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Atlantic Capitalism versus Rhine Capitalism in the European Community
Abstract
The advent of the Single European Market in 1993 has prompted a debate about the differences between the German social market economy and the British liberal market, and whether these can coexist. ‘Rhine Capitalism’ based on social solidarity will remain a source of competitive advantage through its emphasis on continuous development of labour skills and technology. Britain's ‘Atlantic Capitalism’ lacks such a framework for dialogue between government and producer interests, which will make the creation of a national competitiveness strategy to counter deindustrialisation problematic. At the European Community level, some regulatory framework similar to Germany's Ordnungspolitik will probably emerge to underpin the operation of the Single Market.
... The state is "liberal" because it acts as an agent of market preservation, that is, it limits its role in creating a positive regulatory environment, setting rules, and settling conflicts. Furthermore, LMEs are characterized by the spread of shorttermism on a large scale (Hodges & Woolcock, 1993). In fact, in such economies, the resource allocation is driven by capital markets and led by autonomous firms acting on their own. ...
... The post-World War II German Social Market Economy (Wrobel, 2010), which has also been called Rhine capitalism (Hodges & Woolcock, 1993), can be seen as a model of capitalism with an intermediate degree of regulation between liberal concepts and a regulated socialist market economy. One specifi c characteristic is a high level of consumer protection to reduce market inequality in cases of asymmetric information between market providers and consumers. ...
Background: Mill’s liberalism, the post-World War II German Social Market Economy (Rhine Capitalism) and modern consumer protection
share the conviction that market participants have equal rights and responsibilities. Within this framework, governments and market
providers are responsible for balancing the knowledge defi cits of consumers in cases of “asymmetric information”. The widely discussed Reno-Model for Responsible Gambling appears to be based on similar ideas by setting standards for informing participants of gambling features and procedures. Position: Based on recent research, we argue that such standard consumer protection may be adequate for social gamblers but not for vulnerable gamblers. These individuals may not benefi t adequately from a rational informed choice approach to prevent harm and disordered gambling. Conclusion: Gambling providers should implement specific protections to address vulnerable gamblers, e. g., early detection procedures and limits for or exclusion from gambling.
... The state is 'liberal' because it acts as an agent of market preservation, i.e., it limits its role to creating a positive regulatory environment, to setting rules and settling conflicts. Furthermore, LMEs are characterized by the spread of short-termism on a large scale (Hodges & Woolcock, 1993). Indeed, in such economies the resource allocation is driven by capital markets and led by autonomous firms acting on their own. ...
This article sheds light on how the internationalization of state-owned enterprises is influenced by the state involvement in ownership and by the home country’s institutional settings. Integrating international business literature with the debate on the varieties of capitalism, we contend that state-dominated enterprises internationalize more (less) than privately owned enterprises in coordinated (liberal) market economies, whereas they exhibit an inconstant behavior in state-influenced market economies. Our analysis on a sample of enterprises pertaining to 20 OECD countries supports our hypotheses. This article adds to studies on the influence of institutions on firms’ internationalization and has implications for both managers and policymakers.
... Как правило, к категории «либеральной рыночной экономики» относят небольшую группу стран: США, Великобританию. В разряд государств с «координированной рыночной экономикой» входит значительная часть Европы: Германия, Швейцария, Нидерланды, Бельгия, Швеция, Норвегия, Финляндия, Австрия [34]. В последнее время принято также выделять особую, третью категорию: «рыночную экономику, находящуюся под влиянием государства» («state-influenced» market economies -SMEs), где государство играет (точнее, играло в недавнем прошлом) активную и непосредственную роль в координации национальной экономики. ...
... In contrast, coordinated market economies (present in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and non-European Japan) rely much more on the coordination of peak interests (capital, the state, and, in Europe, labor) rather than pure market allocation. Such coordination frameworks are absent in Anglo-American capitalism, including in Britain, where there is no effective framework for dialogue between government and producer interests (Hodges/Woolcock 1993). What have also been termed Rhineland or Alpine models of capitalism thus tend to emphasize regulated labor markets and the continuous development of labor skills and technology within firms. ...
