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Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of change
... Although Türkiye was relieved at the end of the Cold War that it no longer had to share a land border with its most challenging neighbor (Aydın 2000: 1), it did not take long to realize that Eurasian region would emerge as the scene of intense competition. As the countries of the former Soviet hinterland began to consider their economic, political, and geopolitical alignments in the post-Cold War world, Türkiye offered to link them to the West (Aydın 1996 and. While the number of actors capable of influencing the future of Eurasia multiplied, Türkiye and Russia emerged as the most likely candidates to influence the regional countries' potential paths (Çelikpala 2019). ...
... At a time when Türkiye began feeling the adverse effects of the end of the Cold War, this was a welcoming opening. Thus, Türkiye launched ambitious initiatives to expand its political, economic, and cultural relations, especially with the Turkic republics (Aydın 2011: 376-379), which led Türkiye's rivals, especially Russia, to ask whether Türkiye wanted to revive the idea of pan-Turkism (Aydın 1996). ...
Relations between Russia and Türkiye have developed considerably since the end of the Cold War. What began as energy trade in the late 1980s evolved into cooperation in business, energy, construction, tourism, politics and even security. Behind the ever-expanding cooperation lies a mistrust fueled by historical enmity and regional rivalry that occasionally leads to confrontation. As the two countries seek to shape their competitive cooperation beyond the current geopolitical challenges and constraints of regional security and alliances, the question of whether they could find ways to advance their partnership is of paramount importance and has regional and global implications. This paper seeks to understand how they have managed their conflict-ridden past to develop a modus operandi in the post-Cold War world by proposing a new conceptual model, namely “competitive cooperation” or “coopetition”, to understand the relationship that developed over the last 30 years in different geographical regions.
... Against this background, it was no surprise that the independence of six Turkic republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia in 1991 was warmly welcomed in Ankara. Even though the Turkish governments had neglected this region for more than sixty years in order not to antagonize the Soviet Union, the emergence of a Turkic world was perceived by Ankara as a golden opportunity to prove the West that Turkey's strategic importance has not diminished with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, since Turkey could now present itself as a model for these newly independent states (Aydın, 1996). Moreover, Turkey's historical, cultural, religious and linguistic links with the region added a strong psychological dimension to the Turkish leaders' enthusiasm to find a new mission for their country in the emerging post-Cold War world (Robins, 1993). ...
... For instance, in a parliamentary session held in May 1992, the region of Eurasia was emphasized at least sixteen times by delegates from different Turkish political parties. 2 Turkish leaders additionally made reference to the emergence of a "Turkic world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China," which inevitably caused suspicion particularly among the Russian policymakers regarding the real meaning of this version of Eurasia. 3 However, despite Moscow's concerns about Pan-Turkism, Eurasia soon became the focus of Turkey's ambitious policy that aimed to establish extensive political, economic and cultural links with the Turkic republics. Many delegations from Turkey visited these six countries and many bilateral cooperation agreements were signed particularly in the 1991-1994 period (Aydın, 1996). ...
While Eurasianism as a political ideology has made a remarkable comeback to the Russian political scene following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it has also attracted considerable interest among Turkish political and intellectual circles since the early 1990s. Yet, Eurasianism in the Turkish context has acquired different ideological meanings in time. In this regard, it is possible to highlight two main strands of Eurasianism in Turkey: one focusing on the prospects for advanced integration between Turkey and the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and other concentrating on Turkey's strategic cooperation with Russia and China as an alternative to its long-standing ties with the West. While the first approach mainly appeals to nationalist-conservative groups in Turkey, the second is supported by the so-called national-patriotic groups. The article aims to discuss Turkey's role in two Eurasia-based international organizations-the Organization of Turkic States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-as they respectively correspond to the two versions of Eurasianism in Turkey. By analyzing the Turkish governments' policies towards these two organizations, it would also be possible to reveal the influence of Eurasianism as an ideology on Ankara's official approach to the idea of Eurasian integration, in which pragmatic political and economic concerns play an equally important role.
... There was l ttle argument to further a fr endly relat onsh p w th Russ a, pr or t z ng cooperat on. As a result, the dom nant theme of the early post-Cold War era throughout the 1990s was ut l z ng geopol t cal and strateg c advantages aga nst Russ a and develop ng relat ons w th the newly ndependent Turk c Republ cs n Central As a and the Caucasus (Aydın 1996 andÖn ş 1995;Aktürk 2004 (Mango 1993;Sander 1994;Dal and Erşen 2014;Rob ns 1993). ...
