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Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah
Abstract
In the months before the “Second Lebanon War” of 2006, Israeli policy did not prevent Hizbullah from taking actions that Israel considered highly unacceptable and ultimately resulted in the Israeli decision to conduct military operations against Hizbullah's power base in Lebanon. However, this does not vindicate the conventional wisdom that Israeli deterrence of Hizbullah failed in a simple, unambiguous fashion. Rather, Israeli deterrence signals were not clear and Hizbullah did not understand that it was crossing “red lines” that would result in Israel undertaking high-intensity military operations in Lebanon. This paper explores the deterrence relationship between Israel and Hizbullah, with particular reference to the 2006 conflict and its impact on that relationship.
... 27 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman use the term 'second-order coercion' for situations in which the coercer lacks enough leverage over the target state and, therefore, needs to coerce a capable third party into coercing the target. 28 Under similar conceptual logic, Keith Payne et al., 29 Shmuel Bar 30 and Alex Wilner 31 studied situations in which indirect deterrence represents the way to deter or compel nonstate actors by pressuring their patron states. Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman apply the label triadic deterrence in situations when 'one state uses punishments and/or threats against another state to deter it from supporting a non-state actor, if not to compel it to stop assisting it' 32 -for example, Israeli attempts to deal with Palestinian militants based in Egypt and Syria. ...
This article deals with the concept of indirect coercion as a distinct type of coercive strategy involving three actors. We introduce a taxonomy of triangular strategies commonly employed in international politics: ‘hostage-taking’, ‘patron-client’ and ‘composite’ strategies. These three types of indirect coercion cover different ways in how the coercer draws the intermediary actor in the process of coercive bargaining to enhance his leverage over the target. For each type, we conduct a plausibility probe to study these dynamics on short empirical case studies. We argue that our conceptualisation of indirect coercion opens new avenues for research into deterrence and compellence in contemporary world politics.
... 27 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman use the term 'second-order coercion' for situations in which the coercer lacks enough leverage over the target state and, therefore, needs to coerce a capable third party into coercing the target. 28 Under similar conceptual logic, Keith Payne et al., 29 Shmuel Bar 30 and Alex Wilner 31 studied situations in which indirect deterrence represents the way to deter or compel nonstate actors by pressuring their patron states. Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman apply the label triadic deterrence in situations when 'one state uses punishments and/or threats against another state to deter it from supporting a non-state actor, if not to compel it to stop assisting it' 32 -for example, Israeli attempts to deal with Palestinian militants based in Egypt and Syria. ...
... The authority that controls such pieces of territory can be a state, like Jordan, Egypt, or Lebanon, or a nonstate actor with sufficient "state-like manifestations" that make it susceptible to deterrence targeting, like the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hezbollah, or Hamas since it gained control of the Gaza Strip. [24] When a party puts pressure (e.g. through reprisals) on an authority even though that authority is not itself responsible for the attacks that party wishes to deter, this is known as "indirect deterrence. " This term is somewhat of a misnomer because it actually entails the use of compellence. ...
Israel has long used cumulative deterrence-by-denial to deter aggression from state and non-state actors alike. To achieve this, it has combined other measures, including deterrence-by-punishment and compellence, both at the tactical level. It has also compelled actors it can attack directly to clamp down on non-state actors more difficult to target in what is commonly known as " indirect deterrence. " Israel's relative success in this suggests that cumulative deterrence may be used as a conflict management tool that can encourage conditions for finding more permanent political solutions to long-term confrontations. Israel's case also demonstrates the usefulness of a consistent, long-term strategy for managing non-state threats. Finally, it suggests that conflicts may be managed for extended periods with mostly military means, though such means can only assist in laying the groundwork for conflict resolution. The US and its allies could benefit from the judicious application of Israel's deterrence lessons as they seek ways to manage conflicts that appear intractable or too costly to attempt to resolve today.
... Terrorist groups also vary in their organizational structures, ranging from very tight structures to diffuse networks. Hizballah, for instance, is often likened to a welldisciplined military (Bar, 2007), whereas Al Qaeda operates through an expansive transnational network of connections among relatively independent cells (Farley, 2003;Kepel, 2003). In addition, some terrorist organizations have a structure that is centered around a single leader. ...
