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THE AFRICAN UNION’S STANDBY FORCE:
CANADIAN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY OPTIONS
CHARLES BURTON, KRISTIANA POWELL, THOMAS KWASI TIEKU
WITH EDWARD ANSAH AKUFFO *
INTRODUCTION
The war in Iraq has led to unstable changes in the international order. The full implications of
these changes are not, as yet, fully understood. Nevertheless, in light of the Iraq War and the
earlier terrorist bombings in New York and Washington DC, the Government of Canada is
challenged to formulate foreign policy that will best serve Canadian interests and best reflect
Canadian values in a new context of international relations. Canada has recently identified Sub-
Saharan Africa as an area that should be a priority for Canadian bilateral and multilateral
programming. Canada is also encouraging our partners in the G-8 to focus more attention on
Africa, particularly as the recent formation of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiatives provide openings for more effective engagement in
Africa in the years ahead. What follows is a policy-relevant research paper that addresses how
Canada can work with the African Union to contribute effectively to improve the security and
human rights conditions through the African Union’s new African Standby Force (ASF).
Background to Canada’s Interaction with the African Union
In July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, 53 African leaders inaugurated the African Union, a
continental organisation to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This new organisation
calls for major changes to pan-African approaches to peace and security. Its new Peace and
Security Council (PSC) and accompanying Peace and Security Protocol place renewed emphasis
on building a continental security regime charged with preventing, managing, and resolving
conflicts in Africa. Its creation is based on the recognition that the scourge of conflicts in Africa
constitutes a major impediment to African socio-economic development and the integration of the
continent. The members of the African Union acknowledge the need to promote peace, security,
and stability as necessary conditions for empowering all Africans to achieve the fruits of
development. Accordingly, it is mandated to perform a wide-range of peace operations and the
associated engagement of a broad range of actors and institutions to promote peace, security and
stability among its member states.
The Peace and Security Protocol calls for the creation of an intervention force, the African
Standby Force, with the mandate to intervene in internal conflicts in order to halt or avert
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The creation of this intervention force
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* Charles Burton is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, Brock University. Kristiana Powell is project
coordinator and DND SDF intern with the North-South Institute. While contributing to this report, she was working as
a peace and security analyst with Project Ploughshares. Thomas Tieku is a PhD candidate at the Department of
Political Science, University of Toronto. Edward Akuffo is an MA candidate at the Department of Political Science,
Brock University. This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of DFAIT.
© Canadian Foreign Policy, ISSN 1192-6422, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Fall 2004), 47-80
BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY/LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU CANADA
48 represents a paradigm shift in continental security because African leaders have agreed that state
sovereignty is conditional. The Council, through this Protocol, recognises the legitimacy of
balancing the rights of states and the rights of the individual in a way that permits collective
intervention in the internal affairs of a member state to protect vulnerable populations, without
the consent of the target state. In addition, the AU calls for the strengthening of a continental early
warning system (EWS) to anticipate and prevent conflict. Information gathered by this system will
be used to determine the best course of action in a situation of potential or full-blown conflict,
including – if necessary – the deployment of the African Standby Force.
The decision by the AU to establish significant conflict prevention and management instruments
may finally serve to turn the tide on conflicts in Africa, which continue to ravage the continent, leaving
death, disease, and social, economic and environmental disaster in their wake. However laudable as
these steps forward may seem, the ASF and the EWS face enormous obstacles. There is a lack of
political will on the part of member states to allocate adequate financial, technical and human
resources in support of these institutions, making it clear that the standby force and the early warning
system will be almost entirely ineffective without outside support.
Canada’s Policy Options
This policy paper explores how Canada can work with the new African Union and its Peace and
Security Council to address African security issues through the African Standby Force and its
accompanying early warning system. Canada is a country with a long-time commitment to conflict
prevention and peacekeeping, and is a leader of the International Commission for Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This paper develops foreign and defence policy options for the
Government of Canada vis-à-vis the ASF and the EWS. The issues addressed are:
• How can Canada best contribute to effectively building the indigenous capacity of Africans to
address challenges to African security?
• How can the Government of Canada carve out a distinctly Canadian approach to the future
of peace and security on the continent?
This paper first explores Canada’s strengths and interests to ensure that the policy
recommendations reside at the intersection point between the needs of the AU, on the one hand,
and Canada’s capacity and priorities, on the other. It then describes the evolution of the AU’s
security mechanisms with particular attention paid to the creation of the African Standby Force.
This paper argues that an effective ASF will also require a functioning early warning system, and
the involvement of civil society. Accordingly, the paper elucidates some of the challenges in these
areas with a view to developing policy options for Canada. Finally, to ensure that Canada pursues
innovative policy options that do not duplicate or compete with the programmes of other donor
countries engaged in Africa, this paper reviews the peace support operations capacity building
initiatives of eight countries.
This paper concludes that the new African Union’s peace and security mechanisms call for new
policy initiatives from Canada. The African Standby Force will have unique training, logistical, and
funding requirements that Canada, with its extensive experience in promoting peace and security
in Africa, can help to accommodate. There are also a number of ways that Canada can help to
create an effective early warning system through the AU. Canada can contribute to human
resource development, procure equipment, help to strengthen links with civil society and the
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regional mechanisms, and support needs assessments among key actors. Finally, if the AU’s
security mechanisms are to function effectively, there is a need to ensure that civil society actors
are actively and meaningfully engaged in the decision-making processes of the Peace and Security
Council – particularly with respect to the deployment of the ASF – and in gathering and analyzing
information through the early warning system.
TOWARDS A CANADIAN SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR THE
AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: BUILDING ON OUR EXPERIENCE AND
NATIONAL INTERESTS
Canada’s Commitment to Building Peace and Security
Caught in the maelstrom of rapid international change, the Government of Canada has been
forced to reconsider the types of foreign and defence policies that Canada should and can pursue.
The nature of warfare in the new international system has created a need to supplement traditional
concerns of state security with a broader consideration of intra-state violence. Foreign and defence
policy initiatives since the middle of the 1990s have taken as their guiding principle that the
security threats facing humanity are no longer solely derived from the wars between states, but
also, from violence and upheaval within states, and the intentional targeting of civilians. The
devastating attacks of September 11 and the more recent bombings in Bali and Mombasa
underscore this point. In responding to these new types of conflict, which entail pervasive threats
to civilian populations, Canada has pursued a number of initiatives, including projects that focus
on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and the protection of civilians.
Canada’s conflict prevention initiatives are multi-faceted, focusing on co-operative conflict
prevention, the economic dimensions of civil wars, small arms and building national and local
capacity to predict and react to conflict before it becomes violent. (DFAIT 2001; 2002) Canada has
also demonstrated a strong commitment to peacekeeping in societies where vulnerable
populations are at risk. Canada’s established history of, and pride in, peacekeeping places it in a
unique position to assist other countries and regional organizations in developing their own
peacekeeping capacities.
In addition, Canada recently took a highly proactive role in the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Commission is charged with determining international
responsibility in situations where populations are at risk of humanitarian catastrophe. The
Commission’s report, The Responsibility to Protect, reframes the debate of the role of the
international community from a right of states to intervene to suggest that the international
community has an obligation to intervene to protect vulnerable populations in situations of large-
scale loss of life and large-scale ethnic cleansing. The Report makes it clear that sovereignty entails
responsibility on the part of the state to provide for the security of its citizens. When a state is
unwilling or unable to protect its population or, indeed, is targeting its citizens, the international
community has a responsibility to act, even without the consent of the target state. The Report
thus endorses a broad-based view of intervention that includes prevention, reaction – through the
use of military force if necessary and only as a last resort – and rebuilding conflict-torn societies.
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BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
Canada’s Africa-related Foreign and Defence Policy
Canada’s interest and expertise in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and the development of
international peace and security norms has been articulated in its Africa-related foreign and
defence policies. In June 2002 at the G-8 Summit held in Kananskis, Alberta, Canada took a
leadership role in placing Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development initiative firmly
on the G-8’s agenda. Indeed, peace and security in Africa have played increasingly prominent roles
in Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canada frequently purports to be committed to Africa.
Building on the NEPAD initiative and the G-8 Africa Action Plan, Canada announced its
commitment of $6 billion over five years in new and existing resources to development in Africa.
This commitment included the creation of a $500 million Canada Fund for Africa, $4 million of
which will be used over three years to enhance the AU’s conflict prevention and resolution
initiatives. The G-8 Africa Action Plan also committed members of the G-8 to design a joint plan by
2003 for the development of African capability to undertake peace support operations, including
at the regional level. The Action Plan also states as one of its objectives the training of Africa peace
support forces, including through the development of regional centres of excellence for military
and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support. Finally, the G-8 acknowledged the
need for members to better coordinate their peacekeeping training initiatives in Africa.
In addition to these initiatives, Canadian Forces personnel have participated in a number of
peacekeeping missions in Africa.1Canada has also devoted significant resources and energy to
building Africa’s peacekeeping capacity.
• Canada has provided peacekeeping training to African peacekeepers in Canada, through the
Military Training Assistance Programme, and at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centres and
Canadian Forces bases across the country.
• We have pursued training initiatives on the continent like the online Projet de
Dévelopement des Capacitiés en Maintien de la Paix et Securité for Francophone Africa, and
the online course on gender and peacekeeping funded jointly with DFID.
• Canada has trained Kenyan peacekeepers for the UN Training Assistance Team programme
and contributed to peacekeeping training through regional organizations, including the
Southern African Development Community’s Operation Blue Crane.
• In Sierra Leone, eleven members of Canadian Forces personnel provide advice on training,
logistics, and administration skills as part of Operation Sculpture.