Russian and Turkish societies in the 21st century have inherited historically negative and competitive discourses, hailing from long periods of conflict and competition. To be sure, their imperial struggles left a complex and problematic demographic structure across a vast geography from the Balkans to Central Asia, where long shadows of forced migrations and violent exchanges set the stage for more competition and conflict. This long-lasting imperial legacy was later solidified by the Cold War era
ideological struggle, which left a complex and problematic geopolitical environment across their common neighborhoods and a persistent distrust and negative discourse in the post-imperial era. Added to these have been more recent experiences of intense competition across Eurasia during the 1990s for energy and influence. Some of these negative images inherited from earlier eras have been mollified and overturned by the positive turn in the relations in the 2000s. Nevertheless, recent political developments in the international arena, technological transformations, and the current nature of competition/warfare in their shared neighborhood brought new dimensions to the existing, primarily negative, perceptions. This study examines these persistent perceptions and views of the two neighboring countries in the light of historical transformations.
... 1990'lardan sonra ise Türkiye, Orta Asya'dan Balkanlara, Afrika'dan Orta Doğu'ya geniş bir coğrafyada çatışmaların çözümlenmesi, barışın sağlanması ve korunması için paydaş olmuş ve uluslararası terörizmle mücadelede önde gelen bir ülke haline gelmiştir (Ayrıntılı tartışma ve örnekler için bkz. Aydın, 1996;Aydın, 1999;Aydın, 2000;Bağcı ve Kardaş, 2003;Demirel, 2023;Parlar Dal, 2018; T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, t.y.-g). ...
Geçen yüz yıl zarfında Türkiye, uluslararası sistemdeki aktörlerle tarihsel ilişkileri göz önüne alındığında kendi ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda pragmatik etkileşim ağları örebilen, uluslararası sistemin bağlamsal baskıları altında değişim getiren hamleler yapabilen, ilgili aktörlerle her konuda anlaşamasa da ilişki ağlarını iş birliğine yönelik şekilde sürdürme becerisine sahip, etkileşimlerini jeopolitik konumunun bir gereği olarak dengede tutabilen bir aktör olarak gözükmektedir. Türk dış politikasının 100 yıllık seyrini neden-sonuç ilişkileriyle incelemenin güçlüğüne rağmen bu makale tarihsel süreci dikkate alarak Türk dış politikasının 2023 yılındaki portresini betimleyici bir alt yapı ile yeni bir çerçevede yorumlamaktadır. Cumhuriyet’in 100. yılında, dünyada jeopolitik kırılmaların yaşandığı bir dönemde, küresel bir oyuncu ve güvenlik sağlayan bir aktör olan Türkiye’nin bu kırılmalardan en fazla etkilenen ve etkilenecek olan ülkelerden biri olduğu söylenebilir. Bu bağlam içerisinde, Türk dış politikasına dair dört temel özellikten söz edilebileceğini savunan makale, bu iddiayı ilgili veri, gözlem ve örneklerle açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Bu argüman, Türkiye’nin diplomatik kapasite ve yeteneklerindeki gelişimin, uluslararası düzen içerisinde Türk dış politikasını etki sahasını da genişleterek daha etkili bir hâle getirme yöneliminde olduğu; Türkiye’nin, güç merkezleri olarak ifade edilebilecek Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD), Avrupa Birliği (AB), Çin ve Rusya ile etkileşimde bulunma ve çıkarlarını denge politikasıyla sağlama eğiliminde olduğu; Türkiye’nin uluslararası sistem içerisinde güvenlik sağlayan bir aktör konumuna geldiği ve Türk dış politikasının son 100 yıllık tecrübesinin, Türkiye’yi uluslararası sistemde daha dirençli bir aktöre dönüştürebilecek unsurlar içerdiği şeklindedir.
... Although up to the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, Turkey did not prioritize the region. At that time, scholars portrayed Turkey's foreign policy in Central Asia as contingent on developing its relationship with the EU and NATO (Aydin 1996(Aydin , 2004Mozaffari 1997;Weitz 2006). ...
Central Asia's importance in Turkish foreign policy has begun to rise since the beginning of the 2010s. Turkey determines its regional policy in the conception of the Turkic world, including Azerbaijan. With this regard, Turkey pays particular attention to the institutionalization of bilateral relations with the regional states. The most successful measure in that direction is the establishment of the Turkic Council. This integration project marks significant progress for the institutionalization of Turkey's Central Asian policy. Turkey is one of the non-regional actors affecting the Central Asian balance of power. However, it has limited influence on regional security and military affairs, which Russia dominates. Turkey is only a secondary non-regional actor in Central Asia. Therefore, it primarily structures its Central Asian policy using common historical and cultural elements. In this study, we investigate whether Turkey has a long-term project in Central Asia. For this purpose, we explore the restrictions of Turkish policy in Central Asia. After that, we compare Turkey's importance for the foreign policies of Central Asian states. Additionally, we evaluate Turkey's interest in non-Western organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to transform Turkish foreign policy priorities in recent years. Finally, we show that Turkey has a policy toward Central Asia but not a fully-fledged project for the region.
