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Media Favoritism and Presidential Nominations: Reviving the Direct Effects Model
Political Communication
Abstract
This article explores the relationships among media favoritism, media reception, and candidate preference in the 2000 Democratic and Republican presidential nomination campaigns. Content analysis revealed significant media favoritism toward the candidacy of John McCain in the Republican contest but relatively balanced coverage of the Democratic contest. Accordingly, our empirical models reveal that media reception was substantially associated with a preference for McCain over Bush, but was not a consistent predictor in the Democratic race. But even more impressive (and surprising) were the relationships between listening to talk radio and candidate preferences, even among Democrats. Listening to Rush Limbaugh was strongly associated with preference for Bush among Republican primary voters, and for Bradley among Democratic primary voters. These collective results lend support to a classic interpretation of direct media effects, a perspective that had been largely abandoned in contemporary voting models.
... Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996;Wood 2000). Recent evidence suggests that political affairs news use can have direct and relatively strong effects on political persuasion (Diehl, Weeks, and Gil de Z uñiga 2016;Barker and Lawrence 2006;Feldman 2011;Ladd and Lenz 2008;Zaller 1992). Researchers have offered various explanations for direct effects. ...
... For example, recent research shows that favorable media coverage of a political candidate increases his or her public support and newspaper endorsements of candidates can change the degree of public support (Barker and Lawrence 2006). The association between political news use and political persuasion may not be dependent on political ideology to the extent previously suggested (Zaller 1992). ...
... This study finds a direct relationship between these variables, which was the strongest among the variables of interest in the statistical model (Table 2). This finding is concurrent with prior research that shows a direct relationship between news use and political persuasion in social media contexts (Barker and Lawrence 2006;Feldman 2011;Ladd and Lenz 2008), and it contributes to an increasingly convincing argument for examining the influence of social media news use on political attitudes and opinions (Bode 2016; Bond The study also finds a direct relationship between political discussion disagreement and political persuasion in social media contexts, which aligns with previous literature showing a direct relationship between online and offline discussion and political persuasion on social media in the U.S. context. Offline and online social networks become increasingly isomorphic, and this process has arguably increased the amount of political disagreement people encounter in their daily lives through discussion (Bachmann and Gil de Z uñiga 2013;Barnidge 2015;Heatherly, Lu, and Lee 2016;Kim 2011;Rojas 2015). ...
Social media and news use arguably contribute to the prevalence of contentious politics because individuals may express dissent through their social networks as they consume news. This study seeks to test whether individuals might be more open to political persuasion in this context, especially if they are exposed to political disagreement or discuss politics in a civil manner. Relying on survey data from the UK, results based on a moderated moderation model show that (a) social media news use predicts political persuasion on social media (direct effects) and, (b) discussion disagreement and civil reasoning moderate this relationship in two-way and three-way interactions.
... framing or agenda setting), direct effects research suggests that factors like issue salience and message exposure alone can explain media effects. For example, Barker and Lawrence (2006) suggest that favorable media coverage of an insurgent candidate leads to popular support for that candidate. Ladd and Lenz (2008) found that when a prominent UK newspaper switched its endorsement of a candidate, subsequently the public's support changed as well. ...
... Ladd and Lenz (2008) found that when a prominent UK newspaper switched its endorsement of a candidate, subsequently the public's support changed as well. Though strong relationships between political media consumption and attitude change might be explained by partisan cuing , some studies have found direct effects of media persuasion, regardless of political leanings. 1 Accordingly, both Feldman (2011) and Barker and Lawrence (2006) suggest that attitude change follows the direction of news opinion, with little variation attributed to partisanship. Although prior research has demonstrated a relationship between news use and persuasion, this association has not yet been tested in the context of social media. ...
... We know that news use is related to political persuasion in offline contexts (e.g. Barker and Lawrence, 2006), but this study is the first to demonstrate that news consumption and persuasion are related within the realm of social media. The findings also confirm previous work on using social networks for news and network heterogeneity; we found that news use on social media was positively related to respondents reporting that they include people of varying social status and political identity in their friend lists. ...
News use via social media has been linked to pro-democratic political behaviors. However, most people use social media for non-political purposes, like connecting with friends and browsing news feeds. Recent research indicates these behaviors may also have democratic benefits, by means of political expression in social media. Drawing on panel data from a nationally representative sample, this study extends this line of research by exploring how social interaction and news-seeking behaviors on social media lead to diverse networks, exposure to dissenting political opinion, and ultimately reconsidering and changing one’s political views. Social media are a unique communication platform, and their attributes might influence exposure to political information. The tendency for users to build and maintain friend networks creates a potential deliberative space for political persuasion to take place. Consistent with prior literature, news use leads to political persuasion. More interestingly, apolitical, but social interactive uses of social media also lead to political persuasion. These relationships are partially mediated through network and discussion attributes.
... Political persuasion has largely been seen as a result of efforts by elites and interest groups (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997), news consumption (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;Mutz et al., 1996) or social interactions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998;Wood, 2000). While the dynamics of political persuasion have been explored in other contexts, there has been little research on persuasion in social media (for exceptions see Bisbee & Larson, 2017; and particularly, how social media persuasion may be more or less likely in contexts of polarization. ...
... Whether and why individuals are persuaded to change their minds has long been a topic of study in political and communication sciences, leading to studies that have often focused on persuasion as a result of elites or interest group actions (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997), news consumption (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;Mutz et al., 1996), or social exchanges (Cialdini & Trost, 1998;Wood, 2000). Connected to this last research effort, the increasing tendency for individuals to obtain information online (Bachmann & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013;Gaskins & Jerit, 2012) has heightened concern regarding political persuasion in social media. ...
... Political persuasion has largely been seen as a result of efforts by elites and interest groups (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997), news consumption (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;Mutz et al., 1996) or social interactions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998;Wood, 2000). While the dynamics of political persuasion have been explored in other contexts, there has been little research on persuasion in social media (for exceptions see Bisbee & Larson, 2017; and particularly, how social media persuasion may be more or less likely in contexts of polarization. ...
... Whether and why individuals are persuaded to change their minds has long been a topic of study in political and communication sciences, leading to studies that have often focused on persuasion as a result of elites or interest group actions (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997), news consumption (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;Mutz et al., 1996), or social exchanges (Cialdini & Trost, 1998;Wood, 2000). Connected to this last research effort, the increasing tendency for individuals to obtain information online (Bachmann & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013;Gaskins & Jerit, 2012) has heightened concern regarding political persuasion in social media. ...
Prior research underscores the utility of political persuasion to sustain more engaged democracies and as a vital element in political campaigning processes. When citizens display increased openness to political attitude change, societies benefit as diverse viewpoints thrive, and less dissonant public spheres may be fostered. This contrasts with today’s contentious political and media environment. With political polarization on the rise, and new social media avenues enabling citizens to curate more diverse news consumption patterns, little is known about how this polarization influences the ability for citizens to be politically persuaded in social media environments. Relying on representative US panel survey data, this study seeks to shed light on this phenomenon by testing the effects of three distinct types of political polarization: Affective, ideological, and perceived societal. Panel autoregressive causal order regression and structural equation models clarify the direct and indirect negative role of polarization in predicting social media political persuasion. Theoretical implications of these findings, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research are all discussed.
