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Trapping Farmer Communities Within Global Environmental Regimes:
The Case of the GELOSE Legislation in Madagascar
Jacques Pollini
a
; James P. Lassoie
b
a
Department of Politics and International Relations, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, USA
b
Department of Natural Resources, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA
First published on: 05 April 2011
To cite this Article Pollini, Jacques and Lassoie, James P.(2011) 'Trapping Farmer Communities Within Global
Environmental Regimes: The Case of the GELOSE Legislation in Madagascar', Society & Natural Resources,, First
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To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08941921003782218
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Trapping Farmer Communities Within Global
Environmental Regimes: The Case of the GELOSE
Legislation in Madagascar
JACQUES POLLINI
Department of Politics and International Relations, Hendrix College,
Conway, Arkansas, USA
JAMES P. LASSOIE
Department of Natural Resources, Cornell University, Ithaca,
New York, USA
In 1996, the Malagasy Government issued the GELOSE law to provide a legal
framework for the transfer of natural resources management rights to local com-
munities. Eight years later, management transfers have been implemented in 451
sites, but a controversy exists about whether they genuinely favor community-based
management. This article examines the GELOSE legislation in the light of a series
of short case studies in order to identify its potential pitfalls. The conclusion is that
the approach, by creating new institutions instead of strengthening existing ones,
favors resource capture by local elites and is utilized for the enforcement of a non-
negotiable, global environmental agenda. We propose, in order to favor a genuine
devolution of natural resources management rights, to adopt more flexible
approaches that can be appropriated by existing institutions and to compensate local
communities for the restrictions of access to their resources.
Keywords biodiversity conservation, community, decentralization, devolution,
Madagascar, resources capture
The recognition of the increasing negative impacts of human societies on natural eco-
systems led to the emergence of a global environmental agenda that gives paramount
importance to biodiversity conservation. In spite of this, tropical deforestation still
occurs at a rapid pace and biodiversity in protected areas remains under threat. In this
context, decentralization and the devolution of management rights to local communi-
ties have been envisioned as a new and promising approach. But the outcomes of this
new paradigm are now subject to controversy and critique. This article is a contribution
to this critique as well as an attempt to move beyond it. It is based on the analysis of the
GELOSE
1
legislation, which created a legal framework for the implementation of
community-based natural resource management programs in Madagascar.
Received 14 September 2008; accepted 8 February 2010.
Address correspondence to Jacques Pollini, Department of Politics and International
Relations, Hendrix College, 1600 Washington Avenue, Conway, AR 72032, USA. E-mail:
jacques.pollini@gmail.com
Society and Natural Resources, 0:1–17
Copyright # 2011 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 online
DOI: 10.1080/08941921003782218
1
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The first section briefly presents the methodology. The second section analyzes
the GELOSE legislation itself, illustrating its implementation with a few short case
studies. The third section discusses these results in the light of other scholarly work
conducted in Madagascar and elsewhere . It shows that the GELOSE approach is
used for push ing a global environmental agenda that does not answer to the needs
and expectations of local communities. In the conclusion, we reaffirm the necessity
of genuinely involving local communities in the improvement of local environmental
governance and propose a few avenues to achieve this endeavor.
Methods
Two types of empirical material are utilized: the legislation itself , and qualitative
data collected during field visits. Concerning the legislation, we directly analyze
the GELOSE law and its applicatory decrees, which were issued by the Malagasy
Government between 1996 and 2001. Concerning the field investigations, 15 sites
(Figure 1) were visited by the senior author between 2002 and 2006 and represent
about 40 days of fieldwork (1 to 8 days per site). Only the sites where in-depth inter-
views with local farmers were conducted are referred to in the text. All information
collected at other sites was nevertheless consistent with the general findings presented
in the article, except in the case of Katsepy.
2
Qualitative information was collected using a snowball sampling strategy aimed at
‘‘pursuing the surprising’’ (Vayda 1983, 265) and at achieving a ‘‘progressive contex-
tualization’’ (Vayda 1983, 266) of the most relevant empirical observations. Domestic
life (meals and accommodation) was shared with the inter viewees, which facilitated a
relation of confidence and helped to debunk false infor mation and to integrate local
observations into holistic representations. Interviews took the form of informal discus-
sions, often lasted several hours, were associated with visits to the concerned ecosys-
tems, and were conducted with all types of stakeholders. Hidden transcripts (Scott
1990) usually started to be revealed after the third day of investigation. They were
recognized by the form they took (spontaneous speeches occurring during free time)
and by the clarification they brought to hitherto contradictory observations.
The relatively limited amount of time at the study sites was compensated for by
an in-depth knowledge of Malagasy rural livelihoods and institutions accumulated
during the 4 years the first author spent in the country as a PhD researcher from
2001 to 2003 (Pollini 2007) and as a technical advisor for the Ministry of Environ-
ment, Water and Forests, involved in the implementation of the GELOSE, from
2004 to 2006 (MINENVEF and Coope
´
ration Franco-Malgache 2004). As a techni-
cal advisor, Pollini was involved in the monitoring of projects aimed at supporting
management transfers in several of the visited sites, including Ambohimitombo,
Miandrivazo, and all sites in the Mahajanga area. He attended many workshops
and meetings on the subject, which gave him the opportunities to converse with non-
governmental organization (NGO) staff, experts, or local elites involved in the prep-
aration and implementation of management transfers.