... As one Turkish newspaper noted in late 1991: "It has been a great thrill for Turks to realize that they are no longer alone in this world." 24 Turkey's active diplomacy toward the NIS of Central Asia, which included a variety of high level visits, exchanges, and aid transfers, appears to have had strong US backing. American officials hoped that Turkey would act as a Western surrogate in the region, blunting Iran's influence. ...
The US and the West generally should not retreat from the strategic windfall that accompaniedOperation Enduring Freedom. The prestige of American power remains liked to the survival of the Karzai regime in Kabul. In addition, there are vital geopolitical reasons, including, especially, energy concerns, that reinforce Western stakes in Central Asia. Indications at this time are that locals are quite receptive to the new Western military presence and also to the import of more concrete security structures. The threat from Islamic extremism seems to be in retreat. This trend is likely to continue if Western governments actively engage, rather than alienate. NIS governments on issues of human rights. Some specific recommendations include the following: employ regional structures where possible, upgrade Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships, favor the northern tier states to leverage progress on human rights among the southern tier states, send NIS peacekeepers into Afghanistan, and combat drug cultivation with market incentives. It is also important to focus narrowly on developing the Fergana Valley as the strategic center of all of Central Asia, to avoid antagonizing Moscow, and to maintain a visible, but strictly limited military presence in the NIS.
... Within the framework of disowning the heritage of the empire, pan-Turkism was also refused, hence the Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey 427 interest in 'outside Turks', and the Caucasus was curbed. 18 As a result of these developments in Turkey, Caucasian emigrants who were forced to leave Turkey and their organizations continued their activities and fight in Europe, first of all in Paris, and then in Prague and Warsaw, and after the war in Berlin, together with other emigrants who were victims of the Soviet government. 19 In this period, the North Caucasian emigrants, except for the Armenians, in general acted as an anti-Soviet group for independence together with other Caucasian emigrant groups, and strove to realize the ideal of a common state under the name of 'Caucasian Confederation'. ...
... Western countries were concerned that radical Islam might ll up the power vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR, and they therefore strongly encouraged these states to adapt a 'Turkish model' of secular democracy combined with liberal economy. 1 In order to assert their own power and the sovereignty of their republics, various leaders in Central Asia looked to construct a network of external relations beyond the Soviet Union. For reasons of cultural af nity and Western economic and political orientation, Turkey was one of the rst countries to be considered. ...
All throughout history the educational process has been perceived as a very influential agent of the socialization process with the power to shape, reshape, refresh or build the social and psychological environment. It has been perceived to have the same functions in the social transformation of the Central Asian Countries in the transition period. In this context the role of Turkish schools in the educational system and in the social transformation of Central Asian countries in the transition period is open to exploration. The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of Turkish schools in the educational system and social transformation of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in the transition period.
... Moreover, he stated that Ankara-Moscow relations were more important than Ankara-"Republics" relations. 209 Nevertheless, Turkey's interest in the region gradually increased throughout 1991, and eventually led Turkey's recognition of all newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia in December 1991. ...
This study sought to answer why conflict in Turkey-Iran relations increased in the covered period, considering relatively- smooth relations between Turkey and Iran in the 1980s, and thermidorizing of Iran in the 1990s. Indeed, ideology has had an important place in bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey for a long time. Ideological factors constituted the immediate reasons for conflict between Turkey and Iran in the 1990s as well. However, ideological differences between the two countries did not cause any serious conflict in the 1980s. Then, the question arises, why and how did ideological reasons led to severe frictions between Iran and Turkey in the 1990s. In this regard, this thesis paid attention to two factors that have profound effects on the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran changing internal conditions, and the changing geopolitics of Turkey and Iran after the dissolution of the USSR and the Gulf War of 1991.
À l’heure où la Turquie frappe aux portes de l’Union Européenne, elle développe en parallèle une stratégie d’influence dans les républiques turcophones de l’ex-URSS, où sa présence économique et culturelle se renforce depuis le début des années 90. Cette présence turque en Asie centrale est largement l’œuvre d’une puissante organisation religieuse, dirigée par l’énigmatique Fethullah Gülen, longtemps prêcheur officiel au service de l’État turc et actuellement en exil volontaire aux États-Unis. Charismatique et visionnaire, Gülen a choisi l’éducation comme vecteur de son expansion. Aujourd’hui, son mouvement est présent dans toutes les républiques d’Asie centrale : Ouzbékistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Turkménistan et Tadjikistan où ses disciples animent un vaste réseau d’écoles privées. À long terme, ces « jésuites de l’islam turc » projettent de former les nouvelles élites centre-asiatiques qui réislamiseront les populations locales, longtemps soumises à la propagande athée soviétique. Cette entreprise a su se concilier l’appui tacite des gouvernement locaux et des puissances extérieures – Turquie et États-Unis notamment – qui craignent l’implantation d’éléments islamistes plus radicaux, d’obédience saoudienne. L'ouvrage a été traduit en turc sous le titre Orta Asya'da İslâm misyonerleri. Fethullah Gülen okulları aux éditions Iletişim.
