Two traditions of happiness research, not two distinct types of happiness

Abstract

In an earlier paper (Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008), we outlined a critique of the distinction being made between eudaimonic and hedonic forms of happiness. That paper seems to have had the desired effect in stimulating discourse on this important subject as evidenced by a number of responses from our colleagues. In this paper, we address these responses collectively. In particular, we outline common intellectual ground with the responding authors as well as points of difference.

Full text

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by:
[Biswas-Diener, Robert]
On:
15 May 2009
Access details:
Access Details: [subscription number 911207967]
Publisher
Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The Journal of Positive Psychology
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t724921263
Two traditions of happiness research, not two distinct types of happiness
Robert Biswas-Diener
a
; Todd B. Kashdan
b
; Laura A. King
c
a
Centre for Applied Positive Psychology, Milwaukie, OR, USA
b
Department of Psychology, George Mason
University, Fairfax, VA, USA
c
Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
Online Publication Date: 01 May 2009
To cite this Article Biswas-Diener, Robert, Kashdan, Todd B. and King, Laura A.(2009)'Two traditions of happiness research, not two
distinct types of happiness',The Journal of Positive Psychology,4:3,208 — 211
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17439760902844400
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760902844400
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

The Journal of Positive Psychology
Vol. 4, No. 3, May 2009, 208–211
Two traditions of happiness research, not two distinct types of happiness
Robert Biswas-Diener
a
*
, Todd B. Kashdan
b
*
and Laura A. King
c
a
Centre for Applied Positive Psychology, Milwaukie, OR, USA;
b
Department of Psychology, George Mason University,
Fairfax, VA, USA;
c
Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
In an earlier paper (Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008), we outlined a critique of the distinction being made
between eudaimonic and hedonic forms of happiness. That paper seems to have had the desired effect in
stimulating discourse on this important subject as evidenced by a number of responses from our colleagues. In
this paper, we address these responses collectively. In particular, we outline common intellectual ground with the
responding authors as well as points of difference.
Keywords: happiness; meaning in life; subjective well-being, eudaimonia; self-determination theory
Introduction
The surge of attention given to eudaimonia in the
scientific literature (e.g., Breines, Crocker, & Garcia,
2008; Ryan & Deci, 2001), textbooks (Compton, 2004;
Snyder & Lopez, 2007), and the mainstream media
(e.g., O: The Oprah Magazine , March 2008), motivated
us to carefully scrutinize what we know, what we don’t
know, and whether there are any costs to the wide
adoption of the idea of two types of happiness. We
believe that eudaimonia has entered the lexicon of
psychology with minimal scientific scrutiny and felt it
necessary to ask some basic questions about this topic.
We believe that the science of happiness will benefit
not only from our skepticism but also from the
intelligent commentaries to our paper. Indeed, we
would like to thank our colleagues who took the time
to present many insightful comments related to our
original article on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being
(Kashdan et al., 2008). We appreciate the willingness
of these authors to meet the bold spirit of our essay
with similar courage. Although we did not intend to
baffle or provoke, we believe that our article has been
effective in our fundamental aim of increasing critical
dialogue and introducing intellectual caution about the
topic of eudaimonic happiness. We do not want to lose
either this forward momentum or the clarity of this
dialogue by fault-finding each response in this issue.
Rather than responding to each individual point made
by Delle Fave and Bassi (2009), Keyes and Annas
(2009), Ryan and Huta (2009) and Waterman (2008),
here we address broad points of agreement and
departure.
Common ground
Well-being profiles
It might appear that we argue for a monolithic
approach to happiness (what Ryan and Huta, this
issue, refer to as the ‘Big One’). If this is how our
article, and our recent research on the topic (e.g.,
Kashdan & Steger, 2007; King & Hicks, 2007; King,
Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006), was interpreted then
we did an inadequate job of describing our position.
Our approach is exemplified best by the following
passage from our original article:
Our reading of the research literature suggests that
there is good evidence that eudaimonic and hedonic
aspects of well-being can operate in tandem ...
Focusing research attention on specific dimensions of
well-being allows for greater clarity in communication,
facilitates comparison ...and promotes flexibility in
the mixture of well-being variables used in research
(Kashdan et al., 2008, p. 228).
This position overlaps with the work by Richard
Ryan and Ed Deci (2000) on self-determination theory
(SDT) and those who continue to extend this model
(e.g. Sheldon, 2004). Their research shows that the
types of goals people pursue and the reasons they are
pursued act as a synergistic aspect of a person’s well-
being. Other research from SDT underscores how
autonomy supportive environments can facilitate well-
being. These researchers use a continuum of motiva-
tion and various psychological needs that, when
satisfied, provide the nutriments to feel good and
function at more optimal levels. They describe how the
degree to which these needs are satisfied is important,
*Corresponding author. Email: Robert@cappeu.org; tkashdan@gmu.edu
ISSN 1743–9760 print/ISSN 1743–9779 online
ß 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17439760902844400
http://www.informaworld.com
Downloaded By: [Biswas-Diener, Robert] At: 20:39 15 May 2009

