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Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change
... A pesar de las diversas interpretaciones existentes respecto de este primer período (CIDOB, 2010;Mendras, 2012;Zakaurtseva, 2007), lo cierto es que entre 2000 y 2002 se experimentó una etapa de real cercanía ruso-estadounidense, una especie de primer "reset" como el que posteriormente llevará adelante Obama (Kuchins y Zevelev, 2012). Sin embargo, dicha "luna de miel" no se prolongará por mucho tiempo. ...
... Su postura se irá endureciendo, además, como consecuencia de las "color revolutions" en Georgia (2003), Ucrania (2004) y Kirguistán (2005), en las cuales se sospechó soporte estadounidense. A partir de su segundo mandato, se percibirá de mejor forma dicho proceso de aumento de confianza, especialmente en 2006, cuando Rusia paga por adelantado sus deudas al Paris Club, dando cuenta del buen momento en que se encontraba el país, primando cada vez más la idea de que Moscú se hacía más fuerte mientras el unipolarismo estadounidense iba pasando a la historia (Kuchins y Zevelev, 2012). El punto clímax de este primer envión de confianza ruso será el discurso de Putin en la Conferencia de Seguridad de Munich de 2007, con representación de 26 miembros de la OTAN (Zakaurtseva, 2007), en donde critica directamente la política unilateral de Estados Unidos y el proceso de expansión de la OTAN, denunciando una actitud de Guerra Fría que pone en riesgo la seguridad de Moscú (Mendras, 2012). ...
... En la práctica, el discurso se dirigía principalmente en contra del establecimiento del escudo antimisiles en Europa Oriental (Talukdar, 2013), y de lo que desde el Kremlin se percibía como una intensión de "dominación global" (CIDOB, 2010). De igual forma, se afirmó que la era de la unipolaridad estadounidense había llegado a su fin, dando paso a la emergencia de un mundo multipolar (Kuchins y Zevelev, 2012). Moscú se encontraba nuevamente en primer plano, o al menos así se sentía. ...
This article analyses the Russian’s Foreign Policy from the arrival of Vladimir Putin to office in 2000, and the various processes of internal reform implemented since then, stating as main hypothesis that these reforms are in direct relation with one of the main objectives of his administration, the international objective of repositioning Russia in the regional and global structure of power. Since his arrival to office, Vladimir Putin began an accelerated process of power capabilities strengthening, especially in the economic and military fields, which, once consolidated, has permitted Russia to adopt an active and assertive foreign policy, process that is analysed in three moments.
... Meanwhile, the rapidly changing military, political, and technological domains characteristic of Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation, Moscow's approach to foreign policy has consistently prioritised three strategic interests: to secure its post-Soviet states along its periphery, to generate economic prosperity, and to join prestigious international institutions (Sussex 2012). In the pursuit of these interests, Russian foreign policy has undergone several evolutions while adapting to global trends and local circumstances (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012;Liu 2022). One explanation for these changes is the civilisational ideas embodied by Russian leaders Yeltsin, Primakov, and Putin, which aligned with periods of openness towards the West, emphasis on Eurasianism, and a return to great power politics (Tsygankov 2007). ...
... Facing the expanding territory and influence of NATO on one side and the surging economies of the East on the other, Moscow quickly found itself balancing between the great power games unfolding on its flanks, while also trying to secure and exert influence over the Caucuses and Central Asia (Kubicek 1999, 547;Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). The third pivot in Russian foreign policy embraced the challenges and opportunities of great power competition (Roberts 2017, 28). ...
The post-Soviet period has seen dramatic political upheaval across Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. The shadow cast by centuries of Russian influence on Eurasia still affects political tensions in the region. Previous studies have examined both Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century and the implications of parastates on Russia's periphery. This study focuses on the intersection of these issues, identifying parastates as a political wedge used by Moscow to maintain buffer states between its borders and NATO. It presents a comparative analysis of three parastates that are supported by Russia: Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The study finds that Russia supports post-Soviet parastates to perpetuate political stalemates that undermine stability in countries that act as buffers between Russian and NATO borders. This highlights opportunities for further research on a foreign policy tool that can be used to significantly influence regional security.
... This kind of approach was used to explain why the five original members of ASEAN are regarded as being in the same region of Southeast Asia, because they are neighbors, are members of the Malay ethnic group, experienced colonialism, are forging policies to counter Communist expansion, as well as possessing similar economic resources. It was expected that due to such favorable circumstances the ASEAN members would readily become involved in the regional organization underpinned by common interests (Amal, 1974). ...
... IR scholars in Indonesia are aware of the importance of academic work in contributing to the advancement of indigenous theoretical thought amidst the growing intellectual attention and interests in the innovation of theories beyond the Western traditions. Although this activity is still limited to the project of revitalizing the relevance of the concept and methodology of the older Indonesian perspectives, mainly that of regionalism, Amal andArmawi (1998), Habib (1997), and Pranowo (2010) write that the concept of national and regional resilience in the state's foreign relations has multidimensional aspects which are highly likely to become a source of middle-range theories on Indonesia's foreign policy. The concept contains both local political and cultural values, including Javanese ones, which render an appropriate understanding about the image of Indonesia's national security and its policy implications to the Southeast Asia region. ...
