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Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia
Abstract
This article demonstrates how differently the demands of Transdnistria and Gagauzia have been managed by the Moldovan centre. Despite Gagauzia declaring independence as early as 1989, Moldova did not perceive it as a threat to its territorial integrity and embarked on a negotiation process which resulted in a limited but constitutionalized autonomy arrangement in 1995. In contrast, accommodation failed in Transdnistria. While the linguistic concerns of the Russophone population of Transdnistria were a salient factor underlying the outbreak of conflict, pragmatic considerations of the regional elite make this conflict a regional rather than an ethnic issue. The as yet unresolved conflict has had a direct effect on Moldova's transition politics, contributing to the resignation of the government in 1994, the neglect of socio-economic issues and the attempt of both the Moldovan executive and legislature to use the conflict as a justification to expand their powers.
... Хоча три основні мови реґіонумол да вська, російська та укр аїнська -про го ло шені в Кон сти туції та за ко но давстві ПМР офіційни ми й рівни ми, на справді домінує російська мова, а дві інші за ли ша ють ся в марґіна льно му ста но вищі [Hammarberg, 2013: p. 35-36;Comai, Venturi, 2015]. При цьо му ца ри на функціону ван ня мол да вської мови ви яв ляється вуж чою, ніж у Мол давській РСР пе ред роз па дом Ра дя нсько го Со ю зу, хоча саме марґіналізація мол да вської/ ру му нської мо ви по слу гу ва ла сво го часу, на прикінці 1980 х, по туж ним сти му лом для мол да всько го національ но го руху [Roper, 2001]. Слід відзна чи ти й віднос но слаб ку ста тис тич ну реп ре зен то ваність мол да ван в орга нах дер жав ної вла ди ПМР, у тому числі на ви бор них по зиціях [Protsyk, 2009]. ...
... При цьо му не мож на ствер джу ва ти, що політич на ак тив ність не мала сто сун ку до етнічності. Мобілізація була відповіддю на по ча ток про це су "націоналізації" Мол до ви, коли та ще пе ре бу ва ла у складі СРСР, зок ре ма, на зміну мов но го за ко но да вства і спро би об ме жи ти сфе ру за сто су ван ня російської мови [King, 1999: p. 178-208;Roper, 2001]. Рух, що при звів до ство рен ня ПМР, на ма гав ся ви ро би ти іде о логічну й інсти ту ціо наль ну фор му лу співісну ван ня різних етнічних груп і мов у реґіоні, і за ре зуль та та ми більш як двад ця тилітньої історії не виз на ної дер жа ви мож на ствер джу ва ти, що це за вдан ня було ви ко на но. ...
... However, a case could be made for the salience of ethnic divisions elsewhere in Moldova, in the southern region of Gagauzia, where the demands of the Gagauz, a geographically scattered Turkic Christian community, have been met by granting them substantial autonomy (Cantir, 2015;Roper, 2001). Curiously, though, the Gagauz community has traditionally identified politically with Russia, in a manner that undermines the broad, if somewhat wavering, policy of "Europeanization" pursued by Chişinău, and economically towards Turkey, by virtue of the substantial economic aid received from Ankara. ...
... As a result, Transnistria reconfirmed its "independence", 5 and gradually morphed into an internationally unrecognized de facto statelet (with an expectation to be incorporated into the Russian Federation, see Sharkov, 2016), and one of Eurasia's numerous unresolved "frozen" conflicts. While ethnic explanations are sometimes invoked in describing the conflict, especially from the Transnistrian side in order to justify it (see Cojocaru, 2006), there is a broad consensus among scholars that the root conflict is not ethnic but rather (geo)political and regionalist (Cojocaru, 2006;Kennedy, 2016;Roper, 2001). Equipped with a significant army and effective repression organs, and buoyed by the hollow legitimacy of 4 The ethnic composition of Transnistria was roughly one third Russian, one third Ukrainian and one Moldovan in 1989, and it has remained similar ever since. ...
ABSTRACT The literature on divided (or contested) cities has expanded rapidly during the past decade, with a handful of iconic sites presiding over the long list of cities wounded by conflict, violence or general unrest. In this paper, it is suggested that this literature has overlooked a particular, and increasingly prominent, type of divided city deserving of attention in its own right: the geopolitical fault-line city. The main differences between the "classic" divided city and the geopolitical fault-line city relates to the character and origin of conflict. In divided cities, conflict is mostly local and related to social and spatial justice concerns, discrimination, security and political representation; this makes it somewhat predictable. In geopolitical fault-line cities, on the other hand, the main disputes are about geopolitical alignment, foreign policy, and the overall character of government; such disputes are largely scripted elsewhere, adding a substantial measure of volatility. This paper's contribution lies in its provisional theorization of the geopolitical fault-line city in the light of the literature on divided cities. Against a background of powerful ongoing changes in the global information landscape-most notably the increased influence of social media-it illustrates the main characteristics of the geopolitical fault-line city, theorizing its distinctiveness as intrinsically related to the spatio-temporal evolution of information diffusion across the territories of antagonistically predisposed geopolitical alliances.
... A comparable separatist logic triggered the conflict between Moldova and the Russianspeaking enclave of Transnistria. After the Soviet dissolution, the Moldovan government declared Romanian as the official state language to promote Romanian identity and break with its Soviet past (Roper, 2001). Slavic and Russian-speaking groups in Transnistria opposed these initiatives, fearing loss of socio-cultural rights. ...
Objective
This study examines the legacy of experiencing armed conflict in childhood and adolescence on women's later risk of intimate partner violence (IPV) in four ex‐Soviet countries.
Background
Prior research is largely concerned with male soldiers and perpetration, and rarely considers when, during the life course, conflict occurs. This study focuses on civilians, women's victimization and pays attention to the age at conflict exposure. This aspect is crucial to understand if war has lasting consequences for family violence, beyond contemporaneous effects. This paper further contributes by providing insights on driving mechanisms.
Method
The study combines cross‐national data on IPV from the Demographic and Health Surveys (N = 17,787) and geo‐referenced conflict information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Using linear models with fixed effects, it compares the IPV outcomes of women exposed to conflict before the end of their teens with nonexposed peers and older women.
