No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The short-term society: A study in the problems of long-term political and economic development in Iran
Abstract
Iran was a short-term society in contrast to Europe's long-term society.' It was a society in which change - even important and fundamental change tended to be a short-term phenomenon. This was precisely due to the absence of an established and inviolable legal framework which would guarantee long-term continuity. Over any short period of time, there could be notable military, administrative and property-owning classes, but their composition would not remain the same beyond one or two generations, unlike traditional European aristocracies, even merchant classes. In Iran, property and social positions were short term, precisely because they were regarded as personal privileges rather than inherited and inviolable social rights. The situation of those who possessed rank and property - except in very rare examples - was not the result of long-term inheritance (say, beyond two generations before) and they did not expect their heirs to continue in the same positions as a matter of course. The heirs could do so only if they managed to establish themselves on their own merits - merits being the personal traits necessary for success within the given social context. There was thus a high degree of social mobility, unthinkable in medieval and much of modem European history. This did not exclude the position of the shah himself, since legitimacy and the right of succession were nearly always subject to serious challenge, even rebellion.2 The most visible example of the short-term nature of Iranian society is the habit of declaring a building - especially a residential building - as a 'pick-axe building' (sakhteman-e kolangi). Most of these buildings are no more than 30 (even 20) years old, and they are normally sound in foundation and structure. In a few cases they may be run down and in need of renovation, but the feature that results in their condemnation as such, and incidentally wipes off the value of the structure and only leaves the price of their site, is that their architecture and/or interior design is unfashionable according to the latest forms, concepts or whims. Thus, rather than build a
... The short-term society of Iran, or "the pick-axe society (jame'eh-ye kolangi)," as Katouzian (2004) dubs it, has always undergone dramatic changes from one era and dynasty to the other, with short-termness as its constant, that is, being a chain of "connected short runs" as its history. There are "complex sets of forces, voices, and faces interacting at a bewildering pace, engaged in taking positions, forming coalitions, changing positions and forming new coalitions, and changing sides, colors, and voices at an incredible speed, resembling something like 'speed dating'" (Gohardani & Tizro, 2019, p. 162). ...
... The possession of "God's Grace" has been the main criterion of being the legitimate successor for acting as the "vice-regent of God on Earth," who was not supposed to answer to anyone and had control over the "life and possessions" of the subjects. In other words, "all that a slave owns belongs to his master," and throughout the history of this country, the state has many times relied upon confiscation (Katouzian, 2004). On the basis of this ever-present threat of confiscation, there has been no respite for long-term capital accumulation that has been the main cause of the industrial revolution in the West. ...
... On the basis of this ever-present threat of confiscation, there has been no respite for long-term capital accumulation that has been the main cause of the industrial revolution in the West. What remains now is a confused "pseudo-modernism" and, as explained, an arbitrary and disorganized implementation of the market-oriented strategies of the West (Katouzian, 2004) that produces and reproduces the chaotic short-term society, at best, in the form of cronyism. ...
Understanding the political and socio‐economic origins of the psyche depends on examining hegemonic psychodynamics in society and their resonance in the mental space of individuals. This study explains the dominant psychic atmosphere of Iranian participants in the Iranian political and economic context. A qualitative study was conducted through deep interviews with 17 participants from both upper and lower social classes. Based on the results, it seems that through the encounter of citizens with each other and the dominant order, the implemented strategies lead to feelings of insecurity and precarity which loosen the social libidinal ties among citizens and hinder society from reaching integration and cohesion.
... Answering these will contribute to another broad question regarding their durability, in which how they lived for more than 140 years. Considering the controversial theory of Katouzian (2004), which described Iran as "The Short-Term Society", due the lack of durability in social institutions throughout the history, the research seeks benefit from the case of the Drapers lessons to see by which strategies and in a which context, the Drapers could exceptionally live long in a short-term society. ...
... Katouzian, who has written and discussed that Iran is a "short-term" society, believes; lack of legal frameworks to preserve accumulation is one of the reasons behind the discontinuity in Iran, which itself a reason for lack of development in the country (Katouzian 2004). Nevertheless, controversial theory of Katouzian can be challenged by the formation of institutions like the Drapers' Hey'at. ...
Tehran Bazaar has been the most influential marketplace in Iran, over the last two hundred years, since Tehran became the capital of the country. The Bazaar has been a significant socio-political agent in Iranian society. Nevertheless, less attention has been given to its internal atmosphere, where the bazaaris, have tried to conserve their traditions and preserve their heritage. One of these heritages are “hey’ats”, religious formations for holding mourning sessions in Muharram month, as a ritual in Shi’a Islam. “Hey’ats” give the guilds a sense of collective identity, they represent them, and also build a shared heritage for them. The Drapers’ Guild was the first guild in Tehran Bazaar, founding a hey’at. They founded this hey’at in 1883 and named it “the Drapers’ Hey’at”. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Drapers faced difficulties preserving their heritage. They were forced to displace the Mirza Mousa Mosque in the Bazaar. The Mosque was their center for holding religious sessions and was publicly known as “the Drapers’ Mosque”. Since they were attached to the Mosque, their displacement was perceived a loss of heritage. Later, they decided to build a new home, “the Drapers’ Hosseinieh”. They decided to implement the interior design of their lost Mosque in the new place. This strategy enabled them overcome “the traumatic experience of displacement and heritage loss.” Also, to safeguard their new place, they legally registered their hey’at as an institution, and they wrote a constitution for it. The attempts for modernization, led them to develop beneficiary activities, as well. In this research, a qualitative approach is applied, benefiting from multiple methodologies, including; ethnography, secondary sources, and visual methods. The researcher has attempted to outline the story of the Drapers in preserving their heritage. This study hopefully would be useful for similar traditional organizations, showing how continuity and heritage preservation are possible to achieve for communities having experienced a troubled past.
