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Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran

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In 2003, the EU was hopeful to convince Iran to give up its nuclear programme. Five years later, most signals point to an accelerated nuclear programme in Iran. This article first aims to sketch an overview of the EU efforts, and secondly to make an interim assessment of the effectiveness of the EU's approach vis-à-vis Iran. While the final assessment may be different, the current evaluation is disappointing from the point of view of the EU. The Iranian case does not enhance the EU's strategic reputation in the world.
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Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran
Tom Sauer
a
a
Department of Politics, University of Antwerp, Belgium
Online Publication Date: 01 June 2008
To cite this Article Sauer, Tom(2008)'Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran',European
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Struggling on the World Scene: An
Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed
Iran
TOM SAUER
Department of Politics, University of Antwerp, Belgium
A
BSTRACT
In 2003, the EU was hopeful to convince Iran to give up its nuclear
programme. Five years later, most signals point to an accelerated nuclear programme in
Iran. This article first aims to sketch an overview of the EU efforts, and secondly to make
an interim assessment of the effectiveness of the EU’s approach vis-a`-vis Iran. While the
final assessment may be different, the current evaluation is disappointing from the point of
view of the EU. The Iranian case does not enhance the EU’s strategic reputation in the
world.
Since 2003, the EU has attempted to convince Iran to give up its nuclear
enrichment programme. Up to now, the EU has not succeeded in its endeavour.
Should Iran not back down and detonate a nuclear bomb in a few years’ time,
the EU can only argue that it had unsuccessfully tried to prevent that from
happening. From a neutral point of view, the latter is not going to enhance the
credibility of the EU as an actor in global politics. Iran is basically a test case
for the EU in the field of strategic (or security) affairs. If it is mishandled the
EU’s reputation might decline.
The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, I would like to describe Iran’s nuclear
policy and the reaction of the international community with a special focus on
the reaction by the EU. The second objective is to make an interim assessment
of the effectiveness of the EU’s approach, as well as try to explain why the
European policy (at least up to now) failed to deliver.
The Iranian Nuclear Programme and the EU’s Approach towards Iran
Iran started up a civilian nuclear programme under the Shah, but signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The Busher reactor was built
Correspondence Address: Dr. Tom Sauer, Department of Politics, University of Antwerp,
Sint-Jacobstraat 2, B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium. Email: tom.sauer@ua.ac.be
ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/08/02-327321 # 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09662830802481556
European Security
Vol. 17, Nos. 23, 273293, JuneSeptember 2008
Downloaded By: [Sauer, Tom] At: 12:20 19 January 2009
but not completed by Germany in the 1970s. After the revolution in 1979 the
nuclear programme attracted less attention from the Iranian decision-makers.
The Iranian nuclear programme was revived only after the chemical weapons
attacks by Iraq against Iran in the second half of the 1980s. Iran received
technological support from Russia, China and Pakistan. The EU launched a
critical dialogue with Iran in 1993, and relations further improved under
President Khatami (19972005). The current crisis dates from 2002.
While Iran is a signatory of the NPT and therefore legally bound not to
acquire nuclear weapons, rumours circulated in the summer of 2002 that Iran
was working on a nuclear weapons programme. That information reportedly
came from the National Council of Resistance, an Iranian opposition move-
ment that, surprisingly, also figures on the terrorist list of the US State
Department. It is more than likely that Western intelligence agencies already
had access to the same kind of information.
Core elements of these rumours were confirmed when the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Iran in the second half of February
2003.
1
Since then, the Iranian nuclear programme has been a regular global
news item. And most observers believe that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear
weapons in secret, or at least trying to build up the capabilities that are needed
to build nuclear weapons.
2
While Iran has the right under the NPT to establish and maintain a nuclear
programme for civilian purposes, it also has the obligation to declare most of
such activities to the IAEA. The problem was that Iran had not declared
everything that should have been declared to the IAEA. Teheran, for instance,
admitted in the summer of 2003 to having experimented in the past with
uranium conversion, which is the first step towards uranium enrichment. From
the second half of the 1980s, Iran partially expanded its nuclear programme in
secret. This may indeed be an indication that Iran was (and probably still is)
secretly working on a military nuclear programme.
The difference between a civilian and a military programme is that the
former aims at generating electricity while the latter is meant to produce
nuclear weapons. An inherent difficulty in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons is that the technology that is used in civilian nuclear applications
can also be used for military purposes.
While the EU in the past may have reacted in the form of a non-binding
statement or would not have reacted at all because of internal divisions,
3
it
now reacted promptly. A couple of weeks after IAEA Director-General
Mohammed El Baradei visited Iran and confirmed the existing rumours in
February 2003, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the late Anna
Lindh, proposed in the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) in March to come up with a new EU non-proliferation policy.
While most observers link this initiative, which later on was complemented
by the European Security Strategy, to the conflict in Iraq and in particular
the divisions within the EU and the absence of a constructive alternative to
274 T. Sauer
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the belligerent plans of the neo-conservative administration in the US, it
cannot be denied that the Iranian and North Korean
4
programmes also
played a crucial role.
5
The same day that the Iraq war started, the EU Political and Security
Committee (PSC) in cooperation with the Swedish International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) held a seminar about Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD). In mid-April, the GAERC formally launched the Non-Proliferation
of WMD initiative. The draft text of this first EU Non-Proliferation Strategy
was approved at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, while the final draft
was agreed upon in December 2003, in parallel with the overall EU Security
Strategy.
In the meantime, in May 2003 Iran had secretly proposed a deal with the US.
While the State Department showed some interest, neo-conservatives inside the
White House immediately rejected the proposal.
6
Since the Iranian revolution
and the subsequent hostage crisis in 1979, the US had refused to have
diplomatic contacts, let alone negotiations, with Iran. The US was still not
ready to change its policy. As a result, the EU had a clear opportunity to step in
as the main negotiator with Iran.
The EU was already negotiating with Iran on other issues. In December
2002, it had initiated negotiations with Iran for a Trade and Association
Agreement. Because of the nuclear programme, there were voices raised in the
EU to halt these negotiations.
7
At the same time, states like France (and earlier
the US) asked Iran to sign the Additional Protocol of the IAEA. The latter,
which had been introduced in the 1990s on a voluntary basis, provides the
IAEA with more rights in finding undeclared materials and possible violations.
Iran, however, declined the offer to sign the Additional Protocol, and the EU
(despite some protests inside the European Commission) took action against
Iran by suspending the bilateral negotiations for a Trade and Association
Agreement in June 2003.
The IAEA Board Statement of 19 June 2003 confirmed that Iran had failed
to report certain nuclear materials and activities, but did not declare that Iran
was in non-compliance with the IAEA Statute or the NPT.
8
The Board also
asked Iran to sign the Additional Protocol. Two weeks later, the UK put more
pressure on Iran by setting the end of September 2003 as a deadline for signing
the Protocol. In August, and in contrast with earlier statements, Iran admitted
having received technological support from abroad. The IAEA Board Resolu-
tion of 12 September 2003 set another ultimatum: Iran had to provide full
information about its programme before the end of October 2003.
9
On 21 October 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU-3 *France,
the UK and Germany *flew to Teheran to negotiate directly with the regime in
Teheran. Dominique de Villepin, Jack Straw and Joschka Fisher succeeded in
signing an agreement with Iran. In exchange for further negotiations, Iran
agreed to suspend its enrichment programme, to sign the Additional Protocol
and to adhere to the Protocol in the meantime.
10
This was perceived as a major
An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran 275
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breakthrough. Not only did the EU-3 act in unity (in contrast with the Iraq
crisis), their action was*at least publicly*backed by the other EU member
states. Most fundamentally, the EU-3 succeeded in signing an agreement with
Teheran. A couple of days later, Iran submitted a full declaration about its
nuclear programme to the IAEA. As a result, the IAEA resolution of 26
November 2003, although it strongly deplored Irans past failures and breaches,
did not want to declare that Iran was in non-compliance.
11
This outcome was
basically the result of European diplomacy, which had to find a compromise
between the positions of Iran and the US. This bridge-building exercise would
be repeated over and over again in the coming years. In December 2003, the
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Javier Solana was added to the European negotiating team. The other EU
member states felt to a certain extent out of the loop and had asked Solana to
play the role of go-between.
12
The first setback for the EU happened in the beginning of 2004. After the US
had made it clear that Iran was violating the October 2003 agreement, an IAEA
report also warned in March 2004 that there were missing parts in the Iranian
declarations.
