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The 1991 Chechen Revolution: The Response of Moscow
... Following this wave of public outrage Zavgayev was forced to resign and Dudaev was declared the President of the independent Chechen Republic. The declaration of independence on September 17 1991, led the Chechen Revolution to its endpoint (Derluguian 2000;Sokirianskaia 2009;Splidsboel-Hansen 1994). 1 Headed by Dudayev, now the dominant figure in the Chechen political circles, the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union at the turn of 1991 and 1992 provided a novel impetus to de facto Chechen independence, with Russian military units leaving the country, Soviet institutions gradually disbanded, and thousands of ethnic-Russians and members of other ethnic minorities leaving the rebellious republic (Gall and de Waal 1998). ...
Widespread media interest into the Chechen conflict reflects an ongoing concern about the evolution of federal Russia. Why did the Russian leadership initiate military action against Chechnya in December 1994 but against no other constituent part of the Federation? This study demonstrates that the Russian invasion represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. It looks closely at the Russian Federation in transition, following the collapse of the communist Soviet Union, and the implications of the 1991 Chechen Declaration of Independence in the context of Russia's democratisation project.
The many conflicts that have raged in the Caucasus since the end of the 1980s have often been depicted in the media and academia as basically religious in character. The religious differences between parties to conflicts are emphasized and often exaggerated. In particular, the Caucasus has been taken as an example of the ‘clash of civilizations’ supposedly under way. This article seeks to challenge this perception of the Caucasian conflicts, arguing that religion has played a limited role in conflicts that are in essence ethnopolitical and territorial in character. The article argues that seldom are religious bodies or institutions used to legitimize conflict behaviour in this region ‐ there has been no Jihad in the Caucasus, for example ‐ nor has the polarization of the parties to a conflict been underpinned primarily by religious identity or theological perspectives. As such, religious conflict can not be spoken of. Furthermore there has occurred no rallying of outside powers along religious lines; in fact empirical evidence shows that religion has had little impact — especially when compared to ethnicity — in the international ramification of these conflicts.
The conflict in Chechnya is one of the most protracted of all the post-Soviet conflicts and is the only violent secessionist conflict to have occurred within the Russia Federation. The article evaluates the main explanations for the conflict and challenges historicist and ‘ethnic’ war accounts. It presents an alternative analysis which focuses on the interrelationship and combined effect of history, contingency, the instrumentalization of conflict by political leaderships, intra-Chechen cleavages, political economy, sectional interests and international factors. The article views the 1994-6 and 1991-present wars as part of a continuum, and discusses how the dynamics of the conflict have changed over time, as new radicalising elements such as Islamic fundamentalism and Russian nationalism under Putin have become more salient.
‘Power struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia
- A Sheehy