Results
The GELOSE Legislation
The GELOSE legislation consists of one law (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1996)
and several applicatory decrees (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1998, 2000a,
2 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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2000b). By 2004, it had been implemented in at least 451 communities across the
country.
3
Its implementation revolved around five key elements, which are pre-
sented successively: (1) the establishment of management transfer contracts, (2)
Figure 1. Localization of fieldwork sites. The following municipalities (and sites) were
visited (the numbers indicate the duration of the visit, in days): Ambohimitombo (8);
Ambondromamy (Beronono, 2); Andranomamy (Ambodimadiro and Mazimazava, 1);
Beforona (Ambodilaingo, 2); Ikongo (Ambodiara, 5); Katsepy (Antrema, 4); Miandrivazo
(Manelatra forest, Manodiha forest, Bofo lake, and other sites, 8); Morondava (Marofandilla
and Kirindy, 3); Tsaramandroso (Mananada, 1); and Tsinjoarivo (Antsahabe and Antenina,
7). Source for the map: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/madagascar_pol_2003.jpg,
courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries.
The GELOSE Legislation 3
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the creation of a new institution (the COBA
4
), (3) the establishment of community
rules (the dina), (4) the intervention of a mediator (environmental mediation), and
(5) establishing a relative security of land tenure (RLTS). In the case of forest
resources, a specific decree has been issued (Gouvern ement de Madagascar
2001), which is actually an applicatory decree of the forest law (Gouvernement
de Madagascar 1997a). This decree defines a somewhat different approach, called
GCF,
5
which was intended to simplify the GELOSE but was criticized for not
addressing important issues such as land tenure. The consequence is that both
GCF and GELOSE forest management contracts have been signed. The GCF
approach is not detailed here and the term ‘‘management transfers’’ refers to both
GELOSE and GCF contracts.
The Contract. The signatories of GELOSE contracts are the community, the
rural municipality
6
it belongs to, and the decentralized state services the resource
depends on. In the case of GCF contracts, only the forest service and the COBA
are involved. An NGO or a project usually intervenes to facilitate the negotiations
and prepare official documents (e.g., management plans, book of responsibilities,
and resource maps). Contracts are valid for 3 years and can be renewed for 10 more
years after an evaluation.
Each GELOSE contract refers explicitly to one or several resources in a given
territory (for example, trees, fish, or forage). It is thus not clear whether the manage-
ment of the territory itself is transferred to the COBA (it rather seems that it is not),
except in the case of contracts ruled by the GCF decree, where forest ecosystems with
all their resources are transferred. More specific decrees are planned to be issued
to define more precisely the modalities of transfer for each type of resourc e (e.g.,
marine or pastoral). The majority of existing contracts concern forest resources.
The Fokon’olona and the COBA. The initial intention of the GELOSE law was to
create a legal framework for the transfer of natural resource management authority
to communities (Weber 1994). The fokon’olona, which can be translated as com-
munity or collectivity (Condominas 1961), is probably the Malagasy institution
that best matches with the concept of community. It was created by King
Andrianampoinimerina to facilitate the administration of the Imerina region
(Condominas 1961). But in the context of traditional societies where kinship plays
a prominent role in social, economic and political relations, the term fokon’olona
designated both a biological unit (family, lineage, or clan) and a governmental body
or administrative unit.
The term fokon’olona is now used in most regions of Madagascar and can refer
to slightly different realities. Fokon’olona are not fixed entities as they can split or, to
the contrary, fuse or absorb people from different lineages or clans. But according to
Condominas (1961), their essential feature remains a common kinship, manifested
by the burial around the grave of a common ancestor and belonging to a common
territory (the fokontany).
7
Another important feature is the rule of a traditional chief
supported by an assembly of elders, which establishes and enforces community rules
or dina. However, this autonomy has frequently been under threat since the time of
King Andrianipoinimerina (Condominas 1961). During the colonial period, the
fokon’olona was recognized as an autonomous local government accountable to
the colonial administration (Condominas 1961). It was used for facilitating indirect
rule, as were other institutions in other co lonized countries (Ribot 1999). This
4 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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created a situation of legal pluralism and it is unclear whether the fokon’olona was
strengthened or weakened in the end.
During the second republic,
8
the fokontany was declared an autonomous admin-
istrative unit, like the municipality, department, and province designations. The
fokon’olona was recognized as its government body in the form of the general
assembly of the fokontany, made up of all inhabitants with voting rights and
Malagasy citizenship (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1976). This general assembly
was in charge of managing the territory of the fokontany, adopting its budget, and
designing and adopting its regulations (dina). The situation changed in 1994, when
the third republic
9
was established. The fokontany became a subdivision of the
municipality, ruled by a committee whose members were elected by a general
assembly presided by the mayor, and whose president and vice-president had to
be approved by the Sous-Pre
´
fet
10
(Gouvernement de Madagascar 1994; 1997b).
