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Contemporary South Asia
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India and Pakistan's geostrategic rivalry
in Central Asia
SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH
Published online: 03 Jun 2010.
To cite this article: SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH (2003) India and Pakistan's geostrategic rivalry in Central
Asia, Contemporary South Asia, 12:2, 219-228, DOI: 10.1080/095849302000147672
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Contemporary South Asia (2003), 12(2),
(June 2003) 219–228
India and Pakistan’s geostrategic
rivalry in Central Asia
SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH
ABSTRACT Pakistan has suffered a serious blow to its regional aspirations since the toppling
of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In contrast, its South Asian rival India is finding Afghanistan
and its northern neighbours welcoming a larger role. Despite its late entry into the region,
India appears to be set to make significant gains at Pakistan’s expense. The India–Pakistan
rivalry in Central Asia is concentrated on that region’s vast energy reserves, its geo-strategic
importance in relation to Russia and China, and its potential role in the Kashmir dispute. The
Indian government has woken up to the role that Central Asia can play in advancing New
Delhi’s regional ambitions, and the post-Taliban geo-strategic conditions favour its agenda.
Since independence from the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian republics of
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have offered
an attractive area for diplomatic and economic advances by India and Pakistan.
These South Asian rivals see Central Asia as offering an opportunity to advance
their regional and domestic interests. The vacuum left in the wake of Russia’s
formal withdrawal from Central Asia prompted many players in the region and
beyond to seek influence in the space vacated by the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR). India and Pakistan had not been the most active
regional players as far as Central Asia was concerned, although it must be noted
that Pakistan had a much clearer view of the importance of Central Asia for its
national interests than India.
The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent stationing of American
forces in the region (with the tacit approval of Russia) appear to have highlighted
the urgency of strong relations with Central Asia, especially for India. The two
South Asian neighbours are now locked in competition over trade agreements,
security treaties and influence in Central Asia in three main areas of competition:
Correspondence: Dr Shahram Akbarzadeh, Senior Lecturer in Politics, School of Political & Social Inquiry,
Monash University, PO Box 11A, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia; e-mail: Shahram.Akbarzadeh@arts.
monash.edu.au
ISSN 0958-4935 print; 1469-364X online/03/020219-10 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/095849302000147672
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S.AKBARZADEH
•Central Asian gas and oil deposits promise these South Asian states access to
vast energy resources for their economies, particularly for the fast expanding
Indian industries.
•Central Asia offers a geo-strategic advantage point for these competing states
in relation to Russia and China. By gaining prominence in Central Asia, each
state seeks to broaden its international reach at the expense of the other.
•India and Pakistan wish to use their influence in Central Asia to advance their
interests in relation to the Kashmir valley.
This paper deals with these themes. It is important to emphasise at the outset that
even though Pakistan was the first South Asian country to recognise the
independent Central Asian states and establish diplomatic ties, Islamabad is now
operating at a disadvantage relative to India. The Central Asian leadership,
perhaps with the exception of Turkmen leaders, are unlikely to be influenced by
Pakistan because of widespread distrust of Islamabad, especially because of the
latter’s role in propping up the Taliban and its remnants.
Energy reserves
Finding an international outlet for their natural gas and oil is the most pressing
issue for the Central Asian leadership. Estimates of the Central Asian reserves
vary, but some of the conservative estimates put the oil reserves at 7% and gas
at 8% of global reserves.1Although production suffered in the wake of the
Soviet collapse and the uncertainty that followed, the involvement of inter-
national consortia in the energy sector has improved production in the latter part
of the 1990s. The need for hard currency has been the driving force for the
production and export of natural gas and oil, which on the whole has doubled
since 1992, the first year of independence.
Turkmenistan’s case is instructive here. According to the United States
Energy Information Agency, Turkmenistan has the world’s largest deposit of
natural gas, with proven reserves of 101 trillion cubic feet.2In 2001, it produced
1.64 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and consumed a mere 0.26 trillion cubic
feet. The rest was expected to offer Turkmenistan windfall profits through export
earnings. But two significant factors impeded Turkmenistan’s ability to realise
its plans. First, Turkmenistan is landlocked and needs to rely on Soviet-built
pipeline networks, which have traditionally been used to ship Central Asian gas
and oil to Russia and Eastern Europe. Second, the American embargo on trade
with Iran effectively vetoed a much publicised pipeline project to transport
Turkmen gas to Turkey overland, although a much scaled-down pipeline has
become operational between Turkmenistan and Iran since 1998.