This study examines the foreign policy behavior of Türkiye and South Korea in Central Asia comparatively in the post-Cold War era. The article argues that both Ankara and Seoul accomplished to expand and institutionalize their interaction with the Central Asian states through the establishment of multilateral diplomatic platforms, allocation of development assistance and utilization of soft power instruments. While Türkiye’s political bonds with the Central Asian states are more entrenched and institutionalized compared to the South Korea’s political association with Central Asia, South Korea surpasses Türkiye in terms of economic performance in the region. The socio-cultural sphere is a domain in which Russia still prevails despite the increasing Turkish and South Korean efforts in education and entertainment realms. Furthermore, while both Türkiye and South Korea resorted to middle power means of convening international meetings and extending aid in Central Asia, they were unable to assume conciliator/mediator roles in regional conflicts.
Great power politics is a practical reality of world politics and it happens on a daily basis, regardless of which international system we witness. This book seeks to emphasize the ways s these great power politics emerge within greater Eurasia. Most researchers consider China becoming powerful enough to counterbalance the US, and possible power dynamics among the rising powers such as China-India, China-Russia, and China-Japan. In this sense, the book categorizes the battlegrounds in their power politics with three aspects: national/regional/international conflicts, institutions-alliances, and projects.
This chapter aims to shed light on Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia through differentiating the Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s and afterward. It also aims to explain how Turkey utilized its hard and soft power to reach its aims in the region. To this end, the chapter first explores the euphoria in the 1990s and the frustration caused by the limited returns of Turkish foreign policy in this decade. Then the chapter examines the emergence of a pragmatic foreign policy in the 2000s and the relative success of this policy. The conclusion provides a critical evaluation of the Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia with a review of the problems complicating the future of Turkey in the region.
Turkey’s greatest influence among the Turkic populations of the post-Soviet world derives not from their common ethno-linguistic roots, but from the success of Turkey’s religious outreach.
Fethullah Gülen is the leader of a very influential Islamic community in Turkey, one of the most important and most transnational Islamic movements in the world. In Azerbaijan, inspired and influenced by his ideas, many Turkish businessmen and educators have endorsed and supported his movement, most importantly with a huge network of private high schools. When this community arrived in Azerbaijan just after the end of the Soviet Union, its main objective was to encourage Islamic revival in this newly independent state where Islam had been weakened by Soviet anti-religious campaigns. However, after a few years, the movement has changed its strategy, terminating religious activism and limiting its engagement solely and uniquely to secular and modern education. However, through successful, modern education, the movement is able to promote Islamic philosophy and ethics. If the ultimate objectives of the movement are unclear, it is evident that it wants to contribute to future elites from its ranks and to be influential in Azerbaijan. Because of this lack of clarity, the movement constantly attracts controversy.
1991 yılından günümüze iki ülke ilişkilerini her yönden inceleyen çok detaylı bir bölümdür. Nazarbayev dönemi ağırlıklı olsa da mevcut Cumhurbaşkanı Kasım Cömert Tokayev dönemini de içermektedir.
Au carrefour des mondes turc, iranien et russe qui l’ont façonné à travers les siècles, le Caucase resurgit sur la scène internationale et focalise les attentions à bien des égards depuis que la dernière puissance impériale qui l’a dominé, l’Union soviétique, s’est effacée. L’objectif du présent ouvrage collectif est d’explorer les facteurs d’analyse des renouveaux religieux, chrétien et musulman mais aussi juif, yezidi, molokane ou bahai dans l’ensemble de la Transcaucasie et du Nord Caucase. Ces renouveaux religieux sont analysés dans leurs principales composantes et leurs sources locales à la lumière des influences extérieures et nombreuses interactions multiformes qui lient les deux phénomènes. Il s’agit aussi d’observer comment le politique, héritier souvent laïque d’un ancien régime athéiste, se positionne en matière religieuse pour comprendre les nouvelles politiques identitaires nationales.
