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To Be Is to Betray: On the Place of Collective History and Freedom in Psychoanalysis
Abstract
This paper explores an open frontier between psychoanalysis and critical theory, the relations between subjective experience and collective history. Its drive is a concern with the question of freedom: How might contemporary psychoanalysis help us think about freedom? How could it, as a practice, help us to be free? On the theoretical level, the paper follows the critique of psychoanalysis offered by Foucault and Adorno, particularly the latter's close reading Ferenczi in Negative Dialectics and his notion of “the spell.” I employ their critique in order to articulate the dilemma psychoanalysis faces vis-à-vis the notion of freedom in social context. I argue that, unlike traditional psychoanalytic discourse, relational psychoanalysis can address this dilemma in a generative way. I find this prospect in the readiness of relational psychoanalysis to realize the potential inherent in the psychoanalytic setting: the creation of a mutually constituted intersubjective space. I tell the story of a young woman for whom love seems impossible, and of a psychoanalytic expedition that finds her ability to love being held hostage. I suggest that what appears in one register as gender and sexual trouble appears in another as a dilemma of attachments and loyalties: my patient's ability to love is spellbound, trapped in a subjective-collective no man's land between her desire to be for herself and the unconscious demands of collective heritage. I argue that for psychoanalysis to be a practice of freedom, it must address the ways in which subjective experience answers to social forces and collective history. I question in this context the relations between freedom, guilt, and responsibility. Re-engaging Adorno, I agree that selfhood may always involve a guilty betrayal of others but argue against him that we must allow this guilt to be reconciled with living. I suggest, in conclusion, that theory is the bearer of collective responsibility.
... Only recently, in the light of the changing development of the involvement of psychotherapy, and activation policies of the welfare states and the unemployed, for example, have some authors from within the therapeutic community started this debate again (cf. Rozmarin 2011;Loewenthal 2015). ...
... To turn to my second point, I believe that these re/interpretations also thwart social critique (cf. Rozmarin 2011). In the course of the therapists' re/interpretation, the critique implied by the patients' expression of sufferingwith Boltanski (2010), the critique of the ways in which one is forced to work todayis made to disappear. ...
This paper examines how psychotherapists deal with social suffering in its work-related forms. Based on the results of a qualitative empirical study in psychosomatic hospitals in Germany, I show how psychotherapy can lead to a normalization of overburdening demands at work, and ultimately a de-thematization of social factors. I argue that psychotherapists transform social suffering into suffering related to the self by re/interpreting the links to society that figure in the patients’ subjective theories of illness. The reason for this transformation lies in the logic of the profession necessary to legitimate the claim that the patients’ suffering falls within the purview of psychotherapy. Therapists have to disregard ‘the social’ in this manner since there are no medical diagnostic tools that would explicitly refer to work. The result of this professional re/interpretation is a form of therapy that medicalizes and personalizes social suffering, thereby intensifying, rather than tempering, a self-referentiality on the side of patients that is forgetful of society and already weighs on the individuals seeking treatment. To develop this argument, the dimension of work and its significance for psychotherapeutic etiology and diagnosis is considered. The study used and its results are explicated then in terms of three strategies of re/interpretation. Finally, the social-theoretical implications of this re/interpretation are discussed.
... Group Analytic analyst Dalal (2002) challenged his already socially conscious colleagues to broaden their concept of "social unconscious" (Hopper, 2003) to include the psychic effects of the historical transmission of racialization and racism. Resisting what I have called the norm that "unlinks" the individual from the sociopolitical (Layton, 2006), Samuels (1993Samuels ( , 2007, Layton et al. (2006), Boulanger (2007), Rozmarin (2011), Grand (2013), and Frie (2017), among others, have explored the heretofore largely ignored effects on individuals' psyches of politics, historical traumas, and collective experience. ...
... This could only be true, however, if psychoanalysis were self-reflexive about the dynamics of race and the hegemony of Whiteness in U.S. society. There is considerable literature suggesting that psychoanalysis may embody potential for such critical work (cf., Abel et al., 1997;Aron & Starr, 2013;Bhabha, 1994;Gaztambide, 2019;Harris, 2019;Lane, 1998;Layton, 2006Layton, , 2020Leary, 1995;Rozmarin, 2011). However, given that the theory and practices of conventional psychoanalysis are racialized through and through, psychoanalysts-as currently trained-are ill-equipped to address the hegemony of Whiteness or the dynamics of racial difference. ...
