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Self and Identity
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Cascading Metaperceptions: Signal Amplification Bias as a Consequence of
Reflected Self-esteem
Jessica J. Camerona; John G. Holmesb; Jacquie D. Vorauera
a University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada b University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada
First published on: 09 August 2010
To cite this Article Cameron, Jessica J. , Holmes, John G. and Vorauer, Jacquie D.(2011) 'Cascading Metaperceptions:
Signal Amplification Bias as a Consequence of Reflected Self-esteem', Self and Identity, 10: 1, 1 — 17, First published on:
09 August 2010 (iFirst)
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/15298860903429542
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Cascading Metaperceptions: Signal Amplification
Bias as a Consequence of Reflected Self-esteem
JESSICA J. CAMERON
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
JOHN G. HOLMES
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
JACQUIE D. VORAUER
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
People expect intimate partners to understand their personality, including feelings of
self-worth. These general assumptions about transparency may influence situation-
specific estimates of how others view the self (i.e., metaperceptions). In contexts
that elicit evaluative concerns, lower self-esteem individuals, who think their chronic
self-doubts are obvious to partners, should believe that their partners will infer they
are anxious, whether they are or not. In two studies, lower self-esteem individuals
thought that their partners believed they experienced more evaluation anxiety in
comparison to higher self-esteem individuals. These metaperceptions were exag-
gerated (signal amplification) and the association between self-esteem and
metaperceptions was explained by reflected self-esteem, the belief that partners
are aware of one’s chronic self-esteem. We discuss implications for interactions with
close others.
Keywords: Metaperceptions; Self-disclosure; Self-esteem; Signal amplification
bias; Transparency; Understanding.
David has just failed an important exam in his first year of university. He feels
awful and wants to seek support from Susan, his current dating partner.
However, to seek this support, David must disclose his failure, which he fears
might elicit a negative evaluation from Susan. Such evaluation anxiety has been
linked to negative interpersonal behaviors such as inhibited social behavior
(Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) and destructive conflict strategies (Downey, Freitas,
Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998). Perhaps even more insidious, thinking that one’s
Received 28 November 2008; accepted 6 October 2009; first published online 9 August 2010.
This research was funded by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (SSHRC) to each author and by a SSHRC doctoral fellowship to the first author.
We thank Evelyn Au, Meghan Boston, Holly Haberer, Heather Finnegan, Sandra Lackenbauer,
Kent Lam, Kerri Lobb, Jennifer Meyskens, Christine Robinson, Lauren Unik, and Claire Vernon for their
assistance conducting the studies. Study 2 was part of the first author’s dissertation.
Correspondence should be addressed to: Jessica Cameron, Department of Psychology, University of
Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3T 2N2. E-mail: cameron2@ms.umanitoba.ca
Self and Identity, 10: 1–17, 2011
http://www.psypress.com/sai
ISSN: 1529-8868 print/1529-8876 online
DOI: 10.1080/15298860903429542
Ó2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
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evaluation anxiety is transparent to a partner has been linked with feeling weak,
vulnerable, and devalued, and to reports of reduced closeness (Cameron, 2003).
In this context, then, David, who fears Susan sees him as having poor self-esteem,
believes she will infer he is anxious, resulting in further negative intrapersonal and
interpersonal consequences for David. But why would David assume his fears are
obvious to Susan in the first place?
We propose that the tendency to feel generally understood (Murray, Holmes,
Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002; Reis & Shaver, 1988) and transparent
(Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) in intimate relationships contributes to the tendency to
believe specific traits are obvious to close others. If individuals assume that partners
are aware of their enduring sense of self-doubt (i.e., they are transparent), then they
might be more likely to assume that other self-esteem-related states, such as anxiety,
will also be inferred by the partner in appropriate circumstances. For example, if
David assumes that Susan knows that he generally experiences self-doubts, when he
discloses his failure he might assume that Susan will use her knowledge about his
dispositional low self-esteem to infer his heightened fears of negative evaluation in
that particular situation, whether he experiences them or not. This type of mind-
reading would result in a signal amplification bias when one’s actual anxiety is not
following these expectations or is not apparent in actual behavior. In the present
paper, we test this notion with two studies wherein dating couples disclose a personal
failure and then report perceptions of the extent to which partners would infer
evaluation anxiety (i.e., metaperceptions, or ‘‘mind-reading’’).
Who Experiences Evaluation Anxiety?
Evaluation anxiety, or concern about negative appraisals from others, is closely
linked with self-esteem, or one’s sense of self-worth. In comparison to those with
higher self-esteem (HSEs), lower self-esteem individuals (LSEs) experience greater
fears of being negatively appraised or rejected by a romantic partner (Downey &
Feldman, 1996). Overall, LSEs feel generally less valued by others (Leary, Tambor,
Terdal, & Downs, 1995) and also experience less confidence in their romantic
partners’ regard (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). This reduced sense of value
is likely further enhanced by lay theories that low self-esteem itself is undesirable
(Cameron, Holmes, McClellan, & Hole, 2009b). Regardless of the root of these
anxieties, these evaluative concerns reduce prosocial behavior (Vorauer & Turpie,
2004) and inhibited social behavior can lead to actual rejection experiences (Stinson,
Cameron, Wood, Gaucher, & Holmes, 2009). Ironically, the evaluative concerns of
LSEs may actually undermine their ability to be socially successful and ultimately,
may reinforce their low self-regard.
