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The Politics of Inclusion: Black Political Incorporation and the Use of Lethal Force

July 2011
Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 9(3):238-265

DOI:10.1080/15377938.2011.594363

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Lehigh University

Scholarship on the incorporation of Blacks in government and politics has focused on electoral gains and representational styles, but the broad, substantive benefits of inclusion have yet to be established. Utilizing data from 1994 to 2004 for 30 of the 60 largest U.S. cities, random-effects negative binomial regressions for panel data show that the political incorporation of Black elected officials reduces the likelihood of the incidence of lethal force over time, with significance reaching the .01 level in each of 3 models. This study confirms that inclusion contributes to democratic policing by reducing enforcement costs and increasing legitimacy.

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The Politics of Inclusion: Black Political

Incorporation and the Use of Lethal

Force

Holona Leanne Ochs a

a Department of Political Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem,

Pennsylvania, USA

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Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, 9:238–265, 2011

ISSN: 1537-7938 print / 1537-7946 online

DOI: 10.1080/15377938.2011.594363

The Politics of Inclusion: Black Political

Incorporation and the Use of Lethal Force

HOLONA LEANNE OCHS

Department of Political Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, USA

Scholarship on the incorporation of Blacks in government and pol-

itics has focused on electoral gains and representational styles, but

the broad, substantive beneﬁts of inclusion have yet to be estab-

lished. Utilizing data from 1994 to 2004 for 30 of the 60 largest

U.S. cities, random-effects negative binomial regressions for panel

data show that the political incorporation of Black elected ofﬁcials

reduces the likelihood of the incidence of lethal force over time,

with signiﬁcance reaching the .01 level in each of 3 models. This

study conﬁrms that inclusion contributes to democratic policing by

reducing enforcement costs and increasing legitimacy.

KEYTERMS Democratic policing, lethal force, political incorpora-

tion, inclusion, police legitimacy

INTRODUCTION

Despite the long history of Black candidates and representatives in the United

States (e.g., the vice presidential bid of Frederick Douglas in 1872, presiden-

tial hopefuls Representative Shirley Chisholm in 1972 and Senator Carol

Moseley Braun in 2004, Louisiana Governor P. B. S. Pinchback for 32 days

that spanned 1872–1873, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder from 1990 to

1994, and the 81 Black mayors in 1970 to the more than 500 Black mayors

across the United States today) and, most recently, the election of President

Barack Obama, political discourse continues to question whether Americans

broadly are “ready” for Black elected ofﬁcials. This kind of political rhetoric

Submitted July 2010; resubmitted January 2011; accepted February 2011.

This research was supported by research funds provided by Lehigh University in 2009.

Gratitude is hereby expressed to Lehigh University.

Address correspondence to Holona LeAnne Ochs, Department of Political Science, Lehigh

University, Room 313, Maginnes Hall, 9 West Packer Avenue, Bethlehem, PA 18015. E-mail:

hlo209@lehigh.edu

238

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Politics of Inclusion 239

serves to perpetuate racial cleavages that parties rely on to mobilize and

demobilize groups of voters (see Mendelberg, 2001).

Race has been a central component in the deﬁnition, construction, and

regulation of the polis since the colonial period (Bass, 2001). The debate

over the integration of freed slaves in American society among Black schol-

ars and abolitionists began with the publication of the North Star (the most

inﬂuential publication for the emancipation of oppressed people) in 1847,

but the inclusion of Blacks in American society has been a matter of in-

tense debate among the broad public since the passage of the Thirteenth

Amendment outlawed slavery across the United States in 1865. The socially

and legally constructed Black–White racial cleavage in the United States is

particularly paradoxical as it relates to electoral politics. Parties manipulate

racial cleavages to mobilize and demobilize groups (Beckett, 1997; Beckett

& Sasson, 2000; Edsal & Edsal, 1991), and groups face strong pressures from

both within and without to maintain insular identities (Appiah, Gutmann,

& Wilkins, 1996; Du Bois, 1993; Malcolm X, 1970; Pateman & Mills, 2007).

These factors serve to perpetuate racial cleavages despite the fact that re-

solving the problems inherent in identity politics requires a credible political

context that is broadly inclusive (see Sen, 2007). Racial cleavages generate

instability by increasing the cost of law enforcement, undermining the le-

gitimacy of the law, and burdening the police with the impractical task of

maintaining the delicate balance of democratic policing on fractured ground

(Tyler, 2004a).

Scholarship on the incorporation of Blacks in government and politics

has focused on when, where, and how Blacks have gained elective ofﬁce

(see Engstrom & McDonald, 1982; Sass & Pittman, 2000) as well as how the

racial identity of elected ofﬁcials affects their voting behavior (Canon, 1999;

Tate, 2003; Whitby, 1997) and their representational style (Canon, 1999;

Fenno, 2003). The positive relationship posited between Black representa-

tion and Blacks’ level of trust, efﬁcacy, and political participation is referred

to by some scholars as Black empowerment (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp,

2004; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Tate, 2003), and Marschall and Ruhil (2007)

demonstrated that Blacks report higher levels of satisfaction with govern-

ment when represented by Black elected ofﬁcials, particularly when there

are conspicuous improvements in public services. Other scholars have con-

ceptualized these notions in terms of descriptive and symbolic representation

(Pitkin, 1967) and have examined the effect on active or substantive repre-

sentation (Haider-Markel, Joslyn, & Kniss, 2000). These studies and others

have regularly found that descriptive representation inﬂuences the behavior

and attitudes of constituents (Gay, 2002) and is often conditioned upon so-

cietal identiﬁcation (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Representative bureaucracy theorists have also used these ideas to under-

stand the conditions in which descriptive representation might lead to active

representation (Meier, 1975, 1993; Meier & Smith, 1994; Meier, Wrinkle, &

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240 H. L. Ochs

Polinard, 1999), and a number of diverse outcomes have been linked to mi-

nority representation, including the distribution of public expenditures and

services (Eisinger, 1982) and the implementation of police reforms (Jacobs,

1998; Saltzstein, 1989). Considerable attention has been given to the extent to

which Black elected ofﬁcials effectively represent Black constituencies (see

Canon, 1999; Fenno, 2003; Guinier, 1995; Marschall & Ruhil, 2007; Swain,

1993; Tate, 2003; Whitby, 1997). However, the broad, substantive beneﬁts of

the incorporation of Blacks in government and politics remain a neglected

aspect of the literature.