Will the global financial crisis of 2008 represent a symbolic juncture in the geo-economics of globalization? There are differing views, with some arguing that the Washington Consensus is dead, while others holding that the fundaments of the neo-liberal global order remain intact. This article engages with this debate by putting three distinct questions analytically prior: First, is there a political economic model that actually stands in contradistinction to the Washington Consensus and the neo-liberal global order? Second, if there is a potential challenge to the neo-liberal order, what exactly is it? And third, if such a challenge exists, what precisely is its nature and logic as it interacts with the neo-liberal global order? This article argues that there is, indeed, a challenger: refurbished forms of state capitalism. However, the nature and logic of the state capitalist challenge to the U.S.-centered neo-liberal system is fundamentally different from the Soviet challenge during the Cold War. Diverse formations of capitalism are co-dependent on the global level in the present era. Refurbished state capitalism is no exception. It represents an “in-system” challenge, since it does not attempt to actively undermine and supplant the neo-liberal order, but rather to gain influence over it. New forms of refurbished state capitalisms are thus simultaneously in symbiosis and in rivalry with the neo-liberal global order.
... It tried to combine both ordo-liberal and state interventionist ideas [Dyson and Goetz, 2003]. This resulted in a managed capitalist system which has often been referred to as Rhineland capitalism [Hodges and Woolcock, 1993] or the German model (Modell Deutschland) [Harding and Paterson, 2000]. The social market economy doctrine is compatible with Germany's preference for traditional regulation (that is, state intervention) and VAs (that is, selfregulation) which, as will be explained below, are often adopted in the 'shadow of the law' as industry aims to pre-empt government regulation. ...
Demands for wider use of 'new' environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), namely market-based instruments (such as eco-taxes and tradable permits), voluntary agreements and informational devices (such as eco-labels and eco-audits) have increased significantly in Germany in recent years. Germany has also been urged to make wider use of market-based instruments by external actors (such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank). However, the uptake of 'new' policy instruments has remained uneven despite considerable NEPI innovation in Germany. German environmental policy has shown a high uptake of VAs and eco-labels. However, it has made only moderate use of eco-taxes although they have increased significantly with the introduction of the ecological tax reform in 1999. Tradable permits have not yet been tested on the national level although some states (Länder) set up pilot projects to gain practical experience ahead of the EU's tradable permit scheme. Overall, NEPIs have been used mainly to supplement traditional regulatory instruments which still dominate German environmental policy. Germany's transformation from a 'high regulatory' state (which makes wide use of traditional regulation and VAs) towards an ecological market economy (which relies primarily on market-based instruments) has therefore been a slow one.
... Unlike France and its nationwide industrial programs (Airbus, Nuclear, Thales), British capitalism has traditionally not focused on innovation in the manufacturing sector and hence has more difficulty defining a national industrial competitiveness strategy. Moreover, it lacks the cooperation between government, labor and producer interests that characterizes the Rhineland model of capitalism (Hodges and Woolcock, 1993), and though the British government pledged to rebuild a national industry, little was done beyond public announcements and limited tax incentives. We argue that France is at a crossroads. ...
Despite political support and reiterated calls for re-industrialization, the German model (defined as a strong industry backed by the banking sector; greater cooperation between trade unions, the government and corporate boards; an export-driven economy) has remained unachievable in France. The industrial sector and exports have been receding since the 1970s; industrial relations have deteriorated and the ‘National champions’ policy (that is, picking winners, for example, Airbus, or creating them via mergers, subsidizing large-scale pivotal industries, for example, IT Plan of 1968, coal and steel industries) was abandoned in the 1980s. Did that vacuum let the British model slowly take root in France? Are France and the United Kingdom heading toward greater convergence, or do elements of differentiation remain? This article argues that despite some changes to a more liberal political economy in France, British-modelled ‘active’ labor policies, and a shift to international and financial capitalism remains stronger in France than in the United Kingdom. The current crises help highlight persistent differences.
... Second, increasing deregulation has created capital markets that are large and liquid enough to support strong markets for corporate control (O'Sullivan 2000). Impatient and volatile capital markets have also limited the willingness of managers and key skilled employees to invest in, and to build upon, firm-specific competences, fostering the diffusion of short-termism on a large scale (Hodges and Woolcock 1993). ...