... Rather than intensifying attitude differences among opposing partisans, the unidirectional flow of information in opinionated news broadcasts could promote processing and attitude change in the direction of the news message, without regard to partisanship. Indeed, direct persuasive effects-where partisan audiences are uniformly moved by a media message-have been demonstrated in response to newspaper editorials (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998) and political talk radio (Barker & Lawrence, 2006). On one level, then, this research examines how audiences respond to opinionated news relative to more traditional, non-opinionated formats, with implications for understanding the broader role of opinionated news in democratic politics. ...
... Research on the persuasive effects of political talk radio has been inconsistent. While Barker and Lawrence (2006) provide survey evidence for the direct persuasive effects of Rush Limbaugh, even among Democratic listeners, Owen (1997) found that political talk radio had no effect on listeners' attitudes after controlling for partisan predispositions. Meanwhile, experimental research has found evidence for direct persuasion in certain issue contexts and polarization in others (Cappella & Jamieson, 2008). ...
The recent growth in opinionated cable news, in which the anchor expresses a clear political point of view, has aroused concerns about its potential polarizing effects on public opinion. Key to uncovering opinionated news' impact on public opinion is an understanding of how partisan audiences process opinionated news: Do the overt partisan cues in opinionated news stimulate biased processing, thereby enhancing attitude polarization among opposing partisans relative to non-opinionated news? Or are opinionated news messages processed uniformly by partisans, contributing to direct persuasion? Two online experiments tested the effects of news opinionation—and interactions with individual political partisanship—on information processing and attitude change. Results from both studies most clearly support a model of direct persuasion. Message processing and attitude change follow the direction of the news' opinionation, with little variation by partisanship, offering no evidence that opinionated news intensifies attitude differences among partisans relative to non-opinionated news. Implications for theories of political information processing and democratic politics are discussed.
... Second, media outlets may follow, not lead, their audiences' politics, which also could be mistaken for persuasion. Although many studies find individual-level associations between survey reports of exposure to certain news outlets and political opinions (Barker 1999(Barker , 2002Barker and Lawrence 2006;Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Kahn and Kenney 2002;Lawson and McCann 2004;Newton and Brynin 2001;Project for Excellence in Journalism 2007), these associations could thus arise because of media persuasion or because of these two alternatives. ...
... Several studies develop better measures of exposure by using survey data to directly tie individuals to the newspapers they read, radio programs to which they listen, or television shows they watch (Barker 1999(Barker , 2002Barker and Lawrence 2006;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Lawson and McCann 2004;Newton and Brynin 2001). Laboratory experiments (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995;Berinsky and Kinder 2006;Gilliam and Iyengar 2000;Iyengar and Kinder 1987) can avoid many inferential pitfalls but face concerns over external validity. ...
Using panel data and matching techniques, we exploit a rare change in communication flows - the endorsement switch to the Labour Party by several prominent British newspapers before the 1997 United Kingdom general election - to study the persuasive power of the news media. These unusual events provide an opportunity to test for news media persuasion while avoiding methodological pitfalls that have plagued previous studies. By comparing readers of newspapers that switched endorsements to similar individuals who did not read these newspapers, we estimate that these papers persuaded a considerable share of their readers to vote for Labour. Depending on the statistical approach, the point estimates vary from about 10 percent to as high as 25 percent of readers. These findings provide rare, compelling evidence that the news media exert a powerful influence on mass political behavior.
... Second, media outlets may follow, not lead, their audiences' politics, which also could be mistaken for persuasion. Thus, although many studies find individuallevel associations between survey reports of exposure to certain news outlets and political opinions (Barker 1999(Barker , 2002Barker and Lawrence 2006;Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Kahn and Kenney 2002;Lawson and McCann 2004;Newton and Brynin 2001;Project for Excellence in Journalism 2007), these associations could arise either because of media persuasion or because of these two alternatives. ...
... DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find variation by examining the entry of the Fox News Channel onto cable systems in the late 1990s. Several studies develop better measures of exposure by using survey data to directly tie individuals to the newspapers they read, radio programs they listen to, or television shows they watch (Barker 1999(Barker , 2002Barker and Lawrence 2006;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Lawson and McCann 2004;Newton and Brynin 2001). Laboratory experiments (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995;Berinsky and Kinder 2006;Gilliam and Iyengar 2000;Iyengar and Kinder 1987) can avoid many inferential pitfalls, but face concerns over external validity. ...
Using panel data and matching techniques, we exploit a rare change in communication flows—the endorsement switch to the Labour Party by several prominent British newspapers before the 1997 United Kingdom general election—to study the persuasive power of the news media. These unusual endorsement switches provide an opportunity to test for news media persuasion while avoiding methodological pitfalls that have plagued previous studies. By comparing readers of newspapers that switched endorsements to similar individuals who did not read these newspapers, we estimate that these papers persuaded a considerable share of their readers to vote for Labour. Depending on the statistical approach, the point estimates vary from about 10% to as high as 25% of readers. These findings provide rare evidence that the news media exert a powerful influence on mass political behavior.
... The official websites of governments and authoritative institutions are considered the primary sources of authoritative information for the public, acting as the main media that directly affect the public's risk perception [48,49]. Official media often use expert opinions to enhance their authority and persuade the public, using methods such as framing effects or agenda setting. ...
Background
Previous studies on public compliance with policies during pandemics have primarily explained it from the perspectives of motivation theory, focusing on normative motivation (trust in policy-making institutions) and calculative motivation (fear of contracting the disease). However, the social amplification of a risk framework highlights that the media plays a key role in this process.
Objective
This study aims to integrate the motivation theory of compliance behavior and the social amplification of risk framework to uncover the “black boxes” of the mechanisms by which normative motivation and calculative motivation influence public policy compliance behavior through the use of media.
Methods
During the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted a web-based survey of 2309 Chinese citizens from December 4, 2022, to March 21, 2023. We treated the public’s policy compliance behavior during the pandemic as the dependent variable. Media use, specifically the use of authoritative media and “we-media,” that is, personal social media accounts and media platforms operated by individuals, was set as the independent variable. Trust in government, representing normative motivation, and risk perception, representing calculative motivation, were included as mediating variables. A structural equation model was constructed and analyzed using Stata.
Results
First, the mediation effect of trust in government indicates that the use of authoritative media can enhance trust in government, which significantly increases individuals’ policy compliance behavior (β coefficient=0.108, 95% CI 0.080-0.135; P<.001). Second, the mediation effect of risk perception shows that the use of we-media heightened individual risk perception, thereby significantly enhancing policy compliance behavior (β coefficient=0.012, 95% CI 0.002-0.021; P=.02). Third, the study revealed the “paradox of trust”: the chain mediation effect in which authoritative media increased trust in government and reduced risk perception, ultimately decreasing policy compliance behavior (β coefficient=–0.005, 95% CI –0.009 to –0.001; P=.008).
Conclusions
By combining the motivation theory of compliance behavior with the social amplification of risk framework in risk communication, we found that trust in government, as a normative motivation, operates through authoritative media, while risk perception, as a calculative motivation, promotes compliance behavior through we-media. In addition, in major crises, the public’s use of authoritative media can lead to the paradox of trust: on the one hand, trust in the government increases policy compliance; on the other hand, this trust reduces risk perception, thereby decreasing compliance behavior. Authoritative institutions need to balance providing authoritative information with maintaining the public’s risk perception.
