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The evolution of Soviet operational art: The significance of ‘strategic defense’ and ‘premeditated defense’ in the conduct of theatre‐strategic operations
Originally intended as a swift regime-change operation by the Russian leadership, the Russo-Ukrainian War has evolved into a prolonged war of attrition. In that sense, this paper reassesses the transformation of the Russian way of warfare during the war through a focus on the battles of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the Ukrainian Summer Offensive. Accordingly, the theoretical underpinnings of Russian strategy, particularly the enduring influence of Soviet-era legacy, are highlighted in the first part. In the second part, this research offers insights into the Russian military praxis during the war by drawing on various sources, including Telegram channels. It is shown that the Russian army has focused on the combined employment of a new reconnaissance-fire system (ROS), reconnaissance-strike system (RUS), infantry assaults, and umbrella of integrated air defence and electronic warfare systems for force protection and attrition during costly offensives like Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Consequently, this paper asserts that the Russian war machine effectively responded to the necessities of attrition warfare by updating its operational art, drawing on the Soviet legacy.
This monograph explores the similarity between the nuclear battlefield of the Pentomic Era and the nonlinear battlefield described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990's and Beyond. This concept is based on the assumption that future battlefields will be nonlinear (more open, less dense). Since the ideas in this pamphlet will guide developments in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and leader and soldier development, examining this nonlinear battlefield is important. Many aspects of the Pentomic Era's nuclear battlefield are similar to the nonlinear battlefield. If a strong enough connection can be made between the two, some of the nuclear battlefield's testing and analysis data could be used to guide future nonlinear battlefield analysis. The methodology used for objectively determining similarity between the two battlefields is based on comparing the nonlinear battlefield described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 to the nuclear battlefield described in various Pentomic Era books, articles, and studies. The test criteria are: battlefield characteristics (descriptive aspects which set the battlefield apart from preceding descriptions); battlefield relationships (relationships between activities, friendly and enemy forces, and combat and sustainment forces); and combat power dynamics (from FM 100-5 Operations - maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership). Additionally, the Soviet view of the nonlinear/nuclear battlefield relationship is discussed as further evidence linking the two battlefield descriptions. Finally, the monograph ends with comments on the utility of studying military history.
Current and proposed U.S. Marine Corps doctrine proclaims the many virtues of the Marines as an "expeditionary force in readiness." As America's "911 force," the Marine Corps is tasked to be the military force "most ready when the nation is least ready." A Ground Combat Element (GCE) combined with an organic Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) provides a potent military force, rapidly deployable anywhere in the world. Capable of operating at the tactical and operational levels of war, the Marine Corps undoubtedly contributes significantly to the total force projection capability of the United States. Operating independently, however, the ability of the Marines to project combat power over time, space and depth may be limited. The nation maintains a requirement for an operationally durable force. Operational durability is the sustainability of an operational force throughout the entire depth and breadth of the theater of operations for an indefinite period of time. Operational durability consists of four elements. These are time, depth and breadth, sustainability, and the moral and material forces of a country. By analyzing the structure, doctrine (current and proposed), and the requirements that the nation has placed on the Marine Corps against operational durability criteria, a determination can be made as to whether or not the Marine Corps is an operationally durable force. This analysis concludes that both in current and proposed doctrine the MEU (SOC) and the MEB are arguably not operationally durable. Under current and proposed doctrine the MEF is operationally durable. The results of this monograph have applicability to the development of the U.S. Army's Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) concept. As a rapidly deploying force, the IBCT presents a formidable, flexible force that is tactically significant. But is the IBCT operationally durable?
The principal objective of this paper is to explore both theoretical and practical aspects of possible Soviet recce-strike complexes. Note that despite the use of the term 'complex' by the Soviets, a recce-strike complex is not a permanent system, but a collection of various subsystems assembled and directed to accomplished a specific task. Subsystems of a particular recce- strike complex can belong at the same time to another recce-strike complex. Thus, the best way to describe the Soviet concept of recce-strike is to describe and analyze various subsystems or elements which comprise a recce-strike complex. Therefore, the essentials of recce-strike complexes, i.e., reconnaissance, fire concept, and lastly, but perhaps most important, the C3 subsystems, the C3 subsystems, will be described and analyzed in some detail.
The Soviet army tactical defense, when given adequate preparation time, is a formidable obstacle to an attacker. The battalion defensive position supports a combined arms battle which heavily relies on deception, field fortifications and internal fire sacs. The study provides a detailed laydown of forces and weapons systems in such a defense.
Nachal'nyy period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny' [The initial period of the Great Patriotic War], Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhumal [Military-historical Downloaded by
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