... 23 These same officials believed that the 1992 attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of Hizballah leader 'Abbas al-Moussawi one month earlier on 16 February 1992. 24 The support for Hizballah global attacks against Israeli and American targets was publicly voiced in July 2006 during the Second Lebanon War by influential Iranian media figures close to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. 25 In 2008, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah himself declared upon the death of his top military commander, Imad Mughniyah, who was killed in a a car bomb attack on 12 February 2008, that he was prepared for an "open war" beyond the Lebanese theater of operations. ...
The activities of Hizballah in Latin America generally have been viewed by governmental authorities in the region as a security concern primarily because of its importance in bilateral relations with the United States rather than as an internal terrorist threat targeted against their sovereign interests. This article explores Hizballah's network and past activities in South America to assess the nature of Hizballah's strategic aims in the region in support of its global organizational goals. The author argues that the perception of Hizballah as a legitimate political organization by Latin American governments has hampered efforts to effectively apply counterterrorism resources to root out the entrenched Hizballah infrastructure in the region that can potentially carry out directives by the Hizballah leadership or by serving as a proxy of Iran.
Este artículo estudia la hipotética penetración del islamismo –vertiente degradada del Islam– en algunos sectores de la extrema izquierda en Latinoamérica y reflexiona sobre su habilidad para desarrollar tanto una teoría como una práctica islamizadas de la revolución. El objetivo de esto es indagar en un aspecto inusual de la seguridad, el factor ideológico, habitualmente soslayado por preferirse los elementos estratégicos y tácticos. Para ello primero se investigan someramente algunos cambios del terrorismo ligados al islamismo en Latinoamérica. Después se analiza la doctrina mediante la que el islamismo puede conectar con la extrema izquierda mediante los conceptos de revolución, guerra revolucionaria, guerra asimétrica y yihad. Finalmente están las conclusiones del artículo.
The question of how to deter sub-conventional activities—characterized by a limited role for the use of force—is one of the biggest puzzles in security studies. A way forward might be to use an enduring rivalry conflict management framework and to focus on findings from criminology. As the case study of 56 Estonian airspace violations suggests, executing sub-conventional deterrence is not an easy task to achieve. NATO’s deterrence success remains elusive, because there is no consistency in responding to these violations and no meaningful punishment. Yet many changes in frequency, intensity, and volatility of Russian intrusions over the last two decades indicate that a successful dissuasion, if not de-escalation, is still possible. To achieve that, NATO needs to improve information transmission, define its deterrence goals more narrowly, impose group-level costs, and implement dynamic deterrence mechanisms offering alternative modes of behavior.
Over three decades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army waged a campaign of violence that claimed the lives of some two thousand people. This article explores the moral framework by which the IRA sought to legitimate its campaign—how it was derived and how it functioned. On the one hand, the IRA relied on a legalist set of political principles, grounded in a particular reading of Irish history. An interlinked, yet discrete strand of legitimation stressed the iniquities of the Northern Irish state as experienced by Catholic nationalists, especially in the period 1968–1972. These parallel threads were interwoven to build a powerful argument that justified a resort to what the IRA termed its “armed struggle.” Yet the IRA recognized that the parameters for war were set not simply by reference to ideology but also by a reading of what might be acceptable to those identified as “the people” or “the community.” Violence was subject to an undeclared process of negotiation with multiple audiences, which served to constitute the boundaries of the permissible. Often, these red lines were revealed only at the point of transgression, but they were no less important for being intangible. An examination of the moral parameters for IRA violence provides a new perspective on the group, helping to explain IRA resilience but also its ultimate weakness and decline.
Terrorist organizations are one of the non-state armed actors that
threaten national and international security. The approach towards the
terrorist organizations has gained a new momentum especially after the
terrorist attacks which were carried out on September 11, 2001 and have
started to gain a seat more frequently in international relations and
international security studies.
