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Husserl on the Teachings of the Buddha

The Humanistic Psychologist
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Abstract

A previously untranslated essay by Edmund Husserl on the subject of Buddhism is presented along with a commentary on parallels between the methods of transcendental phenomenology and Buddhism. Eugen Fink's comment that the stages of phenomenological method are essentially stages of Buddhist self‐discipline is explored in the context of why Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was not taken up by other phenomenologists. The authors speculate that Husserl may have encountered realms of experience outside that of the majority of phenomenologists due to an advanced level of introspective ability on Husserl's part, that allowed him to access the transcendental domain of experience.
... Especially given the similarities between Husserl's representational/analytic phenomenology and the more presentational states of the Eastern meditative traditions, in both their techniques of detachment and realized "pure consciousness"and as noted by both transpersonal psychologists (Hanna, 1995) and phenomenologists (Louchakova-Schwartz, 2017, 2019), it is not surprising that the later Heidegger, William James, and the contemporary phenomenologists Michel Henry (2008Henry ( , 2009 and Jean-Luc Marion (2002) have in very different ways understood numinous experience as its own spontaneous version "in feeling" of a more primary phenomenology of all consciousness. ...
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Numinous experience—as the felt sense of the sacred—evokes feelings of allone unity, communality, humility, and healing. Its schematization in the absolutes of traditional religion can also be seen as all-encompassing symbolic unifications of an otherwise fragmented human life-world—as more analytically depicted in the life-world phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. In both feeling and concept the numinous would be the semantic amplification of the more concrete organism-surround nonduality of non symbolic organisms—as reflected in a primary consciousness shared across Uexkuell’s sentient animal umwelten and Gibson’s “envelopes of flow.” H usserl’s phenomenology of passive synthesis and James on pure experience can be understood as intuiting the implicit forms underlying such a primary transspecies consciousness, as both differentiated into these concrete lifeworlds, to the level of the inferably sentient protozoa, and abstractly amplified as the human numinous. The latter, with its original social template in an ethically responsible shamanism, becomes similarly responsible in the contemporary context of a human caused global climate crisis for the care and conservation of that Spirit it both develops as such and accurately intuits as a universal is-like shared with all sentient beings.
... To this end, the FOM facilitates client liberation from the negative psychological effects of oppression by bringing cognitive practices into alignment with existential theories on freedom and being. Functioning across three existentially framed stages and 12 cognitively framed steps, the FOM draws upon cognitive, existential-phenomenological, and mindfulness methods compatible with existential premises (Hanna, 1993(Hanna, , 1995. As an oppression-informed therapy and multicultural approach, the FOM maintains that while clients must determine the meaning of liberation and authenticity for themselves, counselors provide support and guidance through the change process. ...
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The freedom‐from oppression model is an integrative conceptual and practical framework for addressing the deleterious impact of oppression on clients. Applying multiculturally grounded counseling strategies as well as various techniques across three existential‐humanistic stages and 12 cognitive intervention steps, the proposed model supports counselor and client discovery of psychological freedom‐from oppression.
... It turns out that Husserl did engage with the Buddhist literature-the Pali Canon had just been translated into German-and even wrote a short note expressing his feelings about what he had read. Thanks to Fred Hanna (1995; see also Hanna, Wilkinson, and Givens 2017), we have an English translation of that 1925 note entitled "On the Teachings of Gotama [Gautama] Buddha." In that note, Husserl seems to thoroughly identify with the aims and methods of Buddhist phenomenology: ...
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Our species of hominin, Homo sapiens, is an extremely social animal. We are born with social brains. The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is a methodological approach to social consciousness that offers significant advantages in terms of uncovering and describing the essential structures of our social perceptions and actions. This is especially true in this period of post‐neuro‐turn social science, because the structures described by Husserlian “pure” phenomenology with its emphasis upon “returning to the things,” performing reductions, and developing the skills available to the phenomenological attitude are in synch with neuroscientific research on the neural correlates of consciousness. For the anthropology of consciousness, the Husserlian methodology allows us to explore consciousness in cross‐cultural settings in greater detail and depth of understanding. This is especially the case with respect to the experience of intersubjectivity, the roots of which are found to be part of the inherent life‐world that all normal humans depend upon to true their experiences of the environing world, regardless of cultural background. The Husserlian approach to intersubjectivity challenges the discipline of anthropology to move past its knee‐jerk distinction between nature and nurture, and its erroneous assumption that human experience is somehow “culture all the way down.”
