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Enforcement Co-operation between Norway
and Russia in the Barents Sea Fisheries
By
Geir Hønneland
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute
P.O. Box 326
N-1326 LYSAKER
Direct Tel.: 47 67 11 19 19
Fax: 47 67 11 19 10
E-mail: Geir.Honneland@fni.no
Abstract: Since 1993, Norway and Russia have co-operated on the enforcement of the Barents
Sea fisheries, a co-operation that the Parties claim to be highly successful and an example to
be copied by other states. The co-operation was triggered by a rather extensive Russian
overfishing in the area in 1992, following new landing practices and incentive structures of
Russian fishermen. Some measures, including the exchange of catch and landings data, were
implemented immediately after the Parties agreed to co-operate. The main instrument in the
co-operation has been the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector. In addition to administering the
exchange of data and personnel, it has undertaken several more comprehensive tasks, such as
elaborating a uniform system of conversion factors, joint routines for the closing and opening
of fishing grounds, and a co-ordinated introduction of obligatory use of selection grids in the
cod fishery. As far as actual problem solving is concerned, the effects of the enforcement co-
operation are more uncertain, but it has clearly represented a relative improvement
compared to the earlier situation.
Key words: fisheries management, enforcement, the Barents Sea, Norwegian fisheries
management, Russian fisheries management
Short title: Enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia
1
Introduction
Since 1976, the Barents Sea fisheries have been managed by a bilateral Russian-Norwegian
regime. From the outset, the regime included co-operation between the two coastal states in
the fields of research and regulation, including distribution of quotas. In 1993, the co-
operation was extended to include control and enforcement of regulations. Norwegian and
Russian fisheries management authorities claim that the co-operation is highly successful and
present it as an example to be copied by other states. The objective of this article is to trace
the background for the establishment of this enforcement co-operation, to describe its
contents and evaluate its success. The main sources for the investigation are the Protocols
from meetings in the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission from the period 1992-
98 and in the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector from its establishment in 1993 until 1999.1 First, a
brief outline is provided of the management co-operation between Norway and Russia that
existed prior to 1993, i.e. within the spheres of research and regulations. Next, the national
enforcement systems of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea are presented in more detail
before focus is directed towards the evolving enforcement co-operation between the two
states since 1993. A rather detailed account of the measures introduced under the auspices of
this co-operation is provided, and their success in terms of problem solving is discussed.
The Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Management Regime
The Barents Sea comprises those parts of the Arctic Ocean lying between the North Cape on
the Norwegian mainland, the South Cape on the Spitzbergen Island of the Svalbard
Archipelago, and the Russian archipelagos Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land.2 For the
Map 1: The Barents Sea region
1 The Protocols from meetings in both the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission and the Permanent
Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector are
prepared in Norwegian and Russian. The Norwegian texts are used in this investigation, and all translations are
done by the author. For the sake of simplicity, the titles of the Protocols are rendered in English in the
references. Likewise, the information that the Protocols are available at the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries is
not repeated in each single reference. It should also be mentioned that the author has participated in several
meetings of the Permanent Committee as an interpreter (meetings in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 1999) and joint
Norwegian-Russian seminars for fishery inspectors (in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999). Observational data
are sporadically referred to in order to supplement the Protocols, though only to the extent that the delegates
themselves have reported similar events and impressions to the public. Moreover, the author worked as an
interpreter in the Norwegian Coast Guard during the period 1988-93. A few events from this period, especially
related to the revealed Russian overfishing in 1992 and the subsequent initiative to establish a working group on
enforcement co-operation, are also referred to. Here, ”author’s own observation” is used as reference instead of
searching for a newspaper description of events to which the author has first-hand knowledge. Likewise, it
would seem odd to conduct interviews with previous colleagues about incidents the author himself participated
in. Again, however, reference is only made to events which have already been described to the public.
2 Gerard J. Mangone, Mangone’s Concise Marine Almanac, 2nd ed. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), 23.
2
purpose of discussing the management of the fish resources in the Barents Sea, however, the
fish banks to the west, north and east of Spitzbergen are also usually included. So are the
banks of the Northern Norwegian coast down to the 62nd parallel. Both groundfish and pelagic
species are traditionally important in this region. Economically, the Norwegian-Atlantic cod
(Gadus morhua) is by far the most important species. Other groundfish species of importance
are haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), redfish (Sebastes mentella and Sebastes marinus),
saithe (Pollachius virens) and Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides). Atlanto-
Scandinavian herring (Clupea harengus) and capelin (Mallotus villosus) are the key pelagic
species in the area. As they serve as food to groundfish and marine mammals, they are crucial
to the functioning of the ecosystem. In addition, there is a considerable fishery of shrimp
(Pandalus borealis) in the Barents Sea.3
The principle of a 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was adopted at the
beginning of the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1975. The right
and responsibility to manage marine resources within an area of 200 nautical miles from the
3 A more detailed presentation of the Barents Sea fish resources is found in Havets ressurser (”Resources of the
Sea”), summary in English, Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, Norway.
3
shore was thus transferred to the coastal states. This led to a transition from multilateral
negotiations for the Barents Sea fisheries under the auspices of the Northeast Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to bilateral negotiations between coastal states with
sovereign rights to fish stocks. To formalise these mutual fishing rights and, more
importantly, to establish a common management regime fit to secure the fish stocks of the
area, Norway and the Soviet Union entered into several bilateral fishery co-operation
agreements in the mid-1970s. The most important ones related to the establishment of the
management regime are the mutual agreements of 11 April 19754 on co-operation in the
fisheries sector and of 15 October 19765 on mutual fisheries relations.
The Norwegian-Russian management regime for the Barents Sea fish stocks defines
objectives and practices for co-operative management between the two states - in addition to
management procedures at each of the two nations’ levels - within the fields of research and
regulations, and since 1993 also compliance control. The co-operation between
Russian/Soviet and Norwegian scientists in the mapping of the Barents Sea fish resources
dates back to the 1950s.6 It is now institutionalised within the framework of the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The main participants are the Knipovich
Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (PINRO) in Murmansk, the
Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (“Havforskningsinstituttet”) in Bergen and the
Norwegian Institute for Fisheries and Aquaculture Ltd. (“Fiskeriforskning AS”) in Tromsø.