This article contributes to the understanding of the role of European governments in fostering new global players in the utilities. We argue that the international growth of firms stems from their interaction with governments, which act not only as rule setters but also as goal-oriented strategists, through public policies and mechanisms ranging from firm ownership to more indirect intervention designed to promote internationalization. We claim that the outcome of the interaction significantly depends on the country's form of capitalism. The particular form of capitalism manifested in a country is deeply rooted in historical and cultural behavioural models and differs according to path-dependent institutional changes. Our conjectures are empirically supported by a comparative analysis of the international growth of previously inward-looking domestic incumbents in the European energy and telecommunications industries over the last 15 years.
... O grau de intervenção do Estado é um elemento diferenciando as diversas formas de capitalismo na Europa (HODGES e WOOLCOCK, 1993). Por exemplo, a Alemanha possui uma extensa estrutura regulamentária que permite as forças do mercado operarem somente dentro das regras prescritas limitando a autonomia dos atores. ...
SUMÁRIO: 1 Antecedentes. 2 Nacionalidade da empresa: implicações do contexto de origem. 3 Análise comparativa. 4 Conclusões. Bibliografia. 1 ANTECEDENTES Este artigo apresenta alguns resultados de uma pesquisa mais abrangente focada na implementação de políticas ambientais corporativas em subsidiárias brasileiras. A decisão de realizar uma investigação com múltiplos níveis de análise 1 levou à necessidade de uma abordagem interdisciplinar, incluindo as áreas de relações internacionais, negócios internacionais e organizações. Pode-se afirmar que a adoção de vários paradigmas resultou da aliança de teoria, método e análise dos dados, o que constitui uma das contribuições do estudo. Em outras palavras, distintos paradigmas serão mencionados ao longo do artigo porque nenhuma abordagem isoladamente discutia de forma satisfatória a potencial influência da nacionalidade da empresa 2 para questões ambientais. (*) Artigo apresentado no 24º Encontro da Associação Nacional dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Administração (ENANPAD), Florianópolis, 10 a 13 de setembro de 2000. A autora agradece o apoio financeiro concedido pela CAPES para realização da pesquisa. 1 Os primeiros estudos focados em ETNs e questões ambientais assumiam múltiplos níveis de análise (GLADWIN, 1977, e PEARSON, 1987). 2 Na área de ciência política o conceito de "caráter nacional" é fundamentado em explicações culturais. Em relações internacionais esse conceito tem sido discutido em estudos que seguem a abordagem realista por seu foco nos Estados e em suas representações de poder. STOESSINGER (In: LITTLE e SMITH, 1991) enfatiza o paradoxo envolvendo o conceito de caráter nacional: "ao mesmo tempo que o caráter nacional parece ser um fator indiscutível não existe acordo na literatura sobre o que são padrões culturais". CUCHE (1999) discute o mecanismo pelo qual o Estado reconhece apenas uma identidade cultural para definir a identidade nacional.
... The practice of hiring and firing may be feasible, or even unavoidable, in certain situations; for example, when producing cheap commodity items in emerging markets, in hiring in highly seasonal markets, or in restructuring failing enterprises quickly (Hodges and Woolcock 1993). However, research of best practice companies in innovationdriven economies does not support hiring and firing as a general practice (e.g. ...
The Global Competitiveness Report raises ethical issues on multiple levels. The traditional high ranking accorded the US is largely attributable to fallacies, poor science and ideology. The ideological bias finds expression in two ways: the inclusion of indices that do not provide competitive advantage, but that fit the Anglo/US ideology; and the exclusion of indices that are known to offer competitive advantage, but that do not fit the Anglo/US ideology. This flaw is compounded by methodological problems that raise further doubt as to the reliability and validity of the survey results. The resultant false high ranking of the US, a strong proponent of Anglo/US capitalism, pseudo-legitimizes the propensity of US-dominated institutions and entities to persuade, coerce and, in the worst-case force other countries and their constituents to adopt Anglo/US practices and behaviours. This is ethically reprehensible because research shows that these practices and behaviours, when compared with other approaches, are sub-optimal in the results they produce for individuals, corporations and nations. The report also unjustly and unnecessarily stigmatizes entire groups of countries with little conceivable benefit to anyone. Given the report’s gravitas through the profound global influence it exerts on the decisions of top government and business leaders, these are serious ethical and economic issues.