... The direct oppositional interlocutors that the Buddha is said to be arguing against in these claims about impermanence are the ideas of a universal Soul, popular in contemporaneous Upaniṣadic conceptions of ātman (related to today's Hinduism (Hadot 1998) to Husserl (Hanna 1995) and Heidegger (1962) (as well as Deleuze, Varela and Maturana and many others -see Geismar, Otto and Warner in this volume), impermanence is elaborated in different ways in many different philosophic traditions. 4 Almond (1988), Hallisey (1995) and others have pointed out the constructed nature of a single global representation of Buddhism, and even of a single Theravāda Buddhism (Skilling et al. 2012;Collins 1990). ...
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In most societies in Melanesia, people perceive death not as an inevitable end, but as renewal. This is expressed through ritual objects that are not seen to outlast human lives. Instead, these ephemeral objects give value to principles of balance and continuity in people’s social lives. But what happens when this impermanence of objects is forced towards permanence through pacification processes enforced by missionisation and government policy and their respective projects of conversion, institutionalisation and conservation? This chapter explores the ways in which Asmat of West Papua struggle to reconcile the permanence of this ‘pacification’ with indigenous logics of impermanence. In the past, ritual cycles aimed at securing ces, the Asmat equivalent of mana (‘strength’, ‘fertility’, ‘prestige’), which was deemed essential for constant renewal and averting entropy. In many of the rituals, woodcarvings mediated between a variety of entities that needed to be brought in balance. Once the ceremonies were completed these carvings were left to ‘decay’ to perpetuate ces. Nowadays, the pacification enforced through missionisation, government policy and commodification of carvings prompt people to reflect critically on impermanence in relation to concerns around the future of their societies. We investigate the Asmat assessment of permanence and impermanence to highlight the complexities, existential dilemmas and anxieties that occur when inherently ephemeral objects come to emblematise or mark ‘Asmat culture’, not just in Indonesia but worldwide.
... -Буддизм и феноменология Ряд феноменолов [Larrabee 1981;Hanna 1995;Sharf 2016;Li 2016;Lusthaus 2002;Hashi 2015; Kwok-ying web и др.] усматривают близость идей Гуссерля к йогачаре. В контексте философии сознания получили также развитие сравнительные исследования феноменологического метода и буддийской медитации как сходных методов изучения сознания от первого лица (first-person methods) [см. ...
Chapter
This chapter is about our faith—the Methodology—we believe that, almost like a religion, research is not more important than its adopted worldview or lifeworld. The whole book is surrounded and covered by the ontological position in this chapter. Here we have four headings—delineate the four philosophical streams—guide the entire study. The second heading limns the study’s context and then lays the instruments out of this Methodology following a methodological limitation reflection. Our first stream is for ourselves. We have been repairing the ‘self’ as a researcher. Then we followed the Critical stance of knowledge, traced back from Al-Farabi (872–950) and Saadia Gaon (882–942). Our Third source of understanding generated came from the post-structuralist movement. Our final justifications come with two stands. One is the Indigenous Gnoseology, the root of knowledge practice, and the Decolonial Knowledge in social science and Tenets of Methodology. The order of philosophical trends is paced in terms of origin, not the influentially, yet, as a whole, enriched our ‘being’—the methodological acumen.
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Although phenomenologist Edmund Husserl's project was not directed at transpersonal experiences, his methods are nevertheless applicable in a profound and effective way. We explore Husserl's project and its methods for their relevance to transpersonal studies. Husserl laid out the proposition that science, including psychology, must be grounded in the study of perception, which after all is the source of all data of interest to the sciences. He held that until the essential structures of experience are laid bare, scientists have no idea of which elements of experience come from the environing world (Umwelt) and which are projected by the cognizing mind upon the world. His methods of reduction and epoché are explored and rudimentary steps toward realizing the 'phenomenological attitude' are defined. Once we are clear about how Husserlian phenomenology is actually accomplished, we turn to its relevance to transpersonal studies, offering examples first by applying them to the Taylor-Hartelius debate in transpersonal psychology, and then to the issue of absorption states in transpersonal anthropology and the study of the roots of religion cross-culturally.