Does Black political incorporation inﬂuence democratic policing? Does

representation by Black elected ofﬁcials beneﬁt the public broadly? This

study reveals that Black elected ofﬁcials offer substantive beneﬁts to demo-

cratic governance that foster legitimacy in the rule of law. The results show

that the incorporation of Black citizens in government and politics con-

tributes to democratic policing by affecting police actions in a manner that

reduces enforcement costs, minimizes risk of legal action against the police,

and increases legitimacy.

This article proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical basis of this exam-

ination of Black political incorporation and democratic policing is outlined.

Second, the data and measures utilized to understand police–public interac-

tions in the context of urban policing in a democratic society are described.

Third, the statistical models estimated are explained. Lastly, I discuss the

theory, case, and test and provide suggestions for further study.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Black Political Incorporation and Public Safety

Democratic institutions that are unrepresentative of the whole tend to

heighten existing inequities in economic, political, and social status (Verba,

Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Concentrations of political and economic power

institutionalize inequalities that contribute to patterns of “criminalization” and

violence (Marable, Middlemass, & Steinberg, 2008). Crime is typiﬁed in Amer-

ican culture as a Black phenomenon to the extent that there is widespread

support for increasingly punitive responses to crime grounded in a “belief

system that constructs crime in terms of race and race in terms of crime”

(Roberts, 1993, p. 1947; see also Beckett & Sasson, 2000). “Modern racism”

eschews overt expressions of superiority and hostility in place of a fear of

crime that inextricably links violence, gangs, drugs, and crime with Black

people (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004). Political leaders and local law en-

forcement ofﬁcials have marketed crime, convincing the public that crime is

a bigger problem than it is (Chambliss, 1999) and transforming the nation

into a “culture of control” (Garland, 2001). Moreover, there is signiﬁcant ev-

idence that the control of so-called dangerous classes is the primary target

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Politics of Inclusion 241

of this criminal justice expansion (Beckett & Western, 2001; Blalock, 1967;

Bridges & Crutchﬁeld, 1988; Fording, 2001; Garland, 1990; Jackson, 1989;

Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Jacobs, 1979; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sharp, 2006)

and that the destabilizing effects of such disparities are mitigated by Black

political mobilization (K. B. Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005). Research

has also shown that the election of Black leaders at the city level can em-

power Black residents and dispel the fears of non-Black residents (Gilliam,

1996; Marschall & Ruhil, 2007).

An American Public Health Association study revealed that the rela-

tive risk of police violence victimization is signiﬁcantly higher for minori-

ties (Gjelsvik & Zierler, 2002). Political and organizational pressures to “get

tough” on crime impact ofﬁcer conduct (Skogan & Meares, 2004). A sub-

stantial body of literature establishes the disproportionate effects of police

procedures and wrongdoing on Black citizens (Bass, 2001; Brunson, 2007;

Brunson & Miller, 2006; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Kane, 2002; Mastrofski,

Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Meehan & Ponder, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).

Police actions can contribute to racial tensions, trigger riots, block le-

gitimate minority aspirations, and shape perceptions of justice and equality

(Altshuler, 1970; Hahn, 1971; Rossi, Berk, & Edison, 1974; Tyler, 2004b), and

Black mayors have been shown to affect the implementation of police poli-

cies that attempt to prevent the documented abuses of the Black community

by the police (Saltzstein, 1989). Research suggests that the presence of Black

elected ofﬁcials increases the likelihood that Black interests are represented

in the policy process (Bratton, 2002; Lim, 2006; Mladenka, 1989; Saltzstein,

1989). Policies that are more responsive to minorities are increasingly sig-

niﬁcant in the face of vast criminal justice disparities, as perceptions of the

legitimacy of police actions are also conditioned upon race (Theobald &

Haider-Markel, 2009). Police administrators have greater incentives to curb

police violence if the mayor is Black (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Black mayors

positively inﬂuence Black representation in city administrative, professional,

and protective services positions (Eisinger, 1982; Mladenka, 1989; Sass &

Mehay, 2003) and minimize the gap between Black and White levels of

trust in government (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990). In fact, Black representation on

city councils improves the perceptions of the legitimacy of law enforcement

of citizens who are Black and those who are not Black as well (Marschall

& Shah, 2007). Black satisfaction with police services improves under the

administration of Black mayors, particularly when there are conspicuous im-

provements in city services (Marschall & Ruhil, 2007). Adequate levels of

trust and satisfaction in government are essential to legitimate, substantive,

and stable democratic governance (Putnam, 2000) and are particularly rel-

evant to the practice of democratic policing (Walker, 2005). When people

view the police as legitimate authorities, they are subsequently more likely

to engage in compliance with the law and deference to the police (Tyler,

2004a; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

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242 H. L. Ochs

Structural Determinants of Lethal Force

Blalock’s (1967) racial threat hypothesis suggests that dominant populations

are likely to be threatened in areas with a larger population of racial minori-

ties. The relationship is hypothesized to be curvilinear. The theory indicates

that the perceived threat to the status quo increases as the Black popula-

tion increases until the population reaches a point at which policy may be

affected by their numbers. Empirical evidence shows that fear of crime is

associated with the percentage of Black people in cities when crime is held

constant (Liska, Lawrence, & Sanchirico, 1982; Skogan, 1995; Webster, 2007)

and that the response to crime is conditioned upon the racial subpopulation

irrespective of the actual rate of crime (K. B. Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording,

2005). Because ofﬁcers are primarily expected to preserve order, the prob-

ability that the police will use force in response to the pressure to maintain

order increases in the absence of adequate restraints (Bittner, 1990; Chevi-

gny, 1995). Consequently, police violence is more likely in cities in which

strong political and economic divisions contribute to disincentives for priv-

ileged groups to interfere with the police because of the perceived threat

of the “underclass” (Hughes, 1963). In addition to the perceived threat of

“criminalized” racial minorities, economic and educational inequalities pro-

duce unstable social conditions that are maintained through violence or the

threat of violence (see Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998).

Considerable evidence suggests that the fear of crime by the majority is

related to the presence and visibility of culturally dissimilar groups (Liska &

Baccaglini, 1990; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981; Liska et al., 1982; Web-

ster, 2007). Higher levels of police violence are experienced in communities

with a higher proportion of racial minorities (Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs &

O’Brien, 1998). Evidence of racial threat indicates that the threat to the status

quo posed by racial minorities might generate increasingly oppressive efforts

to control the subpopulation as the population of that target group increases

to the extent that racial subgroups are integrated into the social and political

processes (K. B. Smith, 2004; Stolzenberg, D’Alessio, & Eitle, 2004; Yates &

Fording, 2005). Other evidence of racial threat reveals that very low popula-

tions of racial subgroups may be subject to more oppression resulting from

opportunity hoarding (Romero & Margolis, 2005), and very high populations

of racial subgroups may experience backlash (Sharp, 2006).

