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Reconstructing Galicia: Mapping the Cultural and Civic Traditions of the Former Austrian Galicia in Poland and Ukraine
Abstract
This article examines the cultural legacy of Galicia, a region comprising parts of Poland and Ukraine, once united under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Using survey data compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we reconstruct the region of Galicia electoral district by electoral district, finding that Galicians today are far more civic than their compatriots. Sharing higher levels of political efficacy, Galicians are more likely to vote, and when they do, they are more likely to support parties who oppose the successor left. The vehicle for this cultural persistence, we argue, could be the (Greek) Catholic Church, which Galicians attend at far higher rates than the rest of Ukraine or Poland.
... In addition to a historical legacy of nationalism, Galician political culture is particularly conducive to political mobilization. Previous studies have noted differences in civic and political culture between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine (Birch, 1995;O'Loughlin and Bell, 1999;Wilson, 2000;Drummond and Lubecki, 2010;Magocsi, 2002). Drummond and Lubecki (2010) argue that: ...
... Previous studies have noted differences in civic and political culture between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine (Birch, 1995;O'Loughlin and Bell, 1999;Wilson, 2000;Drummond and Lubecki, 2010;Magocsi, 2002). Drummond and Lubecki (2010) argue that: ...
This article traces the on-the-ground mobilization and recruitment strategies of Ukraine’s radical right party, Svoboda (Freedom) in the years prior to its 2012 electoral breakthrough. Ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Svoboda party leaders and activists in Galicia show how party leaders strategically created an organizational structure aimed at recruiting young people, making linkages with pre-existing nationalist groups, and shifting the ideological focus away from cultural and toward economic issues. Interviews with party activists reveal how personal networks were key in the recruitment and radicalization process, showing that radical right activists were radicalized, or “made,” through political participation. Consequently, Svoboda’s organizational capacity allowed the party to take advantage of a political opportunity — Yanukovych’s unpopularity and weakened national democratic parties — in the 2012 parliamentary elections.
... Herbst and Rivkin (2013) and Bukowski (2014) document persistent differences in the quality of education across Polish partitions and attribute them to the culture of openness and inclusiveness in Austrian partition. Drummond and Lubecki (2010) hypothesize without showing empirically that the Austrian empire left in Poland and Ukraine a legacy of higher voter turnout and church attendance. Peisakhin (2012) suggests that the partition of Ukraine between the Austrian and the Russian empires left a legacy in terms of today's political attitudes. ...
Poland was divided among three empires—Russia, Austria–Hungary, and Prussia—for over
a century until 1918. The partition brought about divergence in culture, institutions, and
economic development. We use spatial regression discontinuity to examine, which empire
effects are persistent.We find that differences in incomes, industrial production, education,
corruption, and trust in government institutions disappeared with time as they were
smoothed by economic forces and policy intervention. In contrast, differences in intensity
of religious practices and in beliefs in democratic ideals, i.e., democratic capital, persist presumably
via inter-generational within-family transmission. Differences in railroad infrastructure
built by empires during industrialization persisted to this day. Cultural empire
legacies have an effect on the political outcomes in contemporary Poland.
... 6.html; Zugriff: 12.12.2014). Nicht nur Medien und Politik verwenden historische Argumente, um räumliche kulturelle Identitäten mit historischen Räumen zu begründen, sondern auch die Wissenschaft beteiligt sich an diesem Diskurs, wie z.B. Studien zu den wahlgeographischen Besonderheiten in der Ukraine zeigen (vgl. u.a. Birch 2000;Katchanovski 2006;Drummond u. Lubecki 2010;). Aber nicht nur außerhalb der Ukraine, sondern auch innerhalb der Ukraine wird insbesondere von westukrainischen Intellektuellen eine Spaltung des Landes in zwei grundlegend unterschiedliche Ukrainen hergestellt (vgl. z.B. Rjabtschuk 2005;Andruchowytsch 2003Andruchowytsch , 2007): "So gesehen ist der grundlegende Unterschied zwischen d ...
The contribution deals with the currently often discussed
separation of Ukraine and its investigation from the perspective
of culture-centred spatial research. Media, science and
politics divide Ukraine into various regions whose boundaries
are often the former borders of empires or nations. This also
suggests certain territorially conspicuous phenomena such as
election results. In the context of this study these phenomena
are called phantom borders. With the help of symbols and
monuments in villages on the river Zbruč in western Ukraine,
which is also often regarded as a potential cultural dividing
line between cultural regions in Ukraine, light is shed on
ambivalent identification areas and how history is dealt with.