Although evaluative concerns are highly salient and easily accessible to LSEs
(Sinclair & Lentz, in press), certain contexts may be more insecurity-inducing than
others. For example, LSEs believe that acceptance is contingent on performance
(Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996) and thus performance-related disclosures should elicit
evaluative concerns. Consequently, participants in the present studies took a very
difficult test and then disclosed their failure experience to their current romantic
partner. Not only would the failure experience prime contingencies (Baldwin &
Sinclair, 1996), but the act of disclosing the failure to a partner should rouse
evaluative concerns (Baxter & Wilmot, 1985; DePaulo, Kahsy, Kirkendol, Wyer, &
Epstein, 1996) and should provide a context for communication between partners
where evaluative concerns would be pertinent.
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Metaperceptions
People generally believe that their inner worlds are transparent to others and
thus their self-perceptions often closely match their estimates of how they appear
to other people (i.e., their metaperceptions).
1
In fact, the closer people feel to
their friends, romantic partners, and family members, the more they assume
that these close others share their own view of themselves (Vorauer & Cameron,
2002).
Research using new acquaintances (e.g., Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998) and
close intimates (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) typically reveals that people feel more
transparent than warranted by others’ actual impressions. Although people do form
more accurate impressions with friends than with strangers (Funder & Colvin, 1988;
Stinson & Ickes, 1992), transparency overestimation persists in close relationships.
Vorauer and Cameron (2002) demonstrated that as intimacy increases, people tend
to assume more of their traits are transparent as a function of greater self–other
merging: The distinction between individuals’ own and their partner’s perspective
blurs. These increases in felt transparency outpace increases in the accuracy of actual
impressions formed in close relationships (see Cameron & Vorauer, 2008, for a
discussion). Indeed, various biases reduce the accuracy of perceptions in close
relationships (e.g., Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995). Therefore, we suggest that
close relationships may be particularly vulnerable to the phenomenon we call the
metaperception cascade.
A Metaperception Cascade
In the example with David and Susan, if David assumes his chronic self-doubts are
obvious to Susan, we propose that he would subsequently assume that Susan will use
her knowledge of his low self-esteem to infer that he would feel anxious about her
evaluation of him in specific situations, whether he does or not. In essence, feeling
transparent on a general trait leads David to believe Susan will invoke her lay theory
of low self-esteem and assume that David will experience a particular, trait-relevant
state in a situation relevant to that trait. The metaperception cascade, then, refers to
the situation where believing one self-aspect is transparent leads individuals to feel
that states related to that self-aspect will be inferred by a partner. In the present
study, we investigated whether believing that one’s low self-esteem is transparent to
another will lead LSEs to believe their partner will then assume or infer an
experience of evaluation anxiety when disclosing a personal failure to the romantic
partner.
The present studies represent the first investigations of the proposed metapercep-
tion cascade in ongoing relationships. However, in some of our previous research, we
investigated another type of metaperception cascade whereby thinking that one
state was transparent led individuals to believe another state was subsequently
conveyed. Vorauer, Cameron, Holmes, and Pearce (2003) found that insecure
individuals presumed that their inhibitions about conveying romantic interest were
transparent to a potential romantic partner. They then assumed that their potential
partner would use this information to interpret their overtures, augmenting the
meaning of the overtures in light of the fact that individuals made them despite their
inhibitions. In other words, participants engaged in signal amplification bias
whereby they exaggerated the degree to which their attraction had been
communicated.
2
Cascading Metaperceptions 3
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Because individuals believe that dispositions in general (Vorauer & Ross, 1999)
and self-esteem in particular (Cameron, Holmes, Cornelius, & Hole, 2009a) are
transparent, we predicted that lower self-esteem should be associated with lower
reflected self-esteem. In other words, LSEs would assume that their partner sees them
as having trait LSE (i.e., low reflected self-esteem) whereas HSEs would be more
likely to assume that their partners see them as being chronically HSE (i.e., high
reflected self-esteem). Consequently, we predicted that LSEs would report stronger
metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety than HSEs, because LSEs would assume that
their partners would infer they were more anxious in the evaluative situation on the
basis of their transparent low self-esteem. HSEs, on the other hand, would assume
that their partner would interpret their behavior consistent with their theory about
the experiences of a confident person, and would thus report lower metaperceptions
of evaluation anxiety. We anticipated that enhanced metaperceptions of evaluation
anxiety would be driven, at least in part, by reflected self-esteem, which forms the
basis for viewing the self through the partner’s eyes. Thus, we predicted that reflected
self-esteem would partially mediate the relation between self-esteem and metaper-
ceptions of evaluation anxiety.
