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Assessing illegal logging in Ghana
C.P. HANSEN and T. TREUE
Danish Centre for Forest, Landscape and Planning, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of
Copenhagen, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark
Email: cph@life.ku.dk and ttr@life.ku.dk
SUMMARY
Although high on the international forest agenda, illegal logging is often ambiguously defined and
there is considerable uncertainty about its quantitative and qualitative characteristics. This obscures
assessments of its social, economic and environmental impacts and precludes informed policy
conclusions. Through timber export statistics, estimates of the domestic timber consumption and
official harvesting records, the extent of illegal logging and its breakdown to origin, felling agents
and species groups is estimated for Ghana over the period 1996-2005 based on a definition that
emphasises the violation of established forest management regulations. Of the total harvest, 70% or
2.3 - 2.7 million m3 annually is estimated to be illegally cut. Chainsaw operators, who supply most
of the domestic lumber demand, account for two-thirds and the export oriented timber industry
account for one-third of the illegal harvest. The most valuable timber species dominate the illegal
harvest and they appear to originate mostly from forest reserves, which as a consequence are
seriously threatened. Eliminating illegal logging will require positive economic incentives for rural
people to protect and grow timber trees. This, however, calls for fundamental reform of the timber
governance system.
KEYWORDS
Defining and assessing illegal logging, harvest regulation and control, annual allowable cut,
chainsaw lumber, FLEGT
Pre-proof version of C.P. Hansen and T.Treue 2008 Assessing illegal logging in Ghana
published in International Forestry Review 10 (4): 573-590.
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INTRODUCTION
Illegal logging has severe negative environmental, economic and social implications (Contreras-
Hermosilla 2002, Richards et al. 2003). First, it often leads to forest degradation or outright
deforestation, thus reducing forest related environmental services and biodiversity (Curran et al.
2004). Second, it results in government revenue losses. Some US$ 5 billion of government revenue
is lost globally each year because of illegal forest activities (World Bank 2004), and the market
value of products resulting from illegal logging exceeds US$ 15 billion annually (Brack 2007).
Third, illegal logging undermines democratic processes through the inherent disrespect for the rule
of law and associated corruption (Smith et al. 2003). Fourth, illegal logging may lead to increased
poverty, either directly or indirectly, the latter as a result of reduced government revenues available
for development programmes (Tacconi 2007). Fifth, illegal logging depresses domestic and
international forest product prices (Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International
2004, Turner et al. 2007). Finally, in some instances illegal logging has been a major funding
source for armed conflicts (Kaimowitz 2003, Renner 2005, Brack 2003).
On this background, illegal logging has gained prominence in national, regional and
international forestry debates over the past decade, and national, bilateral and international
initiatives have been launched to address the problem, including the European Union’ Forest Law
Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) (EU 2007), the US President’s Initiative
Against Illegal Logging (McAlpine 2003), the G8 Action Programme (Brack 2007) and bilateral
MoUs on illegal logging between Indonesia and the United Kingdom, China, Norway and Japan,
respectively (Speechly 2003). A common denominator for these initiatives is that they are kicked
off by countries consuming rather than producing tropical timber, yet with the overall objective to
promote sustainable forest management (SFM) in the tropics. There is thus a clear linkage between
initiatives addressing illegal logging and attempts, since the Rio Earth summit in 1992, to promote
SFM, which inter alia include efforts coordinated by the UN Forum on Forests and the
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), as well as timber certification schemes (Brack
2005, Tacconi et al. 2003). These efforts have resulted in elaborate and generally accepted criteria
and indicators (C&I) for SFM, but the impact on natural tropical forests has been meagre; it is
estimated that only 7% of natural tropical production forest in ITTO member countries is managed
on a sustainable basis (ITTO 2006).
The assessment of legality offers a basis for consumer countries to deny wood products
entry to their markets, if these are not licensed as legally produced. Contrary to banning the import
of timber, which is not labelled in accordance with existing timber certification schemes, this can be
done without violating World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements – especially if the verification
of legality is done in accordance with C&I agreed between producer and consumer countries (Brack
2005). Hence, consumer countries might promote SFM in (tropical) producer countries through
trade restrictions. This would be additional to and complementary to the traditional assistance
delivered through projects and programmes to promote SFM in tropical countries. A reduction of
the trade in illegal timber will, however, only significantly reduce illegal logging if alternative
markets for illegal timber, including those of producer countries’, are also closed or remain
insignificant Tacconi et al. 2003). Furthermore, the laws against which products and practices are
assessed must actually reflect the C&I for SFM. This is far from guaranteed and ultimately requires
that national legal frameworks are scrutinised through a form of standardised process that is yet to
be developed.
Worldwide, it is estimated that illegal logging takes place in about 70 countries (Toyne et al.
2002) - most of which are tropical and developing (Tacconi 2007). Reviews of studies on the extent
of illegal logging estimate that up to 90% of the total log volume is illegally produced, with
Indonesia, Brazil and Central and West African countries being the most notorious (Seneca Creek
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Associates and Wood Resources International 2004, Smith 2004, Turner et al. 2007, Kishor and
Oksanen 2006). However, it is not possible to directly compare these estimates, because there is no
internationally agreed definition of illegal logging and because the analytical assumptions of many
studies are poorly documented (Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004,
Smith 2004, Tacconi 2007). Moreover, while the overall rate may be useful as an initial
characterisation of illegal logging, further specification is required in order to detect illegalities and
devise adequate policy measures to correct them. Such specification, e.g. to species, geographical
origin and felling agents, is frequently missing or associated with even larger uncertainty (Tacconi
2007, Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004). Accordingly, the
increased focus on illegal logging still leaves substantial uncertainty about its quantitative and
qualitative characteristics at both national and international levels (Tacconi 2007, Smith 2004,
Cerutti and Tacconi 2006).
Illegal logging is recognised to be widespread in Ghana and features prominently in the
national forest policy debate. Ghana is one of the pilot countries of the EU FLEGT initiative, and a
Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) is under negotiation between Ghana and the EU in which
the fight against illegal logging is among the top priorities (MLFM 2005). Published sources, ref.
Karsenty (2003), Bird et al. (2006), Pye-Smith (2007) and Tacconi et al. (2003), quote an illegal
logging rate (unrecorded timber harvest in relation to the total timber harvest) for Ghana of 70%.
All these sources make reference to Birikorang et al. (2001a), who estimate the total 1999 timber
harvest at 3.7 million m3 of which 1.7 million m3 (46%) is illegally felled by chainsaw operators
and 0.9 million m3 (24%) illegally felled by the formal timber industry. The officially recorded log
harvest is 1.1 million m3 (30%). In another study, Glastra (1999) quotes an illegal logging rate for
Ghana of 34% with reference to 1994 data from the then Forestry Department. None of the
referenced studies, however, provide any further specification of the estimated illegal harvest.
This paper discusses the definition of illegal logging and suggests a definition that relates
illegal logging to violation of scientifically sound forest and timber management regulations. On
this basis, it delivers a specification of the extent and characteristics of illegal logging in the High
Forest Zone of Ghana. The study confirms earlier estimates of the overall illegal logging rate to be
around 70%, and that most (75%) of the illegal logging is accounted for by the informal sector
(chainsaw operators) who produce for the domestic market. Further, the study reveals that illegal
logging is predominantly confined to the most valuable species and to the permanent forest estate.
This is alarming and calls for immediate policy measures that go beyond verifying the legality of
timber exports. The study also describes how past policies to control illegal logging have failed and
argues that major reforms rather than another round of adjustments to the current timber resources
governance system are needed, if the situation is to be brought under control. Accordingly, the
paper provides a country-level case study that, in addition to shedding light over illegal logging in
Ghana, feeds into the international discussion on illegal logging, how it may be assessed, what its
causes and consequences are and what policy measures seem necessary to effectively address the
problem. Specifically, the paper presents a method to estimate illegal logging in further detail than
the overall rate and discusses the relevance as well as general applicability of this approach.