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The subject of this research is the method of phenomenological reduction developed by E. Husserl. The article examines the difficulties faced by this method, as well as observes the reception of Husserl’s ideas by the adherents of phenomenology in the XX century. It is substantiated that the phenomenological reduction is unrealizable by theoretical means due to impossibility to comply in the with the initial requirements of directness and non-prerequisiteness in the verbal expression. At the same time, the author proves that the phenomenological reduction could be implemented as a practice. Buddhist meditation is taken as an example. The goal is set to examine the phenomenological reduction through the prism of meditative practice. The research methodology is based on the comparative study of phenomenological and Buddhist philosophy with regards to the subject matter. The scientific novelty lies in examination of the problem of implementation of phenomenological reduction in the context of a completely different, non-Western tradition. The analysis demonstrates that Buddhism and phenomenology, proceeding from similar ideological prerequisites and studying the same subject, come to the markedly different conclusions. The examination of meditative practice indicated the differences between the phenomenology and Buddhism in their interpretation of the problem of consciousness. The fundamental difference pertains to the problem of “Self”: Buddhism does not recognize the apodictic evidence of the empirical and transcendental ego. This opinion is grounded on observation of the variable nature of the mind in the process of meditation. Other differences considered in this article consists in the discrepancy between the phenomenology and Buddhism regarding the interpretation of such concepts as “intentionality” and “ideation”.
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In this chapter, we provide a methodological and theoretical justification for travel and movement in clinical psychology. We draw on various world traditions—Buddhism (especially Zen) and phenomenology (especially Husserl)—in order to both analyze and offer ways to overcome the problems of insularity. In so doing, we reposition the world and its betterment as integral to clinical psychology. We then examine the possibility of traveling into the world, without presupposition, in order to see how suffering appears in all its forms—psychological, social, cultural, and beyond. Social justice and social movements naturally become an integral component of this work.
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The phenomenological reduction and the writings of Husserl and Heidegger are considered in the context of transpersonal mystical experience. The author shows how the practice of the phenomenological reduction spontaneously delivered both Heidegger and Husserl into transpersonal realms. An experiential examination of their writing reveals the great similarities between their own ideas and those of classical transpersonal sources from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. The way in which each utilized the phenomenological reduction is also explored. If Husserl's method does indeed have mystical potential then transpersonal psychology and phenomenology are not only related but may have much to offer each other as modes of inquiry.
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Explores the transpersonal aspects of 2 of this century's most influential philosophers: E. Husserl and M. Heidegger. Both utilized the phenomenological method, which involves direct intuitive seeing. While Husserl's preoccupation was with consciousness, Heidegger's focus was on Being. The sustained and dedicated use of the phenomenological method delivered both Husserl and Heidegger into the transpersonal domain. Their writings are examined against the background of classical transpersonal sources from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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This is an unusual volume. During his periods of study with Ed­ mund Husserl - first from I924 1. 0 I926, then from I93I to I932 - Dorion Cairns had become imnlensely impressed with the stri­ king philosophical quality of Husserl's conversations with his students and co-workers. Not unlike his daily writing (five to six hours a day was not uncommon, as Husserl reports herein, the nature of which was a continuous searching, reassessing, modi­ fying, advancing and even rejecting of former views), Husserl's conversations, especially evidenced from Cairns's record, were remarkable for their depth and probing character. Because of this, and because of the importaIlt light they threw on Husserl's written and published works, Cairns had early resolved to set down in writing, as accurately as possible, the details of these conversations. Largely prompted by the questions and concerns of his students, including Cairns, the present Conversations (from the second period, I93I-I932, except for the initial conversation) provide a significant, intriguing, and always fascinating insight into both the issues which were prominent to Husserl at this time, and the way he had come to view the systematic and historical placement of his own earlier studies. Cairns had often insisted - principally in his remarkable lec­ 1 tures at the Graduate Faculty of the New School - that attaining a fair and accurate view of Husserl's enormously rich and complex 1 Cairns's lectures between 1956 and 1964 are especially important.
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The first decision any historiographer has to make is where to begin his story. Unless he wants this decision to be completely arbitrary, he should also be prepared to justify it by a clear conception of the unifying theme for his account. Unfortunately, this demand cannot be satisfied so easily in the case of the history of phenomenology. The difficulties of stating point-blank what phenomenology is are almost notorious.1 Even after it had established itself as a movement conscious of its own identity, it kept reinterpreting its own meaning to an extent that makes it impossible to rely on a standard definition for the purpose of historical inclusion or exclusion.