Importantly, we propose that the belief that a partner is aware of one’s self-esteem
does not automatically lead one to feel transparent in all contexts. Rather, for the
cascade to occur, people must be in situations where they could potentially reveal
their chronic low self-esteem. When in these contexts people would then assume their
partner would rely on their impressions of their chronic levels of self-worth to infer
their situation-specific evaluative concerns. However, when the situation was
relatively safe, where the possibility of revealing evaluation anxiety was low, we
anticipated that metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety would also be low. For
example, if David had LSE, he would only feel that his evaluative concerns had been
revealed to Susan if he had disclosed the failure but not if he had opted to discuss a
neutral topic. That is, we predicted that LSEs would only report enhanced
metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety when they disclosed the personal failure and
not when they discussed a neutral topic with a partner. Essentially, we are suggesting
that people are situation by person interaction theorists in everyday life (see Idson &
Mischel, 2001).
Although people may believe that they have revealed their vulnerability, we
expected that their behavior will not have clearly signaled their evaluation anxiety to
others. In addition to partners’ motivated perception and partners’ projection
tendencies, evaluation anxiety may be particularly difficult to accurately perceive in
comparison to other, more observable states and traits (e.g., Ambady, Hallahan, &
Rosenthal, 1995). Perhaps even more important, we assumed that partners would not
have a good understanding of individuals’ actual self-esteem levels, thus complicat-
ing the metaperception cascade right from the start. Indeed, some preliminary data
suggest that people do not form accurate impressions of each other’s self-esteem
levels (Cameron et al., 2009a). Thus, we expected that the enhanced metaperceptions
of LSEs who disclosed the failure would result in a signal amplification bias, whereby
metaperceptions exceeded partner’s actual impressions.
Overview of Studies
In the first study, we tested our predictions by randomly assigning participants to
either disclose a personal failure or to disclose a neutral experience to a romantic
partner. To ensure consistency across participants, all participants experienced both
4J. J. Cameron et al.
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a personal failure and a neutral exercise while in the lab. We hypothesized that LSEs
would experience signal amplification when they disclosed the failure but not when
they disclosed the neutral topic. We anticipated that HSEs would be protected from
signal amplification because their reflected self-esteem would be high in both
situations, leading to believing that little evaluation anxiety would be inferred by
their partner. In the second study, we explored whether the predicted enhanced
metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety of LSEs were driven by their beliefs that their
partner understood their chronic low self-esteem. That is, we tested whether reflected
self-esteem mediated the link between LSE and stronger metaperceptions of
evaluation anxiety.
Study 1: Persons in Situations
One member of each dating couple was assigned to be the actor and the other took
on the partner role. All actors took a difficult test and received failure feedback.
However, we assigned some actors to disclose this event to a partner and others to
disclose a neutral experience. Thus, although all actors experienced an in-lab failure,
half were randomly assigned to discuss the failure whereas the other half were
assigned to discuss an irrelevant lab task. The discussion of the failure was intended
to provide a context ripe for the inference of evaluation anxiety.
In Study 1 we sought to test two major predictions. First, do LSEs really
exaggerate how much evaluation anxiety their partner will infer when disclosing a
failure but not when disclosing a neutral task? Second, are the predicted effects for
signal amplification bias unique to evaluation anxiety or do they translate to other
moods? We anticipated that although the failure would rouse negative moods, only
evaluation anxiety would be subject to signal amplification because evaluation
anxiety is a state specifically related to self-esteem.
Method
Participants
Sixty-one introductory psychology students in heterosexual dating relationships that
had lasted for at least 3 months but no more than 6 years were recruited along with
their partners. Participants from introductory psychology courses received partial
course credit for participation and all other participants received $10. Two couples
were dropped from the analyses because one member of the dyad did not follow
instructions.
3
For the remaining 59 couples, the mean age was approximately 18.88
years (range 17 to 21 years) and the average relationship length was 22.2 months
(range 3 to 63 months).
4
Procedure
Participants arrived with their partner at the laboratory for a study on
communication. After being informed that their responses would be confidential
and not shared with their partners, both members of a couple then completed the
preliminary questionnaire. Along with unrelated inventories, the preliminary
questionnaire contained a demographic assessment and the 10-item Rosenberg
(1965) Self-Esteem Inventory, a(59) ¼.87.
The member of each couple who had been recruited from introductory
psychology classes was assigned to the actor role. This resulted in the female
partner being assigned to the actor role in 48 couples. Participants were
Cascading Metaperceptions 5
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informed that actors would make a video for their partner, who would watch the
actor’s tape.
Actors. After the preliminary survey, actors completed two tasks designed to
provide them with a novel experience to describe to their partner. First, actors
completed a relatively straightforward picture task that required them to locate
hidden objects and detect differences between similar photographs. Participants
received no feedback on their performance on this non-diagnostic task.