• Canada has also engaged in research on peacekeeping training. For example, in 1997 CIDA
funds were used to conduct a survey of peacekeeping training in eight countries through the
Institute for Security Studies.
In short, Canada’s interest in pursuing foreign and defence policies for human security, its
experience in conflict prevention, and peacekeeping in Africa, makes it particularly well suited to
enhance the conflict prevention and peacekeeping capacities of the African Union. Moreover, the
development of innovative policy responses to the AU’s emerging security architecture,
particularly the proposed African Standby Force, is also consistent with Canada’s foreign and
defence policy priorities.
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1. Canadian Forces personnel are currently engaged in five UN missions in Africa. These include Operation Reptile
and Operation Sculpture in Sierra Leone, Operation Crocodile in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Operation
Addition, as part of UNMEE (the UN’s Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), and Operation Prudence, mandated to
maintain and enhance stability in Bangui.
Canada’s Foreign and Defence Policy Priorities and the African
Standby Force
Canada is taking the initiative now, while the African Union and its Peace and Security Council are
in their formative years, to forge a meaningful partnership for peace with the AU that also advances
Canada’s national interests. By supporting the Union’s ASF, Canada can live up to its commitments
under the G-8 Africa Action Plan. The articles establishing the African Standby Force make clear
that the AU, unlike its predecessor, does not require the consent of a state to intervene in its
internal affairs in situations where populations are at risk. Implicit here is the understanding that
sovereignty is conditional, and defined in terms of a state’s capacity and willingness to protect its
citizens. While the Protocol still uses the language of a right to intervene, rather than adopting the
ICISS Report’s focus on obligation, the AU’s provisions for intervention – war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity – are codified in international law, thereby providing a clearer set of
criteria governing intervention than is articulated in The Responsibility to Protect. By supporting
the AU’s Standby Force, Canada can seize the opportunity to enhance its credibility and display its
commitment to the principles of the ICISS Report.
Moreover, other donor countries – the US, Britain, France, Germany and the Nordic states – are
already engaged in their own distinctive peace support operations, training, and capacity building.
The African Union’s creation of new conflict resolution mechanisms presents a unique opportunity
for Canada to develop long-term foreign and defence policy initiatives that would further enhance
the image of Canada in the region, as well as put Canada in a better position to influence the
security and development decisions of the African Union and its leading member states.
Finally, by undertaking new initiatives to build indigenous conflict prevention and
peacekeeping capacity in Africa, Canada would be working toward easing the pressure on its own
thinly stretched military to commit troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. A stronger,
more effective African Union would be more capable of preventing full-blown conflict, as well as
assuming greater responsibility for troop deployment in cases where prevention has failed. The
policy recommendations drafted in this paper build on the synergy between Canada’s interests
and experience, and the pressing need for an effective African Standby Force. In what follows, this
paper traces the evolution of the AU’s security regime, particularly the ASF, and elucidates training,
equipping and funding requirements of these new security mechanisms.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S SECURITY
MECHANISMS
The involvement of the OAU in conflict resolution in Africa dates back to the middle of the 1960s
when the Pan-African organisation became involved in the resolution of disputes that arose out of
border demarcations and territorial claims of African states. In addition to settling border disputes,
the OAU’s conflict resolution in its early days was directed towards the diffusion of tension that
resulted from ideological differences during the Cold War.2The OAU’s active intervention in major
militarised conflicts on the African continent is a recent development, however. The OAU did not
have effective institutionalized mechanisms for resolving intrastate and interstate conflicts until
1993, when African Heads of State passed a resolution during the 29th session of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government in June 1993. (Ibok 1999a) This resolution led to the
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2. (Ibok 1999a). The OAU Conflict Management Centre forwarded the original version of this document. Part of this
document can also be found at <http://www.dpmf.org/conflict-sam.html>. (Sam Ibok is the Director, Political Affairs
Department, OAU Secretariat, Addis Ababa.)
establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR),
to which was assigned three fundamental functions.
1. To anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into
full-blown wars.
2. To undertake peacemaking and peace building efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise.
3. To carry out peacemaking and peace building activities in post-conflict situations.
Despite its establishment, the widely held notion amongst leaders of Africa was that the UN had
sole responsibility to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the OAU narrowly
defined the scope for action of the Mechanism. (Olonisakin 1997) As Margaret Vogt (2002), the
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary General of the UN points out:
From the outset, the issue of peacekeeping on which the OAU Mechanism was predicated, was
controversial. It was widely felt within the OAU political leadership that peace and security were
the preserve of the United Nations, which is mandated to keep peace globally and which
possesses more resources than the OAU.
There was concern that the creation of elaborate OAU security architecture would encourage
the UN to reduce its involvement in African conflicts. As a result, the OAU strategically decided to
direct activities of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution towards
conflict prevention, as opposed to conflict management and resolution. (Jonah 1994)
Although the establishment of the OAU conflict resolution mechanism moved the OAU to the
centre of conflict management in Africa, the record of the organisation in resolving Africa’s
conflicts is decidedly mixed. Since 1993, the OAU has provided financial support to sub-regional
peacekeeping operations, including the intervention of the Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It has also provided civilian
contingents towards UN missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Eritrea/Ethiopia, among others. Notwithstanding these, the performance of the
mechanism has not been impressive.3Sam Ibok, as Director of the MCPMR observes:
Even though the OAU and its Charter came into existence as continental frameworks for the
promotion of the African collective will to ensure collective security and collective
development, we had been unable, in over thirty years, to craft a comprehensive security
architecture to drive the peace and security agenda of the Continent. This is in spite of the
provisions of the Charter itself and also, more importantly, in spite of the establishment, in
Cairo in 1993, of a continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.
Three factors intertwined to account for the modest achievements of the mechanism. Foremost
among these factors is that the resources made available to the Conflict Management Centre of the
OAU did not match the conflict management needs of Africa. Second, the four permanent
members of staff charged with the management responsibility of the Centre were overwhelmed by
the enormity of the work. (IPA 2002a) It was practically impossible for these workers to manage
the Centre effectively, partly because they were not provided with modern equipment, and partly
because they did not have the specialized skills required to manage it effectively. As a result, it
became dependent on consultants. As of the end of 2002, as many as seventeen different
consultants had worked with the Centre. (IPA 2002a) Added to all these were constraints imposed
by internal weakness of the mechanism itself. The Cairo Declaration, which created the
mechanism, had enormous legalistic weaknesses. For instance, Article 14 states,
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3. For elaborate discussion of achievements and failures of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, see Muyangwa and Vogt (2002).
The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular
… noninterference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also
function on the basis of the consent and the co-operation of the parties to a conflict. (Ibok 1993)
Two important weaknesses can be detected from the above quotation. First, it suggests that the
Mechanism could not intervene in conflict without the consent of concerned parties. Given the
deep mistrust amongst African leaders, and the intergovernmental nature of the OAU, many
disputants became suspicious of the impartiality of the Mechanism. Hence, they felt
uncomfortable allowing the OAU, through the Mechanism, to get involved in their disputes. This
cautious attitude is understandable, given that some African leaders were known to be sponsors
of some of these conflicts. (Jonah 1994)
Second, the commitment of the mechanism to the principle of non-interference meant African
leaders embroiled in conflict could easily exploit this article to prevent the OAU from getting
involved in its domestic conflict. Besides, the final decision-making body, the Central Organ, was
largely made up of the Assembly of Heads of States. Given the traditional rigid attitude of African
Heads of States towards sovereignty, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution was doomed to failure.
After a few years of operation, it became obvious that the principle of non-interference in
domestic affairs posed a serious problem for both OAU diplomacy in the area of conflict
management, and the effective functioning of the Mechanism. A reorientation of the OAU
conservative attitude towards the issue of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states
was the precondition for effective functioning of the Mechanism.
Coincidentally, it was during this period that the UN began decentralising some of its conflict
management responsibilities to regional and sub-regional organisations. The genesis of the
decentralisation process can be traced to Boutros Boutros-Ghali who, in his 1992 Annual Report,
set out to lighten the burden on the UN in conflict management by ensuring “the active
involvement of appropriate regional agencies”. (1992a) The new conflict management approach
of the UN was further developed in An Agenda for Peace and its Supplement. (Boutros-Ghali
1992b and 1995) The attempt of the UN to decentralise some of the conflict management
responsibilities to regional institutions led to a renewed emphasis on Article 52 of the UN Charter,
which allows states to form regional organisations for dealing with peace and security issues.
Subsequent to these publications, the UN began to aggressively strengthen its relations with
regional organisations.
In the case of Africa, the decentralisation process began in earnest following the Somalia
peacekeeping debacle.4The attempt by the UN to decentralise peacekeeping responsibility to
regional organisations led analysts to describe the new UN conflict management approach in Africa as
“a pyramid security framework”. (Malan 1999) A pyramid security framework, Nhara (1998) tells us:
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4. The public outrage that followed the killing of the US forces and other peacekeepers created the condition for many
countries to take a cautious approach towards direct involvement in African peacekeeping operations. The lack of
political will to contribute troops to peace keeping in Africa influenced Britain, France and the US to design capacity
building programmes for African military, thus supporting African governments to mount indigenous peacekeeping
operation, or alternatively, to contribute the bulk of contingents to UN operations in Africa. 5. I maintain this because
several other authors have drawn similar conclusions from their analyses of democracy assistance in other regions of
the world, including Africa, Asia, and Latin America (see Ottaway and Carothers 2000).