It shows that on the basis of national politics of remembrance,
a spatial cultural difference is created, which is reproduced by
the inhabitants and with which they also identify. However, it
also demonstrates that culture-centred regional research to
understand such phenomena must also look at the specific
local conditions of the events being symbolised in order not to
reproduce the apparently static-essentialist perceptions of
regions.
... After a discussion of the historical background and a summary of electoral geography patterns, this paper will discuss the main types of dominating interpretations of the phenomenon of reproduction of structures brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions. This will be concluded by a discussion of the heritage of the East-West differentiation of Polish space referring to the theory of different types of capital by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986). That part of the paper can be considered to be a preliminary exploration of ideas on incorporation of Bourdieu's theory of capitals into the study of the longue durée effects in spatial variation in electoral outcomes. ...
The main goal of the paper is to discuss various interpretations of the heritage created during the so-called 'partition' of Poland in the 19th century and the ways of its possible reproduction. This goal will be achieved by analyzing patterns of Poland's electoral geography, which is known for its considerable stability. After a discussion of the historical background and a summary of the main patterns of the country's electoral geography, the main types of dominating interpretations of the reproduction of structures, brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions in the 19th century, will be discussed. The paper will show how the recent transformation of the Polish political scene, which happened about 2005-2007, affected both the structures of the electoral geography and the dominant ways of its interpretation. As it will be argued, the above mentioned changes have emphasized the role of the East-West differentiation of the Polish space. The rise to prominence of that dimension was also related to the emergence of a number of new interpretations, many of which could be seen as heavily relying on orientalistic stereotypes, including those of the very negative images related to the heritage of the Russian rule. These mainstream interpretations, based on models of opposition between the positive Western "civilization" and the negative Eastern (Russian) "backwardness", will be confronted with what seems to be a more nuanced view on the basic East-West split of the Polish space. The proposed model will be an attempt to apply the theory of different types of capital by Pierre Bourdieu. In particular, Eastern Poland and its heritage of the Austrian and Russian rule will be presented as more cultural-capital oriented, while Western Poland and its heritage of the Prussian rule - as more economic-capital oriented. In this way the paper will propose a new, more general model of analysis of the spatial longue-duree effects.
... Herbst and Rivkin (2013) and Bukowski (2014) document persistent differences in the quality of education across Polish partitions and attribute them to the culture of openness and inclusiveness in Austrian partition. Drummond and Lubecki (2010) hypothesize without showing empirically that the Austrian empire left in Poland and Ukraine a legacy of higher voter turnout and church attendance. Peisakhin (2012) suggests that the partition of Ukraine between the Austrian and the Russian empires left a legacy in terms of today's political attitudes. ...
Poland was divided among three empires — Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia — for over a century until 1918. The partition caused divergence in culture, economic development, education and the quality of government among the three parts of Poland. We use spatial regression discontinuity to examine which empire legacies are persistent. We find that differences in incomes (luminosity), education, corruption, and trust in government institutions disappeared with time as they were smoothed by economic forces and policy intervention. In contrast, differences in intensity of religious practices and in beliefs in democratic ideals persist presumably via inter generational within-family transmission. These persistent legacies of empires have an effect on the political outcomes in contemporary Poland. We also find durable differences in railroad infrastructure built by empires during industrialization.
... Herbst and Rivkin (2013) and Bukowski (2014) document persistent differences in the quality of education across Polish partitions and attribute them to the culture of openness and inclusiveness in Austrian partition. Drummond and Lubecki (2010) hypothesize without showing empirically that the Austrian empire left in Poland and Ukraine a legacy of higher voter turnout and church attendance. Peisakhin (2012) suggests that the partition of Ukraine between the Austrian and the Russian empires left a legacy in terms of today's political attitudes. ...
We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires—Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia—has a persistent effect on contemporary Poland. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have significant causal effects. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) have better infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. This difference results in higher support for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties in the formerly Prussian lands today. The population of the former Austrian (compared with Russian) lands believes in democracy more, as a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire. People in the Russian territories go to church less frequently than in Austrian or Prussian as a consequence of policies of the Russian empire undermining trust in the Catholic Church. Both liberal and religious conservative parties find higher support in the Austrian compared to Russian lands.