The differential crime thesis contrasts racial threat theory, insisting that

Blacks are more subject to the penalties, punishments, and consequences

of law enforcement because Blacks are supposedly more prone than Whites

to participate in illegal activities (see Sampson & Wilson, 2005). Despite

the fact that Blacks have a consistently high risk of being stopped by the

police while walking, biking, or driving and are signiﬁcantly more likely

to be searched by the police, Blacks are not as likely to be in violation

of the law (National Research Council, 2004; Totman & Steward, 2006).

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Politics of Inclusion 243

Moreover, the police are less inclined to arrest Whites accused of committing

a violent crime against a Black person (Eitle, Stolzenberg, & D’Alessio, 2005;

Stolzenberg et al., 2004). Sampson and Wilson’s (2005) contention that Blacks

are more likely to be victims of police brutality because they are more likely

to be offenders and that reducing the rate of offending among Blacks is

necessary in order to minimize the likelihood of police brutality is akin to

what Katheryn Russell (1998) referred to as blaming the victim. Contrary to

the racial threat hypothesis, differential threat suggests that Blacks compel

the police to be brutal toward them.

Poverty isolation and racial segregation are systems of social control in

which the police may be called upon more frequently to control the so-called

dangerous classes and may be less restrained in the efﬁcient enforcement

of order (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Liska, 1992). Both poverty isolation and

segregation are structural inequalities that constrain opportunities, but the

evidence on the relationships among race, class, and violence is mixed (see

Shihadeh, 2009). An alternative hypothesis to the contentions of conﬂict the-

ory comes from the notion of benign neglect, which has its origins in a

memo Daniel Patrick Moynihan presented then-President Nixon in 1970 rec-

ommending that ﬁre services neglect communities deemed undeserving. The

language of the memo implied that poor people are lawless, pathological,

and irredeemably antisocial. Although neglect is not benign, the argument

is that interventions do more harm, and it is expected that the widespread

application of such policies might result in a situation in which increasing

poverty isolation and racial segregation may lead to the neglect of those

areas. Evidence of benign neglect should be interpreted as a reﬂection of

social control measures and not a prescription for neglecting people.

Proponents of the community violence hypothesis argue that police use

violence in response to levels of violence in the community (Fyfe, 1980;

Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). For example, more densely populated areas

have higher rates of crime, requiring more attention from the police (Eng-

lander, 2007). Levels of violence in the community may be reﬂected in the

size of the police force (Sharp, 2006) or the rate of killings of police ofﬁ-

cers by members of the public (Kaminski & Stucky, 2009) or the murder

rate (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Increased violence is likely to increase police

contact with the public and the complexity of policing (Jackson, 1989; B. W.

Smith, 2003) and so may contribute to an increase in the incidence of lethal

force. Community violence is also reﬂected in the rate of domestic violence

because domestic disturbances are the most volatile situations and complex

circumstances in police work (Chaney & Saltzstein, 1998; Sherman, 1992).

Organizational Factors Affecting Lethal Force

The theory of representative bureaucracy explains how the symbolic rep-

resentation of race in non-elected positions of government may translate

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244 H. L. Ochs

into substantive or active representation through the perception that race is

an indicator of values or experiences that are expected to inﬂuence actions

(Meier, 1975; Meier & Smith, 1994). Evidence suggests that racial and ethnic

subpopulations place real value on having members of the group in elected

and non-elected government positions (Haider-Markel et al., 2000). Black

political representation has been shown to increase bureaucratic represen-

tation (Eisinger, 1982; Mladenka, 1989; Sass & Mehay, 2003) and has also

been positively linked to notions of empowerment that subsequently impact

Blacks’ level of trust, efﬁcacy, and participation (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Tate,

2003). However, Black ofﬁcers may be more likely to be viewed as less re-

pressive among Black citizens where there is greater representation of Blacks

on the police force (Frank, Brandl, Cullen, & Stichman, 1996), but these no-

tions are based on what race represents to the public and not the actions of

public ofﬁcials (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). In fact, Black ofﬁcers may

act more harshly toward Black citizens (Brown & Frank, 2006; Thompson,

1976). Experimental evidence demonstrates that the myth of Black crimi-

nality has become a systematic aspect of the decision criterion (Greenwald,

Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003). Analyses have uncovered a general perceptual

sensitivity in which people of color with guns are less distinguishable from

people with harmless objects, and a subsequent response bias leads to the

determination that objects held by people of color are more often treated

as guns. Similarly, B. W. Smith (2003) found that minority representation in

police agencies is not signiﬁcantly related to lethal force. Put simply, racial

and ethnic minorities are more likely to be incorrectly shot by the police

regardless of the race of the ofﬁcer (Fyfe, 1978, 1982, 2002; Robin, 1963;

Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

Police accountability is another organizational component with the po-

tential to affect the use of lethal force by the police. Democratic societies in-

corporate multiple mechanisms of police accountability that can be broadly

grouped into three levels of control: (a) Internal or departmental control

refers to the management and disciplinary systems that are found within

the police departments that generally have the most direct and immediate

impact on the policing agency; (b) state control refers to the legislative, ju-

dicial, and executive agencies of the state responsible for holding the police

accountable; and (c) social control refers to the mechanisms within civil soci-

ety intended to contribute oversight and accountability, including the media,

research institutions, and community organizations (Stone & Ward, 2000).

The leading scholar on police accountability, Samuel Walker (2001, 2005),

identiﬁed two factors with the potential to enhance police accountability

beyond the political mechanisms of state control: (a) professionalism and

(b) citizen review. Professional expertise attempts to balance the competing

demands of political control with standards intended to establish legal and

ethical guidelines for conduct (Walker, 2005). It is expected that ofﬁcers

with more education and training are less reactive and better prepared to

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Politics of Inclusion 245

manage volatile situations with the minimum force necessary in compliance

with agency standards.

Public oversight of police conduct through citizen review represents a

form of social control. Reactive approaches are a deterrence-based method

for addressing police misconduct. Reactive approaches assume that the pre-

dictable reaction of the oversight structure will prevent police misconduct

and are the most common approach to citizen review. However, the reactive

approach does not attempt to identify or resolve the underlying systemic

problems in police organizations (Walker, 2001), and because police orga-

nizations are highly resistant to public “interference” (Human Rights Watch,

1998), it may not have the assumed deterrent effect. Punishment perceived

as unfair or illegitimate can lead to unacknowledged shame and deﬁant pride

that undermines deterrence and that can increase future crime by individuals

or collectives (Sherman, 1992).