This article explores the development of international relations (IR) in Indonesia with special focus on the changing trends in its theoretical perspectives. It argues that the academic works examined reflect the ways in which Indonesia’s IR scholars perceive and theorize the nature of the dynamics of external political environments and their connections to the state’s foreign relations. The argument is elaborated in two related parts. The first section discusses the theoretical perspectives that developed during the Cold War period, which focuses on the propensity toward historical realism and regionalism. The second part of the discussion examines recent developments in which Cold War perspectives have been reconsidered, and in many respects modified into three new categories of theoretical thinking, namely reform, resistance, and eclecticism. The changing theoretical trends reveal that Indonesia’s IR scholarship is open and innovative. The conclusion comments on the development of the Indonesia’s IR.
... Even though Polish HEIs have become internationalized, and Poland, as a country, has welcomed ideas from the EU in other domains, no equal opportunity measures to improve gender balance at HEIs have so far been adopted. In short, Poland is a basket case of the phenomenon of 'continuity in change' that is observed elsewhere (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). ...
There is growing interest in the underlying mechanisms affecting female leaders in Higher Education (HE). This article compares four countries – Germany, Norway, Poland and Sweden to identify key structural conditions (enablers and barriers) for female representation in academia by studying the regulative framework of government policy. Two research questions are guiding the analysis: first, what (if any) policy instruments are chosen to increase the number of female leaders in HE? Second, to what extent does this choice of instruments mirror either sectorial logic (HE) or national policy styles?
The empirical results of the article show that while processes of policy diffusion are observable at the sectoral level, gender equality policies and instrument choice differ considerably in the four countries under consideration. The article thus concludes that national policy styles need to be understood as enabling and disabling policy factors for gender equality in HE shaping the process of translating diffused models decisively.
... The significance of the United States in Russia's foreign policy is due to two main factors-the weight of the United States in international politics, and the continuity in Russia's strategic thought. Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) write that "Russian perceptions of the United States and its role in the world provide a powerful lens for framing not only how Russia conceives its foreign and security policies far more broadly than US-Russia bilateral relations but also for understanding deeply rooted notions of contemporary Russian identity and the country's domestic political system." Similarly, Monaghan maintains: "The United States (US) has held a special place in Russian foreign and security policy thinking since the end of the Cold War. ...
... The significance of the United States in Russia's foreign policy is due to two main factors-the weight of the United States in international politics, and the continuity in Russia's strategic thought. Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) write that "Russian perceptions of the United States and its role in the world provide a powerful lens for framing not only how Russia conceives its foreign and security policies far more broadly than US-Russia bilateral relations but also for understanding deeply rooted notions of contemporary Russian identity and the country's domestic political system." Similarly, Monaghan maintains: "The United States (US) has held a special place in Russian foreign and security policy thinking since the end of the Cold War. ...
... The significance of the United States in Russia's foreign policy is due to two main factors-the weight of the United States in international politics, and the continuity in Russia's strategic thought. Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) write that "Russian perceptions of the United States and its role in the world provide a powerful lens for framing not only how Russia conceives its foreign and security policies far more broadly than US-Russia bilateral relations but also for understanding deeply rooted notions of contemporary Russian identity and the country's domestic political system." Similarly, Monaghan maintains: "The United States (US) has held a special place in Russian foreign and security policy thinking since the end of the Cold War. ...
... The significance of the United States in Russia's foreign policy is due to two main factors-the weight of the United States in international politics, and the continuity in Russia's strategic thought. Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) write that "Russian perceptions of the United States and its role in the world provide a powerful lens for framing not only how Russia conceives its foreign and security policies far more broadly than US-Russia bilateral relations but also for understanding deeply rooted notions of contemporary Russian identity and the country's domestic political system." Similarly, Monaghan maintains: "The United States (US) has held a special place in Russian foreign and security policy thinking since the end of the Cold War. ...
... The significance of the United States in Russia's foreign policy is due to two main factors-the weight of the United States in international politics, and the continuity in Russia's strategic thought. Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) write that "Russian perceptions of the United States and its role in the world provide a powerful lens for framing not only how Russia conceives its foreign and security policies far more broadly than US-Russia bilateral relations but also for understanding deeply rooted notions of contemporary Russian identity and the country's domestic political system." Similarly, Monaghan maintains: "The United States (US) has held a special place in Russian foreign and security policy thinking since the end of the Cold War. ...