[is a] partnership between the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, together
with its corresponding sub-regional organisations … At the top of that pyramid (is) the United
Nations as a world body, and as the supreme organ for ensuring peace and security, worldwide.
At the bottom of that pyramid (are) the sub-regional organisations. And, between the apex and
the base, the OAU provide(s) the critical linkage.
The OAU role within the pyramid is to serve as an anchor for the UN to pursue its African peace
agenda. This means the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution should
have the ability to coordinate and mobilise the efforts of sub-regional mechanisms, and to provide
the institutional framework for the UN peacekeeping and conflict management activities in Africa.
As then-Secretary General of the OAU, Salim Almed Salim repeatedly underscored in the late
1990s, the advantage of having the OAU providing the mediating role between the UN and conflict
management in Africa was that the OAU “is neither too far from, nor too near to the problem” and
had “no choice but to work very closely with the world body”. (Ibok 2002) However, the
Mechanism was institutionally incapable of performing the mediating responsibilities that the UN
expected. By the mid-1990s, it became obvious that the OAU needed a more robust institutional
framework to replace the Mechanism in order to provide the critical linkage that the UN needed
in its new approach to conflict management in Africa. As a consequence, the OAU convened the
first meeting of its Chiefs of Defence Staff in 1996 to:
• Explore means through which the OAU could design a security regime for effective
management of conflict; and
• Consider the feasibility of an OAU rapid deployment force that could mount indigenous pan-
African peacekeeping operations.
The meeting concluded that, although a new security framework with an indigenous standby
force would be an expensive enterprise, it was a necessary condition if the OAU intended to get
involved in African conflict resolution on a sustained basis. On an African standby force, the report
released at the end of the meeting reads in part, “… the concept of standby arrangements and
ear-marked contingents may be expensive but is absolutely necessary”. (OAU Secretariat 1996)
The meeting recommended, “each [African] country should inform the General Secretariat of
what it is capable of earmarking in terms of the number and type of troops”. A subsequent meeting
of the OAU Chiefs of Defence Staffs, in October 1997, proposed that the OAU could request 100
trained military and civilian observers from each of the five sub-regions of Africa to create a
brigade-size standby force of 500. The contributing countries, the report added, would provide
tables outlining details of equipment accompanying these initial troops. (OAU Secretariat 1997)
The Chiefs of Staff also suggested that the numerical strength of the troops should be adjusted as
time went on. (Malan forthcoming)
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The New Security Regime
It was partly to correct the growing ineptness of the OAU conflict resolution mechanisms, and
partly in response to the ongoing attempts of the UN to decentralise responsibility for conflict
resolution to the regional institutions and sub-regional organisations, that African leaders decided
to devise a new security regime to operate within the framework of the AU. This new security
regime is predicated on collective security to be operationalized by an African Standby Force and
an early-warning mechanism. Five main tasks have been assigned to the new security regime.
1. To promote peace, security and stability in Africa.
2. To promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.
3. To co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of
international terrorism.
4. To develop a common defence policy.
5. To promote and encourage respect for the sanctity of human life and to protect human
rights. (Protocol, article 2)
To give concrete meaning to the pyramid security regime, both the Constitutive Act and the
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (herein “the Peace and
Security Protocol” or “the Protocol”) acknowledge the primary responsibility of the UN in the
maintenance of international peace and security,5and make clear that the sub-regional
mechanisms form an integral part of the AU security framework. (Protocol, article 16)
Diagram of the Peace and Security Council
Towards an African Standby Force
To provide an operational arm to the Peace and Security Council and the security provisions of the
Constitutive Act, the Protocol provides for an African Standby Force (ASF), composed of
multidisciplinary contingents of five hundred (100 hundred from each of the five sub-regions)
civilian and military personnel. The ASF personnel will be stationed in their country of origin and
must be prepared for rapid deployment with appropriate notice. (Protocol, article 13) It is
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5. Article 17(1) of the Protocol empowers the Peace and Security Council to “cooperate and work closely with the
United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security” in the discharge of its duties.
Assembly of Heads of State
15 Member States of the PSC Commission of the African Union
Permanent Representatives of States Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union
Panel of the Wise
African Standby
Peace Fund
Military Staff Military
important to stress here that the Force essentially will be an élite unit comprised of individuals,
not national units. Once deployed, a more robust force, if necessary, will supplement it. The
Protocol provides the pre-conditions for the deployment of the standby force.
• Article 4(j) states that the AU has the “right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.”
• Article 4(k) recognizes “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union
in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.”
The African Standby Force can be deployed without the consent of the target state. It is
authorized to engage in:
• observation and monitoring;
• peace mission support;
• intervention of member states to restore peace and security;
• preventive deployment to prevent conflict from spreading or escalating or to prevent the
resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
• peace building, especially disarmament and demobilization; and
• humanitarian assistance. (Protocol, article 1)
According to UN typology, therefore, the African Standby Force will be mandated to undertake:
• peacekeeping tasks (the Protocol’s “peace mission support”);
• preventive deployment (the Protocol’s provisions to “prevent conflict from spreading or
escalating”);
• peace enforcement (the Protocol’s provisions to “prevent the resurgence of violence after an
agreement, and to intervene to restore peace and security without the consent of parties to
the conflict”); and
• post-conflict peace building (the Protocol’s “peace building”).
While the Protocol makes clear the circumstances under which the ASF can be deployed, it
does not recognize an obligation on the part of the AU to intervene. Indeed, Article 4(j) of the
Protocol confers on the Assembly of Heads of States the sole responsibility for deploying the
standby force for purposes of intervention in the internal affairs of members to prevent or curtail
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Moreover, the consent of a two-thirds majority
of the Assembly of Heads of States of the AU is required for deploying the standby force for
intervention purposes.
The Protocol, however, makes the Peace and Security Council’s 15 Member States responsible
for recommending such intervention (Protocol, article 7(e)) and the Chairperson of the
Commission of the AU is responsible for the effective functioning of the African Standby Force.
(Protocol, article 16(5)) The PSC will be comprised of 15 Member States, ten of which will be
elected to serve for two years. The other five will be elected to serve for three years. All countries
serving on the PSC will have equal voting rights; there will be no veto rights or permanent
memberships. The PSC will be advised by a Military Staff Committee composed of Senior Military
Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council. The Force will report to, and take
instructions from, the 15 Member States, which are also charged with performing periodic
evaluations of African peace support capacities. The Protocol empowers the 15 Member States to
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collaborate with the UN Secretariat for the purposes of co-ordinating foreign support initiatives for
the Force, for capacity building, training, logistics, equipment, communications, and funding.
According to the programme submitted by the AU for funding support, the 500 individuals
comprising the African Standby Force will be selected from the most qualified military and civilian
personnel in Africa. (OAU 2002) The Chairperson of the Commission will appoint a Special
Representative for specific missions. A Force Commander, who will be appointed by the
Chairperson and will report to the Special Representative, will head the military component of this
elite unit. The Contingent Commanders will report to the Force Commander, and the civilian
components will report directly to the Special Representative. Article 13(17) of the Protocol notes
that troop contributing States:
(i) shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorisation by the Peace
and Security Council or the Assembly, release the stand-by contingents with the necessary
equipment; and
(ii) shall commit themselves to make available to the Union all forms of assistance and support
required for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent,
including rights of passage through their territories.
More significantly, the Protocol recognises the role of the sub-regional organisations as an
integral part of the AU security framework. In the wording of Article 16, the sub-regional
mechanisms “are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary
responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa”. The PSC is mandated by Article
16(2) of the Protocol to consult the sub-regional mechanisms for conflict resolution to “promote
initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts”. The Chairperson of the Commission is
responsible for co-ordinating and harmonising the activities of the sub-regional mechanisms to
ensure effective collaboration and cooperation with the AU. To facilitate this partnership, the sub-
regional mechanisms are to keep the Peace and Security Council continuously informed of their
activities, and the sub-regional mechanisms will be “invited to participate in the discussion of any
question brought before the Peace and Security Council”. (Protocol, article 16(5)) In terms of
troop mobilisation, the AU will rely on the sub-regional mechanisms to mobilise contingents for
peacekeeping, peace building, and peacemaking purposes, following or in conjunction with the
deployment of the Force.
Diagram of the Structure of the African Standby Force
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BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
Chairperson of the Commission
The Force Commander The Civilian Representative
Contingent Commanders
Contingents
Civilian Contingents
Special representative of the Chairperson
The Requirements of the African Standby Force
Training: The Protocol does not provide elaborate details of the training requirements of the ASF
except to note that the PSC shall:
• develop appropriate standing operating procedures in manuals and programmes for national
and regional schools of excellence; and
• coordinate training courses, command and staff exercises as well as field training exercises,
to ensure standardization of training doctrines. (Protocol, article 14)
It also calls on the UN Secretariat to assist in the coordination of external initiatives for capacity
building for the Force, including training, logistics, equipment, communications, and financial
support. (Protocol, article 13(16))
The Protocol also provides that training of civilian and military personnel of the Standby Force
will place priority on international human rights and humanitarian laws with particular emphasis
on the rights of women and children. However, it is less clear on other training needs.
It is possible that the AU did not outline specific training for the ASF because it was assumed
that it would be comprised mainly of experts from various countries. Since it is mandated to
perform tasks beyond traditional peacekeeping, and more importantly, because the standby
contingents will play a strategic coordinating role in each operation, it is important for the AU to
design special training programmes for this standby force. The Chapter VI training that the
majority of the ASF will likely have had through their specific country training, their experience
with UN operations, and various external training programmes, is inadequate for the tasks
assigned to the ASF. Indeed, lessons from OAU peacekeeping operations in Chad and, more
recently, the Economic Community of West African Monitory Group (ECOMOG) intervention in
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, as well as other regional and UN interventions, indicate
that African militaries require more specialized peace support operations training. The ASF will
require specialized training in order to fulfil its mandate to engage in activities beyond traditional
peacekeeping, including:
• preventive deployment;
• peace enforcement;
• providing humanitarian assistance; and
• peace building.