The lack of long-term assessment of the administrative divisions of Galicia, a former part of the Austrian monarchy, has so far been a serious obstacle in the mapping and spatial analyses of archival census data. To fill this gap, we reconstructed the boundaries of 5944 cadastral communes, court districts, and political districts into circles (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ PXDP41). Geometric boundaries are accompanied by different names according to census and cartographic sources. We found that a detailed reconstruction of the administrative units for Galicia is critically important for appropriately using census data in spatial analyses. So far, it has been neglected or considered difficult to perform because of the large area of the region, frequent administrative changes, and time-consuming map processing.
Numerous contributions to the literature show that religious activities and civic participation are positively correlated. The available studies, however, are mostly based on cross-sectional data and thus rarely control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. In this paper, using panel data on Poland, we check whether the relationship in question is robust to controlling for municipality-level fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and several time-varying factors. As a proxy for the level of religiosity we use data on religious observance, whereas as a proxy for civic participation we look at electoral turnout. Our results robustly show that municipalities with higher measures of church attendance exhibit higher voter turnout. This, in turn, gives some credence that the relationship between religious commitment and civic participation might be causal.
This article evaluates the role of community bonds in the long-term transmission of political values. At the end of World War II, Poland's borders shifted westward, and the population from the historical region of Galicia (now partly in Ukraine) was displaced to the territory that Poland acquired from Germany. In a quasi-random process, some migrants settled in their new villages as a majority group, preserving communal ties, while others ended up in the minority. The study leverages this natural experiment of history by surveying the descendants of these Galician migrants. The research design provides an important empirical test of the theorized effect of communities on long-term value transmission, which separates the influence of family and community as two competing and complementary mechanisms. The study finds that respondents in Galicia-majority settlements are now more likely to embrace values associated with Austrian imperial rule and are more similar to respondents whose families avoided displacement.
During the long nineteenth century, Poland was divided among the Russian, Habsburg, and Prussian empires. The partition produced regional diversity in political culture and in institutional and economic development. We examine how the cultural legacies of the empires have influenced the propensity of Poles to cast a ballot in parliamentary elections since 1989. Polish National Election Study individual-level data are used to assess whether higher levels of electoral turnout in Galicia are indeed a legacy of the Habsburg rule. Our results confirm that, even after controlling for socio-demographic factors, there is a positive, substantive, and significant effect on turnout of living in the ex-Habsburg part of Poland. This effect can be explained by the frequency of religious service attendance and by ideology. Inhabitants of Galicia not only attend religious services more frequently and are more conservative than their counterparts in the rest of Poland, but also the more frequently they attend church and the closer to the radical right they place themselves, the more mobilized they are to vote. The impact of the legacies of the empires on political behavior in Poland seems persistent.
Multiplicative interaction models are common in the quantitative political science literature. This is so for good reason.
Institutional arguments frequently imply that the relationship between political inputs and outcomes varies depending on the
institutional context. Models of strategic interaction typically produce conditional hypotheses as well. Although conditional
hypotheses are ubiquitous in political science and multiplicative interaction models have been found to capture their intuition
quite well, a survey of the top three political science journals from 1998 to 2002 suggests that the execution of these models
is often flawed and inferential errors are common. We believe that considerable progress in our understanding of the political
world can occur if scholars follow the simple checklist of dos and don'ts for using multiplicative interaction models presented
in this article. Only 10% of the articles in our survey followed the checklist.
Two U.S. geographers discuss the extent to which widespread dissatisfaction in Ukraine with economic and political transition in the 1990s is reflected in the level of non-governmental, mass-based political activity. A major focus is placed on detecting whether a correlation exists at the oblast level between the level of civic engagement (non-governmental organizational activity) and socioeconomic conditions and/or cultural-historical factors. The results of the anaylsis provide a basis for assessing the likelihood of future territorially based ethnic or nationalist unrest. The analysis is based on information from national public opinion surveys, official statistics, and other sources.