Further changes occurred and the fokontany president is now directly appointed
by the municipality’s mayor, but chosen from list of candidates proposed by the
General Assembly. These rules have been in place since at least 2004 (Gouvernement
de Madagascar 2004).
11
In spite of these successive efforts to replace traditional fokon’olona by legal
institutions, the term co ntinues to designate a group of people linked by a kinship
relationship and=or by a common history, that is, a community. It is significant,
for example, that from the perspective of most Malagasy people, several fokon’olona
(in the traditional sense) can coexist on the same fokontany (defined as an adminis-
trative unit). The fokon’olona thus carries with it the contradictions engendered by
legal pluralism (the coexistence of customary and state legal systems), reflecting a
situation that is quite typical of local governance regimes in Africa (Benjamin
2008). But by carrying these contradictions, it may precisely be the institution that
enables local communities to adjust to this plu ralism. It is significant, for example,
that the fokontany administrators nominated by municipalities rarely make decisions
without discussing them with village elders, while the elders often invite these admin-
istrators to their meetings, depending on the subject at stake. In many cases, a village
elder, although not necessarily the oldest and most influential, are even appointed as
fokontany president.
To be consistent with its initial objectives as defined by Weber (1994), the
GELOSE should thus have been designed as a way to grant resource management
rights to the fokon’olona, in its traditional, legal, or hybrid forms. But in the political
context of the mid-1990s, this pro ved to be impossible. The fokon’olona had just lost
its auton omy and the members of the National Assembly opposed the idea that man-
agement rights could be transferred explicitly to it (Aubert 1999). This led the
GELOSE legislation to create a new institution: the COBA.
The COBA was conceived to be more like a group of users organized into an
association, or even an NGO, rather than a way to give a legal statute to a local com-
munity. As the GELOSE law states, ‘‘any inhabitant residing within the limits of
the territory of the basic community can be accepted as a member [of the COBA]’’
(Gouvernement de Madagascar 1996, Article 5), but not necessarily all inha bitants.
‘‘The application to become a member is submitted to the general assembly,
which deliberates within the conditions fixed by the statute’’ (Gouvernement de
Madagascar 1996, Article 5). It is true that exclusion also exists in the case of the
fokon’olona, where recent migrants are not immediately integrated into the
community, or can even be excluded. But in the case of the COBA, the criteria
The GELOSE Legislation 5
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for integration or rejection are much narrower because they are linked to the utiliza-
tion of a given resource. Any group of people with common objectives can constitute
a COBA, decide who will be in and out, and elaborate the rules that best match its
interests. This opens the way to inequities and division if this association gains sig-
nificant power previously held by the fokon’olona assembly or by the fokontany
administrators. This dynamic, however, does not necessarily happen. A fokon’olona
could, instead, use the COBA statute to ‘‘modernize’’ itself. But two factors can
impede this from occurring.
First, managing a COBA requires skills that are not common in remote
Malagasy villages. The contract itself and its annex are elaborated with strong input
from NGOs or other external institutions. They include formal management plans
and maps that owe more to Western science than to local forms of knowledge.
During the meetings, decisions ‘‘have to be written and classified in a book ...[and]
the president or one of the members of the management structure is in charge of all writ-
ings’’ (Gouvernement de Madagascar 2000a, Articles 25 and 26). In these conditions,
rural elites, who usually have higher literacy levels and more formal education than
traditional leaders, can easily take control of the COBA. This phenomenon seemed
to occur in all management transfer sites visited. Discussion with staff from projects
or agencies involved in the implementation of the GELOSE confirmed this tendency.
Second, the persons whose interests better match those of projects or NGOs that
support the COBAs can more easily take control of the associations. This second
factor acts in synergy with the first one because these stakeholders are usually the
most educated.
Tsinjoarivo,
12
a rural municipality on the western side of the forest corridor,
provides a striking example. This municipality is located in Ambatolampy district,
about 70 km southeast of Antananarivo . The PDFIV,
13
a project implemented by
GTZ,
14
works in the area and supported the creation of forest management associ a-
tions. Several villages in Tsinjoarivo (in the Onive Valley) were visited in 2002 by the
senior author, who was accompanied by a field technician from the PDFIV.
Two ethnic groups live in this area: the Betsimisaraka, who come from the east
and typic ally sustain their livelihood by doing slash-and-bur n cultivation (tavy), and
the Merina, who come from the west (from the more populated highlands) and
already have lengthy experience with irrigated rice cultivat ion. The Betsimisaraka
were the first settlers, and for this reason their traditional leaders managed custom-
ary rights, controlling access to land and deciding which patch of forest could be
cleared for slash-and-burn cultivation. The Merina were more recent migrants
attracted by other economic opportunities, such as sugarcane trading. They recog-
nized the legitimacy of Betsimisaraka traditional leaders and negotiated their instal-
lation through matrimonial alliances or by economic transactions. For example, they
raised cattle in the valleys, sold the animals, and bought land from Betsimisaraka
people who had customary rights on it. As a consequence, the biggest landowners
in the area are now the Merina people. They employ Betsimisaraka farmers as
sharecroppers to clear more forest and convert it into agricultural land.
