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An effective measure of institutional engineering? Ethnic party bans in Africa
Abstract
Following the introduction of multiparty systems, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced wide-ranging measures of party regulation, particularly bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties, in order, it is claimed, to prevent intercommunal conflict and to promote democracy. While this restrictive type of party regulation has become a dominant political feature in Africa, little is known about the efficacy of such measures. This article engages in an analysis of the possible effects on democracy and peace of different types of party regulation and implemented party bans and shows that party bans are apparently less suited to alleviating conflict than has been claimed. It also finds that implemented bans seem to be negatively related to democracy as ethnic bans are frequently abused to suppress the political opposition or to silence ethnic or religious minorities.
... We would of course be wrong to claim that the consequences in every country in which a ban is actually implemented (rather than simply kept on the books as a deterrent) are uniformly positive. Research both from Europe and further afi eld suggests mixed results (see Minkinberg, 2006, Bieber, 2008: 109-110, Moroff , 2010, Moroff and Basedau, 2010, as well as 'unintendedand not so unintended -consequences' (Randall, 2008: 252-58). However, we would clearly be mistaken if we were to suggest that they are always and everywhere malign -evidence, if you like of some kind of iron law of institutional interference. ...
... Based on their observation of 43 sub-Saharan African countries, Anika Moroff and Matthias Basedau claimed that the level of ethnic conflict in most sub-Saharan African countries has remained unchanged, despite the adoption and implementation of party regulations. 69 They further observed that political parties in Nigeria, for example, still have marked strongholds, and general political rivalry in the country persists. This conclusion questions the impact of regulating political activities in Africa. ...
This article analyses the ways in which African countries are grappling with the problem of electoral violence. It argues that, although electoral violence has posed a serious challenge to democratic consolidation and peace in Africa, knowledge of how to prevent and or manage it is largely inadequate. Much of the academic interest in electoral violence has focused on defining the phenomenon, particularly analysing its causes, scope, patterns and consequences. This article examines the measures adopted by Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria to manage electoral violence. The specific measures analysed in this study include: (1) establishment of commissions of inquiry; (2) mediation in high-tension situations; and (3) regulation of political activities. While these measures represent significant efforts to curb electoral violence in Africa, they do not, of course, directly address the underlying causes of the problem. Electoral violence will continue to pose serious challenges to democracy and peace in Africa until the lingering socio-economic and political tensions and the lack of credibility of the electoral process in many African countries are addressed; however, in the meantime, to save lives, it is worth putting into place effective deterrents to election violence wherever it threatens.
... 27 In Africa, the most comprehensive study of this issue yet conducted found few clear impacts of ethnic party bans on either peace or democracy. 28 In both regions, the claims that party engineering could promote better governance outcomes were found wanting. ...
As key agents of conflict management, political parties should play a critical role in peacebuilding. But despite a widespread consensus on the importance of parties for both political and economic development, international interventions in post-conflict states often have the effect of undermining, rather than promoting, the development of strong parties and stable party systems. While both the scholarly literature and much domestic political practice favour the development of aggregative and nationally focused parties, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts – particularly cases where the United Nations is involved – often privilege descriptive representation and inclusion over other goals, resulting in fragmented and ethnically based party systems. This neglect of systemic party-building has contributed to extreme political sclerosis in recent high-profile international interventions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Nepal, amongst others.
... Because these criteria constituted a set of incentives for building national parties, not simply a prohibition of ethnic parties, they are best viewed as a 'positive' ethnic ban aimed at aggregation rather than blocking. 5 Other arrangements to promote aggregation were the distribution requirements for presidential elections and local elections. Since 1979, the successful contestant of presidential elections in Nigeria has to win not just an overall majority, but also a minimum percentage of the vote in a minimum number of states to ensure the winning candidate has national support. ...
Nigeria is the African country that implemented ethnic party bans most systematically. At different points in time, a total of at least 64 parties has been denied registration for failing to demonstrate ‘national presence’. Nigeria is also the African country with the longest record in institutional engineering. Ethnic party bans are one instrument in a broader repertoire of incentives for the creation of national parties that transcend the manifold socio-cultural differences. This article provides an overview of the often highly innovative ways in which successive Nigerian leaders, especially military, have sought to control the political organization of ethnicity in the process of democratization.
