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Interest, sensationism and the science of
the legislator. French ‘philosophie
économique’, 1695-1830
Gilbert Faccarello &Philippe Steiner∗
Abstract. For many centuries religion dominated the thought and behaviour
of peoples. From the end of the 17th Century, however, it was progressively
replaced by political economy, which in turn developed its full influence dur-
ing the 19th Century, imposing a new “ethos” and a new “conduct of life”. So
that we might better understand this fact, a Weberian ideal-type is proposed:
philosophie économique. Illustrated by the works of Boisguilbert, Quesnay,
Turgot and Say, it elaborates three main elements: interested behaviour, sen-
sationism and a specific conception of the “science of the legislator”.
1Introduction
This paper considers some crucial elements in the development of economic
thinking in France from the end of the 17th century to the Restoration pe-
riod. We deal with four important authors or groups: Pierre de Boisguilbert,
François Quesnay and the Physiocrats, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, the Idéo-
logues and Jean-Baptiste Say. These writers are not of course unknown to the
historian of economic thought, but all too often they are studied quite sepa-
rately; and for the most part it is their specific differences that are emphasised.
We hope here instead to underline those elements (defined below) that form
the unity of their approach, and which lend it meaning. Our study therefore
constructs an “ideal-type” on Weberian lines: and we will call this ideal-type
philosophie économique.
∗Published in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 15 (1), 2008,
pp. 1–23. Some typos have been corrected. The few other changes are purely formal.
1
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 2
Our starting point is given by Max Weber’s hypothesis concerning the links
between religion and the economy. As is well known, in his very extensive
inquiry into the economic ethic of world religions, and more precisely in his
celebrated study The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism (Weber
1904-5), Weber placed the greatest emphasis upon the importance of religion
in the 17th century. His purpose was to investigate the connection between a
religious ethic (Puritanism) and the “spirit” of modern capitalism; and to show
how and why the adoption by followers of Protestant ascetic sects of a “conduct
of life” based upon “profession as a vocation” – a “worldly asceticism” dictated
by the psychological necessity of a “certainty of salvation” – accorded with
“capitalist” behaviour based upon the systematic rationalisation of economic
life, and endless accumulation. He concluded his study at the end of the
17th1century because, as he wrote, in the 18th century “Puritanism turned
into pure utilitarianism”. The religious ideas in question no longer served to
explain the adoption of an economic practice which, throughout the 18th and
at the beginning of the 19th centuries, was however taken up by very different
groups, and quickly generalised.
If we consider that the “capitalist spirit” has to be maintained and nurtured
through an appropriate set of moral values2which could motivate the daily
activity of a large and growing number of people – what Weber has called
the capitalist habitus – another principle has to be found which might help us
understand the phenomenon during this era. This is the reason for constructing
this ideal type: philosophie économique, a discourse which shapes – even creates
– the practices of these new times.
But religious discourse and the preoccupation with it do not just suddenly
vanish. It is difficult to imagine that economic thinking could become an essen-
tial element upon which politics and daily practices were focused in the 18th
1The same is true for Ernst Troeltsch (1911) and Jacob Viner (1972), whereas Albert
Hirschman moved the Weberian question from the religious field into politics. Since then —
with the notable exception of Michel Foucault’s recently published lectures at the Collège de
France (Foucault 1978, 1979) — few historians of economic thought have shown any interest
in these questions. They have either studied the period preceding that studied here (from
which perspective debates on usury are considered to be of vital importance), or considered
more contemporary or general problems, examining for instance how the economic order
differs from the religious vision of the world: see Frank Knight and Thornton W. Merriam
(1945) and, more recently, Robert Nelson (1991, 2001).
2See for example Bendix ([1956] 1974) or Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) whose works
have demonstrated the existence of such moral values from the 19th century to the present.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 3
century without there being a link to those religious issues so permanently
at the core of 17th century debates – whether these debates be political, sci-
entific or moral. It would be difficult to accept that religion, having once
been so important, just vanished from people’s minds at the turn of the 18th
century. Moreover, if it can be doubted that the philosophe managed to elim-
inate credulity and religious faith from the European population so quickly
and comprehensively, there is even more reason to doubt that this philosophe,
born into a world where religion was all-determining, was able to free himself
from a way of thinking which had formed him. It is for this reason equally
important to emphasise the way in which philosophie économique retained a
religious heritage in some of its most central concepts.
Of course, this paper can only present a preliminary analysis of this issue.3
In the following pages we shall focus on a few key points. First, we must develop
the contemporary meanings of the terms œconomie,philosophe and philosophie
économique (section 2). Their meaning may have been different to our modern
understanding, and this meaning was furthermore itself undergoing a profound
change. We then define philosophie économique as a Weberian “ideal-type”
(section 3) and develop its main characteristics: an interested behaviour in
markets (section 4), a theory of knowledge based on sensationism (section 5)4
and a science of the legislator (section 6). We conclude with some hypotheses
concerning the degree of success of philosophie économique (section 7).
2From “œconomie” to “philosophie économique”
The meaning of “œconomie”: from tradition to abstraction
The word œconomie concerned, first of all, the organisation of the house and a
prudent use of resources – either in the family circle, or in the context of a reli-
gious community. The administrative meaning – the management of a religious
estate following the death of an incumbent principal, pending the appointment
3Further analyses can be found in two companion papers: see Faccarello and Steiner
(2004, 2008).