Results
Young‐age conflict exposure is associated with greater adult IPV risk. Childhood exposure (ages 0–10) matters the most, especially for physical forms of IPV. Results are not driven by migration. Analyses of potential pathways show no relationship between war and changing marriage market conditions, or attitudes towards IPV in women. Conversely, men experiencing conflict in late adolescence (16–19) are more likely to condone violence against partners. Furthermore, women's childhood exposure to conflict correlates with having a violent father.
Conclusion
War in young‐ages has long‐term implications for family violence. These appear in part related to greater exposure to family violence, and to a normalization of the use of violence in future potential perpetrators.
... The number of previous academic studies of political between Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) and Moldova is very small. They generally were published before the Russian-backed secession and annexation of Crimea, the separatist war in Donbas, and covert Russian military interventions in these two regions (See Chinn and Roper, 1998;Katchanovski, 2005, King, 1997Patlis, 2018;Roper, 2001). ...
A pro-Communist and pro-Russian separatist movement emerged and came to power in the Gagauzia region of Moldova in the late Soviet Union by declaring a republic there. But this conflict remained largely non-violent, in contrast to such pro-Russian regions as Transdniestria in Moldova and Donbas in Ukraine. This conflict was resolved peacefully as a result of a compromise agreement between the Gagauz separatists and the central government of Moldova. This deal established the Gagauz autonomy with a right to collect and keep all major tax revenues and a right to secede if Moldova were to join Romania.
This study shows that the autonomy status of Gagauzia was successful in prevention of armed conflict there. However, the autonomous status did not end regional political divisions and did not end or significantly diminished support for separatism and pro-Communist and pro-Russian orientation in Gagauzia. The parliamentary, presidential, and local election results and public opinion polls consistently showed much stronger support for pro-Communist/pro-Russian candidates in the Gagauz autonomy, compared to the rest of Moldova, with the exception of pro-Russian Transdniestrian Republic.
The distinct political values and pro-Russian orientation of the Gagauz in independent Moldova were linked to the historical experiences of this Turkic and Orthodox people. The critical juncture in the evolution of Gagauz political culture was the nineteenth-century mass migration of the Gagauz people from Bulgaria to the Southern part of Moldova, with the aid of the Russian government, to avoid persecution as a Christian Orthodox minority in the Ottoman Empire. The distinct historical experience of the Gagauz shaped their political behavior and attitudes during the post-Communist period.
The fiscal relations between Gagauzia and the national government of Moldova also experienced a certain conflict over tax revenues remaining in the autonomous region. But the tensions in the fiscal relations were much less significant than the political and geopolitical divides and Gagauzia retained the right to keep all major tax revenues collected on its territory. Since Gagauzia remained one of the least developed and urbanized regions in Moldova, the Gagauz budget increasingly relied on transfers from the state budget of Moldova.
This study suggests that the Gagauz autonomy and its fiscal relations with Moldova can serve as a model of successful peaceful resolution of a separatist conflict even though they unlikely to significantly diminish political and geopolitical divisions with the central government. But such a model would be most applicable to cases of minority regions, autonomous regions, and non-violent separatist conflicts in order to prevent or resolve such conflicts and, especially, to prevent them from turning violent.
However, the Gagauz autonomy model failed to resolve the conflict in similarly pro-Russian Transdniestria region in Moldova. This suggests that such model would be problematic in resolving conflicts in separatist regions after these regions experienced armed conflicts and gained de facto independence, such as Transdniestria or Donbas. For example, the Gagauz autonomy model might have helped to prevent the separatist conflict in pro-Russian Donbas in Eastern Ukraine from turning into a civil war in 2014, but it would not be accepted after this region experienced a civil war and Russian military interventions and became de facto independent. The same applies to various other countries with similar minority regions, autonomous regions, or separatist regions.
... To illustrate with some examples, Gagauzia (in Moldova) failed to meet the two constitutive dimensions of the contested state; namely, it did not meet the criteria of the State and that of independence claims. It did not meet the criteria of the State because, while possessing varying degrees of territory, strong evidence suggests that the entity did not have governance structures that would function independently from its parent state (Chinn and Roper 1995;Roper 2001). In the early 1990s, when one could suspect Gagauzia to meet the criteria of the contested state, the entity's leadership consistently relied on its parent state, Moldova, to function properly. ...
Most would agree that the recent emergence of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics in Ukraine, and perhaps the Islamic State, will soon find their place in the already growing literature on contested states. Yet, despite the historical and present importance of these entities for the study of alternative forms of political authority, sovereignty, statehood, international legitimacy, as well as wars within and between states, there is very little agreement in the existing literature on what constitutes a contested state. After illustrating some of the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the current conceptual approaches in the treatment of these entities, this article proposes and adopts an ontological approach to conceptualizing and studying contested states in international relations. I argue that the contested state's internal nature can be understood through four constitutive dimensions, which accentuate the phenomenon's distinct interaction with its environment when compared to other phenomena. The article also provides a way to resolve the discord that currently exists on what the theoretical concept of contested state ought to capture empirically, by introducing an explicit and systematic procedure when applying the concept to the empirical world.
... Authorities in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic started the "nationalization" of the legislation and internal policies (Büscher 2008;Burian 2012;Järve 2008). Transnistria, a predominantly Russian-speaking region with the largest part of Moldova's industries employing basically non-Moldovan laborers, was totally alien to the new nationalist trends and demonstrated the fiercest resistance (Büscher 2008;Roper 2001;Tolkacheva 2004;Troebst 2003). ...
This article addresses the reasons why ethnic diversity has never posed a challenge to the stability of Transnistria (also called the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), an unrecognized state that broke away from Moldova during the collapse of the Soviet Union. We analyze the major societal and political patterns relevant to ethnic relations in the region and focus on the structure, content, and effectiveness of Transnistrian legislation concerning ethnic and linguistic diversity along with the practices of its implementation. In our view, formal and informal ethnic divisions do not hinder the political stability of Transnistria. We conclude that the stability of ethnic relations in Transnistria in part results from a deliberate policy aimed at managing diversity. This policy provides for the dependence of the populace on the state apparatus achieved through a dense plethora of government-orchestrated activities as well as the reproduction of nonconflictual, eclectic, and thus socially acceptable national narratives inherited from the Soviet past.