In this essay I seek to interrogate the specialized language of psychoanalysis and the implicit role unexamined racialization—and hence White hegemony—play in the American psychoanalytic imagination. I begin with a discussion of Eng & Han writing on racial melancholia, a work that offers a thoughtful exposition of the power of Whiteness to induce racial melancholia in its “Others.” I then turn the inquiry toward my own life story, seeking to illuminate the role of Whiteness and racial othering in my own racial formation. Given our field’s core interest in subject formation, notions of racialization and the dominant discourses of Whiteness would appear to be ideal grist for the mill of psychoanalysis. This could only be true, however, if psychoanalysis were self-reflexive about the dynamics of race and the hegemony of Whiteness in U.S. society. There is considerable literature suggesting that psychoanalysis may embody potential for such critical work. However, because the theory and practices of conventional psychoanalysis are racialized through and through, psychoanalysts—as currently trained—are ill-equipped to address the hegemony of Whiteness or the dynamics of racial difference. If, as Claudia Tate suggests, psychoanalysis functions “as a writing of the ethnicity of the White western psyche,” we have much work to do to unconceal these processes and work toward a more emancipatory and inclusive psychoanalysis.
... Our theory has now expanded to include more of the external influences that shape us, such as culture (e.g. Dimen, 2011;Guralnik & Simeon, 2010;Harris, 2012;Rozmarin, 2011), race and ethnicity (e.g. Harris, 2012;Suchet, 2004Suchet, , 2007White, 2007), the social meanings of gender and sexuality (e.g. ...
This editor’s introduction maps out the author’s reflections on the past trajectory of Psychoanalytic Perspectives while also charting out potential directions for its future. She reviews some of the influences that have helped shape the current context of contemporary psychoanalysis, and elucidates the dilemma facing the current Relational psychoanalytic moment, as she sees it. Relational psychoanalysts have been walking a tightrope, squeezed by the perils of the twin pitfalls of relativism and dogma, and the author advocates for more clarity and dialogue around the central ethics and beliefs that hold this theoretical perspective together to create a coherent Relational psychoanalytic identity.
... Whether psychological trauma befalls us in adult life (Boulanger, 2002;Carr, 2011;Stolorow, 2007), destroys our early development (Atwood, 2011;Ferenczi, 1949;Winnicott, 1974), or forms a horrifying legacy of the unspeakable and unspoken (Davoine & Gaudillière, 2004;Rozmarin, 2011aRozmarin, , 2011bStraker, 2011), or more than one of these, it shatters our lived continuity, and our belief that we belong in the world of humans as others do. In addition to the painful sense that we might call normal "outsiderness" (Poland, 2008) that everyone feels in some version, the traumatized often feel alien and weird in the extreme, out of normal time, place, and discourse. ...
This foray into largely uncharted psychoanalytic territory addresses Ron Bodansky’s question about what siblings have to do with psychological survival and healing in situations of extreme developmental trauma. This article speculates that, except when psychological organization has been destroyed at an age when before sibling connections become relevant—see “Fear of Breakdown” (Winnicott, 1974)—siblings can both transmit timeless intergenerational trauma within a generation, and contribute to the survival of such damage. Sketches from clinical work, as well as from the Wittgenstein and Bonhoeffer families, illustrate these possibilities. A further conjecture suggests that sibling countertransferences contain the same two possibilities. Others may wish to extend or dispute these speculations.
Taking up the often referred to concept of interpellation in psychoanalysts’ ongoing discussions about the social, the author explores the ways in which the concept as it was elaborated in the work of Louis Althusser in relationship to the State, governing institutions, and capitalism may now need further exploration. Arguing that interpellation implies a technology of mediation, for Althusser, the cinematic apparatus, the author asks how digital media/technologies and algorithmic processes are presently mediating the subject in the current condition of the State, governance, and capitalism. Concluding that the unconscious is socially mediated, and as such is presently adrift in the social where it no longer is simply given over for its administration to the family or the other governing institutions of the State, the author draws out the implications for psychoanalysis including its present concern about climate change, systemic racism, violence, and the ongoing pandemic.