4We use the word “sensationism” according to its usual philosophical meaning: it refers
to the approach initiated by Locke and developed by Condillac, according to which all
knowledge comes from the sensations. This led to the idea that people look for pleasures
and try to avoid pains.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 4
of a successor – strengthened this dimension. These elements have, of course,
mostly been borrowed from Antiquity, and in particular from Aristotle and
Xenophon: œconomique, meaning the way a domain was administered.
However, towards the end of the 17th century, œconomie was also linked
to the organisation of the State: it meant the order through which the State
could maintain and reproduce itself. This can be related to Foucault’s view of
governmentality – i.e., governmental rationality – and the issue of “transplant-
ing” œconomy from the family to the State. This broadening of the traditional
meaning emphasises a figurative evolution: it raises the traditional sense to an
abstract level, hitherto unused. In this figurative and abstract sense, œconomie
still refers to the prudent use of resources, the order followed by the œconome.
It is true that the traditional meaning of œconome does not appear far
removed from a more abstract meaning, since the œconome is qualified by his
capacity to “save spending”; and œconomie in its traditional sense turns on
“the prudence necessary to use wisely or to manage one’s skills and capacities
carefully” (Dictionnaire de Trévoux: 1704). From this orientation to saving,
or prudence in the use of resources, one can move on to the proper balance
between the means and the result of the action of the œconome, and therefore
by extension, to the actions of anyone who acts like a good œconome. And
from the act in itself, we move imperceptibly on to the evaluation of the result:
œconomie is not just an order, it is a “good order”, “a harmony”, “a right
disposition of things”, a “harmony between the different parts or qualities” of
a whole (ibid.).
In addition œconomie also frequently entailed a moral dimension: be it
domestic morals or more generally speaking an ethic linked to community
life. The theological dimension added gravity to this dimension, because the
parallel between God’s government of humanity and that of a father over
his family opens the door to numerous analogies between œconomie and any
other form of government of a human community. In fact, with the headwords
Œconomie légale and Œconomie évangélique in the Dictionnaire de Trévoux,
an association was made between the œconome and the Divine Legislator so
that attention might be drawn to the tasks involved in the government of a
whole people. This dimension could thus enable authors to move, with no great
difficulty, from Creation and the Divine Legislator to political organisation
under the tutelage of a human legislator.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 5
To sum up: in the figurative sense, œconomie indicates the disposition of
a plurality of entities so that they form a whole characterised by perfection,
whether that be aesthetic (as for a building or a speech) or functional (as for the
human or animal body, military troops, beehive, or State). The definition given
by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac in his (posthumously published) Dictionnaire
des synonymes expresses this view:
Wise use of things . . . As economy needs order, this word is often seen
as an order where nothing is missing, where there is nothing superfluous,
because all the parts have fair proportions between each other, because
they are perfectly subordinated to the same aim. Civil economy, military
economy, the economy of the human body, economy of the universe, of
a building. In a word, it can be used wherever a sense of proportion is
needed. (Condillac 1950: art. “Économie”)
If we add to this definition the idea of a legislator whose objective is to
satisfy the interests “of the larger number of people” (Claude-Adrien Helvétius
and Paul Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach), then œconomie politique becomes a
search for proportions, facilitating the achievement of an optimum – at least
the optimum that humans can reach – depending upon that diversity present
in society (whether expressed in terms of classes, estates, or interests).
The “philosophe”
Let us consider now the term philosophe, that enters into our expression
philosophie économique. This terminology is representative of a character,
the philosophe. According to Paul Hazard’s well-known study (Hazard 1935),
France introduced this character to Europe as a counterpoint to the
“Merchant”, a new social type originating in England and which was at the
time thriving intellectually, scientifically and economically.
As the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française puts it, the philosophe is char-
acterised by his independence, and especially by his capacity to spread the light
of reason. The active dimension of the philosophe is also underlined and high-
lighted in the Encyclopédie (vol. XII: 1765) in an expected, yet significant,
parallel with religion.
Our philosopher does not believe himself to be in exile in this world; he
does not believe himself to be in a foreign country; he wishes to enjoy as a
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 6
wise œconome the gifts that nature offers him . . . For him, civil society
is like an earthly divinity: he praises it, honours it with integrity, with
exact attention to his duties and with a sincere desire to be a member
neither worthless nor a cause for embarrassment. (Encyclopédie, art.
“Philosophe”)
The figurative and abstract meaning of œconomie, entailing the idea of
harmony and perfect proportions in a political body, became a prime concern
for the philosophe in the 18th century.
“Philosophie économique”
As for the expression philosophie économique, it was first coined by Gabriel
Bonnot de Mably in the critique he made of Quesnay and the Physiocrats
(Mably 1768). Mably was careful to indicate that he considered himself as a
disciple of Quesnay and the marquis de Mirabeau in economic matters, that
is to say agriculture and taxes; and he did not hesitate to state that the third
part of L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (1767) by Pierre-
Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière – the part dealing with the principles concerning
wealth, trade and taxation – was quite acceptable to him. However, he declared
himself to be deeply disappointed by the two first parts, in which the topic
of government is dealt with; and also by Quesnay’s Despotisme de la Chine,
which gave him the opportunity of raising a central point of difference:
What really led the author of Despotisme de la Chine into error is that
he began his political studies with agriculture, the nature of tax and
commerce, and consequently considered these quite secondary objects
of administration to be the fundamental principles for society. (Mably
1768: 144)
This is one of the reasons why the term philosophie économique broke for
a time into the debate over the science nouvelle de l’économie politique, as
can be seen in contemporary journals – especially in the comparison made
between the principles of Le Mercier de la Rivière and those of Montesquieu,
then considered to be leading authority in matters of political science.