13
Iran in its turn felt unhappy with the carrotsobtained from the
EU and threatened to resume uranium conversion and to build a heavy water
plant. El Baradei, Director-General of the IAEA, visited Teheran at the
beginning of April and convinced the Iranians to hand over a second full
declaration on 20 May 2004. Another IAEA report a couple of weeks later,
however, talked again about contradictory information provided by Iran. The
IAEA Board Resolution deplored the fact that Irans cooperation has not been
as full, timely and proactive as it should have been.
14
In response, Iran
announced that it would start to produce centrifuges again.
In early September 2004, Iran started to convert uranium hexafluoride into
uranium gas. The EU raised the stakes: Iran had to cooperate with the IAEA
before the end of October 2004. It appears that this ultimatum had an effect.
Four days later, Iran agreed to continue the suspension of the conversion for a
couple of months. It would not be the last time that Iran tried to please the
IAEA right before a Board of Governors meeting. The Board agreed that Iran
had to provide all the necessary information before the next meeting at the end
of November 2004, but without an automatic trigger to send the file to the UN
Security Council in case of non-compliance.
15
The EU-3 proposed a new overall deal with Iran on 21 October 2004 that
would include the start of broader negotiations, economic benefits and the
delivery of light water reactors.
16
This second EUIran agreement was formally
signed in Paris on 14 November 2004 and included a renewal of the suspension
of the Iranian programme.
17
Under pressure from Russia and China, the IAEA
Board ten days later even agreed that Irans suspension was voluntarily instead
of legally binding.
18
In December 2004, EUIran working groups were established for negotiating
the following items: 1) the transfer of nuclear technology; 2) trade and
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cooperation; and 3) security.
19
Already in January 2005, however, differences
emerged with respect to the timing. While Iran expected the conclusion of the
negotiations within weeks or months, the EU did not expect these talks to be
finished for one or two years. Teheran even warned in February that the talks
had to be concluded by mid-March 2005. At the end of February, the EU
succeeded in convincing the US to come up with new carrots: membership of
the World Trade Organization and spare parts for airplanes. But it failed to
convince the US to offer security guarantees. In the meantime Iran launched
different proposals in the working groups. The Iranian leadership became
frustrated because of lack of cooperation on behalf of the EU.
20
Consequently,
Iran threatened to halt its suspension again. In response, the EU threatened to
halt the negotiation process should Iran start again with uranium conversion.
The shadow of the Iranian presidential elections in June also had a major
influence on the negotiations. The EU and the US expected that former
President Rafsanjani, who was regarded as a stronger figure than President
Khatami, would win the elections and be able to take a more moderate view on
the nuclear issue. The EU promised to launch a new proposal in early August
2005. Instead of Rafsanjani, and to the surprise of the rest of the world, it was
the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who won the elections. Right from
the beginning, he made clear that Iran had the right to have its own nuclear fuel
cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. It was therefore not surprising
that Iran rejected the European proposal of 5 August 2004. Iran also started to
convert uranium. The EU consequently broke off the negotiations.
The recommencement of uranium conversion by Iran was regarded by the
EU as a transgression of a red line. For the first time ever, the EU succeeded in
convincing Russia and China not to use their veto against an IAEA resolution
that would formally state that Iran was in non-compliance with the IAEA
Statute. The 24 September 2005 IAEA Board Resolution was supported by the
EU, the US and most other members; Russia and China abstained; only
Venezuela voted against. The resolution also warned Iran that, if it did not
comply before the next meeting, its file would be sent to the UN Security
Council.
21
The EU made clear that it would only negotiate again if Iran suspended its
enrichment programme. The latter meant an implicit acceptance of Irans
uranium conversion, something the EU had never accepted before. Thanks to
new documents provided by Iran to the IAEA in October 2005, and despite the
extremist declarations of President Ahmadinejad with respect to Israel around
the same time, the IAEA Board of Governors did not send the Iranian file to the
Security Council in November 2005.
22
Again, the EU member states found a
compromise between the US position on the one hand and the Russian and
Chinese views on the other.
In December 2005, a new round of negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran
made no progress. Iran even threatened to resume uranium enrichment. When
Iran actually carried out its threat on 9 January 2006, a new red line was crossed
An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran 277
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in the eyes of the EU and the US. This time, they were determined to send the
Iranian file to the UN Security Council. In response, Iran threatened to halt its
cooperation with the IAEA voluntarily and to accelerate its programme from the
level of R&D to an industrial scale.
After three years, the IAEA sent the Iran file to the UN Security Council
during a special meeting of the Board on 23 February 2006.
23
It was again the
EU that had drafted the resolution. This time not only Venezuela, but also
Syria and Cuba voted against. Russia and China voted in favour. The actual
discussions inside the Security Council would only start at the beginning of
March 2006. Nevertheless, Iran did execute what it had threatened to do: it
suspended its voluntarily cooperation with the IAEA and it accelerated its
enrichment programme.
In the meantime, Germany was prepared to consider a Russian proposal that
included limited enrichment in Iran under international *read IAEA
*supervision.
24
The latter led to public friction with the UK and France. On
29 March 2006, after weeks of negotiations, the Security Council adopted a so-
called Declaration of the Chairman, which is not legally binding. This
unanimously adopted document gave Iran another month to come clean.
25
But
Iran was not impressed. On the contrary, on 11 April 2006 Iran proudly
announced that it had succeeded in enriching uranium up to 3.5 per cent thanks
to a cascade of 164 centrifuges. The next IAEA Report recommended the
Security Council agree on a formal resolution in order to increase the pressure on
the government of Iran.
26
On 8 May President Ahmadinejad made a significant move by writing a letter
to President Bush which was later published in the media.
27
While its content
could be easily criticised, the lack of a direct response by the US further
encouraged internal frictions inside the EU. This criticism, however, faded away
because of two successes of the EU-3.
28
First, at the end of May, the EU-3
succeeded in convincing the US to negotiate with Iran, something it had always
refused to do since 1979. The US, however, set as a condition for multilateral talks
that Iran first had to suspend its enrichment programme. Second, the
EU-3 also succeeded in convincing the US, Russia and China to agree on a
new common package for Iran, which was offered by Solana to the decision-
makers in Teheran on 5 June 2006. Orally, he also explained what the sanctions
would be if Iran did not agree. The latter would include a UN Security Council
Resolution that would open the door for sanctions. While there was no formal
deadline, the international community hoped to get an answer from Iran before
the G-8 summit in St Petersburg in mid-July 2006. Iran, however, immediately
made clear that it would only respond in August.
At the end of June, Germany appeared again in favour of a proposal that would
allow limited enrichment. The US, however, immediately blocked further
attempts in that direction.
29
When it became clear that Iran was not interested
in the latest proposal by the international community, the UN Security Council
started to draft a resolution. After two weeks of negotiations, the first (formal)
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UN Security Council resolution was agreed upon on 31 July 2006.
30
It required*
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter*that Iran suspended its enrichment
programme before 31 August 2006. It also threatened a vote on a new resolution
that would open the door to appropriate measures*read sanctions*in case
Iran did not comply. Only Qatar voted against. Iran immediately rejected the
resolution as illegitimate.
On 22 August, Iran also sent a 21-page answer to the proposal made by
Solana at the beginning of June.
31
One week later, the non-EU-3 members
complained at the Gymnich in Finland that they had not yet seen that
document. In particular, Italy, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands were
mentioned in the press as being dissatisfied with the EU-3 approach.
32
As
everybody expected, Iran*also strengthened by the outcome of the Lebanon
war*did not comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions deadline.
While the US immediately wanted to draft a new UN Security Council
resolution that included sanctions, it became clear that not only Russia and
China but also the EU were not yet ready. France, for instance, noted on
7 September that the condition to start up new negotiations for Iran, namely to
suspend uranium enrichment, was not fair.
33
New talks between Solana and Larijani on 10 September raised the
possibility of a new deal. Iran would be prepared to suspend its programme
on a voluntary basis for one or two months, as it had earlier suggested in its
written answer on 22 August.
34
David Albright, director of the Washington-
based Institute for Science and International Security was sceptical, but
nevertheless recommended the EU interpret the document in a favourable
manner and not reject it out-of-hand, while insisting on a full suspension of
Irans uranium enrichment programme, even if for a limited time as a condition
for launching formal negotiations.
35
Even US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice signalled that a temporary suspension could pave the way for direct
negotiations with the US.
36
The French President Chirac went even so far as to
say that formal negotiations could be set up, and that Iran could then take a
reciprocal step by suspending its enrichment programme.
37
But this effort by
Solana also failed. On 28 September he had to admit that there was no deal,
something he repeated in a speech before the European Parliament on
5 October. Another proposal on behalf of Iran, namely to set up a foreign
consortium in Iran, was rejected by the international community, even by
France and Russia.