Since the Force may well be the first outside power to arrive in any given conflict, it will need
to be well trained in conflict mediation, resolution and de-escalation, especially at the local level.
In addition, since the standby force will be drawn from all across Africa, its members will display
diversity in training, orientation, command and military culture that could compromise the
effective functioning of such a force.6It, therefore, will require some training to ensure the
standardization of command, control and communication. That is, it will require training tailored
to a small, multi-national force that is capable of military integration of both personnel and
systems. Moreover, training will have to occur at regular intervals to ensure the ASF is prepared
for deployment at all times. Peace support operations, capacity building and training in Africa,
however, have generally occurred on a national or bilateral basis (see below). It is important to
stress here that external efforts to train ASF personnel will need to be well coordinated to ensure
standardization. As discussed below, there is serious lack of coordination among the training
initiatives of western countries engaged in Africa.
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6. Interview with François Grignon, Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group, Nairobi, Kenya, February 20, 2002.
Furthermore, while some of the members of the military command structure will likely have led
multi-national coalitions through the UN,7their experience is focused on UN operations with
extensive outside support in very specific contexts. (Malan, forthcoming) Force and Contingent
Commanders of the African Standby Force will require specific training for small, multi-national,
rapid reaction forces operating in African contexts that are launched, led and sustained by the
African Union. In addition, training will need to occur at the headquarters level. Representatives
of the 15 Member States will require training to ensure the appropriate deployment of the ASF,
and its effective functioning. For instance, this may include instruction in developing standard
operating procedures for these types of operations.
Equipment and Logistics: The Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and
Security Council recognizes the importance of providing the necessary equipment to support the
ASF’s trained personnel. The Protocol envisions that countries participating in a mission will
provide their troops with appropriate and sustainable equipment. This arrangement is based on
the UN formulation in which countries contributing troops to a UN peacekeeping operation are
required to make available to the UN details of the capabilities and needs of their troops. The UN
arrangement works because countries that are not willing to contribute troops often provide
necessary logistics support and equipment to troop-contributing nations.
However, this may not be the most appropriate means of equipping the Standby Force. African
countries are rarely able to adequately equip and maintain deployed troops (Berman and Sams
2000) and, in the past, have found it difficult to transport troops and equipment in a timely
manner.8Most countries in Africa will likely not be able to equip the ASF. Those African states with
greater military capability may not be able to meet these resource gaps on their own.9To ensure
rapid deployment, reliable and well-maintained equipment must be available immediately; the AU
cannot depend on countries to fill in the gaps as supply and re-supply takes too much time. The
AU must also be capable of sustaining an ASF mission until member states, the regional
mechanisms, or the UN provides a more robust force. Moreover, the standby force will require
unified equipment to guarantee interoperability and compatibility. As an African military analyst
notes, “problems of interoperability can make or break the entire ideal of the standby force”.
(Motumi, forthcoming: 8) Consequently, in order to guarantee that the force can be deployed
rapidly with compatible equipment, the AU needs to procure and maintain its own equipment to
be used by the ASF. The equipment must be suited to diverse climates and the AU must be able
to transport this equipment across the continent, or arrange to have depots strategically
positioned throughout the continent. Finally, military and civilian personnel must be trained to
use this equipment.
Financing: Conflict management in general, and peacekeeping in particular, is an expensive
business. Funding issues have been the main reason that past conflict management activities have
met with mixed success. Indeed, it unduly affected the performance of the first peacekeeping
initiative in Chad and is playing a crucial role in the inability of the AU to effectively deploy in Côte
d’Ivoire. The funding proposal prepared to allow for implementation of the Peace and Security
agenda of the African Union is estimated at US$120 million over three years. (OAU 2002: 38)
BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
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7. African military personnel have played leadership roles in UN missions. For example, Ghanian General Henry
Anyidoho was a UN Force Commander in Sierra Leone, and Ghanian General Emmanuel Erskine was the Force
Commander of the UN in Lebanon.
8. Interview with Mr. El Ghassim Wane, Acting Deputy Director of the Conflict Management Centre, African Union
Commission. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. February 12, 2003.
9. Interview with François Grignon, Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group, Nairobi, Kenya, February 20, 2002.
Phone interview with Eric G. Berman. Waterloo, Ontario. February 26, 2003.
In recognition that an independent source of funding is needed for strategic planning for, and
effective operation of, the African Standby Force, the protocol relating to the Peace and Security
Council gave legal backing for the establishment of a Peace Fund. A similar mandate was also
created for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The main goal of
the Peace Fund, according to Article 21(1), is to provide financial support for peace missions and
other operational activities relating to peace and security. Although Article 21(1) sets out broader
goals for the Peace Fund, it is expected that much of the resources of the Peace Fund would go
into activities of the ASF, if it becomes operational and effective. In order to forestall initial financial
difficulties for the deployment of troops, article 21(6) provides that states contributing contingents
to an operation should bear the cost involved in the participation of their troops for the first three
months. The AU would then assume full financial responsibility for the rest of the operation. It is
envisioned that the Council would draw the resources from the peace fund to pay for the entire
peacekeeping operation.
The Peace Fund would draw its source from a variety of places. According to Article 21, the
Peace Fund shall draw its sources of funding from:
• financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions;
• voluntary contributions from Member States;
• voluntary contributions from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil
society and individuals;
• fund-raising activities;
• voluntary contributions from foreign (non-African) sources, in conformity with objectives
and principles of the Union;
• a revolving Trust Fund.
The AU would stipulate six percent of its annual regular budget, estimated at $30 million,
(Berman and Sams 2002a: 65-66 and 2002b: 36) for peace and security initiatives. The six percent
would be allocated regardless of the state of arrears. This is very important not only because it
would help forestall free rider problems, but also ensure that beneficiaries value the peace
missions. The effectiveness of the African Standby Force would, to a greater extent, depend on the
ability of the AU to raise the necessary funding to support the operations of the Force. According
to the Secretary General of the AU, the Peace and Security Council needs at least US$24 million
from donors to set up the 500-man Force. (OAU 2002: 38)
Experience from the OAU Peace Fund indicates that if proper planning and the appropriate
modalities were put in place, the AU would be able to raise this money. Based on the level of
contributions given to the Peace Fund of the OAU, it seems the political will is there for donor
countries to support the ASF. The Peace Fund, which was established in June 1993, attracted
contributions amounting to US$48 million by the end of March 2002. Of this amount, US$18
million was contributed to member states as a proportion of their contributions to the general
budget of the OAU. The remainder and much larger sum of US$30 million came from non-African
countries and international organisations. (Cilliers 2002) Canada also provided financial support to
the Peace Fund through the Pan-African programme.
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Continental Early Warning System
Regardless of the amount of training, equipment and funding provided to a standby force, such a
force would be effective only if it is deployed “at the right time and to the right place”.10
Recognizing that a lack of reliable information on potential conflicts and appropriate preventive
responses adversely affected the performance of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Management,
Prevention and Resolution, the African Union agreed that a continental early warning system
would be created to support the Standby Force, (Protocol, article 12) and would be “tasked to
develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic,
social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within
the continent and to recommend the best course of action”. (Cilliers 2002)
The operating arm of the Early Warning System, the Situation Room, will connect and integrate
the early warning units of the five sub-regions, which tap information from focal points of experts
at national, regional and international levels. It will also draw on information produced by the “UN,
its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and
NGOs”. (Protocol, article 12(3)) The Situation Room will also engage in its own data collection and
analysis based on established early warning indicators.
The information generated by the early warning system will be used by the Chairperson of the
Commission to advise the Peace and Security Council and to recommend the best course of
action, including – if deemed necessary – the deployment of the Standby Force. The Chairperson
is specifically mandated to use the formulated early warning signals and modules to advise the PSC
(and ultimately the ASF) on potential trouble spots on the continent and also to ensure effective
and strategic troop deployment.
While this arrangement for early action and early response holds a great deal of promise, the
experience of the OAU’s early warning system suggests that the AU will face a number of
challenges to developing a competent early warning capacity. Attempts by the OAU to develop a
continent-wide early warning system failed because of inadequate human and material resources.
It is important to note that significant effort has been made to improve the capacity of the
OAU/AU’s early warning system. For example, the UNDP’s project RAF 197/028, focusing on
capacity building for the OAU to improve the analytical and information and communications
technology (ICT) capacity of some of the OAU and African embassy staff, provided computers and
other ICT equipment, commissioned internet connectivity for the OAU and embassies and assisted
in the development of a computer local area network. Other donor initiatives focused on
developing linkages with regional offices, NGOs and member states. However, in spite of these
initiatives, there is still a need for human resource development, equipment, and increased
coordination and information sharing with civil society and the regional mechanisms.
There are a number of obstacles to the effective function of an OAUAU early warning system.
At present, it is equipped with a database that contains some information on the history, politics,
economics, and potential causes of conflict in specific regions and countries. However, this
information is largely outdated and, therefore, of limited use.11
The Situation Room lacks the human resource capacity to adequately monitor and analyze
information as well as develop policy options. Although the Situation Room is now staffed
24 hours a day, seven days a week,12 (an improvement from the OAU’s capacity to provide staff for
BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
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10. Interview with Mr. El Ghassim Wane, Acting Deputy Director of the Conflict Management Centre, African Union
Commission. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. February 12, 2003.