... For these reasons, the service users are highly inclined to yield treatment results as quickly as possible. Katouzyan (2004) believes that Iranians are not inclined to accept prolonged processes most of the time [53]. They do not have the required patience for accumulation and development [54] and prefer temporal benefits to plan for the future [55]. ...
Introduction:
Socio-cultural norms can either be encouraging or a barrier to addiction treatment. More, rigorous research is needed on nonindigenous models in addiction treatment, to better understand the role of socio-cultural differences.
Methods:
The present qualitative study is part of the project, "The Inclusive Assessment of the Barriers of Drug Addiction Treatment Services in Iran," which was conducted in Tehran from 2018 to 2021. The participants consisted of eight people who used drugs, seven individual family members of the people who used drugs participants, seven service providers, and four policymakers. A purposeful sampling method was used for the selection of the participants, and the process continued until reaching the theoretical saturation of data. Analysis used the Graneheim and Lundman methods, classifying primary codes, the sub-themes, and themes were classified according to the similarities and differences between primary codes.
Finding:
The most important socio-cultural barriers to addiction treatment in Iran are: unrealistic expectations of the family and society from the people who use drugs, addiction stigma, mistrust between various components of the treatment system, perceptions that professional substance use disorder treatment is inefficient and low uptake of that treatment, the disturbed relational boundaries between the people who use drugs and their relatives, the interweaving of treatment and ethical and religious principles, low acceptance of maintenance treatments, treatment focusing on short-term outcomes, and presence of facilitating backgrounds of using drugs.
Conclusions:
The Iranian socio-cultural characteristics play an important role in the addiction treatment of the people who use drugs, so it is necessary for treatment interventions to be sensitive to these characteristics.
... His intellectual attempts to develop theories and conceptual frameworks for the study of Iranian history and society include analyses regarding law and freedom. Casting doubt on the accuracy of uncritically applying the theories developed for the study of European society to the Iranian case, he has put forward a number of thoughtful ideas, such as his notions of 'arbitrary rule and chaos', 44 'the fundamental conflict between state and society in Iranian history', 45 'Iran as a short-term society', 46 and 'liberty and license in Iranian history'. 47 These ideas are useful in recapturing the historical situation in which questions of freedom arose. ...
Rival Conceptions of Freedom in Modern Iran is an original historiographic examination of the idea of freedom in early modern Iran within a larger context of the formation of modern Muslim thought. The study develops an appropriate method for the historiography of ideas by taking into consideration cultural, linguistic, and socio-political limitations and obstacles to free thinking in closed societies. The research shows how most locutions about freedom, uttered during early modern Iran, were formed within the horizon of the question of Iran's decline and were somehow related to remedying such situations. It challenges previous studies which employed Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative freedom as two fundamentally different concepts of freedom. It replaces Berlin's dichotomy of positive and negative liberties with MacCallum's triadic concept of freedom and argues that thinkers in early modern Iran could noticeably present rival interpretations of three variables of the concept of freedom, namely the agent, the constraint, and the purpose of freedom. Rival Conceptions of Freedom in Modern Iran is a unique contribution to the histories of the 1905-11 Constitutional Revolution in Iran and comparative political thinking between Iran and Europe. It is an essential resource for scholars interested in Constitutionalism, History, Political Theory and Sociology within Middle Eastern Studies.
... This contributed to the development of a semi-permanent state of instability and insecurity within Iran (and other Eastern countries) in what Katouzian names a short-term society. 21 Many important historical watersheds such as the fall of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1738) had some important ecological factors. The Safavid empire (the last great historical Iranian empire) gradually disintegrated not only because of the weakness of the latter Safavid monarchs but also due to major economic and military challenges which were often caused by drought and water scarcity. ...
Approximately 97% of the country is experiencing drought conditions. Due to gross water mismanagement and its damaging impact on the country, Iran faces the worst situation in water resources of any industrialized nation. Tens of thousands of villages have been deserted and most of the major urban centers have passed their limits to absorb new rural migrants. Some officials predict that in less than 25 years, 50 million Iranians would be displaced from their current homes because of the pressing ecological conditions. This is happening at the time that the gap between the grassroots and the state has widened and there is increasing dissatisfaction with governance plagued by corruption, nepotism, economic mismanagement, unaccountability and a foreign policy which has produced various regional and trans-regional adversaries. This paper evaluates the pressing ecological challenges in Iran and by conceptualizing political resilience it critically evaluates whether the Islamic Republic is prepared to face the devastating ecological crisis and its socio-economic consequences.
... Decision-makers that are too often in a rush for short-term gains need to be more mindful of the long-term effects of their policies on the environment, society, culture, and politics. Iran has historically been a jame'eye kotah-moddat -a "short-term society" (Katouzian, 2004). Changing this myopic attitude in Iran is thus challenging when change -even important and fundamental change -tends to be a short-term phenomenon. ...
