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Malaysian Chinese politics in the 21st century: Fear, service and Marginalisation
Abstract
Chinese politics in Malaysia has been on the decline since independence and the Chinese community has now been totally marginalized. In particular, the two main Chinese‐based parties in the ruling coalition under the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) — the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) — are essentially powerless on all the key policy areas affecting the Chinese community. Under such circumstances, the Chinese‐based parties changed their political strategies to “service” and “fear” politics. “Service” refers to solving their constituents’ day‐to‐day problems while “fear” refers to reminding the Chinese that the alternative of an Islamic government under Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) is worse. It concludes that given the post‐1969 political structure, the present outcome is unavoidable and the immediate future of Chinese politics in Malaysia is bleak.
... A good example was the Liberal Democrats in UK, who became part of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010, but lost a large portion of support owing to notable policy reversals (Cutts & Russell, 2015;Dommett, 2013). In Malaysia, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was perceived to be compromising the rights of Malaysian Chinese in the coalition government and eventually lost all but one seat (out of 222 seats) in the lower house of the parliament in 2018 (Chin, 2001(Chin, , 2010. Other examples can also be found in Indonesia (see e.g., Chew, 2019;Setiawan & Taufik, 2022), Greece (e.g., Fallon, 2023;Souvlis, 2020) and possibly other countries. ...
... 4.2 (Magnusson et al., 2014;Sayin & Gürhan-Canlı, 2015) • Product/Service failure (Khamitov et al., 2020;Magnusson et al., 2014) • Consumer-brand disagreement (Costa & Azevedo, 2024;Wannow et al., 2024) Consequences • Avoidance and revenge (Grégoire et al., 2009;Yang et al., 2022) • Boycotts (Lasarov et al., 2023;Viscomi, 2023) • Anti-brand behaviour (Costa & Azevedo, 2024;Grégoire et al., 2009) • Self-mediation on brand relationship (Park & John, 2018) Political brand (See Table 1 in 2008, MCA began suffering from electoral performance decline. From being the largest junior partner within the governing coalition, MCA lost all but one seat (out of 222 seats) in the lower house of the parliament in 2018 (Chin, 2001(Chin, , 2010 Country: Indonesia Political Brand: Joko Widodo Joko Widodo once gained public support owing to his strong image as the new hope of combating corruption. However, in 2019, he approved legislation which significantly weakened the institution and contradicted his promises. ...
This study examines political brand transgression (BT) using the Stimuli-Organism-Response (SOR) framework. It explores how voters and opponents perceive political BT and respond through anti-brand behaviors. Understanding these dynamics is essential for political entities to manage their brand and sustain voter support. Employing a qualitative case study with netnographic practices, this research analyzes perceived political BT by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, particularly regarding migration policies and unmet domestic promises. It identifies key stimuli—expectation disconfirmation and relationship norm violations—that trigger perceptions of transgression. The findings highlight core belief misalignments and performance failures as common drivers of political BT, leading to voter disappointment, switching intentions, and opposition-led criticisms, word-of-mouth damage, and efforts to unseat the party. This study extends the SOR framework by outlining the stimuli, process, and outcomes of political BT while identifying factors that moderate post-transgression behavior. Practically, it offers insights for political brand owners on maintaining self-consistency, assessing their governance capabilities, and curbing excessive zeal among supporters. By bridging brand management and political branding, this research provides a novel perspective on how political entities can navigate transgressions and maintain brand integrity, ultimately strengthening electoral resilience.
... The involvement of Chinese women is not only decreasing in the political field, but the participation of the Chinese community in the political field in Malaysia has been low since the country achieved independence again (Chin, 2001). The low level of involvement of Chinese women since the beginning of independence can be seen in the number of MCA sub-committee members; no single woman was in the MCA Annual Report in 1961. ...
This study explores the factors influencing Chinese women's involvement in politics in Peninsular Malaysia, using qualitative interviews with ten participants selected via purposive sampling. Key informants include female political representatives, male politicians, academics and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) activists. The research applies intersectionality theory to analyze how internal and external agents of political socialization and various challenges shape women's political engagement and culture. Internal socialization agents encompass education, economic status, family background, religion, ethnicity, and gender. External agents include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), political parties, and community networks. The study identifies multiple challenges that Chinese women face, such as gender competition, cronyism, low political interest, time management conflicts, racial sentiments, sexist remarks, male dominance, competition from political opponents, and ideological barriers. These agents and challenges are intertwined and impact Chinese women's political culture, which, in turn, influences their empowerment in political, economic, and social spheres. The intersectionality framework reveals how overlapping social identities and systemic barriers shape their political experiences and efforts towards empowerment. This study provides insights into the complex dynamics affecting Chinese women's political participation and highlights the need for comprehensive strategies to enhance their roles in politics and broader societal contexts.