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

This study investigates the contribution of Black political incorporation to

democratic policing. The dependent variable is an event count of justiﬁed

homicides by the police taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Supplemental Homicide Reports, 1994 to 2004. Although problems with the

data on lethal and less-than-lethal force have been noted (see Fyfe, 1988),

Supplemental Homicide Report data are the best city-level data available

on ofﬁcial–public violence and have been widely utilized (see Jacobs &

O’Brien, 1998; Liska & Yu, 1992; B. W. Smith, 2003; Sorensen, Marquart,

& Brock, 1993). One of the primary limitations of the data utilized in this

study is that police-caused homicide that is not determined to be justiﬁed

is classiﬁed as murder and is not distinguished in the data from any other

homicide. Consequently, these data allow for the analysis of the incidence

of lethal force as a violent interaction between the police and the public.

They are a reﬂection of the level of voluntary compliance with the law, but

they do not provide any information regarding the extent to which police

actions may undermine the rule of law.

The use of lethal force is a rare event (Fyfe, 1978, 2002; Milton, Hallock,

Lardner, & Abrecht, 1977; B. W. Smith, 2003). When it occurs, the use of

lethal force is most likely to occur in the largest cities (B. W. Smith, 2003).

There are 27 cities in the United States with populations greater than 500,000

and 60 cities with populations greater than 300,000. The sample used to test

the link between Black political incorporation and the use of lethal force

represents a random sample drawn from cities with populations of at least

greater than 300,000. The cities randomly selected for this sample make up

92.6% of all cities with populations greater than 500,000 and 50% of all cities

with populations of at least 300,000. Urban police departments have long

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246 H. L. Ochs

been a pressure point for greater democratic responsiveness to minorities,

and the greater concentration of police killings in the largest cities in the

United States (Sorensen et al., 1993) makes this the most relevant point of

analysis.

An analysis of an entire population is rare because it is most often cost

prohibitive, and there is a higher likelihood of ensuring the accuracy and

quality of the data in a sample of the population (Ad`

er, Mellenbergh, & Hand,

2008). Doubling the reliability requires a sample 4 times as large because the

reliability of a sample grows at a rate equivalent to the square root of the

increase in the sample size (McNabb, 2008). Random selection ensures that

every city in the population has an equal chance of being selected, thereby

minimizing bias in case selection (McNabb, 2008). In time-series analysis,

there can be no missing values in the panel, so the data set used in this

analysis represents an attempt to maximize precision affordably. The sample

of 30 cities has approximately a 10% margin of potential sampling error, but

increasing the number of cities in the sample would increase the number

of imputed values necessary to maintain the panel for time-series analysis.

Because of the data collection and reporting procedures of the various data

sources, the imputed values would more than double, the cost for best

available data would be prohibitive, and the larger sample would produce

only a marginal increase in reliability. However, the data in this analysis

are the best available data from multiple sources. These data are strongly

balanced and reﬂect a reasonable extent of the population of cities where

lethal force is most likely to occur. The sample allows for generalization to

the largest U.S. cities, and the 10 years of observation on each case affords

a good deal of leverage.

Primary Independent Variable

The independent variable of interest is Black political incorporation. The

measure is composed of a dummy variable reﬂecting the presence of a

Black mayor plus the percentage of the total city council seats available that

are held by Black representatives in each of the cities included in the sample.

The full potential range for this variable is 0–2, and observations approaching

2 reﬂect higher levels Black political incorporation in city government and

politics. Although research indicates that Black mayors have had consider-

able difﬁculty altering relations between minorities and the police (Colburn,

2001; Eisinger, 1982), the presence of a Black mayor is associated with more

representative bureaucracy as well as the adoption of citizen controls over

the department (Saltzstein, 1989). In addition, Black representation on city

councils improves the perceptions of the legitimacy of law enforcement of

citizens who are Black and those who are not Black as well (Marschall &

Shah, 2007). Marschall and Ruhil (2007) demonstrated that Black citizens

report higher levels of satisfaction with police services and neighborhood

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Politics of Inclusion 247

conditions that are rooted in tangible improvements when represented by

Blacks in city hall and that these gains in the evaluation of government per-

formance are particularly evident when Black mayors have long tenures in

ofﬁce. Black political efﬁcacy has been shown to reduce perceptions of in-

justice (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002) and subsequently Black violence against

the police (Kaminski & Stucky, 2009), but research indicates that there is

likely a trade-off between Black and White perceptions of justice as Black

political incorporation (Frank et al., 1996) and Black bureaucratic represen-

tation (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009) increase. In addition, Black city

council representation has been shown to reduce perceptions of the police

as an occupational force (Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996), and such perceptions are

likely to increase voluntary compliance with the law (Tyler, 2004a, 2006).

Because Black mayors and city council members are often credited with

policies that are perceived by the public broadly as improving relations be-

tween the police and the public and are integral in the implementation of

policies and procedures that restrain police use of force (Marschall & Shah,

2007; Saltzstein, 1989), it is expected that higher rates of Black political in-

corporation will contribute to fewer incidents of lethal force.

Control Variables

A number of control variables are included in this study to ensure that the

model is properly speciﬁed. An accounting of the measurement, source,

and summary statistics for each variable is provided in Table A-1 in the

Appendix. Several variables test the nature of structural inequalities and

social control. The racial threat hypothesis is tested using a measure of

the Black population in the city as a percentage of the total population.

The percentage of the Black population is squared to model the curvilinear

relationship predicted by Blalock’s (1967) theory. It is expected that very

low populations of racial subgroups may be subject to more oppression

because of opportunity hoarding (Romero & Margolis, 2005), whereas high

populations that are integrated into the social and political processes may

experience backlash (Sharp, 2006). To test the competing differential crime

notion, a measure of the percentage of Black victims of murder relative to

the murders committed by Black perpetrators is used to account for the

differential threat of and to Black citizens. In order for the differential threat

thesis to hold up, the use of lethal force would have to respond to higher rates

of crime perpetration by Blacks and not to higher rates of Black crime victims.

The relationship among race, class, and violence is a matter of debate

among those who contend that poverty isolation and segregation represent

structural inequalities in which the “dangerous classes” are subject to more

aggressive forms of social control as they are more isolated and those who

contend that interventions intended to impact structural inequalities may

result in the kind of neglect whereby there are fewer interactions between

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248 H. L. Ochs

the police and the public in isolated neighborhoods. The benign neglect

claim is tested using the poverty isolation index of the average proportion of

people living in poverty who live in the neighborhood of the average person

living in poverty multiplied by 100 and the measure of Black–White racial

segregation across central city households. Higher levels of isolation and

segregation indicate neighborhoods vulnerable to either aggressive social

control or neglect. However, one should be cautious not to interpret such

vulnerabilities as prescriptions.