This paper contemplates two notions that I have been exploring in relation to the frontier between subjects and collectives. The first is what I call homo-nationalis, the subject formed by and along the organizing principles of nationalism. This subject, I argue, reflects the ideology and reality of the nation-state. It is animated by its imaginaries and unsettled by its fragilities in the deepest psychological sense. The second is what I call the trans-subject. I use this notion inspired by, and wishing to extend the sense of, transing as it pertains to trans-gendering to other categories of subjecthood, aiming to capture the subject's potential to re-form the precepts of subjectivity as it is prescribed for them. I engage these two notions as I reflect on my (countertransference) experience while working with an individual moving across various collective-social frontiers in the process of a religious conversion.
This article proceeds from my continued exploration of the relations between the subjective and the collective, and from the assumption that the subject, and subjectivity itself, are always a reflection, an iteration, an embodied instantiation of the social universe in which they emerge. In this article, I turn to what the philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls states of exception, those times and places where the law and the norm are suspended, such as we have seen most recently in the context of the COVID pandemic, but is always the case sometimes, in some places, most often regarding particular groups of people. I examine, as examples, two particular exception categories, a status in the Israeli legal code called present/absent, and our modern concept of childhood. I use the notions of present/absent and of childhood to think about what we call in psychoanalysis “the unconscious,” the unconscious as a subjective/collective terrain where what is socially excepted and forbidden becomes that which is psychologically dissociated and disavowed. And I reflect on how a social-theory driven perspective on subjectivity can both complicate and deepen our ability to address the intricacies of human experience.
This paper argues that autonomy is a crucial concept for psychoanalysis that deserves greater attention and closer elaboration. Although there is abundant literature on the complexities of Freud’s psychic determinism and its compatibility (or not) with different notions of freedom, less attention has been paid to psychoanalytic definitions of autonomy, especially in relation to the end(s) of analysis. In what follows I propose a framework for a psychoanalytic conception of autonomy based on an intrapsychic and an intersubjective axis. I argue for the consideration of three kinds of freedom: a freedom “from,” a freedom “to,” and a freedom “through.” Freedom “from” refers to the quest for liberation from intrapsychic constraints that delimit our freedom “to” be agents of change and novelty, subjects capable of degrees of self-creation and self-determination; both kinds of freedom require the common psychic work between patient and therapist, the working-through of the particular elements of the transferential and countertransferential dynamics of the dyad generating a form of freedom “through” one another, unique to psychoanalytic activity.
Taking the online symbol # (“hashtag”) as my guide, I conceptualize mania as a psychic space where collective and individual registers of meaning collide at warp speed with the effect of highlighting the uneasy but recursive intertwining of individual and collective object relations. I coin the term ultrapsychic to describe the transpersonal flow of objects between the individual and the collective as brokered by human and non-human meaning-makers in an ultra-broadband society. Ultra-subjectivity highlights the affects, definitional problems and crossed-temporalities that are in play when individuals negotiate in the collective to locate themselves among others in an intersectional matrix. By reviewing the philosophy that gave rise to the hashtag as well as its transformation into a taxonomic symbol, I return to mania’s uncanny collectivist quality and explore what happens when people who perceive themselves at-risk use a #cyberobject to risk self-disclosure in the collective.
This paper aims at continuing the conversation, slowly building over time, concerning the inclusion of the social-political sphere within our analytic/therapeutic dialogues and theories. Exploring examples of how larger cultural contexts always flow through us, the paper also notes our tendency through the years to narrow our own field of vision and quiet our anxieties about the world in which we, our patients and ourselves, live. This constriction affects our therapeutic work. If we do not listen for the contextual flow, or wonder about the absence of the social-political in our therapeutic dialogues, then we are in danger of reinforcing “malignant normality” and abdicating our moral responsibility.