... The bank-centered regime is supported by a web of institutions in mutually binding relationships with little respect for shareholder value (Bergl€ o of, 1990;Charkham, 1994;La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Although many hybrid forms are emerging through the growing activities of multinational companies and with the increased effect of liberalization and de-regulation, these two models nevertheless present clear distinctions in the ways firms raise capital (Hodges & Woolcock, 1993). 3 The separation of ownership and control in the Anglo-Saxon corporate tradition gave rise to a vast literature examining the challenges of separation and ways to cope with the diverging interests of the parties involved. ...
Since the late 1960s, alternative forms of capitalization have emerged in the absence of an effective capital markets regime in Turkey. We can see these alternative forms in the failed attempts to create Anatolian holding companies through the direct investment of small savings. This article shows how Anatolian holding companies became victims of poor institutional and regulatory regimes, and how the lack of institutions to promote impersonal trust in the economy in turn, permitted widespread abuses. We identify populist politics, lax oversight, and social norms that incorporated gambling as three interlinked reasons which hindered the genesis and development of viable capital market reform and regulatory institutions in Turkey.
... Our research to date suggests that European integration, in particular the restrictive terms of monetary union, represent a far more immediate and pressing constraint on expansive and inclusive welfare provision than globalisation per se (Hay 1999a; Wincott 2000; see also Baimbridge et al. 1997; Gill 1998; Grahl and Teague 1997; Hodges and Woolcock 1993; Rhodes 1992 Rhodes , 1996 Rhodes , 1998; Tsoukalis and Rhodes 1997). Of course, to point to the neoliberal selection mechanisms which have come to be associated with the process of European integration, monetary integration in particular, does not necessarily discriminate well between arguments suggesting that globalisation is the principal process operating here (and that EMU is merely epiphenomal of globalisation) and those that it is EMU rather than globalisation which might best account for such a neoliberalisation. ...
Die Europäische Gemeinschaft hat mit der weitgehend gelungenen Vollendung des Binnenmarktes eine kritische Schwelle erreicht. Das Programm „Europa 1992“ verkörperte in all seiner Suggestivkraft letztlich nicht den dynamischen Aufbruch in eine neue Qualität europäischer Supranationalität, sondern den logischen Höhe- und Endpunkt der bisherigen primär wirtschaftlichen Integrationspolitik der EG. Das Ausmaß der Regelungskompetenzen, die mit der Umsetzung des Binnenmarktprogramms aus der nationalen Regelungshoheit auf die Gemeinschaftsinstanzen übergingen, hat wesentlich zu den wachsenden Vorbehalten in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten gegen Stand und Fortgang der Integration beigetragen. Der Vertrag von Maastricht über die Europäische Union trägt diesen Vorbehalten nur sehr begrenzt Rechnung. Zwar wurde das Subsidiaritätsprinzip in Art. 3b des neuge-faßten „Vertrags über die Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft“ (EGV) stärker verankert. Doch die praktische Umsetzung dieser Vertragsbestimmung bleibt problematisch.
In this chapter we are interested in how economic and social perceptions of the EU fed into growing levels of euroscepticism and outright europhobia in the UK, identified in the previous chapters, which led to increasingly aggressive and ultimately unsuccessful, government intransigence in Brussels after 2010.
In der Geschichte der europäischen Einigung stellt die Währungsunion einen der wichtigsten Entwicklungsschritte dar — einen Schritt, der auch tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf die Zukunft der nordamerikanischen Integration haben dürfte. Während die Einführung des Euro in strategischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht intensiv diskutiert wurde, kam den sozialen Auswirkungen der Währungsunion wenig Aufmerksamkeit zu. Der Wohlfahrtsstaat ist eine der größten Errungenschaften Europas. Doch unter dem Druck nationaler und globaler Faktoren kann der Maastricht-Vertrag zu einer Bedrohung für das soziale Erbe Europas werden. Obgleich Nordamerika allgemein als sozialer Nachzügler bezeichnet wird, wurde dort bereits die Erfahrung gemacht, daß eine Währungsunion in ihrem Kern Mittel zur sozialen Stabilisierung erforderlich macht, um die negativen Auswirkungen der Geldpolitik zu dämpfen. Wenn sich dieser Trend in Europa wiederholt, wird der Europäischen Union in Kürze eine größere Bedeutung auf sozialpolitischer Ebene zukommen. Bis jetzt war Europa traditionell in der Sozialpolitik führend; Nordamerika folgte nach. Im 21. Jahrhundert könnten sich diese Rollen vertauschen. Ein verstärktes transatlantisches Lernen ist im Kampf um die Wahrung weltweiter Gerechtigkeit bei gleichzeitigem Streben nach Wachstum unverzichtbar.