When the PDFIV started to work in the area, it supported the creation of 27
forest management associations, which were not governed according to the
GELOSE approach; the intent was to adapt them to the legislation at a later time.
The Merina, due to their higher education level and better knowledge of urban
and foreign culture, filled almost all the legal positions in the associations (presi-
dents, secretaries, and treasurers), while Betsimisaraka people were simply involved
6 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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as advisors. As these ‘‘modern’’ associations were granted some legal power to con-
trol vegetation clearing, the control of access to land shifted from traditional
Betsimisaraka authorities to Merina people supported by the PDFIV. As the Merina
do not depend on slash-and-burn cultivation, they accepted management rules that
matched the conservation objectives. This provoked a significant reduction in the
land available for slash-and-bur n cultivation, leading to social conflicts between
Merina and Betsimisaraka people.
15
Many Betsimisaraka left the region and moved eastward in search of other land.
Some went across the river, wher e the project did not intervene. They ‘‘wait for the
foreign people to leave so they can take their land back’’ (farmer, in Tsinjoarivo
2001). Those who stayed in the region are now often hired as a labor force by the
Merina people. Between the bottomland occupied by migrants and the hilltops pro-
tected by new management rules, they have little room remaining to sustain their
livelihood and commonly fall into deep poverty.
The PDFIV proposes alternative cropping systems (mostly agroforestry technol-
ogies such as alley cropping and contour strips) that are supposed to compensate for
this reduction in available land. But most of the beneficiaries interviewed, including
the Merina people, consider these alternatives as not applicable because they require
a large investment for their establishment and excessive labor input for their main-
tenance.
In sum, due to the creation of forest management associations, pressure on the
land and forest was displaced in time and space, and social conflicts increased.
Management authority was then transferred from legi timate community leaders to
a minor ity who accepted centrally designed conservation policies and inefficient
alternatives to slash-and-burn cultivation. This served as an excuse for enforcing
these coercive policies through forest management associations.
The Dina. The dina (community rule) provides another example of the disrup-
tions that can be provoked by confusion over the concepts of association and com-
munity. The GELOSE legislation appropriated this traditional institution: ‘‘the
relationships between COBA members are regulated through the creation of dina.
The dina are approved by the COBA members following community customary
rules’’ (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1996, Article 49) and further validated by
the municipality. The consequence is that two distinct institutions (the fokon’olona
and the COBA) are now able to create legal rules at the community level. The first
one can do that in the name of its historical legitimacy, and the second one receives
its legitimacy from the GELOSE legislation. It is then not clear whether a dina cre-
ated by the COBA applies to the whole fokon’olona or only to the COBA members.
Important problems arise, whatever answer is given. If the dina applies to the whole
fokon’olona, it will lack legitimacy because the institution that established it (the
COBA) is not necessarily controlled by the legitimate authorities at the fokon’olona
level. If the dina only applies to the COBA members, the members of the fokon’olona
will have to choose between submitting or not submitting to the dina (by being mem-
ber or not of the COBA). Such a dina could hardly be called a law. It would just be
an internal rule, as are encountered in any association. The fact that municipalities
can give legal recognition to dina further complicates the situ ation.
Moreover, this ambiguity favors the establishment of rules designed by the NGO
that supports the COBA. In most management transfers implemented in eastern
Madagascar, for example, the main dina are aime d at banning forest clearing,
The GELOSE Legislation 7
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controlling fires, and eradic ating or reducing slash-and-burn cultivation, which
reflect the orientation of the global environmen tal agenda. In all three sites visited
in the forest corridor (Tsinjoarivo, Ambohimitombo, and Ikongo), farmers and even
COBA leaders complained about these restrictions, which they consider as being
imposed from the outside. They assert that they will not be able to support manage-
ment transfers much longer if no alternative is provided to replace slash-and-burn
cultivation and compensate for restricting access to land. In the Zafimaniry area
(Ambohimitombo), where management transfers are a relative success due to the
involvement of an exceptional traditional leader who has both a high level of form al
education and a genuine commitment to his community, most farmers consider the
areas put under GELOSE contracts as protected areas managed by the state. At
Bofo Lake (Miandrivazo), where several COBA were set up to protect endemic fish
species, members of a community apologized for having cut the grasses that grew
around a lake in the vicinity of their village. They explained that traditionally, they
had always cut the grasses along the part of the lake adjacent to the village, but that
the COBA changed the rule and no longer allowed them to do that. They violated
the COBA rule because the grasses sheltered a crocodile that had eaten a child
and his mother just a few weeks earlier. One can hardly believe that this COBA
rule was a genuine community rule. In sum, the creation of COBA may be used
as a strategy for establishing indirect rule, as occurred during the colonial period.