This is an analysis of the post-independence Ka.zakhstani elite between 1991 and 1998. Exploratory in nature, the thesis seeks to demonstrate four main points. First, historical antecedents and concurrent socioeconomic and political forces partly explain the composition, recruitment and nature of Kazakhstan's post-independent political elite. Second, while the political elite displays a certain consensus in its cognitive orientations, its social origins have become less homogeneous and its interests increasingly fragmented as a result of socioeconomic change. Third, the structure of the elite has narrowed between 1991 and 1998; this closed elite, through careful recruitment policies, is ensuring its self-replication. Fourth, if some links can be made between elite origins, attitudes and behaviour, these are only of a tentative nature. These lines of enquiry are demonstrated in three sections: the historical antecedents and institutional sources of Kazakhstan's political elite (Section I); the degree of elite integration, in terms primarily of social homogeneity and recruitment (Section II); and the link, if any, between social structure and policies of the political elite (Section III). The study is based on Russian and Kazakh primary and secondary sources and on interviews with the political elite and a "panel of experts". After establishing the work's aims and limits, the first section defines the terms "political elite" and establishes the methodology employed to locate and analyse the political elite. Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 provide the historical and institutional context in which the post-independence political elite has operated. Chapter 11.1 addresses elite composition and structure according to dimensions of social background, in particular those of education, career, ethnicity and sub-ethnicity. Chapter 11.2 assesses the recruitment process since 1991. Section III assesses two major elite policy spheres of these last eight years: nation-building and economic reform. The conclusion aims to establish the degree of linkage between these three sections and briefly discusses the implications of elite structure and integration for the future stability of the regime.
The paper studies the “Turkish model” from a comparative historical perspective from three angles: as an example of mobilization modernization; as a combination of liberal democracy and Islam; and as a de-Westernization paradigm. The focus is on the transformation of the “Turkish model” and its substantive evolution from the early 1990s to the middle of the 2010s as well as on how peaks of international interest in the “Turkish model” impacted Ankara’s foreign policy activities and its positioning on the international stage by Turkish elites. This approach helped to identify the factors behind periodic resurgence and transformation of the “Turkish model” and the shifting balance between the expectations of its potential recipients and Ankara’s plans to use it as a foreign-policy tool. Research methodology is based on the theory of multiple modernities and the concept of symbolic interactionism in international relations which allows the theory of socialization to be applied not only to relationships between individuals but also to interstate relations. In the case of Turkey, this approach provides broader possibilities for interpreting Ankara’s foreign-policy strategies and understanding the mechanisms of its relations with other countries in the Greater Middle East.
Abstract
Since the European Union membership application in 1987, twenty-six years have passed and the status of Turkey has only progressed from a “potential candidate” to an “official candidate”. At the same time, a successive expansion is traceable in Turkey’s efforts for multilateral cooperation with other parts of the world. While being seemingly random at the first sight, it is possible to observe distinct and specific periods where these efforts were escalated. The explanation for this phenomenon rests upon the presented harmony between these specific periods and the contributable insights given by the realist tradition. The applied congruence method shows that the use of “balance of threat” arguments does not demonstrate a great deal of correlation with times of strained relations between the USSR/Russia and Turkey. On the contrary, the deliberated “balance of influence” arguments present an interesting parallel with these efforts throughout the periods of significant deadlocks in Turkey-EU relations.
Öz
Kazakistan ve Türkiye her platformda kardeş olduklarını vurgulamalarına rağmen bu söylem kültürel ve özellikle ekonomik ilişkilere/göstergelere yansımamış ve Türkiye tarafından uygulanan birçok projeden yeterli verim alınamamıştır hipotezine dayanan bu çalışmada, hem Kazakistan-Türkiye ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilerine yapıcı anlamda eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla bakılarak eksik noktaların vurgulanması konusunda somut katkılar yapmak hem de çalışmanın belirtilen hipotezini doğrulanmak amacıyla dört temel soruya cevap aranmıştır. Çalışmanın sonunda her iki ülkenin de Türk dünyası için önemine ve gerek ikili ilişkilerin daha iyi bir seviyeye yükselmesi ve gerekse Türk dünyasının temel sorunlarının çözümü için belli başlı önerilere yer verilerek çalışma nihayete erdirilmiştir.
Abstract
The thesis of the study is that although Kazakhstan and Turkey emphasize at every platform that they are brothers, this discourse is not reflected in cultural and especially economic relations and not enough efficiency has been obtained from many projects implemented by Turkey. Thus, this study is going to examine the cultural and economic relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan with a critical perspective. Both making concrete contributions to highlighting the missing points and confirming the hypothesis the study, the author has looked for answers to four questions in order to investigate Kazakhstan-Turkey relations and reflections of their relationship to the Turkish world in the globalization era. The study has been finalized by mentioning necessary recommendations regarding the importance of both country for the Turkish world.