Second, actors completed a test on the computer. Actors were informed that the
test was an important indicator of future job performance and that because it was a
standardized test, they would receive feedback automatically. In reality, the test was
designed to be very difficult and contained items similar to those found in the verbal
section of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE; Fein & Spencer, 1997). All
actors received feedback that they had done poorly on each subscale of the test
(overall performance was 41%). Next, actors were asked to make a videotaped
message for their partner. Half of the actors were randomly assigned to discuss the
failure experience (concern condition) and the other half were asked to discuss the
irrelevant lab experience (control condition). Actors were informed that they were
only asked to discuss one of the events in the lab. All actors received a sheet of
several prompts to ensure they discussed several aspects of the lab experience (e.g.,
concern condition: What were the questions like? Give an approximate example;
control condition: What were the pictures like? Give at least one example). To ensure
that all actors in the concern condition disclosed the failure, participants received a
prompt (‘‘How well did you perform on the test? Give partner your total score’’) to
disclose their score in addition to describing the test-taking experience. All
videotapes were coded to ensure that the actors had complied.
Partners. Meanwhile partners completed the preliminary questionnaire and a
short series of filler tasks disguised as tasks that they would later describe on
videotape. When the actor had finished making the videotape describing their test-
taking experiences, partners watched the videotape. Next, partners completed the
dependent measures.
At the end of the study, participants completed a relationship affirmation exercise.
Lastly, partners were fully debriefed together.
Dependent Measures
Actors. Actors were first asked to indicate what impression their partners would
form about their evaluation anxiety from viewing their videotape (i.e., metaperceptions
of evaluation anxiety). Actors answered three items (‘‘My partner probably thinks that I
was feeling vulnerable in terms of what he/she might think of me; My partner would
think I was worried that he/she would be disappointed in me; My partner would think
that I was worried about the possibility that he/she would view me negatively’’) using 7-
point scales (1 ¼not at all,7¼extremely); a(59) ¼.79. To conceal the focus on
evaluation anxiety and to provide a comparison, actors also indicated their
metaperceptions with regard to three positive—e.g., ‘‘My partner probably thinks
that I was feeling proud’’ (excited, relaxed)—and two negative—e.g., ‘‘My partner
probably thinks that I was feeling nervous’’ (embarrassed) emotions; as¼.84.
Actors also indicated the extent to which they experienced their vulnerability and
worry while making the videotaped message for their partner (i.e., self-perceptions of
evaluation anxiety) using a modified version the three items described above
6J. J. Cameron et al.
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(e.g., ‘‘I was feeling vulnerable in terms of what my partner might think of me’’).
Again, participants answered using the same 7-point scale; a(59) ¼.81. As with
evaluation anxiety, actors also indicated their experience of the positive and negative
emotions; as¼.82.
Partners. After watching the actors’ videotape, partners indicated what emotions
they believed the actor experienced while describing the test-taking experience (i.e.,
impressions of evaluation anxiety). Partners responded to a modified version of the
actor’s evaluation anxiety items (e.g., ‘‘My partner probably felt worried that I
would view him/her negatively’’) using a 7-point scale (1 ¼not at all,7¼extremely);
a(59) ¼.81. Partners also indicated their impressions of the actor’s positive and
negative emotions; as¼.61.
Results
Analysis Strategy
To test for the influence of self-esteem and the manipulation of self-disclosure, we
used hierarchical linear regressions. The first step contained the main effects for
centered (Aiken & West, 1991) self-esteem (M¼7.50, SD ¼1.10) and condition
(effect coded; 1 ¼Control;71¼Concern) and the second step contained the
interaction between self-esteem and condition. In our initial analyses, we included
gender and partner’s self-esteem level. The results did not reveal any significant main
effects for these variables, nor did they reveal any significant interactions with these
variables. Thus, they are not discussed any further.
Perceptions of Evaluation Anxiety
We expected that LSEs would experience greater evaluation anxiety overall and that
actors who were asked to reveal their failure would also experience greater
evaluation anxiety. Our predictions were supported: When the criterion was self-
perceptions of anxiety, the main effects were significant but the interaction was not,
b¼.15, t51.2. First, LSEs experienced greater evaluation anxiety (Y
ˆ¼2.79) than
did HSEs (Y
ˆ¼1.96), b¼7.34, t(56) ¼72.63, p¼.01. Second, those in the
evaluation concern condition reported marginally greater evaluation anxiety
(Y
ˆ¼2.65) than those in the control condition (Y
ˆ¼1.45), b¼7.23, t(56) ¼71.85,
p¼.07.
Signal amplification bias. Next we tested our main prediction that disclosing the
failure would lead LSEs to exaggerate the extent to which their partners would infer
evaluation anxiety in contrast to HSEs who disclosed the failure. We first calculated
a variable to represent signal amplification bias by subtracting partners’ impressions
from actors’ metaperceptions. Thus, scores above zero indicated signal amplifica-
tion. We then regressed self-esteem, condition, and the two-way interaction onto the
signal amplification score. Although the main effects of self-esteem and condition
were not significant, the interaction between actor’s self-esteem and condition was
significant, b¼.34, t(55) ¼2.77, p5.01 (see Figure 1). Simple effects testing revealed
that in the concern condition, LSEs experienced greater signal amplification than
HSEs, b¼7.57, t(55) ¼73.32, p5.01. In the control condition, self-esteem was
not significantly related to signal amplification, b¼.11, t51. Also, LSE actors
experienced greater signal amplification in the concern condition than LSE actors in
the control condition, b¼7.41, t(55) ¼72.31, p5.05. To put it in perspective,
Cascading Metaperceptions 7
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LSEs who self-disclosed the failure experienced signal amplification in that their
metaperceptions were just over 1 full scale point above their partner’s impression.