DEFINING ILLEGAL LOGGING
As mentioned, there is no internationally agreed definition of illegal logging. Brack (2003) and
Smith (2002) define illegal logging to take place when “timber is harvested, transported, bought or
sold in violation of national laws” (Brack 2003, p. 196). Many of the above quoted references apply
this broad definition of illegal logging. Thus, illegal logging is frequently used interchangeably with
“illegal forest activities”
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as an umbrella term. However, the multiplicity of dimensions included in
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the term makes it unsuitable for analytical purposes. Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources
International (2004) attempts a further specification and attributes four types of key abuses under
illegal logging: (i) harvesting without authority in designated national parks or forest reserves; (ii)
harvesting without authorisation or in excess of concession permit limit; (iii) failing to report
harvesting activity to avoid royalty payment or taxes; and (iv) violation of international trading
rules or agreements, such as export bans or CITES. Tacconi et al. (2003) and Tacconi (2007) denote
illegal logging in a narrow sense as violations of forest management regulations and other
contractual agreements in either public or private forestlands. Yet, the inclusion of “other
contractual agreements” allows for a wide array of activities to be defined as illegal logging.
For analytical clarity, we propose a definition of illegal logging that is restricted to
violations of scientifically sound forest and timber management regulations. In a broader policy
context, these purely environmental aspects obviously need to be supplemented by assessments of
economic, social and cultural dimensions of illegal forest activities because violations of any of
these dimensions undermine SFM. Accordingly, logging without proper felling rights, without full
payment of taxes and fees, in violation of workers’ safety and against the legitimate interests of
indigenous people, just to mention a few “non-environmental” dimensions, are all activities that
undercut SFM. However, since e.g. the “proper” level of taxes and the exact size of territory under
indigenous rule may always be debated, assessing any of these dimensions is inherently a more
normative task than assessing environmental sustainability. Moreover, the economic, social and
cultural dimensions of SFM lose relevance if the very existence of a forest resource is endangered,
e.g. through over-harvesting.
Accordingly, this study applies a definition of illegal logging that includes harvesting of
trees in (i) protection (conservation) forest, and (ii) in violation of scientifically founded
(silvicultural) rules that govern which trees may be felled, where, when and in which quantities in
production forest. This is broadly in line with Gutierrez-Velez and MacDicken (2008), who denote
the violation of forest management rules in production forests as “illegal logging due to practice”
and in protection forests as “illegal logging due to place”. This delimitation establishes a direct
linkage between illegal logging and the concept of environmental sustainability. Moreover, this
definition provides a fairly objective basis for assessing illegal logging, because silvicultural and
environmental sciences offer a reasonably objective assessment of forest management and logging
regulations. They are of course debatable, but only in relation to how accurately scientific models
reflect natural processes – not in relation to what these processes ought to be.
THE REGULATION OF TIMBER HARVESTING IN GHANA
Ghana relies largely on its natural forests to meet the country’s wood demand. Moreover, timber
exports from the natural forests provide an important source of foreign income amounting to € 184
millions in 2005 (TIDD 2005b). The timber resources are situated in the High Forest Zone (HFZ),
which constitutes the southernmost third of the country, and has an extent of approximately 82 000
km2 (Hall and Swaine 1976). Approximately 20% of the HFZ is gazetted as forest reserves
(permanent forest estate) (Nolan and Ghartey 1992). Off-reserves, little closed canopy forest
remains since most of it has been converted to agriculture dominated by perennial crops like cocoa
and oil-palm. However, there are many natural timber trees standing in the agricultural landscape,
especially on cocoa farms and fallows (Planning Branch 1999).
Land and natural timber trees, both on- and off-reserves, are owned by the stools (the
traditional and officially recognised land-owning communities). Yet, the 1962 Concessions Act
vested all timber trees in the President to manage them in trust for the stools (Concessions Act
1962). Under this regime, which is still in force, the government grants logging rights to timber
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companies, both on- and off-reserves, while the resulting revenues are shared with the stools
including the traditional councils and the district assemblies (local government) in accordance with
the 1992 Constitution’s rules on stool land revenue, ref. Constitution of Ghana para. 267 (6). From
1997/98 onwards, all timber rights were to be granted in the form of Timber Utilization Contracts
(TUCs) and all former timber rights were to be converted to TUCs, ref. Timber Resources
Management Act (1997) and Timber Resources Management Regulations (1998) and since 2003,
TUCs should be granted through competitive bidding only, ref. Timber Resources Management
(Amendment) Regulations (2003). However, the TUC system has been slowly and reluctantly
implemented, and the conversion of earlier granted timber concessions and leases to TUCs has yet
to be effectuated. Only a handful of new TUCs have been granted following competitive bidding
while most new TUCs have been granted administratively (Bird et al. 2006). Moreover, especially
but not only in off-reserve areas, timber rights have been granted administratively in the form of
permits (Timber Utilization Permits and Salvage Felling Permits), typically of 5 year duration. The
granting of timber rights has been a thorny area for many years (Treue 2001) and is currently
intensively debated in Ghana, in particular the administrative allocation of TUCs and the granting
of permits, see e.g. World Bank (2006), GLFPSF (2005), Danso and Opoku (2004), Oduro and
Gyan (2007).
The Forestry Commission’ customer database lists more than 1 100 registered companies
(registered property marks) (FSD 2006). Yet, the number of active companies is probably
considerably lower, and a few groups (clusters of companies) hold most of the timber rights,
especially those on-reserves. Likewise, more than 300 companies exported wood products in 2005,
but the top ten companies account for 60% of the export value (TIDD 2005b). The timber firms, in
the following denoted the formal sector, may broadly be divided into logging companies and
integrated firms. The former category consists of small companies, which supply logs to the latter.
The integrated firms are export-oriented due to higher export than domestic market prices
(Birikorang et al. 2001a, Karsenty 2003). Moreover, a log export ban, covering all species from
1994, keeps domestic log prices artificially low and shelters the domestic processing industry from
international competition over raw logs (Treue 2001). Most of the domestic lumber demand is met
by chainsaw operators, who convert trees into lumber at the felling site with chainsaws (Odoom
2004). The 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations banned chainsaw lumbering for
commercial purposes as well as the transport and marketing of chainsaw lumber. Previously,
chainsaw lumbering was legal with permits granted by the then Forestry Department and the
District Assemblies, ref. the 1991 Trees and Timber (Chainsaw Operations) Regulations. Illegal or
not, chainsaw operators have continued to meet most of the domestic lumber demand. Obviously,
no official timber revenue is generated from illegal chainsaw lumber. This has served, in
combination with a modest enforcement of rules against production and transportation of chainsaw
lumber and the log export ban, to keep domestic lumber prices well below the world market prices.
Since chainsaw operators are not registered and operate outside the current legal framework, they
are in the following denoted the informal sector.