38
The North Korean nuclear test on 9 October 2006 moved the spotlight in the
UN Security Council from Iran to North Korea, but only temporarily. The
EU-25 Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed on 16 October 2006 to continue the
talks inside the UN Security Council about sanctions against Iran. These
negotiations appeared more difficult than expected. Not only did Russia and
China continue to oppose economic sanctions, let alone military action, there
was also friction between the US and the EU with respect to the Russian
support for the Iranian Busher reactor.
39
The EU found itself again in the
An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran 279
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difficult position to mediate not only between Iran and the US, but also
between the US and Russia.
At the end of November 2006, the Board of the IAEA rejected the request by
Iran for technological support for the development of a heavy-water nuclear
reactor at Arak.
Exactly two months after Britain, France and Germany had introduced a draft
UN Security Council resolution, the Security Council was able to agree*
unanimously*on Resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006.
40
In contrast to the
former resolution, it contained limited economic sanctions, including a ban on
trade of nuclear-related material; the assets of 10 Iranian companies and
12 individuals were frozen. The draft text had been watered down under pressure
from Russia and China. Iran immediately rejected the resolution.
At the beginning of 2007 the conflict seemed to escalate. The US kidnapped
Iranian diplomats in Iraq. Bush announced that a second aircraft carrier would
be sent to the Gulf. Both the US (Vice-President Cheney) and Israel threatened
to attack Iran. At the same time, EU firms were under heavy pressure by the US
to stop doing business with Iran.
41
Iran reacted to these provocations by not
admitting all IAEA inspectors in January 2007.
More and more voices in the EU, including French President Jacques Chirac,
and an internal EU document that was leaked to the press admitted that Iran
possessed all the necessary knowledge to succeed in producing enough fissile
material for nuclear weapons.
42
A couple of months later, in May, IAEA
Director-General El Baradei would basically repeat these EU statements.
In February 2007, Iranian chief negotiator Larijani stated at the Security
Conference in Munich that Iran was maybe prepared to accept certain limits to its
enrichment activities, but President Ahmadinejad immediately closed the door.
This was interpreted by the West as another example of internal divisions within
Iran.
On 24 March 2007 UN Security Council resolution 1747 was unanimously
adopted. It included the freezing of assets of 28 individuals.
43
The conflict,
however, escalated further: Iran, in particular the Revolutionary Guards,
kidnapped British sailors on the Shatt al Arab river in March 2007. The US
responded with a large-scale naval exercise in the Gulf. The risk of escalation into
war had never been as high. At the end of May 2007, the US and Iran for the first
time held bilateral talks about Iraq, be it only at the ambassadorial level.
In June 2007, Germany proposed (again) a softer approach; the US, France
and the UK (again) did not agree.
44
The IAEA, in particular Director-General El
Baradei, and Iran agreed in June to set up a new action plan to come clean about
the past. Rumours that France and the UK also agreed with this initiative were
denied by the US. On 21 August 2007 the IAEA and Iran agreed on that
timetable: seven issues had to be resolved between August 2007 and April 2008.
45
El Baradei was criticised, especially by the US, but also in the international
press.
46
On 10 September 2007 El Baradei left the IAEA Board meeting angry
because of the lack of EU support for his plans.
47
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At the start of September 2007 Israel attacked a so-called nuclear installation
in Syria with F-16s, maybe as a signal to Iran. Later in the month, there was
again public disagreement between different EU member states: this time
Austria wanted a softer approach; France and the Netherlands did not agree.
48
On 24 September 2007 German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier reacted
sharply vis-a`-vis the US and France. He accused them of being hypocritical as
they criticised German firms for continuing to do business with Iran when
German exports towards Iran had fallen substantially over the previous year,
while at the same time both French and American firms were still secretly
dealing with Iran.
49
At the beginning of October it was Spain that publicly
disagreed with further sanctions. And two weeks later, Italy and Austria vented
their frustrations, enhancing the level of disagreements within the EU.
50
At the end of September 2007, President Ahmadinejad had visited New
York, where he gave a public interview at Columbia University. Russian
President Putin visited Teheran mid-October 2007. He promised that Russia
would finish the Busher reactor soon, and to start the delivery of nuclear fuel.
At the same time, President Bush spoke about the possibility of a Third World
War. On 21 October 2007, top negotiator Larijani resigned. He apparently
could not convince the Supreme Leader Khamenei to support his ideas.
New reports in November by both the IAEA and Solana were rather
uncritical vis-a`-vis Iran. Nevertheless, the P5 1started drafting a new UN
Security Council resolution at the beginning of December. But on 3 December
2007 the declassified US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) about Irans
nuclear weapons programme was released. Surprisingly, it stated that Iran had
probably stopped its military programme in 2003.
51
The immediate conse-
quences of the NIE were that the risk of war diminished and that the UN
Security Council resolution that was in the offing was postponed. In the same
month, Russia also started with the first delivery of nuclear fuel for the Busher
reactor, as Putin had promised before.
A February 2008 report of IAEA was rather positive about cooperation by
Iran, except for three items, only one of which had directly to do with nuclear
weapons (green salt).
52
But in a public meeting, the number two of the IAEA,
Ole Heinonen, remained very sceptical towards Iran.
53
At the end of February
2008, the EU stated that it might provide a new package deal later on.
54
Nevertheless, pressure from the international community was maintained when
UN Security Council resolution 1803 was passed on 3 March 2008.
55
Iranian
President Ahmadinejad reacted by saying that from that point onwards Iran
would not talk to the EU anymore, only to the IAEA.
56
At the NATO
Bucharest summit at the beginning of April, US missile defence plans to be
installed in Europe, which were predominantly legitimised as defence instru-
ments against Iran, were by and large approved by the other member states.
On 14 June 2008 Solana, together with representatives from the UK, France,
Germany, Russia, and China*notably absent was the US*presented a fresh
package of proposals to Iran, similar to the one of two years earlier. New was
An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran 281
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the freeze for freeze offer by which Iran could keep enriching uranium but
would halt the further installation of centrifuges for a while, while at the same
time the international community would not impose extra sanctions.
57
Solana
threatened to impose additional EU sanctions if Teheran failed to respond
positively.
58
It was two years since that Solana had travelled to Teheran. Iran,
however, seemed not impressed by EUs coercive diplomacy and refused to go
along with the new proposal; it continued the enrichment of uranium. Iran
responded with a vague letter to the EU on 4 July 2008, and with a new round
of missile tests one week later.
The US surprised the world by sending Under Secretary of State William
Burns to talks with the EU and Iran on 19 July 2008. It was the first time that
the US established formal talks with Iran since the 1979 revolution. While this
policy shift was partly the result of EU pressure, and can therefore be seen as a
minor diplomatic success for the EU, the talks themselves did not led to a
breakthrough.
59
At the end of July 2008, President Ahmadinejad claimed that
Iran had built between 5,000 and 6,000 centrifuges.
60
Although experts believe
that the exact number is closer to 4,000, they agreed that Irans nuclear
programme is moving forward.
EUs Effectiveness in Dealing with Iran
Effectiveness has to do with realising objectives. The major objective of the EU
from 2003 has been to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This medium-
term objective can be further operationalised in short-term objectives: to
prevent Iran from converting and enriching uranium.
As Iran has not acquired nuclear weapons yet, and as the EU has not halted
its efforts to stop Iran, it is too soon to arrive at a final verdict on the EUs
approach vis-a`-vis Iran. Nevertheless, the first short-term objective was not
reached. Despite having negotiated for 12 months, Iran started to convert
uranium in September 2004. As Iran began uranium enrichment in January
2006, the EU also failed to fulfil its second objective. Since then the EU has
been asking Iran to suspend enrichment. But up to now it has refused to do so,
despite US, UN and EU pressure in the form of diplomatic and economic
sanctions, including UN Security Council resolutions. To conclude, the EU
has*at least up to now*not been very successful in halting Irans nuclear
programme.
61
The outcome, however, is not completely negative. The EU did sign two
agreements with Iran, which led to the temporary suspension of its programme.
The latter has slowed down the Iranian nuclear programme. In addition, these
agreements obliged Iran to sign and adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol,
which meant that the IAEA had significantly more leverage to verify declared
and undeclared installations in Iran. This, however, only lasted until February
2006, when the Iranian file was sent to the UN Security Council and Iran
reacted by ceasing to adhere to the Additional Protocol. Lastly, thanks to these
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agreements, Iran has provided much more information about its nuclear
programme.