... Some suggest exposure leads to message-consistent persuasion for all, although relationships tend to be greater for those congenial to the message, which is a milder form of polarization (Feldman, 2011). Others find that Rush Limbaugh can persuade Democrats as well as Republicans (Barker & Lawrence, 2006). Still others have found "misperception mainstreaming" rather than polarization: stronger relationships of exposure to Fox News (Meirick, 2013;Meirick, 2022) and conservative media more broadly (Meirick & Bessarabova, 2016) with adoption of conservative misperceptions for Democrats than for Republicans. ...
This study analyzed data from a Pew survey ( N = 5,681) to see how party identification, political knowledge, and use of different news sources related to two beliefs about COVID-19 promoted on the right early in the pandemic: that the virus was created in a laboratory and that a vaccine for it would be available within a few months. Republicans were more likely to hold these beliefs. The more that people used news outlets with right-leaning audiences, the more likely they were to hold those two beliefs. The more they used news with left-leaning audiences, the less likely they were to believe the virus was laboratory made, a relationship stronger among Democrats. Political knowledge appeared to discourage believing the virus was laboratory-made, again more so among Democrats. However, the more that Democrats (but not Republicans) used news with bipartisan audiences, the more likely they were to believe the virus was laboratory made. Similarly, the more that Democrats (but not Republicans) used social media for news, the more they believed a vaccine would be available soon, and right-leaning news use had a stronger relationship with the early vaccine belief among Democrats.
... Voters are thus expected to take the media's tone as "an important cue as to whether one should vote for a party or not" (Hopmann et al. 2010: 391). Research on presidential primary and general elections as well as Senate elections in the United States (Joslyn and Ceccoli 1996;Dalton et al. 1998;Kahn and Kenney 2002;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Barker and Lawrence 2006) but also parliamentary elections in the UK (Brandenburg and Van Egmond 2012), the Netherlands (Geers and Bos 2017), Austria (Eberl et al. 2017;Johann et al. 2018), and Germany (Boomgaarden and Semetko 2012) have compiled strong micro-level evidence that voters are indeed sensitive to the tonality of the news media's reporting, although often in highly conditional ways. ...
This concluding chapter discusses changing German voters’ behavior in the context of changing parties, campaigns, and media during the period of its hitherto most dramatically increased fluidity at the 2009, 2013, and 2017 federal elections. It summarizes the book’s findings on three questions: How did the turbulences that increasingly characterize German electoral politics come about? How did they in turn condition voters’ decision-making? How were electoral attitudes and choices affected by situational factors that pertained to the specifics of particular elections? Discussing the consequences of these developments the chapter finds that the ideological and affective polarization of the party system has increased, leading to a dualistic structure that pits the right-wing populist AfD against all other parties. It also shows how the formation of governments under the German parliamentary system of governance gets increasingly difficult. The chapter closes with speculations about the prospects of electoral politics in Germany.
... Mutz (2015) shows that the medium matters, and high-conflict partisan televised media carries both attitudinal and emotional consequences for viewers. Similarly, conservative talk radio has persuasive power for listeners on the left and serves as a "pseudo community" that solidifies attitudes among those on the right (Barker 2002;Barker and Lawrence 2006). While the effects of partisan media are often conflated (Dilliplane 2011;Hyun and Moon 2016;Stroud and Collier 2018), Republican-friendly partisan media sources dominate their Democratic competition on television and especially on talk radio (Hemmer 2016). ...
Objective
This study aims to examine the influence of Republican and Democratic partisan television news on attitudes toward candidates for president immediately following the 2016 general election.
Method
Using two waves of the 2016 American National Election Study, we examine feelings toward Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton before and after the election.
Results
Exposure to Republican partisan media did have a significant negative effect on feelings toward Hillary Clinton, even when controlling for party identification, ideology, and feelings toward Clinton before the election. Consumption of Democratic partisan television, however, had no influence on feelings toward Donald Trump.
Conclusion
Further fragmentation and the expansion of partisan media has—and will continue to—benefit Republicans over Democrats.
... Voters are thus expected to take the media's tone as "an important cue as to whether one should vote for a party or not" (Hopmann et al. 2010: 391). Research on presidential primary and general elections as well as Senate elections in the United States (Joslyn and Ceccoli 1996;Dalton et al. 1998;Kahn and Kenney 2002;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Barker and Lawrence 2006) but also parliamentary elections in the UK (Brandenburg and Van Egmond 2012), the Netherlands (Geers and Bos 2017), Austria (Eberl et al. 2017;Johann et al. 2018), and Germany (Boomgaarden and Semetko 2012) have compiled strong micro-level evidence that voters are indeed sensitive to the tonality of the news media's reporting, although often in highly conditional ways. ...
Choosing the “right” party has been especially challening for German voters due to considerable changes in the German political landscape, with the AfD’s rise in 2013 being just the tip of the iceberg. The chapter aims to answer the question of how these changes have influenced attitude-consistent voting in Germany and specifically whether the reasons for (in-)consistent voting have changed between the German federal elections of 2009, 2013, and 2017. Using GLES cross-sectional survey data and online tracking surveys, the chapter suggests that, regardless of the crises and the rise of a new political actor, most German voters voted (or would have voted) consistently between 2009 and 2017. In 2009 and 2017, inconsistent voting was strongly associated with low levels of political knowledge. By contrast, in 2013 inconsistent voters were primarily dissatisfied with democracy and the political elites and sympathetic to the AfD.
... In democracies, people's political positions are dependent on their tendency to be persuaded, and citizens are influenced by information filtered through the news media, the social context, and group affiliation. Persuasion can occur as a result of the desire to maintain social connectedness or of news consumption (Barker and Lawrence, 2006;Wood, 2000). Research shows that even non-political discussion and social interaction on social media can be a stimulant for political expression and participation, social media becoming an ideal forum for political persuasion (de Zuñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng, 2014). ...
This study examines the potential of fake news to produce effects on social media engagement as well as the moderating role of education and government approval. We report on a 2x2x2 online experiment conducted in Romania (N=813), in which we manipulated the level of facticity of a news story, its valence, and intention to deceive. Results show that ideologically driven news with a negative valence (rather than fabricated news or other genres, such as satire and parody) have a greater virality potential. However, neither the level of education nor government approval moderate this effect. Additionally, both positive and negative ideologically driven news stories enhance the probability that people will sign a document to support the government (i. e., potential for political engagement on social media). These latter effects are moderated by government approval: Lower levels of government approval lead to less support for the government on social media, as a consequence of fake news exposure.
... The occurrence of persuasion is the result of news consumption (Barker & Lawrence, 2006). Similarly, political advertising also played a decisive role in persuasion with individuals and groups (Franz & Ridout, 2010). ...
The current study underscores different practices of political behavior and communication in virtual environments among youth. The primary objectives of this exploratory study were to find out: (i) the association of political affiliation, internet connectivity, and social media usage with online political persuasion, and (ii) the effects of social media base and duration time spent on online political persuasion among university students. A total of 2403 students participated through an online questionnaire, from different universities of Pakistan. Respondent-Driven Sampling was mainly used to collect data from university students. The reliability, validity, and robustness of scale of online political persuasion were tested through factor and reliability analysis. Hypothesis testing and model fitness were scrutinized through simple linear regression analysis and multiple linear regression, respectively. Communicative Action Theory by Jürgen Habermas was used as a theoretical framework. The findings revealed that WhatsApp (58%), Facebook (21%), and YouTube (10%) were leading social media sites among university students. Online political persuasion was higher among students with political affiliation. Similarly, internet connectivity, social media usage, social media base and time spent on social media were positively associated with online political persuasion. In addition, the current study depicted that social media is being used as a platform for political communication that ultimately renders political change. The current research supported the connotation of how the use of inter-subjectivity of social media provides an opportunity to promote communicative political autonomy among users instead of following a coercive political ideology.