The rapid depletion of aquifers around the world is a growing concern. This depletion raises important questions at national and local levels about different aspects of groundwater over-exploitation and related social and political implications. Iran is a country which has historically relied on groundwater resources for development purposes, but in recent decades it has experienced a progressive decline in water levels of aquifers across the country. Groundwater policies and measures to control overabstraction have largely failed to restore the groundwater balance. This paper explores some of the key aspects of Iran's persistent groundwater overabstraction problem. It addresses the demographic, legal, infrastructural, economic, socio-institutional, bureaucratic, and knowledge and expertise challenges as they affect water distribution and water security. The paper illustrates how technocratic knowledge-making, myopic policymaking, and populist lawmaking related to groundwater use have caused mismanagement at the national level and overabstraction at the local level. It is therefore essential that policy reforms pertaining to groundwater be guided by transformative visions in different areas of governance. A consistent, transparent, and integrated legal and institutional framework for law enforcement must be developed; the social and political costs of enforcing regulations must be reduced; and local communities must be included in law-and policy-making as well as implementation.
... It is possible to show that several historical circumstances in the Iranian society have created these cycles of stretching and folding. This is to some extent close to the concept of "short-term society" theorized by Katouzian (2004). By and large, this is the case of societies who have been subjected to exogenous forces. ...
Contradictory forces in urban processes can lead to unstructured, disordered and chaotic forms of urban fabrics. One of the main physical expressions of this chaos could be seen in the prevalence of deteriorated urban fabrics. Whereas the chaos is not limited to physical aspects, any attempt to deal with this problem requires a comprehensive and integrated package without contradictory components. According to the chaos theory, what makes a system chaotic is the incoordination among the differentiated structures because of the exogenous forces. This theoretical approach has been used in this research in the evaluation of the renovation of deteriorated fabrics of Atabak Neighborhood, a disadvantaged neighborhood with a vast physical and social degradation in Tehran, Iran. The renovation plan was launched by the Urban Renewal Organization of Tehran (URO) in 2006 as the first participatory renewal plan in deteriorated urban fabrics of this city, but it was put aside in 2009 leaving behind an unsuccessful experience with negative consequences. Using the official documents of the plan, statistical data from the surveys, the national census and interviews with the facilitators of the project, we have analyzed the causes of the failure of this experience according to our theoretical framework. The results show that the major cause of the unsuccessful urban regeneration is due to the negligence of structural nature of the phenomena in the plan which did not come to institutionalize the process of this regeneration. This negligence has led to not considering the transversal nature of urban regeneration and the lack of coordination between different organizations, non-sustainable financing, mistrust in governmental and municipal agencies intensified by sequential changes in the administration, noninstitutionalized social participation of the residents, exogenous nature of intervention by prioritizing the spatial-physical instead of the social aspects.
... The Iranian society doesn't share the same institutional settings: the legitimacy of the government does not stem from its leadership towards economic progress, as the economic decision making is influenced by oil revenues. The cultural setting promotes short termism (Katouzian, 2004), (Manoocheri, 2017). ...
What are some of the explanations for cross-national diversity of foresight performance among technological followers? Why are some countries more successful than others in learning how to develop national innovation system foresight? This paper argues that the answers are linked to organizational capacities at three different levels: governmental, policy network and social learning. To corroborate this argument, the paper chose Iran and Korea as benchmarking partners, and attempts to find out what makes Iran a slow learner in building innovation system foresight. The conceptual model is an improved model of Saritas’s, by integrating Borras’ and Andersen’s conceptions and classifications. The data are collected from comprehensive interviews in both countries and second-hand data of international indexes. The paper, finally, concludes that it is the weakness of analytical-systemic capacity that impedes and delays the emergence of systemic foresight in Iran, and that this weakness stems from the adverse impacts of the dominant institutions, surrounding the innovation system. The final point is that it is not sufficient for Iran to learn the methods and techniques of foresight from Korea. It should learn how to open its macro-policy towards the global market and design appropriate industrial strategy in a coherent policy-strategy portfolio.
The primary aim of this research is to examine the urban revitalization scenario of the Shahid Beheshti Square in the historical center of Tabriz City after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Regarding Iran's post-revolution and post-war (Iran-Iraq war) eras, in the 1990s, after a decade of state ownership, the government started liberalizing and privatizing its economic structure. Parallel to the state's political-economic regulations, the city core's historical and cultural potential generated a profit-making ground for multiple destructions and rebuilding phases. This study framed the cycle in the Beheshti Square scope under the umbrella concept of "creative destruction" as renewal plans (the 1990s and 2020s), which signifies the temporality of the urban revitalization project. Hybrid Neoliberalism and Islamic Iranian representation are the conditions that formed the meanings behind "creative destruction" as a political apparatus in the Tabriz urban revitalization program. While the local administration erased the entire historical urban fabric, which led to the demolition of multiple courtyard houses and provided a tabula rasa for constructing modern commercial blocks and a tower, they maintained the Karim Khan mosque as a representation of heritage Iranian Islamic architecture. Shahid Beheshti Square emerged as a modern reinterpretation of old squares of Tabriz and was filled with symbolic architectural elements such as the vast carpet-patterned pavement and the addition of minarets to Karim Khan mosque (as a stronger representation of Islamic ideology). That is, creative destruction exploits historical urban fabric to commercialize local cultural values, create a tourism center, and acquire a global Islamic city image. Yet, the finished project failed to make any social or financial progress, and after a short time, the revitalization project produce a problematic public space that required a second phase of urban renewal.