... Attempting to answer such questions and reflecting on the significant cultural value of the lion dance as an emblem of Chinese identity (Tan 2007), alongside the unique contribution of the CIS in Malaysia, which is viewed as essential in the perpetuation of Chinese cultural values (Chin 2001), this study explores a student lion dance society's collaboration with the esteemed Kun Seng Keng Lion and Dragon Dance Association. Focus group discussions (FGDs) reveal reflections of ethnic consciousness, boundaries, and socialization under the influence of heritage. ...
The Chinese community’s unique position in Malaysian inter-ethnic relations weaves through intricate interactions with other ethnic groups, maintaining distinct cultural identities amidst Malaysia’s diverse ethnic fabric. This study explores the intricate relationship between ethnic consciousness and cultural heritage among Malaysian Chinese people, examining, within a historical context, how this community maintains its distinct identity within a multi-ethnic society. Utilizing focus group discussions (FGDs) with Chinese independent schools (CIS) students, the study delves into their identity perceptions, influenced by both “authority-defined” and “everyday-defined” social realities. The findings reveal how cultural heritage, particularly through lion dance activities, reinforces ethnic consciousness while contributing to a broader national identity. This study elucidates the complex dynamics of ethnic identity formation in a multicultural context and advocates for an inclusive heritage management. Such an approach fosters dialogue, respects diversity, and enhances our understanding of the role of heritage in shaping a cohesive, multicultural society.
... Malaysian Chinese comprised about a quarter of the total population of Malaysia (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2018). Most Malaysian Chinese believe that Chinese education is the conduit to pass down the wealth of cultural heritage to the young (Chin, 2001). Some parents continue sending children to CIS for secondary education as these parents see that their children will have better chances to learn Chinese language and Chinese cultural values (Siah et al., 2015;. ...
Before Malaysian government liberalising its private tertiary education in the 1996 Education Act, Taiwan was one of the popular choices for students from Chinese Independent Schools (CIS) to further their tertiary education. However, the number of CIS students choosing Taiwan as the destination of their tertiary education keeps hiking up substantially despite more choices of higher education provided locally after the liberalisation. In light of this, this study aims to explore factors affecting country choice of Malaysian students from CIS in the meantime while they were to further their tertiary education. A mixed-method design was employed to investigate factors shaping this peculiar phenomenon. The researchers identified eight push-pull factors from the data coding of a focus group discussion in the first phase of the study. Based on the results, a questionnaire was crafted in the second phase of the study. Then, by engaging a purposive sampling, 869 Senior Three CIS students were recruited from several CIS in different states of Malaysia to participate in the survey at the second phase of the study. The findings revealed the importance of demographic factors administering CIS students in choosing Taiwan as a popular destination of pursuing tertiary education. In addition, the use of Chinese language as the medium of instruction in teaching and financial consideration were the pull factors contributing to the interpretation of the choice made by this group of participants. Furthermore, students’ perspective of choosing future career path and their concern of family also determine their choice of higher education. Overall, the study highlighted the importance to include demographic factors in the push-pull model. It further provides factual information for the stakeholders or policy makers to incorporate more effective strategies in recruiting CIS students.
... While championing Malay supremacy and hegemony, UMNO also positions itself as the defender of Islam. Chin (2002) also pointed out that UMNO dominated the BN to such an extent that the Chinese-based parties could no longer represent the political interests of the community. ...
The implications of media representations of ethnicity, religion and related issues are significant because they have the potential to fuel nationalism, spreading fear and tensions instead of promoting tolerance and compassion. This study examined the aspects Malaysian newspapers have created for readers’ understanding of the then Chinese ambassador’s visit to Petaling Street (Malaysia’s Chinatown) on September 25, 2015. The then Chinese ambassador’s visit took place a day before the red shirts rally, which was reported as an ‘anti-Chinese demonstration’ by some overseas Chinese-language media. Through framing analysis, this study found that the mainstream and alternative newspapers in Malaysia reported the then Chinese ambassador’s visit with different intensity and prominence. They also employed different news sources and carried dissimilar valence in their coverage. Utusan, a Malay-language daily and a mouthpiece of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), concentrated on criticisms of the then Chinese ambassador in its coverage. The Star, an English-language daily and also a messenger for the Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA), reported the consequences of the then Chinese ambassador’s visit. Significantly, the more independent and vocal newspapers in the country – Sin Chew (Chinese-language) and Malaysiakini (alternative) – focused on condemning the racist remarks of an UMNO politician.