... В случае Молдовы выявленное несовпадение, вероятно, объясняется тем, что центральное правительство проводит политику деконцентрации власти, что, в целом, устраивает Гагаузскую этническую автономию и позволяет нивелировать конфликт [24,. В случае Бельгии, большинство исследователей сходятся на том факте, что объединение Фландрии и Валлонии является вынужденным, что проявляется, в том числе и в абсолютно регионализированной партийной системе. ...
... However, the conflicting parties have been unable to harmonize their positions on the key political issues. 29 At present, the peace process is at a standstill; the TMR leadership seeks to do the maximum possible to provide a virtually independent existence for Transnistria, even in the absence of an internationally recognized status, while the government of Moldova is trying to obstruct the Transnistrian independent existence and thus encourage its reunification with Moldova. ...
... For instance, Chinn and Roper (1995) bring evidence that the intelligentsia feared loss of position within society and, hence, " moved to Transnistria to continue their work " (299) or their Soviet‐ style research (King 2001). Moreover, people like General Yakovlev, who used to be with the 14 th Army, has been named Minister of Defense in PMR (Kaufman 1996, Roper 2001). Furthermore, " Transnistria attracted unreformed communists throughout the former Soviet Union. ...
This dissertation discusses the role of political identities in triggering post‐Soviet conflicts.
Many attempts have been made to explain post‐Soviet conflicts in terms of ethnic and national identities. The current study challenges these views and proposes a complementary theoretical framework, whereby identifying political identities as the deeper causes. It draws upon the Mamdanian interpretation to show how political identities have been created in the context of the Soviet rhetoric, education and employment policies. Lastly, the framework is examined in the context of the Moldova‐ Transnistria conflict.
... Authority promised to the Gagauz in the settlement was gradually reclaimed by the central government. [26] One possible solution to problems of credible commitment is the participation of a thirdparty guarantor. [27] To be effective in this role, however, the third party must be both neutral and credible. ...
... As part of the process of dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Moldova became an independent state on the 27 August 1991. Soon afterwards conflict erupted in the region known as Transnistria with the result that the autonomy of this territory, not recognised by the Moldovan state, was unilaterally declared by Transnistria's leaders in Tiraspol (Roper 2001). Following independence Moldova entered the state of change and adaptation known as 'transition'. ...
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 Moldova has experienced significant levels of migration, both internally, from rural areas to the cities, and also internationally. Today is estimated that around 600,000 Moldavians out of a total population of 4.3 million are earning a living outside the country. Thus around one in seven of the population are living abroad. Migration can be a challenging experience for migrants but it can also have repercussions for non migrants, especially the family members who are left behind. This paper presents the views of older people with regard to the benefits, or otherwise, of migration. Data from a series of focus group discussions and in depth interviews conducted in Moldova during the period November 2008 to March 2009 highlight that older people view recent trends in migration as a mixed blessing. On the one hand many older people recognise migration as inevitable - the result of low pay and high unemployment in Moldova - and see it as the only way for their children and grandchildren to improve their lives. Moreover they recognise the benefits of remittances, although highlight that these are not always reliable. On the other hand, the migration of adult children is perceived to be accompanied by high costs in terms of emotional loss, isolation and lack of physical care; as well as increased responsibility for grandchildren - practically, emotionally and financially. In many cases, these losses appear to outweigh the gains.
... In August 2008 I was part of a mission with the EU Special Representative to Komrat to help the local political parties overcome a deadlock after parliamentary elections in Gagauzia earlier in the year. See also Sato (2009), Roper (2001), Quinlan (2008), and Protsyk (2005). 6 In the legislative elections in Transnistria on 12 December 2010, Renewal increased its majority by 2 to 25 out of 43 seats in the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, compared to Smirnov's Republik (Respublika) who won only 13 seats (no change). ...
0. Abstract The conflict over Transnistria in Moldova has made little progress towards a settlement since the original ceasefire agreement of 1992 despite a number of proposals from most of the relevant conflict and third parties. Rather than assessing why negotiations have frequently stalled, this paper examines the content of existing proposals against the background of existing theories of territorial conflict management and proposes a framework for a durable settlement of the Transnistrian conflict within in the current 5+2 negotiation format: a multiple asymmetric federacy arrangement supplemented by central-level power sharing and entrenched in domestic and international law.
... Furthermore, while relinquishing territorial claims relieves the home state of a persistent source of instability, conceivably supplementing g's payoffs from ceding, it also would increase the probability of future attempts at secession by other 53 Steven Roper (2002) makes the argument that secessionists in Transnistria are wary of negotiated reunification precisely because of the creeping re-centralization they have observed in Gagauzia. ...
The persistence of unrecognized states as territorial units is both intellectually puzzling and normatively problematic. Unrecognized states have demonstrated the capacity to survive for decades in spite of the high costs of their exclusion from the international system. They are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and instability on their borders, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty of recognized states. This paper uses a four player, game theoretic framework to model the stalemates that often arise between the secessionist elite and home state central government and leverages this model to explore paths to settlement. We explain the persistence of unrecognized statehood by modeling how the support of an unrecognized state by a patron can both prevent military reconquest by the home state and cause the secessionist elite to persistently prefer continued stalemate over rejoining the home state through negotiated settlement. We emphasize the pivotal role of the patron in sustaining unrecognized statehood as a stable equilibrium, but we also argue that the international community is capable of inducing peaceful settlement in these conflicts if it is sufficiently motivated to do so. The formal approach in this paper serves both to identify common mechanisms in operation across a diverse set of cases and to provide a coherently structured environment for the analysis of individual cases.
... Cross-border Framework: Regionalism, Space, Governance and Identity 'Cross-border regionalism', 'cross-border space', 'cross-border governance' 'new regionalism' and 'identity' have become important catchphrases on the global geo-economic and geopolitical scene (Paasi, 2009). This is in line with current efforts of geographers, sociologists and scholars to find interdisciplinary conceptual terrain for new spatial and regional approaches (Roper, 2001; Jessop et al., 2008; Vernygora & Chaban, 2008). According to Paasi, the resurgence of these terms has been part of the transformation of 110 S. Marcu both political economy and governance at supra-state, state and sub-state scales. ...