The problem is that Iran did not feel sufficiently rewarded by the EU for
these positive steps. Iran felt betrayed by the EU, because it was the EU that
moved its file to the UN Security Council. The result is that the EU has not
been able to sign an agreement with Iran since the end of 2004, in contrast for
instance to the IAEA with whom Iran did sign an agreement in August 2007.
The EU, in short, has not made any progress during the past four years. Others
claim that the alternative*read US military action*would have been worse.
The problem with this argument is that it compares the EU approach with a
worst-case analysis, which is intellectually not honest.
Should Iran definitively halt its enrichment programme in the future and
should it be possible to relate such an Iranian decision directly to EU policy,
this negative assessment could still be converted into a positive one. Never-
theless, the odds are that that will not happen. Indications for the latter are: 1)
the scientific, financial, and political capital that Iran has already spent on its
nuclear programme; 2) the international political costs that it already had to
bear; 3) the fact that there is more or less a consensus within the Iranian elite to
continue with enrichment. A prominent reformer in Iran stated the following in
August 2006: Those who threaten and pressure from the outside forget that we
still think in traditional ways about national sovereignty. If we have to choose
between individual freedom and national sovereignty, we will choose the
latter.
62
Were this prediction to be correct and the EU does not succeed then its
reputation, which was already low in the field of strategic and security matters,
would be further dented. As long as Iran continues to enrich uranium, the EUs
reputation is declining.
63
The next part of the article aims to explain the lack of success on behalf of
the EU. What are the explanations for the EUs failure? I see basically three
complimentary explanations for the EUs lack of success: 1) a bad assessment of
the chances of success in the beginning, which has to do with an overestimation
of ones own power, and an underestimation of the power of the adversary; in
short, a questionable strategy; 2) internal divisions; 3) and bad tactics.
A Questionable Strategy
When the EU began its efforts in 2003, it should in principle have reflected on
the costs and benefits of its strategy. Apparently, the EU, or at least the EU-3,
judged that the benefits were higher than the costs. The EU-3 were convinced
that they could press Iran to give up its programme. At a minimum, they
believed that their efforts would at least be perceived by the outside world as
being positive, even if the EU did not succeed in the end.
However, it could have been predicted that it would not be an easy ride. From
an Iranian perspective it is not that illogical to want nuclear weapons. From a
security point of view, Iran is situated in one of the most volatile regions in the
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world. It is surrounded by the US in the West (NATO member state Turkey;
more than 100,000 American troops in Iraq), in the East (Afghanistan,
Pakistan), and in the South (Persian Gulf States, US fleet in the Persian Gulf).
In addition, the US categorised Iran as member of the axis of evil. Such
external pressure creates a rallying-around-the-flag phenomenon. Iran has even
been attacked by a neighbouring state*Iraq*and the eight-year war killed
hundreds of thousands of Iranians, and had a tremendous impact on both the
Iranian leadership and people. Iraq, at that time supported by the US, used
chemical weapons against Iran. The latter convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to
restart the nuclear programme in the second half of the 1980s. In addition,
Israel also possesses nuclear weapons, which is implicitly accepted by the
international community despite the fact that Israel has never signed the NPT.
Further, it is certainly noticed that countries without nuclear weapons (such
as Afghanistan, Iraq or Iran) were attacked by the US or were threatened to be
attacked, while countries with nuclear weapons (such as Pakistan and North
Korea) were not. This observation may have strengthened the position of the
hard-liners inside Iran. The dominant perception in Teheran is that obtaining
nuclear weapons may be the only guarantee for Iran not to be invaded by the
US in the future.
64
Last but not least, nuclear weapons provide prestige, both internally and
externally, at least according to its advocates. With Iraq on the losing side
during and beyond the 1990s, Iran began to be perceived as the upcoming
regional power in the Middle East. Regional powers do like to obtain symbols
of prestige, such as nuclear weapons. The Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998
made clear that governments conducting nuclear tests gain popularity at home;
by testing, the political regimes in those developing states demonstrate to their
constituencies that they are able to master complex technological projects
successfully, such as building the bomb.
It is very hard to understand why this proliferation logic is not understood by
European decision-makers. The EU-3 were apparently blinded by different
factors: first of all, the EU was looking to become more visible in world politics
from the 1990s. Already for decades Europe had been criticised for being an
economic giant and a military dwarf. Although it had taken substantial
institutional steps in the direction of a more assertive foreign policy, major
issues in world politics (like proliferation, catastrophic terrorism, or energy
security) had not been tackled. Worse, the Iraq crisis in 200203 had hopelessly
divided the EU into the old and newEurope. The US again called the shots.
Most people in the EU, and the rest of the world, were opposed to the Iraq war,
but their governments did not do much to prevent it, or, if they did, could not
convince the US to change its mind.
This frustration inside Europe (including in the UK) freed a lot of energy in
the form of new thinking to take its own security and defence policy more
seriously. Nuclear non-proliferation seemed a perfect case. Not only the Iraq
issue, but also the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises erupted in the
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summer of 2002. The late Anna Lindt, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
took the initiative to draft an EU Non-Proliferation Strategy in February 2003
and succeeded in convincing her colleagues in the General Affairs and External
Relations Council to support her initiative. At the same time, a broader exercise
was going on to draft a complete European Security Strategy for the first time
ever. Both strategies were written in the spring of 2003, their drafts were
adopted at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, and their final drafts were
formally adopted in December 2003.
Resolving one of the two global non-proliferation crises was regarded as the
ideal signal to the rest of the world that the EU was not only on paper, but also
in practice ready to take its responsibility as a strategic actor. The Iranian crisis
was geographically more suitable for the EU than North Korea, over which
China took the lead.
Secondly, the EU was regarded as the usual suspect to take the diplomatic
initiative due to a lack of alternatives. The US had stopped diplomatic relations
with Iran in 1979, and President Bush was not about to resume them. China did
not play the role of mediator in international politics (yet), except maybe in its
immediate neighbourhood (like North Korea). Russia was not really regarded
as a trustworthy actor in world politics, due to its more assertive external policy
under President Putin, including in the area of energy. The only regional power
left was Europe. EU member states had the benefits of always having
maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, even after the 1979
revolution. At the end of 2002, the EU had even started Trade and Association
Agreement negotiations with Teheran. The latter could be exploited by the EU
to put pressure on Iran, or that was at least the plan.
Thirdly, the EU wanted to show that it could do more than criticising the US.
The EU member states were convinced that a less unilateral and less militaristic
approach was possible in dealing with proliferation. Effective multilateralism
became the mantra in Brussels. Iran was the first test case.
These three factors meant that the advocates of an active approach by the
EU*in their enthusiasm*were more or less blind to potential roadblocks.
65
The EU basically saw only the potential benefits of its strategy vis-a`-vis Iran,
not the potential risks. The decision to fightIran was taken on the basis of the
combination of a kind of euphoria, and of rash and naı
¨
ve ambition in London,
Paris, and Berlin, as well as in the EU Council Secretariat in Brussels.
The combination of euphoria and naivete´ is part of the explanation; the lack
of empathy on behalf of the EU is another. For some, it seems very difficult to
imagine how it feels to be a decision-maker in Teheran nowadays. For instance,
Bruno Tertrais*a French defence expert who is close to the government*
stated: ‘I dont think that Irans nuclear programme is driven by security
concerns.’
66
Such declarations illustrate the continuing underestimation of
Iran’s motivation to acquire all the necessary facilities that would allow them to
produce fissile materials that can be used for both a civilian and military
programme.
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This kind of myopia can only be explained by a lack of empathy and too much
Eurocentric thinking. Many in the EU apparently believe that Iran will make a
rational costbenefit calculus and that the outcome of that calculus will be
integration in the world economy instead of being isolated, let alone bombed.
For instance, Bruno Dupre´*an official of the European Commission in charge
of nuclear non-proliferation*stated in the beginning of 2007: Iranian
authorities know that there is no other alternative than Irans integration in
the international society and becoming a constructive player in the region.
67
As I tried to show above, this reasoning is deeply flawed. In addition, the
threat of being isolated sounds hollow. States that did go nuclear in the past were
not punished, or only temporarily. While the US imposed sanctions against
Pakistan and India after the tests in 1998, they have been lifted since. Pakistan is
currently one of the major US allies in the War on Terrorism; the US recently
even offered India nuclear fissile material and nuclear know-how. The latter goes
against the spirit and the letter of both the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), as India is one of the few countries in the world that never signed
the NPT. To the same extent, Iran may hope that the US will calm down once
Teheran possesses the bomb. The US may even look for closer cooperation with
a nuclear Iran in order to help stabilise Iraq and the Middle East in general.
