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Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use
Abstract
The catchment area of the Nile—the longest river in the world at 6695 km—links 10 African countries: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania (Figure 1). A treaty regulating water use was signed in 1929 (revised in 1959) between Egypt and Sudan, which greatly favors Egypt. But more and more water is being claimed by countries upstream. Altogether, some 300 million people share the water of the Nile. The question of use represents an enormous potential for conflict, and water issues are now being addressed by the Nile Basin Initiative.
... Since the Egyptian Khalif's futile entreaties in the late 11th century, the fate of the Nile River's waters, which currently serve over 300 million people in the Nile River basin (Kung 2003), has been a continual source of regional hydro-political concern-and even outright conflict. Despite the fact that 85 % of the river originates in Ethiopia, today Egypt controls 65 % of the flow and Sudan reaps a significant amount relative to Ethiopia (Waterbury 2002). ...
Game theory can provide valuable insights into strategic water resources conflicts. In this chapter, non-cooperative game theory solution concepts are used to determine the possible outcomes of the Nile River Basin conflict. This conflict is the result of the desire of the main riparian countries, namely Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and other upstream nations, to gain a higher share from the available water resources in the basin. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution decision support system (GMCR II) is used to model the conflict, providing strategic insights, and identifying the stable outcomes of the game, given the players options and preferences. Results suggest that: 1) stability of the possible outcome is very sensitive to Egypt's preferences, and not very sensitive to Sudan's and Ethiopia's preferences; 2) the status-quo is not stable; and 3) any stable outcome includes retaliation by Egypt.
The history of water relations in the Nile River basin indicates the existence of cooperation as well as conflict since the 1950s. Recently, there has been negative escalation of disputes regarding the hydropolitical interactions within the regional system of the Nile Basin region; reaching a critical level after the failure of negotiations of the Framework Convention for the Nile Basin (Entebbe). The situation grew further strained after Ethiopia embarked on the construction of the renaissance dam without prior notification to downstream Egypt and Sudan.
This study aims to analyze the hydropolitical interactions in the Nile Basin with a focus on conflictual interactions. This study is based on the hydropolitical framework, which means the analysis and interpretation of international political phenomena, both conflictual or cooperative, in the context of water issues in the Nile Basin. This framework is related to some analytical concepts such as: Hydrostrategic, Hydro-Hegemony, hydropolitical flexibility.
The study analyzes three issues: (1) the dimensions of the water conflict in the Nile Basin, with a focus on the contradictory attitudes of the countries upstream and downstream; with a focus on the Ethiopian Hydropolitical behavior towards the Renaissance Dam; (2) the role of the external factors in regional and international actions in the Nile Basin; and (3) the potential scenarios of the hydropolitics (conflict and cooperation) in the Nile Basin.
The Nile River has been the center of water resources development tensions among four main riparian actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and other upstream nations. Each player has a desire to meet its national demands under increasingly stressed limited resources. Egypt, the most powerful of the actors, strives to maintain the status quo: securing the water supply that is barely sufficient for its growing population. Sudan is wedged between its 1959 treaty with Egypt and potentially economically beneficial cooperation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia, the source of most of the Nile, strives to increase its water share to secure its food supply and facilitate economic development. Finally, the upstream nations seek to be released from the water development restrictions placed on them by the current system. All nations fear retaliation from Egypt. This study applies game theoretic methods to study this interstate water problem using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, which provides insights into the strategic behaviors of the conflicting parties. The developed model attempts to determine most likely outcomes of the conflict given the nations options and preferences. Results indicate that the current situation is not stable and that stable outcomes include retaliation by Egypt. A sensitivity analysis shows that the model is highly sensitive to Egypt's preferences, however, but not very sensitive to Sudan's or Ethiopia's preferences.
Egypt's fortunes hinge on the Nile. However, little research to date has evaluated economic efficiency improvements that could be achieved by altering Egypt's agricultural water use patterns. This study develops an integrated catchment scale framework to identify potential economic benefits that can be supported by Egypt's irrigation water use. An optimization framework is developed to identify improvements in national farm income, which can be produced with current water supplies that are compatible with Egypt's hydrological, environmental, and institutional constraints. Results suggest that limited water trading across locations and seasons can increase national farm income by up to 28%. The methods used provide a framework for informing decisions on sustainable use of land and water for improved rural livelihoods in the developing world's irrigated areas.
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