Classical realism is one of the most frequently cited traditional theories in
case studies in international relations. According to classical realism, where
the state is considered the only actor, the system in international relations is
based on anarchy. States focus primarily on their own interests. States that
do not hesitate to open war if necessary act in their own interests, and
cooperation is impossible. Terrorist organizations are also a foreign policy
tool according to classical realism. Terrorist organizations, which are used as
a tool used in proxy wars, also have some advantages in terms of the state
that uses them. According to classical realism, which argues that ethical and
moral rules are not important in foreign policy, there is no point in acting in
accordance with human values in achieving success.
In studies conducted regarding terrorist organizations, there are also
subjects where consensus cannot be reached. One of those is that the
question of whether or not they are an international actor like states.
Terrorist organizations have the ability to deter individuals by
frightening them as an armed element. They can even play a role in
shaping domestic and foreign policies of states. In addition to this, it is
also known that they get direct or indirect support.
The main focus of this work is whether or not the terrorist organizations,
which have taken the form of an instrument in the foreign policies of
states by receiving aid from them, can be accepted as an international
actor in the real sense. In order to find the correct answer, the concepts of
proxy war and hybrid war were addressed; the difference between state
sponsored terror and state terrorism was examined and the approach of
realists to legal entities that are accepted by some theories as non-state
actors were studied. In the main chapter, a focus was placed on drawing
a conclusion by searching for an answer to the question.
Bu çalışma son dönemde daha yoğun nitelik kazanan İran ile Ortadoğu bölgesindeki en etkili silahlı devlet dışı aktörlerden (armed non-state actors) Hizbullah arasındaki ilişkilerin kuruluş ve gelişme aşamasını şiddetin ulus-aşırılaşması çerçevesinde değerlendirmektedir. Bu iki aktör arasındaki kültürel, politik, siyasal ve ekonomik yoğun ilişkiyi değerlendiren yeterince çalışma mevcuttur. Diğer taraftan Hizbullah oluşumunun kuruluş ve erken dönemlerinde başvurduğu terörizm boyutuna yaklaşan şiddet eylemlerinde İran’ın konumu büyük oranda tartışma konusu olmasına rağmen bu ilişkiyi uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde değerlendiren çalışmalar sınırlıdır. Bu çerçevede uluslararası hukukun ve uluslararası ilişkilerin de önemli gündemi olmaya başlayan silahlı devlet dışı aktörlerin bazı zamanlar terörizm boyutuna varan ve ulus-aşırı etkileşimi barındıran eylemlerini İran-Hizbullah ilişkileri çerçevesinde somutlaştırma kayda değer bir girişim olarak değerlendirilmektedir.
The project discusses Hezbollah's political ideology and how it evolves over time and the conditions that lead to the change of ideology. The author also examines Hezbollah's relationship with the patron states, Syria and Iran. In contrast with major arguments in the literature, the book argues that political ideologies are not fixed and they evolve depending on a number of factors such as the change in context, major events like a civil war in the patron state, and, most importantly, when the change of ideology becomes linked to survival of the insurgency. This monograph will appeal to a wide range of audiences such as researchers, scholars, and graduate students in the fields of Middle Eastern studies, political studies, Islamism, and nationalism.
Massaab Al-Aloosy is an Assistant Professor in the Critical Security Program at
the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Qatar.
Bu çalışma son dönemde daha yoğun nitelik kazanan İran ile Ortadoğu bölgesindeki en etkili silahlı devlet dışı aktörlerden (armed non-state actors) Hizbullah arasındaki ilişkilerin kuruluş ve gelişme aşamasını şiddetin ulus-aşırılaşması çerçevesinde değerlendirmektedir. Bu iki aktör arasındaki kültürel, politik, siyasal ve ekonomik yoğun ilişkiyi değerlendiren yeterince çalışma mevcuttur. Diğer taraftan Hizbullah oluşumunun kuruluş ve erken dönemlerinde başvurduğu terörizm boyutuna yaklaşan şiddet eylemlerinde İran’ın konumu büyük oranda tartışma konusu olmasına rağmen bu ilişkiyi değerlendiren çalışmalar sınırlıdır. Uluslararası hukuk ve uluslararası ilişkiler literatürü silahlı devlet dışı aktörler ile devletler arasındaki ulus-aşırılaşan şiddet durumuna yönelik çeşitli kavramsallaştırmalar yapmıştır. Devlet destekli terörizm ve vekil savaşları kavramları bu kavramsallaştırmaların başında gelmektedir. Bu kavramların Hizbullah-İran ilişkilerini açıklamadaki eksikliklerine ilişkin kısa değerlendirme sonrasında, bazı zamanlar terörizm boyutuna varan ve ulus-aşırı etkileşimi barındıran Hizbullah’ın şiddet eylemleri (1980-1995) ulus-aşırılaşan şiddet kavramı ile tasvir edilmektedir.