Chapter 4 deals with how the “confronting of the past” that was discussed in the previous chapter becomes significant for an understanding of the present and the future. The notion that Turkey’s promise as a regional and global player is somehow related to historical legacies is not new. This trend is particularly evident with regard to the Armenian, Kurdish, and Alevi questions but also in the surge of popular interest in the final years of the empire and the early years of the republic. This is also reflected in what is now being identified as the “neo-Ottomanist” policy being followed by the ruling AKP in its foreign policy. Internationally, the delay in EU membership and the Armenian chapter of the Ottoman past has proved to be decisive. Domestically this revisiting is said to be associated with the challenge that diverse groups are mounting towards the dominant narrative of national identity which emphasized the unitary, secular character of the Turkish nation state and displayed a staunch commitment to a Western orientation for Turkish identity and foreign policy.
The authors put issues relevant to Turkey today - such as consolidating democracy, dealing with economic development issues, improving its human rights record and its foreign policy - in an historical context, allowing comparisons with other late developers in the world and reflecting the complexity of Turkish political and socio-economic developments. Turkey also argues that the modernization process that started in the nineteenth century, with all its elements including secularization and Westernization, has taken root. © 2005 Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tür. All rights reserved.
The consequences of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian War have deeply infl uenced not only the Caucasus but overall global stability as well. Turkey, as a regional actor which claims to follow active diplomacy in her region, has also been directly aff ected. Currently, Turkey has positioned itself as a regional actor with a 'new' political perspective and has responded to developments in order to give the events shape and to ensure stability in the region. This attitude has caused controversies. The Caucasus became an interesting example to monitor Turkish foreign policy implementations with mottos such as 'zero problems with neighbors,' 'problem-solving country' and 'rhythmic diplomacy.' Turkey's policies and reactions to developments taking place in the Caucasus will help us to analyze and understand foreign policy objectives, policy-making processes and the overall course of Turkish foreign policy. This study makes a comprehensive assessment of Turkey's foreign policy in the Caucasus before and after August 2008.
The volume discusses what the Turkish Model, or Turkish Development Alternative, was and why it was promoted in the Central Asian republics immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It argues that the Turkish Model was a myth that transferred the ideal of a "secular, democratic, liberal society" as a model for the post Soviet Turkic world and in the process encouraged a "Turkic" rhetoric that emphasized connection between the two regions based on a common ancestry. The volume begins with an understanding of the reality of the Model from a Turkish perspective and then goes on to examine whether the Turkic world as a "cultural-civilizational alternative" makes sense both from a historical as well as contemporary perspective. It concludes by looking at the re-emergence of the Model in the wake of the events in West Asia in early 2011 and examines how in the light of a search for options the Turkish Model is once again projected as viable. © Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS) 2014. All rights are reserved.
Fethullah Gülen is the leader of a very influential Islamic community in Turkey, one of the most important and most transnational Islamic movements in the world. In Azerbaijan, inspired and influenced by his ideas, many Turkish businessmen and educators have endorsed and supported his movement, most importantly with a huge network of private high schools. When this community arrived in Azerbaijan just after the end of the Soviet Union, its main objective was to encourage Islamic revival in this newly independent state where Islam had been weakened by Soviet anti-religious campaigns. However, after a few years, the movement has changed its strategy, terminating religious activism and limiting its engagement solely and uniquely to secular and modern education. However, through successful, modern education, the movement is able to promote Islamic philosophy and ethics. If the ultimate objectives of the movement are unclear, it is evident that it wants to contribute to future elites from its ranks and to be influential in Azerbaijan. Because of this lack of clarity, the movement constantly attracts controversy.
This article explores the post-Cold War relations between the United States and Turkey. After defining the Turkish–United States partnership, this article argues that bilateral partnership continues in the post-Cold War era, although there are some problematic issues among them. This hypothesis is explained by analysis of unsolved problems that have lasted since the Cold War, and diverging as well as converging interests in the relationship in the post-Cold War era. While the Turkish government is having some conflicts in the post-Cold War with the United States administration, especially with the Iraq war, it continues to have a partnership.
This article aims to discuss and analyze the emergence and evolution of Turkey's role as a model in the international system in three different periods, 1991–93, 2003–05 and 2010–12. To this end, it methodologically uses the main concepts of role theory: role expectations, role conceptions and role performance. Focusing on K.J. Holsti's example national role conception category in particular, it seeks to reveal the major similarities and differences between the role expectations that have enacted the role conception known as the Turkish model, and compare the impact of these expectations on role performance in each of these three cases. The major argument of the article is that the sustainability of the model's national role conception depends foremost on Turkey's political and economic capabilities that directly influence its role performance.