The institute in Tromsø has in recent years assumed the main responsibility for research on
shrimp and marine mammals, while the other species of the Barents Sea are largely the
responsibility of the Bergen institute. The co-operation is generally characterised as
successful.7
The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission, hereinafter called the Joint
Commission, includes members of the two countries’ fishery authorities, ministries of foreign
affairs, marine scientists and representatives of fishermen’s organisations.8 The Norwegian
delegation to the Joint Commission is headed by the administrative leader of the Norwegian
Ministry of Fisheries. The Russian delegation is headed by the first Deputy Chairman of the
Fisheries Committee of the Russian Federation, which took over the responsibilities of the
previous Soviet Ministry of Fisheries in the Russian Federation.9 The Joint Commission
4 St prp nr 86 (1974-75) Om samtykke til inngåelse av en avtale mellom Norge og Sovjetunionen om samarbeid
innen fiskerinæringen (”Report to the Storting No. 86 (1974-75) On the Consensus to Conclude an Agreement
between Norway and the Soviet Union on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry”).
5 St prp nr 74 (1976-77) Om samtykke til ratifikasjon av en avtale mellom Regjeringen i Kongeriket Norge og
Regjeringen i Unionen av Sovjetiske Sosialistiske Republikker om gjensidige fiskeriforbindelser (”Report to the
Storting No. 74 (1976-77) On the Consensus to Ratify an Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom
of Norway and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fishery Relations”).
6 Olav Schram Stokke, Lee G. Anderson and Nataliya Mirovitskaya , ”The Barents Sea Fisheries”, in The
Effectiveness of International Regimes, ed. Marc L. Levy and Oran R. Young (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1999).
7 Ibid.
8 Cf. Protocols from sessions in the Joint Commission.
9 In March 1997, President Yeltsin deprived the Fisheries Committee of its ministerial status and subordinated it
to the Ministry of Agriculture. The governmental structure of the Russian Federation was reorganised in
connection with the economic and political crisis in the autumn of 1998. According to the decree ”O strukture
4
convenes at least once a year, establishes total allowable catches (TAC) for the joint fish
stocks of the Barents Sea: cod, haddock and capelin. Cod and haddock are shared on a 50-50
basis, while the capelin quota is shared 60-40 in Norway’s favour. In addition, quotas of the
parties’ exclusive stocks are exchanged. Russia has traditionally given a share of its cod quota
to Norway in return for a share in Norway’s quotas of redfish, herring and Greenland
halibut.10 However, after the introduction of reforms in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the
Russians have kept a larger portion of their cod quota.11 After the sessions in the Joint
Commission, the two parties conduct further quota exchanges in bilateral negotiations with
third countries. Traditionally, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has given part of its
Barents Sea cod quota to the Faroe Islands, while Norway has transferred a share of its quota
to the EU in exchange for quota shares in the North Sea.12
On the whole, Russian-Norwegian fisheries management co-operation has proven to
be fairly successful in recent years.13 Most stocks have grown steadily since the end of the
1980s.14 The capelin stock, with its rapid fluctuations, represents a departure from this
tendency. While the stock soon recovered from a near total breakdown in 1985-86, a new
setback came in 1992-93.15 Furthermore, the Greenland halibut stock has suffered a
threatening decline since the early 1990s, and is now only taken as by-catch (except for a
limited direct fishery with passive gear).16 A decline in the cod stock has been observed since
the mid-1990s.17 The total quota was accordingly reduced from the all-time-high of 890,000
tonnes in 199718 to 520,000 tonnes in 1999.19 The most serious problem in recent years in the
co-operation between Norwegian and Russian authorities has been the repeated refusals by
Russian authorities to applications for joint Russian-Norwegian research cruises in the
federal’nykh organov ispolnitel’noy vlasti” (“On the Structure of the Federal Bodies of the Executive Power”),
printed in Polyarnaya Pravda, Murmansk, 24 September 1998, p. 1, the Fisheries Committee was re-established
as a separate structure.
10 For a discussion of the distribution and exchange of quotas between Norway and the Soviet Union, see Olav
Schram Stokke and Alf Håkon Hoel, “Splitting the Gains: Political Economy of the Barents Sea Fisheries”,
Cooperation and Conflict 26 (1991): 49-65.
11 Cf. Protocols from the 20th (1991) to 27th (1998) sessions in the Joint Commission.
12 Alf Håkon Hoel, “The Barents Sea: Fisheries Resources for Europe and Russia”, in The Barents Region.
Cooperation in Arctic Europe, ed. Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (London: SAGE Publications, 1994);
and Olav Schram Stokke, Fisheries Management under Pressure. A Changing Russia and the Effectiveness of
the Barents Sea Regime (Lysaker, Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1995).
13 Cf. Hoel, “The Barents Sea: Fisheries Resources for Europe and Russia”; Stokke, Fisheries Management
under Pressure. A Changing Russia and the Effectiveness of the Barents Sea Regime; and Stokke, Anderson and
Mirovitskaya , ”The Barents Sea Fisheries”.
14 Cf. Havets ressurser.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 The same quota level was set in 1977 and 1978 - the two first years that the Joint Commission was in function.
Cf. Protocol from the 1st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission, 1976; Protocol from the
2nd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission, 1977.
19 Protocol from the 25th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1996, available at the
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries; Protocol from the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries
Commission, 1998.
5
Russian Zone of the Barents Sea.20 However, it should be noted that these refusals are
assumed to come from Russian security services, and not from fishery management
authorities.21 On the positive side, Norway and Russia took a common stance against Iceland
in the dispute regarding the Barents Sea Loophole.22
The Norwegian and Russian Enforcement Systems
Norwegian fisheries enforcement sticks to the principle of horizontal control; fishermen are
subject to control both on shore and at sea (as opposed to, for instance, the EU, which requires
control primarily on shore). The control measures can be divided into a passive and an active
part. The term passive control refers to the examination of the information fishermen are
obliged to submit about their activities at sea; authorities passively receive data from the
vessels and examine whether their behaviour has been lawful. Active control involves
physical tests by inspectors of this information. The passive control of Norwegian fisheries
management is exercised by the Directorate of Fisheries.23 The Directorate receives
information directly from the vessels (foreign vessels and Norwegian factory trawlers), catch
logs (Norwegian vessels exceeding a certain length) and landing data from the fishermen’s
sales organisations (applying to all Norwegian fish factories on shore). On the basis of these
data, the Directorate keeps continuous track of the remaining volume of a ship’s or a foreign
nation’s quota. When the quota is exhausted, steps can be taken to halt the fishing. In addition
to this, a certain responsibility for quota control rests with the sales organisations.24
The active quota control takes place locally where fish are landed, and is exercised by
the so-called Fish Control (“Kontrollverket”), a subunit of the Directory of Fisheries. The
Fish Control is a decentralised body with 5 district offices and some 80 inspectors at its
disposal.25 At sea, inspectors from the military Coast Guard check the fishing gear (e.g. the
mesh size), the catch (composition of the catch, size of the fish, presence of fry) and the actual
quantity of fish on board at the time of inspection.26 The Coast Guard consists of a southern
and a northern squadron with bases in Bergen and Sortland, respectively. Their areas of
20 Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1997; Protocol from the
27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1998.