Reaching the international market has proven to be a daunting task, and
Turkmenistan has been forced to sell its oil and gas to poor ex-Soviet republics,
using exiting pipelines at prices well below their market rate. Ukraine, for
example, is a major importer of Turkmen gas—but it has no money in its coffers
to pay and has promised a barter arrangement with Turkmenistan to construct
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S GEOSTRATEGIC RIVALRY
industrial projects to cover 40% of its debt. The Central Asian states have no
option but to agree to such deals. The urgency of finding an exit route for the
Central Asian energy reserve is self-evident.
It is important to note that this urgency is shared by Pakistan and India.
Islamabad in particular took the lead in establishing ties with Central Asia, and
has favoured the construction of a pipeline across Afghanistan to Pakistan. The
benefits of such pipeline for Pakistan are three-fold:
•First, there are obvious advantages for Pakistani industries in direct shipment
of affordable fuel.3
•Second, the pipeline across Pakistan will offer that state significant inter-
national clout as it would become, in essence, the most direct access point,
primarily for Asian industries, to Central Asian energy reserves.
•Third, it would consolidate relations between Pakistan and Central Asia, and
give Islamabad a considerable degree of political influence in that region.
Pakistan’s push north to Afghanistan, and support for the Taliban, was in part
directed at establishing landlines of communication and trade with Central Asia
and bringing Islamabad closer to the Central Asian capitals. This policy was
pursued by all parties in Pakistan because, by achieving what has been termed
‘hegemony over the southern approaches to [resource rich] Central Asia’,4
Islamabad could seriously enhance its international standing.
The trans-Afghan pipeline project espoused by Pakistan was also welcomed
by certain influential interest groups in the United States, namely the oil
industry. Given the mentioned limitations on access to Central Asian resources,
US companies like UNACOL resigned themselves to that route and they were
prepared to even negotiate with the Taliban. Strong interest groups in the United
States, if not the US government, saw obvious benefits in the Pakistani plan,
much to the chagrin of Iran, Russia and, to some degree, India.
It is clear why the first two countries disapproved of the plan but the situation
with India is less clear-cut because a trans-Afghan pipeline could also connect
India to Central Asian energy resources. At the same time it would also place
India into a compromising situation whereby its energy needs would have to
travel across Pakistani territory. Contrary to some optimistic views that such a
pipeline would herald a new chapter of ‘inter-dependency’ in India–Pakistan
relations,5it is probable that New Delhi would reject this project for making
India dependent on Pakistan’s good-will. According to New Delhi, Indian
industries cannot afford to be put into a position where they could be held to
ransom by Islamabad.
Although the trans-Afghan pipeline project was officially shelved only a year
after its launch in 1997, the 11 September terrorist attack and the subsequent war
in Afghanistan have changed the geo-political landscape. There are now sugges-
tions that the project could resume in earnest. In July 2002, the three states
involved in the project, namely Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, met to
revive it and address an important stumbling block: the availability of construc-
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S.AKBARZADEH
tion funds. They appealed to the Asian Development Bank and received a pledge
of US$3 billion for a feasibility study for the construction of a gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan’s Daulatabad gas fields to the Pakistani port of Gwadar across
Afghanistan.6This meeting was held in the presence of the American Deputy
Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and raises a key question with decisive
implications for the project’s future: What is Washington’s attitude to this, or a
variant of this, project? Early indications seem to suggest that the United States
would welcome this new access route to Central Asian energy reserves. Ajay
Behera, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institute, put this view rather
cynically by stating that the ‘US has not invested so much in its war on terrorism
without eventually addressing the issue of energy pipelines’.7This view appears
to have currency in New Delhi. As early as January 2002, then Indian Minister
for External Affairs Jaswant Singh confided in a journalist by stating ‘I don’t
think America can give up its Central Asia presence now’.8
Discussions about the pipeline project make it abundantly clear that India will
be directly affected by the way the Central Asian energy resources are harnessed.