This article aims to discuss and analyse the major factors behind the emergence and evolution of “Eurasia” as a geopolitical concept in Turkey in the post–Cold War period. For this purpose, special focus will be placed on Turkish political, academic and intellectual circles' redefinition of their geopolitical outlook towards Russia and the Turkic republics of Central Asia and Caucasus in the 1990s and 2000s. The major argument of the article in this regard is that while discourses such as Pan-Turkism, Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism have exercised a degree of influence over the conceptualisation of Eurasia in Turkish academic and intellectual circles, the concept has been generally treated as an instrument of pragmatism by Turkish policymakers. This pragmatism is not only reflected in their geo-economic calculations in the field of energy pipelines, but also the reasoning behind the striking improvement of political and economic relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s.
The collapse of the communist system in Soviet Union and its subsequent disintegration provided Turkey, which enjoys a unique geostrategic position between Europe and Asia, with both challenges and opportunities. At one level, it considerably reduced the importance of Turkey in the geostrategic consideration of the Western powers, particularly the US. At another level, the sweeping changes across the Eurasian landmass, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, provided Turkey with great opportunities in terms of redefining its role in the emerging global system at the turn of the century. The emergence of six independent Muslim states in Turkey's northeast-four of which are Turkic republics: Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan-came as a historic opportunity for Turkey to make a bid to fill the power vacuum in the southern heartland of the former communist Super Power. This article does not aim at presenting a descriptive account of Turkey's bilateral relations with each of the Central Asian states.1 Instead, it provides a conceptual framework for understanding her foreign policy goals and her behaviour as an aspiring regional power in Central Asia.
The article argues that the Turkish experience with democracy may not offer a ‘model’ for democratization of the Arab states in West Asia and North Africa. It begins with a brief account of institutional and political changes in Turkey since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic. It also explains how historical and structural conditions conducive to Turkey’s progression to democracy are absent in much of the Arab world. It concludes that the Turkish experience is sui generis and cannot be replicated by any other state in the region. Nevertheless, it does provide an example for Arab liberal reformers, currently campaigning for democracy and political pluralism in the region.
Though there are several of them, this article will deal with only a few major conjunctural factors that have affected Turkey's foreign policy and its international environment. Bearing in mind that almost every happening in domestic or international politics could affect and change a country's foreign policy in one way or another, it is imperative to be selective. The selection of factors has been determined by the importance of the changes that they caused. In this respect, the most decisive reason for choosing certain conjunctural factors was the sudden shift they had caused in either the implementation or more importantly the foundation of the foreign policy of Turkey. An overview of Turkey's foreign relations shows that the single most important development had been the transition from the Cold War, which dominated relations between the East and the West in the 1950s, to the process of detente. Another important factor in the making of Turkey's foreign policy has been the Cyprus issue, which became a permanent problematic of Turkey's foreign relations since its inception. In the mid-to-late 1960s it was the continual Cyprus crisis which gave impetus to a process of reconsideration of the basic orientation of Turkish foreign policy. And in the 1970s it was another Cyprus crisis which led to fundamental changes in foreign policy, though not as dramatic as pulling the country out of the Western states system. Other important factors which caused some considerable changes in Turkey's attitudes to certain groups of states, have been the constitutional and political development of the country, together with its economic ambitions and problems; the different views of political parties and groups which came into existence after the 1960 military intervention; the 1961 Constitution, together with social and political evaluation it embodied; and the changes in attitudes of certain states towards Turkey.
In the 1990s, Turkmenistan's government dismantled Soviet educational provision, replacing it with lower quality schooling. The Başkent Foundation schools represent the concerted ef- forts of teachers and sponsors to offer socially conscious education grounded in science and math with an international focus. This case study of the Başkent Foundation schools in Turkmenistan establishes the vitality of Gülen schools outside of the Turkish Republic and their key role in offering Central Asian families an important choice in secular, general education. The paper discusses the appeal of the schools' curriculum to parents and students, and records a decade-long success both in educating students and in laying the foundations of civil society: in Turkmenistan the Gülen movement offers the only general education outside of state provision and control. This is particularly significant as most scholars deny that there is any semblance of civil society in Turkmenistan. Notes: The author has been conducting interviews and recording the influence of Başkent schools in Turkmenistan since working as Instructor at the International Turkmen-Turk University in 1997. In May 2007 she visited the schools in the capital Ashgabat, and the northern province of Daşoguz, to explore further the contribution Gülen schools are mak- ing. The recent death of Turkmenistan's president will most likely result in major reforms in education. Documentation of how a shift at the centre of state power affects provincial Gülen schools will enrich this conference's broader discussion of the movement's social impact.