This article analyses a new social space at the border between Romania and Moldova. Given the common identity of the two territories, it explores the changes in the new space and the creation of Euro-regions as contemporary geopolitical strategies, analysing their effectiveness along the Romanian–Moldovan border. The paper attempts to combine two concepts of space and regionalism to construct a new configuration of territory. It also suggests that where historical–cultural identity exists, it may provide a better foundation in the development of Euro-regions and cross-border activities, and may reactivate positive perceptions between citizens.
Are autonomous arrangements that have ethnically distinct minority populations (hereinafter referred to as ethnoautonomy) better off dividing and sharing powers with a central government, or would it be better for them to sever their ties and become fully independent? The past two decades have produced a useful debate regarding this question. Pro-ethnoautonomy scholars emphasize the virtues of autonomy arrangements that have distinct minority populations. They stress their economic advantages, and their meaningful levels of self-determination. On the other hand, still other anti-ethnoautonomy scholars reject the virtues of autonomy. They assert that ethnoautonomy is associated with poverty and violence. They also argue that autonomy can be unfairly exploited by one side or another given inevitable power differentials. This chapter seeks to explain why the pro and anti-ethnoautonomy literatures provide such starkly different assessments. The argument here will be that these distinct views can be explained by the presence (or absence) of constitutional entrenchment credibility mechanisms (which are capabilities that make allocated powers very difficult to change and take away). Even as anti-ethnoautonomy scholars assert their skepticism, they include within their assessment weak autonomy polities that have weak or nonexistent credibility guarantees; the powers of such polities can be taken away by executive fiat or the simple majority decision of a core state or central government legislature. As this chapter will demonstrate, the problems that such scholars observe do not come from autonomy itself. Instead, they emanate from the weakness of the credibility guarantees of the polities that they include within their assessment. By contrast to anti-ethnoautonomy scholars, scholars that accept the virtues of ethnoautonomy tend to exclude such weak autonomy cases and instead assess polities with meaningful constitutional entrenchment.
El presente artículo analiza un modelo de conflicto en el antiguo espacio soviético cuyo origen se sitúa en el periodo final de la Unión Soviética. La prolongación durante el proceso de construcción estatal de la República independiente de Moldavia — con un conflicto bélico durante el año 1992 —, así como la ausencia de una solución definitiva desde el punto de vista político-diplomático y el múltiple apoyo otorgado por Rusia al enclave secesionista, acabó con su conversión en un Estado de facto. No constituye un fenómeno aislado en esta amplia zona geopolítica, a la que Rusia ha convertido en su esfera de interés esencial. Sin embargo, presenta ciertas particularidades que alcanzan a la construcción, consolidación o destrucción de identidades étnico-nacionales —incluida la mayoritaria en el nuevo Estado—, sin olvidar el carácter del propio conflicto. Las consecuencias derivadas de la agresión continuada de Rusia a Ucrania desde 2014 puede derivar en consecuencias imprevisibles en torno a Transnistria: desde la ampliación de los objetivos territoriales del Kremlin hasta el desbloqueo final del conflicto hacia cualquier escenario posible, en un contexto regional de extrema inseguridad.
The ‘Sport for Development and Peace’ (SDP) sector emerged during the twenty-first century, which conceptualizes sport´s contribution to international development. Two Scandinavian SDP programmes serve as examples in this article: LdB FC for Life in South Africa (football and HIV/AIDS prevention) and Open Fun Football Schools in Moldova (football and peace building). Although there is a growing body of research highlighting a correlation between sport and socio-political benefits, it is acknowledged that more needs to be done to understand this connection and the impact sport can have. Furthermore, many SDP initiatives fail to translate ideas into action. Consequently, this illustrates a discrepancy between intention and implementation. On this basis, the aim of this paper is to analyse LdB FC for Life and Open Fun Football Schools from the initiators’, sponsors’, and donors’ perspectives. Accordingly, it seeks to explore the relationship between rhetoric and practice surrounding both projects.
Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union was relatively peaceful, unlike, for example, another socialist state with confederal structure – Yugoslavia, the independence aspirations of individual regions were often accompanied by armed struggle, which later transformed into "frozen conflicts" and turned into ‘’mines’’ placed under the statehood of a number of post-Soviet countries, thus preventing and hindering their development and threatening the regional stability and peace. The Transnistrian conflict is one of the unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet territory, the basis of which is the struggle of the minority for the recognition and realization of its right to self-determination. Within the framework of this paper, the origins and essence of the Transnistrian conflict will be presented. Moreover, the gist of all important international agreements related to the conflict are illustrated one by one. Afterwards, parallels are drawn between Transnistria and Gagauzian autonomy: two conflicts that arose due to similar reasons and in the same country, which eventually had different outcomes. At the end of the research, two most likely scenarios are discussed for the further development of the Transnistrian conflict.
Chapter 7 shows the importance of small state agency within the CIS using the case study of Moldova. The tiny post-Soviet republic is marked by poverty, corruption, state capture, the frozen conflict of Transnistria, and the failed frozen conflict of Gagauzia that was almost reignited during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Moscow has made considerable efforts to bring it within its sphere of influence. Paradoxically, it has failed because of the strong pro-EU attitude of the corrupt and highly unpopular oligarch in control of the Moldovan Parliament and government. But in response to his undemocratic practices, the electorate has become largely pro-Russian. A Kremlin-friendly President was elected and might also win the 2018 parliamentary elections.KeywordsMoldovaRussiaFrozen conflictState captureCommonwealth of independent statesSphere of influence
Moldova gained the independence after collapse of the USSR. It declared the independence in 27 August 1991. Form this date, Moldova have not integrated yet its teritory where ratified by the United Nations. Transnistria is not under the Chisinau government as a de facto state. The Dniester River sperates two governments as if tow different states. The left bank of the river is Transnistria, on the other hand the right bank of the River is Moldova. In this article why the parties have not been able to find a solution for the conflict is examined. Four reasons are claimed for the conflict. First of all historical reality is an important reason for the conflict, also ethnic diversity can be counted as secondly. Especially Russian effect on the teritory is a reason for conflict as geopolitic and the last economic reason is the most important reason for the conflict, which is known as the tfrozen conflict zone.