and the degree to which a person shows balance in
satisfying autonomy, competence, and belonging needs
are both important (two related but separable elements
of well-being; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). The SDT
approach is sensible in that researchers clarify how
some studies focus on subjective experiences (whether
affect or cognitive appraisals of life satisfaction) and
other studies focus on other levels of analysis including
strivings, psychological needs, and the environments
that best allow these needs to be met so that people can
perform at their best.
We also want to emphasize the valuable distinction
between symptoms and functioning made by Keyes
and Annas (2009). Researchers often measure symp-
toms in clinical trials as a proxy for functioning when
they are related but distinct (McKnight & Kashdan, in
press). We often forget the importance of behavior and
functioning and implicitly assume that by measuring
positive experiences we are measuring positive func-
tioning. Although they are positively correlated, as
Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) demonstrate, they
are related but independent. It would be unfortunate if
our interventions to improve people’s well-being only
focused on symptoms or how they feel about their
lives, and failed to address their functioning. To our
knowledge, the research by Keyes and colleagues is the
first time that measures of well-being were differen-
tiated according to this framework (symptoms vs.
functioning). This is exactly the type of conceptually
meaningful, precise strategy for distinguishing well-
being constructs that we feel has been lacking in
discussions of eudaimonia.
We would like to emphasize that, concerning these
and related approaches (Kashdan & Steger, 2007; King
et al., 2006; Sheldon & Tan, 2007), there need be no
intellectual exclusivity and there ought to be flexibility
in studying the inter-relationships among these philo-
sophical ‘camps.’ Compare this with the approach
being offered by Waterman (2008) who asserts that
there are qualitatively different types of happiness and
that certain elements are categorized separately from
others. This latter approach is guided by a priori beliefs
as the data are not yet available to support this idea.
Instead of referring to qualitatively different types of
happiness (those that are phenomenologically felt as
distinct from one another) we believe it is more precise
and flexible to provide conceptual frameworks for
addressing the question of why particular combina-
tions of elements (at various levels of analysis) will lead
to various outcomes. Taking context into considera-
tion, as do Delle Fave and Bassi (2009), and consider-
ing the intricate interplay of well-being variables at
various levels of analysis, as do Keyes and Annas
(2009) and Ryan and Huta (2009) provides the
foundation for examining how meaning making,
affective experience, and overall functioning relate to
one another.
Points of departure
What is eudaimonia?
In our original article, we suggest that the sheer
number of constructs and variables related to eudai-
monia serve to confuse, rather than clarify, this
interesting concept. What becomes clear from reading
the commentaries, particularly those by Waterman and
Keyes and Annas, is how poorly unified is the study of
eudaimonia. Although Keyes provides an explicit
definition of eudaimonia, the vast majority of people
studying this topic are not using his definition or
operationalization. In fact, of the four responses to our
article, no two presents the same definition of
eudaimonia. Only two of the commentaries address
the importance of context in studying happiness (Delle
Fave & Bassi, 2009; Ryan & Huta, 2009), only two
commentaries explicitly inform us that the work of
recent philosophers must be read to understand the
nature of eudaimonia (Keyes & Annas, 2009;
Waterman, 2008), only one of the commentaries
partitions certain positive affects as being part of
hedonics and other positive affects as part of eudai-
monics (Waterman, 2008), and of the three commen-
taries that address the operationalization of
eudaimonia, none of them use the same conceptual
framework or measurement strategy (Keyes & Annas,
2009; Ryan & Huta; Waterman, 2008).
It could be that the apparent disagreement about
eudaimonia stems from the philosophical ambiguity of
the concept. A variety of authors have interpreted
Aristotle’s original writings and, for scientific pur-
poses, clearly, there is not sufficient consensus to treat
this concept as a singular variable. Waterman (2008),
himself, points to areas of personal disagreement with
Aristotle and both Waterman and Keyes and Annas
discuss modern day ‘eudaemonist’ theorists; but
neither of them provides a guide to how we are to
evaluate the quality of the various interpretations.
Should we be faithful to Aristotle’s original writings?
What is it about the modern eudaemonist theories that
might better lend themselves to empirical study? On
what basis should we accept Waterman’s (2008)
revision to Aristotle?
Upon reading these commentaries, it becomes clear
that, to date, there remain serious problems in the
translation of eudaimonia from philosophy to psychol-
ogy. Certainly, the criticisms raised by Keyes can be
levied at almost every reference to Artistotle’s work on
eudaimonia in the psychology literature (e.g.,
Compton, 2004; Peterson, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2001;
Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Snyder & Lopez, 2007;
Waterman, 1993, 2007; Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti,
2008). Moreover, we are still unclear as to how and
why flow, vitality, and interest are in the eudaimonia
‘bin’ and are divorced from other high energy, positive
emotional experiences and motivational states that are
The Journal of Positive Psychology 209
Downloaded By: [Biswas-Diener, Robert] At: 20:39 15 May 2009