11. Interview with Kizito Sabala, Early Warning Program Director, African Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya,
February 7, 2003.
12. Phone interview with Eric G. Berman. Waterloo, Ontario. February 26, 2003.
only 48 hours a week), there are only two contracted staff members working the Situation Room
per shift.13 A report by the International Peace Academy (2002a) suggests that it should be staffed
by seven permanent employees (not consultants) at any one time. There is a need to provide
training to the policy-makers charged with the task of using the information generated by the early
warning system to formulate and adopt strategic options. (Ibok 1999a)
A report based on the UNDP capacity building project with the OAU suggests that the
organization still requires more computers and “an information system capable of analyzing
conflict indicators on a continuous basis”. (IPA 2002a) According to the UNDP, the OAU/AU also
needs to strengthen its relations with civil society, universities, sub-regional organizations and
governments.14 The AU’s Situation Room needs to be adequately linked to the sub-regional early
warning mechanisms. The technological capacity to more effectively connect the AU’s Situation
Room to the sub-regions’ systems is required.
Civil Society and the Peace and Security Council
The importance of the full and active engagement of African civil society15 in the promotion of
peace and security in Africa has been widely acknowledged by civil society groups themselves as
well as the OAU/AU. (IPA 2002a and b) Well-informed and engaged civil society will play an
important role in pressuring governments to respond quickly and appropriately to threats to
peace and security, including through the deployment of the African Standby Force. Furthermore,
civil society groups can serve to monitor and inform the decision-making processes of the Peace
and Security Council to help reduce the possibility that decisions surrounding the deployment of
the ASF are manipulated by the political, rather than humanitarian, interests of member states.
They can also offer credible analyses and policy options for the Peace and Security Council. Many
NGOs and religious communities have invaluable relationships, contacts, and insights into
community dynamics that can be used to develop policy pertaining to peace and security. In
addition, civil society groups have on-the-ground contacts that are essential for gathering
information for an early warning system. (IPA 1996; Ibok 1999) In order to contribute to early
warning through the AU, civil society must be informed and systematically engaged by the Peace
and Security Council. Finally, if the African Union is to be truly responsive to the people of Africa,
and not just the leaders of African states, it must actively and meaningfully engage civil society in
the work of the Peace and Security Council.
African Heads of State have agreed to establish a number of mechanisms to engage civil society
with the AU. For example, the Heads of State agreed to establish the Pan-African Parliament as a
component of the AU “to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and
economic integration of the continent and to allow parliamentarians to vote in their personal and
independent capacity”. (Cilliers and Sturman 2002b) In addition, in 2001, the Heads of State
agreed to establish the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), based on the model of
African Economic Community’s Economic and Social Council. ECOSOCC will serve as an advisory
organ made up of social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union.16
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13. Based on Kristiana Powell’s discussion with staff at the Situation Room. Building B. AU Headquarters. Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia. February 12, 2002.
14. A more detailed discussion of the role of civil society in strengthening the capacity of the African Standby Force
and the early warning system, as well as recommendations for Canada pertaining to civil society is included in a
separate section of this paper.
15. The term civil society is used here to refer to “a loose conglomeration of interest groups formed to further specific
causes” and includes non-governmental organizations, research centres, community-based organizations, academic
institutions, the media, labour unions, the private sector, and religious organizations. (IPA 1996)
16. It is important to note that neither the Pan-African Parliament nor ECOSOCC had been formally established at the
time of writing.
The relationship between civil society and the AU is also highlighted fairly frequently in the
Constitutive Act adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in July 2000. For
example, the Act’s Preamble recognizes “the need to build a partnership between governments
and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector…”
However, despite this formal acknowledgement, Article 20 of the African Union Commission
provides no provisions for the structures or process of engagement of civil society. In addition, the
fact that ECOSOCC is comprised of social and professional groups chosen by Member States,
“could be interpreted to endorse only weak CSO [civil society organization] participation, possibly
subject to government nomination”. (Mohammed 2001) Moreover, the process of transformation
from the OAU to the AU did not actively or systematically involve civil society groups.17 Although
the AU has hosted two conferences on the partnership between the OAU/AU and civil society on
the developing an interface between civil society and the OAU/AU,18 many of the
recommendations made were not translated into action.19
A similar trend characterizes the creation and anticipated operation of the Peace and Security
Council. Like the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security Protocol contains provisions to engage
civil society. The Standby Force will consist of civilian personnel (Article 13) and Article 20 reads:
“The Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-
based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate
actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required,
such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.”
Despite these declarations, however, civil society organizations were largely left out of the
decision-making process surrounding the creation of the Peace and Security Council and its
Protocol.20 In addition, the Protocol provides no structure for consultations with civil society. What
is required is a civil society-AU consultation on developing mechanisms for institutionalizing an
interface between the Peace and Security Council and civil society.
There are a number of other challenges to the effective participation of civil society in the peace
and security initiatives of the AU that can be addressed by donor countries like Canada. Civil
society engagement in the decision-making processes of the Peace and Security Council, once it is
operational, will be hindered by a lack of knowledge and information on the structure and
function of the Council and its mechanisms.21 There is a need to disseminate and popularize
information on the Peace and Security Council and the provisions of its Protocol, and to make
accessible information on the structure and function of the Standby Force and the early warning
system. Moreover, many African civil society organizations involved in peace and security issues
lack the capacity to organize and lobby effectively at the level of the AU.22 Indeed, with the Council
closer to being operational, there is an urgent need to provide structures to engage civil society
before its exclusion becomes entrenched in the decision-making culture of the Peace and Security
Council. Canada can play an important role in ensuring civil society is meaningfully engaged.
BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
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17. IPA 2002b. Interview with Dr. Josephine Odera, Deputy Director of African Peace Forum (APFO) and Lecturer at
the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, February 21, 2003.
18. OAU-Civil Society Conferences were held in June 2001 and June 2002 in Addis Ababa. A third conference was
tentatively scheduled for June 2003 provided funding was made available.
19. Interview with Amb. Adala Ochieng, Program Officer for South Africa and Regional Organizations, International
Resource Group, Nairobi, Kenya, February 3, 2003.
20. Interview with Dr. Josephine Odera, Deputy Director, African Peace Forum (APFO) and Lecturer at the University
of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, February 21, 2003.
21. Interview with Njeri Karuru, consultant for USAID, Nairobi, Kenya, February 19, 2003.
22. Interview with Ms. Elizabeth Mutunga, Programme Officer, African Peace Forum (APFO), Nairobi, Kenya,
February 21, 2003.
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY/LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU CANADA
64 SURVEY OF THE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS CAPACITY
BUILDING INITIATIVES OF MAJOR DONORS
A review of the initiatives of the major powers – the US, France and Britain – and middle powers –
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden – reveals that there exists a
strong need to pursue multi-national peacekeeping training in Africa, especially for the command
structure. The initiatives undertaken by the countries reviewed here are primarily bilateral, or focus
on developing capacity within a specific sub-region. None of these initiatives focuses on developing
the unique combination of skills required by an African Standby Force, that is, the capacity to react
rapidly as well as the ability to engage in conflict resolution, observation and monitoring,
administering and coordinating humanitarian assistance, and in some aspects of peace building.
In addition, there appears to be a dearth of training initiatives through the sub-regional
mechanisms that concentrate on developing capacity at the level of the policy makers who are
responsible for formulating and adopting strategic options. The programmes reviewed here are
tailored to military and civilian personnel who will be deployed in the field. Furthermore, this
survey suggests that there is an urgent need to coordinate the capacity building projects of donors,
particularly Britain, France and the US, the so-called P3. Finally, the survey of these initiatives
provides insight into the type of equipment and logistical support that Canada can consider
offering the African Standby Force. It also reveals that donated equipment and logistical
arrangements (including, for example, transport considerations) have not been made available for
the type of continental rapid deployment that will be undertaken by the ASF.
The capacity building projects of Britain, France and the US can best be categorised into three
types of support – classroom education; field training; and equipment. Since Britain was the first
to embark on this type of training programmes, it makes chronological and analytical sense to
initiate discussion on donor capacity building project in Africa with the British experience.
Britain
British peacekeeping capacity building dates back to 1995 when the British government signed
bilateral agreements with the Zimbabwean and the Ghanaian governments to turn their Army Staff
Colleges into regional centres of excellence for peacekeeping training for Africans. This agreement
paved the way for the dispatch of British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) to
provide classroom instructions in traditional peacekeeping lessons to selected military men from
Africa in Accra. Similar programming was also initiated by Britain in Zimbabwe in 1996. The main
different between the Ghanaian programme and that in Zimbabwe is that the Zimbabwean
trainees travelled to the UK for their peacekeeping instruction. (Berman 2002a: 37)
In 2001, Britain concluded another BMATTs agreement with the Kenyan government, which
paved the way for some selected military officers in East Africa to benefit from similar classroom
peacekeeping lessons in Nairobi.
The Zimbabwean programme was abrogated in March 2001. The British Government intends,
however, to create similar programme in a different African country to provide training for the
entire Southern Africa. (Berman 2002a: 44 ft.31)
■
Besides training through the BMATTs programme, Britain in 1996 also provided peacekeeping
training and administrative support for a SADC Field Training Exercise. The Economic Community
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone also
received funding, lethal equipments and weapons from the British government. (Malan,
forthcoming: 10) Indeed, between 1996 and 2000, Britain provided training to the tune of
$4 million per annum to 20 African countries. (ibid; Berman 2002: 37) Since 2001, the British
peacekeeping training programmes have been integrated into larger policy framework called the
Conflict Prevention Pool.