Critics will argue that sometimes states do opt for giving up WMD
programmes. The best example is Libya, which gave up its nuclear weapons
programme in December 2003 after pressure from the US and the UK. The
problem with this analogy is that there are many differences between Libya and
Iran: the efforts that have been spent on the programme, the level of success of
the programme, the power of the state in the region as well as their recent
history of war and peace.
This strategic failure by the EU is hard to explain, knowing that the
European Non-Proliferation Strategy of December 2003 explicitly admitted
that the best solution to the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is that countries should no longer feel they need them.
68
Without
doubt, this phrase was proposed by the arms control community within the EU
institution, not by those who favour a more hard-line approach. This brings us
to the internal divisions within the EU.
Internal Divisions within the EU
Although there are also substantial internal divisions within Iran, they pale in
comparison with the differences inside the coalition of states that opposes Iran.
On the one hand, there is the extreme hard-line position of the US, and more
particularly the Bush administration, that even refuses to talk unconditionally
to Iran about the nuclear issue. On the other hand, states like Russia and China
are much more moderate. Although in the end they probably prefer not to have
a nuclear Iran, their short-term economic interests seem to prevail. They will
never agree with far-reaching economic sanctions against Iran. That Russia and
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China have already agreed to UN sanctions does not mean very much, as these
sanctions are of limited value in comparison with the trade deals that both
countries have signed with Iran.
69
Ideologically situated in between the US on the one hand and China and
Russia on the other is the EU, which in its turn is internally divided. The EU is
the largest trading partner of Iran with 28 per cent of the Iranian trade coming
from and going to the EU in 2006.
70
The EUs exports to Iran between January
and May 2008, for instance, totalled 4.47 bn.
71
It is also not by chance that EU
member states that have substantial trade relations with Iran (such as Austria,
Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece)
72
are the least in favour of further sanctions,
while states that do not have substantial trade relations (such as the UK and the
Netherlands) or that let security priorities prevail (such as France) are more in
favour of a hard-line approach.
The fact that the EU initiative in 2003 came from the EU-3*the UK, France
and Germany*was internally criticised by Italy and the smaller member states.
Even the addition of Solana to the negotiating team could not temper that. An
Italian security expert put it this way: [Italy] has insisted that the threesome
club be broadened and made more EU-wide.
73
Right from the beginning, a tension between a hard and soft approach
existed within Europe. While the European Commission preferred to rescue the
Trade and Association Agreement talks with Iran and did not want to link it to
the nuclear issue, the EU-3 and the European Council Secretariat won the
internal debate in June 2003, and the trade talks were suspended. The de´marche
of the EU-3 in October 2003 was a compromise between both approaches:
while it put pressure on Iran, it also promised negotiations without threatening
economic (let alone military) sanctions.
While during the whole conflict both the hard-liners and the softies were
able to win temporary games depending on the circumstances, most of the time
the hard-line approach prevailed. The EU in 2003 could have been regarded as
a kind of mediator between the US and Iran, but later on it clearly moved to
the Western camp and tried to oppose Iran with increasingly harsh measures.
Sometimes, it was even hard to distinguish the European from the US position.
A similar development can be detected in the Iranian camp. While Iran was
willing to compromise in the spring of 2003, and signed two agreements with
the EU, it gradually became more disappointed with the size of the carrots and
the slowness of the negotiations. The processes stimulated each other: as the
Iranians became more stubborn, the hard-line approach inside the EU could
more easily overcome internal criticism.
The longer it took for the EU to resolve the impasse, the more internal
frictions occurred. From the beginning of 2007, fears of a US (or Israeli)
military attack, whether planned or as a result of miscalculations and
misinterpretations, did not help either. What follows are examples of public
debates in the EU about how to deal with Iran. Germany was openly against
new economic sanctions by the UN in January 2007. Jacques Chirac, the
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French President, stated at the end of January 2007 that it would be very hard
to prevent Iran from going nuclear, and contrary to statements by the US
leadership he preferred a nuclear Iran to a war with Iran.
74
Similarly, an
internal EU report in February 2007 stated that economic sanctions probably
would not make a difference and admitted that the EU approach had failed.
75
Germany publicly announced in February 2007 that it wanted to offer carrots
to Iran; four months later, it tried (but failed) again.
76
In September 2007
criticism was raised by EU officials against American pressure vis-a`-vis
European firms. Austria used its veto power in the EU Council against further
sanctions in October 2007.
77
German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier
accused the US and France in the same month of being hypocritical by pressing
states like Germany to halt trade relations with Iran and by leaking the names
of German firms that were continuing to do business in Iran, while German
export to Iran had significantly dropped, and while at the same time French
and American firms continued to do business with Iran. Spain also publicly
criticised the hard-line approach of the EU-3 in October 2007.
78
Bad Tactics, Bad Moves
With respect to tactics, at least two criticisms can be voiced: 1) that the EU
changed from being a mediator to being a coercer; 2) that the EU was not very
creative in coming up with new and attractive proposals to Iran.
In the beginning, the EU was perceived as a mediator. The EU put pressure
on Iran, but it also tried to give the Iranians more time, at least more than the
US offered. The US for instance wanted to bring the Iranian file from the
IAEA to the UN Security Council much sooner. Many IAEA Board
resolutions, for instance the one in November 2003, were rather moderate,
thanks to the Europeans. Up to November 2004 the EU could have lived with
limited enrichment. From that point onwards, it closed that option under
pressure from the US.
79
Since then, both the US and the EU have demanded
that Iran first suspends its enrichment before negotiations can be started up.
Later on, the positions of the US and the EU were even harder to distinguish.
For instance, it was the Europeans who drafted the IAEA resolution in January
2006 to move the Iranian file to the UN Security Council. Is it then surprising
to hear Ahmadinejad say (as he did in March 2008) that he is no longer
interested in talking to the EU?
Each time that the soft approach seemed to win the EU internal game, the
US intervened. Most of the time, it succeeded in moving the EU in its direction.
This happened for instance at the beginning of 2004, when the US informed the
EU that Iran had not provided a complete declaration. When Germany seemed
to prefer limited enrichment in June 2006, the US prevented it. One year later,
exactly the same occurred. In July 2007, an EU diplomat in Vienna stated: we
are coming to a situation where five out of six (powers) would support further
talks, and only one would insist on a complete suspension before talking.
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Somewhat later it was leaked by the press (maybe by US sources?) that German
firms were continuing to do business with Iran. The US also tried to halt the
efforts of IAEA Director-General El Baradei when he proposed a new
timetable to Iran in May 2007 and managed to convince the Iranians to accept
it in August 2007. Even more remarkable is the lack of EU support for El
Baradei in August 2007, again under pressure from the US. When the EU did
not support El Baradei at the IAEA Board meeting in September 2007, he left
the room angrily. The day after, the EU and the US back-pedalled and formally
supported El Baradei.
81
Secondly, it seems that there was also lack of creativity on behalf of the EU.
The EU promised a lot in the agreement of October 2003, but it declined to
follow up with concrete proposals, or did so only very slowly. Exactly the same
happened one year later: the Iranians got the impression that the EU was slow
in providing what they had asked for. At that time, the EU preferred to wait for
the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections in May 2005. Again, the EU
proposals in August 2005 were clearly not sufficient to convince Iran. Only at
the beginning of June 2006 was a reasonable offer made by Solana, who spoke
for the P-5 1 (Germany). But even that package did not include American
security guarantees, and made everything conditional on the prior suspension
of enrichment by Iran. In addition, it was an offer made with a Western knife
pointing to the Iranian throat, as Solana threatened to draft a UN Security
Council resolution if Iran did not agree.
To hang on to your position during negotiations is fair enough, certainly in
the first stages. But when both actors do so, the one that has most to lose
should normally take a first step in the direction of a compromise. As a
diplomat in Vienna predicted: The US will push very hard until the last minute
in the hope of getting the Iranians to give in but at the end of the day they will
accept some form of enrichment activity.
82
The more Iran makes progress with
enrichment, the more the US and the EU will come under pressure to give in.
Many non-governmental observers*like the International Crisis Group,
83
MIT experts,
84
and the Atlantic Council of the US
85
*have proposed
technological solutions that would accept limited enrichment or multilateral
fuel production inside Iran. None of them were proposed by the EU to Iran.
Only in June 2007, did the EU (under pressure from Germany) seem ready to
agree with limited enrichment. But under pressure from the US this proposal
did not finally see the light of day. In June 2008, the EU presented a new offer,
similar to the one offered two years earlier.
Conclusion
The EU wants to be a global actor, not only economically, but also politically.