Over the last decade there has been a spirited debate among comparativists as to whether the post-communist transition reflects the earlier transition process in Latin America and Southern Europe or whether it is unique. While the literature is far-ranging and diverse, the central debate is whether the past influences the transition process to such an extent that key comparative concepts such as democratisation or modernisation lose their utility. Transitologists realise that the historical experiences of post-communist countries are distinct from those of Latin American and Southern European countries. However, they question whether these experiences are determinant of behaviour and, especially, of institutions. For example, Przeworski argues that all democratising countries 'are determined by a common destination, not by different points of departure'. This article seeks to make a contribution to this debate by exploring the structural determinants of social cleavages in Romania and Ukraine. These countries were chosen in order to compare whether the pre-World War I and communist legacies have a comparable influence on voting behaviour. We analyse the effect of several independent variables on voting behaviour, including the historical legacy, ethnicity and socio-economic indicators. Unlike previous research, we find that socio-economic variables are only slightly influential in explaining voting patterns. Instead, we find that the historical legacy variable is much more significant in determining social cleavages and voting behaviour. Unlike earlier research which found that socio-economic variables were positively correlated with reform policies and politicians, we find that variables such as urbanisation and education are not necessarily positively correlated with reform support in the post-communist context. Therefore, we find strong evidence that history and culture do matter in determining how the electorate perceives choices.
To understand what conditions make democracies stable or unstable, effective or ineffective, Professor Eckstein examines the stability and effectiveness of Norwegian democracy. He finds them both to be high. He then examines several theories derived from the study of other democracies or from comparative studies of other democratic and nondemocratic societies. Virtually all present an inadequate explanation of the Norwegian case, because the political divisions in Norway are the kind usually associated with instability and ineffectiveness of democratic rule. The author explains, however, that a profound sense of community exists despite the political cleavages.
"Since you're here, Monsieur de Tocqueville, I'd like you to tell me a little about America," said Louis-Philippe, the king of France, in 1848. For 150 years, the French have enjoyed discussing America with Tocqueville; the Americans, too. In America, as in France, Tocqueville is best known as the author of a single book, Democracy in America, which is read as a textbook on the political constitution of the United States. The French see Tocqueville as the apologist for a foreign model: "That American," his adversaries call him. For Americans, Tocqueville is an honorary citizen, who reinforces their idea of their own exceptionalism. The Americanization of Tocqueville is evident from the fact that the remark for which Tocqueville is best known in the United States is apocryphal. Presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan and Clinton have repeated what Tocqueville is supposed to have said but never did: "America is great because America is good. When America ceases to be good, she will cease to be great." Though falsely attributed to Tocqueville, the saying is instructive nonetheless. Like other, genuine quotations, but in a more obvious way, it aims to reinforce an American identity based on moral values and said to derive from an initial promise to which the nation is urged to remain faithful or perish.
This book investigates one of the oldest paradoxes in political science: why do mass political loyalties persist even amid prolonged social upheaval and disruptive economic development. Drawing on extensive archival research and an original database of election results, this book explores the paradox of political persistence by examining Hungary's often tortuous path from pre- to post-communism. Wittenberg reframes the theoretical debate, and then demonstrates how despite the many depredations of communism, the Roman Catholic and Calvinist Churches transmitted loyalties to parties of the Right. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Church resistance occurred not from above, but from below. Hemmed in and harassed by communist party cadres, parish priests and pastors employed a variety of ingenious tactics to ensure the continued survival of local church institutions. These institutions insulated their adherents from pressures to assimilate into the surrounding socialist milieu. Ultimately this led to political continuity between pre-and post-communism.
This paper uses data from a 1992 survey of young people in Ukraine to examine the linkages among geography, nationality, and religion in Ukraine. Differences in religious interest and affiliation follow distinctive geographic and ethnic patterns, and mirror the divisive voting behavior observed in the 1994 Ukrainian presidential election. Therefore, religious interest and affiliation may play important roles in the developing political divisions within Ukraine. Distinct differences exist in religious interest between western and eastern Ukraine. In addition, religious affiliation differs dramatically along regional and ethnic lines. Western Ukraine contains the highest percentage of religious believers, and these believers are most strongly associated with the Greek Catholic Church. Throughout the rest of Ukraine, interest in religion is lower, and the primary affiliation is with the Orthodox Church. This suggests that religious belief and affiliation may be related to geographic, nationalistic, and political divisions that are currently growing in importance within Ukraine.