Indian economy is many times bigger than its Pakistani neighbour and has a
potential to grow even larger, provided it gets access to affordable and depend-
able energy supplies. Today, India is already one of the world’s largest buyers
of energy having ‘overtaken the United Kingdom as the sixth largest consumer’.9
In 2002 it was estimated that India consumed
approximately 26 billion cubic meters of natural gas [per year] … According to the US
Department of Energy estimate, India, which is the home of 20 percent humanity, will need
37 billion cubic meters by 2005 rising to 51 billion cubic meters by 2010 … [and] Should
the gas supplies be easily available, the natural gas demand in India could be as high as
77 billion cubic meters by 2010.10
As a senior Indian policy advisor at the Confederation of Indian Industry put
it: ‘energy is the most critical imperative, and the most critical link in the
strategic linkages that India is trying to build with [Central Asia]’.11 It is perhaps
a belated appreciation of this point that has prompted New Delhi to take
high-level diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia on a number of fronts, including
trade. In 2003, New Delhi hosted separate visits by the Presidents of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for talks on a range of bilateral and regional topics.
In June 2002, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Central Asia
for the first time.12 In the same year, India was involved in at least 10 trade fares
and negotiations with Central Asian partners, including expositions in Almaty
and Dushanbe to show off Indian textile, pharmaceutical, electronic and food-
processing industries. At the present time, India supplies around 30% of Central
Asia’s pharmaceutical requirements.13
In spite of India’s late entry into the field, it enjoys a much stronger position
than Pakistan in Central Asia owing to its larger and more rapidly growing
economy and the affinity that Central Asians feel for India, especially notable in
their love of Bollywood movies. But this advantage over Pakistan does not
compensate for the geographic separation of India from Central Asia, divided by
the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and China. New Delhi has been explor-
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S GEOSTRATEGIC RIVALRY
ing possible trade routes across the Himalaya via Chinese territory, but obvious
geographic impediments have hampered these ambitions.
Geo-strategic importance
A complex set of geo-strategic interests come into play in Central Asia, much
more complex than the Great Game of the nineteenth century between the two
colonial empires of Britain and Russia. The number of players in the game has
increased and this creates a web of inter-related factors.
Both Pakistan and India view the region as offering an opportunity to gain
regional prominence and deal with the other from a position of strength. This is
seen as being achieved not only through gaining influence in Central Asia and
building a coalition of regional partners, but also through consolidating their
relations with one or more of the Great Powers that have a stake in Central Asia.
Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan and Central Asia is often linked by some
analysts to a desire for ‘strategic depth’. It is argued that Pakistan’s relatively
small territory does not offer any depth to absorb a conventional assault from
India. From this point of view Afghanistan and, since the break-up of the Soviet
Union, Central Asia have received special attention in Islamabad’s strategic
thinking. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan offered a welcome opportunity to
Islamabad to pursue its north-bound ambitions. Supporting Afghan Mujaheddin
against Soviet troops made Pakistan into an important link in the America’s Cold
War efforts. It is well known that the United States funded, through Pakistani
channels, the Mujaheddin. It all seemed to go Pakistan’s way, for not only was
Islamabad furthering its influence in Afghanistan but it was also being rewarded
for its role by the United States and was gaining a superpower ally. Pakistan was
an important link in the United States strategy to drive Soviet troops out of
Afghanistan. However, the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent American loss
of interest in Afghanistan brought mixed blessing for Islamabad. It removed the
Soviet bulwark against Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, but also made
Pakistan vulnerable to United States scrutiny on such thorny issues as corruption
and its faltering democracy, which had been previously kept aside when US
interests had been sharply focused on the USSR.
Pakistan’s illicit support for the Taliban movement, culminating in their
recognition of the Taliban in 1997, was aimed at installing a friendly regime in
Kabul. Following the deterioration of relations between Islamabad and Washing-
ton in 1998 as a consequence of Pakistan’s insistence to pursue its nuclear
weapons program and the military coup that brought Pervez Musharraf to power
in October 1999, Pakistan seemed internationally isolated, except for
Afghanistan.
The events of 11 September, and the following American war on terror,
changed the regional dynamism once more. Islamabad was forced to abandon the
Taliban, but in the process restored some of its former ties with the United
States. In Central Asia, American and Pakistani interests converged, with both
sides working to undermine Moscow’s influence.