However, LSEs in the control condition and HSEs in the concern condition
exhibited the opposite pattern, thinking their partners inferred less than their
partners actually perceived.
Importantly, we then conducted the same regression on metaperceptions and
impressions separately. Conducting these tests allowed us to tease apart whether the
effects on signal amplification (the difference score) was driven by effects on the
components of the difference score, metaperceptions and impressions (see Griffin,
Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999). We expected to find an interaction on metaperceptions
but not on impressions of evaluation anxiety. If believing chronic self-esteem is
transparent leads LSEs to exaggerate their metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety,
which in turn leads to signal amplification bias, then we should see a significant
interaction on metaperceptions. Results indicated a significant interaction for
metaperceptions, b¼.24, t(55) ¼2.16, p5.05 (see Figure 2), and a marginally
significant interaction for impressions, b¼7.24, t(55) ¼71.87, p¼.07 (see
Figure 3), suggesting that the effects on signal amplification are driven by effects
FIGURE 1 Signal amplification on evaluation anxiety as a function of self-esteem
and condition (Study 1).
FIGURE 2 Metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety as a function of self-esteem and
condition (Study 1).
8J. J. Cameron et al.
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on metaperceptions and to a slightly lesser extent by effects on impressions. As
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the pattern of effects for metaperceptions and
impressions diverge, each contributing to the interaction between self-esteem and
condition on signal amplification.
When conducting simple effects tests, LSEs reported heightened metaperceptions
in comparison to HSEs in the concern condition, b¼7.66, t(55) ¼74.28, p5.001,
and to LSE actors in the control condition, b¼7.55, t(55) ¼73.41, p5.01.
However, self-esteem was unrelated to metaperceptions in the control condition,
b¼7.18, t51. Unexpectedly, the opposite pattern was observed for impressions.
Here, actors’ self-esteem was unrelated to partners’ impressions in the concern
condition, b¼.14, t51, but in the control condition, the partners of LSEs perceived
marginally greater levels of evaluation anxiety than the partners of HSE actors,
b¼7.33, t(55) ¼71.84, p¼.07. However, the marginal interaction with impres-
sions seems driven by the tendency of partners to infer more evaluative concerns in
HSEs in the concern condition relative to HSEs in the control condition, b¼7.44,
t(54) ¼72.51, p5.05. Perhaps LSEs were more actively inhibiting expressions of
anxiety in the concern condition than in the control condition, leading to this
marginal interaction on impressions.
Controlling for self-perceived evaluation anxiety did not change the pattern nor
significance of the interaction on signal amplification bias, b¼.25, t(54) ¼2.53,
p¼.01. Nor did controlling for self-perceived evaluation anxiety substantially alter
the self-esteem by condition interactions for metaperceptions, b¼.14, t(54) ¼1.88,
p¼.06, and impressions of evaluation anxiety, b¼7.21, t(54) ¼71.63, p¼.10.
Overall, this suggests that the driving force behind the enhanced metaperceptions of
LSEs in the concern condition is not their own experience of anxiety (and thus its
possible transparency), but their inferences about how their partner will see them.
Perceptions of Other Moods
We next turned to investigating whether the effects reported were unique to
evaluation anxiety or whether they generalized to other emotions. We hypothesized
that the previously reported pattern would be unique to evaluation anxiety and
would not replicate with other moods less directly related to self-esteem or the
context of self-disclosing a failure. To address this issue, we conducted the same
FIGURE 3 Partner’s impressions of actor’s evaluation anxiety as a function of self-
esteem and condition (Study 1).
Cascading Metaperceptions 9
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regressions using self-perceptions of other moods as the criterion. Here, there was
only a significant main effect for self-esteem, b¼.27, t(56) ¼2.10, p5.05, whereby
LSEs experienced less positive moods (Y
ˆ¼3.48) than did HSEs (Y
ˆ¼4.07). When
signal amplification on other moods was the criterion, no significant effects resulted.
When metaperceptions of other moods was the criterion, only a significant main
effect for self-esteem resulted, b¼.31, t(56) ¼72.48, p5.05, whereby LSEs thought
they expressed less positive mood (Y
ˆ¼3.38) than did HSEs (Y
ˆ¼4.06). However,
this effect disappeared when self-perceptions of other moods was controlled
suggesting that the driving force behind this effect is transparency overestimation
(e.g., Vorauer & Ross, 1999). When impressions of negative mood were the criterion,
there were no significant effects. In support of our argument, then, LSEs are not
simply more vulnerable to signal amplification bias for all emotions.