21 Cf. e.g. discussions in the Norwegian fisheries newspaper Fiskeribladet, 9 September 1997, p. 10.
22 This is an area of international waters in the northeastern part of the Barents Sea, where Icelandic and other
vessels of various nationalities (partly under flags of convenience) have caught considerable amounts of cod
since the early 1990s. After several years of negotiations, Norway, Russia and Iceland reached an agreement in
March 1999 which gives Iceland a general cod quota for the Barents Sea, cf. Fishing News International 5/1999,
p. 3. For a further discussion of the Barents Sea Loophole, see Olav Schram Stokke, ”The Loophole of the
Barents Sea Regime”, POLOS Report No. 8/1998 (Lysaker, Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute).
23 The control responsibility of the Directorate of Fisheries is founded in Lov om saltvannsfiske (”Law on Marine
Fisheries”), Para. 45.
24 The control responsibility of the Norwegian sales organisations is founded in Lov om saltvannsfiske (”Law on
Marine Fisheries”), Para. 45a.
25 Pers. comm. by Einar Ellingsen, head of the control branch in the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries,
Sortland, May 1999. The Fish Control is currently under reorganisation.
26 The right of the Norwegian Coast Guard to conduct fisheries inspections at sea is founded in Lov om
saltvannsfiske (”Law on Marine Fisheries”), Para. 46-50.
6
responsibility are divided by the 65th parallel. The Coast Guard has approximately 10 vessels
patrolling ocean areas of the Barents Sea.27 The closing and opening of fishing grounds is
administered by a special service under the regional office of the Directorate of Fisheries in
Tromsø, the so-called Surveillance of Fishing Grounds (“Overvåkingstjenesten for fiskefelt”),
which has some 10 inspectors.28
Until 1998, enforcement in the Russian EEZ of the Barents Sea was the sole
responsibility of “Murmanrybvod”, the regional branch of “Rosrybvod” (“Russian fishery
inspection”), which in turn is part of the federal Fisheries Committee (see above).29
“Murmanrybvod” has been responsible for both the passive and active control. In addition, it
is responsible for control of fishing in rivers and lakes on the Kola Peninsula. It has 20
inspectors for control of the Barents Sea fisheries.30 However, as of July 1998, the
responsibility for control in the Barents Sea was transferred to the military Border Guard after
a long and fierce dispute with civilian fishing authorities.31 It should be noted that
“Murmanrybvod” is still in charge of all control operations except those carried out at sea,
e.g. passive control and catch control in harbour. Control at sea was supposed to become more
extensive as a result of the reform since the Border Guard has considerably more vessels at its
disposal than the two owned by “Murmanrybvod”. However, presence at sea by enforcement
authorities has actually been further reduced recently as a result of the economic crisis in
Russia.32 Although the Border Guard possesses more vessels than “Murmanrybvod”, it has so
far not been able to utilise this potential since it cannot afford to buy fuel for them.33 There are
reports of a massive catch of undersized fish in the Russian EEZ throughout the winter 1998-
99.34 Moreover, the Russian control bodies have traditionally given priority to a passive
control of documents, instead of an active, physical checking of the fish.35
Compliance with regulations is the Barents Sea fisheries is assessed to be generally
high. An investigation of violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard from the period
1986-92 concludes that most fishermen seem to comply with most regulations most of the
time.36 A qualitative interview study with Norwegian and Russian fishermen and
27 Årsrapport for Kystvakt Nord 1998 (”Annual Report for the Northern Branch of the Norwegian Coast Guard
for 1998 (Sortland, Norway: The Norwegian Coast Guard, 1999).
28 Pers. comm. by Jens-Petter Hansen, leader of the Surveillance of Fishing Grounds, Sortland, May 1999.
29 For an overview of the Northwest Russian fisheries enforcement system, see Geir Hønneland, ”Autonomy and
Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia”, Marine Policy 22 (1998): 57-65. A more
detailed presentation in Norwegian language is provided in Anne-Kristin Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk
fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet (”Norwegian and Russian Fisheries
Control in the Barents Sea – a Comparison with Regard to Effectiveness), MA Thesis, Department of Political
Science (Oslo, Norway: University of Oslo, 1999).
30 Pers. comm. by Boris Prishchepa, head of ”Murmanrybvod”, Sortland, May 1999. It should be observed that
part of the staff has been transferred to the military Border Guard after the reorganisation of July 1998.
31 For a description, cf. Geir Hønneland and Frode Nilssen, ”The Fisheries Sector of Northwestern Russia –
Norway’s Political Challenge”, FNI Report R:11-1998 (Lysaker, Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute).
32 Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Geir Hønneland, “Enforcement and Legitimacy in the Barents Sea Fisheries”, in Northern Waters:
Management Issues and Practice, ed. D. Symes (London: Blackwell Science, 1998); Geir Hønneland,
7
representatives of Norwegian fishermen’s organisations gives evidence to a management
system where regulations as well as regulation and enforcement bodies and procedures enjoy
a high degree of legitimacy among the fishermen.37 Violation rates from the Russian EEZ of
the Barents Sea are not open to the public. However, a qualitative analysis of compliance
levels in the Russian EEZ has been made. 38 A general conclusion is that no massive violations
of fishing regulations probably took place in Soviet days. Moreover, it is only after the
reorganisation of the Russian enforcement system in 1998 (see above) and the concurring
economic crisis in Russia from August 1998 (rendering fuel costs too high for the
enforcement body to have vessels at sea) that we have reason to believe that the Russian
enforcement bodies in the Barents Sea fisheries have partly lost control of activities at sea.39
The Establishment of a Norwegian-Russian Enforcement Co-operation
In the course of 1992, the Norwegian Coast Guard revealed a dramatic increase in cases of
under-reporting from Russian vessels, and took extra steps to calculate the total Russian catch
in the Barents Sea for that year.40 During autumn 1992, Norwegian fishery authorities
presented these figures to their Russian colleagues. They indicated overfishing by the
Russians of more than 100,000 tonnes.41 Overfishing hence constituted one quarter of the total
cod quota in the Barents Sea in 1992. Russia had 170,000 tonnes at its disposal, of a TAC of
396,000 tonnes, after internal quota exchanges with Norway.42 This estimate was supported by
export statistics, which indicated that close to the total Russian cod quota in the Barents Sea
had been exported to Norway.43 At the same time, considerable quantities had been exported
to other Western countries.44 Some cod had also been landed in Murmansk.45 The sudden rise
in overfishing coincided with Russian fishermen starting to deliver the bulk of their catches
abroad, primarily in Northern Norway.46 At the same time, the direct export of their product
increased the incentives for fishermen to underreport their catches (since they were paid better
abroad), and reduced the possibility for Russian authorities to keep track of the catches since
control had traditionally been conducted in connection with landings of fish in Russian ports.