This chapter brings attention to the concepts of strategic culture and threat perception to highlight the importance of context and cultural underpinnings of foreign policy formation. The concept of strategic culture demonstrates the importance of non-material factors in the state’s formation of perceptions of the international environment, showing that it is not the capabilities alone, but rather the perception of other states’ intentions that matter the most. After discussing the concepts of strategic culture and threat perception and related debates in the literature, a model of foreign policy formation is developed. The model of foreign policy formation demonstrates that perception of the international environment is always subjective since it is always seen through the lens of a particular state’s strategic culture, which influences foreign policy in an indirect way by shaping the perceptions of foreign policy executive (defined as a group of decision-makers authorized with the final formulation of foreign policy), who ultimately makes security decisions for the state.
... The creation of the EAEU as a Russia-led geopolitical entity is the latest iteration of Russia's attempt to restore its status and prestige on the world stage. This has been its most important foreign policy goal since 2000 (Tsygankov 2016), and has been a key part of its practical geopolitical discourse over this period. In order to achieve this, Russia has adopted an 'independent' foreign policy and sought to secure a de facto sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, primarily through creating alternative centres of power in Eurasia (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). ...
The role of geopolitics in European Union (EU) foreign policy has been the focus of much media, political, and scholarly commentary. This literature has interrogated the topic from a number of perspectives, critically exploring, for example, the construction and embodiment of EU foreign policy, the geopolitics of regional cooperation within the EU, and the role of geopolitical imaginations in the creation of the EU. Far less literature, by contrast, has explored how the EU is viewed as a geopolitical actor by other entities. This paper begins to do this, by exploring how ideas of the EU have become an enduring geopolitical conception in post-Soviet Russia. It traces their evolution from the early 2000s, when Russia sought to emulate EU norms and values as part of a broader Westernising tendency in its foreign policy. Narratives about the EU were reworked in the context of the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ between 2003 and 2005, and have subsequently been revitalised since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. In these contexts, this paper critically scrutinises the evolution of the EU’s role within Russian practical geopolitical discourse and this role’s relations to other claims and visions of what it means for Russia to be a great power.
This chapter argues that the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Russia are reinforced through their nuclear doctrines, and explores the way they continue to anchor one another’s post-Cold War strategic outlook in this regard. Strategic culture is defined here as the mode of strategic thinking that political and strategic communities have been socialized into. The conditioning factors that are reinforced within their strategic cultures and nuclear postures are their geopolitical outlook; the maintenance of primacy; the defense of political values; and maintaining an extended political reach. The posture of the United States (US) has remained concerned with Russia, particularly in view of its nuclear capabilities. Yet other imminent or systemic threats have over the past decades taken a greater place within US strategy. On the other hand, Russia continues to see the US as a threat that is seeking to contain Russia. It is argued that Russia’s motivations in Ukraine may be understood in terms of the global influence and parity that it seeks to retain with the US, and indeed parity with China within the US strategy.KeywordsUnited StatesRussiaStrategic cultureNuclear postureNational securityPrimacy
This chapter describes the evolution of Russian-Western relations after the Cold War and Russia’s search for a post-Cold War national identity. The chapter serves as an important example of how liberal universalism reached a wall with a country such as Russia, who views itself as a great power from a different civilizational background with different developmental needs and priorities. Different visions of the post-Cold War order, zero-sum competition, security dilemmas, and threat perceptions ensured the perpetuation of the fundamental lack of trust between Russia and the West. The American strategy of “liberal hegemony” was rebuked by Russia, and Russia’s increasing authoritarianism and rule-breaking were heavily criticized by the West. Both were in fact forces feeding the other. As Russia grew more assertive materially, it asserted itself normatively through soft power strategies. Russia challenges and de-constructs liberal normative hegemony and has a receptive audience among anti-globalist factions and parts of the Global South. The Ukraine crisis was the culminating moment in the deterioration of Russian-Western relations and serves as a prime example of norms, interests, and identity clashes in twenty-first-century international relations.
The Caucasus, dubbed "the Eurasian Balkans" by Zbigniew Brzezinski, or "the near abroad" (bližnee zarubežьe) by the Russians, is both a region of strategic interest for Russia, and a space where the Russian foreign policymaking was clearly manifested, Russia's main goal being to establish regional dominance and discourage the Western influence in the region. Using comparative and content analysis and relying on the theory of offensive structural realism, the paper will discuss the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards Georgia in the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Analysing the case studies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the paper seeks to show how Russia's neo-imperial foreign policy has been shaped, and how Russia's foreign policy has shifted in accordance with the part of the Caucasus involved in the conflict and the degree of anti-Russian influence in it. The results show that Russia carefully created the conditions and chose the moment to use the conflict, i.e., the secession on the Georgian soil, to position itself as a regional hegemon.