The terminology which associates philosophie and philosophe – whose con-
notation is eminently positive – with économie was adopted by some of the
Physiocrats. In 1771 for example, Nicolas Baudeau published a work of syn-
thesis entitled Première introduction à la philosophie économique ou analyse
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 7
des États policés. Pierre-Samuel Dupont, it is true, used the expressions
science économique or science de l’économie politique very often. But there is
no major disagreement between the members of the group: together they cov-
ered the broad field of knowledge so characteristic of philosophie économique;
and thus, as Mably pointed out, they rendered obvious the change in under-
standing of political and social order.
The “Avertissement de l’auteur” that Baudeau inserted in the Ephémérides
du citoyen when he placed his journal at the service of Physiocracy is symp-
tomatic of this situation. Writing of the Tableau économique, he declared:
Political knowledge, which has for too long been uncertain, problematic
and arbitrary, seems today to at last form a body of exact, indubitable
and demonstrative science backed up by evidence: everything seems to
assure this science unfailing stability . . . One formula, less mysterious
than that of the founder of the Chinese Empire, . . . depicts all the
principles of social order or of political philosophy summarised in an
arithmetical demonstration which can be seen and verified at a glance.
(Éphémérides du citoyen, 1767, I: 22).
But while the expression philosophie économique was primarily of concern
to Physiocracy from the moment that it brought together an explicit political
theory and economic thinking, we do not think that this expression should be
limited to Quesnay and his followers. In our opinion, what is at stake is a
decisive issue in economic reflection which developed in France throughout the
18th century. This concerned a political theory organised around a theory of
self-interested action in society, a theory of knowledge based on sensationism,
and a precise conception of the efficient action of a legislator.
3“Philosophie économique” as an ideal type
A definition
As an ideal-type philosophie économique is characterised by three basic
elements. Firstly, we find a self-interested conception of human behaviour
on a pragmatic level as daily action directed to profit – especially monetary
profit, as well as on a purely intellectual level with forms of utilitarianism
which condition and legitimate action. In philosophie économique, utilitari-
anism can be either different from Bentham’s version (Quesnay, for example,
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 8
links a theory of natural law with a utilitarian motivation to action); or close
to it (for example, Helvétius’s and d’Holbach’s views of human nature and
society).
Secondly, we find a theory of knowledge that explains the way in which
individuals grasp the world intellectually. This theory of knowledge gives a
rather particular flavour to philosophie économique; and the importance we
lend it implies that we propose to alter the emphasis hitherto placed on theories
of natural law.
Thirdly, there is the relation to the Legislator. In contrast to developments
in Scotland, the rationalism inherited from Cartesianism, sustained in 18th
century France through the lasting influence of Malebranche, lends a particular
meaning to certain expressions of philosophie économique on this point – a form
of what Carl Schmitt called “political theology”, the fact that principal political
concepts are derived in a secularised form from theology – even if some authors
place greater emphasis upon the representation of interests, or the implication
of enlightened citizens in a decentralised political organisation.
Two levels of analysis
With these three characteristics kept in mind, our study must distinguish two
levels of analysis.
The first level concerns the fact that the new form of political theory em-
phasises the fundamental importance of the economic dimension of social and
political life; in one way or another, this political theory put self-interested
economic activity at the centre of its discourse. We need to start from what is
most central, so we consider here four authors – Boisguilbert, Quesnay, Turgot
and Say – despite the differences which exist between them. Many authors
cannot be included in philosophie économique: this is the case for example
of writers and administrators such as Melon, Dupin, Gournay and his group
– especially Forbonnais – or Necker, in spite of the fact that they are usu-
ally associated with the growth of political economy in 18th Century France.
These authors still considered themselves to be special advisors of the current
ruler and, accordingly, they did not address the problem of the formation of
a particular economic ethos among the population at large. Of course, great
political theoreticians such as Bossuet, Montesquieu, Rousseau or Mably are
also obviously no part of philosophie économique.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 9
A second level of analysis is however deserving of attention and some brief
comments. Here we would like to stress the existence of a practical form
of philosophie économique. In this case the issue was not to build scholarly
structures following the intellectual logic of the philosophe, but to translate the
world vision of philosophie économique into daily administration and policy.
We should note those who had this pragmatic attitude: they were for example
military and civil engineers. These are the people who implemented philosophie
économique practically, yet inconspicuously, with the construction of major
infrastructural projects (bridges, roads, canals and, later on, railway lines).
An ideal-type
Defined in this way, philosophie économique has the characteristics of what
Max Weber called an “ideal-type”. What does this mean? Not the description
of an author’s thoughts or those of a particular political movement, nor even
those of the Physiocrats. It is not the rational reconstruction of a mode of
thought unaware of its own existence, nor is it a retrospective reconstruction
of economic thinking in 18th century France. By highlighting certain features
from historical reality, philosophie économique can be seen as a “conceptual
picture” constructed to aid understanding and explaining how, since the 18th
century, philosophical thinking and practical activity have been directed to a
form of economic activity acknowledged to be the foundation on which society
could and should be built.