This last factor in turn increased their possibilities of cheating.
“Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard”, Ocean Development and International Law 29
(1998): 339-360.
37 Geir Hønneland, ”Co-operative Action between Fishermen and Inspectors in the Svalbard Zone”, Polar
Record 35 (1999): 207-214; Geir Hønneland, ”Compliance in the Barents Sea Fisheries. How Fishermen
Account for Conformity with Rules”, Marine Policy (in press); Geir Hønneland, ”Co-management and
Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries”, Human Organization (in press).
38 Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet.
39 Ibid.
40 Author’s own observation.
41 Ibid.
42 Protocol from the 20th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1991.
43 The Norwegian Export Council for Fish, 1992.
44 Ibid.
45 Goskomstat, Murmansk, 1993.
46 The Norwegian Export Council for Fish, 1992.
8
Towards the end of 1992, both Norwegian and Russian authorities seem to have
become aware of the shortcomings of the control in Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea. At
the 21st session of the Joint Commission in November 1992, the delegation leaders of the two
parties jointly proposed the appointment of a working group to consider the question of co-
operation between the control bodies of the two states.47 This was reflected as follows in the
Protocol from the session:
”The Parties agree to appoint a joint working group consisting of experts in the fields of fisheries
regulation, legislation, statistics and control. The working group shall within the first quarter of
1993 present proposals for concrete co-operative measures.”48
No reference was made in the Protocol to the (at that time) suspected overfishing. However,
after the Expert Group had presented its proposals in May 1993 (see below), the Joint
Commission convened for a subsequent meeting under its 21st session in early June 1993. The
problems related to overfishing and the proposals from the working group were the only
issues on the agenda. Now, explicit reference was also made to the overfishing in the
Protocol:
”Problems with preventing the overfishing in the Barents Sea.49
The Parties note that a considerable overfishing of cod in all likelihood has taken place in the
Barents Sea. Due to the great significance of the fish resources to the two countries, the Parties
agreed on the necessity to strengthen control with the fishery in the Barents Sea. In this
connection, the Parties referred to Art. 11 in the Protocol from the 21st Session of the Joint
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission and to subsequent correspondence between the
Ministers of Fisheries of the two countries.
The Parties agreed through available sources to ascertain as soon as possible the extent of the
possible overfishing and exchange data on this.”50
The Proposals of the Expert Group
The Expert Group consisted of four representatives from each country. The Norwegian
delegation was entirely composed of representatives from the Directorate of Fisheries, and
was led by Deputy Director Lisbeth W. Plassa from the Directorate’s legal department. The
other representatives came from the legal, statistical and control departments. The Russian
47 Protocol from Meeting in the Norwegian-Russian Expert Group on Management Co-operation within the
Fisheries Sector, May 1993, Introduction.
48 Protocol from the 21th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1992, Art. 11.2.
49 The use of the definite form (the overfishing) indicates that the concrete overfishing at the time – and not
overfishing in general – is at issue. The use of the verb ”prevent” instead of e.g. ”halt”, however, alludes to an
overfishing that has not yet taken place and is hence not elegant language in either English or Norwegian in this
particular case.
50 Supplement to Protocol from the 21st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1993,
Art. 3.
9
delegation was headed by Deputy Director Viktor A. Gorokhov from the fisheries association
”Sevryba”.51 The enforcement body ”Murmanrybvod”, the research institute PINRO and the
federal Fisheries Committee were also represented.52 The Expert Group met three times
during spring 1993, once in Bergen, Tromsø and Sortland (Norway) to acquaint the Russian
delegates with the Norwegian enforcement system, once in Murmansk to inform the
Norwegian members about the Russian system, and one more time in Bergen to discuss co-
operative measures.53 The Expert Group presented a list of 18 concrete proposals within the
categories of legislation (two), information (five), control (nine) and others (two).54 Most of
them referred to exchange and co-ordination of information and procedures. In the Protocol
from the subsequent meeting under the 21st session of the Joint Commission in June 1993 (see
above), the work of the Expert Group and its proposals were assessed as follows:
”The Parties expressed great satisfaction with the work of the Norwegian-Russian expert group on
co-operation and management of resources. The proposals put forward in Protocol of 29 May […]
were regarded as very useful. […] The Parties discussed their further implementation.
The Parties agreed that enforcement authorities in the two countries shall take steps to strengthen
enforcement efforts at sea and in connection with landings of catches. There was agreement to
establish routines for direct contact between the enforcement authorities of the two countries for
exchange of information, concerning practical enforcement routines among other things, so that
the Parties in co-operation can make enforcement more effective.
The first meeting between the enforcement authorities of the two countries will take place in
Kirkenes [Norway] on 15-16 June 1993. As regards the proposal to place observers on each
others’ vessels, the Parties referred to the planned Coast Guard seminar in Norway, where it will
also be possible to discuss further proposals for a joint standardisation of enforcement routines.
Furthermore, the Parties agreed to prepare for Norwegian and Russian personnel to participate on
vessels used in connection with the closing and opening of fishing grounds.
In accordance with the proposal from the expert group, Norwegian enforcement authorities will
demand that the fishery and port tickets be produced on board Russian vessels. In cases when
these documents are not produced, this will be reported to Russian fishery authorities.
[...]
The Parties agreed to work for the establishment of a uniform system of conversion factors55 to be
used by all who fish in the Barents Sea.
51 In Soviet days, ”Sevryba” united all fishery actors from both industry and management in Northwestern
Russia. “Sevryba” was made into a private joint-stock company in the autumn of 1992 and has in recent years
seen its role in the management process somewhat reduced. For a further presentation of ”Sevryba”, see Geir
Hønneland, ”Autonomy and Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia”; Geir
Hønneland and Frode Nilssen, ”The Fisheries Sector of Northwestern Russia – Norway’s Political Challenge”.
52 Protocol from Meeting in the Norwegian-Russian Expert Group on Management Co-operation in the
Fisheries Sector, May 1993.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Factors used to calculate the weight of round fish from the weight of fish products.
10
The Parties agreed that Norwegian authorities shall forward data on landings of Russian vessels in
Norwegian ports to Russian authorities.56
The Parties agreed on the necessity to establish direct contact between the official sales
organisations so that settlement for Russian landings in Norway can take place through official
sales organisations.
Furthermore, the Parties agreed to exchange upon request copies of weekly catch reports and
information about inspections.