In this issue EditorialGodwin R. Murunga & Ibrahim O. Ogachi........................................................................................3 ÉditorialGodwin R. Murunga & Ibrahim O. Ogachi........................................................................................5 1. Introduction: Pan Africanism and the Reparative Framework for Global Africa, _ Horace G. Campbell ............................................................7 2. A Pan-Africanist Approach to Migration,Patricia Daley ...............................................................................17 3. Franc CFA: la farce de mauvais goût de Macron et Ouattara,Fanny Pigeaud & Ndongo Samba Sylla........................................................................23 4. Africa-United States Relations under the Biden Administration: Room for a Pan African Agenda?Cheryl Hendricks.....................................................27 5. Kwame Nkrumah and the Quest for Independence,Adom Getachew....................................................33 6. The Prophecy of Self-Emancipation: Walter Rodney and the Scholarship and Praxis of Defiance in the African World,Michael O. West........................................................... 39 7. Reparations, Knowledge and the Decolonial University,Carole Boyce Davies..............................................43 8. Cyberpower and Pan-Africanism,Abdul Alkalimat & Kate Williams ................................................................................49 9. The Danger of ADOS: How Disinformation Campaigns Threaten Reparations and Pan African Movements through Digital Media,Jessica Ann Mitchell Aiwuyor ................................................................................53 Debates / Débats10. A Response to Lloyd G. Adu Amoah’s ‘Ghana’s Democracy and the 2020 General Election: Signs of a Fading Promise,Nene-Lomotey Kuditchar .......................................................61 11. Samir Amin : Recueil de textes introduit par Demba Moussa Dembele – Note de lecture,Bernard Founou Tchuigoua .........................................................65
What determines which identity cleavage, ethnicity or religion, is mobilized in political contestation, be it peaceful or violent? In contrast to common predictions that the greatest contention occurs where identities are fully segmented, most identity conflicts in the world are between ethnic groups that share religion. Alternatives in Mobilization builds on the literature about political demography to address this seeming contradiction. The book proposes that variation in relative group size and intersection of cleavages help explain conundrums in the mobilization of identity, across transgressive and contained political settings. This theory is tested cross-nationally on identity mobilization in civil war and across violent conflict in Pakistan, Uganda, Nepal and Turkey, and peaceful electoral politics in Indonesia. This book helps illustrate a more accurate and improved picture of the ethnic and religious tapestry of the world and addresses an increasing need for a better understanding of how religion contributes to conflict.
Islamist movements in Mauritania have not enjoyed a widespread following nor have they been influential political actors. Besides the climate of persecution and lack of liberties, citizens have generally had other ways to organise and express their interests: through tribes, and particularly through clientelistic networks that go beyond tribes, old religious brotherhoods and other religious outlets. Mauritania is one of the poorest countries in the world and has experienced accelerated urbanisation, but for the people who live in the deprived outskirts of large cities, the main objective of Islamist leaders appears not to radically change their living conditions, but rather to satisfy their own desire for power.
Party system nationalization is often viewed as critical to national unity, the production of public goods, and may have implications for democratic success. This paper assesses the impact of ethnic diversity and electoral rules in 74 economically developing democracies. Contrary to past studies, majoritarian electoral systems heighten the tendency of ethnic diversity to reduce nationalization while proportional representation greatly reduces its impact. Presidential systems produce higher levels of nationalization than parliamentary systems but the effect reverses as the number of presidential candidates increases. Though ethnic party bans may increase nationalization, ballot access requirements, the level of freedom, and relative prosperity have no effect.