This paper researched the proposition tnat United States in Central Asia was important to our national security strategy. It analyzed whether or not the United States should develop a tailored foreign policy for engaging the Republic of Kazakhstan. To accomplish that objective, the essay compared alternative policy options for advancing U.S. interests identified in the 1998 United States National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS). Therefore, this essay has illustrated how the United States could improve its abilities to lead the Kazakhstan government towards a more democratic system, embracing the rule of law' concept over centralized government controls, by structuring a program which provides tangible incentives for achieving these objectives. It has also provided evidence that an economic approach appears to be the most viable means for success, but that the economic approach should be woven with both a diplomatic and military aspect. To ignore Central Asia, or to conclude that U.S. engagement in central Asia somehow will result in Russian resistance or develop unintended consequences that are contrary to U.S. interest in the region, is to accept an argurnent that Central Asia is just not of sufficient importance to the U.S. to risk the effort necessary to achieve these goals.
The purpose of this paper, is to identify the sources of unrest and possible threats to the future stability of Central Asia and the Caucasus region, the definition of the Caspian Sea's status, the inspection of the Caspian basin energy resources, and the inspection of alternative pipeline routes from Caspian Basin.
Turkish Straits but sits astride the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. It is a member of the largest surviving military bloc, that is, NATO, as well as an associate member of the European Union (EU). Its political involvement and exposed position assign an importance hardly matched by any other middle power. Further, it successfully expanded its strategic importance in general amidst the dust created by the important systemic changes in world politics since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Thus Turkey has, once more, emerged as an important actor, poised to play a leading role across a vast region extending ‘from eastern Europe to western China’. 2 Yet Turkey lives in a perennial ‘insecurity complex’, or a ‘national security
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A panoramic outlook on the present global system shows that the US has been failing to preserve its global preponderance against the rise of new contenders from Asia. Turkey's new foreign policy demeanor under the AKP government reflects this shift of global power from the West to the East, leaning on both of these two poles (especially Russia and the US), thereby, aims at creating a ‘zero‐problem’ situation with the neighboring Caucasian states. Yet, this strategy has not achieved its goal, mainly due to the ongoing debates, not only between Moscow and Washington, but also between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasian Regional Security Complexity. This work tries to read all these developments by applying insights from the neoclassical realist standing and argues that there are two main hindrances to the plan's success: the dynamics of the current global system and the security complexity of the Caucasus region.
Die zentralasiatischen Staaten, die aus der Sowjetunion hervorgingen, liegen in der strategischen Region zwischen vier Atommächten – Russland, China, Pakistan und Indien – und an der Schnittstelle zwischen Russland und der islamischen Welt.Die Völker Eurasiens haben heute zum ersten Mal die Möglichkeit, ihr Schicksal und ihre Zukunft selbst In der internationalen Wahrnehmung lässt sich um das Kaspische Meer herum die „Geburt einer neuen Region“ beobachten. Nach dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion wurde ein historisches Schlagwort des 19. Jahrhunderts wieder belebt, das die Einflusskonkurrenz in Zentralasien benannte: „Great Game“.zu bestimmen.In dieser Arbeit werden die rivalisierenden Machtprojektionen der wichtigsten Akteure in Zentralasien seit 1991 beschrieben. Bereits in einer frühen Arbeitsphase des vorliegenden Forschungsprojekts konnte man erkennen, dass die Entwicklungen in der Region nicht ohne die Einbeziehung externer Erfahrungen bewertet werden können. Der realpolitisch wichtigste Faktor für das Interesse der äußeren Mächte in der Region sind die Energiereserven.Der Hauptzweck dieser Studie ist es also, die Interessen der Regional- und Großmächte hinsichtlich der neuen zentralasiatischen Republiken von Kasachstan, Usbekistan, Kirgisien, Turkmenistan und Tadschikistan zu analysieren.
Relations between the US and Turkey will continue to deteriorate as Turkey's government continues to set its own course in regional affairs, often in ways that contradict US interests. The Ciller government is unwilling to change course of the Kurdish issue for fear of losing territory and of a backlash of uncontrollable nationalism. This will exacerbate Turkey's political and social crises. US congress will continue to bring attention to Turkey's human rights violations and will pressure the president to limit the military assistance provided to Ankara. Refah's success in the spring and its continuing buildup for the elections in 1996 will further pressure the Turkish government and secular parties to incorporate elements of the Islamic fundamentalist platform. Turkey's turn eastward will continue, but the extent to which it distances itself from the West will depend primarily on the ability of secular parties to fend off the fundamentalist onslaught. The changes of progress being made seems remote, and American patience may run out, thereby further aggravating Turkey's precarious position. The honeymoon between the US and Turkey, consummated by Ozal's alignment with the international coalition against Iraq, is over. -from Author