Discussion
As expected, LSE actors exaggerated their metaperceptions and engaged in signal
amplification when they disclosed the failure, compared to HSE actors, suggesting
that only LSEs are susceptible to amplifying this signal in this evaluative context.
Importantly, LSEs were only more vulnerable to signal amplification with regard to
the trait-relevant state, evaluation anxiety, when disclosing the failure. That is, LSEs
experience signal amplification on evaluation anxiety when disclosing the failure but
not when disclosing the irrelevant picture task. This demonstrates that it is not
simply any self-disclosure that heightens metaperceptions of evaluative concerns
but specifically negative self-relevant disclosures. Additionally, LSEs engaged in
greater signal amplification on evaluation anxiety, but not on other negative or
positive moods when disclosing a failure to a romantic partner. In our next study,
we directly assessed whether this pattern could be explained by cascading
metaperceptions, whereby perceptions of the transparency of trait low self-esteem
leads to enhanced metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety when disclosing a personal
failure.
Study 2: The Role of Reflected Self-esteem
We had two main goals for the second study. First, we wished to replicate our
findings regarding the association between self-esteem and metaperceptions of
evaluation anxiety. And, second, we wanted to explore reflected self-esteem as a
potential mediator of this link. If signal amplification bias for LSEs who disclosed a
failure is caused by metaperceptions outpacing actual impressions as demonstrated
in Study 1, what causes metaperceptions to be exaggerated? We expected that LSEs
would be more likely to believe their partners thought they had low esteem, as some
preliminary research has demonstrated. In other words, LSEs assume their partners
are aware of their low self-regard (i.e., low reflected self-esteem) and HSEs expect
their partners to be aware of their high self-regard (i.e., high reflected self-esteem).
We anticipated that if LSEs believed their chronic low self-esteem was transparent to
their partner, then they would expect their partner to use this trait information when
inferring their evaluation anxiety in the present situation. We hypothesized that
LSEs would be associated with enhanced metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety and
that this link would be at least partially mediated by reflected self-esteem. In Study 2,
all participants experienced a failure in the lab and were asked to create a video
disclosure about the failure, just as did the actors in Study 1. To enhance the realism
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of the situation, actors were informed that their partner would be recruited for a
later session.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven University of Waterloo introductory psychology students (20 female;
7 male) in heterosexual, exclusively dating relationships that had lasted more than
three months and who had indicated that their partner might be able to participate at
a later date, participated in exchange for partial course credit. The mean age was
approximately 19.22 years (range 17 to 22 years) and the average length of
relationship was 18.46 months (range 4 to 39 months).
Procedure and Measures
Participants were informed that at a later date the researcher would contact the
participants’ partners to come into the lab to view the videotapes that participants
would soon make. Although we never intended to bring in partners, it was important
that participants believed that their partner might actually view their self-disclosure.
Participants first completed the preliminary questionnaire containing the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory, a(27) ¼.81. After filling out a few filler surveys,
participants completed our assessment of reflected self-esteem by responding to the
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale from the partner’s metaperspective. For example,
the item ‘‘I feel that I have a number of good qualities’’ was converted to ‘‘My
partner thinks that I feel that I have a number of good qualities’’. Participants
responded using a 9-point scale (1 ¼very strongly disagree,9¼very strongly agree),
a(27) ¼.83.
For exploratory purposes, participants completed three assessments of relation-
ship quality from Marigold, Holmes, and Ross (2007). First, participants completed
a 4-item assessment of relationship satisfaction (e.g., ‘‘I am extremely happy with our
relationship’’). Next participants completed a 4-item assessment of relationship
commitment (e.g., ‘‘I would never consider leaving my partner’’). Lastly, participants
indicated their perceived regard on three items (e.g., ‘‘I am totally confident that my
partner sees many good qualities in me’’). The reliabilities of all measures were high,
a(27) ¼.85, .90, and .77, respectively.
The computerized test and video procedure was identical to that used in Study 1.
When participants had completed making their tape, they were given the dependent
measures. As in the previous study, participants indicated their metaperceptions and
self-perceptions of evaluation anxiety. Participants responded using 7-point scales
(1 ¼not at all,7¼extremely); a(27) ¼.90 and .81, respectively.
Results
Perceptions of Evaluation Anxiety
To examine the relation between self-esteem and perceptions of evaluation anxiety,
we conducted Pearson correlation coefficients between the target variables. As in
Study 1, our first step was to explore the association between self-esteem and self-
perceptions of evaluation anxiety. Self-esteem and self-perceptions of evaluation
anxiety were not significantly correlated, r(27) ¼7.10. Next, we tested whether our
prediction that self-esteem would be negatively related to enhanced metaperceptions
of evaluation anxiety. As anticipated and in replication of the previous study, lower
Cascading Metaperceptions 11
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self-esteem actors were (marginally) more likely to report stronger metaperceptions
of evaluation anxiety, r(27) ¼7.33, p¼.09. Although this effect doesn’t meet the
traditional significance level, this is likely due to the smaller sample size and is
significant in a one-tailed test (p5.05). Furthermore, controlling for self-perceived
evaluation anxiety did not reduce, and in fact somewhat enhanced, the association
between self-esteem and metaperceptions, r(26) ¼7.37, p¼.06.