The Parties plan to establish an exchange of data with the help of modern information technology.
The practical details will be clarified by experts from the two countries.
The Parties agreed as a matter of routine to exchange complete texts of laws and regulations of
current interest with a view to an enhanced understanding of each others’ fisheries management
systems and a possible harmonisation of the regulations in certain fields.”57
Hence, the Parties agreed to establish means for direct contact between the enforcement
bodies of the two countries, and exchange law texts, observers and catch data. They also
agreed on more ambitious initiatives, such as the elaboration of uniform conversion factors
for fish products. Moreover, six months after the issue of enforcement problems had been
raised in the Joint Commission for the first time, the Parties agreed on several concrete co-
operative enforcement measures. For example, Norwegian enforcement authorities would
immediately start forwarding data on Russian landings in Norway to their Russian colleagues,
and the Norwegian Coast Guard would start checking the Russian document of fishery ticket
(giving the captain the right to fish) and port ticket (giving the vessel the right to fish).
Moreover, the Parties agreed to appoint a Permanent Committee under the Joint
Commission which could meet at short notice and when necessary to discuss management
and enforcement issues. The committee was a continuation of the Expert Group and came to
be known as the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, hereinafter referred to as the
Permanent Committee. The composition of the Permanent Committee has been fairly stable
since its establishment in 1993. As for the Norwegian delegation, the Coast Guard was given
a seat in connection with the transformation from Expert Group to Permanent Committee.58
Lisbeth W. Plassa has remained the head of the Norwegian delegation. Aleksandr Zelentsov,
head of ”Murmanrybovd” until 1999 and since then representative of the Russian Federation’s
Fisheries Committee in Norway, has headed the Russian delegation since 1996.59 Since 1995,
the federal Fisheries Committee has no longer been represented in the Russian delegation to
56 This measure had been proposed by the Joint Commission one year earlier, but does not seem to have been
implemented yet during the work of the Expert Group in spring 1993, cf. Supplement to Protocol from the 20th
Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1992, Art. 5.
57 Supplement to Protocol from the 21st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1993,
Art. 5.
58 Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994, Introduction.
59 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 10-13 September 1996, September 1996, Appendix 1.
11
the Permanent Committee.60 As a result of the reorganisation of Russian fisheries
enforcement, representatives of the military Border Guard were included in the Russian
delegation in connection with the meeting in May 1999.61 In addition, various experts from
the two countries’ fisheries administration and research institutions have occasionally met in
the Permanent Committee. The number of representatives in the Norwegian delegation has
varied from three to eleven, in the Russian delegation from three to eight (excluding
interpreters, but including observers).62
Initial Co-operative Measures
The above mentioned exchange of information was commenced immediately after the
proposals of the Expert Group had been approved by the Joint Commission in June 1993. The
most important measure was the exchange of landing data from Norwegian to Russian
enforcement authorities. The Russian overfishing in 1992 had been allowed to take place
since Russian authorities were no longer able to keep track of landings from their own
vessels, now primarily taking place in Norway. As a result of the co-operation between the
two countries’ enforcement bodies, data from these landings were now automatically
forwarded from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries to ”Murmanrybvod”.63 Moreover,
routines for informal exchange of information about the situation at sea were established
between the Norwegian Coast Guard and ”Murmanrybvod”.64 These measures were facilitated
by Norwegian aid in improving the communication lines to the Russian side. Both
”Murmanrybvod” and ”Sevryba” were connected to the Norwegian telecommunications
system, and telefaxes were purchased at the expense of Norwegian fisheries management
authorities.65 Likewise, systems for electronic transfer of data were established.66
Another important measure was that the Norwegian Coast Guard upon request from
”Murmanrybvod” started to control the presence of valid fishery and port tickets (see above)
on Russian vessels during inspection.67 Until then, the Coast Guard had only checked that the
60 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 29 August – 1 September 1995, September 1995,
Appendix 1.
61 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Appendix 1.
62 Until the meeting in May 1999, two or three representatives from each country were referred to as ”the
delegation” and the rest as ”other participants”. In the practical work of the Permanent Committee, no difference
was made between ”the delegations” and ”the others”. In the Protocol from the meeting in May 1999, all
participants were formally included in the respective delegations, cf. Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent
Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at
Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Appendix 1.
63 Author’s own observation.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Protocol from the 22nd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1993, Art. 11.2.
67 Author’s own observation.
12
vessel was licensed for fishing in the Norwegian EEZ.68 One increasing problem, according to
Russian enforcement authorities, was that Russian vessels with a right to fish only shrimp and
pelagic species engaged in the cod fishery.69 Earlier, Russian authorities would have detected
the cheating when the fish was landed. Now that the fish was mostly landed in Norway, the
vessels could fish for cod in Norwegian waters and deliver it in Norwegian ports, escaping
surveillance from Russian enforcement bodies altogether. As of May 1993, the Norwegian
Coast Guard had already started to control which species the Russian vessels were allowed
(by Russian authorities) to fish for by checking the fishery and port tickets.70 During summer
and autumn 1993, a handful of vessels only allowed to fish shrimp were detected in the cod
fishery in Norwegian waters.71 ”Murmanrybvod” was informed and the captains in question
had their fishery tickets withdrawn.72
The first in a series of joint Norwegian-Russian ”Coast Guard seminars” was held at the
Northern base of the Norwegian Coast Guard at Sortland in September 1993.73 The seminar
was visited by two Norwegian Cabinet Ministers (the Minister of Fisheries and the Minister
of Defence), 74 emphasising the political weight ascribed to the enforcement co-operation with
the Russians by Norwegian authorities. During the 22nd session in the Joint Commission in
November 1993, the emerging co-operation in the enforcement sector was assessed as
follows:
”The Parties expressed satisfaction that in accordance with the Supplement to the Protocol from
the 21st session in the Fisheries Commission, a Coast Guard seminar had been organised at
Sortland, where representatives from Norwegian and Russian enforcement authorities discussed
improvements in enforcement routines and future co-operation. The Parties noted that routines for
exchange of information between Norwegian and Russian enforcement authorities have now been
established.
The Parties observed that the system for transfer of data on landings by Russian vessels in
Norwegian ports functions satisfactorily.
The Parties referred to the fact that the two countries’ resource and regulation control had become
more effective through the established co-operation between the enforcement authorities of the
two countries.
68 Ibid.
69 Information given by the Russian delegation of the Expert Group during spring 1993; author’s own
observation. The problem is indirectly reflected in the Protocol from the Expert Group: “During the meeting of
the Working [Expert] Group in Murmansk, the Norwegian Party was given copies of the fishery and port tickets
issued by “Murmanrybvod” to Russian fishing vessels. The Norwegian enforcement bodies have started to check
these documents and will inform “Murmanrybvod” in cases where Russian vessels do not produce these”, cf.