Jung was not interested in exploring group dynamics within the many dimensions of concrete social reality that the authors claim also contributes to how we are formed as individuals in addition to psychical phenomena. Our interactions with these concrete and psychical phenomena have lingering effects on both the individual and the intersecting social worlds to which we are inured across the planet and through time. The authors argue that sociodrama facilitates the exploration of uncritically held ideological belief structures that are influenced by these interactions that can hinder our ability to bear responsibility for our transactions within any collective. The authors’ theoretical assumptions that support sociodramatic exploration within an academic conference environment are elaborated, including details about a diversity sociodramatic exploration the authors conducted during the International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) conference in Cape Town, South Africa in 2017. The article further includes a depiction and critique of this sociodramatic demonstration that occurred as an example of its applicability in conferences such as this one.
Does being a psychoanalyst imply that one should hold a particular political sensibility? This article aims to approach this question in the aftermath of Donald Trump having become the president of the United States and the reverberations of this event, both political and personal, in analytic spaces. Contemplating the ways in which psychoanalysis addresses (or not) the social and political aspects of life, I argue that the social is the unconscious of the unconscious of psychoanalysis. The social is the unconscious of the unconscious of psychoanalysis in the sense that, unlike the unconscious that it traditionally assumes and aims to uncover—the unconscious of drives, of object relations, and of family life—psychoanalysis is reluctant to attend, both in theory and in practice, to the social forces that structure our very being and underwrite our lives. It is so reluctant that one might argue that the social is repressed into an even deeper unconscious, one that disappears completely out of sight. I suggest in the article that the reason for this reluctance is our collective historic trauma, as a discipline created by displaced people and refugees. And I try to imagine what might be our subject matter if psychoanalysis moves beyond its avoidance of the social.
Neo-liberalism is now a dominant ideology and sociopolitical-economic organizing principle. Following Nancy Hollander’s (this issue) illuminating foray into its psychological demi-monde, and in full agreement with the understanding that the subject contains and reflects the social, my commentary aims to elaborate on neo-liberalism’s subjective and intersubjecrive correlates. I also raise some more general questions about the relations between the subjective and the social, and our ways of thinking about them. I begin in exploring the value attached to caregiving and attachment. Attachment as goods exchanged and as investment. I follow by highlighting the slippage between ethical and economic meanings in terms such as “value,” “debt,” “guilt,” and “redemption,” a slippage that points to the the probable co-emergence of ethics and markets. Leaning on Foucault’s notion of homo economicus and on the psychoanalytic concept of libidinal economy, I outline some questions about the psychology of the homo economicus of neo-liberalism. I question what seems to me a nostalgic sentiment that runs through neo-liberalism as well as recent psychoanalytic theories, suggesting that this similarity demonstrates how psychoanalytic thinking itself reflects the current order of things. Finally, I wonder whether, under this ideology, we are encountering not only a new kind of subjectivity but also the end of subjectivity as a fundament of human life.
Immigration is in the unconscious of the unconscious of psychoanalysis. Immigration as a dramatic instance of the always precarious social and political registers of human living. Immigration as the movement of people from one place to another, across regions and national borders and oceans, by choice or necessity. Immigration as movement across other types of social boundaries, always defining an outside and a way into a desired inside. Immigration as an inverted reflection of our deep need to belong. This paper reflects on immigration as a clinical reality and as a clinical metaphor. It uses the notion of immigration to question the perceived, often if not always illusory settledness of the analytic practice, and its tendency to privilege a sense of well-inhabited center vis-à-vis the margins we all travel through and persist in. My aim is to join Veronica Csillag in deliberating a more uncertain and daring potential for our theory making and practice.
This discussion reflects closely on Dominique Scarfone’s call to consider psychoanalysis as a practice founded on ethics, and to rely on this premise in charting a fundamental common ground such that has eluded psychoanalysis for most of its history. Out of the three points Scarfone centers on, I dedicate most attention to the third—psychoanalysis as modeled on the notion of translation—because I find his suggestion inspiring, and promising toward the goals he sets for his paper. Building on the basis Scarfone offers in this context with the help of ideas developed by Walter Benjamin and Emmanuel Levinas, I suggest that the vision that can pull us together as psychoanalysts indeed relies on an ethics of attending to the other’s speech, its meaning as well as its fundamental yet complicated striving for comunicability. More specifically, we need to recognize that words can hide our need to say them. That what we say obscures our vulnerability and shame. That when we try to recall, the language we speak is distorted by the personal and historical forces collaborating to make us forget ourselves. I argue that the task of the psychoanalytic translator is therefore to uncover and resignify the scattered, coded fragments; to help us restore our ability to tell our stories; and to recognize that more than everything, we want to tell them.