Reflected Self-esteem as a Mechanism
We next tested our predicted mediation model (see Figure 4) whereby participant’s
beliefs about their partner’s impression of their dispositional self-esteem (i.e.,
reflected self-esteem) would mediate the link between self-esteem and metapercep-
tions of evaluation anxiety using the basic steps outlined by Baron and Kenny
(1986). First, as described above, self-esteem marginally predicted metaperceptions
of evaluation anxiety, b¼7.33, t(25) ¼71.76, p¼.09. Second, self-esteem was
highly related to our mediator, reflected self-esteem, whereby those with lower self-
esteem felt that their partner was more aware of chronic insecurities, b¼.71,
t(25) ¼5.02, p5.01. When we entered both self-esteem and reflected self-esteem as
predictors of metaperceptions, reflected self-esteem was significantly and strongly
associated with metaperceptions, b¼7.65, t(24) ¼72.71, p¼.01. Importantly, the
association between self-esteem and metaperceptions was reduced, b¼7.13, t51.
A Sobel’s (1982) test revealed that the indirect effect was significant, Z¼2.37,
p5.05, and controlling for self-perceived evaluation anxiety at every step in the
mediation model did not alter the results, Z¼2.49, p5.05. Thus, it appears that
part of the reason that LSEs had such exaggerated metaperceptions was due to their
belief that their partner’s chronic understanding of their insecurities would influence
their perceptions of them in this particular situation.
Alternative mechanisms. Does reflected self-esteem act as a proxy for relationship
quality variables such as perceived regard, relationship satisfaction or commitment
that might also explain the link between self-esteem and metaperceptions of anxiety?
To address this question, we replaced reflected self-esteem with perceived regard,
relationship satisfaction, and commitment in three different mediation models. In
each case, when self-esteem and the new mediator were entered into a regression to
simultaneously predict metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety, the mediator did not
significantly predict metaperceptions (b¼.10, t51 for perceived regard, b¼7.06,
t51 for satisfaction, and b¼7.11, t51 for commitment). Consequently, it
appears that reflected self-esteem uniquely predicts and mediates the relation
FIGURE 4 The metaperception cascade: A mediation model (Study 2). Note:
Values on paths are standardized regression coefficients. *p5.05;
{
p5.10.
12 J. J. Cameron et al.
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between self-esteem and metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety. Most importantly,
reflected self-esteem is not redundant with perceived regard as reflected self-esteem
uniquely mediates the association between self-esteem and metaperceptions of
anxiety.
Discussion
As in the previous study, when disclosing a personal failure, LSEs thought their
partners inferred greater evaluation anxiety than HSEs. As expected, we found
support for the proposed cascading metaperceptions mechanism: The lower people’s
self-esteem, the more likely they were to believe that their partner thought they were
dispositionally low in self-esteem. Believing their trait low self-esteem was
transparent contributed to their sense that their partner would see them as
particularly worried about their evaluation when they disclosed the failure. Indeed,
the associations between self-esteem and reflected self-esteem and between reflected
self-esteem and metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety were remarkably strong,
b4.6 in magnitude, demonstrating the robustness of the effect.
General Discussion
In the present research, the more LSEs believed their partners knew about their
dispositional low self-esteem, the more they felt their partners would infer their
evaluation anxiety when disclosing a personal failure to a romantic partner.
Importantly, the metaperceptions of LSEs were exaggerated and indicative of a
signal amplification bias; LSEs thought their partners would infer more anxiety than
the partners in fact reported. Study 2 revealed that the link between self-esteem and
metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety was mediated by reflected self-esteem. In
other words, LSEs expected their partners to ‘‘read their minds’’ by using their
preexisting knowledge about their chronic self-doubts to infer their present
evaluative concerns when disclosing a personal failure. HSEs also thought their
self-esteem was known to their partners yet they did not expect their partners to
infer evaluation anxiety because HSE is not linked with feeling evaluative concerns
in lay theories of self-esteem (Cameron et al., 2009b). Although the present paper
primarily focused on the signal amplification of evaluation anxiety, we speculate that
the same process of cascading metaperceptions might also create exaggerated
metaperceptions in HSEs in contexts that draw out states linked with HSE (e.g.,
confidence).
Alternative Explanations
We argue that the pattern of results reported here represent cascading metapercep-
tions. Could the results also support the notion that some people simply feel more
transparent on everything? Or could our results simply suggest that a general sense
of transparency is associated with specific estimates of transparency? We think not.
Study 1 demonstrated that this metaperception cascade was specific, not general:
LSEs only exaggerated their metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety when they
disclosed a personal failure but not when they discussed a neutral topic. In addition,
LSEs did not exaggerate their metaperceptions of other emotions; indeed, signal
amplification seemed to be unique to evaluative concerns for LSEs when disclosing a
personal failure.