Despite the impact of ideological rigidity, the primary challenge of heritage planning in Tehran and beyond lies not in the dominance of an inflexible Authorized Heritage Discourse, but rather in the absence of stable spatial-discursive and administrative structures. Solmaz Yadollahi maps the historical trajectory of conservation and urban heritage planning in Iran, depicting a discursive-spatial assemblage that tends to knock down its accumulated resources. This is in line with Katouzian's portrayal of Iran as a pick-axe society. Residing within this society, the studied assemblage strives to deconstruct the prevailing structures and usher in a fresh one, paradoxically perpetuating the very cycle it seeks to escape.
Purpose
This paper aims to analyze the implications of orality for management practices in a developing country such as Iran.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper relies on the seminal theory of Walter Ong (1982) and a leading line of anthropological research to analyze the implications of orality/literacy for management practices in Iran. The authors first define orality and literacy as distinct modes of communication and examine their conceptual properties. Then, the authors draw on the existing literature to analyze the five main management functions impacted by orality.
Findings
The analyses suggest that the predominance of orality in Iran is associated with a wide range of management practices, including short-term or unstructured planning, spontaneous decision-making, fluid organizational structure, the prevalence of interpersonal relations, authoritarian and traditional leadership and behavior-based controlling mechanisms.
Originality/value
While most studies have focused on the impacts of cultural dimensions and economic variables, this paper offers a novel approach to analyzing management practices. More specifically, the paper suggests that in addition to the implications of cultural dimensions and economic variables, the mode of communication, namely, orality/literacy, could have significant implications for management practices.
Türk kökenli Kaçar Hanedanlığı, İran tarihinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Kaçarlar döneminde hükümdarların şehzadelerle yaşadığı bazı sorunlar dikkat çekmektedir. Bu sorunlar neticesinde şehzadelerin bir kısmı Osmanlı Devleti’ne sığınmıştır. Çalışmamızda bu şehzadelerden biri olan Abbas Mirza’nın Osmanlı Devleti’ne gelişi meselesi, Bağdat’a yerleştirilmesi ve bu süre içerisinde yaşanan olaylar ile buna bağlı olarak gelişen Osmanlı-İran ilişkileri aydınlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. Abbas Mirza ilk önce Osmanlı Devleti’ne İran ve İngiltere tarafından sürgün olarak gönderilmek istenmiştir. Lakin Abbas Mirza’nın sürgün olarak ülkeye girmesine Osmanlı Devleti tarafından karşı çıkılmış ve bu şekilde ülkeye girmesine izin verilmemiştir. Fakat daha sonra sığınmacı konumunda iken ülkeye girişi kabul edilmiştir. Abbas Mirza, Osmanlı Devleti sınırları içerisinde yirmi beş yıl gibi uzun bir süre yaşamıştır. Bu süre içerisinde Abbas Mirza’nın güvenliği ve her türlü ihtiyacı Osmanlı Devleti tarafından karşılanmıştır. Diğer taraftan Osmanlı Devleti ile İngiltere arasında şehzadenin himayesi sorunu yaşanmış ve buna bağlı olarak konu uluslararası bir boyut kazanmıştır. Ancak Osmanlı Devleti şehzadenin himayesini İngiltere’ye bırakmamayı bir haysiyet meselesi olarak görmüştür. Osmanlıya sığınan Abbas Mirza’nın siyaseten kullanılma ihtimali, İran iç politikasında bir tehdit unsuru olarak algılanmıştır. Ayrıca bu ihtimal iki ülke arasındaki ilişkileri olumsuz olarak etkilemiştir. Çalışmamıza konu olan bu süreç, ağırlıklı olarak Osmanlı arşiv vesikalarından faydalanılarak yazılmıştır. Bu kaynağın dışında ise konu ile ilgili tetkik eserler ve makalelerden de istifade edilmiştir.
The land reform that followed the social, economic, and political changes in Iran is the most crucial mission of the administrative system before the Islamic Revolution and one of the most critical issues of environmental governance in Iran in modern times. The purpose of this study is to explain how the land reform program was on the agenda in the 1960s. Due to the nature and objectives of this study, the qualitative analysis method and case study method were used. First, the collected data from research sources were categorized within the framework of Kingdon's multiple stream theory. Analysis was performed based on the theoretical concepts of the theory. This article explains how the stream of issues, political, and policy-making process result in the land reform agenda. The results show that although theoretically separated, the three streams are not entirely independent of each other. This study argues that Kingdan's theory is effective in analyzing and explaining the process of the land reform law, despite its limitations. The window of opportunity has been opened following the co-existence of the current land problems and the owner-farmer relationship, domestic political forces and international pressures, and the policy-making process. Since then, the issue has been on the government's agenda, and political Entrepreneurs have taken the opportunity to approve their proposals and facilitate the change process.
There is divine and democratic legitimacy in the Islamic Republic state of Iran. Therefore, bureaucracy confronts dichotomies such as ‘religious commitment and being qualified/professional’, ‘accountability to Vali-e-Faqih and public’, ‘alms-tax dichotomy’, and ‘institutions and Bonyads. The purpose of this paper is to investigate this paradox using historical-comparative analysis. In conclusion, through three mainstreams – i.e., ancient Persia tolerant bureaucracy, contributions from the new public service professional principles and restricting the power of Guardian Jurist to determine the overall red lines of bureaucracy – insights are presented to resolve these conflicts, in particular, the accountability paradox, which needs further explanation and empirical study.