... Subsequently, people's opinions may polarize, as hearing opinions you already hold echoing in the media provides legitimacy to even stronger believe in these ideas (Jones, 2002;Sunstein, 2007). Under normal circumstances, opinionated news therefore confirms and reinforces political attitudes (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007;Druckman & Parkin, 2005;Holbert, 2004;Jamieson & Cappella, 2008;Jones, 2002;Morris & Francia, 2010;Smith & Searles, 2013;Stroud, 2010). ...
... Past studies have also shown that stories presented in the media may have a direct influence on how partisan audiences form attitudes towards the message being conveyed (Dalton, Beck & Huckfeldt, 1998;Barker & Lawrence, 2006). If we examine the manner in which opinions and attitudes may be formed, then it has been suggested that a degree of polarization occurs that will either move the reader's attitude in one direction or the other (Kunda, 1990). ...
... It is also uncertain how people will respond to such news. There is evidence of direct persuasive-media effects under some conditions (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998;Feldman, 2011), suggesting that counter-attitudinal news stories-those positive toward the outgroup-may decrease affective polarization. However, people tend to defend their prior positions against messages that challenge their beliefs. ...
We use three online experiments—two selection-based and one forced-exposure—to demonstrate that increasing the salience of national identity can promote affective polarization toward undocumented immigrants, both directly and indirectly, via the selection of pro- and counter-attitudinal articles about immigration. As anticipated, across both selection studies, priming national identity exacerbates polarization among immigration opponents. For that group, priming national identity also indirectly increases polarization via enhanced exposure to pro-attitudinal (i.e., anti-immigration) news. In one selection study, however, the prime’s polarizing effect is attenuated by increased exposure to counter-attitudinal (i.e., pro-immigration) news. These polarizing effects do not emerge among immigration supporters. Finally, a forced-exposure experiment more rigorously tests the causal model by assessing polarization when both the identity prime and message exposure are randomly assigned. We discuss practical and theoretical implications.
... On the other hand, evidence for direct persuasion, unconditioned by political predispositions, has been found in response to slanted news (Druckman and Parkin 2005;Kahn and Kenney 2002) and, in some instances, political talk radio (Barker and Lawrence 2006;Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Such examples suggest that when media cues are especially clear and one sided, this is enough to overwhelm partisan biases in processing (Dalton et al. 1998). ...
... Others have considered the structure and consistency of public attitudes as a measure of political sophistication (Conover and Feldman 1984;Converse 1970;Fiske and Kinder 1981;Jackson and Marcus 1975). The definition of political sophistication employed in this study reflects more recent research which relies on political knowledge (Althaus 1998;Barker and Lawrence, forthcoming;Bartels 1996;Cassel and Lo 1997;Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996;Duch, Palmer and Anderson 2000;Lupia 1994;Luskin 1987;Mondak 2000;Neumann 1986;Smith 1989), and political awareness, or attentiveness (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983;Krosnick 1990;Neumann 1986;Zaller 1990), to measure an individual's level of political sophistication. ...
Although scholars have long recognized the president's pre-eminent status as an agenda-setter, there is surprisingly little evidence available to suggest that presidents can and do influence the public agenda. While a modest literature reveals presidential speeches as important determinants of the public agenda, the assumption that rhetoric matters, commonly made by students of the presidency, has been largely unaccompanied by the support of empirical evidence. As a result, the question of whether presidential rhetoric constitutes an important ingredient of agenda setting success remains very much open to debate. Based on an extensive content analysis of State of the Union Addresses from 1946 to 2003, this dissertation considers in three separate studies the influence of presidential rhetoric as a tool for setting the public agenda. The first considers the influence of several presidential rhetoric variables resulting from the content analysis on aggregate-level evaluations of the salience of 1,113 issues discussed by 11 presidents from 1946 to 2003. The second study estimates the influence of several moderators of the relationship between presidential rhetoric on the public agenda, based on the individual-level assessments of issue salience expressed by respondents following State of the Union Addresses given by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Finally, based on an experimental analysis in which 340 subjects were shown edited videos of a presidential speech, the third study examines the influence of the three specific forms of presidential rhetoric used by President George W. Bush in his discussion of the issue of the economy. The findings demonstrate that (1) presidents respond to environmental conditions fashioning their State of the Union rhetoric, (2) presidents use their rhetoric to move issues onto the public agenda and, by claiming credit, presidents also move issues off the public agenda, (3) presidential rhetoric not only influences the public agenda directly, among those who watch the speech, but also indirectly by affecting media coverage after the speech, and (4) the influence of presidential rhetoric is more pronounced among those who support the president, who share similar political predispositions as the president, and who are politically sophisticated.
... In recent years, there has been a constant stream of micro-level studies of how mass media consumption structures whether andmore oftenhow individual voters cast their vote (cf. Barker and Lawrence, 2006;Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010). However, media might not only influence individuals" behavior through direct exposure to their content because we need to keep in mind the "essentially social character of political participation" (Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010, p. 392). ...
In modern democracies elections are considered the central mechanism for people to control their political representatives. Yet, an effective control requires both knowledge of the incumbents’ performance and visibility of alternative party options in electoral contests. This paper evaluates how the press system contributes to these premises. By means of cross-national multilevel analysis, we test whether well-balanced and critical media coverage mobilizes voters to go to the polls and countervails the impact of individual prerequisites for political participation. Contrary to normative ex-pectations, our results indicate that ideologically biased press systems lead to higher turnout and reduce the importance of personal resources and characteristics.
... In recent years, there has been a constant stream of micro-level studies of how mass media consumption structures whether andmore oftenhow individual voters cast their vote (cf. Barker and Lawrence, 2006;Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010). There is also an increasing number of studies explaining the effect of media coverage on vote choices or voter mobilization on the aggregate level (cf. ...
In modern democracies elections are considered the central mechanism for people to control their political representatives. Yet, an effective control requires both knowledge of incumbents’ past per-formance and visibility of alternative party options in electoral contests. This paper evaluates how the media system contributes to these premises. By means of cross-national and multilevel analysis, we test whether well-balanced and critical media coverage mobilizes voters and levels out the impact of individual prerequisites for political participation. Our results indicate, first, that ideological-ly biased press systems lead to higher turnout and reduce the importance of personal resources and characteristics. Second, we find that the more often newspapers cover improper behavior by officials, the less likely voters are to cast a vote.
... In this analysis, a dummy-coded voting variable would be explained more appropriately by a logistic function. The simultaneous test for direct and indirect effects on voting, however, does require a path analysis, which is able to consider both kinds of effects at the same time (see, e.g., Barker & Lawrence, 2006). ...
Content analyses have shown that German political parties make use of party Web sites in different ways, leading to unequal levels of mobilizing, informing, interacting, and participating features. This article examines whether or not the use of party Web sites has an impact on voting by using individual-level data from a representative survey of Germany in the European parliamentary elections of 2009. Although voting behavior was primarily influenced by well-known factors such as party identification and issue competence, evidence suggests that the use of party Web sites could have positive effects on voting for the Greens and the Social Democrats.