Mobilität und Lebensverlauf sind zeitlose soziologische Konzepte, die auf nichts so sehr wie auf Zeit setzen. Mobilität, sei es der soziale Auf- oder Abstieg zwischen Generationen, der berufliche Werdegang, die räumliche Wanderung oder der Wechsel des Familienstandes, ist immer ein zeitlicher Prozeß. Gleiches gilt für den Lebensverlauf, der sich zu weiten Teilen aus solchen Mobilitätsprozessen ergibt. Neben der Zeitabhängigkeit ist beiden Konzepten eine Ausgangsüberlegung gemeinsam: Individuelle Entwicklungen, also berufliche Veränderungen, Scheidungen, Umzüge, usf. sind in gesellschaftliche Strukturen eingebettet, werden von diesen geprägt und prägen diese wiederum selbst. Gesellschaftliche Strukturen umfassen dabei alle Bestandteile wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Regimes — die Organisation des Bildungsund Beschäftigungssystems, die Familie, die Gesetzgebung, die Wohnungspolitik, die Sozialpolitik und vieles mehr.
We know from the cost of the 2007-09 crisis that transnational finance does not operate in a realm removed from our everyday lives. Variegated Neoliberalism explains why its inequalities persist and how they undermine more social-minded policies towards finance in the EU. The book suggests that large financial groups capitalize on broader changes in capitalism and emerging assumptions about what benefits society at large. Those pushing these political-economic projects present policy change to cope with financial globalization as a new common sense. Macartney's argument then contests these assumptions through an analysis of the spatial relations of transnational actors, and the political claims made within finance and research communities. Rather than relying on umbrella concepts like 'transnational capitalist class', Variegated Neoliberalism emphasises the national-domestic foundations for transnationalization and what we commonly understand as neoliberalism. The book provides comparative analyses of global and European banking communities, and economic research centres, in the UK, France, and Germany. It explains the constellations underpinning the current neoliberal order in global finance, and the realms of possibility for challenges to it.
The 1996 intergovernmental conference on the European Union will represent an important test of German influence in the European Union. The two preceding reforms-the Single European Act and the Maastricht treaty-were undertaken under different circumstances. The Single European Act preceded German unification, whereas the Maastricht treaty negotiations were partly a response to German unification and the end of the Cold War. The IGC negotiations will see the unified Germany operating in a more typical set of circumstances. This article examines the Federal Republic's role in European integration on the eve of the IGC. What are the limits and possibilities of German diplomacy in the EU? Is Germany reluctant to use the various sources of influence at its disposal? Alternatively, are there signs of Germany willingly acting as the driving force of European integration?
The 2007–09 financial crisis has prompted critical self-reflection, not least because of the socioeconomic costs to more susceptible social groups. This paper targets public policy accounts of EU integration for their agent-centred, pluralist analysis, which systematically failed to address latent asymmetries and inequalities. For this reason, these accounts are largely incapable of either explaining the crisis except in contingent terms or of suggesting fruitful political responses. Instead I outline a historical materialist apparatus to contextualize the financial crisis within the longer-term rise of financialized capitalism in Europe, its key agents and dominant worldviews. In turn, I employ this apparatus to examine post-2000 EU financial integration before suggesting certain key lessons for a post-crisis agenda.