This chapter describes and analyses the case of the Khoob-Bakht Regeneration Project as a comprehensive redevelopment model. The chapter structure is based on the analytical framework diagram that was illustrated in the conclusion of chapter one, starting with the urban problems that existed in the neighbourhood in order to assess whether or not the regeneration project responded to these challenges. The main analysis section is structured around themes of property development and implementation as key themes that emerged from the earlier theoretical discussions. Utilising institutional analysis as a methodological approach, the chapter unravels the ways in which property actors see the comprehensive redevelopment process and their subsequent actions. The development decision-making is examined within the institutional contexts structured by dynamic needs and concerns of actors, and the developers’ behaviour is analysed combining both economic motivations and social aspects of their decision-making process. The final section provides post-completion analysis of the case study 11 years later in 2021.KeywordsKhoob-Bakht neighbourhoodComprehensive redevelopmentLarge-scale redevelopmentTop-down planningImplementation of regenerationLarge-scale developer behaviourUrban regeneration incentives
Chapters 4 and 5 by outlining the two case studies laid the basis for comparing the two models side by side. With that background, Chap. 5 highlights the points of difference and similarity between the two cases, in the quest to answer the main research question: How do piecemeal and comprehensive redevelopment models operate in the run-down neighbourhoods of Tehran? Specifically, how do they operate in terms of implementation and property development? The different aspects of studying regeneration are used as the overarching framework within which the comparison takes place. The analysis topics were selected based on their significance to regeneration in general, and in the run-down neighbourhoods of Tehran specifically, and in order to answer the research questions, providing a better understanding of how these two models operated in the run-down neighbourhoods of Tehran. Finally, the main findings of this research are spelled out, focusing specifically on the lessons that can be learned from the Khoob-Bakht and Malek-Ashtar case studies. These lessons are then expanded to the wider scale and other similar cities, concluding by discussing the underlying theoretical issues as well as the field of urban regeneration in a more general sense.KeywordsState intervention in run-down areasInstitutional analysis of property developmentHousing provision in run-down areasPiecemeal versus comprehensive redevelopmentUrban regeneration in developing countries
Seeking to determine the factors driving political cultures onto distinct trajectories, researchers have considered development one of the main causes for emerging new values, which configure political culture trends along with cultural heritage as a conservative force. We argue that if the theories are correct, then they should function not only at the national level but also at other levels. We found that disparate human development levels in Iranian provinces, as a result of the concentration of resources and wealth in some regions, are contributing to the diverse levels of emerging democratic values and attitudes across the country and among provinces, which in turn has driven the country to a cultural heterogeneity in terms of these new values. Furthermore, the inconsistent case of Kurds indicates that there is still room for the cultural heritages of small worlds to impose their forces on national political culture structure.
Recruiting insiders as a way of recruitment which universities try to employ their
graduates has a long history. So, the aim of the present study was to investigate status of
Iran's old universities about attracting and recruiting the graduates of insider at
university and also, provide an integrated wisdom about graduates of insider to
thinkers and policymakers of higher education with using a qualitative research
synthesis. Therefore, in initially all keywords around insiders were emerged and then
special databases. A total of 48 studies were identified and 29 twenty-nine of them were selected purposefully as sample. In the second section, researchers chose 4 Iran's old universities by cluster sampling as sample.To quality control of the data, CASP checklist was conducted and also, code reliability was used to integrate the data. To analyze the data, conductive content analysis was conducted. The results of first section showed that we can view recruiting insiders based on two themes which are challenges and opportunities. The challenges are academic development challenge; professional development challenge; academic chauvinism growth in recruitment and employment; individual communication development challenge; inter-university communication development challenge. In addition, opportunities are the structural-cultural development of the university, the structural-cultural advantages and the economic advantages. Also the results of second section showed that there is higher percentage the graduates of insider in Iran's old universities.
The development theorists and thinkers have put forward various ideas about the lack of convergence of the development path in different societies. In this regard, as one of the new institutionalists, North discussed the transition from limited access order (natural state) to open access order with an emphasis on the issue of violence. In this chapter, attempts have been made to examine the institutional barriers to transition from the natural state of Iran during 1941–1979. The results of this research indicate that during this era, synergies between extractive political and economic institutions created a vicious cycle. Competition and struggles in this era for gaining benefits were merely enclosed in the hands of a certain group; thus, the political atmosphere was closed so that their interests be supported. Disturbances in this era were in order to achieve economic rents under the control of other groups. Under such circumstances, the long-term balance between political and economic institutions was not made possible which led Iran to experience an era of basic limited access order and then to move toward a fragile limited access order and eventually the chaos instead of moving toward an open access order.
The incongruity between different dimensions of social status has some specific consequences at both individual and structural levels. One of these consequences at the individual level is its effect on political attitudes and behaviors. In several studies in which it has been investigated, there has not been sufficient consensus, though, most of them usually emphasize on some types of dissatisfaction among the inconsistent people. In this research the effect of status inconsistency on political attitudes has been investigated through a mediatory mechanism. Our basic hypothesis is that the status inconsistency brings about some specific political attitudes through engendering injustice feeling in the individual. We have considered the status inconsistency as the discrepancy between one’s ranks with respect to education, income and occupational prestige. The dependent variables in this study are: opposition to the status quo, authoritarianism and revolutionariness. In order to concentrate on the relation between the status inconsistency and the political attitudes precisely, six variables have been applied as moderators (including religiousness, fatalism, age, powerlessness, politicalness and dependence on the ruling power). In this regard additional hypothesizes have been put forward.