У статті розглядається вплив ідентичності на сепаратизм на сході України, узагальнюються ключові моменти дисертації, поданої на ступінь магістра міжнародних відносин Кембриджського університету, 2015–2017 рр. Юрієм Бендером із коледжу Робінсона, під керівництвом доктора Рорі Фінніна, доцента кафедри українознавства Кембриджського університету.Моє недавнє дослідження подій, що призвели до відокремлення так званої Донецької Народної Республіки та Луганської Народної Республіки на сході України та їхні подальші спроби функціонувати як окремі автономні регіони, ґрунтувалося на дослідженні впливу економіки та ідентичності, підкріплених зовнішньою політикою Москви в країнах «ближнього зарубіжжя». Ключові економічні чинники тимчасового відокремлення «автономних регіонів» відбувалися на тлі зміни ідентичності та елітарної поведінки. Вивчення цих питань є життєво важливим для визначення того, чи мають «республіки» довгострокове автономне майбутнє. Пропонована стаття присвячена ідентичності, а економічні чинники розглядатимуться деінде. Досліджуються змінні та часто суперечливі множинні ідентичності, закріплені за регіоном Донбасу, історично багатого на просторові ресурси для політичних та економічних біженців. Однак у теперішній конфліктний час мігранти все частіше покидають Донбас, а не в'їжджають в зазначений регіон. Як це не парадоксально, але найбільш підприємливі та освічені громадяни, які демонструють найсильніші прояви ідентичності – саме того типу, який необхідний для створення ефективної держави, – найімовірніше виїдуть.Конфлікт розглядається через теоретичні призми, включаючи «Дике поле» історика Гіроакі Куромії, оскаржуване олігархами, злочинними угрупуваннями та політичними кланами; та євро-азіатський «Хартленд» географа Халфорда Макіндера, що історично боровся та відстоював східні та західні держави. Спираючись на напівструктуровані інтерв’ю, проведені під час моїх візитів до України, я прагну внести свій внесок у дискусію щодо майбутньої траєкторії проблемних східних прикордонних територій України та пролити світло на їхнє недавнє минуле. Детальне вивчення цього геостратегічного регіону може запропонувати рішення для ключових суб’єктів, включно з Росією, Україною та іншими членами міжнародної спільноти, щоб винести урок з конфлікту, що триває. Особливо важливим для політиків є питання змішаних ідентичностей, поширених на більшій частині східної України.
This paper focuses on the status of post-Soviet non-recognised states, viewed through the lens of world-system analysis. The author interprets non-recognised states as an 'extreme 'periphery' in relation to 'the centre' with its legitimate periphery, international law and global order. The author argues that even though post-Soviet non-recognised states emerged from national movements in a collapsing USSR, with the aim of legitimately building new nation states, in time, they turned into polities that oppose international law and global order. This opposition creates a state model that has proved to be sustainable in spite of conflicts and sanctions, and that proliferates across the region. The most recent case of extreme periphery-shared their models of state-building with the ruling groups in Donetsk and Lugansk after 2014. The specificity of this state-building is connected with the opposition to the centre of the core-periphery world-system and to all of the political, legal and economic rules sanctioned by the international organisations and states which constitute this centre.
The post-Soviet area is a home for a several de facto states, which are entities that resemble "normal" states but lack international recognition. This paper examines a historical and under-researched case study of the Gagauz Republic (Gagauzia), a de facto state that existed within Moldova between 1990 and 1995. Drawing on a new suite of sources-interviews, memoirs and journalism-it analyses the territorial, military , political, and socioeconomic dimensions of the Gagauz de facto statehood, tracing how the Gagauz authorities proceeded in consolidating Gagauzia's statehood through processes of state-and nation-building. This study concludes that the Gagauz leadership was moderately successful in its activities.
This paper examines opportunities and possibilities for national minority councils (NMC's) to serve as a channel for dialogue and cooperation between national minorities, governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations within the Republic of Serbia and across this state. The main objective of this paper is to review the constitutional and legal framework of trans-ethnic cooperation in Serbia. In order to achieve this, I am analysing the constitutional and legal status of NMC's, and their competences and role in the trans-ethnic cooperation in Serbia and across it. The model of trans-ethnic cooperation and its functioning in practice is analysed especially within the case study of the Slovak NMC in Serbia. The previous framework of cooperation was restricted by the decision of the Serbian Constitutional Court in 2014. Remaining opportunities and possibilities for NMC's in trans-ethnic cooperation are not fully used in practice. There is no systematic cooperation of the Slovak NMC with other organisations of ethnicities within and across Serbia. Trans-ethnic cooperation is not so common and is conducted usually on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, the existing institutional and legal model for trans-ethnic cooperation is relatively good. NMC's can and should be active agents fostering trans-ethnic cooperation in and beyond Serbia.
The relationship between inequality and civil conflict has attracted considerable interest in conflict research. Recent large-N studies have shown that inequalities significantly contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict and have proposed a number of causal pathways to account for this. These pathways, however, have rarely been assessed in systematic case-based research. This study implements a “middle-N” qualitative congruence analysis of 16 conflicts, focusing on the observable implications of the pathways through which inequalities are typically theorized to influence conflict. The study finds evidence to support some of the main pathways proposed in the quantitative literature. Furthermore, the analysis finds that different types of inequalities relate to different conflict categories. Specifically, vertical inequalities relate to non-ethnic governmental conflicts (via an “individual deprivation pathway”), regional inequalities to non-ethnic territorial conflicts (via a “separatist pathway”), and horizontal inequalities to ethnic conflicts (via a “group deprivation pathway”).
This paper compares the escalation of civil war in South Ossetia and Kosovo and shows how different modes of transition deeply influenced the timing and type of conflict in these two cases. It argues that regimes resulting from a transition from above – when the elite in power leads the process of regime change and imposes its political agenda on other social actors – are more likely to ensure political stability in the short term, since governments are more cohesive internally, enjoy the support of the military, and can rely on a loyal bureaucracy. In contrast, regimes that emerge from transitions from below are more likely to experience civil war with an ethnic minority in the short term because of an intrinsic weakness of the elite in power. Under these circumstances, the newcomers need to win the loyalty of the military and of the bureaucracy, and separatist groups can take advantage of the incumbents’ weaknesses and try to build resources to militarily challenge the state.