This essay analyses the evolving character of Russia’s energy relationships in the post-Soviet space by looking at the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the past, due to the historic legacy of Russia-controlled pipelines, Moscow was able to exert influence by manipulating structural asymmetries in regional natural gas value chains. This has changed with China’s entry as the region’s major market alternative and the breakthroughs of the global energy transition. The initial phase of Russia’s declining ‘energy power’ vis-à-vis China in Central Asia came to an end as the Crimea crisis was unfolding, an event that has drastically changed the risk perception of Russian gas in Europe, setting off a chain of consequences that led to a re-evaluation of Russia’s energy power in post-Soviet Eurasia. The essay also shows, however, that Russia maintains influence in post-Soviet Eurasia through inter-elite networks and shared concerns among hydrocarbon-exporting countries about the energy transition.
This article examines the Georgian-Ossetian conflict by considering recent developments and comes up with a formula for the resolution of the conflict. According to the article, a new confederal order that takes its shape at the constitutional level would contribute to the cessation of the rooted hostilities and the elimination of the institutionalised doubts between the two communities. South Ossetia would benefit from the confederal order in the short run; however, the order would, in the long run, create a public area where the two communities would coexist in a peaceful manner. Collaborationist and integrationist steps taken by the Georgian and Ossetian authorities after the construction of the confederal order would gradually cease the hostilities and eliminate the doubts, ultimately leading to the transformation of regional or national loyalties into confederal allegiances. These allegiances would establish an environment of mutual trust encouraging the communities to turn their confederal union into a federation or unitary state. Such unionist and holistic transformation processes have been completed by historical confederations. Furthermore, present confederal organisations are also carrying out such processes. The article taking into account various matters, e.g. the current Georgian and Ossetian standpoints as well as the present military, financial and political capabilities of the Georgian state, recognises its confederal formula as a worth-examining alternative.
Due to the globalization and high demand of international
market, business correspondence is being performed mainly in English,
making the English language lingua franca in international trade. This
paper shows in what degree the English language is, as the language for
specific purposes, important in the international trading companies; it
studies the connection between the professional position of an employee
in a company, the usage and understanding of the language. Together
with examples from the research conducted, this paper provides some
answers to the questions – what professional positions are most likely to
change in terms of the English language usage, that is, on which professional
positions is the language known best?
Keywords: Business English, international trade, trading companies,
business correspondence, knowledge of business English
This textbook provides an introduction to Eurasian Studies. As the book is designed for undergraduate students, it delivers an overview of political developments in Eurasia. The study primarily addresses Eurasianism as a geopolitical concept to familiarize students with the region they are projected to deal with. Subsequently, it concentrates on the last years of the Soviet Union to elucidate the conditions under which modern Eurasia as a geopolitical space was shaped. Eventually, the book details a number of former Soviet republics, in particular the Russian Federation, to probe into the developments that take place in Eurasia.
This article contributes to the study of Russian great powerness, focusing on the potential of the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations to influence the construction of Russias great power status in a multipolar world. Based upon Russian and English literature dedicated to the study of great power concept and Russian great powerness, authors adopt analytic eclecticism for the theoretical framework of the study. In this regard, for a comprehensive understanding of Russian great powerness, both constructivism with its focus on identity, and neorealism stressing national interests, security, and power, are applied. The authors actively employ the official documents, international agreements, statements of government officials, and official declarations. As a result, the study examines to what extent bilateral relations with Turkey and Israel, the Wests traditional non-Western allies, can contribute to the construction of Russian great power identity. For this purpose, first of all, the factors of Russian great power construction and its role in Russian foreign policy are examined. After addressing the efficiency of great power status as a foreign policy tool, the development of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations are discussed. It is concluded that Russia has developed strategically significant relations with Turkey and Israel despite the deteriorated relations with the West, and the development of these relations has supported the consolidation of Russias great power status at the international and regional levels. Furthermore, the study suggests that Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli bilateral relations can enable Russia to strengthen its great power status vis--vis the West via cooperation and competition and contribute to the construction of a multipolar world.
The soft power literature has indicated that American soft power use has been declining while Russian and Chinese soft power use has been increasing. Until now, the only way scholars could test such claims was to compare these countries' soft power rankings. This paper uses a new soft power dataset that can evaluate countries' soft power use. Using this dataset, this paper tests three hypothesis regarding China's, Russia's and the US' soft power use for the time-period of 1995-2015. The findings indicate that surprisingly the US is still using more soft power than Russia and China. The data analysis also reveals that the US is leading in economic soft power actions over China and in military soft power actions over Russia as well.
Russia's New Authoritarianism is a detailed study of the development of the Russian political system in the 21st century. Lewis explores the ideas that gave rise to 'Putinism' - a new type of authoritarian system in Russia that influenced a wider global trend away from liberalism towards right-wing populism and authoritarianism. Lewis examines the intellectual debates among Russian conservatives that challenged liberal beliefs about concepts such as sovereignty, the state, and democracy, and instead promoted a very different set of political ideas.