The population consists of all 23 or older persons from the urban regions of Hamedan. The sample size is 604. The results show that status inconsistency is not prevalent in the population. Data Analyzing also rejected the main hypothesis: the status inconsistency does NOT bring about any political attitudes through the mediating mechanism. Controlling the moderator variables did not make any change in this finding. Nonetheless, when the types of inconsistencies were taken into account, some significant effects were detected. Increasing status inconsistency among the losers (individuals whose education is higher than their income) leads to higher levels of injustice feeling which causes to increase the opposition to the status and to decrease authoritarianism. Increasing status inconsistency among the winners (individuals whose income is higher than their education) leads to lower levels of injustice feeling which causes to decrease the opposition to the status quo and to increase authoritarianism. Some moderator variables modified the effecting mechanism of status inconsistency on political attitudes, whether in losers or winners. The effect of status inconsistency on revolutionariness through the mediating mechanism is not significant among the losers. In the case of the winners, increasing status inconsistency leads into lower levels of revolutionariness, through decreasing injustice feeling.
Key Words: social status, status inconsistency, political attitude, winner, loser.
Using the ‘chaos theory’ this article argues that the Iranian society shows a chaotic behavior, and it can be considered as a chaotic system. To illustrate this point, some traits of the chaotic systems such as “sensitivity to initial condition” and “stretching and folding” mechanisms are considered, by which we discuss characteristics of the Iranian society. Some manifestations of chaos are investigated such as: non-normal distribution of variables and status inconsistency. Making an essential distinction between “chaos” and “complexity”, we have compared the Iranian chaotic society with the developed complex societies of the West. Some theories’ terms, especially Smelser’s concepts of “structural differentiation” and “functional unification” and Katouzian’s“short term society”, have been used to make this comparison. The other goal of this paper is to explain why the social sciences in Iran, as one of the important elements of the modern knowledge, have not been prospering.
Thus, the consequences of this typology on the emergence of the social sciences are examined and we have tried to introduce Tabatabayi’s theory into our theoretical framework. Chaos is born by “stretching” and “folding” mechanisms. The basis of our inference is that in the developed societies of the West, due to “structural differentiation” and “functional unification”, the complexity has led the societies to structuration. We have considered this structuration, in its dialectical relation between the western social structures and epistemological foundations. There has always been a “folding” besides “stretching” in Iran and this has made “reductionism” impossible – which has been a requisite of the emergence of social sciences. In fact, the constituent elements of a chaotic society are not reducible, because the boundaries of categories are always changing. At last, in spite of subscribing to Tabatabayi’s theory, we have shown some new possibilities for sociology in Iran by using a few examples. The goal of this theory is to search order in chaos.
In retrospect, the government intervention in business ecosystem of Iran has a long history. Oddly enough the dimensions of such intervention are more conspicuous after the approval of the first Constitution in 1906. Nonetheless, it is essential to point out that the strict regulations imposed by the government were partially eased and, at later stages, new concepts in the business world were shaped. This trend greatly contributed to the emergence of entrepreneurship in Iran which goes back to 15 years ago when an Entrepreneurship Development Program at Universities was approved for the first time in this country. Furthermore, the research tries to answer questions about the meanings of entrepreneurship from viewpoints of Iranian policymakers, the actions taken concerning entrepreneurship by government, the key effective factors influencing the policymaking process and finally finding the most prerequisites for effective entrepreneurship policy in Iran. These questions were answered in the wake of studying the relevant National Development Plans (NDPs), and reliable documents which have been recorded by accredited centers also the information gathered through interviews and questionnaires.
Located at the foot of the Alborz Mountains, Tehran once had a reputation for its many gardens, trees, and natural beauty. It was because of this rich natural asset that the city was even dubbed ‘
Chenarestan
’, or the land of Chenar trees. Today, there is not much left of this natural element due to decades of rapid urban development and expansion. This chapter presents an analytical account of how this asset came under such heavy threat that there is now a clear scarcity of green spaces in the city. The chapter first traces how social and economic factors, along with the process of modernisation have, over years, contributed to this destruction. An analysis follows of the cultural factors playing parts in this process. The relationship between governmental, public, private factors and the role of civic society as a regulating body are used as a framework for analysis. In the final section, a case study of Darband neighbourhood is offered to illustrate the points made. The destruction of Darband’s rich natural environment exemplifies the wider process of incongruent development and its consequences for Tehran. The case study demonstrates how various factors discussed in the chapter operate to shape the concrete reality of the city.
In recent years, Iran has gained attention mostly for negative reasons-its authoritarian religious government, disputed nuclear program, and controversial role in the Middle East-but there is much more to the story of this ancient land than can be gleaned from the news. This authoritative and comprehensive history of Iran, written by Homa Katouzian, an acclaimed expert, covers the entire history of the area from the ancient Persian Empire to today's Iranian state. Writing from an Iranian rather than a European perspective, Katouzian integrates the significant cultural and literary history of Iran with its political and social history. Some of the greatest poets of human history wrote in Persian-among them Rumi, Omar Khayyam, and Saadi-and Katouzian discusses and occasionally quotes their work. In his thoughtful analysis of Iranian society, Katouzian argues that the absolute and arbitrary power traditionally enjoyed by Persian/Iranian rulers has resulted in an unstable society where fear and short-term thinking dominate. A magisterial history, this book also serves as an excellent background to the role of Iran in the contemporary world.