At the same time, and as has already been emphasised (above, section 1),
it is important to show how, although in a very curious manner, our ideal-type
displays some continuity with Weber’s ideal-typical construct of the capitalist
“spirit.” We believe that religious thinking – and especially the vigorous reli-
gious controversies of the 17th century – led to the development of economic
reflection in eighteenth century France. Some basic concepts and ideas emerged
from these controversies, and are indeed presented as solutions to theological
or moral problems extensively discussed at that time. Some striking examples
will be given in the following section.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 10
4Economic behaviour led by interest
“Intérêt”, “amour propre” and the passions
We noted (above, section 2) the evolution of the word œconomie. We must
turn now to the evolution of the meaning of another word, intérêt or interest
– a word of material importance for our subject. It became increasingly used
and played an important role in the shaping of political economy in general,
and philosophie économique especially – together with the now old-fashioned
amour-propre or self-love.
There is a rich new literature on the historical emergence of the concept of
interest. Let us simply return to the dictionaries of the time. The Dictionnaire
de l’Académie française (1694) first defines the general meaning of the word
in the following way: “Interest . . . What matters, what suits . . . some-
body’s honour, utility or satisfaction”. Then there is a series of phrases like
“public, general, common interest”, “family interest, private interest, interest of
honour, pecuniary interest”, “State interest” or “Interest of the Princes”. Some
expressions are explained. The article in fact shows the polysemic aspects of
the word, and specifies that the reference to “the sole utility” only happens
“sometimes”. In the Dictionnaire de Trévoux (1704) we can find similar com-
ments, with one interesting difference however: it is stated that, in the field of
ethics, intérêt “sometimes means passion”. And the entry “Intéresser” stresses
the use of the word in the religious controversies of the time. “Mystics call
interested love, the love of God which aims at a reward . . . , because it is a
mercenary love, the main motive of which is self-interest” (ibid.).
The word interest originated in jurisprudential language and first meant
loss, and then compensation for loss: see for example the French phrase “dom-
mages et intérêts”. But this meaning was fading away – the Dictionnaire de
l’Académie française considers it in fact to be marginal – except perhaps for
what concerns the expression interest of money which came out of the contro-
versies on usury. At the same time, at the end of the 16th and the beginning
of the 17th centuries, the notion of interest was, so to speak, “dematerialised”.
This significant evolution was the result of important changes in the way of
thinking in two main fields: politics and religion.
The first change is due to authors like Francesco Guicciardini and Henri
de Rohan (Taranto 1992: chap. 3 and 5). It concerns the discourse on the
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 11
policies of the Princes and on reason of state, but was easily extended to
private persons: intérêt started to refer to any advantage one can obtain or
any disadvantage one can eliminate: political, moral, or – but not necessarily
– economic.
The dematerialisation of the notion of interest also took place in religious
thought and emerged in the writings of the 16th Century Spanish mystics
(ibid.: chap. 6). An “interest for God” can have both positive and negative
implications. Positively, it concerns an action performed for pure love of God
and his commandments. Negatively, it is a question of an interest for God
driven by expectation of reward – be it the personal satisfaction resulting
from observance of religious precepts, or the wish to avoid damnation – as is
emphasised in the Dictionnaire de Trévoux.
In general, especially in political discourse, intérêt first bore the connotation
of perceptive behaviour – “Interest will not lie” – and with the idea of dispas-
sionate and rational analysis of a situation: an objective statement. But this
characterisation has to be qualified, for some authors stressed that “interest
can blind”. This is the case because an interest is always necessarily linked to a
passion – pride, anger, cupidity, etc. Thus, on the one hand the variety and the
strength of the passions can prevent the clear perception of real interests, and
the aforementioned objective statement can be wrong; and on the other hand,
even if this is not the case, even if interest is precisely specified, other passions
and the interests linked to them can interfere and prevent its realisation.
All these discourses unavoidably lead to considerations of amour-propre,
as the Dictionnaire de Trévoux also emphasised. This phrase also comes from
religious thought: it is linked to the dogma of original sin and the idea that after
the Fall, egoism, exclusive love for the self, replaced the love of God in the heart
of human beings. Its meaning is of course strongly negative and amour-propre
has thus to be distinguished from the amour de soi that some theologians
and political writers – François de Sales, Jean-Pierre Camus, Jean de Silhon
– opposed to it so that they might lend emphasis to the fact that a certain
amount of concern for oneself is a quite legitimate need for self-preservation.
Discourse on amour-propre and on intérêt inevitably intermingled and the two
concepts sometimes could be seen as equivalent. When interest is not used
synonymously with amour-propre, we can propose this distinction: (i) interest
is a potential advantage, seemingly or possibly defined in a rational way; (ii)
it is linked to a given passion which has to be specified every time: in the
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 12
economic field, for the philosophes économistes, this is cupidity; (iii) interest
is thus a motive of action for amour-propre – “Interest is the soul of amour-
propre” (La Rochefoucauld 1678: 475).