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S.AKBARZADEH
In its efforts to be a relevant regional player Islamabad expressed an interest
in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In many ways this was
a peculiar request. The SCO was formed as a confidence-building enterprise
between China and its neighbours from the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan
also joined this group in 2001 because it hoped to benefit from its anti-terrorist
objectives. Beijing and Moscow set the agenda for the SCO because, despite
their differences, they share a dislike of America’s long-term presence in the
region. Pakistan’s entry into this organisation would have placed Islamabad in
the potentially anti-American camp, but on the other hand it would have
consolidated its traditional security ties with China and given Islamabad some
bargaining power in its dealings with the three Great Powers (Russia, China, and
the United States) as a result of this association.
India, by contrast, has played a low key role since the 1990s without being
entirely absent from Central Asian affairs. New Delhi was mindful of the
growing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan under the Taliban and contributed to
the anti-Taliban resistance movement. New Delhi recently revealed that it had
supplied the Northern Alliance military hardware worth around US$8 million,
and military advisors and helicopter technicians to maintain Soviet-made MI-17
and MI-35 attack helicopters.14 It is also noteworthy that Ahmad Shah Masood
was taken to an Indian-operated field hospital across the border in Tajikistan
after his assassination in September 2001. India was clearly involved in an
unofficial coalition of states that had backed the Northern Alliance. Other
members of this unofficial coalition were Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In
this sense India had an advantage over Pakistan because it was already involved
with the Central Asian states in working towards a common military objective—
although, as mentioned earlier, India kept a low profile in Afghanistan.
The history of cooperation between India and the Northern Alliance and
Tajikistan offered New Delhi a springboard in its post-11 September push
toward Afghanistan and Central Asia. New Delhi announced in August 2002 that
it would help train the newly formed Afghan army and contribute to the
maintenance of its Russian built military equipment.15 This prompted General
Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to warn India to ‘lay off’ the region.16 But New
Delhi was not taking any notice. In May 2001, New Delhi had already offered
Dushanbe a US$5 million grant.17 Twelve months later it established its first
military base outside Indian territory, in southern Tajikistan.18 Indian technicians
and engineers are now involved in the training of Tajik defence personnel
(including English language training), and the service and repair of Russian-built
military equipment. India is well suited to these tasks as the Indian Defence
force uses identical Russian tanks, combat vehicles and fighter planes.
As India’s presence in Central Asia continues to grow, it comes into much
closer contact with its traditional friend, Russia, and its traditional foe, China.
This makes for a complex interaction. India’s growing involvement in Central
Asia does not seem to bother Moscow. If anything, Moscow welcomes
India; first, as a subtle means of building a united regional front against
further American entrenchment in the region and, second, as a reliable
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partner in the fight against Islamic militancy. The July 2002 meeting of the
India–Russia Joint Working Group in New Delhi emphasised the shared view
that the American presence in Afghanistan and its northern neighbours is
justified within the parameters of the ‘war on terror’—the hint was that once the
objective had been achieved there would be no further justification for a United
States military presence in the region.19
The idea of a regional triangle composed of Russia, China and India with
Central Asia at its centre was pushed forcefully by Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov in February 2002, while visiting New Delhi.20 India’s endorsement
of a ‘slow but steady’ move towards that triangular vision and its stated
preference for global multilateralism are obvious evidence of successes for the
Russian strategy. But what Moscow gains in geo-strategic terms it loses in the
trade and economic sphere, because greater Indian involvement in Central Asia
will inevitably help re-orient Central Asian economies away from Russia.
Policy-makers in Moscow appear to be resigned to Russia’s declining economic
influence over their former Central Asian domain, but they will find it hard to
tolerate the regional security repercussions and their own symbolic decline
during this process. Moscow is also not going to allow Central Asia to become
a hotbed of Islamic militancy, but at the same time is unlikely to tolerate
long-term American presence in the region. For India, American domination of
the region’s security alignments, is simply unthinkable.21 It is against this
background that New Delhi is now receiving positive signals from Moscow.
It is perhaps ironic that a similar set of issues have brought China and India
together. Like Moscow, Beijing welcomes a united regional coalition with the
ability to defeat Islamic militancy. As far as the Chinese leadership is concerned
this is valuable in itself, but such an effective coalition is also strategically
beneficial because it illustrates their self-reliance and provides a diplomatic way
of telling Washington that there is no need for American troops in Central Asia.