As opposed to cases of interstate coercion and deterrence, where the main problem has usually been one of threat credibility, the central problem of deterrence/coercion of violent non-state organizations (VNSOs) has to do with threat potency—the ability to inflict significant damage on non-state adversaries. This ability is a function of VNSOs’ vulnerabilities and the degree to which they can be exploited by the state. Despite its theoretical and practical importance, the question has not been systematically addressed in the extant literature. Based on the Israeli experience in countering terrorism and non-state violence, this chapter provides some theoretical insights regarding the types of VNSOs’ vulnerabilities that states can exploit and the most effective strategies to do so. The main argument of this chapter is that the level and forms of VNSOs’ vulnerability to states’ countermeasures vary according to the phase of their organizational development, and that processes of institutionalization and power consolidation make VNSOs paradoxically more susceptible to state coercion. The reason is that organizational expansion involves greater dependency on various resources that can be effectively threatened by states’ countermeasures, particularly growing dependency on safe havens and on popular support.
What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conoict breaks out, the weak actor would be capable of rendering its opponent’s strategic capabilities tactical and its own tactical capabilities strategic. The deterrence relationship that has evolved between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in the decade since—and as a result of—the 2006 Lebanon War (a.k.a. the Second Lebanon War or the July War) conarms this observation. A comparison of these two actors’ deterrence behavior in the years preceding the war and in its aftermath shows that one of the leading explanations for the ongoing stability along the Israeli- Lebanese border is that Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply deterrence in a manner that meets the prerequisites of rational deterrence theory.
The National Institute for Public Policy's new book, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, the late former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examined eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny. Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero." As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence. This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of Comparative Strategy. © 2015 National Institute for Public Policy. All rights reserved.
Acts of terrorism against public transportation evolved since the 1970s from acts of hostage taking to free imprisoned terrorists to acts of indiscriminate murder of passengers and grew popular due to the lack of a robust response by the target countries. Later, this modus operandi shifted into attempts to blow up aircraft in flight and, of course, the attacks of 9/11. The logic behind the attacks remained the same—to hit Western society at its “soft belly.” Islamist terrorists adhere to similar strategic and tactical considerations as their secular predecessors. However, they are also obliged to take into account the rulings (fatwas) of Islamic legal experts. The tactical appeal for terrorists of all ideological streams for attacking mass transportation will not disappear. Therefore, it remains to deter the terrorists and to counter the very ideology that promotes such actions. True, even if prominent moderate Sheikhs issue fatwas against such acts of terrorism, there will emerge others who will condone them. The answers therefore may lie in a Kulturkampf of the Islamic orthodoxy against the radicals, criminalization in Western law of acts and statements that condone terrorism, and redefining the principle of personal criminal culpability to cover religious leaders for the acts of their flock as a result of their spiritual influence.
Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: Precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.
More than any other modern nation, Israel has combatted, prevented, countered, and deterred terrorist attacks. While the conflict that spawns terrorism did not begin with the founding of modern Israel, its establishment by United Nations resolution in 1948 has certainly become the contemporary trigger point for this ancient antipathy. Israel has attempted different tactical and strategic approaches to halt attacks, including deterrence, but, in contrast to what U.S. strategists might initially suppose from their Cold War experience, Israeli deterrence of terrorism does not fall into either the Kahn or Schelling schools of thought. It has more affinity to risk management, and kinship with deterrence of crime in a civil legal system. Like criminal law enforcement, the expectation of Israeli terror deterrence is not unrealistically zero attacks, but practical management to maintain a certain status quo. Israel, however, appears trapped in an endless cycle of pain with its adversaries, a cycle regulated by unspoken rules. This article evaluates the Israeli experience in terrorism deterrence, and concludes with observations concerning efforts to protect the U.S. homeland.