The logic of interest
We have seen how the concept of economy had concluded with the inclusion
of the idea of a harmoniously proportioned ensemble, in which everything
appeared to be arranged in a just and fitting manner which engendered “an
order where nothing is missing, where there is nothing superfluous, because all
the parts have fair proportions between each other, because they are perfectly
subordinated to the same aim” (Condillac). For philosophie économique a
political order conceived in this way must rest, without disturbance, upon the
harmony which economic activities spontaneously create, provided that the
play of particular interests is allowed to be freely expressed in markets.
Boisguilbert was the first to mark out this position at the end of the 17th
century. He argued that if one was to uncover an order within economic activity
it was enough to consider the motivations of agents, which are nothing but the
translation into economic life of the selfish conduct of men, a form of conduct
which is theirs following Original Sin and the Fall of Man: “each thinks of
attaining his own personal interest to the highest degree and with the greatest
possible ease”, he writes in 1705 in his first Factum de la France (Boisguilbert
1966: 749). What is the characteristic of this order? It is what Boisguilbert
calls an “equilibrium” or a “harmony”, that is, a situation in which a specific
system of relative prices prevails: the “prix de proportion”. And if, in Le
Détail de la France (1695), he can emphasise “the harmony of the Republic
invisibly ruled by a superior power” (Boisguilbert 1966: 621), this is because,
in his opinion, this “superior power” consists of nothing other than perfect free
trade in markets which secure the realisation of these “prix de proportion” (see
Faccarello 1986).
What is particularly striking here is that Boisguilbert, starting from Jansenist
religious thought (see ibid.), explains how a basic passion like cupidity could
be neutralised in markets with the assistance of a specific social mechanism:
free competition. By confronting each individual’s cupidity with the cupidity
of all other people, competition eliminates socially harmful effects and en-
ables one to obtain an orderly society, a harmony, as if each individual was
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 13
charitably motivated, which in fact he is not. Boisguilbert’s employment and
transformation of a way of thinking that he found in the religious and moral
works of Pierre Nicole (1670, 1671, 1675) so that it might be projected into a
new field exemplifies this linkage of religion to economic thinking. That the
result reached by Boisguilbert was one of general value, imposing itself with
the development of philosophie économique during the 18th century, is even
more significant: Quesnay, Turgot and Say developed this fundamental idea in
various but complementary ways.
The idea of “maximising” behaviour based on interest was also developed by
these authors, and here we encounter the opinion already emphasised above
of a kind of rationality linked to interest. In Boisguilbert this idea of “max-
imisation” was of course connected with the Fall and embedded in religious
controversies. It is thus interesting to note that an important and parallel de-
velopment took shape at the end of the 17th century in the writings of Nicolas
Malebranche and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz – a development linked to theo-
logical discussion of the rationality of divine action, which would in turn give
rise to the modern concept of rational action.5
Confronted with debates on the nature of predestination, human freedom
and the distribution of grace, Malebranche and Leibniz put forward a rational-
isation of the religious vision of the world which brings out a new conception
of rationality. The idea is to show that the best among all possible worlds
is not a world where everything is perfect: the best world can contain “local
flaws”, if we bear in mind that this world is the result of the infinite wisdom of
a God reluctant to enact miracles. Divine wisdom and rationality act through
a small number of general laws, and perfection depends upon the best relation
between means and end – and not on the end independent of the means, as
Antoine Arnauld claimed.
This approach was first outlined by Malebranche. Leibniz then took it
further and linked it to the technique of calculus and the research of extrema,
while representing it as an ideal of wisdom towards which man should aim.
By linking the rationality of human action to that of God and by suggesting
that human wisdom – i.e. the wisdom of the legislator, the craftsman, the
engineer – is only seeking “the best”, Leibniz gave an important impetus to
the foundation of political theology on the one hand, and on the other the
5See Steiner (2005: chap. 8).
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 14
definition and legitimation of instrumental rationality. While this idea was
a perfect match to the rhetoric of philosophie économique, it was only fully
appreciated in the 19th century, since calculus was only introduced to economic
thinking in France after the Revolutionary period.
Free Foreign Trade as an exemplary policy
for philosophie économique
Free trade is thus an essential policy element in philosophie économique. Such
freedom is essential to the realisation of the system of prices which, driven
by competition, facilitates the conciliation of opposed interests in the market.
But our authors go further. They all link free trade in home markets to the
freedom of foreign trade. Free trade at home, they argue, can stabilise the
price of corn and create a condition of wealth based on a harmonious system
of relative prices only if it is supported by freedom in foreign trade.
This new political view of foreign trade, initiated by Boisguilbert, is
important for another reason: it provides a solution to the problem caused by
the material interests of different countries. These interests can be peaceably
harmonised if the merchants are able to trade freely in international markets,
pursuing their own private interests. This in turn requires that governments
understand the principal condition that philosophie économique establishes for
the realisation of a condition of harmony and plenty at home: comprehensive
free trade, internal and external.
In the second half of the 18th century philosophie économique developed this
line of thought, especially in the works that aimed to disseminate Physiocratic
doctrine: L’ordre naturel et essential des sociétés politiques (Le Mercier de la
Rivière 1767), Première introduction à la philosophie économique (Baudeau
1771), or De l’ordre social (Le Trosne 1777). Le Mercier de la Rivière and Le
Trosne explicitly presented the idea as a political alternative to the policy of
a “balance of powers in Europe”, which policy they considered to be a fertile
source of disagreement and warfare between States.