That is why the EU-3 took the initiative in 2003 to try to resolve the nuclear
impasse in Iran. Five years later, the issue has not been resolved. In 2006, Iran
even started to enrich uranium. Most experts agree that Iran will be able to
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produce enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb before 2015. If Iran
succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, the EU effort can only be categorised as
a failure. Its reputation as a strategic actor would decline. While the EU efforts
are not completely ineffective, and in the end may still succeed, the interim
assessment is negative.
There are three complementary explanations for this failure. First of all, one
can question the EUs strategy in 2003. It seems that the EU has overestimated
its own power and underestimated the power of Iran. This in turn can be
explained by the EUs determined ambition to do something on the global
scene, regardless of the difficulties. The latter points immediately to a further
problem: a lack of empathy which prevented the EU to see the underlying
interests of Iran. Secondly, there are the classic internal divisions within the EU,
which complicated the already very difficult job of mediating between the US
on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. Thirdly, there were some
tactical blunders. En cours de route, the EU changed from being a mediator to
become the right hand of the US. Another tactical failure is that (at least up
to June 2008), the EU failed to come up with a deal that was powerful enough
to make a difference in Iran. It remains to be seen whether the EU will manage
in the end to convince Iran to give up enrichment.
Notes
1
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 19 June 2003, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
2
Mark Fitzpatrick, Assessing Irans Nuclear Programme, Survival 48/3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 526.
3
For previous EU non-proliferation efforts, see: Paul Cornish (ed.), Europe and the Challenge of
Proliferation, Chaillot Papers 24 (1996), 71 p.; Harald Mu
¨
ller and Lars van Dassen, From
Cacophony to Joint Action: Successes and Shortcomings of the European Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Policy, in Martin Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy (London:
Pinter, 1997).
4
The North Korean nuclear programme again became a hot topic in autumn 2002 when the US
stated that North Korea had admitted that it also pursued enrichment, something which was later
on publicly denied by North Korea.
5
Clara Portela, The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, PRIF Report
65 (Fall 2003), 39 p.; Joanna Spear, The Emergence of a European ‘‘Strategic Personality’’’, Arms
Control Today 33/9 (November 2003); Stephen Pullinger and Gerrard Quille, The EU: Seeking
Common Ground for Tackling Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament Diplomacy 74
(December 2003), pp. 4047; Mark Smith et al., Fighting Proliferation*European Perspectives,
Chaillot Papers 66 (December 2003), 92 p; Tom Sauer, The ‘‘Americanization’’ of EU Nuclear
Non-proliferation Policy, Defense and Security Analysis 20/2 (June 2004), pp. 11331; Oliver
Meier and Gerrard Quille, Testing Time for Europes Nonproliferation Strategy, Arms Control
Today 35/4 (May 2005); Eileen Denza, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the EU and Iran,
European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (2005), pp. 289311; Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo, Mixing
Tools Against Proliferation: the EUs Strategy for Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction,
European Foreign Affairs Review 11 (2006), pp. 41738.
6
Gareth Porter, Neo-con Cabal Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks, Asia Times online, 30 March 2006,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_east/HC30Ak01.html; Gareth Porter, Iranian Crisis in the
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Wilderness, Asia Times online, 2 May 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/
HE02Ak04.html.
7
Steven Everts, Iran Will Be the Test for European Foreign Policy, Financial Times, 1 June 2003.
8
IAEA, Statement by the Board, Vienna, 19 June 2003, available at http://www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/medadvise200372.html.
9
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 12 September 2003, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf.
10
Iran signed the Additional Protocol of the IAEA on 18 December 2003.
11
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 26 November 2003, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf.
12
Interview EU ofcial.
13
IAEA, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General El
Baradei, Vienna, 8 March 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/
ebsp2004n002.html#iran.
14
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 18 June 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf.
15
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 18 September 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-79.pdf.
16
Light water reactors are more proliferation resistant than Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
reactors.
17
IAEA, INFCIRC/637, Vienna, 26 November 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.
18
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 29 November 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-90.pdf.
19
Honor Mahony, EU to Restart with Iran, EU Observer, 11 January 2005.
20
Honor Mahony, Iran Sets Deadline in EU Talks, EU Observer, 8 February 2005.
21
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 24 September 2005, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
22
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 24 November 2005, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf.
23
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 4 February 2006, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.
24
Mark Beundermann, Russian Move on Iran Challenges EU Unity, EU Observer, 7 March 2006,
available at http://www.euobserver.com/9/21062.
25
UN, Security Council, Presidential Statement, New York, 29 March 2006, available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm.
26
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 12 June 2006, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf.
27
CNN.com, Ahmadinejads Letter to Bush, 9 May 2006, available at http://edition.cnn.com/
interactive/world/0605/transcript.lemonde.letter/.
28
Interview EU ofcial.
29
EU, Iran to Meet on Nuclear Offer Next Week, NTI Global Security Newswire, 29 June 2006.
30
UN, Security Council, Resolution 1696 (2006), New York, 31 July 2006, available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm.
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31
Irans Response to the Package of 6 June 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/
publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf.
32
Mark Beundermann, EU Members Want More Openness from Solana on Iran, EU Observer,2
September 2006, available at http://www.euobserver.com/9/22322.
33
U.S. to Push for Iran Sanctions Next Week, NTI Global Security Newswire, 8 September 2006.
34
Ian Traynor, Iran Offers to Freeze Uranium Enrichment for Eight Weeks, The Guardian,11
September 2006.
35
David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, Irans Response to the EU: Confused but Sporadically
Hopeful, ISIS, 11 September 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/
confusedbuthopeful.pdf.
36
Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, Brief Nuclear Halt may Lead to Talks with Iran, The
Washington Post, 12 September 2006, p. A20.
37
Elaine Sciolino, Irans Freeze on Enrichment Could Wair, France suggests, The New York Times,
19 September 2006; Seymour Hersh, The Next Act, The New Yorker, 20 November 2006.
38
Helena Spongenberg, West Rejects Iran Offer of Solution to Nuclear Dispute, EU Observer,4
October 2006.
39
Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, U.S., European Allies at Odds on Terms of Iran Resolution,
The Washington Post, 26 October 2006.
40
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement.
41
Steven Weisman, Europe Resists US Push to Curb Iran Ties, The New York Times, 30 January
2007.
42
Daniel Dombey and Fidelius Schmid, Too Late to Halt Irans Nuclear Bomb, EU is told,
Financial Times, 12 February 2007; Een Atoombom of Twee Maakt Iran Niet Gevaarlijk, Metro
1389, 2 February 2007.
43
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/281/40/PDF/N0728140.pdf?OpenElement.
44
Daniel Dombey and Stephen Findler, Strains Grow over Strategy to Rein in Iran, Financial
Times, 4 June 2007.
45
IAEA, INFCIRC/711, Vienna, 27 August 2007, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
46
Rogue regulator, The Washington Post, 5 September 2007, p. A20; Elaine Sciolino and William
Broad, An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and its Foes, The New York Times, 17 September 2007.
47
IAEA-baas ElBaradei Boos Over Iran-Houding EU, De Standaard Online, 11 September 2007.
48
Iran: Gemengde Reacties Op Uitlatingen Kouchner, De Standaard Online, 17 September 2007.
49
Berlin Says US and France Guilty of Hypocrisy, Der Spiegel, 24 September 2007.
50
Lucia Kubosova, EU to Avoid Extra Iran Sanctions, EU Observer.com, 12 October 2007.
51
US, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007,
available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf.
52
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of SC res. 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 5
March 2008, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-
4.pdf.
53
Joby Warrick and Colum Lynch, UN Says Iran May Not Have Come Clean On Nuclear Past,
The Washington Post, 2 March 2008.
54
Helene Cooper and Warren Hoge, Europeans Plan Incentives, As Iran Says Sanctions Wont
Halt Nuclear Programme, The New York Times, 26 February 2008.
55
UN, Security Council, Resolution 9268, New York, 3 March 2008, available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9268.doc.htm.
56
Iran Limits Nuclear Talks to IAEA, NTI Global Security Newswire, 5 March 2008.
57
Najmeh Bozorgmehr, James Blitz and Daniel Dombey, Optimism over Nuclear Offer to Iran,
Financial Times, 16 June 2007.
58
James Blitz and Alex Barker, EU Backs Iran Offer with New Sanction Threat, Financial Times,
17 June 2008.
292 T. Sauer
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59
Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, Policy Shift Seen in US Decision on Iran Talks, New
York Times, 17 July 2008.
60
Mark Heinrich, Diplomat Close to IAEA Says Iran Inates Atom Progress, Reuters, 28 July
2008.