Over the first half of the 1990s, major reforms were made to the technical regulation on
natural timber harvesting. The key objective was to create a system founded on classic biological
and silvicultural principles to sustain the productive capacity and maintain the protective functions
of the forest estate. First, in 1989, a 40-year felling cycle in forest reserves replaced the 15-year
cycle implemented from 1971 (Baidoe 1970, Parren and de Graaf 1995). Second, in 1994, a
framework of “large-grained“ and “small-grained” protection was introduced for the forest reserves
(Hawthorne and Abu-Juam 1995, FIMP 1994a). The former defines various area types (hills,
swamps, etc.) within reserves that are under protection, and hence should not be logged. The reform
significantly increased the area under permanent protection in the forest reserves
2
. “Small-grained”
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protection measures encompasses restrictions on logging along watercourses, on steep slopes, in
swamps and a maximum number of trees to be logged per ha, depending on ecological zone
(Planning Branch 1995). Third, a new method, the Interim Yield Formula
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, was developed to
calculate the species specific yield (maximum allowed harvest) in felling compartments of 128 ha
within forest reserves. The formula was applied with a new classification of commercial timber
species, the reddish star classification, ref. FIMP (1994b), which builds on the original
classification
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proposed by Hawthorne (1993). The reddish star classification defined pink stars as
species for which the recorded average harvest in 1989-94 is less than 50 % of the estimated annual
quota (calculated by applying the Interim Yield Formula on the national inventory results), red stars
as species for which the extraction is between 50 and 200 %, and scarlet stars as species for which
the average harvest 1989-94 exceeds the annual quota by more than 200 %. The reddish star
classification is shown in Table 1. The revision also included revision of the minimum felling
diameters (Planning Branch 1995, FIMP 1994b, Treue 2001). Fourth, for off-reserve areas, District
Felling Quotas were introduced, specifying the maximum number of trees per species that may be
felled annually within a given administrative unit (forest district) (Planning Branch 1999).
Based on this regulatory framework and the results of the first national on-reserve and off-
reserve timber inventories carried out in the same period, ref. FIP (1989) and FIMP (1997), a
national regulated harvest level, the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), was calculated and endorsed in
1996
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(Planning Branch 1999). It amounts to 1.0 million m3 with a break-down to on- and off-
reserve harvest and to star classes (species groups) as depicted in Table 2 (Planning Branch 1999,
Treue 2001). The reforms were impressive, also by international standards. At the time, few if any
developing countries probably had a timber regulatory framework, and inventory data to support it,
that could match those of Ghana.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
TABLE 1 The reddish star classification of commercial timber species in Ghana. Sources: FIMP
(1994b) and FC (1998)
[Insert Table 2 around here]
TABLE 2. Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) and its division to on- and off-reserves and star classes.
Sources: FIMP (1995) and FIMP (1997)
METHODS AND MATERIALS
It follows from the above description that the AAC in Ghana is a direct reflection of the forest
management regulations and the resource characteristics. Under the definition of illegal logging
discussed above, the extent and composition of illegal logging can be estimated as the difference
between the “actual” timber harvest (which is estimated) and the AAC. We study a10-year period,
beginning in 1996. This point of departure coincides with Ghana’s adoption of the AAC and the
revised timber harvest regulations. The 10-year period allows investigation of trends and provides
analytical robustness by levelling out stock fluctuations at mills as well as possible delays in
updating official felling and export records. Moreover, the estimated “actual” timber harvest is
compared with the officially recorded timber harvest. This second measure provides additional and
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analytically useful insight into the characteristics of illegal logging.
The “actual” timber harvest is – with inspiration from Tacconi (2007) – estimated as:
QL = PRORWEf + PRORWEi (1)
Where
QL is the estimated total timber harvest;
PRORWEf is the roundwood equivalent (RWE) of the total production by the formal sector;
PRORWEi is the roundwood equivalent of the total production by the informal sector (chainsaw
operators).
PRORWEf and PRORWEi are defined as:
PRORWEf = SAWRWE + RVENRWE + SVENRWE + PLYRWE + BOURWE + TERRWE (2)
PRORWEi = CSAWRWE (3)
Where
SAWRWE is the roundwood equivalent of sawnwood produced by the formal sector;
CSAWRWE is the roundwood equivalent of chainsaw lumber produced by the informal sector;
RVENRWE is the roundwood equivalent of rotary veneer produced by the formal sector;
SVENRWE is the roundwood equivalent of sliced veneer produced by the formal sector;
PLYRWE is the roundwood equivalent of plywood produced by the formal sector;
BOURWE is the roundwood equivalent of boules produced by the formal sector;
TERRWE is the roundwood equivalent of tertiary wood products (mouldings, furniture parts and
flooring) produced by the formal sector.
Export of logs is not included in (2) because Ghana has no official export of logs due to the
log export ban and there are no indications of logs being illegally exported. Log imports are not
included either, because Ghana has no import of non-coniferous sawlogs (FAOSTAT forestry
database). Finally, Ghana has no pulp or fibre-board production.
PRORWEf is estimated from annual forest products export statistics, data on product
recovery rates
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(conversion factors) and the distribution of products to export and domestic markets,
respectively. Statistics on exports by products and species are published monthly by the Timber
Industry Development Division (TIDD) of the Forestry Commission (FC). PRORWEf is estimated
by dividing the species and product-specific export volumes by the relevant conversion factor and
summing up across all products and species. The study applies recovery rates and distribution to
domestic and export markets as reported by the 1999 Ghana Wood Industry and Log Export Ban
Study, ref. Birikorang et al. (2001a), and shown in Table 3. It is assumed that rotary veneer and
plywood production are integrated at sector level, i.e. the log intake for plywood is embedded in the
rotary veneer recovery rate. Likewise, no separate log-intake is estimated for tertiary wood products
(mouldings, furniture parts and flooring), which is assumed embedded in the recovery rate for
lumber. All data on exotic species (mainly Teak, Tectona grandis) in the export statistics are
excluded because the study, and the AAC, refers exclusively to timber from the natural forest.
Export statistics are used in the study because there is no readily available (published) data
on the domestic production
7
.
8
[Insert Table 3 around here]
TABLE 3 Average recovery rates in the Ghanaian wood industry. Source: Birikorang et al.
(2001a)
PRORWEi (equal to CSAWRWE) is, in principle, estimated in a similar way. The estimate
by Birikorang’s et al. (2001a) of an annual chainsaw lumber production of 460 000 m3 is applied. It
refers to 1999 and is based on a comprehensive survey
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among furniture and woodworking
industries and workshops, wholesalers and retailers in Ghana (Birikorang et al. 2001b). The species
distribution is derived from a FC survey in 2002 of the major chainsaw lumber markets in Ghana
(FC 2002). This survey sampled the major chainsaw lumber markets in Ghana and covers 28 000
m3 (844 894 pieces) of chainsaw lumber in 49 markets. Species information is available for 18 000
m3 (664 774 pieces). The present study assumes (i) an annual chainsaw lumber production in the
period 1996-2005 identical to the 1999 estimate; and (ii) a species distribution in the annual
chainsaw lumber production identical to the 2002 “snapshot” distribution. Conversion to RWE is
done using an average recovery rate (all species and dimensions) of 27%, again with reference to
Birikorang et al. (2001a).
Finally, for information on the officially recorded timber harvest, this study uses national
level statistics on (i) bole volume of all harvested trees maintained by the Resource Management
Support Centre (RMSC) of FC; and (ii) log statistics maintained by TIDD. The former is denoted
TIF because the information is recorded in Tree Information Forms (TIF), which are used to invoice
the timber operator a volume-based species-specific stumpage fee. Log data is recorded in Log
Measurement and Conveyance Certificates (LMCC), which must accompany logs during transport
from felling to processing sites. Bole volume data (TIF) is available from 1998 onwards, and has a
breakdown to species and origin (on- and off-reserve). Log data (LMCC) is available from 1986
with a break down to species; from 1996 also with a break down to origin. For this study, 1996-
2005 TIF and LMCC data was collected from the relevant institutions. Neither TIF nor LMCC data
are routinely published, e.g. in the form of annual national timber harvest statistics.
RESULTS
The estimated harvest by the formal sector, PRORWEf, is shown in Figure 1 together with the AAC
and the officially recorded harvest. The figure illustrates the timber harvest for all species (Figure
1A) and breakdowns to scarlet stars (Figure 1B), red stars (Figure 1C) and pink stars (Figure 1 D),
respectively. From 1996 to 2001, the total harvest is estimated at 2.0 million m3 annually which is
twice the AAC, i.e. the formal sector is illegally harvesting approximately 1.0 million m3 annually.