The Conflict Prevention Pool approach is to merge resources from the Ministry of Defense, the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development, in order
to develop elaborate and sustainable multidimensional involvement of the British government in
the capacity building process in Africa. This slight shift of emphasis of the of British government
conflict management approach in Africa is intended to develop the capacity of African military and
regional organisations to undertake peace operations on their own. (Berman 2002a: par 26-28) The
new emphasis of the British government is reflected in the recent appointment of British Military
Liaison Officer at the UK Embassy to Ethiopia with a mandate to advise the AU on military issues.
The importance attached by the British government to this new approach is demonstrated by
the fact that the Foreign and Commonwealth office intended to spend $100 million per annum for
the fiscal years 2001-2003 for peacekeeping capacity programme in Africa.23 Britain, together with
Germany, also provided initial funding and technical support for the establishment of the Kofi
Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra. The goal of this centre is to create
modern state of the art peacekeeping centre to provide training for African peacekeepers.
France
The French began its African peacekeeping capacity training programme in 1997. The most
comprehensive of their peacekeeping training programmes commenced in 1998 when the French
spent 180 million French francs (US $30 million) in 1998 to create the Reinforcement of African
Military Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) programme with the following mandate:
• the creation of a training centre for peacekeeping at Zambakro in Côte d’Ivoire;
• the pre-positioning of equipment to equip designated peacekeeping battalions; and
• the organisation of a Franco-African tactical peacekeeping Field Training Exercise.
In order to enhance peacekeeping training programmes, the French established three
peacekeeping depots in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti.
Since 1998, the various units of African military and police forces have been involved in the
capacity building exercises. As of the end of 2002, about 545 officers from 36 different African
countries had graduated from the Zambakro Peacekeeping School in Côte d’Ivoire (Malan,
forthcoming)
Three pre-positioning of equipment, which officially commenced in February 1998 in Dakar,
January 2000 in Libreville, and June 2001 in Djibouti, have provided support for African regional
and UN peace operations in the Central African Republic in 1998, the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-
Bissau in 1999 and ongoing Senegalese contingent in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
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23. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/
ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390518>
BURTON, POWELL, KWASI TIEKU WITH ANSAH AKUFFO
The Franco-African Peacekeeping Field Training Exercises programme conducted training
programmes for about 32 African countries. (Berman 2002b: 37) The programme has so far trained
2,600 troops assembled from eight West and Central Africa in 1998;24 1,120 troops drawn from
eight central Africa countries, in 2000;25 and 1,000 troops drawn from 16 Southern and Eastern
African countries in 2002.26
United States
The US commenced its Peacekeeping training programme in 1997 when it created the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), with the long-term objective to build a peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance capacity in Africa of about 12,000 trained military personnel. This was
intended to:
• ensure inter-operability among peacekeepers by standardizing communication and
conducting joint training exercises;
• develop the capacity (African troops) to respond rapidly and effectively to emergency
situations in Africa;
• engage in traditional peacekeeping duties as authorized under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter,
to uphold political settlements or stabilize conflict situations;
• monitor cease fires, serve as observers to negotiations between disputants, and monitor
elections; and
• assist in humanitarian relief missions.27
ACRI trained and equipped peacekeeping troops from African nations, stationed but ready in
their nation of origin, for effective, collective and rapid deployment to respond to humanitarian
and other crises in Africa. According to the State Department, the programme provided training
and non-lethal equipment (including uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, night vision
devices and water purification units) to almost 8,600 peacekeepers from six African militaries
between July 1997and 2001. Through this initiative, sixty trainers from the Special Forces units of
the US Army were despatched to conduct training twice in Senegal, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin
and once in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda.28 According to official data available, ACRI spent almost $70
million between 1997 and 2000 on training programmes in Africa.
Apart from African Crisis Response Initiative, the US also spent approximately $90 million on
Operation Focus Relief, which involved the training of seven battalions from ECOWAS member
states to support UN operation in Sierra Leone.
Current ongoing US Peacekeeping training programmes in Africa are:
• International Military Education and Training Program;
• Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance; and
• Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program.
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24. This first training programme, which the French named Exercise Guidimakha, involved troops from eight west
African Countries: Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.
25. Countries participating in this training exercise, which took place in Gabon in 2000, were Burundi, Cameroon,
the CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and as São Tomé and Principe.
26. Participating countries were Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
27. <http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/acri.html>
28. <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/acrisumm.htm>
International Military Education and Training, with the annual budget estimated at $30.9 million
in 2001 fiscal year, $41 million in 2002 fiscal year, and $30 million in 2003 fiscal year, aims to train,
equip, and support troops from selected African countries that are involved in international
peacekeeping operations. Countries that have already benefited from this programme are
Nigerian, Senegalese, Ghanaian peacekeeping units serving in Sierra Leone, units of the Guinean
army policing Liberia-Guinea border, and some selected African Peacekeepers serving in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. (Volman)
The training programme, however, goes beyond the training for peacekeeping purposes. It
involves joint military exercises between the US and African troops, normally at the US military
installations. With annual budgets of $8,833 in 2001, $10,185 in 2002 and $11,095 in 2003, the
programme aims to cover 1,600 African troops, drawn from 46 countries. In July 2002, the State
Department replaced the African Crisis Response Initiative programme with the Africa
Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). Its goal is to:
• enable sub-Saharan African militaries to develop and improve sustainable capacities to
deploy and conduct peace support operations in Africa and other areas of the world; and
• improve African militaries’ interoperability in order to facilitate sub-regional and regional
operations.
This training programme, which has a budget of $10 million, has five main principles: flexibility,
sustainability, training to the operational environment; integration; and regional cooperation.
The essential difference between Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance and the
African Crisis Response Initiative is that it will entail offensive military training, including light
infantry tactics and small unit tactics, and also involve the provision of weaponry equipment,
including rifles, machine guns, and mortars, to improve the capability of African troops to conduct
peacekeeping operations in hostile environments. Ghanaian troops have been selected to begin
the programme in 2003. Senegal and countries that participated in the ACRI programme will also
benefit from the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance.
Denmark
The Nordic countries have developed a coherent approach to building peace support operations
capacity inasmuch as conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities have been integrated into
their development co-operation and peace efforts. (Hermes 1998) Denmark has concentrated its
efforts on peacekeeping training, mostly through the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). In 1997, the Government of Denmark signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
Zimbabwe, and contributed US $ 27 million to developing a Regional Peacekeeping Training
Centre (RPTC) at the Zimbabwe Staff College.29 This money was used to build a lecture block and
accommodations, to procure computers, fax machines and photocopiers as well as to create and
finance ten peacekeeping courses at the staff college.30 The Danish government also played a
central role in creating and maintaining a clearing house at the College to “monitor peacekeeping
training activities, identify new regional training requirements, keep a record of trained
peacekeeping practitioners and instructors in the sub-region and beyond, establish a library, and
publish a quarterly magazine”. (Berman and Sams 2000: 341)
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29. The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre was disengaged from the Zimbabwe Staff College in mid-1999.
30. <www.rptc.org.zw/rptc.htm>
Denmark also provides international peacekeeping training in Europe to Africans. For example,
the government funds personnel from the SADC region to participate in Nordic peacekeeping
courses.31 Courses to develop peacekeeping skills are held for civilians, military personnel and the
police force.32 Denmark also organized and funded trips for SADC military experts to travel to
Bosnia and Herzegovina to witness firsthand how a multinational peacekeeping force operates. In
addition to providing peacekeeping training, the Danish government has also supported efforts to
develop indigenous conflict resolution strategies at South African universities. In 2002, Denmark’s
training centre for its peacekeeping forces in Oksbol in Jutland was converted into a Peacekeeping
School for all UN and NATO personnel preparing for peacekeeping missions. The Danish Armed
Forces created a handbook for peacekeeping training.33
Germany
Through its Support Aid Program, to which it contributed US $23 million over four years, Germany
has sent military advisory groups to ten African countries34 from the five sub-regions. In July 1998,
in partnership with a Group of Interested States (GIS), Berlin supported a “Train the Trainer”
course on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for military personnel from Central
African states. By 2001, Germany had donated US $280,000 to GIS projects.35 Germany also
contributed 1.8 million Euros to infrastructure development for the Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Centre. (BBC News 2002; Faith and Berman 2002) The Centre is designed
to train West African troops and will complement the basic training provided at Zambarkro in Côte
d'Ivoire and the strategic level training provided at the Nigerian Defence College.36
In terms of equipment and logistics, Berlin supplied the Zimbabwe Staff College and the
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre with computers.37 It also contributed US $493,000, a C-160
aircraft and 28 satellite phones to the SADC training exercise, Blue Crane. (Berman and Sams
2000) In 1998, Germany covered the transportation costs of 150 Central African troops serving
with the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, and provided the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with 35 trucks in Liberia, and 27 jeeps, 5,000
uniforms, and communication and medical equipment in Sierra Leone. Germany has contributed
money, flak jackets, helmets, binoculars and medical supplies for OAU missions. (Berman and
Sams 2000) Furthermore, Germany, like Sweden, Norway, Canada and the UK supports the UN
Institute for Training and Research regional training programme to enhance conflict prevention
and peace building capacity in Africa. This programme provides training to policy makers at the
Foreign and Defence Ministries of Africa states. It is also designed to train staff members from
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations in Africa. (Berman and Sams 2000)
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31. <www.um.dk/publikationer/fremmedsprog/english/dda2000/02_chapt/2_21_4.asp>
32. <www.um.dk/publikationer/fremmedsprog/english/dda2000/02_chapt/2_21_4.asp>
33. <www.internationalreports.net/europe/denmark/2002/peaceenforcers.html>
34. These countries include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia,
and Zambia.