Mauritania is celebrating the first legislative and municipal elections following the Arab Spring. These elections show us the position of the main political actors and their relationship with the authoritarian political regime. Our interest is focused on the analysis of the role exerted in the Arab Spring by the Tawassoul party and its participation in the legislative and municipal elections. Since this approach other main character has been Initiative for the resurgence of the abolitionist movement (IRA). Tawassoul has decided to participate in the elections, in spite of its critiques against the political regime and the President Ould Abdel Aziz. This decision breaks the cohesion of the opposition parties and their boycott. However, the IRA maintains its positions during the Arab Spring and the conditions of a non-legalized party.
Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced legal provisions to ban ethnic or other identity-based particularistic parties. Altogether, 12 countries have actually banned political parties on these grounds. In theoretical terms, such bans can exclude particularism from politics but - contrary to public discourse - also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to violent means or of becoming an object of conflict themselves. Empirically speaking, hardly any general patterns in the effects of bans can be detected. A closer look at 12 politically relevant bans in six countries reveals an initially stabilizing impact in one case (Rwanda in 1994). A ban on a religious party in Kenya in 1993 triggered violent conflict. In cases such as Equatorial Guinea (1994) and Rwanda (2001, 2003), this regulatory measure, allegedly designed to promote peace, seems to be part of the 'menu of manipulation' and is abused to suppress the opposition.
Recent research has questioned the notion that ethnicity is the main determinant of party preference in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on data from representative survey polls in eight anglophone and francophone sub-Saharan countries, multinomial and binary logit regressions confirm that ethnicity counts but does not explain party preference as a whole. More importantly we find that the relevance of ethnicity varies substantially from country to country. Looking at possible effects, there is little evidence that ‘ethnicized’ party systems harm democracy; discussing possible structural, institutional and historical determinants of the role of ethnicity in party politics, tentative results suggest that specific integrative cultural features, low ethnic polarization, one-party dominance and a historical non-mobilization of ethnicity might thwart the politicization of ethnicity. Future research should focus on the interaction of several factors and how processes of ethnic mobilization evolve historically.
The article is interested in the main reasons for the emergence and enforcement of party bans in sub-Saharan Africa. While the introduction of legal provisions that allow for the banning of particularistic political parties is the standard on the African continent, few countries actually use these provisions and actually deny registration or ban existing parties. We use qualitative comparative analysis to compare the introduction of party bans and the patterns of implementation across all sub-Saharan countries. Our analysis shows that structural conditions do matter. Countries that did not introduce legal provisions to ban political parties combine a British colonial background and a stronger tradition of multi-party democracy. With regard to the decision to actually use these provisions our analysis shows the interaction of two conditions to be decisive: Countries which have experienced ethnically motivated violence in the past and which are at the same time ‘liberalizing’ their regimes rely on party bans to restrict political party competition.
With the re-introduction of multiparty politics at the beginning of the 1990s most African countries started to regulate political parties extensively, especially ethnic and other particularistic parties. This article presents a new database on particularistic and other party bans in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on a comprehensive collection of African party regulations and records of their implementation since 1990. After demonstrating the magnitude and complexity of party bans in Africa the article deals in depth with enforcement institutions and legal procedures. It shows that party bans are especially pervasive in less democratic countries and have often targeted politically relevant parties.
Senegal has a long history of multiparty rule. In the 1970s the regime used party regulation to restrict political competition; since the 1990s and notwithstanding a steady rise of the number of political parties to around 150 at the end of 2008, there have been only a few attempts to regulate the activities of political parties. Party bans have been effective in limiting the politicization of ethnicity in the party system, but other social and political variables have contributed equally to this outcome. Formal rules have not been applied in stopping the rise of religious parties, as the electoral success of these parties remains limited. The shrinking importance of political parties in the increasingly personalist regime of President Wade makes regulation of party activities a less contested issue.
The debate on institutional engineering offers options to manage ethnic and other conflicts. This contribution systematically assesses the logic of these institutional designs and the empirical evidence on their functioning. Generally, institutions can work on ethnic conflict by either accommodating (“consociationalists”) or denying (“integrationists”) ethnicity in politics. Looking at individual and combined institutions (e.g. state structure, electoral system, forms of government), the literature review finds that most designs are theoretically ambivalent and that empirical evidence on their effectiveness is mostly inconclusive. The following questions remain open: a) Is politicized ethnicity really a conflict risk? b) What impact does the whole “menu” (not just single institutions) have? and c) How are effects conditioned by the exact nature of conflict risks?