The article discusses the evolution of EU policy towards the Transnistrian conflict. It describes major elements of the Transnistrian status quo as it formed throughout the 1990s and analyzes factors accounting for the EU's involvement in the Transnistrian conflict settlement in the early 2000s. The policy of putting pressure on Transnistria, the breakdown of the 'Kozak plan', the 'Meseberg initiative', and EU's shift to the policy of 'small steps' towards Tiraspol are explored. The article analyzes the impact of heightened international tensions in Europe in 2014-2015 on the situation in the conflict zone and shows risks of escalating contradictions over Transnistria. The author argues that the EU has become the second (after Russia) key external actor involved in the Transnistrian conflict settlement. It is not only the political settlement that is impossible without the EU's involvement - resolving everyday problems created by the de facto coexistence of two statehoods in the Moldovan territory and further maintenance of the status quo in the conflict zone also require its engagement.
The article discusses a wide range of issues associated with the use of scientometric methods in the humanities, for example in history, philosophy, and philology. It draws on the results of a survey conducted among humanities scholars of different ages and statuses who deal with different research topics and have different attitudes to the problem. Are these methods in fact applicable in the humanities; what are the pros and cons as to their use in this regard; what does international experience tell us about this; how much important are the rankings and citation indices for a humanities researcher; how important and feasible is it to publish in foreign languages (first of all, in English) in international journals included in foreign bibliometric databases; how does it influence scholars and institutions' ratings; what is the specifics of what humanities scholars employed at the university do - these are some of the questions the article seeks to explore.
In this chapter, I examine the role of constitutional politics in Moldova. I argue that executive-legislative relations, questions concerning rule of law, and disputes over the identity of the polity are the dominant features of constitutional politics in the post-soviet Moldovan context. I find that most amendments of the constitution, both successful and unsuccessful, were driven by dysfunctions of the political system, and intense power struggles among the elite. Thus, the constitutional amendments present a picture torn between tendencies that harm democracy (i.e. the reduction of the autonomy of judges in 2002) and something resembling democratization. At the same time, I argue that the influence of external actors, e.g. the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission and Russia, is ambiguous and limited.
The article analyses trans-ethnic organizational settings (TOS) – multi-ethnic nongovernmental
organizations, autonomous parts of the public sector or recurrent
organized practices designed for the promotion of inter-ethnic accord and
communication between ethnicities and public authorities. Most of these low-profile
power-sharing arrangements have been established in the post-Soviet countries, and
they range from a statehood resting on the very idea of multi-ethnic coalition
(breakaway Transnistria) to official or semi-official ‘assemblies of peoples’
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and coordinative bodies for minority NGOs
(Belarus and some provinces of Ukraine). The constant features of all these settings are
the patronizing involvement of the state and the principle of inter-ethnic cooperation
which justifies and guides all the related activities. The author investigates why TOS as
a rule exhibit durability and a high level of popular support combined with a lack of
explicit state compulsion and resistance from minority rank-and-file despite the fact
that TOS provide virtually no assets and opportunities to ethnic groups involved.
Several mutually compatible explanations rest on discarding the view of ethnic groups
as internally cohesive social entities and independent actors, and can be looped into
two categories, namely discursive accommodation and institutional cooptation of
ethnic activism.
The diversification of allegiances with several more powerful states is seen as a way for minor actors to improve their strategic position in the international system. The result, however, could become less than desirable when these relations are both essential and contradictory. This article intends to examine the challenges for Transnistrian foreign policy through the concepts of bandwagoning and balancing. It uses alternative neorealist perspectives to identify various types of alignment and then examines how this landlocked territorial entity attempts to use relations with Russia and Ukraine to protect its statehood and identity in the context of the ongoing threat from Moldova. This article identifies that twice in the last decade (after the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan), the strategy of ‘dual alignment’ failed. It claims that recent attempts by both the EU and Ukraine to weaken Russia’s position in the region by isolating Transnistria has led to a further strengthening of ties between this actor and Moscow.
The dispute for regional influence between Russia and the European Union has resulted in dramatic events in Ukraine. Less visibly, a similar situation has developed in the southern Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia. In the context of Moldova’s signing of an EU Association Agreement in June 2014, calls were made to take up arms and erect barricades. Independence was to be proclaimed one day after – and because of – that signing. This was avoided, but the crisis is far from coming to an end. Using the concept of failed frozen conflict, this article argues that tensions mainly are due to local leaders trying to take advantage of the new international situation in order to promote their own group and private interests. This endangers seriously the stability and security of both Gagauzia and the Republic of Moldova.
This article analyses what may be termed as the European Union's (EU) post-liberal approach to the Moldova–Transnistria conflict. Since 2003, within the ENP framework, the EU has become increasingly committed to its transformation. Such an engagement is further confirmed by the establishment of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in 2005, aimed at building confidence between the parties, stimulate their economic interdependence and change perceptions about the conflict. The mission's outcomes are moving beyond its technical scope, supporting the conflict peaceful transformation. The focus on bottom-up initiatives and local engagement allows for a broader understanding of the complex dynamics underlying the conflict, which together with the high-level negotiation process may provide a holistic approach to its resolution and increase the likelihood to reach a sustainable settlement.
This article examines the state of and perspectives on democracy in the Republic of Moldova. The fall of its communist authoritarian regime in 2009 – sometimes compared to a colour revolution – went against the trend toward heavy authoritarianism now visible in the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, the regime change in Moldova does not necessarily imply a process of genuine democratic consolidation. This article argues that the future course of the Moldovan polity will be decided by structural domestic and geopolitical factors different from those that produced the regime change. Most of these structural factors do not favour democratization. Moldova's only chance to secure a genuinely democratic trajectory may therefore be dependent on its relationship with the European Union (EU). The article argues that nothing short of a process of accession to the EU can modify factors that are likely to prevent democratic consolidation. In its absence, the article contends that Moldova will either develop a Ukrainian-style hybrid regime or return to its authoritarian past.
In recent years, increased European Union interest in its eastern “neighborhood” has been hailed as a possible solution of the Transnistrian frozen conflict. The fall of the communist authoritarian regime of Chişinău and the internal crisis of the Smirnov regime in Tiraspol also modified the conditions of the nineteen-year conflict. However, the European involvement in Moldova is perceived by the Kremlin as an intrusion in its own domaine réservé. Moreover, the 2008 war in South Ossetia illustrates Russia’s return to the early 1990s policy of overt instrumentalization of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts. This volatile situation is analyzed in order to predict the future evolution of the Transnistrian conflict in the larger context of the developing regional rivalry between Brussels and Moscow.