From 2001, the estimated total harvest declined, and in 2005 the total harvest of the formal sector is
estimated at 1.6 million m3 annually, i.e. approximately 0.6 million m3 more than the AAC. Figure
1B illustrates that the formal sector harvest is largely dominated by scarlet stars. The scarlet star
harvest is estimated at 1.4 million m3 in 1997, i.e. an illegal logging of scarlet stars alone of more
than 1 million m3 in that year. The results illustrate a declining scarlet star harvest over the period.
For 2005 the scarlet star harvest is estimated at 0.8 million m3, corresponding to an illegal harvest
level of approximately 0.5 million m3. The red star harvest by the formal sector (Figure 1C)
illustrates an increasing level in the beginning of the observed period, reaching approximately 0.7
million m3 annually in the period 2000-2, after which it shows a declining trend, reaching
approximately 0.6 million m3 in 2005. Except for the first years of the period, the estimated red star
harvest is above the AAC. The results suggest an illegal harvest of red stars between 100 000 and
9
200 000 m3 annually. Finally, the harvest of pink stars (Figure 1D) is estimated at a level of
approximately 100 000 m3 in the beginning of the period, rising to just above 200 000 m3 in 2001, a
level that is maintained for the reminder of the observed period. The estimated pink star harvest is
thus significantly below the AAC, i.e. no illegal logging by the formal sector for this species group.
The informal sector harvest, PRORWEi, is estimated at 1.7 million m3 annually (Table 4)
with a breakdown into 0.5 million m3 scarlet stars, 0.4 million m3 red stars, 0.4 million m3 pink stars
and 0.4 million m3 “other species”. The latter primarily consists of species which has been
classified as mixed redwoods
9
in the chainsaw lumber stock survey. As chainsaw lumbering takes
place outside the regulatory framework (it is outlawed), the entire informal sector harvest is per
definition illegal.
Figure 2 illustrates the estimates for the total harvest, QL, i.e. the combined formal and
informal sector harvest. It is estimated between 3.3 and 3.7 million m3 annually (Figure 2A);
highest around 2001/2 and declining from 2002. For 2005, the total harvest is estimated at 3.3
million m3, which is more than three times the AAC. Accordingly, 70% of the total harvest is
illegally logged. Scarlet star species (Figure 2B) constitute approximately 40% of the total harvest
throughout the observed period. For 2005, the scarlet star harvest is estimated at approximately 1.25
million m3. The figure illustrates a declining trend since 1997 where the scarlet star harvest peaked
at approximately 2 million m3. The 2005 harvest of scarlet stars is five times the AAC, i.e. more
than 80% of the scarlet stars are illegally logged. The red star harvest (Figure 2C) is estimated at
approximately 1.0 million m3 annually throughout the period. This is approximately twice the AAC,
suggesting an illegal logging rate for red stars of approximately 50%. Finally, Figure 2D illustrates
an illegal logging of approximately 0.3 million m3 annually for the pink stars, corresponding to an
illegal logging rate of 50%.
[Insert Figure 1, Table 4 and Figure 2 around here]
FIGURE 1 Annual formal sector harvest in Ghana and the species distribution, 1996-2005.
TABLE 4 Annual informal sector (chainsaw lumber) harvest in Ghana and the species distribution,
1996-2005.
FIGURE 2 Annual combined formal and informal sector harvest and its species distribution, 1996-
2005.
In relation to the origin of the harvest, Figures 3 and 4 present data on the officially recorded
timber harvest inside and outside forest reserves, respectively. With the exceptions of 1996 and
1997, the total recorded on-reserve harvest has been above the AAC of 0.5 million m3 (Figure 3A).
The highest on-reserve harvest in the period is recorded for 1999 at approximately 0.8 million m3,
or 60% above the AAC. Figure 3B illustrates that the recorded harvest is dominated by the scarlet
stars, which constitute 50% or more of the total annual harvest. As for the total harvest, the highest
recorded scarlet star harvest is for 1999 at approximately 500 000 m3. In the reminder of the
observed period, the scarlet star harvest is recorded between 300 000 and 400 000 m3 annually. The
figure thus illustrates a high level of illegal logging of scarlet stars throughout the period. The
recorded on-reserve harvest of red and pink stars, respectively, has been fairly stable at
approximately 150 000 m3 annually, which for both species classes is below the AAC, c.f. Figure
3C and Figure 3D.
The recorded off-reserve harvest (Figure 4A) illustrates a decline from 0.9 million m3 in
10
1996 to approximately 0.3 million m3 in 2005, i.e. from a harvest level almost twice the AAC to a
level significantly below it. Figure 4B illustrates that the recorded off-reserve harvest initially was
dominated by the scarlet star harvest, but that the recorded off-reserve scarlet star harvest drops
from approximately 0.6 million m3 in 1996 to approximately 50 000 m3 in 2005, a decline from
more than 6 times the AAC to a level below the AAC. The off-reserve harvest of red stars (Figure
4C) illustrates a fluctuation around the AAC level (approximately 250 000 m3 annually), however
with a marked increase in 2002 and 2003, followed by a decline in 2004 and 2005. Finally, the off-
reserve harvest of pink stars (Figure 4D) has been recorded at a level below 100 000 m3 annually
throughout the observed period, and with a tendency of decline from 2002. Throughout the period
the recorded off-reserve pink star harvest is significantly below the AAC.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 around here]
FIGURE 3 The annual recorded on-reserve timber harvest in Ghana, bole volume (TIF) and log
volume (LMCC) and the species distribution, 1996-2005. Sources: RMSC (1998-2005) and TIDD
(1996a-2005a)
Note: 1996 LMCC data includes a volume of 59 626 m3 not specified to origin. It has been divided proportionally to
the reserve and off-reserve harvest
FIGURE 4 The annual recorded off-reserve timber harvest in Ghana, bole volume (TIF) and log
volume (LMCC) and the species distribution, 1996-2005. Sources: RMSC (1998-2005) and TIDD
(1996a-2005a)
Note: Same as for Figure 3
DISCUSSION
The discussion falls into four parts. First, the reliability of the estimates is discussed. Second, the
results are interpreted and their ecological, economic and social consequences and implications
briefly outlined. Third, we discuss the results in the context of the wider political economy that
surrounds timber utilization in Ghana and elsewhere with the view to outline “ways forward”.
Finally, we discuss the used approach and its general applicability.
The reliability of the estimates
The reliability of the presented illegal logging estimates may be broken down to a discussion of the
reliability of the estimates for the formal and informal sector harvest, respectively.
Taking the formal sector harvest first, the estimates depend on (i) the timber products export
statistics (volume and species distribution) and (ii) the export recovery rates. First, the total export
volume is likely to be underestimated because some export may go unrecorded, in particular
overland export to neighbouring countries. Birikorang et al. (2007) report that the Ghana Customs
Excise and Prevention Service (CEPS) in 2005 captured 7 times higher overland export volumes
compared to TIDD’s export records (23 000 m3, ref. TIDD 2005b). While some of the volumes
captured by CEPS may be chainsaw lumber (see below), this nevertheless points towards an
underestimation of the overland export, and consequently, an underestimation of the illegal harvest
by the formal sector. An analysis of the export data of Ghana vis-à-vis the import statistics of its
trade partners using the approach described by Johnson (2002 and 2003) does not support an
underestimated export; the export is larger than the sum of imports of the trading partners
throughout the period. We however maintain that an underestimation of export is likely, and that the
observed larger export than import of trading partners may be a result of weak statistics, a fact that
11
is also generally recognised by Johnson (2002 and 2003).