Environmental Mediation. The designe rs of the GELOSE legislation anticipated
the pitfalls described in the previous sections and incorporated an agent to mitigate
them: the environmental mediator. A specific decree (Gouvernement de Madagascar
2000b) was issued to define the role and responsibilities of environmental mediators
and the procedure for their training. According to this decree,
the goal of environmental mediation is to facilitate discussion and negoti-
ation between the various partners involved in local resource manage-
ment, by contributing, through the establishment of an information
flow between parties, to bring points of views closer to each other.
(Gouvernement de Madagascar 2000b, Article 2)
Mediation concerns the relation between community members as well as
between the community, the state, the municipality and the other stakeholders
involved. In addition, the mediator is involved in pr actical and strategic tasks such
as the establishment of rules for access to resources, the determination of modalities
concerning natural resource extraction and benefit sharing, the determination of
how the income will be used and the determination of fees, and penalties in case
of fraud (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1996, Article 17). The mediator is recruited
from people trained specifically for this task and who have received a certificate from
a committee that includes members of seven different governmental mini stries.
The mediators are required to be neutral (Gouvernement de Madagascar 2000b,
Article 31), and the training they receive is intended to prepare them for this neu-
trality. However, mediators are in most cases urban people who are foreign to the
regions where they work and are financially and technically supp orted by the
NGO or project that is implementing the GELOSE. This support consists of the edu-
cation of stakeholders, organization of meetings, training of community leaders,
implementation of socioeconomic studies and diagnosis, purchasing of technical
8 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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tools and equipment, assessment and mapping of resources, design of ‘‘modern’’ or
‘‘scientific’’ management plans, search for market opportunities, and communication
of results. It can hardly be imagined how mediation work could remain independent
from these multiple tasks and the agenda of the NGO that implements them.
Aubert (1999) unintentionally reveals the ambiguity of the mediator’s role. She
contends that the implementation of the GELOSE could imply a ‘‘social restructur-
ing’’ (Aubert 1999
16
) and that one of the mediator’s roles is to legitim ate this new
social organization. These assertions reveal the existence of a social engineering pro-
ject that implies much more than just favoring transparent communication and the
emergence of a common vision. The mediation, in other words, may be used for
facilitating the adoption of social and environmental agendas designed outside
and at odds with local expectations and needs. This confusion of roles may explain
why the GCF decree eliminated the necessity to utilize environmental mediators
(Gouvernement de Madagascar 2001), thus allowing their duties to be assumed by
NGO staff, whose role is to promote this externally designed agenda.
Relative Land Tenure Securization. Relative land tenure securization (RLTS) is
another key element of the GELOSE legislation. It consists of delineating the bound-
aries of the territory put under COBA’s authority, of defining zones inside this ter-
ritory according to the resources that are encountered and according to the rules
applied to these resources, and, in some cases (not mandatory), in the establishment
of a cadastral map aimed at solvin g land tenure conflicts (Gouvernement de
Madagascar 1998). RLTS does not lead to the granting of land titles (which explains
the term ‘‘relative’’), but can serve as a base for granting them in the future. In most
management transfers, RLTS was not implemented because it is costly, can slow the
overall process by revealing land tenure conflicts, and is not perceived as being essen-
tial by the projects or NGOs that suppo rt management transfers. Moreover, the lack
of RLTS may actually be an opportunity for the communities involved.
For example, management transfers typically involve a single resource (but can
be extended to several resources), which poses a practical problem for the implemen-
tation of RLTS. When several resources are encountered on the same land, it would
not be legitimate to secure land tenure in favor of an association of people extracting
just one of these resources. We illustrate this by the case of management transfers
aimed at favoring sustainable charcoal production in the Mahajanga region, with
support from CIRAD.
17
In Andranomamy, Ambondromamy, and Tsaramandroso, as in many other
sites around Mahajanga, Zyziphus savannahs were zoned to optimize charcoal pro-
duction by COBA members. Five zones were defined and charcoal producers have to
follow a 5-year rotation in these zones. One may wonder about the legitimacy of this
zoning for farmers who do not produce charcoal and are not COBA members, but
who, in response to population increase, will need to convert Zyziphus savannahs
into agricultural land in order to sustain their livelihood.
Muttenzer (2006) investigated the functioning of charcoal COBAs in other sites
in the region. He showed that most trees used for charcoal production are cut in
areas that will soon be converted to agricultural land. Five-year rotations would
not make sense in such cases because once the trees are converted into charcoal,
the site is converted into agricultural land and the natural vegetation cannot develop.
From the farmer’s perspective, this logic is rational because agriculture is more prof-
itable than charcoal production, with the latter being merel y a transition activity for
The GELOSE Legislation 9
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recent migrants (Muttenzer 2006). If the management plans and the 5-year rotations
were successfully implemented, they would compete with the customary modes of
regulation, which support this multiple-use logic . The land use would become fixed
according to a pattern determined by the harvesting of a minor resource (Zyziphus )
and adopted because it is compatible with the wishes of actors who support the
GELOSE. This could lead to concentration of profits into the hands of a minority
(the charcoal producers), constraining agricultural intensification, and failing to
alleviate pressures on the forest frontier. This scenario, however, will not necessarily
occur, as communities may find their own mode of regulation when they are con-
fronted with such problems. They may initiate negotiations between the COBA
and the rest of the fokon’olona in order to break or change the rules. According to
Muttenzer (2006), this is indeed the situation that prevails. RLTS, in this context,
should not be implemented because it would render more difficult the breaking of
COBA rules upon which a multif unctional use of the landscape depends.