This convergence of interests goes a long way in explaining Beijing’s tacit
approval of India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).22
Another important factor in Beijing’s thinking is India’s potential for becom-
ing an even more important ally of the United States. The cooling of relations
between Washington and Islamabad in the 1990s forced a re-evaluation of
United States–India relations by successive US administrations. There has been
a growing realisation that New Delhi, which has had its differences with Beijing,
could be a useful regional ally for containing China. So India’s re-orientation in
Central Asia is a source of concern for Beijing, especially when it agrees to
share intelligence with the United States as happened in December 2001.23 It
may be argued that this concern has motivated China’s policy of engagement
with India through a number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements as
providing a counterpoint to a further strengthening of United States–India ties.
Relations between the two neighbours show distinct signs of improvement.
India and China are engaged in talks to resolve their border disputes. A bilateral
anti-terrorism working group was formed in April 2002 to discuss areas of
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S.AKBARZADEH
common concern and facilitate cross-border cooperation.24 This rapprochement
has been furthered by Beijing’s tacit approval of India’s entry into the SCO. This
is a clear indication of China’s re-evaluation of the geo-strategic chess-board.
The emerging geo-strategic landscape presents new opportunities for New Delhi,
and the latter appears eager to take advantage of them.
It is in light of the aforementioned transformation that the Indian leadership
is re-evaluating it regional role, taking a more assertive tone in its foreign policy
statements. In January 2002, for example, Indian Minister for External Affairs
Singh, in a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, made a veiled reference
to American hegemony in the region, and that India would not tolerate such
behaviour.25 This hint would have delighted the Chinese counterparts, as they
use the same terminology in describing US power.
The new realities and convergence of interests is offering India a chance to
establish itself in Central Asia as a major player. This is welcomed by the
Central Asian leadership, not so much because India is a multi-religious
democracy that could serve as a model of development (as has been suggested
by some analysts), but because India’s involvement is seen as economically
advantageous to the region and as politically helpful in shifting the balance of
power away from Moscow and Beijing and ‘diluting’ their influence. It was in
this context that both Kyrgyz and Kazakh leaders suggested India’s entry into
the SCO.
The potential entry of India and Pakistan into the SCO would create a peculiar
situation with these old South Asian enemies tied together in a new multilateral
security arrangement. The optimist would see this as a step forward, and a
golden opportunity, to resolve inter-states disputes. The pessimist, however,
would see this as either impossible or bringing a massively disruptive element
into the working of the SCO. In effect, Indian and Pakistani membership of the
SCO would paralyse it because the organisation operates on the basis of
consensus and it is difficult to see New Delhi and Islamabad agreeing on many
regional issues.
Kashmir
A key point of dissention in India–Pakistan relations has been the protracted
dispute over Kashmir. Given the intensity and sensitivity of the issue for these
states, it is not surprising that both would try to use their growing links with
Central Asia to further their interests in the Kashmir cause. As Stephen Blank
from the US Army War College argues, New Delhi realises now that its lack of
initiative in Central Asia during the 1990s left the field open for Islamabad to
mobilise Central Asian support for the Pakistani position on Kashmir. India
cannot afford, therefore, not to develop a strategy for Central Asia.26
New Delhi’s growing interest in Central Asia goes beyond off-setting Pak-
istan’s influence in the region. It is also seen as a diplomatic offensive to
discredit the Pakistani position on Kashmir within the Muslim world. India could
cultivate the opinion of the Muslim world on Kashmir by encouraging Muslim
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Central Asian states to present New Delhi’s case in the Organization of Islamic
Conference. Among other things, India could argue that it has a greater Islamic
interest at heart, given the fact that India has the world’s second largest Muslim
population after Indonesia. The willingness of Pakistan and Kashmiri Muslims
to resort to terrorism is another card that New Delhi might play against Pakistan
in giving its position credibility among the Central Asian states.
Conclusion
The 11 September attacks on the United States and the subsequent US military
operation in Afghanistan had a critical impact on the geo-strategic map of the
region. On the revised regional map, Pakistan has lost its sway over Afghanistan,
and the former Soviet Central Asian republics are being wooed by the South
Asian rivals. Both India and Pakistan see enormous opportunities in Central
Asia. The perceptions of leaders in India and Pakistan are partly influenced by
their long-standing dispute over Kashmir and the diplomatic advantages that
closer ties with a host of Muslim states in Central Asia would offer them over
their adversary. But this competition for influence in Central Asia is not driven
exclusively by the Kashmir factor. Also important are the region’s mineral
resources and its geo-strategic location, where the three great powers of Russia,
China and the United States meet. The need for fossil fuel in the case of India
and the potential of cross-border trade income in the case of Pakistan are
significant considerations. In addition, Pakistan’s search for regional friends and
allies, and India’s determination to deprive Pakistan of its (now-diminished)
strategic assets (i.e. a key role in Afghanistan) influences their approach to
Central Asia.