The species classification in the export statistics does not influence the size of the illegal
harvest, but its division among the star classes. While anecdotal information suggests that deliberate
wrong reporting occurs, it is not obvious if there is a general pattern. A deliberate under-
classification, i.e. exporting scarlet star products as if they were of pink star species, could be used
to reduce export levy payments, i.e. a form of transfer pricing. This would result in an
underestimation of the illegal harvest of scarlet stars, and to a lesser extent, red stars. The opposite
also appears plausible, that is “up-classification” of a species to a higher star class or mixing other
species, e.g. pink star species, into a consignment of a scarlet or red star species to meet export
orders. This would obviously have the opposite effect on the estimated scarlet (or red) star harvest.
It follows that nothing conclusive can be said on this point.
Second, in relation to industry recovery rates, the study applies the results of the 1999
Ghana Wood Industry and Log Export Ban Study, which is the most comprehensive study to date.
More recent sources, e.g. Birikorang et al. (2007) and Bruks Associates (2005), suggest that while
recovery rates have not changed, the formal sector has gradually improved the share of products
going to the export market. For lumber, the export share is currently estimated at approximately
74% compared to 56% in 1999 (Birikorang et al. 2007). This suggests a certain overestimation of
the illegal harvest in the second half of the observed period. If it is assumed that all products have
experienced an export improvement of the same order as reported for lumber, the illegal harvest is
overestimated by approximately 250 000 m3 for 2005. An overestimation of that magnitude would,
however, not change the general direction of the results, and should be considered in connection
with the likely underestimation because of un-recorded (overland) export discussed above.
Moving on to the reliability of the estimated illegal logging by the informal sector, it
depends on (i) the annual chainsaw lumber consumption, (ii) the recovery rate in chainsaw
lumbering and (iii) the species distribution. First, in relation to the annual chainsaw lumber
consumption, the study applies the results of the Ghana Wood Industry and Log Export Ban Study,
which reports an annual domestic lumber consumption of 650 000 m3, with 190 000 m3 provided by
the formal sector and the remaining 460 000 m3 by the informal sector (Birikorang et al. 2001a).
Other sources suggest a considerably lower chainsaw lumber consumption. With reference to data
from the former Timber Export Development Board, Coleman (2004) reports a domestic lumber
supply for 1995 at 460 000 m3 with 270 000 m3 provided by the formal sector and 190 000 m3
supplied by chainsaw operators. Odoom (2004) quotes a 2003 TIDD estimate of 273 000 m3 of
chainsaw lumber. Yet, these two sources do not provide details on how the estimates have been
derived. On the other hand, the enhanced export focus of the formal sector in recent years suggests
a decreased deposition of lumber on the domestic market by the formal sector, which may have
been met by an increased chainsaw lumber production. Birikorang et al. (2007) estimate a formal
sector lumber supply to the domestic market of 90 000 m3 in 2005 against 190 000 m3 in 1999.
Data from TIDD seems to support this; 2003 and 2004 lumber supply to the domestic market is
reported at 65 000 m3 and 66 000 m3, respectively (TIDD 2004c, TIDD 2005c). The generally
positive economic development in Ghana in recent years also suggests an increasing demand for
lumber rather than a decline; a trend confirmed by lumber wholesalers interviewed as part of this
study. They report a sharp increase in the demand for chainsaw lumber over the past 5 years
associated with a boom in housing construction. Finally, there may be a considerable illegal
overland export of chainsaw lumber to neighbouring countries, c.f. the above discussion, which is
not considered in the quoted TIDD estimates. The 460 000 m3 estimate captures such export if it
goes through local timber market wholesalers and retailers, but direct export from the felling site to
neighbouring countries may also take place. In summary, we consider the 460 000 m3 a fairly
conservative estimate, especially for the latter part of the observed period. The above discussion,
12
however, illustrates the need for further research on the size of the chainsaw lumber market in
Ghana.
Second, in relation to the chainsaw lumber recovery rate, Frimpong-Mensah (2004) records
chainsaw recovery rates between 22 and 51 % with an average of 40 % in a study of 72 logs of 9
species in Ghana. However, this study does not consider losses due to butt and top end residues
where especially the latter is significant because chainsaw lumber is produced in fixed lengths,
typically 14 feet, and large unused top sections are left behind in the forest (Odoom 2004 and
personal observations). In a study in Guyana, Grisley (1998) reports a 15% recovery rate in
chainsaw lumbering and suggests poor cutting technique and discarding of trunk wood as the main
reasons for the low recovery. In this light, we consider the applied recovery rate (27%) to be fairly
conservative.
Third, while not influencing the total volume estimate, the species distribution in the
chainsaw lumber production is associated with uncertainty, as it is based on a 2002 “snapshot”
distribution in key chainsaw lumber markets, and hence may not capture possible seasonal variation
and variation between years. However, more elaborate data or time series do not exist in Ghana,
which again stresses the need for further research on the chainsaw lumber market. Interestingly, the
species distribution in the informal sector harvest does not differ much from the distribution of the
formal sector meaning that the formal and informal sectors are basically pursuing the same set of
preferred species, which makes perfect economic sense. This observation is also supported by
Adam et al. (2006), who in an analysis of confiscated chainsaw lumber report that 40% of volumes
were scarlet stars, 25% red stars, 25% pink stars and 10% other species
10
.
Finally, we have conducted a sensitivity analysis where all parameters (export volume, the
disposition of products to the export market, chainsaw lumber volume and chainsaw lumber
recovery rate) where reduced by 10%. This obviously reduced the illegal logging estimates in
absolute terms, but did not undermine the general direction of the results presented in the previous
section. In sum, we consider it highly unlikely that the inherent error on parameters used and
assumptions made can change the general direction of the results.
Interpretation of results – and their implications
The results document a high degree of illegal logging in Ghana. Illegal logging has fluctuated
between 2.7 and 2.3 million m3 annually over the observed period against an AAC of 1.0 million
m3. The estimated timber harvest exceeds the recorded harvest by three to five times. This result
confirms earlier quotes of the overall rate of illegal logging in Ghana, e.g. Tacconi et al. (2003) and
Karsenty (2003), both based on Birikorang et al. (2001a). An illegal harvest rate of approximately
70% puts Ghana in the high end, internationally, although it is difficult to compare estimates across
countries because definitions and assumptions differ. The results suggest a reduction in illegal
logging of some 0.4 million m3 annually in the last years of the observed period, which is brought
about by a reduction in the formal sector’s raw wood consumption. However, the apparent
reduction in total harvest level and level of illegal logging may, in fact, be countered by an increase
in the informal sector harvest during the same period, which, as discussed above, is not reflected in
the estimates.
The informal sector (chainsaw operators) contributes close to 75% (some 1.7 million m3) of
the total illegal logging (2005) while the remaining 25% (some 0.6 million m3) is accounted for by
the formal sector. The informal sector harvest goes largely to the domestic market, while the formal
sector harvest is mainly for export. This underlines the importance of the domestic market in Ghana
as the key driver of illegal logging.
The results document a strong preference for scarlet stars and, to a lesser extent, the red star
species, i.e. the commercially most valuable timber species. The scarlet stars constitute 40% of the
13
estimated 2005 total harvest, and their share has been as large as 55% earlier in the period. The
results further suggest that the scarlet stars constitute half of the illegal harvest, i.e. that
approximately 1.0 million m3 of scarlet stars are harvested illegally each year. The illegal harvest of
scarlet stars is more or less equally divided between the formal and informal sector. For the formal
sector, the high level of illegal logging of scarlet stars is also clearly documented in the official
harvest records: On-reserves, the recorded scarlet star harvest has consistently been three to four
times the AAC. Off-reserves, the recorded harvest of scarlet stars has been five to six times the
AAC in the first years of the observed period, which strongly indicates that the District Felling
Quotas
11
have never really worked. From this initial high level, close to 600 000 m3 annually, the
recorded off-reserve scarlet star harvest has declined drastically and is recorded at less than 50 000
m3 in 2005. This is interpreted as an almost complete depletion of commercially interesting off-
reserve scarlet star resources over the observed period. Consequently, the continued high harvest
level of scarlet stars (estimated at approximately 1.25 million m3 in 2005) must inevitably originate
largely from the forest reserves. If, conservatively set, the on-reserve scarlet star harvest is assumed
to be in the order of 1.0 million m3, this is about 8 times the AAC.