Despite political support and reiterated calls for re-industrialization, the German model (defined as a strong industry backed by the banking sector; greater cooperation between trade unions, the government and corporate boards; an export-driven economy) has remained unachievable in France. The industrial sector and exports have been receding since the 1970s; industrial relations have deteriorated and the ‘National champions’ policy (that is, picking winners, for example, Airbus, or creating them via mergers, subsidizing large-scale pivotal industries, for example, IT Plan of 1968, coal and steel industries) was abandoned in the 1980s. Did that vacuum let the British model slowly take root in France? Are France and the United Kingdom heading toward greater convergence, or do elements of differentiation remain? This article argues that despite some changes to a more liberal political economy in France, British-modelled ‘active’ labor policies, and a shift to international and financial capitalism remains stronger in France than in the United Kingdom. The current crises help highlight persistent differences.
'At a time when business leaders are coming under severe pressure to adopt the Anglo/US ideal of shareholder value, Leadership for Sustainable Futures convincingly demonstrates the corporate and social superiority of the approach which adds simultaneous value to shareholders and stakeholders. Although its roots lie in Europe, this leadership approach is practiced worldwide by successful companies that outperform the market over time. Gayle Avery's message is brought to life by practical examples from 28 organizations illustrating different facets of sustainable leadership. This well-researched, coherent book makes timely and essential reading.' - Martin Hilb, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Many managers in the English-speaking world are seeking an alternative to the prevailing business model which promotes a short-term, shareholder-value approach. In this accessible and highly topical book, Gayle Avery argues that this Anglo/US approach to capitalism and business is seriously flawed and does not bring the quality of life to individuals and societies that many people seek. But what is the alternative and do business leaders have a different choice?
Accounts of the future of the welfare state are often presented in crisis terms. Some commentators identify globalization as a force that has already led to a major retreat by the state and is likely to lead to further downsizing of the public sector. Others see the future burden of an aging population as creating huge public expenditure pressures that can be countered only by increased parsimony in most areas of spending. Although both crisis scenarios contain elements of truth, analysis of recent public expenditure trends shows that both are substantially exaggerated as general representations of likely developments over the next two or three decades. However, unnoticed by most commentators, a real, longer-term crisis is beginning to make itself felt. This crisis arises, in part, from the demographic impact of a cultural transformation in the labor market, in progress for several decades. Extreme scenarios of possible consequences over the next 50 to 100 years include population implosion, mass migration, increasingly dangerous eruptions of right-wing populism, and, possibly, territorial conflict between developed and underdeveloped nations. This is not a crisis of the welfare state but rather a crisis for which the welfare state may be an essential part of the answer. The only way Western societies can lessen the future impact of the ongoing cultural transformation of the labor market is through the redesign of welfare state institutions to confront these new challenges.
1. Theoretical Perspective: Social Forces and the Struggle Over European Order 2. Global Restructuring, Transnational Capitalism and Rival Projects for European Order 3. The European Roundtable: an Elite Forum of Europe's Emergent Transnational Capitalist Class 4. The Roundtable's Changing Strategic Project and the Transnational Struggle over European Order 5. Transnational Class Agency, the Rise of 'Embedded Neo-Liberalism' and the Evolving European Order References
Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from a close study of various integration schemes, past and present, is their wide range of outcomes. At one extreme, the highly successful European Union has managed over the past forty years to establish an array of institutions and policies, as well as a broad and clearly defined set of rules. At the other extreme, projects such as the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Pact, and the Economic Community of West African States failed to make any progress towards integration. Between these polar cases are a few integration projects with mixed results. What explains variation in integration outcomes? The study argues that two sets of conditions must be specified in order for integration to succeed, namely, demand side and supply conditions. Regional groups that satisfy both demand and supply conditions stand the greatest chance of succeeding, whereas groups that fulfill neither set of conditions are least likely to attain any significant level of integration.