Levels of community violence are captured by including measures of

population density, the incidence of domestic violence per 1,000 population,

and the number of ofﬁcers killed in the line of duty. Some variation in the

literature remains regarding which is the more appropriate variable to use

when controlling for crime levels in the community, so both murder rates and

violent crime are tested. Many studies examining the size of the police force

or the rate of killings of police ofﬁcers by members of the public control for

the violent crime rate (Kaminski & Stucky, 2009; Sharp, 2006), but the murder

rate is the control variable commonly used when the dependent variable is

a measure of deadly force (see Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). However, it is

also the case that violent crime and/or murder rates are often shown to be

insigniﬁcant (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Sharp, 2006).

The model also controls for the organizational factors affecting police

use of lethal force. The representative bureaucracy hypothesis is tested using

a measure of the percentage of the police force made up of Black sworn

ofﬁcers. If a more representative bureaucracy does indeed act in a manner

that remediates the oppressive nature of criminal justice toward Blacks in

the United States, as the empowerment perspective implies, it is expected

that the incidence of lethal force will decrease over time in cities with a

higher percentage of Black ofﬁcers on the force. If the previous ﬁndings

that Black ofﬁcers may act more harshly toward Black citizens are upheld

in the aggregate analysis of police actions, the incidence of lethal force is

expected to increase over time as the percentage of Blacks on the police

force increases.

The race of the police chief is also controlled for in this analysis. In

this case, the race of the police chief may reﬂect political or bureaucratic

representation. The police chief is responsible for deﬁning and maintain-

ing compliance with the rules of engagement. However, the police chief

is accountable to the city manager (who is subsequently accountable to

the council) in council–manager governments, and the police chief is held

responsible by the mayor in council–mayor systems. Research on the rela-

tionship between the formal legal structure of the city and police violence is

based on the expected impact of reforms designed to separate politics and

administration in city government (Chevigny, 1995; Sampson & Cohen, 1988;

Wilson, 1971). Because the trade-off between responsiveness and representa-

tiveness is a primary feature of the job of the police chief, and the race of the

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Politics of Inclusion 249

police chief may manifest differently under the varying constraints, a measure

that reﬂects the race of the police chief by the type of city government the

chief is accountable to is utilized in this analysis. Given the lack of empirical

support for the link between city structure and control over police violence

(Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) and the inconclusive ﬁndings regarding represen-

tative bureaucracy (Brown & Frank, 2006), the expected outcome is unclear.

The level of police accountability is also controlled for using a measure

reﬂecting the citizen review board (CRB) model as outlined by Walker (2005)

and a measure of police professionalism. Walker (2005) noted that police

organizations resist a number of recommendations from the audit process.

If CRBs are broadly a participatory mechanism that facilitates more positive

police–public interactions, the use of lethal force will be reduced by their

persistent effect as a deterrent. If CRBs are likely to be met with increasing

resistance from the police, CRBs may signiﬁcantly increase the incidence

of lethal force as they increase the degree of oversight by the public. Pro-

fessional expertise attempts to balance the competing demands of political

control with standards intended to establish legal and ethical guidelines for

conduct (Walker, 2005), and the measure of professionalism in this study

attempts to capture the extent to which there is parity between the demands

of police professionalism and the status of the ofﬁcers as reﬂected by their

pay. A high degree of parity between expectations and incentives reﬂects

higher levels of professionalism and is expected to minimize the incidence

of lethal force.

Interactions

A second model includes the potential interaction effects between the race

of the ofﬁcer and the race of the citizen involved in the incident. A third

model examines the rate of the use of lethal force by Black ofﬁcers relative

to the percentage of Black ofﬁcers on the force and the rate of the use of

lethal force by White ofﬁcers relative to the percentage of White ofﬁcers on

the force. It is expected that Black ofﬁcers are unlikely to use lethal force

against White citizens but that the rates of lethal force by Black and White

ofﬁcers are unlikely to be different across the police force.

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

The data utilized in this study consist of panel data from 1994 to 2004 for

30 cities selected at random from the 60 largest U.S. cities (populations

>300,000). Panel data allow for the control of factors that cannot be easily

observed or measured, like cultural variation or different managerial prac-

tices. The primary limitations of panel data are the cost and time commitment

required for data collection. However, panel data allow for the estimation

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250 H. L. Ochs

of a greater range of conditional probabilities. It is also important to note

that this analysis examines the incidence of the use of lethal force in the

aggregate and not the individual choices ofﬁcers make in the use of lethal

force. Considering that a greater concentration of police killings occur in the

largest cities (see B. W. Smith, 2003) and that police use of lethal force is

a rare event (Fyfe, 1978, 2002; Milton et al., 1977; B. W. Smith, 2003), an

analysis of longitudinal data for the largest cities available is necessary and

sufﬁcient for adequate inference.

Because the dependent variable is an event count for a relatively rare

occurrence, the distribution is skewed. Given these conditions, ordinary least

squares regression is unsuitable and can result in biased estimates (Osgood,

2000). Poisson regression models are better suited for the type of data utilized

(Land, McCall, & Nagin, 1996; Osgood, 2000). Preliminary analyses of good-

ness of ﬁt using the standard Poisson regression technique indicate that the

standard Poisson method is inappropriate for modeling the data because the

estimates are consistent but inefﬁcient (Gourieroux, Monfort, & Trongnon,

1984; Greene, 2003). Because of the problems of overdispersion with the

basic Poisson regression, a random-effects negative binomial regression for

panel data is estimated to avoid misleading signiﬁcance tests resulting from

underestimation of the standard errors (Baltagi, 2008; Osgood, 2000).

Problems of multicollinearity are common to structural-level data, so

it is necessary to check for collinearity (Baltagi, 2008; Beck & Katz, 1995).

Calculation of the variance inﬂation factors reveals no problematically high

levels of multicollinearity. A Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity reveals

a chi-square of 111.81 for the ﬁrst model of the effect of Black city leadership

on the incidence of lethal force over time; a chi-square of 91.06 for the second

model, which accounts for the interaction between the race of the ofﬁcer

and the race of citizen; and a chi-square of 206.76 for the third model, which

accounts for the rates of lethal force by Black and White ofﬁcers in proportion

to the makeup of the force. Signiﬁcance reaches the .001 level in each case.