The book uses the political thought of Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist and anti-liberal political theorist, to explore political developments in Russia in the first two decades of the 21st century. Case-studies examine how ideas of sovereign decision-making and exceptionality undermined the rule of law in Russia, producing a system of politicized, selective justice. A striving for national unity degenerated into a search for external and internal enemies. Russia’s democratic institutions were gradually hollowed out as Russia developed a form of “illiberal democracy”.
The second part of the book uses Schmitt’s theories of international relations to study Russian foreign policy, including a detailed case-study of the annexation of Crimea, a new interpretation of Russia’s search for a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and a study of messianic thinking in Russian policy in the Middle East.
In the words of James Billington, “No nation ever poured more energy into answering the question of national identity than Russia.” Russia continues to fight the struggle with its ongoing “identity crisis;” what Tim McDaniel’s describes as the “agony of the Russian Idea.” When faced with decisions regarding its identity, the verdict often ends in a hybrid of sorts. For example, when Russian President Vladimir Putin made the decision to reconsider the national anthem, the outcome resulted in a mixture of old and new: the Soviet tune remained, while the lyrics changed. Puzzling decisions as mundane as this often coincide with the puzzling actions of Russia’s foreign policy; thus, confounding scholars who continue to grapple with the complex nation. And yet, how are we, as academics, supposed to figure out a country that is still “in search of itself”? The scholarly focus on national identity cofounds a number of academics who cannot escape the realist mentality. A portion of the literature remains rooted in power-relations and geopolitics. Many intellectuals remain unwilling to conceptualize a genuine “Eurasianist” identity, constructed over the centuries by Russia’s damaged history, evolving norms, institutional influences, geographical location, and cultural relations. Nevertheless, identity formation research is expanding into more novel camps, such as constructivism. However, for the most part the concept of Eurasianism fails to shift alongside the evolving studies and methods, remaining rooted in traditional geopolitical discourse. Yet, it is undeniable that a Eurasian identity exists in some way, shape and form. Whether it is a top-down or bottom-up approach is still debated, as is how it influences Russia’s foreign and domestic policy. Meanwhile, the research continues to tackle this perplex topic and nation. This review examines the literature regarding the changing concept of Eurasianism as it relates to Russian identity.
La estructura de este libro, después de una breve excursión conceptual e histórica (capítulo 1), está planteada cronológicamente, de acuerdo con la sucesión de los momentos de alto impacto que cada una de las tres potencias tuvo sobre la evolución del orden internacional. Rusia, desde el ascenso del Imperio ruso a la categoría de gran potencia, en 1709 (capítulos 2 y 3). Dos y medio siglos más tarde, durante el período de la Guerra Fría, primero India (1947), con su tardía pero auspiciosa aparición como Estado (capítulo 4), y treinta años después China (1978), con la reorientación de su modelo económico hacia los mercados mundiales (capítulo 5). Nuestra perspectiva pretende dar una idea sobre aspectos como de dónde vienen estas potencias, cuáles han sido los propósitos que las han guiado en su evolución interna e internacional, cuáles han sido sus principales logros y fracasos, y cuáles son sus fortalezas y debilidades actuales. Nuestro análisis llega básicamente hasta 2015. Finalmente, es necesario mencionar que este libro se ha elaborado sobre la base de la revisión y ampliación de trabajos del autor publicados anteriormente, por la misma Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, principalmente por el Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (IDEI) y también por la Escuela de Gobierno.
With a reference to Russia’s size and location, its unique history and culture, and its massive economic and military resources Russia claims a prominent role in the current world order. The foreign policy strategy which Russia’s post-communist leadership developed from this worldview, has generally been pragmatic and re-active. More recently, partly due to developments beyond Russia’s influence and partially as a result of political and economic changes in Russia itself, the country’s foreign policies have become more self-confident, more assertive and more offensive, initially especially in its own environment but later also beyond its sphere of influence. Russia is a revisionist power, but with a strongly conservative streak. Multipolarity is Russia’s major foreign policy ambition, one that is based on competition and cooperation among sovereign great powers. Russia demands the right to be included, but it also wants to stand apart. Russia is strongly in favour of multilateralism, but preferably a multilateralism for the few, Russia included.
SSCB sonrasında Rusya Federasyonu siyasal ve ekonomik açıdan benimsenen sosyalist düzeni terk ederek kapitalist sisteme eklemlenmeye ve “liberal demokratik” ülkelerle de uzlaşmaya başlamıştır. Ancak söz konusu radikal dönüşüm Rusya açısından hem iç politikada hem de dış politikada çok önemli sorunlarla karşılaşılmasına neden olmuştur. Bu noktada dış politika açısından da önemli bir değişim yaşanmıştır. Rusya, SSCB’ye oranla her anlamda (coğrafi, ekonomik, nüfus, askeri kapasite…) bir küçülme yaşamış ve bu durum dış politikaya da yansımıştır. Bir diğer değişim konusu ise güvenlik alanında olmuştur. Bu konuda özellikle bölgesel işbirliği örgütleri ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmada ise Rus dış politikasında güvenlik faktörü ele alınacaktır. Öncelikle Rus dış politikasında yaşanan değişim genel hatlarıyla ortaya konulacak ve Rus dış politikasındaki güvenlik faktörü irdelenecektir. Daha sonra ise hem dış politika hem de güvenlik açısından Rusya için son derece işlevsel niteliklere haiz olan Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu, Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Kolektif Güvenlik Antlaşması Örgütü konu kapsamında ele alınacaktır.