... Subsequently, people's opinions may polarize, as hearing opinions you already hold echoing in the media provides legitimacy to even stronger believe in these ideas (D. A. Jones, 2002;Sunstein, 2007). Under normal circumstances, opinionated news therefore confirms and reinforces political attitudes (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007;Druckman & Parkin, 2005;Holbert, 2004;Jamieson & Cappella, 2008;D. A. Jones, 2002;Morris & Francia, 2010;Smith & Searles, 2012;Stroud, 2010). ...
... Subsequently, people's opinions may polarize, as hearing opinions you already hold echoing in the media provides legitimacy to even stronger believe in these ideas (D. A. Jones, 2002;Sunstein, 2007). Under normal circumstances, opinionated news therefore confirms and reinforces political attitudes (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007;Druckman & Parkin, 2005;Holbert, 2004;Jamieson & Cappella, 2008;D. A. Jones, 2002;Morris & Francia, 2010;Smith & Searles, 2012;Stroud, 2010). ...
... Subsequently, people's opinions may polarize, as hearing opinions you already hold echoing in the media provides legitimacy to even stronger believe in these ideas (D. A. Jones, 2002;Sunstein, 2007). Under normal circumstances, opinionated news therefore confirms and reinforces political attitudes (Barker & Lawrence, 2006;DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007;Druckman & Parkin, 2005;Holbert, 2004;Jamieson & Cappella, 2008;D. A. Jones, 2002;Morris & Francia, 2010;Smith & Searles, 2012;Stroud, 2010). ...
Opinionated news targets communities of likeminded viewers, relies on dramaturgical storytelling techniques, and shares characteristics with political satire. Accordingly, opinionated news should be understood as a specific form of political entertainment. We have investigated the mechanisms underlying the effects of opinionated news on political attitudes using an experimental design that employed manipulated television news items. Findings confirm that opinionated news positively affects policy attitudes via its presumed influence on others and subsequent perceptions of the opinion climate. However, opinionated news also negatively affects attitudes via hostile media perceptions and evoked anger, especially for people with incongruent political preferences. Due to these opposing processes, we found no total effect of opinionated news on policy attitudes. Conditions are discussed under which either the positive or the negative indirect effect is likely to dominate.
... Thus, even given conditions of one-sided message flow on cable news channels, this information could polarize the opinions of partisan audiences. On the other hand, evidence for direct persuasion, unconditioned by political predispositions, has been found in response to slanted news (Druckman and Parkin 2005; Kahn and Kenney 2002) and, in some instances, political talk radio (Barker and Lawrence 2006; Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Such examples suggest that when media cues are especially clear and one sided, this is enough to overwhelm partisan biases in processing (Dalton et al. 1998). ...
This study examines climate change coverage on the three major cable news channels and assesses the relationship between viewership of these channels and beliefs about global warming. Evidence from a content analysis of climate change coverage on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC during 2007 and 2008 demonstrates that Fox takes a more dismissive tone toward climate change than CNN and MSNBC. Fox also interviews a greater ratio of climate change doubters to believers. An analysis of 2008 survey data from a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults finds a negative association between Fox News viewership and acceptance of global warming, even after controlling for numerous potential confounding factors. Conversely, viewing CNN and MSNBC is associated with greater acceptance of global warming. Further analyses reveal that the relationship between cable news viewership (both Fox and CNN/MSNBC) and global warming acceptance is stronger among Republicans than among Democrats. That is, the views of Republicans are strongly linked with the news outlet they watch, regardless of how well that outlet aligns with their political predispositions. In contrast, Democrats don’t vary much in their beliefs as a function of cable news use. This asymmetry suggests that some Republicans, who as a group tend to be predisposed toward global warming skepticism, are less skeptical when exposed to information on the reality and urgency of climate change.
... The second study, utilizing a field experiment design, found that news readers' attitudes changed as a result of exposure to the Washington Post or the Washington Times (Gerber, Karlan & Bergan 2009). Barker & Lawrence (2006) found that exposure to conservative talk radio had implications for voters' decisions in the 2000 primary elections. ...
Media elites strive to shape the policy preferences of their audience through the publication of their opinions. Scholars, however, have not fully distilled whether the opinions communicated by media elites are successful in moving the public or politicians toward their preferred policy position, or whether media is responsive to these actors. This article offers a means of assessing media influence. I provide measures of the policy preferences of two leading newspaper editorial pages, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, and employ these scales in a dynamic time series analysis. I find that the announced positions of the media have minimal influence. Rather, I find evidence of a movable media, where media opinion shifts in response to changes in the policy positions of politicians.
... Two alternatives in particular are especially difficult to rule out: individuals choosing media outlets that share their politics (self-selection) and media outlets adopting the politics of their audience. Although many studies find associations between survey reports of exposure to certain media outlets and political opinions, associations that tend to be stronger when the outlets are more partisan (Barker 1999(Barker , 2002Barker and Lawrence 2006;Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998;Druckman and Parkin 2005;Kahn and Kenney 2002;Project for Excellence in Journalism 2007), determining whether these associations reflect media persuasion or either of these alternatives is difficult. ...
Using panel data and matching techniques, we exploit a rare change in communication flows—the endorsement switch by several prominent British newspapers to the Labour Party before the 1997 election—to estimate media persuasion effects. This unusual event provides an opportunity to test for such effects while avoiding methodological pitfalls that have plagued previous studies. By comparing readers of newspapers that switched to similar individuals who did not read these newspapers, we estimate these papers persuaded a considerable share of their readers to vote for Labour. Depending on the statistical approach, the point estimates vary from about 10 to as high as 25 percent of readers. These findings provide rare, compelling evidence that the news media exert powerful influence on mass political behavior.
... However, in recent years interest in the impact media may exert on their audience's electoral behavior has been revived. Yet, this strand of research mostly concentrates on how exposure to mass communication structures how voters cast their votes, but less so, whether they go to the polls in the first place (e.g., Bartels, 1993;Zaller, 1996;Dalton et al., 1998;Schmitt-Beck, 2000, 2003Denemark, 2002;Dobrzynska et al., 2003;Lawson and McCann, 2004;De Vreese and Semetko, 2004;Druckman and Parkin, 2005;White et al., 2005;Barker and Lawrence, 2006;Beltrán, 2007). ...
This paper explores the impact of informal communication in voters’ social networks and the formal communication of the mass media on individuals’ propensity to take part in elections. Analyzing survey data from a recent local election in Germany it shows how both forms of communication may not only mobilize, but also demobilize voters. On the whole, personal communication appears more influential than mass communication. The media’s effects are generally weaker than those of social networks. Moreover, they are mediated by attitudes, while social networks have strong direct effects. These originate mainly from information conveyed through personal contact with voters and abstainers in one’s immediate social environment. Social voting norms are only influential, if they originate from persons’ families and are in favor of electoral participation.