This paper puts forward the idea that “relationality” can exist only in relation to something that is necessarily non-relational, and by extension argues in favor of such open structures for psychoanalytic theorizing. After making the distinction between relational theory and the Relational movement, it takes up and elaborates two registers of “non-relationality,” the domains of place and of the body.
The intellectual movement known as the interpretative turn is used to develop an understanding of relational psychoanalysis as a way of preparing patients and practitioners to resist the dominant way of being and political structures of the current era. This interpretation is explored by discussing a newly emerging configuration of the selfthe flattened, multiple selfand its connections to 1) the growing influence of neoliberal proceduralism, and 2) an increase in both political indifference and political fundamentalism in the general population. By providing a brief history of relational psychoanalysis that highlights its moral vision and political implications, and by drawing on film, television commercials, online gaming, and psychotherapy practices, it is argued that relational practice can oppose and offer an alternative to a neoliberal way of being, the political arrangements it serves, and the psychological attitudes that enable it. By explicitly recognizing some of the political meanings of relational practice it is hoped that practitioners will be helped to develop political practices within the clinical hour more directly than in the past.
In the face of the monumental events that took place during the first half of the twentieth century (for example the First and Second World Wars, the Holocaust and Hiroshima), a group of theorists which came to be collectively known as the Frankfurt School (established in 1923 as the Institute of Social Research in affiliation with the University of Frankfurt) developed a specific type of interdisciplinary approach to the examination of social, psychological and cultural phenomena called critical theory. In this chapter, I intend to present the work of two of the most important figures of the Frankfurt School – Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno – by focusing on their analyses of the catastrophic nature of history, their emphasis on the importance of remembrance and redemption, and their portrayal of our post-Holocaust social reality. I will then attempt to explore how their insights could be employed for the development of a radical psychotherapeutic practice.
This article reflects on Jessica Benjamin's important first book, The Bonds of Love (19883.
Benjamin , J. (1988). The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination . New York , NY : Pantheon Books. View all references), considering one of its greatest contributions to be the cultural shift it helped inaugurate in the psychoanalytic understanding of gender and its ethos of reworking and historicizing core psychoanalytic concepts. In this spirit, and following Benjamin's reference to Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (192132.
Freud , S. ( 1921 ). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego . Standard Edition , 18 . London , UK : Hogarth Press , pp. 65 – 144 . View all references), it offers a reconceptualization of the Oedipus, adding to it the psychoanalytic idea of the group. Using groups to theorize gender allows greater flexibility and a more nuanced description of the intersection of the social with subjectivity than do more traditional readings that rely on individual accounts of identification.
It is not a simple matter for analysts across nations, oceans, generations, and schools to be discussing Germans and Jews post WWII. I found the discussions of my paper moving and troubling; they offer powerful teachings on listening to the kind of dislocated traumatic tales that patients carry into analysis, however left me still wishing to return to the power of nationalism and ideology as major forces that shape psychic reality and argue against reducing this realm into the language of family drama and object relations. In reviewing my work with Nyx following these discussions, I suggest that by being “former enemies” to some degree we functioned transferentially as ambassadors of our collective, and of history. Our field teetered between falling under the spell of a tribunal to a reconciliation committee, while we were negotiating the possibility of historical redemption. My way of working with Nyx manifests an underlying assumption that ideology, as expressed through history, is one of the key factors that constitutes one’s psychic reality and is very important to engage with psychoanalytically. With that in mind I discuss some thoughts on why it is so difficult to signify the horrors of mass trauma and suggest some ethical considerations that can help us think about the difference between Wolff Bernstein’s invitations for us to hover on the rim of the Real, Bohleber’s commitment to historical precision, and Faimberg’s way of listening to the transference.