Taking Syria’s armed conflict as a case study to illustrate the processes of normative contestation in international relations, this article is interested in re-examining the typology of Russia as a ‘rising power’ to account for ‘rise’ in a non-material dimension. The article integrates the concept of ‘rising power’ with the literature on international norm dynamics to reflect on the rationale for Russia’s engagement in Syria despite adverse material preconditions. It will argue that Russian norm divergence from alleged ‘Western’ norms illustrates Moscow’s ambition to co-define the conditions for legitimate transgressions of state sovereignty.
This paper explores the correlates of Russia’s aggressive international policy and argues that rising oil revenues increase the aggressiveness of presidential foreign-policy rhetoric. Using content analysis and machine-learning techniques, I generate a measure of aggressive discourse as the share of anti-Western sentences in Russian presidential speeches delivered between 2000 and 2016. These are analyzed using OLS regression with lagged dependent variables. I conclude that the aggressiveness of foreign-policy rhetoric in Russian presidential speeches positively correlates to oil prices. I also find no support for alternative explanations linking hawkish foreign policy to NATO expansion or domestic legitimacy concerns.
This paper explores the correlates of Russia's aggressive international policy and argues that rising oil revenues increase the aggressiveness of presidential foreign policy rhetoric. Using content analysis and machine-learning techniques, I generate a measure of aggressive discourse as the share of anti-western sentences in Russian presidential speeches delivered between 2000 and 2016. These are analyzed using OLS regressions with lagged dependent variables. I conclude that the aggressiveness of foreign policy rhetoric in Russian presidential speeches positively correlates to oil prices. I also find no support for alternative explanations linking hawkish foreign policy to NATO expansion or domestic legitimacy concerns.
With its growing geopolitical inclination, Russian foreign policy has beenconsidered as a resurgence of Eurasianism (Neo-Eurasianism).Notwithstanding its strong geopolitical sense, Eurasianism is multifacetedconcept. It is often associated with philosophical thinking, cultural andpolitical doctrines which changed over time and yet full of contradictions. Thisarticle seeks to find out the influence of Neo-Eurasianism in Russian foreignpolicy. Tracing back the idea of Eurasianism from historical perspective andemploying Graham Smith classification on school of Eurasianism, this articleargues that the rise of Neo-Eurasianism in Russia is driven by the needs todefine and strengthen the spheres of influences. It is mainly motivated byethnocentric sentiments to expand the sphere of influences across the border as a safeguard and protection. Neo-Eurasianism compromises building aforeign policy consensus based on political culture and national awareness.
This article analyzes Russia’s retaliatory food embargo, explaining why the Russian government banned some imports from the West but refrained from banning a range of equally plausible others. I argue that Moscow was following a strategy of differentiated retaliation when selecting which imports to embargo. The countersanctions were not designed to mete out equal punishment on all members of the sanctioning coalition. Rather, Russia purposefully crafted the policy to inflict greater economic damage on some states than others. Utilizing an original data-set on all agricultural and food products that Russia imports, I demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, imports of sizeable commercial value to countries the Kremlin has long viewed as the mainstays of anti-Russian policies were far more likely to have been banned. In contrast, the evidence shows that Moscow stayed its hand in dealing with Europe’s major powers. This analysis both illuminates the policy objectives being pursued by a leading actor in world politics, as well as lays the groundwork for theoretically understanding the geostrategic, political, and economic drivers of countersanctions.
This essay argues that despite the Russian regime’s clampdown on civil society and apparent desire to defy the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, there are grounds for optimism. During nearly twenty years of engagement with the Court, a new generation of activists has emerged, which is also conscious of the turbulent history of reform in Russia. For them, as for their counterparts in the West, the fight for human rights is unrelenting.
This article examines Russian energy policies toward China over the past decade as reluctant engagement changed into a priority energy partnership. From 2008 to 2016 Russian and Chinese companies signed several major oil and gas agreements, a period in which Moscow reassessed China as a future energy consumer and lifted bilateral cooperation to a new level. The article utilizes the strategic partnership concept as an analytical framework and finds traditional realist concepts and hedging inadequate for this particular case. The study illuminates Russian geopolitical considerations and acceptance of vulnerability, which combined make long-term Russian energy policies more China dependent. Officially, Russia seeks diversification among Asian energy buyers, but its focus has increasingly been on China. Western sanctions imposed in 2014 for Russia’s role in Ukraine accelerated this trend. Moscow’s energy policies toward Beijing with its pipelines and long-term agreements are permanent arrangements that resemble strategic partnership policies. China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies, but Beijing also ensures that it does not become too dependent on one supplier. Russian concern over its increased dependence on China in the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still-dominant European market.