Discussion
This analysis showed that the GELOSE legislation can be easily used by a group of
stakeholders for gaining control over access to natural resources. This results from
confusion between the concepts of association and community and from the high
level of formal education required to understand and implement the approach.
The consequence can be a marginalization of traditional and legitimate modes of
resource management in favor of new modes implemented by new institutions whose
objectives better match the international conservation agenda. Paradoxically, instead
of transferring management rights to communities, the implementation of the
GELOSE may actually lead to transferring these rights from a community that
was the de facto manager of the resources due to the absence or the weakness of
the state, to a restricted group of individuals willing to adopt management rules
designed by the state and its partners.
These outcomes match those of many other studies conducted in Madagascar.
Randrianasolo (2000) and Maldi dier (2001) conducted a national evaluation of
GCF and GELOSE contracts, respectively. They showed that both approaches
are insufficiently understood at all levels, are appropriated by influential person s
concerned with their own private interests, are not accepted by the whole com-
munity, sometimes lead to conflicts between COBA member s and nonmembers,
and are associated with a ban on forest clearing and forest product commercializa-
tion. They effectively result in less forest clearing, but tend to be regarded as a new
form of control by villagers who ask for alternatives to the restrictions on their land
use (Maldidier 2001). Maldidier (2001) also recognized the ambiguous character of
the COBA (community or association) and referred to the controversies that
accompanied the early implementation of the GELOSE. According to him, this
approach was criticized for being unreali stic, inapplicable, complex, costly, rigid,
formal, and intellectual, which led to the creation of the GCF ap proach.
Scholarly articles and books are even more pessimistic. Kull (2002, 2004), based
on several case studies, concludes that management transfers fail to empower com-
munities due to ‘‘obstructive environmental ideologies’’ (Kull 2002, 57), whose first
endeavor is the eradication of fires. In this context, the GELOSE transfers to com-
munities responsibilities, not rights. It uses a ‘‘potentially troubling’’ (Kull 2004, 257)
new institution, the COBA, in ‘‘a top-down attempt to expand control’’ (Kull 2004,
10 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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262). It ignores ‘‘the potential for fractious intracommunity politics,’’ which leads to
‘‘noncompliance, elite capture, or reshuffled local power relations’’ (Kull 2004, 262).
Goedefroit (2006), based on investigations conducted in six villages, shows that
COBAs are regarded by villagers as similar to the multiple and obscure associations
created by NGOs to implement development activities. She observed that COBA lea-
ders are typically educated persons with no legitimate power who are attempting to
gain power, while mediators attempt to educate villagers rather than facilitate com-
munication. In the end, contracts often lead to division inside communities and
disruption of traditional natural resource management controls.
Gezon (1997) and Horning (2000) also observed resource capture and the reshuf-
fling of power relations in the sites they investigated. Horning (2000) and Kull (2002)
give examples of successful community-based natural resource management. But
these cases concern communities in remote places where there are no project inter-
ventions, where the GELOSE legislation is not even known, and where the state is
almost absent. Muttenzer (2002) shows that in regions where state power is present,
Malagasy farmers adapt to legal pluralism by developing informal collaborations
with administrative agents. They may, indeed, have more control over the manage-
ment of their land and resources under these cooperation modes than when manage-
ment transfers are implemented.
Beyond Madagascar, many other studies (Rahnema 1992; Brosius et al. 1998;
Kellert et al. 2000; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Batterbury
and Fernando 2006) show that community-based natural resource management
approaches and participatory methods in general often contradict their ideals of
decentralization and community empowerment, and often lead to new forms of ‘‘tyr-
annies’’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Rather than helping to design projects adapted
to local situations, they may contribute to the creation of global governance regimes
(Duffield 2001; Kothari 2005) that push centrally designed development and conser-
vation agendas. Because this agenda puts the emphasis on property regimes rather
than access to resources and benefit sharing, a bundle of rights rather than a bundle
of powers is granted to local communities (Ribot and Peluso 2003). If these powers,
which determine ‘‘access to technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, auth-
ority, identity and social relations’’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 173), are not provided,
rights may fall into a vacuum and local communities may not be able to influence
management rules and access natural resources.
Some authors (Hickey and Mohan 2004), however, challenge the idea that par-
ticipation is a ‘‘new tyranny’’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001), arguing that participatory
methods can be improved and can meet their transformative goals. It is true that
there are situations where participation enabled the creation of platforms that com-
munities utilized to become more vocal and claim their rights. In the Chimalapas
region of Mexico, community organizations were able to invert participatory process
to their own advantage (Walker et al. 2007). But they were able to do so because they
inherited a long-standing revolutionary culture, were educated, built up their own
organizations, and ha d guns.