61
Sergey Smolnikov called it disappointingly unsuccessful. Sergey Smolnikov, Neither Submis-
sion, Nor War: Conceiving the EUs Policy Response to the Iranian Challenge, Strategic Insights
6/6 (December 2007).
62
International Crisis Group, Iran: Ahmadi-Nejads Tumultuous Presidency,inICG Middle East
Briefing 21, 6 February 2007, p. 25.
63
EU ofcials do not always want to admit that. Bruno Dupre´ (European Commission) for
instance stated on 1 February 2007: This [double-track approach by the EU] has brought
credibility to the European Union concept of effective multilateralism. See Bruno Dupre´, Iran
Nuclear Crisis: The Right Approach, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 February
2007.
64
Thomas Powers, Iran: The Threat, New York Review of Books 55/12, 17 July 2008.
65
See also Sahar Arfazadeh Roudsari, Talking away the Crisis? The E3/EU*Iran Negotiations on
Nuclear Issues, EU Diplomacy Papers, College of Europe, 6/2007, p. 3.
66
Interview with Bruno Tertrais at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference on 25
June 2007.
67
See for instance the interview with Neil Crompton (British embassy in Washington DC) at the
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference on 25 June 2007; Bruno Dupre´ (EU
Commission), Iran Nuclear Crisis: The Right Approach, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1 February 2007.
68
EU, Council, EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels, 10
December 2003, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf.
69
China for instance has a plan worth $70 bn to develop Irans massive Yadavaran oil eld in
exchange of a stake in that elds development and the supply of gas. See Philip Gordon, Beijing
Must Be Tougher On Iran, Financial Times, 8 July 2008.
70
Cited in: Smolnikov, Neither Submission, Nor War.
71
Rikard Jozwiak, EU Exports to Iran Rise, European Voice, 7 July 2008.
72
Only Greece and Italy are to a substantial degree dependent on Iranian oil imports, for 27 per
cent and 12 per cent respectively.
73
Antonio Missiroli, Foreword, in Sara Kutchesfahani, Irans Nuclear Challenge and European
Diplomacy, EPC Issue Paper 46 (March 2006), p. 5.
74
Een Atoombom Of Twee Maakt Iran Niet Gevaarlijk, Metro 1389, 2 February 2007.
75
Daniel Dombey and Fidelius Schmid, Too Late to Halt Irans Nuclear Bomb, EU is Told,
Financial Times, 12 February 2007.
76
Daniel Dombey and Stephen Findler, Strains Grow over Strategy to Rein in Iran, Financial
Times, 4 June 2007.
77
Lucia Kubosova, EU to Avoid Extra Iran Sanctions, EU Observer.com, 12 October 2007.
78
Berlin Says US and France Guilty of Hypocrisy, Der Spiegel, 24 September 2007.
79
Interview with EU ofcial.
80
Quoted in: West Rules out Iran Sanctions until September, NTI Global Security Newswire,23
July 2007.
81
IAEA-baas ElBaradei Boos over Iran-houding EU, De Standaard Online, 11 September 2007.
82
Michael Adler, IAEA Studies Enrichment Compromise but US Remains Unimpressed, Agence
France Press, 25 June 2006.
83
International Crisis Group, Iran: Is there a Way out of the Nuclear Impasse?, ICG Middle East
Report 51, 23 February 2006.
84
Geoffrey Forden and John Thomson, Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear
Arrangements, MIT Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group, 16 June 2006.
85
William Luers, Thomas Pickering and James Walsh, How to End the USIran Standoff,
International Herald Tribune, 3 March 2008.
An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran 293
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... 2003 b), in order to continue with further negotiations (Sauer, T. 2007;Windt, A. 2017). The publication of the Tehran agreement was perceived as a major achievement of the EU in order to put an end to the Iranian crisis (Moshaver, Z. 2003;Sauer, T. 2009 (Sauer, T. 2009), willing like that to spoil the European initiative. It stuck to its policy of sanctions and isolation and made clear that it would not support European diplomatic efforts. ...
... 2003 b), in order to continue with further negotiations (Sauer, T. 2007;Windt, A. 2017). The publication of the Tehran agreement was perceived as a major achievement of the EU in order to put an end to the Iranian crisis (Moshaver, Z. 2003;Sauer, T. 2009 (Sauer, T. 2009), willing like that to spoil the European initiative. It stuck to its policy of sanctions and isolation and made clear that it would not support European diplomatic efforts. ...
... However, this new status symbol was not recognized by all great powers: The U.S. stated again that the European initiative was futile (Windt, A. 2017;Meier, O. 2013). In contrast with U.S. reaction, the agreement was welcomed by China and Russia, who were satisfied with EU's action (Sauer, T. 2007;Sauer, T. 2009;Windt, A. 2017). ...
Thesis
Full-text available
Perceptions matter. How we are seen by others determines in practical terms who we are more than the very fact of being who we are. This also applies to political actors such as the EU. The aim of this paper is to analyse how the EU is seen by the other main security providers (China, Russia and the United States), and specifically to analyse how the perception of EU's status as a security provider has changed in the eyes of these three powers as a result of its role during the Iranian nuclear negotiations. The main conclusion reached in this paper is that the perception of EU's status as a security provider did not change for all actors, but only for the U.S., which was the sole country that did not consider the EU a security provider at the beginning of the negotiations with Iran.
... The E3 foreign ministers travelled to Teheran in October 2003 and managed to negotiate the temporary suspension of Iran's nuclear programme. This first trip defined the Europe's distinctive role as a bridge builder between Iran and the US and set the stage for a more ambitious agreement in Paris a year later (Sauer 2008). ...
Article
While Germany is a proponent of a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), Berlin has been part of a number of minilateral diplomatic initiatives in recent decades which seemingly side-lined EU diplomatic actors. This article illustrates how Germany uses minilateral formats as a means to exercise leadership in international diplomacy. The German engagement in minilateral diplomatic initiatives coincides with an increased focus on its structural – mostly economic – power. Nevertheless, Germany's institutional power – partly based on an extensive network between government and bureaucratic actors – remained crucial in order to create consensus and acceptance for the minilateral diplomacy within the EU. Hence, minilateral diplomatic initiatives allow Germany to reconcile its long-standing preference for a strong CFSP with the growing expectations to engage more actively in international relations. Three case studies on the Western Balkan Contact Group, the Iran nuclear negotiations, and the Normandy format during the Ukraine conflict provide the empirical material for the analysis.
... The goals and measures of sanctions are key in determining whether economic sanctions can be efficient or not. While some posit that realistic or modest goals can be achieved via economic sanctions [27], others argue that economic sanctions tend to be overambitious, particularly in proportion to the range of economic tools applied [5,28]. For example, Elliott [27] argues that the US oil embargo contributed to Uganda's powerlessness against Tanzania and rebel forces in 1978 [27], and that similar measures by the US and UK partially succeeded in changing Iran's expropriation of Western oil companies' assets once a regime change took place [29]. ...
Article
This study—addressing the absence of a specific and focused analysis of energy sanctions in current literature—provides a longitudinal and quantitative study of economic energy sanctions based on a global perspective. We unpack the design of economic energy sanctions by distinguishing their goals, their measures, and how they are imposed and evolve over time, with the aim of better understanding their effectiveness, cost, and implementability. Drawing on a dataset of officially reported sanctions from 1938 onwards, we find that energy sanctions were particularly frequent between 1973 and 2002, with key senders being the US, Russia, and the UN, each using different sanction regimes, goals, and measures. Analysis reveals that energy sanctions target the distribution segment of the supply chain, and are paired with non-energy sanctions. Further, when variations and changes take place in the design of sanctions, they tend to trigger counter-sanctions. Thus, a possible explanation for senders’ preference not to change or intensify sanctions is the high transaction cost associated with each change in the sanction design. We conclude that transformations and changes taking place in the global energy market are likely to influence the design of future sanctions.
... 52 These suspicions were intensified when, on February 2003, the IAEA stated that Iran was not declaring all of its activities to the agency, as it ought to do. 53 Iran was arguing that its program would be used for energy and civilian reasons; but still, the fact that it had not informed IAEA according to the NPT, raised serious concerns within the EU. 54 The EU was now on a crossroad: it wanted to conduct an alternative approach towards Iran and its WMD program. ...