This book offers a view of Iran through politics, history and literature, showing how the three angles combine.
This paper represents an initial effort to model the volatile behavior of Iran's socio-political-economic system. More specifically, Homa Katouzian's theory of Iranian political economy?a well-established descriptive theory of Iran's unstable economic development?is translated into a system dynamics model, tested for internal consistency, and used for policy analysis. Simulation results confirm Katouzian's claim that periodic episodes of significant arbitrary power are key to understanding the historically less-than-optimal behavior of the Iranian socioeconomic system. They also confirm the significance of oil revenue, economic sanctions, and civil resistance on Iranian economic development. Of note is that experimentation with the model reveals that educational policies that generate increased respect for the law by Iranian citizens can significantly improve the behavior of the Iranian socioeconomic system. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.
This article studies the relationship between social culture and spatial discrimination in the modern urban planning of Tehran. It examines how planning attempts during the Qajar era began to enrich the ideas of citizenship and public space, which in effect transformed the racial and religious discriminations to new forms of segregation based on economic classes. It shows how multiple planning practices during Reza Shah favored a uniform modernist style to create an imaginary national identity. The divergence of socioeconomic classes under Shah's planning practices is also analyzed to show the spatial discrimination that the new urban poor had to bear.
Mohammad Ali Mojtahedi occupies a prominent place in the development of modern education in Iran. Yet, though not a politician, his influence exceeded far beyond education into the social and political life of contemporary Iran. Deeply convinced of the central role of education in development, his career made important contributions to changes in the landscape of modern education in Iran at both high school and university levels. Within this context, the paper traces the outlines of Mojtahedi's life and work from his birth in 1908 in the city of Lahijan in the northern province of Gilan, up to his death in 1997 in southern France. The paper's most seminal contribution covers the events of the period between the summer of 1964, when Mojtahedi was director of Tehran Polytechnic, and his dismissal in February 1967 by the shah as the head of Aryamehr (now Sharif) University which were closely related to the unsuccessful attempt on the shah's life in April 1965.
The case of “homelessness in Iran” presents empirical evidence to demonstrate “how a small media organization affects and changes social discourse.” The study investigates how the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) embodied the view of a news agency as having a role not only in the coverage of events, but also as an active agent of social change through discursive interventions. The process by which ISNA reconstructed homelessness and its empirical consequences is compatible with the five accepted stages labeled by Blumer. Homelessness represents the different ways in which ISNA has intervened in the social discourse in Iran: foregrounding a social issue, thematizing a discourse and problematizing social issues in order to open up a new kind of discourse.
The pilgrimage is a central religious practice in Islam. But beneath this banal observation lies a great social and historical complexity. On the one hand pilgrimage is not a timeless phenomenon, it is located within time and space; on the other hand it is made up of religious and mundane or profane aspects that are looked upon as unconnected with religion. It is this complexity that makes pilgrimage a political practice important to the formation of civil society. The observation of a group of Iranian Shiites throughout the pilgrimage to the holy sites of Syria in July 2003 helps to understand the role played by women both as pilgrims and traders. It also highlights the social impact of such practices as referred to gender relationships, the autonomy of business in the state, and the process of individuation. Although as transcendental as they have ever been, the religious experiences are far from being devoid of rational and economic calculation. Thus the pilgrimage is less a kind of updating of communitas for believers than an area where social practices are shaped and struggles identified in the double context of nation and globalisation.
The ancient Persian empires are denoted as despotic, practicing arbitrary rule while Greece, Persia's archrival during the sixth to fourth century BC, exercised rule of law. This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze some of the geographical and environmental underpinnings of the existence of rule of law in the city-states of ancient Greece and its absence in Persia. I discuss the role of geographical conditions of land (open plains versus mountains), population pressure, proximity to the sea and form of trade (overland versus overseas) as factors conducive to rule of law in the city-states of ancient Greece and to despotism in ancient Persia. Specifically, the role of trade via land in Persia prior to the fifth century BC is compared to the role of sea trade (alongside with piracy) in ancient Greece. I argue that in ancient Persia monarchs could tax or expropriate much of the gains from overland trade, preventing the accumulation of an independent form of wealth by merchants. In Greece, sea trade alongside the practice of piracy led to gains from trade that could not be easily expropriated by the monarchs and acted as a balancing force vis-à-vis the power of the monarchs, creating a basis for rule of law in the Greek city-states.
Fereydani Georgians are the only Georgian-speaking ethnic group in Iran. Despite being all that is left of the once vast and important Georgian-speaking community in Iran, this ethnic group is still largely unknown, both inside and outside Iran. There is a general consensus that Georgians have played a pivotal role in Iran's history since the seventeenth century. Despite this, the Fereydani Georgians are also still relatively unknown within Iran itself. Also in Georgia there is some (popular) knowledge about them. Nevertheless, even this knowledge is rudimentary and is plagued by a large number of misconceptions. The Fereydani Georgians are virtually unknown outside Iran and Georgia.
The recent Iranian revolution has brought into light the question of the nature and significance of both the logic and the sociology of long-term social and economic development in that country. This subject is of considerable interest in its own right, but it is of even greater significance for a realistic understanding of the country's recent developments, its present situation, and its future prospects. For it was mainly the Jack of such an understanding and insight which led the vast majority of modern Iranian intellectuals and educated masses of all political and ideological persuasions to misconstrue the logic of the events since 1963, and fail to predict the form, content, and consequences of the recent revolution.