Much of the literature on communist successor parties has concentrated far more on East-Central Europe than the former Soviet bloc and on the 'social-democratic' successors than those of a neo-communist hue. This-article aims to extend the comparative impact of studies of such successor parties by analysing two of the principal 'neo-communist, successor parties in the former Soviet Union (FSU): the Russian CPRF (Cominunist Party of the Russian Federation) and PCRM (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova). I argue that legacy-based approaches, which focus on the 'patrimonial communist' history of the FSU, explain much of the general context for party origins, political profile and the political capital possessed by the neo-communists, but are far less persuasive at explaining both the timing and extent of party return and their longer-term trajectory and electoral success than previously accounted for in the literature. In particular, differences in the political environment (such as the role of presidentialism versus parliamentarianism) and (especially) the role of political agency are seen to have greater importance.
Various efforts to assess the effects of autonomy a rrangements on the prospects of achieving stability and democracy in ethnically heterogeneous societies have received a lot of attention in the literature. i The Gagauzian autonomy illustrates some of the key challenges of elaborating and implementing autonomy provisions in the context of fledging democratic institutions and a weak system of rule of law. Alth ough the Gagauz autonomy is often considered as a rare case of successful conflict tr ansformation in post-Soviet space, the actual implementation of autonomy provisions has been a highly contested issue. The terms of the autonomy deal - the framework of rules and provisions that central authorities and Gagauz elites agreed upon in 1994 - have not elicited poli tical actors' compliance with the letter of the law to the extent that the legal literature on autonomy usually assumes. This chapter provides an analysis of terms and reas ons for the Gagauz autonomy agreement. Its main focus, however, is on explaining how the p rocess of autonomy implementation led to the establishment of an autonomy regime whose functioning is far from the model autonomy arrangement envisioned in the founding documents of the Gagauz autonomy. It examines strategies employed by the central government and a utonomy authorities in autonomy implementation struggles and discusses outcomes produced by the interaction of these strategies. The paper also shows how the analysis o f autonomy implementation practices increases our leverage in explaining successes in s ecuring stability and democracy without falling into the trap of attributing these outcomes of ultimate interest simply to the fact of the formal introduction of an autonomy arrangement. The proposed account pays close attention to the co ntext in which political struggle over implementation of autonomy provisions takes place. Characteristics of the domestic political and legal environment affect the structure of choic es available to political actors and shape their strategies. Key characteristics of domestic e nvironment for the purposes of this this paper
A Specialist on constitutional issues in the former Soviet Union examines the prospects for federalization and democratic consolidation in Moldova. Data used are from interviews, newspapers, documents of civil society organizations, and opinion polls. The article contributes to the general discussion of federalism and democracy by specifying conditions that facilitate or impede efforts to employ democratization and federalization strategies in a mutually reinforcing manner.
For most of the first decade of the present century, Moldova was governed by the Party of Communists of Moldova, led by Vladimir Voronin, who displayed impressive political skills as the president of the republic and party leader. In office, the party engaged in a political reorientation towards Europe in 2004–5 and an ideological transformation in 2008, yet the party remains a superficially reformed, non-transmuted communist successor party. During eight years in office, 2001–9, it led a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime similar to the neo-communist constructs of Ion Iliescu in Romania and Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria. The crisis of 2009 weakened the party, however, with defections of leading communists to other parties. Moldova has thus returned to a situation of ‘pluralism by default’ and a hybrid political regime, in which the communists, though weakened, remain a potent political force.
Who is it that builds the state? How and where do they establish territorial boundaries, and how are those who live within that territory compelled to obey? Generally speaking, these are the questions that will be addressed here. Of more immediate concern is the fate of peoples located in regions where arbitrary land boundaries fall. Are they made loyal to the state through coercion or by their own compulsions? More importantly, how are their identities shaped by the efforts of the state to differentiate them from their compatriots on the other side of the borders? How is the shift from ethnic to national identities undertaken? A parallel elaboration of the national histories of the populations of Karelia and Moldova will shed light on these questions. The histories of each group are marked by a myriad of attempts to differentiate the identity of each ethnic community from their compatriots beyond the state's borders. The results of such overt, state-initiated efforts to differentiate borderland populations by encouraging a national identity at the expense of the ethnic, has ranged from the mundane to the tragic-from uneventful assimilation to persecution and even genocide. As an illustration of the range of possibilities and processes, I maintain that the tragedies of Karelia and Moldova are not exceptional, but rather are a consequence of their geographical straddling of arbitrary borders, and the need for the state to promote a distinctive national identity for these populations to differentiate them socially from their compatriots beyond the frontier.
The politics of language identity have figured heavily in the history of the people of the Republic of Moldova. Indeed the region's status as a province of Russia, Romania, and then the Soviet Union over the past 200 years has consistently been justified and, at least partially, manipulated on the basis of language issues. At the center of these struggles over language and power has been the linguistic and cultural identity of the region's autochthonous ethnicity and current demographic majority, the Moldovans. In dispute is the degree to which these Moldovans are culturally, historically, and linguistically related to the other Moldovans and Romanians across the Prut River in Romania. Under imperial Russia from 1812 to 1918 and Soviet Russia from 1944 to 1991, a proto-Moldovan identity that eschewed connections to Romania and emphasized contact with Slavic peoples was promoted in the region. Meanwhile, experts from Romania and the West have regularly argued that the eastern Moldovans are indistinguishable, historically, culturally, and linguistically, from their Romanian cousins.
Various efforts to assess the effects of autonomy arrangements on the prospects of achieving stability and democracy in ethnically heterogeneouos societies receive a lot of attention both in academic and policy-making communities. This paper argues that the analysis of the actual implementation practices of autonomy settlement agreements should be an integral part of such efforts. Taking implementation practices seriously means going beyond the analysis of grand formal provisions listed in the auonomy's constitutional law or statute, which is usually adopted at the end of the conflict settlement process. The actual implementation process can produce an autonomy regime whose functioning is far from the model autonomy arrangement envisioned in the autonomy's founding documents. Successes and failures in securing stability and democracy then can be better accounted for by studying the effects of these implementation practices rather than by attributing democracy and stability outcomes to formal autonomy provisions.