A national panel survey (n = 1,332) oversampled partisans (40% Democrat, 40% Republican, 20% Independent) and exposed them to an experiment showing partisan news sources (Fox News Channel and MSNBC) and partisan content, in a test of hostile media perception. Partisans did not find the news outlets to be hostile but did find out-group content to be hostile. The study also compared partisan cable news with broadcast TV news and found that viewers of traditional broadcast news (both network and local) were more moderate and viewed the news, and news sources, as less hostile. This study is also one of the first to examine the role of emerging social media outlets which have reportedly been embraced on the right, including Parler, Telegram, MeWe, Gab, Gettr, and Rumble.
Political and media commentators have noted the current symbiotic relation between the Fox News network and the Trump administration. While the phenomenon of revolving doors between a media outlet and a branch of government is unprecedented, the relationship between Fox and the Trump White House in fact taps into a long-standing tradition of conservative media operating as Republican role players. Focusing on nationally syndicated conservative talk radio (CTR) programs in the ante-Trump era (1988-2010) and mobilizing the theory of political parties as coalitions of interest groups, I examine how CTR negotiated a delicate position within the Republican coalition operating as an interest group in its own right. Using Clive S. Thomas's typology of group-party interaction models (2001, 20-21), I argue that CTR programs engaged in a form of ideological but pragmatic relationship with the Republican elite, namely one that is based on ideological affinity and sometimes identical policy goals but formed on an ad hoc basis. I show how, though mutualistic, this relation fluctuated throughout the two decades as CTR programs acted as willful though autonomous allies of GOP officials, working in tandem with Republican officials when deeming it consistent with their own views and interests, but without ever being subservient to them. 2
Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. This paper advances a theoretical argument linking presidential primary outcomes to the strategic behavior of subnational party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters in their regions. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters.
Evidence of journalistic fact-checking’s capacity to correct misperceptions is mixed, and evidence of its capacity to alter candidate appraisals is even more limited. However, to date, investigators have pursued such evidence only as it relates to atomized factual corrections on the part of fact-checkers, rather than aggregated appraisals of candidate truthfulness—the latter of which have become common from non-partisan fact-checkers such as Politifact. Furthermore, little research has considered the specific characteristics that may condition voters’ willingness to be persuaded by information provided by fact checkers. In the population-based survey experiment described herein, conducted just before the 2016 California Democratic presidential primary, we assess the persuasive impact of an infographic comparing candidates’ factual accuracy, as judged by fact-checks conducted by Politifact over time. Our findings suggest that such summary information is not likely to alter inter-partisan candidate appraisals, but they may affect intra-partisan ones—at least among Democratic primary voters. These results add some clarity regarding the conditions under which fact-checking can influence voter decision-making.
span style="font-size: 100%; font-family: Arial; color: #000000;" data-sheets-value="{"1":2,"2":"This paper examines the research in media and presidential nomination campaigns as it has emerged during the post-reform era and moved into the new millennia. While there has been ample progress in the field, most notable has been the change in tone in the research from \u201cbad\u201d news to \u201cgood\u201d news. Interpretations from the most recent research in the area suggest that the news media do not perform as poorly as judged in the earlier decades, at least in terms of providing information to voters. Moreover, voters are now portrayed not as na\u00efve citizens who are easily manipulated by the media, but rather more resilient to media manipulation, and active consumers of information for political learning purposes."}" data-sheets-userformat="{"2":2111744,"11":0,"14":{"1":2,"2":0},"15":"arial,sans,sans-serif","16":10,"24":{"1":0,"2":3,"3":0,"4":3}}">This paper examines the research in media and presidential nomination campaigns as it has emerged during the post-reform era and moved into the new millennia. While there has been ample progress in the field, most notable has been the change in tone in the research from “bad” news to “good” news. Interpretations from the most recent research in the area suggest that the news media do not perform as poorly as judged in the earlier decades, at least in terms of providing information to voters. Moreover, voters are now portrayed not as naïve citizens who are easily manipulated by the media, but rather more resilient to media manipulation, and active consumers of information for political learning purposes.</span
Utilizing an innovative dataset the article analyses the relevance of television, the daily press and the internet at the 2005 German Parliamentary Election. Against the background of recent changes in the German media system it focuses on two aspects -the reach of various media and its development during the campaign, as well as the media's effects on turnout (mobilization) and voters' political attitudes and party preferences (persuasion). Partly, the analyses take also account of political conversations and the parties' campaign communications as alternative sources of political information for voters. Several TV programs as well as political discussions within primary relationships had the largest and during the course of the campaign further increasing reach. Serious daily newspapers, public-TV news, and political talks within the family and with friends increased the likelihood of turnout, while the tabloid 'Bild' rather demobilized voters. Some media, most clearly again the tabloid 'Bild', influenced political attitudes and electoral decisions. Several of these effects were conditional; they emerged particularly pronounced among voters with little interest in politics.
This study examines mediators of the relationship between news consumption and political participation in the contemporary news environment. We test the differential effects exerted by pro- and counter-attitudinal news compared with balanced news on intended participation. Our primary objective is to model three paths that may link news exposure and participation: cognitive (i.e., perceived issue understanding), affective (i.e., emotions evoked by a news story), and attitudinal (i.e., attitude strength). We compare these paths across four issues, testing which is strongest. Relying on a large survey-based experiment on a representative sample of the American population (N = 2,300), we find that pro-attitudinal exposure increases intended participation relative to balanced news exposure, while the effects of counter-attitudinal news do not differ from those exerted by balanced news. Issue understanding, anger, positive emotions, and attitude strength all mediate the relationship between pro-attitudinal exposure and intended participation, with the route via attitude strength being strongest. These effects do not depend on whether exposure is self-selected or experimentally assigned.
During the campaign for the 2010 midterm elections, conservative talk radio (CTR) played a fundamental role in voicing the protest against the Obama administration. A radio genre that has long been equated solely with Limbaugh, CTR now includes a more diverse offer of syndicated programs enjoying ratings similar to Limbaugh's and large national audiences. A content analysis of four of the five top CTR programs shows that, while they share a common ideological core—with common emphasis on economic issues and foreign affairs, and a systematic indictment of the forty-fourth president—each program tailors its content in a unique way. Significant differences emerge in the way hosts foreground and characterize role players, emphasize themes, and relate to the grassroots. Findings tend to define Limbaugh and Hannity as fiscal conservatives, and Ingraham and Savage as culture warriors. Overall, they point to Savage's particular status as an outlier in the CTR ecology, resulting from his cynical view of politics and suspicion of both Democrats and Republicans.
Most rigorous studies conclude that there is no consistent partisan or ideological bias in the mainstream American news media. This suggests a natural but little-asked question: Why isn't there more bias in the media? A year spent working as a journalist suggests a possible answer: Advancing a political perspective does not help secure a place on the front page. Instead, the core incentive for a journalist is to be interesting. Interesting work that reveals the essence of a situation garners a more prominent spot in the newspaper and all its associated benefits. Because “interesting” sources are found on both the left and the right, among Republicans and Democrats, balance does not require a Solomonic commitment to fairness. Rather, balance can be achieved merely as a by-product of the effort to be interesting.