These tests indicate that correction for heteroscedasticity is required for each

of the three models of the incidence of lethal force over time.

Panel data models estimate ﬁxed- or random-effects models using

dummy variables. Fixed effects can be thought of as treatment levels. A

ﬁxed-effects model is conceptually appropriate when all possible levels of

a treatment have been included or when the results are not intended to be

generalized beyond the cities selected. Because the panel utilized in this

study consists of data from 30 cities from a larger population of cities, the

variable is considered conceptually a random effect. In random-effects es-

timation, the dummies are considered a constant aspect of the error term,

and the error variances vary across group and time (Greene, 2003). Random

effects are tested using the Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980).

The Lagrange multiplier test for each of the models is signiﬁcant at the .001

level, indicating that the random-effects model is appropriate.

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Politics of Inclusion 251

The estimates from each of the models listed in Table 1 indicate that

Black political incorporation is signiﬁcant at the .01 level in each of the three

models tested. The incident rate ratios listed in the table for each model show

the odds of the incidence of lethal force going up or down in a given year

as predicted by the models, and the positive or negative sign associated with

the zvalue indicates the direction of the relationship. The direction of the

relationship reveals whether the odds are predicted to go up or down with a

change in that independent variable. A negative zvalue indicates an inverse

relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

The results show that higher levels of Black political incorporation in city

government reduce the incidence of deadly force over time. Black political

incorporation in cities in which all of the elected seats in city government are

held by Black representatives has a marginal impact that decreases the likely

incident rate by 1.398 over time. By contrast, the marginal impact of having

no Black elected ofﬁcials in city government increases the likely incident

rate by 0.607 over time.

The ﬁrst model reveals that as the percentage of Black sworn ofﬁcers

on the force increases, the incidence of lethal force is likely to increase over

time. This ﬁnding is consistent with existing evidence that Black ofﬁcers

may treat Black citizens more harshly (see Brown & Frank, 2006; Thompson,

1976). The second model reveals that Black ofﬁcers are not signiﬁcantly likely

to use lethal force on White citizens but are signiﬁcantly likely to use lethal

force against Black citizens. When the rate at which ofﬁcers use lethal force

is understood in relation to the makeup of the force (Model 3), the results

suggest that Black ofﬁcers appear to be nearly as likely as White ofﬁcers

to use lethal force against Black citizens. This is not especially surprising,

considering that into the 1960s Black police ofﬁcers in the United States were

not allowed to even arrest Whites (Dulaney, 1996). There is some evidence

that this history continues to have an effect on police practice, although

the mechanism remains unclear (National Research Council, 2004). Because

citizen attitudes and perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are most

likely affected by the race of the ofﬁcer rather than the action of the ofﬁcer

(Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009), interpreting how this ﬁnding may be

understood in relation to democratic policing is difﬁcult. Aggregate analysis

does not allow for individual-level inferences about the ways in which the

descriptive, symbolic, or active representation of Black ofﬁcers on the force

may or may not affect the perceptions of the legitimacy of police actions.

There is nothing in the data that speciﬁes whether Black ofﬁcers may or

may not be relatively more likely to be assigned patrol districts that have

higher Black populations, and there is no evidence regarding how the use

of lethal force is diffused across the force. However, these ﬁndings do seem

to imply that the contention that Black descriptive representation fosters

empowerment (see Banducci et al., 2004; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990) may be

premature.

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TABLE 1 Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regression: Incidence of Lethal Force Over Time (1994–2004)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Independent Variable IRR (z)SE IRR (z)SE IRR (z)SE

Black political incorporation 0.6696 0.51412 0.7125 0.38713 0.7246 0.37529

(–1.30)∗∗ (–1.84)∗∗ (–1.93)∗∗

Black sworn ofﬁcers 2.4492 4.07011 1.8365 2.66000

(0.60)∗(0.69)

(Black police chief by city structure)20.9907 0.02852 0.9937 0.01967 0.9939 0.02248

(–34.74) (–50.52) (–44.21)

Black population20.4173 1.41925 0.4445 0.74863 0.4356 0.93371

(–0.29)∗∗ (–0.59)∗∗ (–0.47)∗∗

Poverty isolation 0.9514 0.26965 0.9830 0.15014 0.9707 0.16433

(–3.53)∗(–6.55) (–5.91)

Racial segregation 0.9940 0.16150 1.0015 0.10324 1.0080 0.10105

(–6.16) (9.70) (9.98)

Relative threat ratio 1.1240 0.41582 1.1329 0.32765 1.1984 0.30198

(2.70)∗∗ (3.46)∗∗ (3.97)∗∗

Murder rate 1.0109 0.02483

(40.71)∗

Violent crime rate 1.0000 0.00005 1.0000 0.00005

(20000)∗∗∗ (20000)∗∗∗

Professionalism 5.1400 625.96860 94601.1439 542.71450 56522589 546.40850

(0.01) (174.31) (103443)

Citizen review board 1.0921 0.23000 1.1491 0.13348 1.1198 0.16018

(4.75) (8.61)∗∗ (6.99)∗

(Continued on next page)

252

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TABLE 1 Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regression: Incidence of Lethal Force Over Time (1994–2004) (Continued)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Independent Variable IRR (z)SE IRR (z)SE IRR (z)SE

Domestic violence 0.9997 0.00158 0.9995 0.00165 0.9992 0.00137

(–632.72) (–605.76) (–729.34)

Population density 1.0000 0.00005 1.0000 0.01904 1.0000 0.02102

(20000) (52.52) (47.57)

Ofﬁcers killed on duty 0.9920 0.48092 1.0240 0.39859 1.0139 0.39225

(–2.06) (2.57) (2.58)

Black ofﬁcer—Black citizen 1.0375 0.28301

(3.67)∗

Black ofﬁcer—White citizen 1.0346 0.82252

(1.26)

White ofﬁcer—White citizen 1.0963 0.10818

(10.13)∗∗∗

White ofﬁcer—Black citizen 1.1300 0.16443

(6.87)∗∗∗

Black ofﬁcer lethal force rate 1.0114 0.05356

(18.88)∗∗∗

White ofﬁcer lethal force rate 1.0184 0.05155

(19.76)∗∗∗

N330 330 330

Wald χ2(13) 47.97∗∗∗

Wald χ2(17) 195.76∗∗∗

Wald χ2(14) 102.75∗∗∗

Log likelihood –770.5934 –721.7718 —752.4141

Note. Standard errors are heteroscedastic panel-corrected standard errors. Analysis was performed using STATA Version 10. Positive and negative signs indicate the

direction of the relationship, such that a negative sign (–) indicates a likely decrease in the incident rate ratio (IRR).