in the hedonics ‘bin.’ The same ambiguity applies to
meaning in life, which is a cognitive appraisal that a
person makes about his or her life. Each of us is a
proponent of good theory and, despite four commen-
taries, none have provided a theoretical rationale for
these distinctions.
Further, the question of ultimate value of embrac-
ing this all-encompassing ambiguous construct remains
unanswered. We stand by our original argument
perfectly described by Ryan and Huta, ‘eudaimonic
sensibilities add an unnecessary layer of obscurity to
the theory.’ Considering the difficulty of communicat-
ing science to non-scientists, we don’t understand the
utility of adding additional terminology to ‘categorize’
self-determination theory as eudaimonia. Even Ryan
and Huta agree that it is the processes, functions,
values, and organization of elements within a person
that is important. What is gained by reducing this
complexity into a category that is distinct from useful
elements that help flesh out the theoretical model such
as emotions and cognitive appraisals about the self,
other people, and the world?
It is the notion of observing various combinations
of variables that we argue is needed. Subjective well-
being components (positive affect, negative affect,
judgments about life) are not separate from other
well-being components, they are in the same nomolo-
gical net and are even included in the same conceptual
models. For instance, Waterman suggests that there
are three categories of experience: occasions on which
both are present, occasions on which hedonia is present
but not eudaimonia, and occasions on which neither
are present. This is our point. Guided by a meaningful
conceptual framework, we should be examining path-
ways between matrices of variables, with an eye toward
relevant moderator variables (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Lent, 2004).
Hedonic pleasure remains hedonic pleasure
We remain steadfast in our original assertion that
existing evidence does not support a conceptualization
of two qualitatively distinct forms of happiness.
Regardless of its source, it is still hedonic happiness.
Considering the conceptualization proposed by Telfer,
and described by Waterman (2008), we can see that
hedonic pleasure may have been a dead end road
for those interesting in eudaimonia to begin with.
According to Telfer (1990), hedonic pleasure sometimes
occurs in the absence of eudaimonia, but eudaimonia
never occurs in the absence of hedonic pleasure. This
conceptualization, of course, requires empirical support
addressing the question of whether engaging in eudai-
monic activities is always associated with feelings of
pleasure. Should such a conceptualization prove to be
supported by research, it certainly has important
ramifications for research on eudaimonia, suggesting,
at its base, that hedonic happiness does not differentiate
eudaimonia from non-eudaimonic activity. Hedonic
happiness, instead, is beside the point. If hedonic
pleasure does not distinguish eudaimonic activity from
other activities (except quantitatively) then why focus
on hedonic well-being in research on variables purport-
ing to represent eudaimonic tendencies? If hedonic
feelings of pleasure are simply a by-product of such
activities (Deci & Ryan, 2000), why focus on these
feelings in research on eudaimonia? And why label
those feelings qualitatively different from hedonic
feelings that emerge from other pleasurable activities?
It is surely no small irony that research intending to
demonstrate that happiness is not everything should
focus, nevertheless, on hedonic well-being as an out-
come. The quantitative characteristic of this hedonic
pleasure (e.g., its level, frequency, or intensity) would
seem to be the last place one might look to demonstrate
a qualitative difference between two types of human
experiences. Instead, researchers might examine vari-
ables that are, themselves, clearly empirically and con-
ceptually distinct from hedonic well-being, to examine
the non-affective consequences of the activities and
motivations that are thought to represent eudaimonia.
Hedonic pleasure reinforces many human behav-
iors, some of which have been labeled eudaimonic. But
these feelings would seem to be the least important
aspect of the Good Life, from the eudaimonist
perspective. We concur with Waterman in calling for a
more expansive list of outcomes that ought to be
considered as consequences that might be pursued as
they relate to the ‘why’ of happiness (but not happiness,
itself). Surely, these more distal variables would be the
place to pursue the notion that some activities or
motivations represent a nobler life than otherwise. To
call the hedonic feeling of pleasure that accompany (and
perhaps maintain) such behaviors qualitatively different
from the pleasure that derives from other less noble
activities is simply not tenable from the data to date.
As Waterman (2008) points out, ‘eudaimonic
research’ is relatively young and we believe this
scientific tradition should not be presented or accepted
as more established than it is. We are concerned about
the potential dangers of people misinterpreting a
distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic happiness
as meaning that there are two unrelated experiences of
happiness. In the end, we agree with Ryan and Deci
(2001) that there are two intellectual traditions of
happiness research, and that looking at happiness
antecedents and outcomes through a variety of lenses is
instructive and important.
Acknowledgements
The contributions of the first two authors to this manuscript
were equal. This work was supported by National Institute of
Mental Health grant MH-73937 to Todd B. Kashdan.
210 R. Biswas-Diener et al.
Downloaded By: [Biswas-Diener, Robert] At: 20:39 15 May 2009