The year 1995 was momentous for the Gagauz people located primarily in the towns and villages of southern Moldova in the area known as Gagauzia. The Gagauz leadership in Comrat and the Moldovan government in Chişinău reached agreement in December 1994 on autonomy for Gagauzia, ending a five-year secessionist movement involving both a war of words and sporadic conflict. For Chişinău, this agreement settled the lesser, but nonetheless important, of two secessionist movements that threatened the Moldovan state's viability. For Gagauzia, the agreement set the terms for extensive cultural, political, and social autonomy within Moldova. For Europe, this agreement broke new ground in granting a small nation control of its affairs within a larger state.
Stuart J. Kaufman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky.
The author would like to thank Leokadia Drobizheva, Airat Aklaev, Nicholas Dima, Stephen Bowers, and Vasile Nedelciuc for their help in organizing this research. This research was supported by funds from the University of Kentucky, and by grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Valuable suggestions and advice were provided by Jeff Chinn, Charles Davis, Pal Kolsto, Karen Mingst, and Stephen Saideman. None of these people or organizations is responsible for the views expressed.
1. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). Some more sophisticated approaches including this argument are Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); and Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele MacIver, "The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon," Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 127-142.
2. Among the first to publish this insight was Barry R. Posen in "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.
3. The most sophisticated mobilization theory of political violence is Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978). The competing theory is from Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. On diversionary theories of war, see Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). The classic exposition of the spiral model is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
4. This process is described and defined in Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).
5. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict."
6. Carol Tavris, Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion, rev. ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 91.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976 [1832]), pp. 137-138 and passim.
8. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
9. Jack L. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds. Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
10. Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990).
11. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay."
12. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39.
13. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay."
14. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay."
15. I show the presence of these factors in Yugoslavia and Azerbaijan in Stuart J. Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Interethnic War," Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 149-171. On Georgia, see Stephen S. Jones, "Populism in Georgia: the Gamsakhurdia Phenomenon," in Donald Schwartz and Razmik Panossian, eds., Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 127-149. On Sri Lanka, see K.M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986).
16. This process is noted in Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay"; and Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, among others.
17. For more detail, see Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Interethnic War."
18. Jones, "Populism in Georgia."
19. See Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 586.
20. See V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130-166.
21. Stuart J. Kaufman, "The Irresistible...
Depuis que la Moldavie n'appartient plus a l'Union sovietique (depuis 1991) se pose la question delicate de la future orientation de la republique. Deux mouvements coexistent dans la politique du pays : les defenseurs de l'independance font face a ceux de l'unification avec la Roumanie, la terre patrie. L'identite moldovienne apparait sous deux aspects : s'agit-il d'une identite nationale, ou d'une identite regionale ? Si les Moldaves partagent en effet une culture et un langage communs avec les Roumains, cela suffit-il pour autant pour parler d'unification, car l'identite ne se limite pas a des similitudes rhetoriques. Le debat diverge entre les politiques et les intellectuels qui ne voient pas la creation d'un Etat sous le meme angle
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Since the early 1980s, the study of political institutions has made a remarkable come-back within political science. After a long period of concentrating on the “outputs” of the political process, many political scientists have begun to give greater attention to the formal and informal structures that circumscribe political behavior: governmental departments, ministries, standard operating procedures, social norms, duties, obligations. Especially in its more inductive, interpretive forms, contemporary institutional analysis has focused less on political outcomes and more on the political process itself—the “how” questions of politics rather than the “why” questions addressed both by highly quantitative methods and by deductive, rational choice approaches. One legacy of the behavioral revolution has been a propensity for researchers to see the elucidation of why some groups win out over others in the political process as the chief end of political science. But by examining the strategic boundaries within which action takes place, modern institutional analysis—labelled the “new institutionalism” as early as 1984—seeks to remind political scientists that, quite simply, institutions matter.
Rarely does an ethnic conflict remain wholly confined to its country of origin. Because ethnic groups often have members across international borders, their civil wars can have a strong influence on neighboring countries’ politics, impelling kindred communities to push for their state to intervene in support of imperilled relatives across the border. At the same time, strategic thinkers often find it tempting to destabilize neighboring countries, or to oppose groups acting as proxies for regional rivals. Because of such considerations, intervention in ethnic civil war becomes a political issue for the neighbors, with the emotional stakes often strengthening the hands of nationalists in the neighboring countries.
1. Introduction
Until the October 1991 Soviet coup, Moldova, previously known as Bessarabia and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, had known independence only briefly, having been part of the Russian Empire, Romania, or the Soviet Union for almost its entire history. As a result of shifting foreign influences and borders, Moldova, like most modern political entities, has a multiethnic population. The conflicting perspectives and demands of Moldova's different ethnic groups underlie many of today's controversies.
notes that the russification process was not linear. During the 1950s, Moldovan literature flourished compared to the
- Dyer
Dyer (1999) notes that the russification process was not linear. During the 1950s, Moldovan literature flourished compared to the 1960s and 1970s.
981) argue that the language law was not undemocratic and contained articles protecting the linguistic rights of other ethnic groups
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Kolsto, Edemsky and Kalashnikova (1993: 981) argue that the language law was not undemocratic and contained articles protecting the linguistic rights of other ethnic groups.
argue that Moscow provoked the violence in Bender in order to justify military intervention. However, there is no conclusive evidence that supports the contention that the
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Chairperson of the Joint Committee for Democratization and Conciliation, interview with the author
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Yuri P. Ataman, Chairperson of the Joint Committee for Democratization and Conciliation, interview with the author, Chisinau, 6 March 1997.
Former head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, interview with the author
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Philip Hahn, Former head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, interview with the author, Chisinau, 4 June 1995.
Former head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, interview with the author Basapress went on to say that the 'talks in Kiev have not changed one little thing in the stance of the Tiraspol leadership
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Donald Johnson, Former head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, interview with the author, Chisinau, 8 August 1997. 17. Basapress went on to say that the 'talks in Kiev have not changed one little thing in the stance of the Tiraspol leadership'. See Basapress (1999).
Head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, interview with the author
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