them brought about by their perceived wholesale illegitimate exclusion from the town hall. Moreover, the empowered action of crowd members was limited by shared definitions of proper practice. The implications of these findings are discussed for studies of collective action, and it is suggested that further research along the present lines is necessary to shed more light on factors leading to the endurance and generalization of the types of empowerment found here.
Article
Full-text available
We describe a study intended to determine whether cultural variations in collaborative decision making are due to differences in beliefs about ideal collaboration processes, or are a reflection of distinct social norms. The results of a web-based survey study that included respondents from India, S. Korea, Turkey, and the U.S. were obtained using a recent statistical technique, Cultural Mixture Modeling that treats culture as an outcome of the analysis based on patterns of consensus in belief. The findings suggested that beliefs about effective collaborative decision processes have spread fairly widely among business professionals, but that typical practice rarely matches the ideal in some countries. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
Article
Through the use of the critical incident technique one may collect specific and significant behavioral facts, providing "… a sound basis for making inferences as to requirements… " for measures of typical performance (criteria), measures of proficiency (standard samples), training, selection and classification, job design and purification, operating procedures, equipment design, motivation and leadership (attitudes), and counseling and psychotherapy. The development, fundamental principles, present status, and uses of the critical incident technique are discussed, along with a review of studies employing the technique and suggestions for further applications.
Article
Description: JMEWS is the official publication of the Association for Middle East Women’s Studies. Its purpose is to advance the fields of Middle East women’s studies, gender studies, and Middle East studies through contributions from multiple disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. Located at the cutting edge of the new scholarship in Middle East women’s studies, JMEWS provides a forum in which area-specific questions are discussed and debated among authors from the global north and south. It reflects the explosion of knowledge production about Middle Eastern women and gender over the past several decades and publishes research informed by transnational feminist, masculinity, and modern historical studies, new forms of ethnography, and the emergent intersections of science, technology, and philosophy. JMEWS provides a forum in which area-specific questions can be discussed and debated among authors from around the globe, through scholarly articles, book and film reviews, and other forms of communication. Join AMEWS and become a member, with the added benefit of a subscription, by selecting Join Society or purchase a subscription alone.
Article
Current conceptualizations of the acting crowd are heavily influenced by LeBon, particularly those aspects of LeBon's formulation that emphasized the pathological and bizarre nature of crowd behavior. An examination of the characteristics imputed to the crowd indicates that many of them are not empirically valid. Further, many of the characteristics assigned to crowd behavior do not differentiate it from the behavior of other social systems. Sociologists have overstressed the “cultural” factors, and de-emphasized interaction in their studies of social conduct. One consequence of this emphasis has been to look to the characteristics of crowd members to account for the behavior of crowds. It is suggested the crowd be studied as a social system.
Article
Tested the proposition, derived from the authors' (in press) differential self-awareness theory, that only 1 type of antecedent variable traditionally associated with deindividuation (attentional cues) and a single aspect of self-awareness (private) are involved in the deindividuation process. 48 male undergraduates were assigned to groups of 4 and were exposed to factorial combinations of attentional cues (internal vs external focus of attention) and accountability cues (potential accountability to authority figures and victims) and then allowed to aggress against a victim. As predicted, attentional cues affected private but not public self-awareness, whereas accountability cues altered public but not private self-attention. External attentional cues and low accountability cues disinhibited aggression relative to internal attentional cues and high accountability cues, respectively. Exposure to external attentional cues created an internal state of deindividuation, composed of reduced private self-awareness and altered experience, that mediated aggression. Two major types of collective aggression were identified: One category resulted from group members' assessments of the possibility of an authority figure's and the victim's surveillance of their attacks; the other category resulted from the decreased cognitive mediation of behavior evoked by the deindividuation process. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)