Protocol from Meeting in the Norwegian-Russian Expert Group on Management Co-operation within the
Fisheries Sector, May 1993, Art. 3, p. 7.
70 Ibid.; author’s own observation.
71 Author’s own observation.
72 Information from the Russian delegates of the Permanent Committee during meetings at Sortland and Tromsø
(Norway) in December 1993.
73 Author’s own observation.
74 Ibid.
13
The Parties noted that the installation of modern telecommunications equipment has led to a
substantial improvement of the Parties’ enforcement activities.”75
Main Areas of Co-operation 1994-99
The activities of the Permanent Committee during the period 1994-99 can be divided into
three main categories: i) discussions on currents issues in the fisheries management and
enforcement practices of the two countries; ii) the administration of exchange of personnel
(inspectors and observers) and data; and iii) the solution of more comprehensive tasks
assigned to it by the Joint Commission.76 Most importantly, the meetings of the Permanent
Committee have functioned as arenas for Norwegian and Russian fishery authorities to
discuss issues of current or even urgent interest in somewhat greater depth than is possible
through ordinary correspondence. For instance, Russian authorities have on several occasions
requested clarification concerning the interpretation of Norwegian regulations and the
enforcement routines of the Norwegian Coast Guard on behalf of Russian fishermen.77
Likewise, current information about the Parties’ national legislation as well as management
organisation and procedures is always on the agenda at the Committee meetings. Moreover,
the Permanent Committee was a natural forum to discuss the critical situation which arose in
the Barents Sea during winter-spring 1999 with massive intermingling of undersized fish in
the catches.78
Exchange of data and personnel was one of the main proposals of the Expert Group (see
above) and has been a major task of the Permanent Committee since it was established.
Procedures and practical arrangements for exchange of catch and landing data were soon
established and have functioned without particular problems. Since 1994, it has been noted as
a matter of routine in the Protocols of the Joint Commission that the exchange of data
functions to the satisfaction of the Parties and will hence be continued.79 Another initial
measure that has proved effective and has been maintained until the present is the
participation of Russian inspectors from ”Murmanrybvod” as observers in connection with
the Norwegian Fish Control’s inspections of Russian vessels in Norwegian ports. Russian
inspectors have annually made six trips to Norway to participate in such inspections.80 In
1995, the Parties agreed to extend the exchange programme also to include exchanges
between inspectors from ”Murmanrybvod” and the Norwegian Coast Guard at sea.81 The first
75 Protocol from the 22nd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1993, Art. 11.2.
76 It should be observed that a complete list of all activities of the Permanent Committee is not presented here.
77 Cf. e.g. Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 29 August – 1 September 1995, September
1995, Art. 4.
78 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Art. 5.
79 Cf. Protocols from the Joint Commission from the period 1994-98.
80 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 14-18 September 1998, September 1998, Art. 9.
14
exchange of inspectors (as observers) at sea was conducted in December 1995.82 There has
since been one exchange of inspectors at sea each year; the inspectors usually spend five days
on board the other Party’s inspection vessel.83 In addition, personnel from “Murmanrybvod”,
PINRO and the Norwegian Surveillance of Fishing Grounds have occasionally been
exchanged between vessels engaged in the closing and opening of fishing grounds since
1994.84 Finally, joint seminars for enforcement officers from the two countries have been
organised annually since 1994, every other year at the Coast Guard base at Sortland and in
Murmansk.85 The seminars include inspectors from the Coast Guard and Fish Control on the
Norwegian side and “Murmanrybvod” on the Russian side.86 They are intended to function as
forums for discussions of current issues and have an explicit focus on the practical inspection
work at sea and in port.87
In addition to the administration of the exchange programmes and discussions of
pressing issues, the Permanent Committee has undertaken more comprehensive work on
behalf of the Joint Commission. One major task has been the elaboration of joint conversion
factors for products of fish caught in the Barents Sea. As mentioned above, the introduction of
a uniform system of conversion factors was proposed by the Expert Group in 1993. During
the Session in November 1993, the Parties agreed “…that it is necessary to elaborate a
uniform system of conversion factors, and that the question should be discussed in the
Permanent Committee for Management and Enforcement [Co-operation].”88 The Permanent
Committee appointed a Working Group on the issue, which concluded that some conversion
factors were already uniform between Norway and Russia, some were slightly divergent
whereas others differed more significantly.89 The Joint Commission in 1994 ordered the
Permanent Committee to “… continue its work to clarify reasons behind the divergent
conversion factors, participate in each others’ measuring cruises and elaborate measuring
methods with a view to achieving revised and uniform conversion factors”.90 During 1995, the
Permanent Committee organised two joint Norwegian-Russian measuring cruises, concluding
81 Protocol from the 24th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1995, Art. 11.2;
Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-
operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 29 August – 1 September 1995, September 1995, Art. 9.
82 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 10-13 September 1996, September 1996, Art. 3.5.
83 The only exception was 1998, when due to uncertainty caused by the reorganisation of the Russian
enforcement system (see above) no ordinary exchange of inspectors at sea was carried out. However, a meeting
at sea (in the Barents Sea Loophole), where Russian inspectors visited a Norwegian Coast Guard vessel for a few
hours, was organised on 26 August 1996, cf. Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian
Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 14-18
September 1998, September 1998, Art. 9.
84 Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994, Art. 8.
85 Cf. Protocols from meetings in the Permanent Committee during the period 1994-98.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Protocol from the 22nd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1993, Art. 11.3.
89 Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994, Art. 6.
90 Protocol from the 23rd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1994, Art. 11.3.
15
that a foundation existed for reaching agreement. 91 The Joint Committee during its Session in
November 1995 requested that the Permanent Committee propose a uniform system of
conversion factors and a joint instruction for measurement used to establish conversion
factors. Agreement on a joint method was reached in 1996.92 The Joint Commission expressed
“…great satisfaction with the work carried out [by the Permanent Committee]”,93 and decided
“…to adopt the method for use in future establishment of conversion factors”.94 A
comprehensive instruction for measurement in the establishment of conversion factors was
finalised by the Permanent Committee95 and adopted for use in the Barents Sea fisheries by
the Joint Committee in 1997.96 Joint conversion factors have been achieved for all species and
products except haddock, which is still the object of investigation.97
A second comprehensive task for the Permanent Committee was the elaboration of joint
routines for the closing and opening of fishing grounds. This is a widely used management
measure in both the Norwegian and Russian parts of the Barents Sea, but the routines for its
application have varied significantly between the two countries. In short, Russian procedures
have proved far more flexible than the Norwegian ones,98 and there is great dissatisfaction
among fishermen with how this system works in Norwegian waters.99 At the meeting of the
Permanent Committee in September 1997, the Norwegian delegation requested a briefing
about the Russian system for closing and opening of fishing grounds.100 During the Joint
Commission’s subsequent meeting under its 26th Session in June 1998, the Commission
ordered the Permanent Committee to prepare a proposal for elaboration of new criteria on
decisions to close and open fishing grounds.101 A detailed instruction was produced by the
91 Protocol from the 24th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1995, Art. 11.3.
92 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 10-13 September 1996, September 1996, Art. 2.