... Tan 1997;Lee 2011;Santhiram and Tan 2017). Some scholars have examined independent Chinese schools vis-à-vis the formation of the multi-ethnic nation (Kua 1985;Tan and Santhiram 2010), while others have focused on how they safeguard the inter-generational continuity of Chinese cultures (Chin 2001;Collins 2006;Tan and Teoh 2016). To date, however, little is known about the distinctiveness of students' educational migration across the Chinesespeaking world, or addressed the wider question of how this transnational cultural practice transforms their ethnic identities and communities in Malaysia. ...
Drawing on a multi-sited ethnography of Chinese Malaysian students’ educational mobility, this article discusses the experiences, everyday practices and future aspirations of my queer informants who went to Taiwan for university and returned to Malaysia after graduation. Through examining their narratives, this article has three objectives. First, it demonstrates how tensions between my informants’ ethnic and sexual identities are reconfigured and how new forms of queer relationality and subject positions have emerged via a distinctive process of student migration across the Chinese-speaking world. Second, it contributes to the theorisation of transnational queer Chinese cultures vis-à-vis an articulation of queer Sinophone Malaysia. Third, by way of conclusion, I present a case study of transnational queer activism and demonstrate how it is practised by returned migrants in everyday life settings.
How do discontented masses and opposition elites work together to engineer a change in electoral authoritarian regimes? Social movements and elections are often seen as operating in different terrains – outside and inside institutions, respectively. In this Element, I develop a theory to describe how a broad-based social movement that champions a grievance shared by a wide segment of the population can build alliances across society and opposition elites that, despite the rules of the game rigged against them, vote the incumbents out of power. The broad-based nature of the movement also contributes to the cohesion of the opposition alliance, and elite defection, which are often crucial for regime change. This Element examines the 2018 Malaysian election and a range of cases from other authoritarian regimes across Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa to illustrate these arguments.
(Full-text free access until February 23, 2022: https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/street-and-the-ballot-box/984D9821A42E634531F41C1130A58738)
Budaya politik wanita Cina di Semenanjung Malaysia bersifat pasif. Fenomena ini dapat dilihat melalui bilangan wanita Cina antaranya di dalam Parlimen dan DUN. Malahan bilangan wanita Cina di peringkat pembuat keputusan dalam parti berorientasikan masyarakat Cina seperti DAP serta MCA masih lagi rendah, walaupun sistem kuota 30 peratus wanita telah dibentuk. Proses sosialisasi politik melalui agen sosialisasi politik merupakan antara indikator penting yang mempengaruhi budaya politik wanita Cina di Semenanjung Malaysia. Agen sosialisasi ini dilihat tidak berdiri sendiri dan saling berkait seperti yang diketengahkan melalui teori intersectionality dan telah memberikan kesan berbeza kepada wanita. Kajian kualitatif ini mengenal pasti agen sosialisasi politik melalui proses sosialisasi politik, yang telah mempengaruhi budaya politik wanita Cina di Semenanjung Malaysia. Temu bual secara intensif telah dijalankan ke atas tujuh orang informan dalam kalangan perwakilan wanita Cina, seorang ahli politik lelaki, aktivis wanita Cina dari Organisasi Bukan Kerajaan (NGO) dan ahli akademik. Hasil temu bual dianalisis di mana proses transkripsi temubual telah dikodkan dan ditemakan. Tema ini kemudiannya telah dibahagikan kepada dua iaitu agen sosialisasi politik lingkaran dalaman dan agen sosialisasi politik lingkaran luaran. Agen sosialisasi lingkaran dalaman terdiri daripada pendidikan, ekonomi, budaya, agama, keluarga serta gender. Agen sosialisasi lingkaran luaran pula terdiri daripada NGO/persatuan, parti politik dan masyarakat. Model Agen Sosialisasi Politik Wanita Cina melalui dimensi intersectionality turut dibangunkan untuk menggambarkan hubung kait agen sosialisasi politik wanita Cina di Semenanjung Malaysia.
This paper looks in detail at the performance of the three main Chinese-based political parties in Peninsular Malaysia in the 1999 Malaysian general election. They are the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan (Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, or Malaysian People's Movement Party), which are members of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN), or National Front, coalition, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the only Chinese-based opposition party in the Barisan Alternatif (BA), or Alternative Front, coalition. While conventional wisdom suggests that there was a significant swing of Chinese votes towards the government, this paper argues that there was no swing, and that the Chinese voting pattern in 1999 was broadly similar to that of the 1995 general election, confirming that the 1995 Chinese vote marked a permanent shift in the pattern of Chinese voting.