35. <www.auswaertiges-amt.de>
36. Phone Interview with Eric G. Berman, February 26, 2003.
37. <www.rptc.org.zw/rptc.htm>
The Netherlands
The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Defence
cooperate in financing peacekeeping capacity building programmes, although the Ministry of
Defence still provides all training equipment. The government invites and sponsors African officers
to participate in training courses at Dutch military institutes. In 2001, the government provided
financial support to a Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping
Capacities seminar on Africa peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Tanzania, attended by
15 African states.
The Dutch government supplied generators, kitchen trailers, ambulances, vehicles, and mine
detectors to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). In 1997, it supplied 84 trucks to
ECOMOG Liberia and donated money used to transport a Malian battalion to the ECOMOG
mission in Sierra Leone.
In December 2002, the Dutch Government agreed to provide 294, 000 Euros to support the
peacekeeping initiatives of the South African Department of Defence in the Democratic Republic
of Congo. The funds will be used to purchase satellite telephones, a bus, and other material as well
as transport costs. This money will be drawn from the Dutch Peace Fund, which provides financial
support for developing countries to participate in peacekeeping missions.38
Norway
In 1995, the Norwegian government initiated a five-year funding project to create a Training for
Peace programme in southern Africa in partnership with the Institute for Security Studies and the
African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). In 2000, the Norwegian
government decided that the project should be extended for another five years and that its budget
should be doubled. The objective of Training for Peace is to build conflict management and
peacekeeping capacity in southern Africa. The programme is designed to train the military,
government (especially staff from Foreign Affairs and Defence), NGOs and media in southern
Africa at the practical and conceptual level.39 Oslo is considering funding another Training for
Peace programme in West Africa. (Faith and Berman 2002)
The Norwegian government has also covered the costs of six officers from SADC to take part in
Norwegian UN courses for military and police personnel.40 In addition, military officers from
Norway have provided peacekeeping training at different African institutions.41
In terms of equipment and logistics, Oslo created the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness
System to provide “relief supplies and personnel to the UN system and other international
organizations in their efforts to reach disaster areas without delay”.42 Through NOREPS, Norway
supplies depots of humanitarian-related equipment in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. (Berman
and Sams 2000) It also offers to provide health care products, food items, satellite communication
services, water/sanitation equipment and temporary shelter within 24 hours (transported by air and
ship charter to developing countries) and trained personnel within 48 hours. In addition, Norway
played a leadership role in the UNDP capacity building project for the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was completed in 2002.
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38. <www.dutchembassy.co.za/persrel.htm>
39. <www.accord.org.za/web.nsf>
40. <www.nupi.no/default-e.htm>
41. Ibid.
42. <www.noreps.com>
Sweden
Sweden has provided significant financial and training support to the OAU. In addition to
contributing to the OAU Peace Fund, Stockholm has trained OAU staff and SADC (Staff Officers)
participants at the UN building at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).43
Sweden has also contributed instructors and funding to the Regional Peacekeeping Training
Centre. In 1997, the Swedish government agreed to undertake “Challenges of Peacekeeping and
Peace Support into the 21st Century”, a research and training project involving the Swedish
National Defence College and some African countries. (Faith and Berman 2002)
From the above, it seems the capacity exists in Africa to mount its own capacity development
and to relieve the UN of some of the responsibilities. It is, however, clear that the training and the
capacity building projects remain bilateral and state projects, with little effort made to integrate the
various programmes. As Berman informs us:
… the three partners have created little in the way of synergy. Few countries are willing to co-
operate with any enthusiasm if they do not get sufficient credit and have control of the
situation. France, the UK and the US are no exception … What is needed now is for each
country to more fully buy into each other’s more worthwhile initiatives. (Berman 2002a: par.57)
The reluctance of the P3 to coordinate their programmes has impelled some analysts to
question the value of the capacity building project. A report prepared for the Norwegian Institute
for International Affairs in 2002, for instance, asked, “does the training or equipment offered make
African recipients any more willing or able to undertake peacekeeping on their continent?” (ibid.)
The answer, as some security experts on Africa have pointed out, is an emphatic “no” because the
necessary institutional mechanism has not been created. As Malan tells us:
Training should not be conducted for the sake of training, and equipment provided should
match the real deployment and sustainment [sic] needs of recipient countries. Scarce resources
need to be allocated to the areas, which will produce the most effective output. In the realm of
peace operations, this means that all capacity-building assistance should be contingent upon a
minimal level of commitment to put such training to good use – through actual deployment on
peace operations, rather than a vague mandate to build an ill-defined “African peacekeeping
capability”. (Malan, forthcoming)
What this means is that even though the skills have been imparted and equipment provided, it
is now clear that the skills and equipment have not been put to use. It is in this light that we think
the African Standby Force provides a platform for Canada to project itself in Africa. Focusing on
the force has the added advantage of providing a sustainable capacity that could be used in the
future, because the training for the 500 ASF amounts to training the trainer.
POLICY OPTIONS FOR CANADA
African Standby Force
Coordination and Advisory Tasks: Canada could offer to create a permanent post at its
embassy in Ethiopia to advise the Peace and Security Council and the Military Staff Committee on
issues related to the ASF. Canada could second a Canadian experienced in peace support
operations in Africa to assume this role.
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43. <http://www.swedint.mil.se> and <www.usip.org/vdi/vdr/13B.html>
Canada could develop a three-year engagement programme with the AU’s Standby Force. During
this period, Canada would work towards meeting the training, equipment, and financial needs of the
ASF. The focus of this assistance would be to build a sustainable capacity such that at the end of the
three-year period, Africa would be capable of independently launching, leading and sustaining a
successful ASF mission. Although Canada would have disengaged at the end of these three years, it
could still be in a position to influence the decision-making processes of the Peace and Security
Council with regards to the deployment of the standby force through its permanent post at the
Canadian embassy in Ethiopia, its advisory positions, and through the civil society consortium.
Canada could offer to host a meeting in Ottawa with the AU and non-African countries involved
in projects to enhance peace support capacity building and training on the continent. The purpose
of this meeting would be to help to facilitate the coordination of external support for the African
Standby Force. The meeting could serve as a forum for the P3 (Britain, France and US) to re-initiate
efforts to harmonise their programmes for use by the ASF. It could focus on discussing how best
to move forward on training and equipping an effective standby force. Topics could include
assessing the needs of such a force, determining the resources available, enhancing transparency
and cooperation among countries involved in training, and reducing redundancy of efforts. As one
of the Friends of the AU, who has special relations with the P3, Canada is well suited to convene
such a meeting.
Canada could support the development a capabilities database that would list the personnel
and equipment that each member state would be willing to contribute to the deployment of an
African Standby Force. This database would need to be updated regularly.
Canada could offer to head a Military and Civilian Advisory team of ten to fifteen experts to
advise and accompany the missions of the ASF during its first three years of deployment. Members
of this team would work alongside the permanent staff at the AU as well as serve as liaisons with
the ASF personnel in the field. This team could be based on the model of Britain’s International
Military Advisory Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone. After this three-year period, Canada could offer
to send a core group of two to five military and civilian advisors to travel to the AU headquarters
on short notice to assist in the decision-making process surrounding the deployment of the force.
Canada could take the lead in working in partnership with the AU to support the creation of a
clearinghouse at the AU headquarters, similar to the information centre established by Denmark
for the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe, to monitor the peace support
operations training activities of the standby force, identify new training requirements, and
maintain a database of trained ASF military and civilian personnel. Most importantly, it could serve
as a co-ordination centre to harmonize the capacity building programmes of the external powers,
particularly the P3.
Canada could encourage the AU, when developing the Peace and Security Council’s Rules of
Procedure, to make provisions for the creation of a civilian unit44 at the AU Headquarters in Addis
Ababa. This unit could be staffed by a project officer who would serve as a liaison officer between
the Peace and Security Council (the Military Staff Committee or the Chairperson of the
Committee) and a Peace and Security Consortium of representatives from prominent NGOs and
leaders of civil society interested in peace and security research. These representatives would
serve in an advisory role during the decision-making process of the Peace and Security Council as
well as help to determine appropriate training for an African Standby Force. The project officer
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44. This suggestion is based on the recommendations for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre. (Faith
and Berman 2002)
would encourage and facilitate open dialogue between the Military Staff Committee or the
Chairperson of the Committee and the consortium. Canada could second a Canadian citizen with
experience in civil military issues to assume this post or Canada could consider funding the
training of AU staff. Canada could also provide financial and diplomatic support to a Peace and
Security Consortium of NGOs and civil society leaders.
Training: Canada could provide instructors and logistical support to offer training specific to
the ASF military and civilian personnel at the regional peacekeeping training centres, at regional
schools of excellence and at national staff colleges. Such training must be tailored to a
multinational force with the mandate to engage in peacekeeping, peace building, observation and
monitoring, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and conflict mediation and resolution. It
must occur at regular intervals. For example, Canada could provide training in command
structures, logistics and monitoring, intelligence and surveillance capacity, scenario-training,
international humanitarian law and human rights law, the rights of women and children, military
codes of conduct in accordance with human security principles, negotiation and mediation, the
administration of humanitarian assistance, civil-military cooperation, and other competencies.