Article
Full-text available
The objective of this paper is to highlight the shift of transatlantic relations from divergence to convergence; leading to a strong transatlantic unity, as it is has been formed by the positive for the international community progress of the nuclear program of Iran. In fact, the European Union (EU) did persuade the USA to restart its negotiations with Iran, after years of refusing it, which has strengthened the unity between the two parts. The EU has followed a more soft-power approach; while on the other hand, the USA has always been following a more hard-power approach. It is worth mentioning that not only has the USA been imposing economic sanctions to Iran, but it has also been threatening it with its military strength. The election of Ahmadinejad as Iranian President had deteriorated the EU- Iran relations, leading the EU to adopt a hard - power approach. During the Obama period, the EU-USA relations were in the best era ever, while most of their policies and preferences on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program were significantly converging. Thus, the transatlantic cooperation regarding Iran's issue has been closed and extensive. Both the EU and the USA had been negotiating with Iran for almost ten years until the Iran Deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA; July 14, 2015) was achieved. The efforts of the EU and the USA to address the Iranian nuclear dispute had a plurality of conceptions which was characterized as “multilateralism”. Furthermore, this paper highlights the success of the EU policy as a significant international actor. As the USA was still having no diplomatic relations with Iran, the EU did play a prominent role, as it was the only negotiator. The EU managed to convince USA to negotiate with Iran, despite the fact that the bilateral relations between the two parts had been disrupted since 1979. Moreover, the EU obtained the support of the USA, Russia and China for its initiatives regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In general, EU’s attitude played a key role in the international negotiations which led to an agreement that ensures Iran’s nuclear program can be solely used for peaceful purposes.
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Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been one of the most prominent threat discussed in the post-Cold War security studies. The article presents analyses of the European Union policies towards proliferation of WMD and the impact of the political crisis around Iranian nuclear programme on them. Based on documents of the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency, two processes are identified as the main source of the EU agenda on non-proliferation. Firstly, internal dynamics of the negotiations on the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, including performance of a specific agents promoting their ideas and interests. Secondly, the evolution of the EU role in the debate around Iranian nuclear programme between 2003–2015. Negotiations with Iran are identified as the biggest challenge for the EU policy on WMD so far, with positive conclusions about successful implementation of multilateral mechanisms.
Article
This article helps understand the change in the European Union (EU)’s policy toward North Korea. In the first phase of their relationship, the EU actively participated in the security dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and engaged North Korea through economic and humanitarian assistance. Since 2003, Europe abandoned the conciliatory approach and repeatedly condemned Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, while disengaging from regional security initiatives. This change was a byproduct of the consolidation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Two of its main features restricted the range of diplomatic options available to the EU in dealings with North Korea. The first was the designation of a possible Weapons of Mass Destruction arms race in the Middle East as an issue of highest security concern for Europe. The second was a firm commitment to the relationship with the United States in addressing security threats. In order to maintain the consistency of its foreign strategy, the EU stopped tolerating activities related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, its policies became consistent with Washington’s line of action, which required terminating economic support and discontinuing independent diplomatic engagement with the “rogue” state.
Chapter
Between 2003 and 2015, the European Union and its member states were directly involved in the management of one of the most prominent issues of international concern: how to bring the Islamic Republic of Iran to give verifiable guarantees that its nuclear programme would not be diverted to military purposes. Over the course of this 13-year-long period, a group of member states consisting of the ‘big three’, France, Germany and the UK, supported by the EU (E3/EU), shaped the European Union’s approach. The E3/EU group is the most important instance of a peculiar foreign policy practice of EU foreign policy, the ‘lead group’, which has received scarce expert and scholarly attention. This book aims to fill the gap.
Chapter
Intra-EU unity and transatlantic convergence on Iran’s nuclear issue were intrinsically tied. On the one hand, EU unity resulted from transatlantic convergence. France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) used the ‘US factor’ throughout the nuclear dispute to defend themselves from intra-EU criticisms, build support for their policy line or persuade the other member states to take difficult decisions. On the other hand, EU unity facilitated transatlantic convergence. During the Bush presidency, the E3 managed to moderate US requests for tougher action by insisting that the European Union would only support coercive measures if they were incremental, reversible and had a legal basis in Security Council resolutions. When Obama took office and steered US policy closer to EU preferences, the E3/EU could argue that EU-sanctioned coercive measures were a way to strengthen Obama’s hand in forcing Iran back to the negotiating table and fend off criticisms from America’s Middle Eastern allies and their supporters in the US Congress.
Chapter
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the High Representative () enabled the European Union to play multiple roles: initiator of a major diplomatic initiative, vigilant member of a rules-based international system, supporter of multilateral institutions and cooperative crisis management, committed transatlantic ally and non-proliferation norm-enforcer. The E3/EU experience also contributed to articulating the type identity of the European Union as a multi-actor foreign policy system encompassing both EU institutions and member states. Furthermore, the E3/EU effected a process through which the identity of member states was channelled through their EU membership. In the case of the outsiders, this happened because the management of Iran’s nuclear issue reflected an interest informed by EU membership. In the case of the insiders, this happened because the ‘EU option’ (i.e. acting through and along EU institutions) was internalised as a foreign policy practice that substantiated the E3’s self-representation as international agents.
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Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been one of the most prominent threat discussed in the post-Cold War security studies. The article presents analyses of the European Union policies towards proliferation of WMD and the impact of the political crisis around Iranian nuclear programme on them. Based on documents of the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency, two processes are identified as the main source of the EU agenda on non-proliferation. Firstly, internal dynamics of the negotiations on the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, including performance of a specific agents promoting their ideas and interests. Secondly, the evolution of the EU role in the debate around Iranian nuclear programme between 2003-2015. Negotiations with Iran are identified as the biggest challenge for the EU policy on WMD so far, with positive conclusions about successful implementation of multilateral mechanisms.
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Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a renewed risk for International Peace and Security. The conventional international mechanisms that control WMD rely on the State, but their efficiency faces specific challenges nowadays. Within this context, the EU has tried to enhance its role as a non-proliferation actor, specifically with the adoption of the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD in December 2003. This Strategy reflects the political will of EU Member States to fight against proliferation in a specific ‘European way’. This ‘European way’ is related to the nature and structure of EU, and has classical European trademarks: rule of law, multilateralism, economic and political pressure on third States, focus on the political causes of international problems, and international cooperation. To assess the EU approach, the article examines the scope, objectives and principles of the EU strategy as well as her instruments with regards to WMD. Overall, the analysis shows that the EU strategy, even if not sufficient, is effective against proliferation of WMD and, at the same time, is compatible with the main requirements of international law.
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The many indicators of military involvement in Iran's nuclear programme strongly suggest that Iran seeks more than just a latent nuclear-weapons capability, although not necessarily an all-out Manhattan Project-style effort. Depending on assumptions about technical variables, the earliest Iran might be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon is assessed to fall between the end of 2008 and 2010, a range that might be said to be within the margin of error, given the unknowns about the pro gramme and the inspectors' sharply decreased access. This timetable provides room for diplomacy. There are strong arguments, with universal appeal, for opposing an Iranian nuclear-weapons capability.
20 Honor MahonyIran Sets Deadline in EU Talks 21 IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
  • Honor Mahony
  • Eu
  • Restart With Iran
  • Eu Eu Observer
  • Observer
19 Honor Mahony, 'EU to Restart with Iran', EU Observer, 11 January 2005. 20 Honor Mahony, 'Iran Sets Deadline in EU Talks', EU Observer, 8 February 2005. 21 IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 24 September 2005, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. 22 IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 24 November 2005, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf. 23 IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 4 February 2006, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.
Europeans Plan Incentives, As Iran Says Sanctions Won't Halt Nuclear Programme', The New York Times
  • Helene Cooper
  • Warren Hoge
Helene Cooper and Warren Hoge, 'Europeans Plan Incentives, As Iran Says Sanctions Won't Halt Nuclear Programme', The New York Times, 26 February 2008.
How to End the USÁIran Standoff', International Herald Tribune
  • William Luers
  • Thomas Pickering
  • James Walsh
William Luers, Thomas Pickering and James Walsh, 'How to End the USÁIran Standoff', International Herald Tribune, 3 March 2008.
Too Late to Halt Iran's Nuclear Bomb
  • Daniel Dombey
  • Fidelius Schmid
Daniel Dombey and Fidelius Schmid, 'Too Late to Halt Iran's Nuclear Bomb, EU is Told', Financial Times, 12 February 2007.
50 Lucia Kubosova, 'EU to Avoid Extra Iran Sanctions', EU Observer.com 51 US, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of SC res
  • Berlin Says
  • France Guilty
  • Der Hypocrisy
  • Spiegel
Berlin Says US and France Guilty of Hypocrisy', Der Spiegel, 24 September 2007. 50 Lucia Kubosova, 'EU to Avoid Extra Iran Sanctions', EU Observer.com, 12 October 2007. 51 US, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007, available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. 52 IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of SC res. 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, 5