Hence, the situation in Madagascar may reflect the rule, rather than the excep-
tion, at least in the context of marginalized communities with a low level of formal
education. Power relations may matter more than formal contracts and rights in
determining the outcomes of community-based natural resource management
approaches. Central power, taking the form of knowledge, may more easily spread
into communities through ‘‘modern’’ institutions such as the med iator, the COBA,
The GELOSE Legislation 11
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and the dina. As Leach et al. (1999, 241) put it, ‘‘Jus t as power relations pervade the
institutional dynamics of everyday resource use, so they would pervade any nego ti-
ation process.’’ The GELOSE, with its naive attempt to create neutral, transparent,
and rational communication, may contribute to the creation of a panoptic system
(Foucault 1975; Kapoor 2002) aimed at controlling access to natural resources.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Management transfers are used to enforce the global environmental agenda. They are
instruments in the service of what Rahnema (1992) called ‘‘manipulative partici-
pation,’’ despite the fact that they were initially not intended to be so. They favor
three forms of participatory tyranny identified by Cooke and Khotari (2001). The
‘‘tyranny of decision making’’ (Cooke and Khotari 2001, 7) and control is incarnated
by the COBA, a new institution that favors decisions that match the global environ-
mental agenda. Customary management by fokon’olona leaders is the overridden
‘‘existing legitimate decision making process’’ (Cooke and Khotari 2001, 7). The ‘‘tyr-
anny of the group’’ (Cooke and Khotari 2001, 7) is incarnated by the opportunistic
elite of more educated people who have a comparative advantage in gaining control
over the COBA. The ‘‘tyranny of the method’’ (Cooke and Khotari 2001, 8), eventu-
ally, is the exclusion from COBA’s leadership of those who cannot manage paper-
work and other ‘‘modern’’ administrative tasks. It is also true that all COBA must
adopt the same structure, implement the same RLTS, work with the same mediators,
establish the same tripartite contracts, and implement the same mapping and zoning.
Management transfers also serve to promote a Western form of modernization
that concerns the social and organizational sphere as much as than the technical one.
The COBA, the dina , the mediator, and the RLTS are instruments of a sophisticated
social en gineering project. They help to reshape local communities and in this sense
can be regarded as a manifestation of what Scott (1998) called high modernism. The
GELOSE may just be more local, more ephemeral, and more dependent on
short-term external financ ial resources than the more extreme cases described by
Scott (1998). Fortunately, this may provide a chance for its failure or its distortion
and appropriation by local communities for their own advantage.
The manipulative character of management transfers results from a fundamental
lack of congruence between state and communi ty objectives. On one hand, the insti-
tutional framework within which the GELOSE and GCF approaches were designed
is the Malagasy National Environmental Action Plan, which adopted an environ-
mental agenda designed by the international community and whose main objective
is to stop forest clearing and fires (Pollini 2007). On the other hand, most communi-
ties need to clear fores ts and ignite fires to sustain their livelihoods. According to
Antona et al. (2004), congruence between stakeholders’ objectives is the main fact or
that determines the success or failure of management transfers. As this congruence
does not exist, the GELOSE created the COBA, a new institution that tends to be
mostly upwardly accountable, instead of empowering the fokon’o lona, an institution
that is both downwardly and upwardly accountable, to use the words of Ribot
(1999). We may face here the fundamental problem that the GELOSE and other
community-based natural resource managem ent approaches in the world failed to
address.
In order to escape from this dead end and promote a genuine community-based
natural resource management, several strategies need to be employed simultaneously.
12 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
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First, we believe that attempts to design perfect models should be abandoned and that
support should be limited to providing more information, more opportunities, more
capacities, and more means to actors who want to engage in change. This can be
achieved through an equal, or less unequal, access to education, health care, markets,
infrastructure, and political power. The GELOSE in its current form is not consistent
with this logic due to the high level of skills required to be an active COBA member or
leader.
Second, the fokon’olona should be recognized as a legal body with a legal statute,
and its traditional institutions, such as the fokon’olona assemblies, should be g ranted
some legal form of power again. Once the fokon’olona was legally recognized, it
could be granted managem ent rights like any municipality, district or region, using
Article 24 of the forest law (Gouvernement de Madagascar 1997a) as a legal frame-
work. In contrast to the GELOSE, this new type of contract could concern a terri-
tory and all its resources. Co-management, involving the fokon’olona and a partner,
which could be a NGO or another category of actor, could also be implemented
under Article 24. The GELOSE legislation could still be utilized, but for granting
single-resource management rights to associations that would be controlled by the
fokon’olona. Indeed, the fokon’olona could replace the municipality in the tripartite
GELOSE contracts, while the munici pality could still play a role by coordinating
several management transfers.