93 Protocol from the 25th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1996, Art. 11.3.
94 Ibid.
95 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 9-14 September 1997, September 1997, Art. 2. The
instruction is found as Appendixes 3A (Norwegian version) and 3B (Russian version) to the Protocol.
96 Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1997, Art. 11.3.
97 At the time of writing, the results of a joint Norwegian-Russian measurement cruise are being evaluated, cf.
Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-
operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Art. 8.
98 Decisions on preliminary closure of an area can be made by individual inspectors on the Russian side; in
Norway, only the Director of Fisheries can make such decisions. Furthermore, the Russians tend to close smaller
areas than is normally done in Norwegian waters, and they have more flexible follow-up test hauls after the area
is closed. For a further description, see Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en
sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet.
99 Geir Hønneland, ”Compliance in the Barents Sea Fisheries. How Fishermen Account for Conformity with
Rules”.
100 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 9-14 September 1997, September 1997, Art. 8.
101 Supplement to Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1998,
Art. 1. There is no reason to assume that the initiative was the result of the mentioned dissatisfaction with the
Norwegian system among fishermen, cf. Geir Hønneland, ”Compliance in the Barents Sea Fisheries. How
Fishermen Account for Conformity with Rules”. Rather, it should be regarded in the wider context of a
decreasing cod stock and increasing uncertainty about the existing stock estimation models.
16
Permanent Committee in September102 and was adopted for preliminary use by the Joint
Commission in November the same year.103 A few minor changes were proposed by the
Permanent Committee in May 1999, and further revisions are considered.104 However, the
main framework is in place.
In addition to these two major achievements, the Permanent Committee has played a
significant role in paving the way for the introduction of compulsory use of selection grids in
the cod fishery and satellite tracking of fishing vessels in the Barents Sea. During the
Permanent Committee’s meeting in September 1994, the Parties informed each other about
on-going experiments with selection grids,105 and the Joint Commission that same year noted
that tests with grid technology have proved promising.106 Based on positive results from joint
Norwegian-Russian experiments during 1995, the Parties of the Joint Commission in
November 1995 agreed to introduce compulsory use of selection grids in cod trawls in
specific areas of the Barents Sea as of 1 January 1997.107 The Permanent Committee co-
ordinated joint experiments and the exchange of test results from national projects. It has also
produced a joint Norwegian-Russian instruction for control of selection grids108 and
functioned as a forum for exchange of experiences with the use of selection grids.109
The introduction of satellite tracking of fishing vessels was on the agenda for the first
time during the Permanent Committee’s meeting in September 1996, when the Parties
informed each other about on-going national satellite tracking projects.110 One year later, the
Joint Commission requested the Permanent Committee to assess the possibility of a co-
operation between the two countries concerning satellite tracking of fishing vessels in the
Barents Sea.111 In the Permanent Committee, the Parties continued to exchange information on
national plans about satellite tracking systems,112 and in November 1998 the Joint Committee
ordered the preparation of a plan for a joint Norwegian-Russian introduction of satellite
tracking in the Barents Sea fisheries.113 At the Permanent Committee’s meeting in May 1999,
102 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 14-18 September 1998, September 1998, Art. 2. The
instruction is found as Appendix 3 to the Protocol.
103 Protocol from the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1998, Art. 5.2.
104 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Art. 6. The revised instruction is
found as Appendix 5 to the Protocol.
105 Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994, Art. 5.
106 Protocol from the 23rd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1994, Art. 4.3.2.
107 Protocol from the 24th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1995, Art. 4.3.2.
108 Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1997, Art. 12.2.
109 Cf. e.g. Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 9-14 September 1997, September 1997, Art.
7.
110 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 10-13 September 1996, September 1996, Art. 7.
111 Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1997, Art. 12.2.
112 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 14-18 September 1998, September 1998, Art. 3.
113 Protocol from the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 1998, Art. 12.2.
17
the Parties agreed on an agenda for a separate expert meeting on satellite tracking.114 Finally,
mention should be made of the efforts of the Permanent Committee to standardise the forms
used for various types of fisheries statistics in Norway and Russia.115 The only abortive
initiative of the Permanent Committee seems to have been the attempt to direct the settlement
of all Russian landings in Norway into the Norwegian sales organisation system.116
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Co-operative Measures
As observed in the introduction to this article, Norwegian and Russian fisheries management
authorities claim that the enforcement co-operation between the two states is highly
successful and present it as an example to be copied by other states.117 Undoubtedly, the co-
operation has been successful in the sense that the Parties have managed to “do something
together”. However, the elaboration and implementation of regulative measures is not
automatically equivalent to the solution of the problems that spurred their introduction. The
effectiveness of such initiatives can be evaluated according to different standards.118 One the
one hand, one can assess the relative improvement of the situation by comparing the status
before and after the measure is introduced. On the other hand, one can take the optimal
situation as a point of departure and discuss the extent to which the problem is solved by the
introduction of the measure. Even an extensive relative improvement may sometimes prove
ineffective in solving the problem that spurred the regulative measure. In other cases, a
marginal improvement is sufficient to reach the optimal situation. Hence, the measures in
question should be studied from both these angles when their effectiveness is at issue.
The problem that triggered the establishment of a Norwegian-Russian enforcement co-
operation in the Barents Sea fisheries was the Russian overfishing in 1992 (see above). It also
seems fair to conclude that the enforcement co-operation soon developed a broader ambition
than halting Russian overfishing, namely to counter management and enforcement problems
in the Barents Sea in general.119 The measures proposed were a mixture of exchange of data
and personnel, more frequent and extensive consultations on current issues, and concrete
114 Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement
Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector at Sortland 3-7 May 1999, May 1999, Art. 7. The agenda is found as
Appendix 6 to the Protocol.
115 Cf. e.g. Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 29 August – 1 September 1995, September
1995, Art. 3 and Appendix 4.
116 Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and
Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994, Art. 2.