The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Rise of the Pahlavis (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), Vols.13; Iranian History and Politics, .arrah-ye Izadi va Haqq-e Elahi-ye Padshahan in Ettelaat Siyasi-Eqtesadi
- See Katouzian
- State
See Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran, The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Rise of the Pahlavis (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), Vols.13; Iranian History and Politics, .arrah-ye Izadi va Haqq-e Elahi-ye Padshahan in Ettelaat Siyasi-Eqtesadi, 1998, pp.12930; Legitimacy and Succession in Iranian History, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol.23 (2003).
from Constantine to St Louis (London: Longman, 1974), Parts II
- R H C Davis
- Political And Economic Development In Iran
- History
R.H.C. Davis, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN A History of Medieval Europe, from Constantine to St Louis (London: Longman, 1974), Parts II, VIX. Herbert Butterfield et. al., A Short History of.rance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). H.A.L..isher, A History of Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1936).
Early Modern Europe, from about 1450 to about 1720
- See Sir
See Sir George Clark, Early Modern Europe, from about 1450 to about 1720 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966);
The Age of Humanism and Reformation
- H A L Isher
- History
- Europe
- Ii Book
- A G Dickens
H.A.L..isher, A History of Europe, Book II; A.G. Dickens, The Age of Humanism and Reformation (London: Prentice-Hall International, 1977).
The Trial of Charles I (London: World Books, 1964); The Kings War
- C V See
- Wedgwood
See C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (London: World Books, 1964); The Kings War (London:.ontana, 1966);
Louis XIV and the Greatness of .rance
- See
- Maurice Ashley Example
See, for example, Maurice Ashley, Louis XIV and the Greatness of.rance (London: The English Universities Press, 1966);
Richelieu and the .rench Monarchy
- C V Wedgwood
C.V. Wedgwood, Richelieu and the.rench Monarchy (London: The English Universities Press, 1958).
arrah-ye Izade va Haqq-e Elahi-ye Padshahan
- See
- Further
- Katouzian
See further, Katouzian, .arrah-ye Izade va Haqq-e Elahi-ye Padshahan.
Iranian History and Politics; State and Society in Iran, The Eclipse of the Qajars, especially ch.1. 16. .or a statement of this myth expressed in post-Islamic termsTehran: Ershad, 1995), pp.11617; Nezm al-Molk Tusi, Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasatnameh
- See
See further, Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics; State and Society in Iran, The Eclipse of the Qajars, especially ch.1. 16..or a statement of this myth expressed in post-Islamic terms, see Abolfazl Baihaqi (ed.), Tarikh-e Baihaqi Ali Akbar.ayyaz (Tehran: Ershad, 1995), pp.11617; Nezm al-Molk Tusi, Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasatnameh, Hubert Darke (ed.) (Tehran: Tarjumeh va Nashr-e Ketab, 1961).
1554, just as .erdawsi resumes his own writing after the 1
- Shahnameh
Shahnameh, vi, p.1554, just as.erdawsi resumes his own writing after the 1,000 inserted distiches of Daqiqi come to an end.
iscal History of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods, Persian Studies
- Willem Loor
Willem.loor, A.iscal History of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods, Persian Studies, No.17 (New York, Bibliotheca Press, 1998). 27..loor, A.iscal History, p.335.
.or a somewhat different, though not contradictory, version see Etemad al-Saltaneh
- Bamdad
Bamdad, Vol.5, p.303..or a somewhat different, though not contradictory, version see Etemad al-Saltaneh, p.601.
An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen, 1950) 1, II, 3, Of the Accumulation of Capital
- Adam See
- Smith
See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen, 1950) 1, II, 3, Of the Accumulation of Capital, or of Productive and Unproductive Labour, 320.
Amir Kabir, 1979), pp.957, 1537. 45. .or an extensive account and discussion of this subject, see Homa Katouzian, Ideology and Method in Economics
- Ibid
- Homa 3213 Further
- Adam Katouzian
- Smith
Ibid., pp.3213 further, Homa Katouzian, Adam Smith va Servat-e Melal (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1979), pp.957, 1537. 45..or an extensive account and discussion of this subject, see Homa Katouzian, Ideology and Method in Economics (London and New York: Macmillan and New York University Press, 1980), pp.13. See also, Katouzian, Adam Smith va Servat-e Melal.
whose theory (which was directly based on Smiths) he was POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN 21 401mes01
- Keynes
Keynes said this about Ricardo, whose theory (which was directly based on Smiths) he was POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN 21 401mes01.qxd 06/01/2004 10:29 Page 21 Downloaded by [University of Winnipeg] at 05:26 03 September 2014 attacking. See his The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1961), 2.
A Comparative Theory of State and State and Society in Iran, ch.1. 51. See further, Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics. 52. .or the latest version of this authors concept of pseudo-modernism, see State and Society in Iran
- See
- Example
- Katouzian
See, for example, Katouzian, Arbitrary Rule, A Comparative Theory of State, Politics and Society in Iran, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.1, No.24 (1997), and State and Society in Iran, ch.1. 51. See further, Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics. 52..or the latest version of this authors concept of pseudo-modernism, see State and Society in Iran, p.11.