Russia’s foreign policy is characterized by a combination of several conflicting narratives which coexist in a general space of rhetoric on identity, security, and civilizational divisions. Russian perceptions of the United States and China provide a powerful lens for framing not only how modern Russia conceives its foreign policy, but also for understanding its national identity transformations. Culturally and historically, Russia deems itself a part of Western civilization. China looks alien and lacking intellectual and emotional appeal to many Russians. However, the image of the United States in the eyes of the Russian political elite is essentially ambivalent and conflicting, while China is described as a reliable partner. Finding the right balance between the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific vectors will be the key challenge to Russian foreign policy in the years to come. The USA is watching China closely and cautiously; part of this caution will be keeping an eye on Chinese relations with the rest of the world. China is doing the same when it looks at the United States. Within this triangular construct, not losing sight of Russia will be a priority for both the USA and China. This situation creates many opportunities for Russia—if it plays its cards right.
The mapping of Greek-Russian relations, despite their limited extent, runs up against a number of complexities, mainly due to the fact that aspirations and sentiment have usually been put before pragmatism and interests. At the same time, due to Russia’s broadly positive image in Greece, there are few obstacles to the development of ties with Moscow—a fact that has on occasion been exploited politically. However, given the constraints deriving from Greece’s position in Euroatlantic institutions, a certain diffidence on the part of the Greek political establishment, and the Kremlin’s disinclination to trust Athens, Greek-Russian relations over the past 20 years have been characterized by goodwill and sporadic, tentative deepening, with limited substance and content.
Russia’s role and importance in debates on promoting regional solutions for Afghanistan is paradoxical. Moscow is a second-rank actor in terms of its influence over the Afghan domestic situation, well behind Pakistan and Iran, and also behind India. However, it is a major actor in terms of cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in large part thanks to the growing role played by the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), but also because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989) is seen as having foreshadowed the difficulties that the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) troops have faced in the country since 2001. Moreover, the states of Central Asia, three of which border Afghanistan, are also often omitted from the regional view,1 even though all together, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, comprise a key neighborhood in Afghanistan’s future, especially with regard to the internal balance between the different ethnic groups that make up the country. This chapter first studies the weight of recent history in shaping Russia’s multifaceted relations with Afghanistan; second, it analyzes their bilateral relations and Russia’s proposed role in shaping solutions for the country; and third, it discusses Moscow’s responses at the regional level, both within the Central Asian, and a wider context.
Com enfoque no espaço Euro-Atlântico, este volume analisa as relações daRússia com atores diversos, em níveis de análise diferenciados, e comênfase nas dimensões de atuação relevantes a nível político, económico ede segurança. Destacam-se o espaço pós-soviético, área vital de atuaçãoe influência russa; as relações com a União Europeia (UE); o Ártico,pelos recursos energéticos abundantes e pelas rotas de distribuição; asrelações com os Estados Unidos da América; as relações com a Turquia, umator emergente com estatuto regional importante para a diplomacia deMoscovo; e as relações no quadro do Médio Oriente, região em grandemudança desde a primavera Árabe com implicações para a diplomacia russa.De um modo inclusivo esta análise visa clarificar os alinhamentos depolítica externa russa mais de duas décadas após o fim da UniãoSoviética, com todas as implicações que lhe estão subjacentes,constituindo um contributo fundamental para a compreensão das relaçõesinternacionais russas num contexto em mudança.
This chapter considers the global security and economic ambitions of Russia. Russia is now ruled by leaders who regard the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as one of the greatest geo-strategic debacles of the twentieth century. They are keenly aware of the rich history of their country and are determined to re-assert the role and position of Russia in the world. While willingness and capacity to make such a claim for global leadership is unequivocal what is more moot is the acceptance factor. Increasingly Russia’s policies and actions are regarded with great scorn in some capitals notably in the Western World. Its policies on Ukraine, human rights, Syria and denuclearization are considered antagonistic in many parts of the West. The challenge for Russia and other global actors is to increasingly find those areas where there are shared interests even if tactics may differ such as on counter-terrorism and limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass murder.
Although the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev is often seen as a continuation of Vladimir Putin's presidency, with the same policies applied in the same way, this book disagrees, arguing that Medvedev's foreign policy was significantly different from Putin's. The book considers especially the relationship between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security configuration, including both NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a relationship of great importance to Russia, given constant attention. It discusses a wide variety of issues, including "frozen conflicts", security co-operation and nuclear weapons reductions, highlights the different tone and approach under Medvedev, exemplified especially by his draft European Security Treaty, and shows how after Putin's return to the presidency there has been a shift in foreign policy, with much great emphasis on influencing Russia's immediate neighbours and on Eurasian union, and less emphasis on rapprochement and co-operation.