References
Breines, J.G., Crocker, J., & Garcia, J.A. (2008). Self-
objectification and well-being in women’s daily lives.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 583–598.
Compton, W.C. (2004). An introduction to positive psychol-
ogy. New York: Wadsworth Publishing.
Deci, E.L., & Ryan, R.M. (2000). The ‘what’ and ‘why’ of
goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of
behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.
Delle Fave, A., & Bassi, M. (2009). The contribution of
diversity to happiness research. Journal of Positive
Psychology, 4, 205–207.
Kashdan, T.B., Biswas-Diener, R., & King, L.A. (2008).
Reconsidering happiness: The costs of distinguishing
between hedonics and eudaimonia. Journal of Positive
Psychology, 3, 219–233.
Kashdan, T.B., & Steger, M.F. (2007). Curiosity and
pathways to well-being and meaning in life: Traits,
states, and everyday behaviors. Motivation and Emotion,
31, 159–173.
Keyes, C., & Annas, J. (2009). Feeling good and functioning
well: distinctive concepts in ancient philosophy and
contemporary science. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4,
197–201.
Keyes, C.L.M., Shmotkin, D., & Ryff, C.D. (2002).
Optimizing well-being: The empirical encounter of two
traditions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
82, 1007–1022.
King, L.A., & Hicks, J.A. (2007). Whatever happened to
‘what might have been’? Regret, happiness, and maturity.
American Psychologist, 62, 625–636.
King, L.A., Hicks, J.A., Krull, J., & Del Gaiso, A.K. (2006).
Positive affect and the experience of meaning in life.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 179–196.
Lent, R.W. (2004). Toward a unifying theoretical and
practical perspective on well-being and psychosocial
adjustment. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 51,
482–509.
McKnight, P.E., & Kashdan, T.B. (in press). The importance
of functional impairment to mental health outcomes:
A case for reassessing our goals in depression treatment
research. Clinical Psychology Review.
Peterson, C. (2006). A primer in positive psychology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Ryan, R.M., & Deci, E.L. (2000). Self-determination theory
and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social devel-
opment, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.
Ryan, R.M., & Deci, E.L. (2001). On happiness and human
potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudai-
monic well-being. Annual Review Psychology, 52, 141–166.
Ryan, R.M., & Huta, V. (2009). Wellness as healthy
functioning or wellness as happiness: The importance of
eudaimonic thinking. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4,
202–204.
Ryan, R.M., Huta, V., & Deci, E.L. (2008). Living well:
A self-determination theory perspective on eudaimonia.
Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 139–170.
Sheldon, K.M. (2004). Optimal human being: An integrated
multi-level perspective. New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Sheldon, K.M., & Niemiec, C. (2006). It’s not just the
amount that counts: Balanced need-satisfaction also
affects well-being. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91, 331–341.
Sheldon, K.M., & Tan, H. (2007). The multiple determina-
tion of well-being: Independent effects of positive needs,
traits, goals, selves, social supports, and cultural contexts.
Journal of Happiness Studies, 8, 565–592.
Snyder, C.R., & Lopez, S. (2007). Positive psychology: The
scientific and practical explorations of human strengths.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Telfer, E. (1990). Happiness
. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Waterman, A.S. (1993). Two conceptions of happiness:
Contrasts of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia) and
hedonic enjoyment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 64, 678–691.
Waterman, A.S. (2007). On the importance of distinguishing
hedonia and eudaimonia when considering the hedonic
treadmill. American Psychologist, 62, 612–613.
Waterman, A.S. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: A eudai-
monist’s perspective. Journal of Positive Psychology, 3,
234–252.
Waterman, A.S., Schwartz, S.J., & Conti, R. (2008). The
implications of two conceptions of happiness (hedonic
enjoyment and eudaimonia) for the understanding of
intrinsic motivation. Journal of Happiness Studies, 9,
41–79.
The Journal of Positive Psychology 211
Downloaded By: [Biswas-Diener, Robert] At: 20:39 15 May 2009