This chapter explores how electoral arrangements have been used and can be used in Sub-Saharan Africa to shape the political organization of ethnicity in the emerging party systems of the region. Electoral system is understood here in the broad sense, including not only the way votes are translated into seats, but also the regulations for party registration and candidate nomination. The analysis covers countries spread over most of the continent, in the present and past. In the process, the chapter will propose corrections to three prevailing conceptions about electoral engineering for conflict management.
One under-theorized aspect of "multiculturalism and the antidiscrimination principle" is religious and ethnicity based political parties. With political organization, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. When the struggle for empowerment is "waged within the world of democratic politics" it is waged through parties. That is the associational form modern democracies have settled on for participation, representation, and governing, and for countervailing power and regular opposition. Particularist parties and bloc voting are key instruments of political conflict and, as important, of political integration. This paper looks at the challenges these parties pose to democracy; specifically, at the principal reasons given for banning parties from participation in electoral politics. I identify four categories of justification for disqualification: violent overthrow, incitement to hate, altering the character of the nation, and outside support or control. This is a preliminary to setting out regulative principles of "defensive democracy."
Do ethnic parties exacerbate ethnic conflict? Many scholars have argued that the mere appearance of ethnic parties inevitably leads to a spiral of ethnic conflict and the collapse of incipient democracies. This article tests this proposition by examining how ethnic parties affect protest and communal conflict across 82 countries and 213 ethnic/communal groups from 1985–2003. Using a variety of quantitative techniques, I find that ethnic parties do mobilize minority ethnic groups to engage in protest, but there is no natural connection between the appearance of ethnic parties and the extent to which the minority group engages in communal conflict.
This book asks what distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones and what distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics. The book posits that ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. It furthermore argues that political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations. In particular, absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. A number of case studies and statistical analysis of all electoral democracies since 1945 are used to test and support the formal argument.
While it may be difficult to achieve and maintain stable democratic governments in countries with deep religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, or ethnic cleavages, Lijphart argues that it is not at all impossible. Through the analysis of political systems in six continents, he demonstrates that what he calls consociational democracy can be successful in severely divided or plural societies. "Here, once again, Arend Lijphart is directing our attention to matters which will surely engage much of the attention of students of comparative politics in the next decade." G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Political Science Review "A study which can speak to such a wide audience in political science deserves a warm welcome from the profession." Government and Opposition "A copybook example of the comparative method of political analysis, as well as indispensable reading for all who have an interest in the nature and prospects of representative democracy, whether in Europe or beyond."-The Times Higher Education Supplement "This well-written work, containing a wealth of information on politics of many diverse nations, is highly recommended."-Library Journal
In multi-ethnic democracies, majority rule can be a form of alien rule for ethnic minorities. Thus, Serbs in Croatia preferred a state of their own to life under a Croat-dominated government, as did Tamils in Sri Lanka, Whites in South Africa, and Kurds in Iraq, to cite only a the many examples of minorities who have protested, and sought safeguards against, the spectre of majority domination. All multi-ethnic democracies, however, are not believed to be equally prone to the possibility of permanent exclusion of minorities by majorities. According to a classic argument in empirical democratic theory, the tendency towards permanent exclusion is likely to be weaker in multi-ethnic democracies with "multipolar" rather than "bipolar" or "majority-dominant" structures of ethnic division, and in countries with "cross-cutting" rather than "coinciding" structures.
The second of August 2009 marked the tenth anniversary of the failed secessionist attempt by the Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM). It resulted in Namibia's sole state of emergency since independence. Ten years on, the high treason trial for what began as more than 130 accused drags on. Namibia thus has the longest serving political prisoners within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) without their having been convicted. This article draws attention to a widely neglected failure in Namibia's nation-building effort and thereby highlights a special challenge left by the colonial legacy to the independent government. It presents a summary of events leading to the secessionist attempt and a historical overview of issues around the so-called Caprivi Strip and explores the shortcomings in an unresolved relationship between the central state and the local perspectives and identities of people living at the margins. By doing so, it uses the case study of the Caprivi region as an example for the challenges of bringing about ‘One Namibia, One Nation’.