Canada could expand its Military Training Assistance Programme to ensure that personnel from
all over the continent are able to attend these courses. Canada could also ensure that an
appropriate amount (a suggested 33 percent) of funding is offered to female combatants or female
civilians involved in peace support operations. Canada could create mobile Training Assistance
Teams to give instruction on all aspects of planning, conducting and validating ASF missions at
training centres in Africa. Canada could offer training at the level of the policy-makers at the Peace
and Security Council on developing common rules of engagement and standard operating
procedures as well as providing instruction on the appropriate deployment of the Standby Force.
Canada could organize and fund a visit for the members of the Military Staff Committee and the
civilian components, or the representatives of the Peace and Security Council, to Bosnia and
Macedonia to demonstrate how a multinational peacekeeping force and peace can support
operation work.45
Canada could offer to establish Operational Trauma and Stress Support Units for ASF personnel
similar to the ones created by the Canadian Forces to treat Canadian military personnel and their
families for post-traumatic stress disorder.
Equipment and Logistics: The AU has received equipment from Canada in the past.46
Canada should commission a study in partnership with the Chairperson of the Commission or the
Military Staff Committee to determine how this equipment was used and/or where it is being
stored.
Canada, either unilaterally or through a coalition of like-minded states, could assist in stocking
and monitoring ASF Logistical Supply Depots, similar to the packages offered by Reinforcement of
African Military Capability for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) in Dakar, Libreville, and Djibouti or the
American African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) issued equipment. These depots would be
comprised of equipment contributed by the sub-regional mechanisms and the Friends of the AU
that meets UN standards and requirements. Such depots could be strategically located in all of the
continent’s five sub-regions and would be capable of equipping and sustaining a rapid-reaction
force of 500 troops. They would be accessed in pursuance of a decision made by the Assembly to
deploy the African Standby Force.
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45 . Canada has organized these sorts of trips for senior Palestinian security officers. (Adams 2002)
46. Phone interview with Eric G. Berman. Waterloo, Ontario, February 26, 2003.
Canada could offer to commit equipment and logistical support to these depots, including, for
example, non-lethal matériel like rations, medical supplies, communications equipment, uniforms,
boots, generators, mine detectors, night vision devices, and water purification units. Alternatively,
Canada could copy the Norwegian NOREPS programme and have supplies available in Canada that
could be delivered within twenty-four hours to ASF deployments. Canada could offer to assume
responsibility for storage of materiel at these depots. It could offer to second military personnel,
engineers and technicians to maintain and control this equipment. Canada could offer to cover the
transportation costs of part or all of the ASF personnel during deployment. Alternatively, Canada
could create a transportation fund that could be used when required.
Financing: Canada could offer to contribute funds to the AU’s Peace Fund specifically reserved
for the African Standby Force, or Canada could request that a portion of the $4 million it has
offered the AU be reserved for the ASF. The Canadian government could use its influence at the
G-8 and the OECD to persuade member countries to designate resources for a standby force
through the Peace Fund. Canada could offer to monitor this fund on behalf of contributing
countries. In this capacity, Canada would ensure that finances are being used appropriately as well
as play a key role in the peace and security decision-making processes of the AU.
Continental Early Warning System
Human Resources Development: Canada could second conflict specialists to up-date and
contribute to the information in the OAU/AU’s database as well as provide training for additional
African staff to undertake this task. Canada could initiate a programme to train policy-makers at
the Peace and Security Council in information analysis and policy development. Canada could also
support exchange programmes and internships for African experts to develop their conflict
analysis skills in Canada.47
Canada could fund the transportation and accommodation costs of early warning experts from
the sub-regional mechanisms to attend training and information-sharing sessions with staff of the
Situation Room at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Alternatively, Canada could support
exchange programmes and internships for African experts to travel throughout the continent to
learn from other early warning experts and systems.
Equipment: Canada could provide the financial and technical resources required to create an
information system for the analysis of conflict indicators. Canada could supply computers to be
used specifically for the Situation Room. Canada could contribute information and communication
technology to link the Situation Room with the sub-regional early warning databases and the focal
points.
Civil Society
Canada should encourage Member States to raise awareness on the substantive issues of the AU,
in particular to educate people on its security mechanisms and the ways in which civil society can
become engaged.
Canada could offer direct support by funding and endorsing conferences throughout Africa for
representatives of prominent NGOs on civil society input and participation in the decision-making
processes of the Peace and Security Council. Canada could fund and support similar conferences
with the African Diaspora living in North America. Canada could encourage the African Union,
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47. For example, Canada’s Commonwealth Scholarship can be tailored to finance this type of programme.
when developing the Peace and Security Council’s Rules of Procedure, to make provisions for the
creation a civilian unit48 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. This unit could be staffed by a
project officer who would serve as a liaison officer between the Peace and Security Council (the
Military Staff Committee or the Chairperson of the Committee), and a Peace and Security
Consortium of representatives from prominent NGOs and leaders of civil society who are
interested in peace and security research. These representatives could serve in an advisory role
during the decision-making process of the Peace and Security Council as well as help to determine
appropriate training for an ASF. The project officer would encourage and facilitate open dialogue
between the Military Staff Committee or the Chairperson of the Committee and the consortium.
Canada could create and contribute to a human resource development fund that could be used to
cover the salary of this project officer, or Canada could consider funding the training of this officer.
Alternatively, Canada could second an experienced Canadian citizen to assume this post.
Canada could also provide financial and diplomatic support to a Peace and Security Consortium
of NGOs and civil society leaders. Canada could fund projects through Canadian NGOs partnered
with African NGOs to disseminate and popularize information on the Peace and Security Council
and the provisions of the Peace and Security Protocol, in particular the structure and function of
the early warning system and the African Standby Force. For example, Canada could support the
creation of a manual on the AU’s security architecture for civil society similar to the publication on
the EU and civil society, Understanding the EU: A Civil Society Guide to the Development of
Conflict Prevention Policies created by Saferworld. CIDA’s $500,000.00 Outreach Fund for New
Partnership for Africa’s Development, which was used to increase awareness and to promote
dialogue on the principles of NEPAD in Africa, could be used as a model for this initiative. Canada
could work in partnerships with institutions of learning in Africa to inform practitioners of the
Peace and Security Council’s agenda.
Canada could support public education campaigns about the African Union, either through the
AU website, which at present provides very little substantive information on the organisation, or
by funding an on-line information centre similar to the G-8 Online project supported by DFAIT.
This information centre would serve as a resource on the AU for civil societies. Canada could play
a role in funding and/or updating this site, and/or providing updated information on the AU to the
DFAIT, CIDA and/or DND websites.
It is important to note, however, that for civil society to be truly engaged in these issues, there
is a need for capacity building that would move beyond education to focus on developing
advocacy skills. Canada could encourage and financially support capacity building projects through
Canadian NGOs partnered with African NGOs.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The emergence of the African Union’s new security regime and the creation of an African Standby
Force present exciting new opportunities. Canada’s approach to defence and foreign policy, as
articulated by the recent Responsibility to Protect, resonates with the new objectives and
principles guiding the AU’s standby force. Indeed, Canada seems sufficiently motivated and
equipped to contribute to peace and security in Africa under the aegis of the African Union.
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48. This suggestion is based on the recommendations for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre. Faith
and Berman 2002)
This paper has argued that it is in Canada’s interests to develop innovative policies vis-à-vis the
African Union. An examination of the training, equipment, and financing requirements of the
African Standby Force, its accompanying early warning system, and the Peace and Security
Council’s mechanisms to engage civil society, identified ways in which Canada can make a
meaningful contribution to the Union’s new security regime. As a review of the peace support
operations capacity building projects of eight major donor countries has suggested, there are a
number of areas in which Canada can seize the opportunity to fill gaps and define a distinctly
Canadian niche for itself. With the African Union and its Peace and Security Council in their
formative years, the time is indeed ripe for Canada to develop long-term foreign and defence
policy initiatives in Africa.
Future Research Directions
While researching and writing this paper, the author and his colleagues identified a number of
valuable research projects that would serve to enhance Canada’s capacity to develop new foreign
and defence policy options vis-à-vis the African Union. The Canadian government should consider
conducting a survey of all the major peace support operations capacity building programmes
being pursued by African institutions in Africa. In 1997, CIDA funded a project to survey the
peacekeeping training programmes of eight countries in Africa in partnership with the Institute for
Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa. There is a need to update this information as well as
broaden the scope of such a study to include a review of all types of peace support operations
training initiatives (not just peacekeeping) being undertaken at regional as well as national levels.
Canada could then ensure that its training initiatives for the African Standby Force complement
and advance indigenous programmes.
While this report developed policy options for a specific element of the African Union’s security
mechanisms, it would be worthwhile to commission another research project that explores the
AU’s security regime its entirety. This information could be used to develop additional foreign and
defence policy options beyond Canada’s support of the Standby Force.
Canada is currently doing a great deal to support non-military peace and security projects in
Africa. However, there is a dearth of information on the nature and value of these initiatives. The
authors have concluded that there are several reasons for this. First, there seems to be little or no
coordination between DFAIT and CIDA, especially with respect to collaborating and sharing
information on their respective projects in Africa. Secondly, Canada is working in collaboration
with other nations involved with development and non-military security projects in Africa, thereby
complicating the production and dissemination of project information.
In order to make a meaningful contribution to peace and security in Africa, the Government of
Canada should consider commissioning a report that evaluates and reviews the non-military peace
and security initiatives that DFAIT and CIDA are undertaking in Africa. Such a review would put
the Government in a better position to understand the strengths and weaknesses of current
projects in order to draft recommendations that build on successes and avoid past mistakes. In
addition, such a report would assist in developing policy coherency and empower the
Government of Canada to inform the Canadian public of the contribution that Canada is making
to peace and security in Africa.
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