The success of these two rival states depends, to a large extent, on the
perception of Central Asians towards them. It is here that Pakistan is fighting an
uphill battle, while India, despite its late arrival on the Central Asian scene, is
finding a much better reception. Contrary to optimist interpretations, it is not
India’s democratic traditions and institutions, or its ethnic policies that interest
Central Asians. The Central Asian leadership is attracted to the more tangible
benefits that might flow from trade and aid in the field of information technol-
ogy, pharmaceutical expertise and military know-how. In addition, India and
Central Asia share a common enmity to Islamic radicalism, as demonstrated in
their common support for the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. These factors
place New Delhi in an undeniably advantageous position over its South Asian
rival.
Notes and references
The author wishes to thank Elena Mogilevski for her tireless efforts in researching this paper.
1. M.S. Roy, ‘India–Kazakhstan: emerging ties’, http://www.idsa-india.org/AN-JAN0102–3.htm, accessed 1
December 2002.
2. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: Turkmenistan, July 2002, http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emen/cabs/turkmen.html, accessed 17 August 2002.
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S.AKBARZADEH
3. Pakistan has sufficient gas reserves to meet its domestic needs, but imports about 70% (312,000 barrels
per day in 2002) of its oil consumption. See Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs:
Pakistan. May 2003, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emen/cabs/pakistan.html#oil, accessed 29 May 2003.
4. A. Cohen, ‘Regional powers in Central Asia grapple with expanding US military presence’, Eurasia
Insight, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020602.shtml, accessed 2 June 2002.
5. A. Kazi and T. Saeedi, ‘India and the politics of the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline’, Central Asia—Caucasus
Analyst,28August 2002.
6. Ibid.
7. A. Behera, ‘Pakistan’s strategic vision: with and without the Taliban’, Asia Times,22March 2002.
8. J. Hoagland, ‘Staying on in Central Asia’, The Washington Post,20January 2002, p B07.
9. Roy, op cit, Ref 1.
10. Kazi and Saeedi, op cit, Ref 5.
11. A. Blua, ‘Central Asia: India keen on expanding its influence’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,23
August 2002.
12. Ibid.
13. R. Bedi, ‘India and Central Asia’, Frontline, 14–27 September 2002.
14. Ibid.
15. Blua, op cit, Ref 11.
16. Bedi, op cit, Ref 13.
17. Tajikistan Daily Digest,15May 2001, www.eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/200105/0015.
html, accessed 2 August 2002.
18. Bedi, op cit, Ref 13.
19. For the Russian account, see ‘Zayavlenie sovmestnoi rossiisko-indiiskoi rabochei gruppy po Afganistanu’,
17–18 July 2002, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, www.in.mid.ru/nsrasia.nsf/
1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/432569d80021985f43256bfb00 2c15e0?, accessed 15 August 2002.
For the Indian account, see ‘Transcript of press briefing by the official spokesperson, India’, 17 July 2002,
Discover India, www.meadev.nic.in/news/20020717.htm, accessed 17 August 2002.
20. J. Cherian, ‘Central Asian ambitions: the Bush administration’s military and diplomatic blueprint for
Central Asia alarms even some of its allies’, Frontline,16February–1 March 2002.
21. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov told the BBC: ‘We believe … the [US] bases are deployed there
on a temporary basis and only until the end of the anti-terrorist operation’, BBC News,13February 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1817458.stm, accessed 15 August 2002.
22. Sean Yom argues that ‘Sino-Russian interests and their vision of the region’s political future have been
severely shaken by the new U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia’. India is a key regional
player that could help seal off the US advance. See S. Yom, ‘Power politics in Central Asia’, Foreign
Policy on Focus,26July 2002.
23. R. Bedi, ‘A spreading menace’, Frontline,20July–2 August 2002.
24. Ibid.
25. ‘Premier Zhu Rongji meets Indian Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh’, 15 January 2002
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/23639.html, accessed 17 August 2002.
26. Blua, op cit, Ref 11.
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