In this paper, a clinical impasse is used to study the philosophical premises and culture biases that inform the foundations of psychoanalytic theory. In his childhood, the patient was a migrant laborer, in a large Christian fundamentalist family. He survived through forming bonds with other children, in shared conditions of abjection. In adulthood, he has fulfilled the American Dream. And yet he suffers. He feels like anyone and no one, and is without individual subjectivity. Through his illness narrative, his devotional practices, and a near-death clinical impasse, he confronts the analyst with questions. What is missing from our psychoanalytic vision of the “family”? Can we recognize this patient in our current models of attachment? If psychoanalysis extrudes politics and culture and spirit and ethics, can we “mentalize” this patient? What happens when a patient has a collectivized self, and no individual psychology? What happens when a patient's Christian worldview is radically disjunctive with the Jewish ethos of psychoanalysis? Who is the psychoanalytic subject? Ultimately, the treatment argues for this: that we need to rewrite our understanding of the psychoanalytic subject.
How we listen to the potential space of online relations is rapidly becoming part of our daily work. Two treatments are examined where themes of sexual shame, repression, and relational difficulties were found and refound through online relating and hooking-up. Consideration is given to the ways in which online exploration opens a potential space that affords sexual practice and the reach of relationality. Moving with these patients into this potential space opened onto an intriguing and productive relational field. These cases help illuminate a shift in our modern social order, and how that shift has followed on a reconsideration of our psychoanalytic ideals about sexual well-being. We are now positioned to reflect not only on the evolution and revolution of our shifting sexual cultures, including the increasing role of technology in our modern relational world, but on how this new world finds its way into our consulting rooms.
Feminism and the postmodern turn have vaporized the commonsense materiality of gender and sexuality, both in theory and, for many, as lived experience. But where gender has moved to the ironic, sexuality still holds the space for the “authentic.” Gender now seems squarely positioned in a postmodern sensibility, but sexuality still veers between the modern and the postmodern. We can conceive and experience gender as being “made,” but sexuality retains the mark of something “found” and often, as Foucault demonstrated, of something “found out.”In an attempt to account for these divergent trajectories, the author attempts to historicize and deconstruct the categories of gender and sexuality in order to reflect on their modes of psychic action and to consider how they work with, and against, each other in mind and culture.
Gender as Soft Assembly weaves together insights from different disciplinary domains to open up new vistas of clinical understanding of what it means to inhabit, to perform, and to be, gendered. Opposing the traditional notion of development as the linear unfolding of predictable stages, Adrienne Harris argues that children become gendered in multiply configured contexts. And she proffers new developmental models to capture the fluid, constructed, and creative experiences of becoming and being gendered. According to Harris, these models, and the images to which they give rise, articulate not only with contemporary relational psychoanalysis but also with recent research into the origins of mentalization and symbolization.
At both ends of the century, a border between the aberrant-marginal them and the ideal-central us has been constructed around and through the homosexual. I challenge the insufficiency of this characterization, so that we may learn more, not only about homosexuality, but also about the ways in which all human development is infused with an interplay between centrality and marginality. I argue that traditional developmental models are dominated by the normative logic of centrality, with limited accounting for the developmental necessity of marginality, whereas postmodern theories of subjectivity overvalue the potential of the margin and fail to account for the significance of similarity and coherence in human relations. I then use that criticism as a platform for proposing five quasi-axioms toward a new developmental model. Central to this new model, which employs constructs derived from chaos and systems theories, is the interplay of centrality and marginality in any given life.
Postmodern psychoanalysis differs from the original practice of postmodern writers in a way that highlights the particular demand placed on psychoanalytic theory: to mediate between traditional practice and theoretical innovation. The argument is made here that it is postmodern theory to which relational psychoanalysis turns for auto-critique and to expand the horizons of practice, a process of disciplinary growth that is evident in the roundtable on Bringing the Plague: Toward a Postmodern Psychoanalysis. This introduction locates the roundtable in a critical moment when postmodern theory, as it becomes an -ism in practice, copes with inevitable and necessary innovation and strives not to jettison the field's operational principles while retaining its critical edge.
By examining the private correspondence of a circle of German psychoanalyst emigrés that included Otto Fenichel, Annie Reich, and Edith Jacobson, Russell Jacoby recaptures the radical zeal of classical analysis and the efforts of the Fenichel group to preserve psychoanalysis as a social and political theory, open to a broad range of intellectuals regardless of their medical background. In tracing this effort, he illuminates the repression by psychoanalysis of its own radical past and its transformation into a narrow medical technique. This book is of critical interest to the general reader as well as to psychoanalytic historians, theorists, and therapists.
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