Dass die politische Berichterstattung der Massenmedien für die Unterstützung von Parteien und Politikern in der Bevölkerung
maßgebliche Bedeutung besitzt, ist für viele Akteure der deutschen Politik eine fraglos feststehende Gewissheit. In den 1970er
Jahren stand die seinerzeit vor allem von Politikern der CDU/CSU vertretene Überzeugung vom wahlentscheidenden Einfluss des
„getarnten Elefanten“ Fernsehen (Noelle- Neumann 1970) sogar an der Wiege der fundamentalen medienpolitischen Weichenstellung
in Richtung eines dualen Rundfunksystems (Schulz 2008: 236). Zum geflügelten Wort wurde in jüngerer Zeit das dem „Medienkanzler“
Gerhard Schröder nachgesagte Diktum, mit „Bild, BamS und Glotze“ könne man die Bundesrepublik Deutschland regieren (Pontzen
2006). Doch haben die Praktiker der Politik mit solch weit reichenden Wirkungsvermutungen Recht? Die in Deutschland verfügbare
wissenschaftliche Evidenz zur Bedeutung von Medien für das Wahlverhalten ist fragmentarisch. Und selbst auf den vorhandenen
Evidenzen kann sich die Forschung nicht ausruhen, denn beständig voranschreitender Medienwandel zwingt unablässig zur erneuten
Überprüfung der Gültigkeit etablierter Wissensbestände.
This article outlines two modes of publicity, a publicity of promotion and a publicity of openness, and then considers their implications for traditional broadcast versus online communications. Although the structure of the internet makes it particularly good at developing a publicity of openness, the economics, regulatory structure and technology of the traditional broadcast media make them far better at developing promotional publicity. I trace a series of examples that demonstrate this inequality and discuss the implications of this disparity for the economics of attention. Ultimately, I argue, discussions of the democratic possibilities of the internet must take account of the relative lack of promotional publicity online.
This paper explores whether Democratic voters emphasize different traits when evaluating potential party nominees than do Republican voters. Using data obtained from the only two electoral cycles in the modern era in which competitive races took place for both the Republican and Democratic nominations (1988 and 2000), we present evidence that Democratic primary voters tend to place the greatest weight on perceived candidate compassion, whereas Republicans are more likely to rely on perceived personal virtue.
Combining a telephone survey of a probability sample of residents in the Austin, Texas, metropolitan area and a content analysis of the local daily newspaper, this study replicates and extends prior research on attribute agenda setting with an emphasis on the attribute priming consequences of agenda-setting effects for opinions about candidates in the 2002 Texas gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial elections. Correlation and regression analyses support the central proposition of attribute agenda setting and indicate that attributes positively or negatively covered in the news are related to opinions about each candidate. Attributes receiving extensive media attention were more likely to affect attitudinal judgments for heavy newspaper readers than for light newspaper readers.
This paper examines the persuasability of rhetorical value framing within a presidential nominating campaign, in an effort
to understand how values and value-laden language may provide useful signals in electoral contexts where partisan cues are
absent. Relying on a survey-experiment conducted during the 2000 Republican nomination campaign, I evaluate the relative persuasiveness
of arguments framed in either individualistic or egalitarian terms. Drawing upon an “active-receiver” model of framing effects,
I posit that Republican primary voters respond more readily to candidates when they use individualistic frames than when they
use egalitarian frames, because individualism is a more “chronically accessible” value construct for Republicans. Furthermore,
I hypothesize that this dynamic is particularly pronounced among more educated respondents, who have been trained to recognize
abstract value cues and automatically apply them to applied political contexts. The experimental findings support these hypotheses.
Public perception of a biased news media, particularly media biased in a liberal direction, has increased over the past 3 presidential elections. To examine what might be influencing this public opinion, the authors look at shifts in public perception of media bias, press coverage of the topic of media bias, and the balance in valence coverage of presidential candidates—all during the 1988, 1992, and 1996 presidential elections. Their results suggest that the rise in public perception that news media are liberally biased is not the result of bias in valence news coverage of the candidates, but, rather, due to increasing news self-coverage that focuses on the general topic of bias in news content. Furthermore, the increased claims of media bias come primarily from conservative elites who have proclaimed a liberal bias that is viewed as including the entire media industry.
Although much recent work suggests that contemporary presidential campaigns have more powerful electoral effects than were seen in previous decades, there has been little research that examines the actual effect of recent campaigns on individual vote choice. Using the 1980 NES panel study, I show that the overwhelming majority of individual votes can be accounted for from attitudes such as party identification and presidential approval that are measured before the political conventions, and that changes in orientations during the campaign had limited effects on individual vote choice and negligible consequences for the electoral outcome. Moreover, models derived from the 1980 panel data can predict with a great deal of accuracy the aggregate outcomes of the 1984 and 1988 presidential contests. I argue that the results support an “activation” model of campaign effects in recent elections: rather than simply reinforcing individuals' preexisting vote intentions, the campaigns served mainly to activate existing political predispositions and make them electorally relevant. At the same time, the results show that campaigns have the potential to exert larger electoral effects, but in recent elections they have not done so.
Much research demonstrates the importance of national, rather than personal, economic conditions on voting behavior, yet relatively unexplored is how citizens develop what scholars have called “rough evaluations” of the economy. We argue that campaign news coverage about the nation's economic health provides cues to the public; in turn, these cues supply the criteria for sociotropic voting, thereby shaping presidential preferences during the course of campaigns. Examining news stories in each of the past four presidential elections, we (1) categorize coverage as economic or noneconomic, (2) measure its volume and valence, and (3) model candidate coverage against presidential preference polls. Results suggest that economic candidate coverage, although accounting for only a fraction of content, strongly and consistently predicts variation in presidential preference during all four elections, suggesting that voters gain sociotropic criteria for evaluating candidates from news media coverage of campaigns.
Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy. Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for the Ku Klux Klan. The first presented research participants with one of two local news stories about a Klan rally that varied by frame: One framed the rally as a free speech issue, and the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan than participants who watched the public order story. Additional data indicate that frames affect tolerance by altering the perceived importance of public order values. The relative accessibility of free speech and public order concepts did not respond to framing. A second experiment used a simulated electronic news service to present different frames and replicated these findings.
The disclosure that high officials within the Reagan administration had covertly diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras funds obtained from the secret sale of weapons to Iran provides us with a splendid opportunity to examine how the foundations of popular support shift when dramatic events occur. According to our theory of priming, the more attention media pay to a particular domain--the more the public is primed with it--the more citizens will incorporate what they know about that domain into their overall judgment of the president. Data from the 1986 National Election Study confirm that intervention in Central America loomed larger in the public's assessment of President Reagan's performance after the Iran-Contra disclosure than before. Priming was most pronounced for aspects of public opinion most directly implicated by the news coverage, more apparent in political notices' judgments than political experts', and stronger in the evaluations of Reagan's overall performance than in assessments of his character.
Voters in a primary or caucus are unlikely to invest substantial personal resources in making their choice, but at the same time their choice-problem is complex. A mixed model of choice is presented with two steps: an elimination step that reduces the field of candidates considered seriously by the voter, and an expected-utility step that involves comparisons of the candidates in the reduced "decision set." Voters use party affiliation, visibility, and viability to narrow the field of candidates. They then compare the expected-utility gains of electing any of the remaining candidates. If no clear preference emerges, voters consider their affect for the candidates and reconsider viability. We have written a computer algorithm to simulate the decision model for potential caucus and primary voters early in the 1988 nomination campaign. A significant strength of this simulation technique is that it allows us to model choice across all 7 Democratic and 6 Republican candidates. The elimination step has a powerful effect in narrowing the field of candidates for nomination participants. Overall, the model accurately predicts choice across the options voters faced early in the 1988 nomination season.