The principle of fraternity of nations is not . . . only dictated by
justice, but it also accords with the interest of each nation, independently
from the behaviour of the others. It should not simply be regarded as
a beautiful moral idea, a worthy conception to be taught in schools of
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 15
philosophy, but also as a practical maxim of government from which we
can only detach ourselves to our own detriment. (Le Trosne 1777: 413-4)
The idea took root. At the end of our period we can find it in the writings
of Say, for example in this excerpt from his Cours complet d’économie politique
pratique developing the international consequences of the “loi des débouchés”:
What is true about one individual in relation to another is also true
for a nation in relation to foreign countries; each one is interested in
the prosperity of all the others, as one can only sell to nations which
are in a position to buy; and a nation . . . can only buy with that
which it produces. This more exact conception of the nature of things
now holds sway over the enlightened views of a few nations, and should
progressively change the policy of the world; because as men become more
enlightened, they listen to the suggestions of their enlightened interest,
which for them are more reliable than the dreams of philanthropy. (Say
1828-9, VI: 317-318)
5Sensationism
The reference to sensationism is an important element of philosophie écono-
mique – even if Boisguilbert had no contact with this philosophy. It represented
a possible line of development for discourse on the passions, interest and self-
love. On the one hand, in spite of the great diversity of passions, one principle
suffices to harmonise them: one passion might create good, or evil; that is,
pleasure, or pain. Passions can therefore be comprehended in terms of their
generally positive or negative consequences for a person or a group.
On the other hand, Original Sin, which placed everyone in thrall to self-love,
enfeebled the powers of reason. All knowledge consequently became problem-
atic, the essential nature of things being for evermore hidden from man. How
could one escape this situation? Some writers relied, in spite of this problem,
on a reason which, however enfeebled, in its semi-blindness could be guided
by clear rules which would prevent it being led astray – the philosophy of
Descartes or the Port-Royal Logique was looked to for such rules. Alterna-
tively one could resort to experience, renouncing a search for the essence of
things and limiting oneself to phenomena, their proportions and their place in
a network of relationships: “we only know relationships. Wishing to say more
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 16
is to confuse the limits of our spirit with that of nature” (Turgot 1913-23, I:
168).
For our subject, the most important development in France is related to the
theory of human knowledge offered by John Locke’s famous Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding (1690). This book – translated by Locke’s friend
Pierre Coste, with many editions throughout the 18th century – also made a
notable impact through the works of Condillac, and this contributed in large
part to the diffusion of sensationism among French elites, and notably among
the philosophes économistes such as Quesnay, Turgot, the Idéologues and Say.6
This new theory of human knowledge engendered both the sensationist polit-
ical economy of Quesnay, Turgot and Condorcet,7and the so-called French
materialistic thought of Helvétius and d’Holbach,8the latter being close to
Bentham’s view of utilitarianism and which greatly influenced Say.
Quesnay’s article “Évidence” in the Encyclopédie showed that sensationism
served as the foundation for an empirical theory of knowledge unencumbered
by the mind/body dualism of the Cartesians. This new sensationism led to
the idea that it is the utility of an action (the agreeable or disagreeable sen-
sations) which determined behaviour (Quesnay 1756 [2005]: paragraph 24);
nevertheless, for Quesnay and the Physiocrats this form of utilitarianism was
associated with the idea of a natural order. That meant that seeking the use-
ful was not the criterion for the discovery of the good, but only the means of
reaching it. The socio-political construction of legal despotism rendered this
sentiment quite clearly: the norm of economic government was fixed in the
Natural Order, but it was the harmony of interests between different classes
which permitted its realisation.
The stance of Turgot and Condorcet is a little different. Sensationism es-
tablished fundamental natural rights which human beings can enjoy – liberty,
security, property – and of which free trade is the main aspect. It also served to
explain value and the equilibrium prices which established themselves in mar-
kets guided by free competition. Upon the same foundation there also rested
notions of justice and morality which, with the effective realisation of free
6Quesnay and Turgot were naturally primarily inspired by the original works of Locke.
7See for example Steiner (1998) and Faccarello (1990, 1992, 2006).
8See for example Steiner (2006).
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 17
trade, must guide the political and administrative organisation of the country
– both Turgot and Condorcet rejected the idea of legal despotism.
The position of Helvétius and of d’Holbach is different again. These writers
did not develop a theory of self-interested behaviour in markets organised
around the principle of competition, but traced all behaviour to a calculation
of pleasure and pain. In a society where economic activity played a significant
part, this calculation involved a love of money which, since it permitted one
to reduce pain and increase pleasure, became the most common passion of all.
Deprivation of such a passion in such a society would lead to the removal of any
principle of action (Helvétius 1773: 580). This was also what Say suggested
when he opposed self-interested behaviour founded upon a calculus of pleasure
and pain to vanity (or self-love) and lamented the fact that individuals did not
know how to pursue their own interest (Say 1817: 84).
However, in all cases sensationism is also linked to the other characteristic
of philosophie économique: it provides a new perspective upon the (cognitive)
links existing between people in society, and between people and their institu-
tional or natural context, without having recourse to God after the manner of
Malebranche. On the one hand, sensationism explains how people in society
can understand the functioning of social interaction, whether economic or non-
economic. This understanding is grounded in their sensations, more precisely
on the valuation of these sensations in terms of pleasure or pain. Accordingly,
sensationism is the principal link between the pragmatic level of self-interested
action and the cognitive level (characteristic of human beings compared to
animals). Briefly, sensationism explains how people can make judgements or
choices between alternative courses of action in a rational manner.