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In our second study we also addressed whether relationship quality or perceived
regard, instead of reflected self-esteem could explain the relation between self-
esteem and metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety. Our results suggested that
reflected self-esteem was a unique variable and uniquely mediated the relation
between self-esteem and metaperceptions of evaluation anxiety. Importantly,
believing that a partner thought you had LSE was not akin to feeling negatively
regarded by that partner, suggesting that our effects cannot be explained away by
arguing that feeling devalued is reflected by believing one always comes across
negatively.
Implications for Theory
In the present research, believing that a partner was aware of a trait (low self-esteem)
led individuals who possessed a strong standing in that trait (LSEs) to assume that a
trait-relevant state (evaluation anxiety) would be transparent in trait-relevant
contexts (self-disclosure of a personal shortcoming). We suspect that such
metaperception cascades can occur with a variety of traits, states, and contexts. In
general, then, cascading metaperceptions refers to the process that occurs when
people assume one self-aspect is transparent and consequently exaggerate the degree
to which others infer their experience of related self-aspects. Ultimately, this process
can lead to a signal amplification bias. Presumably, the necessary ingredient in
constructing a cascade is the linkage between trait, state, and situation. In the present
research, when the context was not trait relevant (e.g., disclosing a neutral task),
signal amplification did not occur. Additionally, when the state was not relevant to
the trait or context (e.g., other moods when disclosing a failure), signals were not
amplified by LSEs.
Consider another trait—introversion, for example. The more individuals believe
their introversion is known to a friend, the more they would think their friend
assumes they are experiencing discomfort when engaged in a social situation (e.g., a
party with strangers), even if they were not actually experiencing discomfort in that
context. Misunderstandings could easily result and in this particular example, friends
may provide unnecessary reassurance, prematurely curtail the evening, or shelter
their introverted friend. However, the degree to which a person believes their
introversion is transparent may have little to do with their estimates of how much
their friend understands their enjoyment of a particular artwork, a context unrelated
to introversion. Exploring cascading metaperceptions in other domains might be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
Implications for Relationships. Misunderstanding a partner’s personality has
been linked with deficits in relationship satisfaction and stability (e.g., Kobak &
Hazan, 1991; Newmark, Woody, & Ziff, 1977). One explanation for this association,
as our results suggest, is that misunderstanding a partner’s personality could
manifest itself in frequent signal amplification. An exaggerated sense of transparency
could lead to miscommunication, negative affect, conflict, and even relationship
dissolution (Cameron & Vorauer, 2008; Gilovich, Kruger, & Savitsky, 1999). In fact,
Eidelson and Epstein (1982) proposed that the tendency to assume one’s partner
knows what one is thinking or feeling, labeled ‘‘expected mind-reading,’’ is a
dysfunctional belief that is likely to undermine healthy relationships. In the context
studied here, such misperceptions may lead to disappointment in a partner’s
responsiveness: If I think my partner believes that I worry about what he or she
thinks of me, then I should expect my partner to reassure me if he or she truly cared.
14 J. J. Cameron et al.
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Because LSEs’ metaperceptions of their chronic low self-worth were exaggerated,
any expectations about a partner’s responsiveness would be unrealistic.
Conclusions
Our research included several methodological strengths. First, the present research is
the first investigation into the mechanisms behind signal amplification in ongoing
relationships. Second, the present studies are the first to investigate how feeling
understood by a partner might impact perceptions in specific situations. Third, we
followed an experimental approach, creating a real trait-relevant situation in the lab
(a real failure and disclosure) among actual dating partners. This approach allowed
us to hold the types of disclosures constant across conditions. Moreover, by having
participants experience both the failure and the neutral task in the lab, we ensured
that the only difference between conditions was the type of disclosure, not the
experience of participants prior to disclosure.
In the present studies, LSEs expected their partners to use their knowledge of their
chronic low self-esteem to infer their situationally-based anxiety. However, partners
in fact did not interpret their behavior in the anticipated manner, resulting in signal
amplification. That is, LSEs believed their partners would infer considerable anxiety,
when, in fact, partners did not detect the degree of evaluation anxiety that disclosers
expected or infer it. Further, the current research suggests that expecting a partner to
‘‘mind-read’’ one’s psychological states is based on relatively sophisticated theories
about how their partners will interpret their situational states. Consequently, we
should be able to predict on theoretical grounds the particular situations where
signal amplification is apt to occur. Such prediction should bolster intervention
programs aimed at improving communication between individuals in ongoing
relationships.
Notes
1. The term reflected appraisals also refers to perceptions of how one is viewed by others
and could be used interchangeably with our reference to metaperceptions.
2. For a discussion on the distinction between illusion of transparency and signal
amplification bias refer to Cameron and Vorauer (2008).
3. In both cases, the actor did not report their score in the concern condition, so the
couple was eliminated from the analyses.
4. Data collected from this sample but unrelated to the present paper was reported in
Cameron, Holmes, and Vorauer (2009c).
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