∗p≤.05, ∗∗ p≤.01, ∗∗∗ p≤.001.

253

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254 H. L. Ochs

This study also lends support to the racial threat hypothesis. The three

models yield signiﬁcant estimates regarding the curvilinear effect that the

Black population in the city has on the lethal force incident rate over time.

The analysis reveals that cities in which the Black population is very low

or very high are likely to have a signiﬁcantly higher incidence of lethal

force. In addition, poverty isolation is weakly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst model.

The results show that the incidence of lethal force decreases as people

living in poverty are more isolated. These ﬁndings suggest that policies of

benign neglect may result in fewer interactions between the police and the

highly isolated population of people living in poverty, which may result in

a reduced incidence of lethal force. However, there is nothing in the data

that would indicate where the incidence of lethal force is likely to occur in

the city. The incidence may be lower but concentrated in the highly isolated

neighborhoods.

The three models also reveal that the incidence of lethal force is likely

to increase signiﬁcantly over time in cities where Black citizens are more at

risk of being victims of murder. Furthermore, the models suggest that the

Black murder rate does not affect the likelihood of police use of lethal force.

The Black murder rate was also tested in place of the relative threat ratio

variable in each of the models with the violent crime rate in the place of the

murder rate, and the Black murder rate did not near statistical signiﬁcance

in any test. This analysis indicates that there is no reason to believe that

police use of lethal force is in response to higher rates of perpetration of

crime by Black citizens. Considering that the number of ofﬁcers killed in the

line of duty does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the use of lethal force and

that circumstances in which Black citizens are more likely to be victims of

crime than perpetrators of crime result in more incidents of deadly force,

these ﬁndings constitute important evidence against the differential threat

hypothesis. This analysis demonstrates that it is not the case that the use

of lethal force is a function of differences in the perpetration of crime. The

differential threat hypothesis is an example of what Katheryn Russell-Brown

(2004) referred to as part of the coded language that serves to justiﬁably link

crime to race, particularly Blackness. The evidence presented here shows

that this link is not justiﬁed.

As expected, higher murder rates signiﬁcantly increase the incidence of

lethal force over time. When the violent crime rate is used in the place of the

murder rate, it is evident that higher rates of violent crime increase the inci-

dence of lethal force. Both Models 2 and 3 suggest that the violent crime rate

increases the incidence of lethal force, reaching signiﬁcance at the .001 level.

CRBs do not have a signiﬁcant effect on the use of lethal force in the ﬁrst

model. However, the second and third models reveal that cities utilizing CRB

models that are more proactive have a signiﬁcantly higher incidence of lethal

force over time. This may be a reﬂection of how the data on justiﬁed homi-

cide are collected. It may be the case that cities with more proactive CRBs are

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Politics of Inclusion 255

likely to experience higher incidence rates because the CRB may function

to legitimate or justify the actions of the police, which is still consistent with

Walker’s (2005) thesis. Citizens may perceive police actions as more legiti-

mate when they understand the circumstances and the level of complexity in

policing and have a forum in which to interact positively with the police, re-

sulting in more positive interactions regardless of the impact on outcomes in

the aggregate. Alternatively, more proactive CRBs may be perceived as more

intrusive and meet with considerable resistance. If the appeals and audit

processes of public oversight are resisted by policing agencies, their recom-

mendations might be disregarded by the command or even undermined by

internal affairs, who might perceive CRBs as competition. This study only

allows for speculation as to these ﬁndings. A comprehensive understanding

of this issue would require an analysis of interorganizational interactions

and a critical look at how CRB recommendations are incorporated into the

process.

DISCUSSION

This study of the impact of Black city leadership on interactions between

the police and the public conﬁrms that the incorporation of Black citizens in

government and politics contributes to legitimate, lawful policing that has the

potential for widespread gains. The existing literature overlooks the extent

to which Black elected ofﬁcials impact police actions. This study addresses

a gap in the literature by assessing the direct effect of Black elected ofﬁcials

on the aggregate level of lethal force. In this test case, the results show that

over time Black political incorporation signiﬁcantly reduces the use of deadly

force by the police.

Representation gains by Black elected ofﬁcials are not a zero-sum game.

The reduction in the incidence of lethal force achieved by Black political in-

corporation is in the interest of Black citizens to the extent that the reductions

may decrease the relative risk of exposure to lethal force, but it is also the

case that the public broadly beneﬁts from the potential reduction in enforce-

ment costs. Increasing penalties to enforce the law increases costs and has a

diminishing return (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Darley, 2000). Furthermore,

because legitimacy is essential for voluntary compliance (Tyler, 1990), the in-

cidence of the use of force may also reﬂect to some extent deﬁance that can

increase enforcement costs and undermine order, meaning that each time

lethal force is used to “assert authority and gain deference” (Lipsky, 1980,

p. 32), the authority of the law is in question. The more force is applied to

maintain peace, the more it costs to maintain, and the less peace is sustained.

A considerable amount of scandal that can undermine legitimacy is of-

ten generated from the use of lethal force. Departments spend a substantial

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256 H. L. Ochs

amount of time and resources dealing with situations in which lethal force

is used. In addition, ofﬁcers often experience trauma that necessitates coun-

seling services to deal with situations in which they have used lethal force

(Klinger, 2004). They may have their careers interrupted, and their reputa-

tions can be damaged by such incidents. Reducing the incidence of lethal

force also means that ofﬁcers will not have to experience this form of vio-

lence either.

Stephen Mastrofski (2004) contended that police culture and the relevant

features of the policy and social environment in which policing organizations

operate need to be accounted for in order to understand the mechanisms by

which street-level discretion is controlled. In addition, shooting policies are

believed to affect how individual ofﬁcers use their ﬁrearms (Klinger, 2004),

and although most policing agencies have deadly force policies that are in

line with the best practices outlined by the profession and constrained by

state statute and case law, the ways in which those policies may be put into

practice in a manner that reduces violence remains unclear. Currently, there

is no rigorous evidence to support the claim that police culture is relevant to

the use of lethal force (National Research Council, 2004). However, future

research may examine the speciﬁc mechanisms by which Black elected ofﬁ-

cials succeed in reducing the incidence of lethal force by exploring variations

in managerial strategies, administrative practices, and/or redirecting of the

organizational culture.