On the other hand, sensationism explains how the consequent effect of peo-
ple’s behaviour is open to change and manipulation. If people behave according
to their sensations and the valuation of the feelings resulting from them, then
it is possible to modify the effects of their behaviour through modification of
the context, especially the institutional context. As a consequence, the wise
legislator can act upon the people without imposing upon them any norma-
tive rule of conduct, and without hindering them from looking after their own
interests: he achieve this simply by modifying the context of self-interested
behaviours. Such an approach is at the very heart of “laissez faire” policies
and, more generally, at the very heart of economic liberalism.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 18
If one added to these two remarks the fact that the legislator is himself
a man driven by political or economic interests, then sensationism offers a
powerful and integrated understanding of the way in which society functions,
from laymen to the legislator, from top to bottom and from bottom to top.
6Philosophie économique
and the science of the legislator
How can influence be brought to bear on the legislator?
As a vision of political and social life philosophie économique is necessarily
faced with its actual implementation, and in this respect it is a science of the
legislator. As such philosophie économique evolved pari passu with some other
important transformations of this period.
Beginning our period with Boisguilbert, the philosophe économiste sought
to act by gaining access to the King or his ministers. He had the traditional
role that the monarchy offered the King’s advisers: informing the King of the
living conditions of its people to secure justice for them and that their living
conditions are satisfactory.
By the middle of the 18th century this had changed, especially in the case
of the Physiocrats and Turgot. Here there was a very clear movement towards
what Jürgen Habermas has called the public sphere, where the central idea of
“public opinion” was formed by landowners publicly making use of their reason.
This movement had a major impact upon philosophie économique as a science
of the legislator on three points.
First of all, this turn towards public opinion produced a change in the way
in which the philosophe économiste expressed his ideas. Instead of papers and
memoranda addressed to the royal authority, he turned to printed works and
even articles in journals – the work of Quesnay is exemplary in this aspect
– intended for the public and for debate. Was this public opinion an ideal,
or was it social reality? As an ideal it functioned as a new way of thinking
about politics and the legitimising of political action, seeking to convince the
“reading and thinking public” – a good example of this can be found in the
preliminary declarations of Turgot’s edicts. It was however more than an ideal.
For one thing, the number of publications grew dramatically after 1750 (Théré
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 19
1998). Additionally, Turgot and Baudeau began to define the social category
that formed the basis of this new public opinion: the middle class. This can
also be found in the writings of d’Holbach, Rœderer and Say.
Secondly, philosophie économique treated politics as a pedagogic practice: it
needed to explain itself so that the opinions of reasonable members of the public
might be guided, defining as a consequence the conditions of acceptability
and legitimacy for the measures taken by the legislator. This pedagogical
dimension is associated with a duality in those institutional structures at which
the philosophes économistes were aiming. In some cases (Quesnay and Le
Mercier de la Rivière for example) the importance assigned to public opinion,
also strongly associated with public education, went hand in hand with the role
of the philosophe économiste as an expert. In other cases (Mirabeau, Dupont
de Nemours, Turgot), projects for the representation of interests through local
assemblies were developed so that the interests of the landowners might be
discovered and channelled – these interests being considered identical to the
interests of the nation.
Thirdly, with Say a new phase of relationships between philosophie écono-
mique and the legislator appeared. After the French revolution, Say became
very cautious with respect to the positive role of the State in social life. He
emphasised the autonomy of civil society with respect to government; and,
following the Physiocrats, Turgot and the Idéologues, he insisted on the im-
portance of the middle class in public opinion, and on the necessity of spreading
economic knowledge through public lectures and books (his Catéchisme is an
leading example of this). This middle class is also important in administration,
the role of which is essential in the implementation of measures upon which the
legislator has decided. All in all, the middle class makes up the administration
and also controls it. The diffusion and reception of philosophie économique is
therefore of the greatest importance.
Philosophie économique is more than rhetoric; it is quite concrete when it
alters the priorities of administrative action. We have already touched on this
point when considering the specific problem of foreign trade and the interna-
tional policy to which it is linked. The same phenomenon can be found in
the case of policy in the grain trade. Instead of adhering to the traditional
idea that the merchant is dangerous because motivated by greed, and that
the population therefore needs protection, especially during periods of grain
shortage, philosophie économique sees the merchant as equal to Providence in
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 20
regard to food distribution. It is therefore the merchant who needs protec-
tion from the irrational passions and ignorance of the people. Keeping this
in mind, philosophie économique engenders a real political battle on an is-
sue about which no-one could be indifferent; and hence the importance of the
controversy over grain markets in mid-18th century France.
Two modes of harmonisation of interests
Let us now turn to a more general point. Our study has shown that, from
Boisguilbert to Say through Quesnay and Turgot, philosophie économique
emphasised two ways in which interests might be harmonised in society.
The first concerns the functioning of the markets in a situation of free
competition: in this case the harmonisation of self-interested behaviour on
the part of agents occurs without any intervening regulation – whether it be
political or religious. The legislator and the administration would here at best
be able to do no more in the market than autonomous and decentralised agents
already do; it is therefore pointless to regulate markets. This mechanism differs
from the one pointed out by Hirschman (1977) since it opposes the same pas-
sion (cupidity, or economic interest) to itself through the actions of different
agents in the market.