This paper estimates the influence of newspaper endorsements on voting behavior in presidential elections. The analysis focuses on the impact of newspaper endorsements in the 1964 presidential election--the one recent presidential election in which a considerable number of newspapers endorsed the Democratic candidate. Multiple regression analysis of the 1964 vote in 223 northern counties suggests that a Democratic endorsement from the local newspaper added about five percentage points to the 1960-1964 Democratic gain. The same estimate is obtained from an application of two-stage least squares. From this result, along with evidence from other election years, it is argued that newspaper endorsements exert an important influence on the outcomes of presidential elections.
As Arizona Senator John McCain emerged to win the New Hampshire and Michigan Republican primaries, much was made of his distinctive campaign tactics. Most notably, the press pointed to his willingness to open himself up to the media and voters. The authors argue that McCain's success was less tactical and idiosyncratic than has been suggested. McCain's rise was fueled by a confluence of circumstances. First, there was a latent pool of support for an antiestablishment, reformist candidate. Second, several high profile competitors departed right as McCain began his book tour and the New Hampshire primary started receiving attention. Third, for a variety of reasons, McCain was able to use subsequent free media attention to increase his support in New Hampshire and other primary states. Finally, the structure of the initial contests—open primaries in New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Michigan—allowed reformist-minded independents to vote alongside registered Republicans.
Electoral research acknowledges the growing significance of the mass media in contemporary campaigns, but scholars are divided on the nature of this influence. Using a unique database that includes both media content and public opinion, we examine the flow of partisan information from newspapers to the voters and assess the press's role in electoral politics and citizen learning. We find that the American press does not present clear and singular messages about presidential elections but, rather multiple messages about the candidates and the campaign. In addition, perception of the information is shaped as much by an individual's political views as by the objective content. Despite the mixed messages, we find that a newspaper's editorial content is significantly related to candidate preferences in 1992. These results challenge the minimal effects interpretation of the media, because local newspapers can play a significant role in providing cues that influence voters' electoral calculus.
Analyses of the persuasive effects of media exposure outside the laboratory have generally produced negative results. I attribute such nonfindings in part to carelessness regarding the inferential consequences of measurement error and in part to limitations of research design. In an analysis of opinion change during the 1980 presidential campaign, adjusting for measurement error produces several strong media exposure effects, especially for network television news. Adjusting for measurement error also makes preexisting opinions look much more stable, suggesting that the new information absorbed via media exposure must be about three times as distinctive as has generally been supposed in order to account for observed patterns of opinion change.
The studies reported deal with the effectiveness of films and other mass-communication devices. Part I on film evaluation studies contains chapters 2-6 entitled (2) The orientation film, "The Battle of Britain," (3) general implications derived from the orientation film experiments, (4) the audience's evaluation of films, (5) experimental comparison of alternative presentations, and (6) effects of films on men of different intellectual ability. Part II on studies employing controlled variation contains chapters 7-9 on (7) short-time and long-time effects of an orientation film, (8) the effects of presenting "one side" versus "both sides" in changing opinions on a controversial subject, and (9) the effect of an audience-participation technique in film-strip presentation. Chapter 10 is a summary and evaluation. An appendix on measurement problems deals with (A) the baseline for measurement of percentage change, (B) "marginal" versus "internal" effects, (C) comparison of the before-after and the after-only design of experiments, and (D) "regression" in the analysis of effects of films. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The attitudinal effects of the television docudrama “The Day After,” which depicted the aftermath of a Soviet nuclear attack on the Kansas City area, are analyzed through data from a panel conducted immediately before and after the program was shown. The effects of the program's byproducts (associated coverage and discussion) outweighed the effects of the program itself. The program seems to have had its greatest direct impact on the salience of and information about nuclear war rather than on attitudes as such.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate several potential theoretical frameworks for understanding the social psychological processes underlying the effects of momentum. Using an experimental design embedded within a national survey conducted during the 1992 Democratic presidential primary season, I examined several potential explanations for changes in candidate preference that result from changing perceptions of public support. Findings were most supportive of an explanation based on the cognitive responses elicited by hearing about others' views. Consensus cues stimulated additional information processing and a reassessment of the individual's own position; information about mass support for candidates triggered respondents who were only moderately involved in this decision-making process to mentally rehearse potential reasons for supporting or opposing the candidates. By priming these thoughts, people's own opinions were moved in the direction of the arguments that would not have otherwise come to mind.
Research in political behavior has increasingly turned to the cognitions underlying attitudes. The simplest of these cognitions are political facts - the bits of information about politics that citizens hold. While other key concepts in political science - partisanship, trust, tolerance - have widely used (if still controversial) measures that facilitate comparisons across time and among studies, the discipline has no generally accepted measure of the public's level of political information. This paper describes the development and testing of survey-based measures of political knowledge, with special attention to the existing items on the National Election Study surveys. In so doing, it illustrates the use of a variety of techniques for item analysis and scale construction. We also present a recommended five-item knowledge index.
What's the primary message: Horse race or issue journalism
- H Brady
- R Johnston
Brady, H., & Johnston, R. (1987). What's the primary message: Horse race or issue journalism? In G. Orren & N. Polsby (eds.), Media and momentum (pp. 127–186). New York, NY: Chatham.
McCain Learns, as George W. Has Not, How to Be a Challenger in a Golden Age
- Charles Krauthammer
Charles Krauthammer, February 5, 2000. " McCain Learns, as George W. Has Not, How to Be a Challenger in a Golden Age. "
The Marvelous Maverick
- Kelly
Kelly, " The Marvelous Maverick. "
How McCain Can Take the Reins
- William Safire
William Safire, February 28, 2000, " How McCain Can Take the Reins. "
Campaign organization confront the media-political environment
- David C Barker
- Adam B Lawrence
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David C. Barker and Adam B. Lawrence Arterton, C. F. (1978). Campaign organization confront the media-political environment. In J. D. Barber (Ed.), Race for the presidency (pp. 3–25). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Words of the Father: Candidate George W. Bush Sometimes Mangles Words
- Ron Hutcheson
Ron Hutcheson, January 29, 2000, " Words of the Father: Candidate George W. Bush Sometimes Mangles Words. "
Is anyone responsible? Chicago
- S Iyengar
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCain's Journey: POW to Power Broker
- Nicholas D Kristol
Nicholas D. Kristol, February 27, 2000, " McCain's Journey: POW to Power Broker. "
Predictions of public opinion from the mass media
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Fan, D. P. (1988). Predictions of public opinion from the mass media. New York: Greenwood Press.
Being Positively Negative
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E. J. Dionne Jr., February 15, 2000, " Being Positively Negative. "
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Zaller (1996) has shown that media effects are often not monotonic due to gaps in References Arbuckle, J. (1994). AMOS. Chicago: SmallWaters. Downloaded by [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] at 04:10 01 January 2015
The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential cam-paigns News coverage, economic cues, and the public's presidential preferences
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McCain's Nine Lives: The Straight Talk Express Keeps on Trucking
- Mary Mcgrory
Mary McGrory, February 26, 2000, " McCain's Nine Lives: The Straight Talk Express Keeps on Trucking. "
The media in American politics: contents and consequences
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Paletz, D. L. (1999). The media in American politics: contents and consequences. New York: Longman.
He's an inspiring candidate Downloaded by
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The mass media election
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When and how candidates matter. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association
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