This article outlines possible scenarios of Social Europe. First, the status quo of (fragile) welfare state sovereignty and autonomy in the Member States is outlined. Then the major reason for the EU's difficult inheritance of a 'social dimension'is explored: namely, limping labour market integration — the only E U market that looks like a free trade zone - and its consequences for delicate European social integration. Without a common labour market chances for a bottom up social dimension are meager. 'Single' and multiple scenarios for a development of Europe's Social Dimension are then fleshed out. They stretch from 'one ge ometry' to 'variable geometries': European de velopment may be shared by all Member States, though there are different models of European development applying to them col lectively. These models are analysed in terms of the interaction between welfare state sover eignty and economic interdependence: 're sovereignization' and regime competition, 'joint sovereignty' of a positive and a trapping variety, and hegemony are the subscenarios discussed. The 'one Europe' about to develop since 1957 may also be shattered, though frag menting into many 'Europes': speaking about a Europe with different tracks and speeds still implies a shared European destination and common institutions, owed to the 'one ge ometry' legacy. But Europe may, and this is quite likely, also spin off into altogether differ ent policy trajectories, and lose its common destination - and also its unitary institutional structure at the European Union level.
International evidence suggests that the European venture capital market would grow by itself for management buy-out and buy-in type investments but would not function to promote small and medium sized enterprise growth and employment without a stimulus from policy, as the bridge between risk and return is simply too great. In this paper it is argued that the challenge for policy is to use venture capital as a tool for creating that growth--rather than growing the venture capital industry in and of itself. Whilst acknowledging that the limited public provision of seed capital can prove an effective stimulus for many small enterprises, it is hypothesized that a further target for government in Europe should be the removal of structural barriers--both tangible and intangible--that hinder the development and diffusion of private venture capital. This involves tackling not only regulatory impediments but also providing the information to dispel the embedded fear of risk--and of venture capitalists--that abides across Europe.
This article does not have an abstract
The literatures on globalization and regionalization on the one hand, and on the institutional distinctiveness of national capitalisms on the other, seem to pull in very different directions. Nonetheless, an increasing number of international and comparative political economists sensitive to the institutional and cultural variability of contemporary capitalism identify tendencies towards convergence-often towards an Angle-US model of deregulated neoliberal capitalism. In this article I critically review the literature on convergence, difference and divergence in the global political economy, differentiating between neoclassical and institutionalist perspectives. Resisting arguments which posit a natural selection process initiated by untrammelled free market competition and free capital mobility, I identify the contingent, political and frequently coercive nature of the convergence process. This is illustrated through a discussion of regional selection mechanisms in the context of European Monetary Union and the East Asian financial crisis. In so far as evolutionary selection mechanisms can be identified in the European context, selecting for a more residual social model, these are more a product of the contingent process of European economic integration than they are a necessary consequence of globalization. Moreover, in so far as similarly convergent processes can be identified in contemporary East Asia, they are less a product of globalization than of the 'predatory neoliberalism' of a beleagured Washington Consensus.
Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.
The subject of this paper is the impact of European Union (EU) social policy on the human resource practices of European subsidiaries of American multinational corporations (MNCs). The human resource policies of an enterprise are affected by the environment in which it operates. Laws, culture, economic and social conditions all have an impact. In the case of a MNC, human resource management is complicated by the necessity to operate in two or more environments in which contradictory or incompatible conditions may exist. The issue that is of concern in this paper is the congruity or incongruity of American human resource practices with EU social policy in general and with the European works council directive in particular.
The European subsidiaries of American multinational corporations (MNCs) are subject to the restraints and the benefits of European Union policies. In general, American corporations support the creation of the single market. Most observers believe that American corporations, experienced in a large domestic market, are well placed to benefit from the single market. American corporations, however, have opposed the addition of a social dimension to the single market. Their executives have argued that the social policies of the EU obstruct the normal operation of human resource management and result in the loss of flexibility and in an increase in the cost of operation.
The objective of this paper is to examine the challenge which one of the most important social policies of the EU poses for American MNCs. The European works council directive is the first directive to be adopted under the Social Protocol of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). The approach involves both a consideration of the American field of human resource management (HRM) and a consideration of the works council directive in order to ascertain the difficulties in reconciling the two. The paper is divided into three parts and a conclusion. Part one deals with trends in American HRM and explains some similarities and differences with European developments. Part two examines the European works council directive. Part three presents the findings of a questionnaire given to human resource managers in American MNC's with operations in the EU. The conclusion, which are preliminary pending personal interviews with HR managers, draws together the implications of the findings in the three parts.