117 The following statement is produced in the Protocols from the Joint Commission’s 24th and 25th Sessions:
”The Parties observed that the organisation of the enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia
emerges as an example to be copied by other states”, Protocol from the 24th Session of the Joint Norwegian-
Russian Fisheries Commission, 1995, Art. 11.2; Protocol from the 25th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian
Fisheries Commission, 1996, Art. 11.2. Similar statements are often given by members of the Permanent
Committee and other representatives of Norwegian and Russian fisheries management systems when speaking
about the enforcement co-operation (author’s own observation).
118 Cf. e.g. Arild Underdal, “The Concept of Regime ‘Effectiveness’”, Cooperation and Conflict 27 (1992): 227-
240.
18
initiatives such as co-ordination of conversion factors, procedures for closing and opening of
fishing grounds and national schemes for such management initiatives as obligatory use of
selection grid and satellite tracking. Let us start with the question of whether the Norwegian-
Russian enforcement co-operation put a stop to the Russian overfishing in the Barents Sea.
It can be argued that the 1992 overfishing was related to the changed incentive structure
of Russian fishermen. Landing fish abroad not only made it possible for them to underreport
catches; rather, it was only now that it became profitable for them to do so. Under the plan
economy of the Soviet system, authorities had to urge fishermen to fulfil their plans rather
than prevent them from overfishing their quotas. Since goods were considerably scarcer than
the purchasing power, minor rewards in roubles were not necessarily strong incentives to
overfish quotas. The possibility to land fish abroad suddenly made it considerably more
profitable to fish more than one reported. If the difference between real and reported catches
could be sold to the captain’s or the fishermen’s own gain, the incentive to misreport had
significantly increased. At this point, the existing Russian enforcement system was becoming
inadequate, not primarily because of its lack of information about the landings of the vessels,
but because of its failure to influence the incentive structure of the fishermen towards a lawful
behaviour. The old system based on a passive quota control was probably adequate in the
Soviet period. The lacking incentives to exploit the resource made coercive measures
(including an active quota control) unnecessary.120 With the emergence of such incentives, the
shortcomings of the old system became apparent. The core of the enforcement problem lay
not only in the fact that catch data escaped ”Murmanrybvod”, but more importantly, in the
absence of social mechanisms capable of urging the fishermen to avoid violations.
The co-operation between Norwegian and Russian enforcement bodies has served the
purpose of supplying Russian authorities with information about the activity of Russian
fishing vessels in Norwegian waters and ports. Russian fishermen can no longer report
incorrect species and volumes of fish to ”Murmanrybvod” without being discovered.
However, the crucial question is whether this represents a sufficient step in adapting the
enforcement system to its new surroundings. As already suggested, access to information is in
itself hardly enough to secure a lawful behaviour from fishermen. Coercive measures
necessarily rely on the ability to threaten with sanctions in the event of violation. Whether this
is the case in today’s Russia, is largely an open question. Indeed, one can question whether
fishermen fear the sanctions of ”Murmanrybvod”: How threatening is a fine in roubles as long
as both shipowner, captain and crew can expect by Russian standards rather large incomes
abroad? In sum, the exchange of catch data between Norwegian and Russian enforcement
authorities has provided one link in the chain of necessary measures to avoid overfishing. In
lack of any hard evidence, there is reason to believe that the situation has improved since
119 Cf. the proposals of the Expert Group and the subsequent measures implemented by the Permanent
Committee above. These are directed towards management and enforcement problems in the Barents Sea in
general, and not only the one of overfishing.
120 For a discussion of coercive and discursive measures in fisheries management, see Geir Hønneland, “A
Model of Compliance in Fisheries: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application”, Ocean & Coastal
Management 42 (1999): 699-716.
19
1992 (assuming that many previous violators have turned to a compliant behaviour), but that
the problem has not been completely solved.121
The other co-operative measures are primarily aimed at the broader ambition of the
enforcement co-operation: to improve the foundation for effective management and
enforcement in general. The elaboration of a uniform system of conversion factors is one such
measure; the calculation of correct catches (in round weight) from product weight is
dependent upon the correctness of the conversion factors used. It is beyond the competence of
a social scientist to evaluate the correctness of the joint Norwegian-Russian factors arrived at
by the Permanent Committee. Provided they are ”correct” according to natural science
standards, it can be assumed that they represent a relative improvement in relation to the old
factors, or even that the optimal situation in this respect might be approached. Likewise, such
measures as exchange of personnel and co-ordination of routines for the closing and opening
of fishing grounds are also mainly aimed at improving the general conditions for effective
enforcement. The exchange of inspectors at sea may increase the individual inspector’s
experience and knowledge base and hence improve the basis for effective enforcement. It
seems fair to see a relative improvement here; the distance to the optimal situation is
uncertain.
Conclusions
The enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea has been
successful in the sense that the Parties have managed to extend their longstanding co-
operative patterns in the spheres of research and regulation of the Barents Sea to include
enforcement issues. The Expert Group and later the Permanent Committee have proved to be
effective co-operative bodies in registering management and enforcement problems,
proposing and elaborating solutions, and implementing the tasks assigned to it by the Joint
Commission. The success of the enforcement co-operation can probably be attributed to a
similar understanding of the problems between the Parties, good personal relations across the
national divide in the Expert Group/Permanent Committee, and the advantage of several
years’ experience of Norwegian-Russian co-operation in the fisheries sector. As far as
problem solving is concerned, the effects of the enforcement co-operation are more uncertain.
There is reason to believe that a similar overfishing as in 1992 has not been repeated in recent
years. On the other hand, investigations as thorough as in 1992 and the immediately following
121 The extent of overfishing after 1992 is in fact uncertain. Official data do not give evidence of any massive
overfishing in subsequent years, but they did not do so in 1992 either. The Russian overfishing this year had not
been discovered if it were not for the efforts of the Norwegian Coast Guard to calculate the total catch of Russian
vessels since the beginning of the year (including their catches in the Russian EEZ; this information was
obtained from the Catch Log during inspections in Norwegian waters). Similar calculations have not been
undertaken in recent years as one seems to assume that the problem of overfishing has been solved. It can even
be argued that Norwegian authorities have an interest in presenting the enforcement co-operation with the
Russians as successful and hence avoid such calculations. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that there
are no indications of any significant overfishing in recent years.
20
years have not been conducted since, so there is no “proof” that it has been avoided. The
exchange of catch and landings data between Norway and Russia provides a necessary, but
not sufficient factor in the elimination of underreporting of catches. Sanctioning mechanisms
in Russia represent an uncertain element in this respect. Finally, the Permanent Committee
has successfully co-ordinated many of the enforcement routines of the two countries and
administered a fruitful exchange of personnel, but the effects of these measures in terms of
problem solving can only be evaluated over time.
21