Since 2008, the Dahya concept has been portrayed by journalists, independent experts, and scholars as an official policy of Israel to address the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, there has been no official Israeli document formulating a Dahya strategy. Although this Dahya concept is not officially endorsed by the Israeli Defense Forces, it is a key reflection of the state of the Israeli military vis-à-vis Hezbollah debate since the 2006 war. This debate reflects a significant evolution of Israeli threat assessment and the remedies for these challenges. It acknowledges not only the political support and military strength of the Lebanese organization, but also its rationality. Conceding the extreme difficulty of dismembering Hezbollah's power, the Dahya concept postulates a deterrence system that, as a matter of fact, finds its roots in traditional Israeli strategic doctrine.
This article considers the developing role of deterrence in countering conventional terrorist threats, tracing the post-9/11 rejection and later rediscovery of deterrence as a tool of counter-terrorism. Why do so many policymakers assume that the ‘new’ terrorism represented such a break with the past? Why was deterrence neglected as a consequence, under the belief that few terrorists do not aspire to be strategic in their campaigns? To the contrary, this analysis shows that most terrorists are open to attempts at coercion and in particular can be influenced by denial-based strategies. In the case of the United Kingdom, denial-based strategies successfully diverted a potentially crippling campaign of economic dislocation in the 1990s, with lessons for today's challenges. A reinvigorated focus on resilience – physical and societal – as part of a denial-based approach to deterring terrorist attacks, particularly those involving home-grown activists, is recommended. This offers the prospect of time and space for broader counter-terrorism programmes of counterradicalization and de-legitimization to run their course and should be part of future counter-terrorism strategies.
Israel's policies regarding Lebanon have been dependent on public opinion, which is vola-tile. The citizens of Israel did not favor the occupation of the security zone in South Leba-non because of the Four Mothers movement, which influenced the government to unilate-rally withdraw military forces in May 2000. When Hizbollah attacked an Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol and abducted two soldiers on the northern border, the Israeli citizens supported the decision to wage a war in retaliation. This study aims to shed light on the causal mechanism of the influence of public opi-nion on defense policy within the rational framework of deterrence strategy. I chose the evolutionary game theory approach as my research method in order to deal with dynamics of public opinion. My study yielded the following result: deterrence is not stable when the aggression level of the defenders is less than the level of the critical condition. The Israeli government made a decision to conduct a unilateral withdrawal under pressure from passive defenders among the people. However, the IDF could begin the operation in Lebanon be-cause of a substantial number of supporters who hoped to retaliate against Hizbollah. As a result, deterrence was restored after the war. We can understand the implications of the case of the Second Lebanon War: the enforcement of conventional deterrence may occasionally require conflicts to occur with small non-governmental military groups.
This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological, and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self-restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.
This article examines the coercive and deterrent utility of targeting the leaders of violent, non-state organizations with precision force. Building on the literatures on targeted killings and deterrence theory, this article provides a case study analysis of targeted killings in Afghanistan. Relying on publicly available and semi-private sources, the article presents a comparative analysis of four targeted killings conducted against Taliban leaders. Findings suggest that the eliminations degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group's success rates, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale. These findings speak to the efficacy of targeted killings in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations.
Israel’s policies regarding Lebanon have been dependent on public opinion, which is very volatile. The citizens of Israel did not favor the occupation of the security zone in South Lebanon because of the Four Mothers movement, and it influenced the government to withdraw military forces unilaterally in May 2000. When Hizbollah attacked the Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol and abducted two soldiers on the northern border, the Israeli citizens supported the government’s decision of waging a war in retaliation. This study aims to shed light on the causal mechanism of the influence of public opinion on the defense policy in the rational framework of deterrence strategy. I chose the evolutionary game theory approach as my research method. My study yielded the following result: the deterrence is not stable when the aggression level of the defenders is less than the level of the critical condition. The Israeli government made a decision to conduct unilateral withdrawal under the pressure of passive defenders among the people. However, the IDF could begin the operation in Lebanon because of a substantial number of supporters who hoped to restore the deterrence. This study concludes that the Israelis exhibited strong intension and an aggressive attitude toward the deterrence.
Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 23.4 (2005) 204-207
In the late 1940s, an aspiring graduate student at one of America's leading universities was advised by a senior faculty member that if he was either Jewish or Italian, he need not consider a career in the State Department or the Foreign Service, as these were closed shops for these two ethnic groups. Scarcely 25 years later, the Secretary of State was Jewish (Henry Kissinger), and his Deputy Italian (Joseph Sisco). Now along comes Dennis Ross, an identifying Jew, to narrate a blow-by-blow account of the Middle East peace process (so-called) in which he played a critical role, often instructing the President of the U.S. on what to say and do in formal negotiations! Although at times Palestinian leaders complained about Ross's identity and role, in the end, more tellingly, both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators begged him not to follow through on his announced intention to resign from government at the end of the Clinton Administration. They feared his departure would mark the end of peace efforts and a descent into violence and chaos. As Alice said, "curiouser and curiouser."
A lifelong Democrat, Ross nevertheless became the senior Middle East person on the National Security Council staff in the Reagan years. After the 1988 election, he became head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. In this capacity, he was a top aide to Secretary of State James Baker, for whom he has much respect (as he did for President Bush, the father). The Clinton team wisely invited him to remain with them as chief negotiator for the Arab-Israeli conflict. He remained in that job for the entire Clinton presidency, and thus served a total of 12 years through two administrations as top policy maker and negotiator in one of the most intractable conflicts of the 20th century.
Ross emerges in this incredibly detailed account as a consummate diplomat. He is equally hard on Israelis, Jews, Palestinians, and Arabs. His personal likes and dislikes are plainly evident, especially in the personality sketches interspersed throughout the account, in which he doesn't mince words. Among those he admired most are Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, President Clinton, some of his own staff, and some Israelis, such as Amnon Shahak (IDF Chief of Staff and later a Cabinet minister). At the top of the list of those he admired least are Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud leader and Prime Minister, 1996–1999), Yitzhak Shamir (Likud leader and Prime Minister through most of the period from 1983 to 1992), and Yassir Arafat.
Throughout this tortuous narrative, Ross never takes his eye off the ball: his job was not to impose a solution on the parties to the conflict, nor simply to promote American interests. He was convinced that there was no alternative to the two sides' directly negotiating an end to the conflict between them, with the U.S. helping. As the situation progressed, however, game-playing often interfered with the negotiations. In particular, both Israelis and Palestinians often expected Ross to run interference for them, or to draft negotiating proposals that they felt would be more acceptable coming from the Americans. Nothing perhaps better illustrates the importance of active involvement by the U.S. in this enduring conflict.
If there are errors or weaknesses in this book, they lie in Ross's failure to clearly date various developments as he goes along, making it difficult for the reader to maintain a clear orientation to the facts. Thus, a reference to consultations with Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and Robert Dole as Majority Leader of the Senate (p. 185) seems out of date, since these gentlemen did not assume these titles until after the 1994 election. A series of maps is helpful, however, as is an extensive list of the main Dramatis Personae. Missing, however, is a map of the city of Hebron, which was the subject of intensive negotiation between the two sides, right...
Based on content analysis of global media and interviews with many diplomats and journalists, this paper describes the trajectory of the media from objective observer to fiery advocate, becoming in fact a weapon of modern warfare. The paper also shows how an open society, Israel, is victimized by its own openness and how a closed sect, Hezbollah, can retain almost total control of the daily message of journalism and propaganda.
Hasan Nassrallah to al-Majala (Saudi Arabia), 24 March
- Mohammad Fanush
- Manar
Mohammad Fanush to al-Manar, 18 January, 2002, Hasan Nassrallah to al-Majala (Saudi Arabia), 24 March, 2004, Hasan Nassrallah to al-Mostaqbal (Lebanon), 31 December 2000.