The results do not allow a firm conclusion on the division of the total harvest to origin, i.e.
the actual size of the on- and off-reserve. Yet, conservatively estimated, the results suggest that
presently the total on-reserve harvest may well approach 2.0 million m3 annually of which at least
1.5 million m3 is illegal. This is alarming, because the forest reserves obviously cannot support this
level of logging for long. Illegal logging – by both the formal and the informal sector – is thus
seriously threatening the maintenance of a permanent forest estate in Ghana. The selective nature of
the illegal logging (“creaming” off the commercially most valuable species) only exaggerates the
graveness of the situation. It follows that illegal logging is threatening vital environmental services
and biodiversity conservation provided by the forest reserves, especially because a significant
portion of the illegal logging is likely to take place in forest areas which in principle should be
under protection, i.e. under “large-grained” protection measures.
Also in a wider socio-economic context the results are alarming. First, illegal logging
reduces the direct economic benefits – now and in the future – flowing to the beneficiaries under the
timber revenue benefit-sharing arrangement (Forestry Commission, district assemblies, stools and
traditional councils). While some aspects of illegal logging by chainsaw operators may be
considered to be more “pro-poor” than that of the formal sector because the former creates more
local job-opportunities and may result in some tree payments to farmers, these effects are likely to
be rather insignificant if considered at the national scale. Moreover, profits from illegal chainsaw
lumbering are considered largely to be captured by the urban business elite who is organising and
financing the activities (Amanor 1999, Marfo 2004). Second, illegal logging by the informal sector
obviously has negative consequences for formal sector employment in the harvesting and timber
processing sectors, which – in the short term – may be countered by job opportunities created in the
informal sector. If illegal logging is not controlled, it will, however, lead to a complete collapse of
the formal sector within a foreseeable future, with loss of formal employment opportunities and
foreign exchange earnings. The formal timber sector is presently employing some 100 000 people
(Birikorang et al. 2001a) equal to 0.3 % of the total work force (Whiteman and Lebedys 2006) and
contributes 12 % of total merchandise exports (Whiteman and Lebedys 2006). Yet, even if illegal
logging is brought under control, the future supply of raw wood from natural forests would be much
reduced, and hence influence the future size and structure of the forest sector. Off-reserve resources
are seriously depleted, and due to past over-exploitation, the forest reserves cannot in the future
supply even the present 500 000 m3 on a sustainable basis, i.e. the current on-reserve AAC and its
species composition is no longer a valid measure of a sustainable harvest level. Even under an
intensified plantation programme, Ghana will probably in the years to come change from being a
14
net exporter of wood-based products to become a net importer of either raw wood or processed
wood and wood products in order to meet the domestic demand. This will significantly increase
consumer prices and influence the trade balance negatively.
The causes of illegal logging in Ghana and the way forward
The study clearly documents that the, in principle, sound forest management regulations established
during the mid 1990s have not worked in practice. Tacconi (2007), based on a review of several
national case studies, stipulates 5 generic causes of illegal logging: (i) the perceptions of local
communities that illegal logging is not criminal, (ii) a biased, inconsistent and over-complex
regulatory framework, (iii) lack of government willingness and/or capacity to enforce laws and
regulations, (iv) conflicting interests over forest management between central and lower-level
government, and (v) corruption. All these causes are relevant in explaining the underlying causes of
illegal logging in Ghana. In the following, we will briefly discuss the overall policy context within
which the forest management regulations are embedded and we suggest that the combined effect of
several policy failures provides the key underlying causes of illegal logging in Ghana.
First, the current timber management regime offers insufficient economic incentives for
individual farmers and communities to involve in forest conservation (both on- and off-reserves)
and tending of off-reserve timber trees (Richards and Asare 1999). On the contrary, the policy has –
unintended - established strong incentives for farmers and local communities to engage with the
informal sector thereby promoting illegal logging. Insufficient economic incentives are the result of
two key factors: an undervaluation of the timber resource, i.e. low forest fees (Richards 1995, Treue
2001, Birikorang et al. 2007), and an inappropriate benefit sharing regime under which individual
farmers and local communities receive an insignificant share if any of the timber revenues while
compensation for damages to their crops in connection with off-reserve logging is also inadequate
or simply not paid (Hansen and Treue 2008, Marfo 2006). Attempts to revise the fiscal regime, e.g.
by pegging stumpage fees to international lumber prices which was introduced by the Timber
Resources Management Regulations (1998) and competitive bidding for timber rights that was
introduced by the Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Regulation (2003), have not been
successful in fundamentally revising the fiscal regime – simply because these measures have not
been fully implemented. The resulting undervaluation of timber resources also opens opportunities
for windfall profits, which creates room for informal payments (bribes) at the forest level (to local
forest officials), during transport and processing (to other law enforcing officers), during allocation
of felling rights (to politicians and central level forest officials) and during policy and law revisions
(to politicians).
The 1997 outlawing of chainsaw operators constitutes another major policy failure. As the
present study clearly demonstrates, the ban has not been effective at all. On the contrary, it has
resulted in a market differentiation where the formal sector predominantly supplies the export
market and chainsaw operators the domestic market. This has triggered illegal logging, because the
entire AAC has been allocated to the export based sector
12
.
The failure to create effective incentives for the timber industry to increase its efficiency and
use a broader variety of tree species has also contributed to illegal logging. This is associated with
the failure of the government to generally increase forest fees and differentiate fees among over-
harvested and more abundant species. Coupled with the discretionary allocation of logging rights
(not through competitive bidding) and the log export ban, encompassing all species since 1995, this
has created a protected formal sector that is more concerned with securing logging rights and
increasing its through-put than with increasing processing efficiency. This scramble for logging
rights and windfall profits is further aggravated by the legacy of the 1980s, where favourable donor
supported credit schemes have increased the log processing capacity to at least 5 million m3
15
annually, i.e. five times the AAC (Treue 2001, Birikorang et al. 2001a).
Effective measures to reduce illegal logging must obviously address these policy failures. In
other words, fundamental policy reforms are required to (i) create appropriate economic incentives
for farmers and local communities to engage in tree tending and conservation, (ii) formalise the
informal sector, and (iii) downsize the industry’s processing capacity. First, creating appropriate
economic incentives for farmers will require various approaches on- and off-reserves. For forest
reserves, policy reforms must, as a minimum, increase official timber revenues (through
competitive bidding of logging rights) and include a reform of the benefit-sharing regime such that
local communities receive a larger share of the benefits. Another - and more fundamental - option
would be to decentralise the management of the forest reserves to local governments (the District
Assemblies). Off-reserves, we suggest that it is time to abandon the concession regime, and transfer
exclusive rights to trees on farmland to the cultivators, who may then decide to keep them as shade,
process the trees themselves or sell them to a contractor of their own choice. Other natural off-
reserve timber trees that grow in non-cultivated areas could be owned and managed collectively by
the land-owning communities. Second, formalising the informal sector requires official recognition
of chainsaw operators that allows them to compete for logging rights on similar terms as timber
firms and under a chain-of-custody system that will ascertain the legality of their operations.
Finally, a downsizing of the industry’s processing capacity must be done in a way that establishes
competition and favours the highest willingness to pay for standing timber, i.e. competitive
allocation of timber rights. Such a process may be softened through a decommissioning scheme that
allows insufficient operators a reasonable way out of business and creditors’ claims.