The fokon’olona, howeve r, must not be seen as a panacea and the community
must not be idealized (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). In a context of transition from
a moral economy (Scott 1976) to a market economy, traditio nal leaders can violate
the relations of reciprocity and redistribution and capture resources, as COBA lea-
ders do. But the fokon’olona is an institution that has a long history and is already
part of the social fabric of rural Madagascar, contrary to the COBA. Communities
already have a long experience in the management of its ambiguities (traditional ver-
sus administrative character; kinship versus territorial base), whereas the COBA
creates unnecessary new ambiguities (community versus association; land manage-
ment versus resource management). Transferring management authority to the
fokon’olona, however, does not imply the disappearance of the COBA. Agrawal
and Gibson (1999) pointed out the importance of developing a diversity of institu-
tions, in order to constitute a rich social fabric. The fokon’olona, the COBA and
other associations could thus all play a role, as suggested above.
Third, the fundamental lack of congruence between local and global objec-
tives (conversion versus conservation of forests) should be recognized, as well
as its nonnegotiable character. In the present political and environmental context,
it appears quite clear that the ban on forest clearing will remain in place. Even
the strongest advocate s of community-based natural resource management never
proposed to put an end to this ban. On the other hand, closing the forest frontier
is a luxury that most Malagasy communities cannot afford and is fundamentally
at odds with the Malagasy land ethic (Keller 2008). If these two points are made
explicit, the necessary but illegitimate character of closing the forest frontier could
then come into full light and the necessity of instituting a system of straightfor-
ward co mpensation could be recognized. This compensation scheme, which differs
from the PES and REDD schemes
18
that are currently in place in Madagascar,
could indeed be the starting point of genuine local empowerment, because it
would give to the fokon’olona the possibility to bargain its commitment to natural
resource conservation.
The GELOSE Legislation 13
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Under such a clear combination of control and supports designed to make local
and global interests match more closely, communities could find their own way to
develop. Biodiversity could be conserved in spite of the farmer’s legitimate propen-
sity to convert forests into food and marketable products. Nature and marginalized
social groups could coexist because the intrinsic value attributed to the first woul d be
granted to the second, through a compensation that could take the form of a direct
payment (James et al. 1999; Ferraro and Kiss 2002) at household level. Access to for-
est land would be controlled but land uses and social organizations would be freed
from external design, not submitted to sophisticated zoning, monitoring, planning
and reporting. Local stakehol ders woul d establish their own management rules,
fulfilling the multiple functions they expect from their landscape. Households could
invest the money they receive in agricultural intensification. And if they were further
provided better access to information and more economic opportunities, they would
move toward a modernity they never rejected, entering into it at a pace dependent on
their skills, not on our wishes.
Notes
1. Acronym for the French Gestion Locale Se
´
curise
´
e (Secured Local Management).
2. At this site, a local institution headed by a traditional chief seemed to successfully manage
natural resources, in partnership with the Parc zoologique de Vincennes. But this partner
chose not to adopt the GELOSE approaches, although this could have changed since our
visit.
3. List established in July 2004 by RESOLVE-PCP-IRD (2005).
4. Acronym for Communaute
´
de Base (Basic Community). The term VOI, acronym for
Vondron’Olona Ifotany (Malagasy translation of Communaute
´
de Base), is also often
employed.
5. Acronym for Gestion Contractualise
´
e des Fore
ˆ
ts (Joint Forest Management). See
Gouvernement de Madagascar (2001).
6. Commune Rurale in French.
7. The terms fokon’olona and fokontany, in their traditional sense, are not employed in all
regions, as fokon’olona and fokontany are originally Merina institutions.
8. The second republic lasted from 1975 to 1992. It was initiated by Didier Ratsiraka, who
attempted a socialist revolution and established partnerships with the Soviet Union.
9. The severe repression by the army of popular protests led to the instauration of a new
constitution and the election of Albert Zafy in 1993.
10. The Pre
´
fet is a representative of the state in the Department, which is an administrative
unit above the municipality. The Sous-Pre
´
fet is the delegate of the Pre
´
fet in subdivisions
of the Department called arrondissements.
11. It is possible, however, that the situation changed again after 2007. Reality on the ground
may also differ from what the law established.
12. Vakinankaratra Region, Antananarivo Province.
13. Acronym for Projet de De
´
veloppement Forestier Inte
´
gre
´
Villageois (Integrated Forest and
Village Development Project).
14. Acronym for Gesellschaft fu
¨
r Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical
Cooperation).
15. The treasurer of an association was murdered a few years ago by a Betsimisaraka. It seems
that this was caused by conflict over access to land, but more clarification is required.
16. No pagination because reference is an html file.
17. International Centre for Agronomic and Development Research.
18. In Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes currently being developed in
Madagascar, stopping forest clearing is generally not regarded as a service, because forest
clearing is already forbidden by the law. Eligible services are rather patrolling forests,
monitoring animal populations, planting trees, protecting soils from erosion, improving
watersheds, etc. The REDD mechanism (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
14 J. Pollini and J. P. Lassoie
Downloaded By: [Pollini, Jacques] At: 18:07 5 April 2011
Land Degradation), which, 15 years after the GELOSE, will create a new buzz and may
finance PES schemes in Madagascar, could provide an opportunity to implement what is
proposed here and save the GELOSE. I believe it unfortunately will not, because the lack
of congruence between the objectives of local and global stakeholders is still ignored.
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