A full discussion of the policy implications of these ﬁndings is beyond

the scope of this study. However, there are some important policy and practi-

cal implications. In particular, the emphasis that Black elected ofﬁcials place

on maintaining the peace appears to reduce the incidence of police actions

that have the potential to threaten the peace. Over time, the aggressive pur-

suit of order maintenance increases costs, produces diminishing returns, and

undermines legitimacy. The recognition and attention Black elected ofﬁcials

give to mitigate systematic biases in the criminal justice system tend to op-

timize the delicate equilibrium between credible force and legitimacy in the

rule of law. Unpacking the paradox of forced peace requires critical reﬂection

regarding the pervasive myths of Black criminality that serve to perpetuate

violence. This study shows that valuable gains can be made when elected

ofﬁcials recognize and give suitable attention to fact that criminal justice

policies based on faulty notions about criminality pose considerable risk to

Black citizens but also pose a threat to democratic policing. The incidence

of lethal force is responsive to the racial subpopulation rather than differen-

tial crime, and Black citizens who have a higher risk of crime victimization

than perpetration might also be under increased threat from the police as

well. Consequently, addressing disparities in criminal justice is likely to pro-

duce greater gains in overall levels of violence than attempts to control the

mythical problem of Black criminality.

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Politics of Inclusion 257

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Politics of Inclusion 263

APPENDIX

TABLE A-1 Variable List

Variable Source Range MSD

Lethal force Number of justiﬁedahomicides coded as

“felon” killed by the police based on the

Supplementary Homicide Reports stored

at the National Consortium on Violence

Research (NCOVR).

0–40 5.31 6.46

Relative risk

ratio

Reﬂects the Black victims of lethal force in

proportion to the Black population

relative to the White victims of lethal

force in proportion to the White

population.

0–110.7 5.85 15.42

Black mayor Variable coded 1 for the presence of a

Black mayor and 0 for a mayor who is

not Black. The data are based on the

historical record and cross-checked with

records from the National Conference of

Black Mayors.

0–1 0.39 0.49

Black repre-

sentation on

city council

Percentage of the city council members

who are Black. Data purchased from the

Joint Center for Political and Economic

Studies. Funding provided by Lehigh

University Department of Political

Science faculty research development.

0–0.93 0.32 0.25

Black political

incorpora-

tion

Black mayor variable +Black

representation on city council variable.

The full potential range of this variable

is 0–2. Observations approaching 2

reﬂect more Black political

incorporation in city politics.

0–1.93 0.70 0.66

Control variables

Black sworn

ofﬁcers

The percentage of the police force made

up of Black sworn ofﬁcers. Data on the

race of sworn ofﬁcers are taken from

the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

2–69% 0.24 0.10

(Black police

chief by city

structure)2

Variable coded 1 for the presence of a

Black police chief and 0 for a police

chief who is not Black. The data are

based on the historical record provided

by the police organization and/or city

cross-checked with newspaper archives.

0–20.09 8.35 8.35

Black

population2

Black population in the city as a

percentage of the total population. Data

are from the Lewis Mumford Center for

Comparative Urban and Regional

Research, University at Albany, State

University of New York. The percentage

of the Black population is squared to

model the curvilinear relationship.

1–3.46 1.30 0.31

(Continued on next page)

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264 H. L. Ochs

TABLE A-1 Variable List (Continued)

Poverty

isolation

The isolation index is a measure of the

average proportion of poor people

who live in the neighborhood of the

average poor person multiplied by

100. Source: Dr. Russell Lopez,

Boston University School of Public

Health, Department of Environmental

Health, Analysis of Census Data.

11.4– 31.2 20.95 1.96

Racial

segregation

Measure of Black–White segregation

across central city households

ranging from 0 to 100, with higher

values reﬂecting higher levels of

segregation. Data are from the

Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic

Change (Census 2000) American

Communities Project.

43.7–85 64.75 3.34

Citizen review

board

Reﬂects the type of citizen review

board based on Samuel Walker’s

(2005) classiﬁcations (0 reﬂects no

active review board) from the

National Association of Civilian

Oversight of Law Enforcement.

0–4 1.20 1.56

Domestic

violence

Measure of within-family violence

based on incidents of familial

homicide per 1,000 population. FBI

Uniform Crime Reports:

Supplementary Homicide Reports

(www.ncovr.org).

0–330 104.20 97.29

Population

density

Census data on the

population/geographical area.

1,278–

150,728

26,376.35 30,912.72

Murder rate Homicides per 100,000 population.

Cities not available in all years

through census are obtained through

NCOVR data cubes.

1.9–85.8 19.55 15.14

Violent crime

rate

Violent crime per 100,000 population.

Cities not available in all years

through census are obtained through

NCOVR data cubes. Any remaining

missing values are imputed using

STATA Version 10.

371–

136,522

10,289.18 17,463.42

Ofﬁcers killed

on duty

Number of ofﬁcers killed in the line of

duty (deaths classiﬁed as accidents or

natural causes not included) from the

Ofﬁcer Down Memorial Page, Inc.

0–23 0.49 1.47

Relative threat

ratio

Reﬂects the percentage of Black victims

of murder relative to the murders

committed by Black perpetrators to

account for the differential threat of

and to Black citizens. Obtained

through NCOVR data cubes.

0–8.74 1.40 0.76

(Continued on next page)

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Politics of Inclusion 265

TABLE A-1 Variable List (Continued)

Variable Source Range MSD

Professionalism Bureau of Justice Statistics data on the

amount of education required for law

enforcement ofﬁcials (0 =high

school education, 1 =any amount of

college education) plus the number

of hours of training required. The

education and training requirements

are divided by the average salary to

reﬂect the professional pay parity.

0.00003–

0.003

0.001 0.0005

City structure Categorical variable indicating the

system of organization for city

administration (0 =council–manager,

1=council–mayor). Data are

obtained through ofﬁcial documents

of the city government.

0–1 0.80 0.40

Black ofﬁcer

lethal force

rate

Reﬂects the rate of the use of lethal

force by Black ofﬁcers relative to the

percentage of Black ofﬁcers on the

force. From the Bureau of Justice

Statistics Law Enforcement

Management and Administrative

Statistics (LEMAS).

0–173.55 4.02 11.58

White ofﬁcer

lethal force

rate

Reﬂects the rate of the use of lethal

force by White ofﬁcers relative to the

percentage of White ofﬁcers on the

force. From the Bureau of Justice

Statistics LEMAS.

0–129.87 6.40 11.35

Note. Thirty cities were randomly selected from a total of 60 cities with a population greater than 300,000

in all years (1994–2004).

aPolice-caused homicide that is not determined to be “justiﬁed” is classiﬁed as murder and cannot be

distinguished from any other homicide.

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