Traditionally, Containment and Engagement strategies are considered to be the part of the United States foreign policy during the Cold War. However, recent developments in international relations indicated that these strategies are still relevant to the contemporary foreign policy of the U.S., particularly in the U.S.-Russian relations. Contradictory presidency of George W. Bush has raised a question which of the mentioned foreign policy strategies was dominating in the U.S.-Russian relations. On the one hand, U.S. officials had declared that partnership with Russia was being pursued. On the other hand, the administration of G.W. Bush favored the expansion of NATO and did not surrender the initiative of missile defense shield. This paper intends to assess which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) dominated in U.S.-Russian relations during the presidency of G.W. Bush and to analyse reasons of such domination and the ways these strategies were implemented. The results of the research indicate that G. W. Bush administration implemented different foreign policy towards Russia on the declared and practical foreign policy levels. If on the official U.S. foreign policy level Russia’s engagement strategy dominated, in the U.S. foreign policy practice, particularly influenced by the foreign policy of Russia, and to a lesser extent by the events in the international arena, the dominant foreign policy strategy towards Russia was Russia’s containment strategy.
That the foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov and John Kerry on 14 September 2013 agreed to a six-point plan for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons cannot gloss over one thing: relations between Russia and the United States are at a low point. Reasons for this profound alienation are incompatible domestic and foreign policy aims and perceptions of the two governments. The willingness for the restart announced by President Barack Obama after his election is missing.
Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy examines the American, Chinese, and Russian (Big 3) competition for power and influence in the Post-Cold War Era. With the ascension of regional powers such as India, Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, the Big 3 dynamic is an evolving one, which cannot be ignored because of its effect to not only reshape regional security, but also control influence and power in world affairs.
The aim of this text is to contribute to the discussion about formation and subsequent development of the Georgian identity, which we consider as an important factor in current European vector of the Georgian foreign policy. From this perspective we try to set the pro-Western orientation of Georgia in the context of confrontation between Russia's foreign policy strategies and foreign policy concepts and policies of the EU. The research was conducted by means of analysis of recent academic texts and newspaper sources.
Russia has a dual self-perception deeply rooted in its historical development. It is represented in two competing traditions of defining Russia's position in the world. While some parts of society view Russia as a part of Europe, others believe that it is a distinct Eurasian power. An academic view - although one less popular among Moscow foreign policy-making elites - defines Russia as a Euro-Pacific power possessing vital interests in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. This article examines recent developments in Russian foreign policy decision-making with a view to interpreting how contemporary dilemmas have featured in the adaptation and rearticulation of the two predominant identity traditions by Russian foreign policy actors since 1991. It also analyses how the beliefs of the situated agents, namely, political elites and bureaucratic, intellectual and business actors at various levels, have contributed to Russia's interpretation of recent global power shifts. These are examined with particular reference to the ongoing crisis in Russia's relations with the West, sharply accented in Ukraine, and the emerging significance of the Asia-Pacific for thinking about the Russian foreign policy and its role in the world.
This article addresses the question of interaction between Western and “non-Western” international relations (IR) by analyzing liberal theory of IR that is emerging in contemporary Russia. We argue that, despite a growing diversity within Russian scholarship of liberal orientation, it remains largely a product of Western, particularly American, intellectual hegemony, and more so than any other theoretical perspective. As compared to two other existing traditions in Russian IR—realism and critical studies—liberalism remains the most dependent and therefore must be explored before any other traditions as a crucial case for understanding the dialectic of cultural dependence and hegemony in production of global knowledge. We argue that the greater dependence of Russian liberal IR results from its relatively weak indigenous tradition, perception of Russia’s material weakness as opportunity, and greater availability of Western research funds. We also discuss an alternative, less dependent version of Russian liberal IR, and opportunities that its existence implies for development of a global, de-centered international relations theory.
Sila i vliyanie v amerikano-rossiiskikh otnosheniyakh. Semioticheskiy analiz (Power and influence in U.S. —Russian relations. A semiotic analysis)
- Igor Zevelev
- Mikhail Troitskiy
See Igor Zevelev and Mikhail Troitskiy, Sila i vliyanie v amerikano-rossiiskikh otnosheniyakh. Semioticheskiy analiz (Power and influence in U.S. —Russian relations. A semiotic analysis) (Moscow: NOFMO, 2006).
What Russian Empire?'' New York Times
- See Dmitri
- Trenin
See Dmitri Trenin, ''What Russian Empire?'' New York Times, August 23, 2011, http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/opinion/24iht-edtrenin24.html.
The Speeding Troika,'' Russia Beyond the Headlines
- Andrew C Kuchins
Andrew C. Kuchins, ''The Speeding Troika,'' Russia Beyond the Headlines, September 21, 2010, http://rbth.ru/articles/2010/09/21/the_speeding_troika04953.html. Russian Foreign Policy THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j WINTER 2012