Introduction 1. Approaches to democratization 2. Neopatrimonial rule in Africa 3. Africa's divergent transitions, 1990-1994 4. Explaining political protest 5. Explaining political liberalization 6. Explaining democratic transitions 7. The prospects for democracy Conclusion: comparative implications.
If one of the most interesting characteristics of the Turkish party system in the 1990s was the rapid rise of political Islam under the banner of the Welfare Party, an equally, perhaps even more, noteworthy development in the early 2000s is its transformation under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership into a moderate conservative democratic party. Various aspects of this transformation are the central focus of this work. The AKP is compared with the earlier Islamist parties in terms of ideology, organization, competitive strategy, and government performance.
Why do opposition parties in Tanzania remain chronically weak a decade and a half after the country's democratic transition? Part of the absence of a vigorous political opposition is the result of little demand for it and its uninspiring leadership. This argument views the ruling CCM as a relatively benign hegemon acceptable to the vast majority of Tanzanians. Although this argument is based on a significant amount of truth, the main reason opposition parties remain weak is because the CCM suppresses those who contest its near-monopoly of power, including resorting to coercion when other methods of containing the opposition fail.
The authors analyze the significant political reforms undertaken by 40 sub-Saharan countries. The introduction provides a brief overview of political trends in Africa's period of regime transition in the first half of the 1990s. Chapter 1 surveys the literature on democratization and the different approaches that have been used to explain the success or failure of democratization attempts. Chapter 2 extends and illustrates this theoretical framework by discussing the nature of African political institutions, both formal and informal. Chapter 3 describes in detail the beginning, internal dynamics, and outcomes of recent political transitions across the continent. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 test the authors' politico-institutional approach with the help of a comprehensive base of quantitative data that includes variables on each country's socioeconomic status, legacy of political institutions and transition trajectory. Extensive use is made of case studies. The final chapter examines the prospects for democracy in Africa as of the mid-1990s. It distinguishes between the reversal, survival and consolidation of fragile democratic regimes.
This article discusses the public justifications brought forward for three waves of bans on political parties in Rwanda after the regime change of 1994. While the standard narrative of protecting democracy from its enemies (‘militant democracy’) was not invoked, two alternative narratives carried the burden of justification. The first is that of banning strongly particularistic parties, i.e. parties that discriminate or incite hatred and violence along ethnic or similar lines. The second is that of banning the former ruling party, responsible for mass atrocities, and its successor organizations. While both justification narratives have strong initial plausibility against Rwanda's history of ethnic conflict and genocide, and mirror analogous justifications for banning parties elsewhere, a detailed discussion of the evidence suggests that Rwanda's bans mainly served the purpose of repressing political opposition. The justifications brought forward in the later waves of bans remain unconvincing and cannot claim political legitimacy.
Nigeria is the African country that implemented ethnic party bans most systematically. At different points in time, a total of at least 64 parties has been denied registration for failing to demonstrate ‘national presence’. Nigeria is also the African country with the longest record in institutional engineering. Ethnic party bans are one instrument in a broader repertoire of incentives for the creation of national parties that transcend the manifold socio-cultural differences. This article provides an overview of the often highly innovative ways in which successive Nigerian leaders, especially military, have sought to control the political organization of ethnicity in the process of democratization.
The article is interested in the main reasons for the emergence and enforcement of party bans in sub-Saharan Africa. While the introduction of legal provisions that allow for the banning of particularistic political parties is the standard on the African continent, few countries actually use these provisions and actually deny registration or ban existing parties. We use qualitative comparative analysis to compare the introduction of party bans and the patterns of implementation across all sub-Saharan countries. Our analysis shows that structural conditions do matter. Countries that did not introduce legal provisions to ban political parties combine a British colonial background and a stronger tradition of multi-party democracy. With regard to the decision to actually use these provisions our analysis shows the interaction of two conditions to be decisive: Countries which have experienced ethnically motivated violence in the past and which are at the same time ‘liberalizing’ their regimes rely on party bans to restrict political party competition.