Multivariate analysis of political values and voting behaviour demonstrates beyond a doubt that the 'regional effect' in Ukraine is not simply the consequence of other factors having regional dimensions. True, more ethnic Russians live in eastern Ukraine than in the west of the country, and true more people are employed in heavy industry in the east, but region exerts an independent impact on political beliefs even when factors such as ethnicity and occupational sector are controlled for. This does not in and of itself explain the significance of the regional effect in Ukrainian politics, however. As political geographers are keen to stress, place matters in politics, but it matters in different ways, depending on the historical, physical and socio-cultural context. This investigation has gone some way towards illuminating the import of this 'regional effect' in the Ukrainian context.
Much of the initial comment on the 1998 Ukrainian elections focused on the strong performance of the Communist Party. The Communists did indeed emerge as the largest single force, with 24.65% of the list vote and 122 out of 450 seats in parliament (Verkhovna Rada). However, the real story of the elections was one of underlying stability and limited change. The elections confirmed overall voting patterns that were initially apparent in the transition elections of 1990-94. Ukraine still has no real national party system, only a set of local systems, but the sum total of these systems now seems to produce overall that are fairly predictable. This article is in five parts. First, we give an overview of the election law used for the 1998 elections, followed by an examination of the main groups contesting the poll. We then describe the voter survey designed by the authors and conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in the last two weeks of the election campaign and use its data to construct a model of party support. The voting results are then analysed in detail, before a final section discusses the process of faction formation in parliament after the elections.
The publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences. Throughout the period from 1973 to 1987, given nationalities consistently showed relative high or low levels of a “civic culture”—a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order. Those societies that rank high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that rank low. Economic development and cultural change are linked in a complex pattern of reciprocal influence. Originally, Protestantism may have facilitated the rise of capitalism, leading to economic development, which in turn favored the emergence of the civic culture. But in those countries that attained high levels of prosperity, there eventually emerged postmaterialist values that tended to neutralize the emphasis on economic accumulation that earlier characterized Protestant societies.
Using Soviet archival materials declassified in the 1980s, John-Paul Himka examines a period during which the Greek Catholic church in Galicia was involved in a protracted, and at times bitter, struggle to maintain its distinctive, historically developed rites and customs. He focuses on the way differing concepts of Rutherian nationality affected the perception and course of church affairs while showing the influence of local ecclesiastical matters on the development and acceptance of these divergent concepts of nationality. The implications and complications of the Galician imbroglio are engagingly explained in this latest addition to Himka's work on nationality in late nineteenth-century Galicia. His analysis of the relationship between the church and the national movement is a valuable addition to the study of religion and national movements in East Europe and beyond.
The most telling criticism of political culture theory is that it has coped very inadequately with political change. There is a good reason for this: the assumptions of the political culture approach in fact lead to the expectation of continuity. But continuity can be reconciled with changes, though only changes of particular kinds. The nature of political changes consistent with culturalist assumptions and with the culturalist expectation of continuity are here specified by hypotheses about (1) the effects of changes in social context, whether “normal” or involving abrupt discontinuity, and (2) the effects of attempted revolutionary transformation.
THIS STUDY of the political culture of democracy had its inspiration some thirty years ago in the Social Science Division of the University of Chicago. Much of what now goes under the name of the behavioral approach to the study of politics originated there in the period between the wars. It is a tribute to the vision of the men who created this leaven that it has taken three or four decades for their conception of political science to become a common possession. In particular, this study owes its inspiration to the work of Charles E. Merriam. His Civic Training series formulated many of the problems with which this study is concerned, and his New Aspects of Politics suggested the methods that have been used in its execution.
In several republics of the former Soviet Union, the close association between national oppositions and national churches
can be understood in terms of an intermediate form of social organization called religio-oppositional subcultures. These are
patterns of private social relations that are withdrawn from public life in the communist state. They draw upon the popular
merger of nationhood, language and national church, and were typically associated with secular dissident groups. Despite concerted
repression and intense atheistic mobilization by the communist party, these patterns of relations not only held fast but eventually
expanded their oppositional role in the last decade. By tracing variable patterns of the church-nation-opposition merger in
the Baltic states, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, this article offers explanations for differences in the role, scope,
and course of development of religio-oppositional subcultures.