Implementing such reforms form a formidable challenge and would produce winners and
losers. Previous attempts to reform policy in Ghana have been hampered by a preference for status
quo by key stakeholders, notably the timber industry, chainsaw operators, chiefs, politicians and the
forestry administration, all of whom, albeit in various ways, derive substantial financial benefits
from illegal logging and the current regulatory framework, including the non-enforcement and non-
implementation of certain rules. Accordingly, we emphasise the role of Ghana’s civil society,
including environmental NGOs, in demanding reforms, in maintaining momentum of a reform
process and in implementing reforms. Moreover, donors need to support such a process. Currently,
the key forum for forest policy debates in Ghana, involving all stakeholder groups and donors, is the
negotiation of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between Ghana and the EU under the EU
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme, which has the main
objective to secure the legal origin of wood products entering the European market. It remains to be
seen whether this process can trigger a broad-based reform of forest governance in Ghana or only
facilitate minor policy changes combined with intensified control and monitoring of wood exports.
This might secure formal legality of wood exports, and hence ease the conscience of EU consumers
while illegal logging continues to satisfy the domestic market, degrade forests and, hence, erode
their social as well as economic potentials. With reference to previous policy reform processes in
Ghana this scenario is not just hypothetical and reforms may easily be too few and come too late.
Methodological considerations
As indicated, illegal logging is often a rather loosely defined concept with various dimensions that
are associated with their own methodological considerations and challenges. We underline the
importance of individual studies to clearly specify the dimension(s) under investigation and to
document the methods and assumptions under which they are carried out. This would allow for
analytically sound interpretation and comparison of results at national or international levels.
The present study has focused on illegal logging in relation to violation of scientifically
16
founded forest management regulations, which we argue is a fundamental dimension of illegal
logging, and a dimension that is the relevant point of departure in all countries where illegal logging
is perceived to be a problem. We have applied and documented an approach where illegal logging is
derived as the difference between the estimated, total annual timber harvest and a scientifically
founded, as well as legally defined, maximum annual harvest level. We believe that the illustrated
method could – which such modifications as may be required – be applied in other national settings.
In the current study, the total timber harvest has been estimated from data on exports of wood
products and consumption of chainsaw lumber on the domestic market. In other national settings, it
may be relevant to use other data sources, e.g. data on domestic log production, statistics of total
production of wood-based products, statistics on trade on the domestic market or import statistics of
trading partners. Use of various data sources, either directly or to validate estimates, obviously
improves the reliability of estimates.
We assess the total estimated harvest against the AAC, which is the legally defined national
harvest level. Since the national-level AAC typically is not divided into concession-level AACs and
used directly in the allocation of logging permits, an alternative approach would be to estimate
illegal logging as the difference between the estimated total harvest and the aggregate volume of
timber allocated for harvesting under official timber permits. However, we find the AAC to be a
more appropriate measure, because it reflects deliberate and transparent policy intentions and the
biological potential rather than permit volumes which may be a result of opaque administrative
procedures and corrupt practices. Moreover, an approach where permit volumes is used as reference
may be prohibitive in terms of the time required to go through such permits, or data may simply not
be available or accessible. A number of studies, e.g. Tacconi (2007) and Cerutti and Tacconi
(2006), assesses illegal logging as the difference between the estimated total harvest and the
officially recorded harvest. While pragmatic, this approach does not capture the biological
sustainability element that we have emphasised here, neither does it fully capture other dimensions
of illegal forest activities; it merely captures the fraction of timber on which no stumpage fees is
paid. The main methodological contribution of the present paper is its demonstration of an
approach that, in addition to the total volume, provides a specification of illegal logging in terms of
felling agents, origin and species. The case of Ghana illustrates that such specification provides
additional insight into the characteristics and consequences of illegal logging, which are indeed
relevant for policy processes and decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
Illegal logging constitutes a serious problem in Ghana. By defining illegal logging as the violation
of scientifically founded forest management regulations in production forests as well as logging
inside protection forests, the study estimates that approximately 70% of the timber harvest in Ghana
is illegal; over the period 1996 - 2005, the annual timber harvest has ranged between 3.3 and 3.7
million m3, against an annual allowable cut of 1.0 million m3. It is documented that approximately
75% of the illegal logging is done by the informal sector, i.e. chainsaw operators, who supply
lumber to the domestic market, and the remaining 25% is accounted for by the formal sector,
primarily for the export market. The study further documents that the illegal harvest is dominated
by scarlet stars, the commercially most valuable timber species, which make up half of the illegal
harvest, i.e. approximately 1.0 million m3 of scarlet stars are harvested illegally each year. The
presented statistics of the officially recorded harvest strongly suggests that the scarlet stars have
been depleted outside forest reserves during the observed 10 year period, which again suggests that
most of the illegal scarlet star harvest is presently coming from the forest reserves. The study
17
estimates the annual timber harvest inside forest reserves to be approximately 2.0 million m3, which
is four times the allowable cut. For the scarlet stars, the annual harvest exceeds the allowable cut by
eight times.
Given its size and characteristics, illegal logging in Ghana is seriously threatening the
country’s natural forest resource and in particular the biological integrity of the forest reserves.
Moreover, it threatens the existence of a formal timber sector in Ghana including its contribution to
employment and foreign exchange earnings. Even though most illegal logging is carried out by
chainsaw operators, the potential positive effect on rural livelihoods is considered to be minimal as
most of the economic benefits are appropriated by urban elites who are organising and financing the
activities.
The high incidence of illegal logging is the result of policy failures, notably the failure to
establish positive economic incentives for farmers and local communities to tend and conserve
timber trees and forests, the outlawing of the chainsaw operators, and the failure to downsize the
timber industry. Efforts in Ghana to address illegal logging have been ineffective because they have
focused on enforcing and adjusting an inherently unenforceable and unfair legislative framework.
Consequently, the paper argues that more fundamental policy changes are required.
Methodologically, the study argues for a more precise definition of illegal logging. It
suggests a definition that that takes point of departure in the violation of scientifically sound forest
management regulations, thereby emphasizing the biological sustainability aspect of illegal logging
as a crucial starting point, and one that can be assessed objectively. Moreover, the study illustrates a
method to analyse illegal logging in further detail than its overall rate/size. The case of Ghana
illustrates that this approach provides insights, which are indeed relevant for policy processes and
decisions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank staff of the Headquarters of the Forestry Commission, the Resource Management Support
Centre, the Forest Services Division, and the Timber Industry Development Division for kind
assistance in providing data for this study and for frank and fruitful discussions. Moreover, the
paper benefited from the comments to an earlier version of the paper provided by three anonymous
reviewers. The field work for this research was supported by the Danish Council for Development
Research and the Heilmann Foundation.
ABBREVIATIONS
AAC: Annual Allowable Cut; CEPS: Customs Excise and Prevention Service; C&I: Criteria and
indicators; CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and Wild Flora and
Fauna, FC: Forestry Commission; FLEGT: Forest Law Enforcement, Governance the Trade, FSD:
Forest Services Division (under FC); HFZ: High Forest Zone; LMCC: Log Measurement and
Conveyance Certificate; RMSC: Resource Management Support Centre (under FC); RWE:
Roundwood equivalent; SFM: Sustainable forest management; TIDD: Timber Industry
Development Division (under FC); TIF: Tree Information Form; VPA: Voluntary Partnership
Agreement.