With the re-introduction of multiparty politics at the beginning of the 1990s most African countries started to regulate political parties extensively, especially ethnic and other particularistic parties. This article presents a new database on particularistic and other party bans in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on a comprehensive collection of African party regulations and records of their implementation since 1990. After demonstrating the magnitude and complexity of party bans in Africa the article deals in depth with enforcement institutions and legal procedures. It shows that party bans are especially pervasive in less democratic countries and have often targeted politically relevant parties.
In most studies of the impact of ethnic diversity on economic growth, diversity is hypothesized to affect growth through its effect on macroeconomic policies. This article shows that most measures of ethnic diversity (including the commonly used ELF measure) are inappropriate for testing this hypothesis. This is because they are constructed from enumerations of ethnic groups that include all of the ethnographically distinct groups in a country irrespective of whether or not they engage in the political competition whose effects on macroeconomic policymaking are being tested. I present a new index of ethnic fractionalization based on an accounting of politically relevant ethnic groups in 42 African countries. I employ this measure (called PREG, for Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups) to replicate Easterly and Levine's influential article on Africa's “growth tragedy.” I find that PREG does a much better job of accounting for the policy-mediated effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth in Africa than does ELF.
Recent theory on ethnic identity suggests that it is constructed and highly influenced by contextual factors and group leaders' strategies. Therefore, while the notion that social cleavages stabilize electoral politics is well established, which cleavages matter and why remain open questions. This article argues that in new democracies the effects of diffuse ethnic cleavages on electoral politics diverge depending on the amount of information they provide to their constituency. The information provision, in turn, depends on how well the cleavage lends itself to the formation of ethnic parties. A formal model of voting stability is developed and empirically tested using data on electoral volatility in all new democracies since 1945 and on individual voting in democratizing Bulgaria. The results show that in the sample examined only identity that centers on language jump-starts party-system stabilization, while race and religion do nothing to stabilize the vote in early elections.
Despite earlier assumptions that ethnicity is a central feature of African party systems, there is little substantial evidence for this claim. The few studies with an empirical foundation rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favor of Anglophone Africa. This paper looks at four Francophone countries, drawing on four representative survey polls in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Multivariate regression models and bivariate control tools reveal that ethnicity matters as a determinant of party preference, but that its impact is generally rather weak and differs with regard to party systems and individual parties. “Ethnic parties” in the strict sense are almost completely absent, and only the Beninese party system is substantially “ethnicized.” In particular, regional ties between voters and leaders—rather than ethnic affiliation alone—deserve attention in the future study of voting behavior in Africa.
Today the most common form of political regime in the developing world is electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular multiparty elections for parliament and the chief executive. Yet they violate liberal-democratic minimum standards of freedom, fairness, and integrity in so systematic and profound ways as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule, rather then instruments of democracy. This volume presents cutting-edge empirical research into the internal dynamics of electoral authoritarian regimes. The methodological chapters (1–3) discuss issues of conceptualization and measurement in fresh and innovate ways. The empirical chapters (4–12) focus on the conflictive interaction between rulers and opposition parties in the central arena of struggle under electoral authoritarianism: the electoral battlefield. Each contribution addresses one particular analytical puzzle on the basis of careful cross-national comparison, with a focus either on a specific region or a cross-regional subset of cases. The concluding chapter (13) offers a critical review of the debate and outlines the contours of a future agenda of research.
Les multiples usages de l'Islam dans le champ politique mauritanien
- Marianne Marty
Ethno-political Identities Forged through Violence
- Barnabé Ndarishikanye
- Burundi
Party Regulation in Conflict-Prone Societies: More Dangers Than Opportunities?
- Vicky Randall
‘Ethnically Dominated Party Systems and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
- Robert A Dowd
- Michael Driessen
Regulating Minority Parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe
- Florian Bieber