The factors which condition citizens' participation in elections and referendums are of major interest. There has been little effort as yet to consider how the choices made by the Ukrainian electorate represent the beginning of a pattern of electoral cleavage. At the time of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 a number of large-scale electoral surveys were carried out. There has so far been little concrete evidence on the structure of the electorate and the development of electoral behaviour during the late Soviet period. The investigation which follows charts the social determinants of electoral behaviour in Western Ukraine in national elections and referendums between 1989 and 1991. Throughout the perestroika period, Western Ukraine's regional centre L'viv was, outside Kiev, the main base of democratically minded nationalist groups who saw independence as the way to political reform and economic recovery. Electoral cleavages here were particularly well defined. The analysis of electoral behaviour in Western Ukraine represents a valuable case study of the development of political allegiances during the crucial initial phase of electoral liberalisation. -from Author
This article explores associations between participation and party voting and a number of socio-economic variables observed at the voivodship level in Poland's 1993 Sejm elections. It further identifies similarities and differences between the impact of those factors in the 1991 and 1993 elections. The regression estimates indicate that 1993 was not a “reproduction” of 1991. In the most recent election, increases in voting participation accounted for the great upsurge in support for parties of the left, while socio-economic factors were of lesser significance. Moreover, a geographical political cleavage, not previously identified in other voting studies, had an important influence on both participation and party voting.
Journal of Democracy 10.1 (1999) 57-62
Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, one thing is clear: The word "postcommunism" has lost its relevance. The fact that Hungary and Albania, or the Czech Republic and Belarus, or Poland and Kazakhstan shared a communist past explains very little about the paths that they have taken since. Indeed, it is striking how vastly different the outcomes of the democratic transitions have been in Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, certain patterns do emerge. A new tripartite political geography of formerly communist Europe is emerging: a new Central Europe (the so-called Visegrád group, the Baltic countries, and Slovenia) as a clear "success story"; the Balkans, where the democratic transition has often been derailed by the priorities of nation-state building or undermined by the legacies of communism and economic backwardness; and Russia, in search of a postimperial identity and teetering on the brink of economic disaster. (The fate of democratizaton in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova will to a large extent depend on what happens in Russia.)
Shortly after the collapse of the communist system, Ralf Dahrendorf identified three interrelated areas of change with different "timetables": political democracy and the rule of law (six months), the conversion to a market economy (six years), and the emergence of a civil society (six decades). Almost a decade later, it appears that so far the new political elites in Central Europe have successfully met the challenge posed by the disjunctive time spans of these three processes of change. They have established parliamentary democracy as the only game in town, creating a constitutional framework and political institutions that are seen as legitimate by all political actors; moreover, the formation of a relatively stable party system, allowing for smooth alternation in power, by now has taken place everywhere in Central Europe. A market economy has been established, with more than half of GNP produced in the private sector and over three quarters of trade now conducted with the OECD countries. A civil society is developing, with both its economic dimension (emerging new strata of entrepreneurs) and its networks of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
This picture contrasts not only with the former Soviet Union (the Baltic states excepted) but also with the Balkans. The most extreme case of a "derailed" transition, of course, is former Yugoslavia, because of the war and the breakup of the Federation into several successor states whose legitimacy and viability are still being questioned. The legitimacy of the territorial framework clearly remains the first prerequisite for a democratic transition.
To be sure, the situation in the Balkans should not be seen solely through the prism of the Yugoslav war and ethnonationalist conflict. There have been encouraging developments over the last year or two in both Bulgaria and Romania. In the former, the winter of discontent (1996-97), culminating in the ransacking of Parliament, forced the incompetent and corrupt ex-communist government to step down and call for an early election, opening the way for much delayed economic reforms. In Romania, a belated alternation in power ("We have lost seven years," said President Constantinescu when taking over from Iliescu) saw the ex-communists replaced by a right-wing coalition, although after two years in power it has produced little or no reform. If the contrast between the Central European and Balkan models can be summed up as that between democratic consolidation and the rise of "illiberal democracies," then Romania and Bulgaria (as well as Slovakia) are in an intermediate position.
There is, of course, no single factor that accounts for this process of differentiation. One can only point to a combination of factors, explanations, or hypotheses that can help make sense of the uneven progress of the democratic transition in the region.
1) The legacies of communism. More important than the manner of the changeover in 1989-91 (gradual or sudden, negotiated from above or imposed from below) in influencing the longer-term prospects for democratic success are the nature of the old communist regime and the depth of its imprint on society. The harshest totalitarian domination in the postwar period tended to be in the Balkans (Albania...
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