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23
A. Formal sector harvest, all species
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Roundwood Equivalent (m3 x 1000)
Est. harvest AAC Recorded harvest ( TIF) Recorded harvest (LMCC)
B. Formal sector harvest, scarlet stars
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Roundwood Equivalent (m3 x 1000)
Est. harvest AAC Recorded har vest (TIF) Recorded harvest (LMCC)
C. Formal sector harvest, red stars
0
250
500
750
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Roundwood Equvalent (m3 x 1000)
Est. harvest AAC Recorded harvest ( TIF) Recorded harvest (LMCC)
D. Formal sector harvest, pink stars
0
100
200
300
400
500
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Roundwood Equivalent (m3 x 1000)
Est. harvest AAC Recorded harvest (TIF) Reco rded harvest (LMCC)
5
Figure 1
24
25
Figure 2
26
27
Figure 3
28
29
Figure 4
30
Table 1
Botanical name
Trade name/
Local name
Minimum
felling
diameter
cm
Scarlet stars
Albizia ferruginea
Albizzia
90
Aningeria spp.
Asanfina
90
Daniella ogea/thurifera
Daniella
110
Entandrophragma angolense
Edinam
110
Entandrophragma cylindricum
Sapele
110
Entandrophragma utile
Utile
110
Guibourtia ehie
Hyedua
90
Khaya anthotheca
Mahogany
110
Khaya grandifoliola
Mahogany
110
Khaya ivorensis
Mahogany
110
Milicia excelsa/regia
Odum
110
Nauclea diderrichii
Kusia
110
Pericopsis elata
Afrormosia
110
Pterygota macrocarpa
Kyere
70
Tieghemella heckelii
Makore
110
Triplochiton scleroxylon
Wawa
90
Red stars
Afzelia africana
Papao
90
Antiaris toxicaria
Chenchen
110
Antrocaryon micraster
Aprokuma
90
Canarium schweinfurthii
Canarium
110
Ceiba pentandra
Ceiba
110
Chrysophyllum albidum
Akasa
70
Chrysophyllum subnudum
Adasema
70
Distemonanthus benthamianus
Ayan/B'dua
90
Entandrophragma candollei
Candollei
110
Guarea cedrata
Guarea
90
Guarea thompsonii
Guarea
90
Heritiera utilis
Niangon
90
Lophira alata
Ekki/kaku
110
Lovoa trichilioides
Walnut
90
Mansonia altissima
Mansonia
90
Piptadeniastrum africanum
Dahoma
70
Rhodognaphalon/Bombax brevicuspe
Bombax
70
Terminalia ivorensis
Emire
90
Pink stars
Albizia adianthifolia
Albizzia
90
Albizia zygia
Albizzia
90
Alstonia boonei
Sinuro
110
Amphimas pterocarpoides
Yaya
90
Anopyxis klaineana
Kokote
70
Berlinia spp.
Berlinia
70
Bombax buonopozense
Rhodognaphalom
70
Celtis mildbraedii
Celtis
70
Celtis zenkeri
Celtis
70
Coryanthe pachyceras
Pamprana
50
Cylicodiscus gabonensis
Denya
70
Cynometra ananta
Ananta
70
Dialium aubrevillei
Duabankye
90
Erythrophleum spp.
Potrodum
70
Holoptelea grandis
Nakwa
70
Klaindoxa gabonensis
Kroma
90
Lannea welwitschii
Kumnini
70
Mammea africana
Bompagya
70
Morus mesozygia
Wonton
90
Nesogordonia papaverifera
Danta
70
Ongokea gore
Akwana
50
Parinari exelsa
Afam
90
Parkia bicolor
Asoma
70
Petersianthus macrocarpus
Esia
70
Pycnanthus angolensis
Otie
70
Ricinodendron heudelotii
Wama
110
31
Sterculia rhinopetala
Wawabima
70
Strombosia glaucescens
Afena
50
Terminalia superba
Ofram
90
Trichilia tessmannii
Trichilia
50
Trilepisium madagascariense
Trilepisium
70
Turreanthus africanus
Avodire
70
32
Table 2
Classification
Annual
Allowable Cut
m3/year
On-reserve harvest:
Scarlet stars
120 745
Red stars
201 353
Pink stars
177 902
Total on-reserve harvest
500 000
Off-reserve harvest:
Scarlet stars
64 375
Red stars
259 240
Pink stars
176 385
Total off-reserve harvest
500 000
Total on- and off-reserve harvest
1 000 000
Table 3
Product
Overall
recovery rate
Export
recovery rate
Domestic
recovery rate
Lumber
34%
19%
15%
Rotary veneer
24%
12%
11%
Sliced veneer
40%
19%
21%
Boules
55%
55%
-
Table 4
5
Species class
Harvest
million m3
Scarlet stars
0.5
Red stars
0.4
Pink stars
0.4
Other species
0.4
Total
1.7
33
FOOTNOTES
1
For useful typologies of illegal forest activities, see e.g. Tacconi et al. (2003) and Contreas-Hermosilla (2002).
2
The area under permanent protection (“large-grained” protection) constitutes 22% of the reserved forest area which is
currently 1 613 240 ha (Affum-Baffoe 2002). In addition, approximately 122 000 ha is under convalescence and 397
000 ha identified for conversion to plantations. Thus, 55% of the permanent forest estate is outside the production cycle.
3
The Interim Yield Formula determines the species specific number of trees that can be harvested in a compartment
(approximately 128 ha) based on the results of a stock survey, i.e. a 100% inventory of all trees above 50 cm diameter at
breast height. It has two entries. The normal formula applies to red and pink star species in the evergreen and semi-
deciduous forest zones: Z = 0.2 X + 0.5 Y. The reduced formula is applied to scarlet star species and the dry semi-
deciduous forest zone: Z = 0.2 X + 0.25 Y. Z is the number of trees above the felling limit to be harvested, X is the
number of trees in the 20 cm diameter class immediately below the felling limit; and Y is the number of trees above the
felling limit. When Y < Z, the yield is reduced to Y-2 to allow the retention of a minimum of two seed trees per
compartment (Planning Branch 1995). The formula is denoted “Interim” because the intension was to replace it once
more detailed species specific growth data became available from permanent sample plots. The formula, however, is
still in use. For a critique of the formula, see e.g. Vanclay (1993) and Wong (1998).
4
The star classification of Hawthorne includes 7 star classes. The commercial timber species (the reddish star species)
are divided into three classes: the pink, red and scarlet stars. The former consists of species which are significantly
exploited but not yet so as to cause concern for their economic future. The red stars are species where the current rate of
exploitation presents a significant danger of damage over a ten year period. The scarlet stars are under more imminent
threat than the red stars. In addition to the reddish stars, four categories (the green, blue, gold and black stars) reflect
conservation priorities for species that are not commercially exploited (Hawthorne 2003).
5
In 2002, Ghana revised the AAC to 2.0 million m3 through an increase of the off-reserve AAC to 1.5 million m3
(Bamfo 2005). Apart from illustrating that official rules do not necessarily reflect “sustainable” practices, this increase
made little sense because, as illustrated in this paper, the officially recorded off-reserve harvest had at the time already
dropped below the earlier AAC of 0.5 million m3, and kept declining. The on-reserve AAC was maintained at 0.5
million m3.
6
Volume of the product in percent of the log volume needed to manufacture it.
7
The FAOSTAT Forestry database on forest products and trade holds information on domestic production based on
questionnaire information from Ghana. However, the data does not provide a break-down to species level and are thus
less useful for the present study.
8
The survey involved a questionnaire survey with 111 respondents and a more in-dept questionnaire with 13 wood
industries, furniture and wood working industries and workshops, wholesalers/retailers in Ghana (Birikorang et al.
2001b).
9
Most of the “mixed redwoods” would probably be scarlet star species (Entandrophragma and Khaya spp.), ref. Adam
et al. (2006).
10
The proportions presented here are after volumes of exotic species (primarily Teak) have been excluded.
11
It is noted that the District Felling Quota system has recently been suspended, but this system has in principle been in
place throughout the period observed in this paper.
12
The allocation of permits to selected timber firms with the expressed objective of supplying lumber to the local
market has not had the intended effect, as clearly illustrated by the TIDD statistics, ref. TIDD (2004c) and TIDD
(2005c).