However, this form of spontaneous harmonisation does not exist in those
fields where the social mechanism of competition cannot work. From
Boisguilbert to Say, all authors emphasise this point. Say for example does so
in the pages he devotes to administration and to the functioning of bicameral
political representation. In this case the harmonisation of interests calls for
complete attention on the part of the legislator and the elected representatives:
this is the domain of artificial harmonisation of interests. This artificial har-
monisation can work in two different ways. When interests are basically the
same, the role of the legislator is to create a political structure which enables
these interests to be recognised as identical. When they are not identical,
the legislator has to construct a system of laws; for the legislator can become
manipulative and dangerous if not guided by the knowledge of general rules
discovered by philosophie économique, or by the elected representatives of the
people.
We must emphasise that in both cases artificial harmonisation, and thus
politics, deals with economic interests.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 21
7The success of “philosophie économique”
in the 19th century
In 1803 both Say and Jean-Charles-Léonard Simonde de Sismondi published
a book devoted to political economy. During the Restoration economic dis-
course was profoundly modified so that it might confront the questions posed
by industrial society – a society which differed significantly from Smith’s com-
mercial society on account of the role played by production and machinery. It
was a time when the actual foundation of society was changing due to prob-
lems created by the liberty and independence of the Modernes – as Benjamin
Constant put it in 1819 – with the spread of the passion of equality and the
passion of wealth. According to Alexis de Tocqueville in his Démocratie en
Amérique, all this called for a “new political science”.
This does not mean that philosophie économique had failed. On the con-
trary, it had succeeded. It had become inappropriate to consider political
theory without placing economic activity at the centre of things. Even reli-
gious thinkers had to pay due regard to issues related to economic activity
so that they could modernise their religious message and propose a religious
approach to this dimension of worldly activity.
This opened up a new and general issue, which can be illustrated by
considering some aspects of the French debate around industrialisme during
the 1820s and 1830s.9
Liberal economists such as Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, Sismondi and
Say on the one hand and Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, Augustin Thierry and
Auguste Comte on the other, all sought to promote political economy during
the early Restoration years as the political science appropriate to an industrial
system. However, they discovered during the 1820s that their views diverged
in many respects, and this eventually led them into conflict with each other.
The first group, and Dunoyer especially, radicalised the economic approach to
society, introducing the terminology of utility and rational behaviour. The sec-
ond group (Saint-Simon, Saint-Amand Bazard and Prosper Enfantin, Auguste
Comte), drew on religious thought and recovered a moral dimension that the
economic approach either left out, or restricted to the domestic sphere.
9For a more comprehensive analysis, see Faccarello and Steiner 2008.
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 22
Hence the opposition between the two forms of industrialisme: one aiming
at a central organisation and associated with the Saint-Simonians, who linked
social engineering to the promotion of “altruistic” values (according to the term
coined by Auguste Comte); and the other “catallactic”, where Dunoyer argued
that the freedom needed for economic life and utilitarian behaviour should be
extended to the whole of social life, including politics.
The opposition between the two forms of industrialism entailed as well an
opposition between two forms of economic ethos. In catallactic industrial-
ism, the market should be a domain solely ruled by self interested behaviour,
whereas other motives of action are at work in other, connected social spheres,
such as the family. This does not mean that the market is a-moral, but it
does means that the morality of the free market should be fully acknowledged
as a moral principle. By contrast, altruistic industrialism brings to the fore
the need for a new moral principle to mitigate the social effects of generalised
self-interested behaviour. This is, in the words of Auguste Comte, the most
important challenge for the positive and industrial society: the prominence of
altruism over self interest. In this sense, this opposition is also an opposition
between two different views of the frontiers between economy, society and pol-
itics. Hence the great debate became that between socialism and liberalism,
that is to say between two different forms of economic ethos, two different
principles for economic life conduct.
It appears that the success of philosophie économique is linked to the emer-
gence of an issue related to self-interested behaviour and values. If Dunoyer
proposed to ground the entirety of social life upon utility and competition, the
Saint-Simonians, Constant, Auguste Comte and Tocqueville were not ready to
accept such a view. Leaving aside here the question of the ideal functioning of
the market – decentralised according to Constant, centralised and “organised”
according to the Saint-Simonians, Tocqueville remaining ambiguous on this
point – they all stress the fact that self-interested behaviour in the market is
only one side of the problem; the other side involving values, and particularly
religious values of a new form, that is to say fitted to the industrial society with
its elevation of scientific achievement (such as Saint-Simon’s New Christianity
or Auguste Comte’s religion of humanity).
Finally, we can emphasise the fact that philosophie économique was gain-
ing momentum within industrial society in two different ways. The teaching
of political economy is a major element in the spreading of the new ethos
French Philosophie économique, 1695-1830 23
among the people living in France and the most advanced European countries.
The pragmatic implementation of philosophie économique occurred differently,
through the technical activity of a growing number of engineers, whether they
were ingénieurs d’État (with the École Polytechnique, the École des mines
and the École des ponts et chaussées), or ingénieurs civils (with the creation
of the École centrale); these people were able to use Leibniz’s mathematical
tools when industrial and technical issues were at stake, cost minimisation and
price setting included. The connection between the two levels of our ideal type
is perfectly illustrated with Jules Dupuit’s work as an engineer and economist.
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