A complex relationship exists among EU regulations, current national practices and rules, institutional capacities to implement regulatory adjustments and the legacy of past health and regulatory policy and traditions. However, there is little empirical information on medical devices policy, the medical devices industry, and the assurance of medical device safety and usage. Drawing on a review of the secondary literature and on-going field work, the evidence suggests that the current mix of statecentric and self-regulatory traditions will be as important in determining the implementation and final outcomes of EU-rules as the new rules themselves. EU directives redesign rules, but they do not necessarily lead to institutional change, create institutional capacities, or alter old practices in the short term. Neither EU directives nor national regulatory adjustments determine the "man-machine/skill-experience" interface which is shaped and influenced by local medical traditions and the acceptance of these traditions by local publics.
The process of European integration is marked both by continued deepening and widening, and by growing evidence of domestic disquiet and dissent. Against this background, this book examines three key themes: the challenge to the power of member states - as subjects of European integration - to determine the course of the integrationist project and to shape European public policies; the constraints in the domestic political arena experienced by member states as objects of European integration; and the contestation over both the 'constitutive politics of the EU' and specific policy choices. These three themes - power, constraint, and contestation - and their interdependence are explored with specific reference to Germany. The main findings call for a revision of the 'conventional wisdom' about Germany's Europeanization experience. First, while Germany continues to engage intensively in all aspects of the integration process, its power to 'upload' - 'hard' and 'soft', 'deliberate' or 'unintentional', 'institutional' or 'ideational' - appears in decline. Germany's capacity to 'shape its regional milieu' is challenged by both changes in the integration process and the ever-more-apparent weaknesses of the 'German model'. The traditional regional core milieu is shrinking in size and importance in an enlarging Europe, and Germany's milieu-shaping power is being challenged. Second, the coincidence of enabling and constraining effects is being progressively replaced by a discourse that notes unwelcome constrictions associated with EU membership.
Este artigo discute a importância da nacionalidade da empresa com base na literatura de relações internacionais. Os resultados empíricos aqui apresentados contribuem para a literatura de economia política internacional porque revelam a importância da variável nacionalidade para explicar o comportamento frente a questões ambientais de empresas transnacionais em países em desenvolvimento. A ampla investigação de subsidiárias brasileiras de empresas transnacionais de diferentes origens nacionais resultou em descobertas que confirmam a influência relevante, em termos da definição de padrões legais e do estilo de gerenciamento, do contexto de origem nas políticas e práticas ambientais corporativas.
Considers the extent to which a single market will be achieved in Europe, its likely characteristics, and the impact it will have on national approaches to market regulation and vice versa. The study focuses on Britain and Germany in order to compare two contrasting approaches to 1992, which are explored through industry case studies which examine the interactions of market- and policy-led forces. Each study concentrates on the analysis of one of two broad areas of EC legislation: issues of mergers, standards, and public procurement; and sectoral studies of telecommunications, banking, and insurance. The authors argue that Britain and Germany will strongly influence the eventual form of the Single European Market, and therefore present significant clues to the tasks facing the EC in the near future. -after Authors
This article presents new evidence of the ‘hollowing out’ of British manufacturing. It shows that large British firms are building up their overseas activities while the manufacturing operations which remain in Britain are increasingly sheltered and low tech. The authors argue that these developments set limits on the effectives of national industrial policy. Britain's peculiar national problems must in any case be seen as part of a larger European problem about German manufacturing predominance
This article examines the impact of international business on the kind of class compromises that evolved and characterised many West European societies until the late 1970s. It raises the question of why class compromises endured longer in Austria and Sweden than in Belgium and the Netherlands. The argument is that domestic business in Austria and Sweden has fewer alliances with international capital and is, therefore, in a sense less integrated in world markets than those in Belgium and the Netherlands. The conclusion of the article, based upon recent trends, points out that the differences between the four countries appear to be rapidly disappearing.
This article examines the empirical and theoretical validity of the power of banks over industry in West Germany. An outline of the historical development, structure and institutions of credit in the Federal Republic is followed by discussion of the three alleged factors behind the banks' power: the functional linkage of bank and industrial capital; property rights and ‘personal influence’; the planning and economic guidance capacities of the banks. Finally, it is argued that the thesis of bank power in Germany, in the light of empirical evidence and theoretical reflection, should be somewhat more differentiated.
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1991.